2026:HHC:38228

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal Nos. 4244 of 2013 and 211 of

2014

Reserved on: 22.08.2026

Date of Decision: 09.09.2026

1. Cr. Appeal No. 4244 of 2013

State of H.P. ...Appellant

Versus

Som Raj & Ors ...Respondents

_______________________________________

2. Cr. Appeal No. 211 of 2014

Sunder Singh & Anr. ...Appellants

Versus

Som Raj & Ors ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

Cr. Appeal No. 4244 of 2013

For the Appellant/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,

Additional Advocate General.

For the respondents : Mr Naresh Sharma, Advocate.

Cr. Appeal No. 211 of 2014

For the Appellant : None.

For respondents No.1 to 11 : Mr Naresh Sharma, Advocate.

For respondents No.12/State :Mr Lokender Kutlehria,

Additional Advocate General.

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeals are directed against the judgment

dated 29.06.2013 passed by learned Special Judge, Sirmaur, District

at Nahan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents

(accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charged

offences. Since both the appeals have arisen out of the common

judgment, they are being taken up together for disposal. (The

parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were

arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal

are that the complainants Sunder Singh (PW1) and Puran Chand

(PW2) filed a complaint (Ext.PW1/A) before the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, District Sirmaur under Section 156(3)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973. It was asserted that

the complainants belong to Schedule Caste category. Their

ancestors were employed as bonded labourers with the rich people

of the same village. The complainants and their family members

refused to work as bonded labourers, and they were deprived of

their basic right to live with dignity after such a refusal. A scheme

for supply of drinking water was initiated by the Block

Development Officer (BDO), Rajgarh, to the complainants’ village.

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However, the complainants and their family members were

deprived of the use of the water from the scheme. A water spring is

located near the complainants’ house, which was cordoned off by

Som Raj and Ranjit Singh in March 2007. The complainants and

their family members were constrained to draw water from the

seasonal Nallah, which is used by the accused to answer the call of

nature. Hence, the complainants and their family members were

forced to use water which is noxious and unfit for human

consumption. The complainants and their family members were

prevented from using the water for irrigation by saying that the

members of schedule caste were not entitled to do so. They were

not permitted to walk on the common village path, even though

the path is located on the complainants’ land. The accused used to

abuse the complainants and their family members in the name of

their caste. They were badly beaten, and their oxen were also killed.

An FIR was registered against Som Raj, Ranjeet Singh, Geeta Ram,

Sukh Dev, Baldev, Arun, Kapil Dev, Anil, etc., after the intervention

of the Inspector General of Police, but the provisions of the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)

Act, 1989 (SCST Act) were not invoked in these FIRS. The

complainants made a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner,

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Nahan, and the water source was opened for their use. The accused

entered the complainant's field on 12.09.2008 and gave beatings to

the complainants’ father with sticks. They also abused the

complainants’ family members in the name of their caste. The

complainants’ family members went to the Police Station to seek

help but no action was taken. Therefore, it was prayed that suitable

action be taken against the accused.

3. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmaur at Nahan

sent the complaint to the Police and the police registered the FIR

(Ext.PW1/B). The police investigated the matter and submitted a

cancellation report before the Court. The complainants filed a

protest petition (Ext.PW1/C). Learned Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Rajgarh, treated the protest petition as a complaint, and

recorded the preliminary evidence of Randeep Singh (CW1), Sunder

Singh (CW2), Puran Chand (CW3) and Som Dutt (CW4). The learned

Judicial Magistrate found, after going through the complaint and

the preliminary evidence, that offences punishable under Section 3

and 4 of the SCST Act and Section 147, 148, 323, 451 read with

Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) were made out against

the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court summoned the accused

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and committed the case to the Court of the learned Special Judge,

Nahan, for trial.

4. Learned Special Judge Nahan (learned Trial Court)

charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable

under Section 3(1)(ii)(v)(x)(xii) of the SCST Act, Sections 147, 323,

429 read with Section 149 of IPC, to which the accused pleaded not

guilty and claimed to be tried.

5. The prosecution examined Sunder Singh (PW1), Puran

Chand (PW2), Som Dutt (PW3), Randeep Singh (PW4), Prem Lal

(PW5) and Bhagti Devi (PW6) to prove its case.

6. The accused, in their statement recorded under Section

313 of CrPC, denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They

claimed that they were falsely implicated to claim compensation

from the government. They did not produce any evidence in their

defence.

7. Learned Trial Court held that there was a delay in

reporting the matter to the police, for which no proper explanation

was provided. No certificate showing that the complainants

belonged to the scheduled caste was filed, and the necessary

condition for invoking the provisions of the SC/ST Act was not

satisfied. The statements of the prosecution witnesses

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contradicted each other on material particulars, and it was difficult

to rely upon the prosecution’s case. No person had seen the

accused administering poison to any of the oxen. All these

circumstances made the prosecution case highly doubtful.

