As per case facts, the appellant issued a cheque which was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The respondent sent a demand notice, but the Metropolitan Magistrate deemed it invalid because ...
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 113 of 2000
PETITIONER:
SUMAN SETHI
RESPONDENT:
AJAY K, CHURIWAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/02/2000
BENCH:
G.T. NANAVATI & S.N. PHUKAN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2000 (1) SCR 601
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PHUKAN, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 3,10.1997
passed by the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1611/97. By the
impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the order of the Metropolitan
Magistrate - 16th, Calcutta passed b case No. C/1661/96.
Briefly stated the facts are as follows :
The appellant issued a cheque for Rs. 20,00.000 (Rupees Twenty Lacs) in
favour of respondent No, 1 The cheque was presented to the banker which was
returned on 2nd August, 1996 with the remarks "Insufficient Fund".
Thereafter within 15 days of return of the cheque, respondent No. 1 gave a
notice of demand as required under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as amended, (for short the Act). As the
appellant failed to meet the demand, a complaint was filed before the
Metropolitan Magistrate. On perusal of the above notice, the Magistrate was
of the view that the (demand made in the notice being higher than the
amount of the cheque), notice was bad in view of an earlier decision of the
High Court. Respondent No. 1 approached the High Court by filing the
revision petition which was allowed by the impugned order and the order of
the Metropolitan Magistrate was set aside. The High Court was of the view
that the decision of the High Court on which reliance was placed by
Magistrate was distinguishable. The High Court held that as in notice,
respondent No. 1 clearly demanded the cheque amount, the notice was a valid
one and accordingly set aside the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate.
We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel for the appellant,
Mr. Sanjiv Sen, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Dilip Sinha,
learned counsel for respondent No. 2 - the State of West Bengal.
The only question for consideration by us is whether the notice in question
issued under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act was valid or not. We
extract below Sections 138 and 139 of the Act :
"138 - Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account
- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a
banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of
that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the
cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account
by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have
committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of
this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or
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both :
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless -
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may
be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a
notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the
cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount
of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of
the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice".
(Emphasis supplied)
"139 - Presumption in favour of holder. - It shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the
nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part,
of any debt or other liability."
We have to ascertain the meaning of the words "said amount of money"
occurring in clauses (b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 138. Reading the
Section as a whole we have no hesitation to hold that the above expression
refers to the words "payment of any amount of money" occurring in main
Section 138 i.e. the cheque amount. So in notice, under clause (b) to the
proviso, demand has to be made for the cheque amount. Dr. Dhawan, learned
senior counsel has urged that Section 138 being a penal provision has to be
construed strictly. We may refer the decision of this Court in M. Narayanan
Nambiar v. State of Kerala, AIR (1963) SC 1116 = [1963] 2 Supp. SCR 724.
This Court considered the rule of construction of a penal provision and
quoted with approval the following passage of the decision of the Judicial
Committee in Dyke v, Elliot, (1872) LR 4 AC 184. The passage runs as
follows :
''No doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say,
the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain
meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that
there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing
is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be
included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right
to say that he thing charged although within the words, is not within the
spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within the words
and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any
other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language
used, and the Court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the
language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly
not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument."
There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138. Reading the
entire Section as a whole and applying commonsense, from the words, as
stated above, it is clear that the legislature intended that in notice
under clause (b) to the proviso, the demand has to be made for the cheque
amount. According to Dr. Dhawan, the notice of demand should not contain
anything more or less than what is due under the cheque.
It is well settled principle of law that the notice has to he read as a
whole. In the notice, demand has to be made for the "said amount" i.e.
cheque amount. If no such demand is made the notice no doubt would fall
.short of its legal requirement Where in addition to "said amount" there is
also a claim by way of interest, cost etc. whether the notice is bad would
depend on the language of the notice. If in a notice while giving the break
up of the claim the cheque amount, interest, damages etc. are separately
specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous
and these additional claims would he severable- and will not invalidate the
notice. If, however, in the notice an ommbus demand is made without
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specifying what was due under the dishonored cheque, notice might well fail
to meet the legal requirement and may be regarded as bad.
This Court had occasion to deal with Section 138 of the Act in Central Bank
of India & Anr. v. M/s. Saxons Farms & Ors., JT (1999) 8 SC 58 and held
that the object of the notice is to give a chance to the drawer of the
cheque to rectify his omission. Though in the notice demand for
compensation, interest, cost etc. is also made drawer will be absolved from
his liability under Section 138 if he makes the payment of the amount
covered by the cheque of which he was aware within 15 days from the date of
receipt of the notice or before complaint is filed.
In Section 138 legislature clearly stated that for the dishonored cheque
the drawer shall be liable for conviction if the demand is not met within
15 days of the receipt of notice but this is without prejudice to any other
provision of the Act. If the cheque amount is paid within the above period
or before the complaint is filed the legal liability under Section 138 will
cease and for recovery of other demands as compensation, costs, interest
etc., a civil proceeding will lie. Therefore, if in a notice any other sum
is indicated in addition to the "said amount" the notice cannot be faulted,
as stated above.
Drawing our attention to Section 139 of the Act, Mr. Dhawan has urged that
if in the notice in addition to ''said amount" other demands are made the
presumption as contemplated under Section 138 would operate. We are unable
to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel as Section 139 has
to be read with Section 138 and reading both the Sections together it would
appear that presumption would arise only in respect of the "said amount".
