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C hief Justice’s Court

AFR

Writ – C No 34893 of 2014

Sunil Kumar & 4 Ors

Vs

State of U P & 4 Ors

With

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No 3195 of 2018

Dr Suryakant Sharma

Vs

State of U P & 5 Ors

Appearance:

For the petitioners : Mr Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate, with Mr

Shiv Kant Mishra, Advocate (in Writ-C No

34893 of 2014)

: Mr Ashok Nath Tripathi, Advocate (in PIL No

3195 of 2018)

For the respondents : Mr Shivam Yadav, Advocate

Mr Kaushlendra Nath Singh, Advocate

Hon’ble Dilip B Bhosale, Chief Justice

Hon’ble Suneet Kumar, J

(Per Dilip B Bhosale, CJ)

The questions involved and the facts against which they are raised in

these petitions, are common and, hence, by consent of counsel for the parties,

they are being disposed of by this judgment.

2.Writ petition (Writ-C No. 34893 of 2014) under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India has been instituted by the petitioners after 29 years,

seeking direction in the nature of mandamus declaring the notifications under

Sections 4 (1) and 6 read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

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(for short, “Act, 1894”) both issued on 07.11.1985, as lapsed in view of the

provisions contained in Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

(for short, “Act, 2013”). The lands in dispute are Khasra Nos. 312 measuring

0-16-10 bigha, 313 measuring 0-18-0 bigha, 314 measuring 0-11-0 bigha and

315 measuring 0-10-0 bigha, situated at Village Gijhore, Pargana and Tehsil

Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar (for short, “the lands”).

3.The challenge has been raised solely on the ground that, by virtue of

the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, the

acquisition deemed to have lapsed, since neither possession of the lands had

been taken, nor compensation had been paid on completion of the acquisition

proceedings in 1985. Petitioners have also challenged a notice issued on

23/25 June 2014 by respondent no.5, whereby they were asked to

immediately stop unauthorised constructions on the acquired lands and

remove the unauthorised constructions already made within 15 days. By this

notice, petitioners were also asked to submit a written reply to the notice

within 15 days. The petitioners chose not to submit any reply and filed this

petition on 04.07.2014. In the notice, a reference has been made to the lands

in dispute only and not to the land-Khasra Nos. 532 and 533, with which the

petitioners admittedly do not have any concern, whatsoever.

4.The factual matrix that may be relevant for our purpose for considering

the prayers made in these petitions, as disclosed in the pleading, is as under:

4.1The lands (in dispute) alongwith other lands of a notified Village

Gijhore, including Khasra Nos. 532 and 533, except a small portion of

Khasra No. 314, were acquired by the State Government by issuing

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notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6 read with Section 17 of the Act, 1894

on 07.11.1985 for a planned industrial development through New Okhla

Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA). By these notifications, the

lands, except one biswa land of Khasra No. 314, had been acquired. After

notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894, award under Section 11

was made on 31.03.1987. Reference to the share of each of the petitioners in

the lands is not necessary for our purpose. According to the respondents, the

possession of the land was also taken by them. Though the award was passed,

according to the petitioners, they did not receive/accept compensation and, as

a result thereof, the amount of compensation came to be deposited in the

R.D. (Revenue Deposit). Petitioners claim that though acquisition

proceedings were concluded in 1987 with the award, their possession was

never disturbed and even today they are in possession. They claim that they

planted lot of trees and they are having their houses in the said property. In

short, petitioners claim that physical possession of the lands in dispute was

never taken nor the compensation had been paid to them after the award in

1987. In this backdrop and after the petitioners were served the notice dated

25.06.2014, they filed the instant writ petition challenging the acquisition,

contending that it deemed to have lapsed, by virtue of the provisions of sub-

section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 on two grounds, firstly, that

physical possession of the lands had not been taken, secondly, compensation

had also not been paid or deposited in the Court. They further contend that if

the appropriate Government still needs the lands in dispute, they will have to

initiate fresh acquisition proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the

Act, 2013 and pay compensation under the provisions of this Act.

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5.In Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No. 3195 of 2018, the petitioner

(for short 'PIL- petitioner') seeks the following prayers:

“I. Issue any writ, direction or order in the nature

of writ of MANDAMUS commanding the respondents to

remove the encroachment of respondent Nos. 5 and 6,

from Green Belt Area of Sector-34, Noida, District

Guatam Budh Nagar.

II. Issue any writ, direction or order in the nature of

writ of MANDAMUS commanding the respondents to

remove the encroachment of respondent Nos. 5 and 6,

from facility Plot Nos. 532 and 533.”

5.1Respondent nos. 5 and 6 in the PIL are sons of late Deo Dutt Vashisth.

Respondent no. 6, alongwith four others, is petitioner no. 1 in Writ – C No.