Therefore, the accused were acquitted of the charged offences.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned

Trial Court, the State and the complainants have filed separate

appeals. The State has asserted in the appeal filed by it that the

learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence properly. The

statements of prosecution witnesses were wrongly discarded

without any cogent reasons. The independent witness would not

have supported the complainant party against the accused, and the

learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the complainants’

testimonies. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be

allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set

aside.

9. The complainants asserted in their appeal that the

learned Trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the evidence

on record. The origin of the case was based upon a protest petition

submitted against a cancellation report. The learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class should have provided an opportunity to file

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the complaint. The complaint and the objection petitions were

never drafted to meet the requirements of a private complaint. The

complainants were not provided any opportunity to prove that they

belonged to the scheduled caste, and the accused did not belong to

the scheduled caste. The learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the

testimonies of the witnesses on the ground that they belong to the

caste of the complainants. The police had not registered the FIR,

and their complaint should not have been dismissed on the ground

that they had failed to produce their caste certificates. Hence, it

was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment

passed by learned Courts below be set aside.

10. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional

Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Naresh Sharma,

learned counsel for the respondents/accused. None appeared on

behalf of the complainants, and none could be heard on the

complainants’ behalf.

11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate

General for the appellant/State, submitted that the statements of

the complainants were corroborated by the other witnesses and

learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the statements based on some

minor contradictions. The contradictions were bound to come with

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time because of failure of memory and should not have been used

to discard the prosecution case. The witnesses consistently stated

that the accused had harassed the complainants for being

members of the scheduled caste. They were subjected to various

indignities by the accused persons. Therefore, he prayed that the

present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned

Trial Court be set aside.

12. Mr Naresh Sharma, learned counsel for the

respondent/accused, submitted that the complainants had not

produced their caste certificates to prove that they belong to the

scheduled caste, and the accused were not members of the

scheduled caste. The statements of the witnesses contradicted each

other on material aspects. The FIR was lodged belatedly, and the

delay was not properly explained. The learned Trial Court had

taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this

Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned

Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed

that the present appeal be dismissed.

13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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14. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of

acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay

Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can

interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible,

perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was

observed:

Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of

the settled principles governing interference with an order

of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven

guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the

accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but

reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High

Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article

136 is even greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC

808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden

thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the

following words:

“25. Another golden thread which runs through the web

of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two

views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one

pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his

innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should

be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases

wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by

circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid

down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is

consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused

and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court

should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the

accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court

entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the

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accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of

course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be

reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so

vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion

or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their

natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt

also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to

surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As

mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v.

Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein

one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It

concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused

arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is

charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of

the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the

conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the

commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by

the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus

of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to

depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every

reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts

should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie

trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of

conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that

wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on

the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person

causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the

administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of

doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive

safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC

450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited

scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed:

“75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the

demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence;

therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere

with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the

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Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is

totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised

certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of

innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two

views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must

prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to

reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the

acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in

miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be

given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the

trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of

witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415:

(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the

appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the

evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by

an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable

conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record,

the appellate court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State

of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an

order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are

compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two

reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on

record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal.

33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether

another view on the evidence is possible. The question is

whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by

the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly

unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the

record, we are unable to hold so.

15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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16. It is undisputed that the caste certificate of the

complainants and accused have not been placed on record. It was

laid down by this Court in Chandu Ram vs. Nathu Ram and others

2011: HHC:10502 that the provisions of the SCST Act are not

attracted without the caste certificate. It was observed:

“12. On having gone through the record of the case, there is

not even an iota of evidence to attract the offence under

Section 3(1)(X) of the Act, as the prosecution has miserably

failed to prove that the complainant was a member of the

"Scheduled Caste" community.

13. Section 2(1)(c) of the Act says that "Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes" shall have meanings assigned to them

respectively under clause (24) and clause (25) of Article 366

of the Constitution. 'Scheduled Caste' under clause (24)

means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups

within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under

Article 341 to be "Scheduled Castes" for the purposes of this

Constitution and similarly under clause (25) "Scheduled

Tribes" mean as stated in Article 342 of the Constitution of

India.

14. Under Article 341 of the Constitution, a notification is

required to be issued by the Central or State Government

specifying the castes, races or tribes or part of or groups

within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purpose of

this Constitution be deemed to be "Scheduled Castes" in

relation to that State (or Union Territory, as the case may

be). However, Parliament by law may include or exclude

from the list of "Scheduled Castes" specified in a notification

issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or

group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a

notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied

by any subsequent notification.

