1

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)

WPA 6126 of 2026

Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited

Versus

Samitava Roy & Anr.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Soumya Majumdser, ld. Sr. Adv.

Mr. Dwaipayan Sengupta,

Ms. Sanjukta Dutta.

For the Respondents : Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Aninda Lahiri,

Ms. Pallabi Mondal.

Judgment reserved on : 17.09.2026

Judgment delivered on : 13.10.2026

Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:

1. The writ application has been preferred challenging an order dated

2

nd

January, 2026, passed by the learned First Industrial Tribunal,

West Bengal in Case No. 04 of 2025 under Section 10 (1B)(d) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

2. The petitioner‟s case is that following the condition of service

pertaining to transfer, as delineated in the Appointment Letter,

private respondent was transferred on 29.7.2024.

2

3. The employee filed an application under section 10(1B)(d) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to set aside the order of transfer.

4. In written statement, company has specifically raised the point of

lack of jurisdiction to invoke the provision of Section 10(18)(d)

since only an individual dispute of termination of service of

workman can be adjudicated in a Section 10(1B)(d) proceeding. A

collective dispute like transfer cannot be adjudicated having been

raised by an individual workman. The same will not constitute an

industrial dispute".

5. Company's application for deciding the maintainability of the

proceeding as a preliminary issue was supported by a judgment

delivered by this Hon'ble Court in Merck Specialties Private

Limited (MSPL) vs Abhishek Datta & Ors., in WPA 20299 of

2025, decided on 03.09.2025. Another reference was made to a

judgment passed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court on the

same point.

6. The issues framed by the Learned Tribunal were also with regard

to the propriety of the transfer order.

7. Argument was advanced on behalf of the workman and accepted

by the Learned Tribunal to the effect that since "to transfer a

workman malafide from one place to another, under the guise of

management policy comes under Item 7 of the Fifth Schedule of

the ID Act; the Industrial Tribunal would retain jurisdiction to

decide dispute with regard to transfer of a workman, even if the

said dispute has been raised by an individual workman. In other

3

words, a collective dispute through a trade union or substantial

number of workmen of the industry is not required for the purpose

of raising a dispute of "transfer".

8. The impugned order dated 2.1.2026 passed by the Learned

Tribunal accepts the cause of action to be a transfer dispute and

by placing reliance upon Item 7 of Fifth Schedule to the Industrial

Disputes Act and the definition of "industrial dispute u/s 2(k) of

the Industrial Disputes Act, it has been held that the said dispute

is an "industrial dispute and hence it cannot be said that the

proceeding is ex facie not maintainable in law and fact.

9. The order militates against the very concept of "industrial dispute".

As defined in section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, an

"industrial dispute is essentially a dispute between the employer

and the workmen, and not a dispute between the employer and the

individual workman.

10. Reliance has been made in AIR 1958 SC 353 (Para 15):

Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate Vs. Management of

Dimakuchi Tea Estate.

11. It is only by reason of section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act,

that a dispute relating to termination of service of an individual

workman has been "deemed to be an industrial dispute. It means,

such an individual dispute is not actually an industrial dispute.

The word "deemed" means akin to, although not exact. It only

creates a legal fiction.

4

12. The petitioner has also relied upon the decision in Ali M.K. & Ors.

Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in 2003 AIR SCW 2931 -

(2003) 115 CC 632 (Paras 14,15,16).

13. Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner

submits that if an individual workman is permitted to raise a

transfer dispute, over which substantial number of workman of the

industry does not have any interest, then the very object of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will loose its way.

14. Section 10 (1B)(d) cannot be said to have expanded the zone or

horizon of industrial dispute for the State of West Bengal so as to

make any dispute in relation to an individual workman, to be an

industrial dispute.

15. Section 10(1B), although begins with a non -obstante clause; it

specifically mentions the expression "in a conciliation proceeding

of an industrial dispute relating to an individual workman".

16. Mr. Majumder further argues that the provision only expedites the

adjudicatory process in a dispute relating to termination of service

of an individual workman through bypassing the administrative

action of the Government towards making a reference. This is all

what section 10 (1B) has intended to do. Similar provision is

contained in section 2A(2) of the principal Act.