34893 of 2014. They claim to be co-owners of the lands. It is against the

backdrop of the facts, as narrated in the foregoing paragraphs, the PIL-

petitioner contends that respondent nos. 5 and 6 some time in 2001 started

making encroachment and illegal construction in the green belt area, in

particular, Khasra No. 314, on the part of which an old temple exists/stands.

The encroachment was also noticed by all concerned, including Assistant

Director, Horticulture, NOIDA, Senior Project Engineer, Zone-3, NOIDA,

Project Engineer IV, NOIDA, Superintendent of Police (City), NOIDA,

Deputy Director, Horticulture, Circle ii, NOIDA etc. A lot of correspondence

since then has been exchanged between the PIL-petitioner/residents of

Sector-34 and these authorities. Residents of Sector-34 made representations

requesting them to take immediate steps for removal of encroachment and

stop illegal construction in and around the temple plot. It appears that on

09.10.2012, an FIR was also lodged against encroachers in the green belt

area of Sector-34. The Resident Welfare Association also made complaint to

concerned authorities on 15.04.2013 against private respondents in PIL and

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the petitioners in Writ-C No. 34893 of 2014, hereinafter shall be collectively

referred to as “petitioners”, about the encroachment over the green belt area

and also setting up of cattle sheds and starting dairy business by them.

Several efforts were made by NOIDA authority for removal of encroachment

but, for some reason or the other, they did not succeed. On few occasions,

police force was not made available and, hence, their encroachment removal

drive failed. The petitioner asserts that the encroachment made by private

respondents in the green belt area is after construction of compound

wall/fence covering the said area and the existing structures, erected by these

respondents, are of temporary nature and there doesn't exist a single pacca

construction which could be termed as old in the green belt area.

5.2The petitioners, despite the time was granted on 20.04.2018, have not

filed counter affidavit and argued the matter on the basis of averments made

in Writ-C No. 34893 of 2014.

6.We have perused the averments made in the PIL, annexures and the

photographs. The photographs on record clearly show that the petitioners

have occupied/are in possession of the green belt area covered with a

compound wall and grills, which are usually erected to protect garden/parks.

It is also seen from the photographs and the sanctioned layout that Sector-34,

in which the lands (in dispute) situate, has been developed by NOIDA as

planned city and lot of wide roads, residential and commercial complexes

have come up and they all appear to be quite old developments/constructions.

Similarly, photographs also show that the encroachment is in the nature of

temporary sheds, including tarpaulin sheds and lot of cattle seen within the

compound wall/fence constructed by NOIDA to protect green belt area. A

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small temple of about 100-150 sq. ft., is also seen in the same green belt area

where the alleged encroachments are made by the petitioners.

7.In this backdrop, we have perused the counter affidavit filed by the

Tehsildar-NOIDA. It appears that when the award was passed, the petitioners

were given hearing and the objections filed by them were also considered by

Acquisition Officer and those were rejected. The assertion of the petitioners'

father that they were in possession of the lands, except a small portion of

Khasra No. 314, was rejected outright and it clearly finds mention in the

award dated 21.03.1987. It has also come on record, as stated in the counter

affidavit, that petitioners' lands - Khasra Nos. 312 and 313, according to

respondent-Authority (as per Sector-34 layout plan) after developments, are

covered by 12 metre wide road alongwith 20 meter wide green belt and so far

as Khasra Nos. 314 and 315 are concerned, they have constructed 60 metre

wide road along the service road, green belt etc., except a small portion of

Khasra No. 314 where the temple exists, is in the green belt, along the 60

metre wide road. It is further stated that Sector-34 is one of the oldest Sector

of NOIDA and it is densely populated being one of the prime Sectors and

they have developed large number of residential/commercial

premises/buildings, open spaces, gardens, parks etc. all over. Thus, according

to the respondent Authority, the entire lands in dispute, except small portion

of Khasra Nos. 314, were taken possession of in 1985-86 itself and over a

period of time it has been developed as planned city and they have denied the

claim of petitioners that they never lost possession of the lands.

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8.Before we proceed further, it would be necessary to make a reference

to an affidavit filed by the petitioners i.e. respondent no.5 in the PIL on

20.04.2018. In paragraph 4 of the said affidavit, the deponent has stated thus:

“4. That it is categorically stated that the deponents

have not encroached even an inch of land of Khasra Nos.

532 and 533. The deponents are the law abiding citizens

of the country and they cannot dare to encroach any land.

The deponents are in possession of Khasra Nos. 312,

313, 314 and 315 and they have no concern with

Khasra Nos. 532 and 533.”

(emphasis supplied)

9.Having regard to the averments made in the above paragraph and the

submissions advanced in support thereof on behalf of the petitioners across

the bar, we observe that if there exists any encroachment on Khasra Nos.532

and 533, there is no reason why the respondents Authority should not remove

the same forthwith. According to the respondents Authority, there exists an

encroachment in the lands and also Khasra Nos. 532 and 533 and it is recent.