15. The notification as required under the above provision of

the Constitution has not been produced or proved that the

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complainant belongs to a caste which is declared to be a

"Scheduled Caste" to attract the provisions of this Act.

Hence, the charge against the accused persons under the Act

is not proved at all.

17. Therefore, learned Trial Court had rightly held that

ingredients of the complaint and the statements on oath, even if

believed to be true, do not constitute any offence punishable under

the provisions of SCST Act in the absence of the caste certificate.

18. Sunder Singh (PW1) stated that the relationship

between him and the accused was cordial till the year 2007, but

when they refused to work for the accused without payment of

wages, the accused stopped the water from Bauri by fencing it and

filling it with soil. He filed an application (Ext.PW1/A) before the

learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, regarding the incident.

This complaint was filed before the learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate on 01.10.2008. Thus, there was a delay of about one year

from the date of the incident. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v.

State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to

embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should

see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of

delay. It was observed:

"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a

vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the

evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt

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lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information

regarding the circumstances in which the crime was

committed, including the names of the actual culprits and

the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also

the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the

FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an

afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets

bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also

creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or

exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the

FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been

recorded, the courts generally look for certain external

checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR,

called a special report in a murder case, by the local

Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it

can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at

the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of

course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation

for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR

by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no

evidence at all in this case. The second external check,

equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along

with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report.

Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC,

is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to

the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of

statements recorded during inquest proceedings get

reflected in the report. The absence of those details is

indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in

an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and

that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due

deliberations and consultations and was then ante-dated to

give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion,

on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has

lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the

same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the

inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

19. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of

Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: -

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“12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the

prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first

information report because of the possibility of a concoction

of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is

satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on

the merits without giving much importance to such delay.

The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the

explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and

circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the

complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive

for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State

of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi),

(2017) 6 SCC 1].”

20. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N.,

(2024) 2 SCC 176; (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653,

wherein it was observed on page 182:

“14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been

taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no

satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite

that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR,

the same by itself and without anything more ought not to

weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the

prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be

adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular

case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the

FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the

incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the

prosecution’s version.

15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the

anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall

consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the

court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained,

mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution

case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and

it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been

necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no

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reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal

forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.”

21. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in

doubting the prosecution’s case because of the delay.

22. Som Dutt (PW3) admitted in his cross-examination that

there was a land dispute between the parties. He stated that the

complainant, Puran Chand (PW2), was drawing water from the

Bowri located one kilometre from his house. This falsifies the

contents of the complaint (Ext.PW1/A) that the complainants were

drawing water from the water springs located near their house,

which was fenced by the accused.

23. Bhagati Devi (PW6) stated that the accused gave

beatings to the family of Puran Chand inside their house.

Significantly, she has not mentioned any date on which such

beating was given. She has not mentioned the names of the

assailants and the names of the victims. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pandurang vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR

1955 SC 216, that it is unsafe to rely upon the omnibus statement

that the accused had committed the offence. It was observed:

“Rasikabai says that the "accused" raised their axes and

sticks and threatened her when she called out to them, but

that again is an all-embracing statement which we are not

prepared to take literally in the absence of further

particulars. People do not ordinarily act in unison like a

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Greek chorus, and, quite apart from dishonesty, this is a

favourite device with witnesses who are either not mentally

alert or are mentally lazy and are given to loose thinking.

They are often apt to say "all" even when they only saw

"some" because they are too lazy, mentally, to differentiate.

Unless, therefore, a witness particularises when there are

several accused, it is ordinarily unsafe to accept omnibus

inclusions like this at their face value.”

24. Therefore, her testimony that the accused had given

beatings to the family of Puran Chand is not sufficient to record

conviction.

25. No person deposed that the accused had administered

poison to the complainants' oxen in their presence. The

complainants had also not produced the report of the post-

mortem examination of their oxen to show that the oxen had died

because of the poisoning. Therefore, the averments in the

complaint that the accused had killed the complainants' oxen by

poisoning them were not proved.

26. The complainants claimed in the complaint that the

accused had taken forcible possession of their cow shed and

residential house. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that

the documents of the land where the house and cow shed were

located were not produced.