17. Reliance is also placed on the Bill for introducing section 10 (1B)

through legislative amendment. Copy of the Bill which has been

assented to by the President in terms of Arti cle 111 of the

Constitution of India has been annexed.

5

18. It is stated that a Bill is an aid to a statutory provision if the

provision requires any interpretation. Mr. Majumder relies upon

the decision in the case of Rajesh Awasthi vs. Nandlal Jaiswal

& Ors. reported in (2013)1 SCC 501 (Paras 40-43)

19. Further reference is made to the definition of "industrial dispute"

under section 2(q) of the Industrial Relations Code 2020 which

includes any dispute or difference between an individual worker

and an employer connected with or arising out of discharge,

dismissal, retrenchment or termination of such worker. Therefore,

both under the old Act as well as under the new Code; there

can be no doubt that only a case of termination of service of a

workman can be raised individually as an industrial dispute.

20. It is thus stated that the impugned order is therefore grossly

erroneous, and thus the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside

the impugned proceeding pending before the Learned Tribunal on the

ground of maintainability.

21. The respondent no. 1 has filed written notes and it is argued by

Mr. Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel that the respondent no.

1 joined the petitioner i.e. M/s. Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited

on 06.06.2002, as a Trainee Sales Officer (Medical Representative)

in the Sun Division at Burdwan Headquarter. After confirmation of

service with effect from 01.06.2003, he became “sales officer”,

although the job profile did not undergo any change. Further the

Respondent No. 1 was re-designated a “Territory Sales Executive”

with effect from 01.04.2006. The Respondent No.1 was again

6

promoted to the post with effect from 03.07.2008 and got the

designation of “Area Sale Manager”. All these designations of the

respondent No.1 denote same job profile of a Sales Prom otion

Employee (SPE).

22. The respondent No.1 received an email on 02/07/2024 from the

petitioner asking him to attend Mumbai office on 04/07/2024 at 2

P.M. for performance and business activity review meeting. The

Respondent No.1 as per that email attended Mumbai office for such

review meeting on the appointed date and time. In the name of

performance and business activity Review meeting, the respondent

No.1 was asked about unethical adjustment payment made by one

Sales Promotion Employee of Bankura, to the stockiest to meet the

sales target.

23. The respondent No. 1 states that he has never been involved in such

unethical practice throughout his career in any manner whatsoever,

as the respondent No. 1 remained as a star performer, t he

respondent No.1 frankly told the superiors in Mumbai meeting about

that. He was then pressurized by other superiors in the meeting to

tender his resignation without assigning any reason. The respondent

No. I expostulated to such proposal and refused to resign. The

respondent No.1 was literally perplexed having come across with

such conduct of the Petitioner towards him, who has all along been a

star performer.

24. All on a sudden the Respondent No.1 was given a letter dated

29.07.2024 by the OP/Company transferring his services from

7

Midnapore Head Quarter to Jamnagar Head Quarter, Gujarat, Sun

Division on the ground of business exigency, the Respondent No.1

being a star performer till then in Midnapore Head Quarter does not

evoke any reason to the respondent No.1 to be transferred to any far

off place like Jamnagar. Business exigency is anything but a reason,

of such transfer. Moreover when the respondent No. I was

pressurized to tender resignation by the Company Management, this

illegal and mala fide transfer of the Respondent No.1 unerringly

reflects mala fide of the said transfer. That the Respondent No.1 by a

representation dated 8.8.2024 requested the company/ management

to revoke the said transfer order dated 29.07.2024 from Midnapore

Head Quarter to Jamnagar Head Quarter.

25. It is this transfer order which it is stated to be mala fide and has

been challenged and the impugned order has been passed by the

learned Tribunal.

26. The contention of the respondent herein is that there is no provision

for challenging maintainability of a case either in ID Act or W.B. ID

Rules as a preliminary point, because the case is scheduled to be

adjudicated by trial-on-Evidence, and not in proceeding. So

application of the petitioner is not at all maintainable a summery by

itself on that Court.