We extract below the relevant portion of notice :
"I, therefore, by means of this notice call upon you to pay the amount of
Rs. 20,00,000 along with the incidental charges of Rs. 1,500 spent on the
cheque on its presentation and also Rs. 340 as notice charges within a
period of 15 days from the date of receipt thereof, failing which my
clients shall take necessary legal steps against you holding you liable for
all costs and consequences thereof, which please note."
In the notice in question the "said amount" i.e. the cheque amount has been
dearly stated. Respondent No. 1 had claimed in additional to the cheque
amount, incidental charges and notice charge. These two amounts are
severable. In the notice it was clearly stated that on failure to comply
with the demand necessary legal steps will be taken up. If respondent No. 1
had paid the cheque amount he would have been absolved from the criminal
liability under Section 138. Regarding other claims, a civil suit would be
necessary
We, therefore, do not Find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly
it is dismissed.
The landmark Supreme Court judgment in SUMAN SETHI v. AJAY K, CHURIWAL (Appeal (crl.) 113 of 2000, delivered on February 2, 2000) offers crucial insights into Cheque Dishonour Laws, specifically concerning the validity of demand notices under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This pivotal ruling, readily available for review on platforms like CaseOn, clarifies intricate aspects that continue to shape legal practice and judicial interpretation regarding financial liabilities.
The case originated from a dishonoured cheque for Rs. 20,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Lacs) issued by the appellant, Suman Sethi, to the respondent, Ajay K. Churiwal. The cheque was returned by the bank on August 2, 1996, with the remark “Insufficient Fund.” Following this, the respondent issued a demand notice, as mandated by Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, calling for payment of the cheque amount along with incidental and notice charges.
When the appellant failed to comply, a complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate. The Magistrate, however, dismissed the complaint, deeming the demand notice invalid. This decision was based on a previous High Court ruling that suggested a notice demanding an amount higher than the cheque amount was flawed. Aggrieved, the respondent approached the Calcutta High Court in revision, which subsequently set aside the Magistrate's order, holding the notice to be valid.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was: **Whether a demand notice issued under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is rendered invalid if it includes claims for amounts beyond the principal cheque amount (e.g., interest, costs, or incidental charges)?**
To address this, the Court meticulously examined Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
Section 138: Dishonour of Cheque for Insufficiency, etc., of Funds
This section outlines the conditions under which a person can be prosecuted for cheque dishonour. Crucially, proviso (b) states that the payee must make a demand for “the said amount of money” by giving a written notice within 15 days of receiving information about the cheque’s return.
Section 139: Presumption in Favour of Holder
This section establishes a presumption that the holder of a cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation of “the said amount of money” mentioned in proviso (b) to Section 138.
The Supreme Court clarified that the expression “said amount of money” refers specifically to the cheque amount mentioned in the main part of Section 138. While Section 138 is a penal provision and typically subject to strict construction, the Court emphasized that strict construction does not mean creating ambiguity where none exists.
The Court referenced the principle from *M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala*, highlighting that penal statutes should be construed according to the fair, commonsense meaning of the language used. In this context, the legislative intent for the demand notice under proviso (b) was clearly to demand the cheque amount.
A critical point of analysis was the inclusion of additional claims like interest, costs, and incidental charges in the demand notice. The Court ruled that such claims, if specified separately, do not invalidate the notice. If the notice clearly demands the cheque amount and additionally specifies other claims, those additional claims are considered 'superfluous' and 'severable'. The demand for the cheque amount remains valid.
For legal professionals analyzing such rulings, tools like CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs are invaluable. They offer concise, accessible summaries that help in quickly grasping the nuances of complex judgments, ensuring a thorough understanding without extensive reading.
The Court reiterated that the object of the notice is to give the drawer an opportunity to rectify their omission by paying the cheque amount within 15 days. If the cheque amount is paid, the drawer is absolved from criminal liability under Section 138. Other claims, such as compensation, interest, or costs, are matters for civil proceedings, not the criminal mechanism of Section 138.
Drawing attention to its earlier decision in *Central Bank of India & Anr. v. M/s. Saxons Farms & Ors.*, the Court affirmed that demanding compensation, interest, or costs in addition to the cheque amount does not fault the notice. The crucial aspect is the clear demand for the amount covered by the cheque.
In the present case, the demand notice explicitly called for the payment of Rs. 20,00,000 (the cheque amount) along with incidental charges of Rs. 1,500 and notice charges of Rs. 340. The Court found these additional amounts to be clearly stated and severable from the cheque amount, thus upholding the validity of the notice.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Calcutta High Court’s judgment. It concluded that a demand notice issued under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is valid even if it includes additional claims for incidental charges, interest, or costs, provided the cheque amount is clearly demanded. These additional claims are considered severable and do not undermine the legal requirement of the notice concerning the cheque amount.
This judgment is an essential read for lawyers and law students for several reasons:
Clarity on Demand Notice Drafting: It provides definitive guidance on drafting demand notices under Section 138 NI Act, clarifying that including additional claims for interest or costs does not invalidate the notice, as long as the cheque amount is clearly specified.
Distinction Between Criminal and Civil Liability: The ruling underscores the distinction between criminal liability under Section 138 (focused on the cheque amount) and civil claims for other damages (interest, costs), which must be pursued separately.
Interpretation of Penal Statutes: It reinforces the principle of interpreting penal statutes strictly but with common sense, avoiding the creation of ambiguity where the language is clear.
Practical Implications: For practitioners handling cheque dishonour cases, this judgment offers a strong precedent to counter arguments regarding the invalidity of notices that include ancillary demands.
All information provided in this blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice regarding their specific legal issues.
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