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27. It was asserted in the appeal filed by the complainant

that a proper opportunity was not provided to the complainant to

file a proper complaint. The ingredients of the complaint under

Section 156(3) or the protest petition did not satisfy the

requirements of the complaint. This submission will not help the

complainant. It was for the complainant to mention the facts

constituting the commission of a cognizable offence in the

complaint made by them to the Court under Section 156(3) of the

CrPC. It is undisputed that the police had submitted a cancellation

report in the present matter. The complainants were entitled to file

a protest petition against the cancellation report prepared by the

police, and the Court could have treated the protest petition as a

complaint. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2019) 8 SCC 27: 2019 SCC

OnLine SC 877 that the magistrate can take cognisance of the

protest petition as a complaint if it discloses the commission of a

cognisable offence. It was observed at page 47:

43. It is true that law mandates notice to the

informant/complainant where the Magistrate contemplates

accepting the final report. On receipt of notice, the informant

may address the court, ventilating his objections to the final

report. This he usually does in the form of the protest

petition. In Mahabir Prasad Agarwala v. State [Mahabir Prasad

Agarwala v. State, 1957 SCC OnLine Ori 5: AIR 1958 Ori 11], a

learned Judge of the High Court of Orissa took the view that a

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protest petition is in the nature of a complaint and should be

examined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVI

of the Criminal Procedure Code. We, however, also noticed

that in Qasim v. State [Qasim v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine All 260:

1984 Cri LJ 1677], a learned Single Judge of the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad, inter alia, held as follows: (Qasim

case [Qasim v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine All 260: 1984 Cri LJ 1677],

SCC OnLine All para 6)

“6. … In Abhinandan Jha [Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra,

AIR 1968 SC 117: 1968 Cri LJ 97 : (1967) 3 SCR 668] also what

was observed was “it is not very clear as to whether the

Magistrate has chosen to treat the protest petition as

complaint”. This observation would not mean that every

protest petition must necessarily be treated as a

complaint whether it satisfies the conditions of the

complaint or not. A private complaint is to contain a

complete list of witnesses to be examined. A further

examination of the complainant is made under Section

200 CrPC. If the Magistrate did not treat the protest

petition as a complaint, the protest petition not satisfying

all the conditions of a complaint to his mind, it would not

mean that the case has become a complaint case. In fact, in

the majority of cases, when a final report is submitted, the

Magistrate has to simply consider whether, on the materials

in the case diary, no case is made out to accept the final report

or whether the case diary discloses a prima facie case to take

cognisance. The protest petition in such situation simply

serves the purpose of drawing the Magistrate's attention to

the materials in the case diary and invites a careful scrutiny

and exercise of the mind by the Magistrate, so it cannot be

held that simply because there is a protest petition the case is

to become a complaint case.” (emphasis supplied)

44. We may also notice that in Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa

[Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa, 2001 SCC OnLine Kar 447: 2002

Cri LJ 2150], the High Court of Karnataka observed as follows:

(SCC OnLine Kar para 9)

“9. From the above, the position that emerges is this:

Where initially the complainant has not filed any

complaint before the Magistrate under Section 200 CrPC,

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but, has approached the police only and where the police

after investigation have filed the ‘B’ report, if the

complainant wants to protest, he is thereby inviting the

Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190(1)( a)

CrPC on a complaint. If it were to be so, the protest

petition that he files shall have to satisfy the

requirements of a complaint as defined in Section 2(d)

CrPC, and that should contain facts that constitute an

offence, for which the learned Magistrate is taking

cognisance under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC. Instead, if it is

to be simply styled as a protest petition without

containing all those necessary particulars that a normal

complaint has to contain, then it cannot be construed as a

complaint for the purpose of proceeding under Section

200 CrPC.”

45. “Complaint” is defined in Section 2(d) of the Code as

follows:

“2. (d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or

in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action

under this Code, that some person, whether known or

unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include

a police report.

Explanation. —A report made by a police officer in a case

which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a

non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a

complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is

made shall be deemed to be the complainant;”

46. If a protest petition fulfils the requirements of a

complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a

complaint and deal with the same as required under Section

200 read with Section 202 of the Code. In this case, in fact,

there is no list of witnesses as such in the protest petition.

The prayer in the protest petition is to set aside the final

report and to allow the application against the final report.

While we are not suggesting that the form must entirely be

decisive of the question whether it amounts to a complaint

or is liable to be treated as a complaint, we would think that

essentially, the protest petition in this case is a summing up

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of the objections of the second respondent against the final

report.

28. Thus, there is no infirmity in the procedure adopted by

the learned Magistrate in treating the protest petition as a

complaint.

29. No other point was urged.

30. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a

reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence

led before it and no interference is required with the reasonable

view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

31. In view of the above, the present appeals fail, and are

dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed

of.

32. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail

bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like

amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four

weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that

in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this

judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on

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receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme

Court.

33. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the

learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

9

th

September, 2026

(Nikita)