27. It was contented by the petitioner that the order of transfer of any

individual workman does not come within the scope and ambit of

Industrial Dispute as defined under Section 2K of the ID Act, 1947.

8

28. There is a specific mention of victimization of an individual Workman

in case of transfer in entry 7 of Schedule V of the I.D. Act which says

"То transfer a Workman mala fide from one place to another,

under the guise of following management policy. It obviously goes to

underscore that in case of transfer of an individual Workman, he can

have a clear legal remedy to adopt it individually and for which the

Workman need not take resort to any Union or a group of Workmen

to challenge that transfer order, in order to avail (maintain) the legal

remedy.

29. The respondent has alleged that by way of the order of transfer

served upon the respondent there has been unfair legal practice

by the petitioner herein.

30. This aforesaid legal concept has become adequately pronounced after

the introduction of Section 10(1B)(d) vide West Bengal Act 33 of 1989

Section 4 w.e.f. 08.12.1989.

31. This particular Section 10(1B) has been formulated exclusively for

the individual. Workman to get the access to legal remedy directly by

approaching Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court, pending disposal

of the conciliation proceeding for his any kind of victimization

including transfer.

32. Finally, it is stated that an individual workman can surely assert

his/her unfettered right against the Order of illegal and mala fide

transfer by raising Industrial Dispute before conciliation authority

and thereafter Industrial, Tribunal or Labour Court, under Section

10(1B) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus the Learned Tribunal

9

has rightly passed the order dated 02.01.2026 in rejecting the

application dated 27.08.2025 filed by the petitioner.

33. The respondent has relied upon the following judgments:-

(i) Canara Banking Corporation Limited Vs. U Vittal

Reported in AIR online 1963 SC 3.

(ii) Management of Cipla Ltd. Vs. Jay Kumar, R and Anr.

reported in AIR on line 1997 SC 49.

34. From the materials on record, it appears that the employee joined the

petitioner company on 01.12.2002.

35. Clause 7 in the letter of appointment provides the transfer clause:-

“7. AREA OF ACTIVITY AND TRANSFER:

Your Head quarters for the time being will be at

BURDWAN in the territory of WEST BENGAL. You are

liable to be transferred to the area assigned to you by

the management and/or such other territories

anywhere in India as the Management may, from time

to time, deem necessary at their sole discretion. Your

refusal for such transfer will be considered as

your unwillingness to serve the company and in

such a case management will be free to terminate

your services by giving one month's notice or

salary in lieu thereof.

You may be required to attend Bombay/ Baroda/ Vapi

office from time to time either for instruction or for any

other official purpose or to attend meetings arranged at

anywhere in India and you will got refuse to do so. In

such case you will be paid actual traveling expenses

and outstation allowances as per Clause 4-ii-d above.”

36. On 29

th

July, 2024, the employee was transferred from Midnapore to

Jamnagar and was relieved on 31.07.2024, after 22 years of

service to join his place of transfer.

10

37. Vide letter dated 29

th

July, 2024, the employee was asked to join his

place of transfer on 10

th

August, 2024 at 10.00 A.M.

38. The issues framed by the tribunal are as follows:-

“Issues

1) Whether the application filed by the applicant u/s

10(1B)(d) of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 is

maintainable in law or in fact?

2) Whether the application of the applicant can be

entertained by treating him as a workman in view of

Section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act?

3) Whether the impugned order of transfer dated

29.07.2024 of the applicant Sri Samitava Roy by the

Management of the OP/Co mpany M/s Sun Pharma

Laboratories Limited is lawful, bonafide and justified in

the light of the Industrial Dispute Act upto date

amendment?

4) Whether the applicant is entitled to get the

relief/reliefs as prayed for?

5) To what other relief/reliefs, if any, the applicant

is entitled to?”

39. Vide the impugned order the tribunal held:-

“………It is further claimed that the applicant by

his application u/s 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial

Dispute Act, has challenged his order of transfer

dated 29.07.2024 passed by his company herein

Opposite Party, which is veiled individual

dispute by challenging his transfer from

Medinipur (Headquarter) to Jamnagar

(Headquarter), Gujrat…..”

40. The preliminary issue decided by the tribunal was:-

“…….The crux of the controversy is that as to

whether the transfer of the applicant being a

incidental part of service, at all comes under the

scope of industrial dispute or not……….”

41. It is also recorded:-

11

“…….During the pendency of the conciliation

proceeding before the Conciliation Officer, the

applicant obtained Pendency Certificate from the

Conciliation Officer in the prescribed Form P-4

dated 28.01.2025 and filed the instant

proceeding before this Tribunal u/s 10(1B)(d) of

the Industrial Dispute Act (West Bengal

amendment), seeking relief as stated in his

prayer…..”

42. The findings of the tribunal is as follows:-

“…… But the fact of the case in hand, this

applicant has come with a prayer to annul the

transfer order or revoke the same before this

Tribunal under Section 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial

Dispute Act (West Bengal Amendment), after

compliance of pre-condition of obtaining pending

certificate before the appropriate government.

In this context I am agreed with the submission

made by the Ld. Counsel for applicant that

Section 10(1B) of the Industrial Dispute Act,

(West Bengal Amendment) is a Genius and

Section 2A of the Industrial Dispute Act is a

species in terms of an industrial dispute and

Section 10(1B) has also enabled any workman

as an individual to come to the Tribunal for

seeking relief against the dispute in the colour of

mala fide transfer raised by him.

Apart from it, it is pertinent to state that if any

malafide transfer of any individual workman is

made under the guise of the interest of the

company or following management policy the n

that workman, in any state of imagination,

cannot be remained un-remedied against such

malafide transfer. For that reason and to protect

from malafide transfer, this malafide transfer

has been incorporated in Clause-7 of V Schedule

under the heading of "Unfair Labour Practice" in

Industrial Dispute Act…..”

…….On the contrary, if transfer is made by

way of victimization or something that ulterior

motive, not connected with the interest of the

establishment or company, then it should be

called as malafide transfer and in that case it

certainly comes under the scope of industrial

dispute because Section 2K also enunciates

difference between employer and workmen

12

"connected with the employment" or "the terms of

employment" or "with the condition of the

labour".

The case in hand, the grievances are

ventilated by the workman against the transfer

order claiming malafide transfer. Obviously it

comes under the nature of industrial dispute.

Simple way, it can not be said that the

proceeding exfacie is not maintainable in law

and fact.

Rather the order of transfer made by the

OP/Company against the workman/applicant is

malafide or for the interest of business, is a fully

subject of trial. But it cannot straightway be said

that the proceeding itself, in the given fact, is not

maintainable in law and fact.

Therefore, in view of above discussion, I

definitely hold that the question of not

maintainable of the proceeding, raised by the

OP/Company, is having no merits and liable to

be rejected.

Thus, the prayer made by the

OP/Company on petition dated 27.08.2025

stands rejected. No order as to cost is passed.

Accordingly issues to be framed on the next

date.”

43. It appears from the order impugned that there was no material before

the tribunal to even prima facie make out any case of unfair labour

practice.

44. The only issue before it was the order of transfer.

45. The tribunal has wrongly interpreted the definition of “industrial

dispute” as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act, which defines 2(k):-

“2(k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or

difference between employers and employers, or between

employers and workmen, or between workmen and

workmen, which is connected with the employment or

non-employment or the terms of employment or with the

conditions of labour, of any person;”

13

46. Petitioner relies upon the judgment in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea

Estate vs Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCC

OnLine SC 4, the Court held:-

„15. We reach the same conclusion by

approaching the question from a somewhat

different standpoint. Ordinarily, it is only the

aggrieved party who can raise a dispute; but an

“industrial dispute” is put on a collective basis,

because it is now settled that an individual

dispute, not espoused by others of the class to

which the aggrieved party may belong, is not a n

industrial dispute within the meaning of Section

2(k). As Isaacs, J., observed in the Australian

case of George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber

Workers' Union [32 CLR 413, 441] :

“The very nature of an „industrial dispute‟ as

distinguished from an individual dispute, is to obtain

new industrial conditions, not merely for the specific

individuals then working from the specific individuals

then employing them, and not for the moment only, but

for the class of employees from the class of

employers.… It is a battle by the claimants, not for

themselves alone.”

Section 18 of the Act supports the aforesaid

observations, insofar as it makes the award binding

not merely on the parties to the dispute, but where the

party is an employer, on his heirs, successors or

assigns and where the party is composed of workmen,

on all persons employed in the establishment and all

persons who subsequently become employed therein.

If, therefore, the dispute is a collective dispute, the

party raising the dispute must have either a direct

interest in the subject-matter of dispute or a

substantial interest therein in the sense that the class

to which the aggrieved party belongs is substantially

affected thereby. It is the community of interest of the

class as a whole — class of employers or class of

workmen — which furnishes the real nexus between

the dispute and the parties to the dispute. We see no

insuperable difficulty in the practical application of this

test. In a case where the party to the dispute is

composed of aggrieved workmen themselves and the

subject-matter of dispute relates to them or any of

them, they clearly have a direct interest in the dispute.

Where, however, the party to the dispute also

composed of workmen, espouse the cause of another

14

person whose employment, or non-employment etc.

may prejudicially affect their interest, the workmen

have a substantial interest in the subject-matter of

dispute. In both such cases, the dispute is an

industrial dispute.”

47. Thus the argument of Mr. Majumder that:-

“………The order militates against the very concept of

"industrial dispute". As defined in section 2(k) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, an "industrial dispute" is

essentially a dispute between the employer and the

workmen, and not a dispute between the employer and

the individual workman…………….” has merit and

substance.

48. Section 2A of the Act provides for termination of service and thus an

individual workman can raise a dispute and also under Section

10(1B) of the Act when it is a case of termination.

49. But the provision does not provide for an issue as to a „transfer order‟

which in view of the definition in Section 2(k) of the Act, does not

permit an individual to raise a dispute.

50. The tribunal‟s view that as a certificate has been issued by a

conciliation officer to raise a dispute, the dispute is maintainable, is

erroneous, considering that when the term „industrial dispute‟ under

Section 2(k) itself does not permit such disputes (transfer) to be

raised individually, the tribunal‟s interpretation that the dispute is

maintainable in view of the West Bengal Amendment of Section

10(1B) is wrong and not in accordance with law, in view of the fact

that Section 10(1B) relates to dispute of termination raised

15

individually and not cases of transfer which is to be raised as per

Section 2(k) of the Act.

51. Section 10(1B) clearly talks of individual disputes relating to an

individual workman.

52. Individual disputes relating to an individual workman is provided

under Section 2A of the Act and only such disputes can also be

raised under Section 10(1B) of the Act.

53. Any other dispute has to raised collectively as per Section 2(k) of the

Act.

54. The tribunal holding the transfer order prima facie as „malafide‟ is

also erroneous, as the same cannot be decided when the

maintainability of the dispute raised is challenged on the grounds as

discussed above.

55. In the present case there are no grounds to even prima facie show

that the transfer is malafide. There are no incidents or allegations of

any trade union activities or otherwise, other than some statement of

the employee as to certain allegations.

56. A transfer order after 22 years in one place, and transfer being a

condition in the letter of employment cannot be termed ‘mala

fide’.

57. The said order of transfer dated 29

th

July, 2024, clearly shows it

is a plain and simple, an order of transfer in due course and

there is nothing to indicate otherwise.

58. An employee not joining his place of transfer in spite of several

directions/notices, does not support even a case of “refusal of

16

employment” to enable the same to be an i ndividual dispute

maintainable under Section 2A of the Act.

59. Here the case of the employee herein is prima facie of “abandonment

of service”.

60. Thus the impugned order dated 2

nd

January, 2026, passed by the

learned First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. 04 of 2025

under Section 10 (1B)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, being

erroneous and not in accordance with law is set aside.

61. WPA 6126 of 2026 is allowed.

62. The employee is entitled to his dues till 31

st

July, 2024, which

be paid, (if any) within three months from the date of this order.

63. Applications, if any, connected thereto stand disposed of

consequently.

64. Photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to

the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities.

(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)