They further state that the petitioners taking benefit of the order dated

30.07.2014 passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 34893 of 2014 made further

encroachment over the entire green belt area along the 60 ft. wide road, 20 ft.

wide service road and park in Khasra Nos.532 and 533.

10. Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

petitioners, at the outset, after making submissions on merits, based on the

case of the petitioners reflected in the foregoing paragraphs, (to which we

would deal with in the subsequent part of the judgment), invited our attention

to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, submitted

that these petitions may not be heard, in view of the order of the Supreme

Court dated 21.02.2018 passed in SLP (C) …..... CC 8453 of 2017. He

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submitted, that since compensation was not either paid to the petitioners or

deposited in the Court and possession was not taken, the acquisition deemed

to have lapsed and the respondents, if they so desire, will have to initiate the

acquisition proceedings afresh, in accordance with the Act, 2013. In support,

he invited our attention to the order of the Supreme Court dated 21.02.2018,

whereby the Supreme Court has made reference to a larger Bench to

reconsider the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr Vs

Harkchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors, (2014) 3 SCC 183, and also to the

order dated 18.05.2018, keeping it open to the High Court to decide any issue

except the applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, which is pending

consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Indore

Development Authority & Ors etc Vs Manoharlal & Ors etc, SLP (C)

No 9036-9038 of 2016. In this backdrop, Mr. Shashi Nandan, after

contending that the petitioners never lost possession of the lands and even

compensation was not paid or deposited in the Court, alternatively submitted

that this Court cannot hear these petitions in view of the specific directions

issued by the Supreme Court vide order dated 18.05.2018. The relevant

portion of the order dated 21.02.2018, reads thus:

“Special Leave to Appeal (C)......CC 8453/2017

has been filed by the State of Haryana challenging the

judgment and order dated 29th June, 2016 passed by the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana in M/s. G.D. Goenka

Tourism Corporation Limited & Anr. V. State of Haryana

and Others.

There are some other similar matters that are listed

today on the same subject, that is, with regard to

acquisition of the land of the respondents.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the State of

Haryana that the matter is covered by the recent decision

of a Bench of 3 learned Judges of this Court in the case of

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Indore Development Authority Vs. Shailendra (Dead)

Through Lrs. And Ors. [(2018) 2 SCALE 1].

During the course of the submissions made by

learned counsel for the State of Haryana, some learned

senior counsel were present in Court and they requested

to be heard in the matter since they had been engaged in

some similar matters. They submitted that the decision in

Indore Development Authority had unsettled a long

standing statement of law and had very serious

repercussions on land acquisition cases.

Acceding to their request, we heard some learned

senior counsel led by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv. and

we also heard learned counsel for the State of Haryana.

Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel who has

been engaged to represent the State of Haryana expressed

his personal difficulty in appearing in Court today and

tomorrow. However, he did appear for a short while and

requested that the matter may be taken up on some other

day.

Acceding to his request, we list the matter on 7th

March, 2018 as part-heard matter.

It was submitted by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned

senior counsel and by other learned senior counsel that

when a Bench of 3 learned Judges does not agree with the

decision rendered by another Bench of 3 learned Judges,

the appropriate course of action would be to refer the

matter to a larger Bench. He submitted that one of the

learned Judges in Indore Development Authority (supra)

has expressed that view.

It was also submitted by Mr. Rohatgi that a

Bench of 3 learned Judges cannot hold another

decision rendered by a Bench of 3 learned Judges as

per incuriam. He referred to some decisions but we need

not go into them at the present moment.

Hearing is not concluded on the issue whether the

matter should at all be referred to a larger Bench or not.

However, we were informed by Mr. Rohatgi that some

cases have already been decided on the basis of the

judgment rendered in the case of Indore Development

Authority (supra), without the matter being referred to a

larger Bench.

We have also been informed by learned counsel

appearing on both the sides that some similar matters are

listed tomorrow as well and it is possible that in the next

couple of days similar matters may be listed before

various High Courts.

Taking all this into consideration, we are of the

opinion that it would be appropriate if in the interim

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and pending a final decision on making a reference (if

at all) to a larger Bench, the High Courts be requested

not to deal with any cases relating to the

interpretation of or concerning Section 24 of the Right

to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,

2013. The Secretary General will urgently

communicate this order to the Registrar General of

every High Court so that our request is complied with.

Insofar as cases pending in this Court are

concerned, we request the concerned Benches dealing

with similar matters to defer the hearing until a decision

is rendered one way or the other on the issue whether the

matter should be referred to larger Bench or not. Apart

from anything else, deferring the consideration would

avoid inconvenience to the litigating parties, whether it is

the State or individuals.

Delay condoned in SLPs.

Issue notice on SLPs returnable on 7th March,

2018. Dasti.”

(emphasis supplied)

10.1The order dated 18.05.2018 passed in Petitions for Special Leave to

Appeal (C) No(s) 12295 of 2018, reads thus:

“Heard.

We do not find any ground to interfere with the

impugned order.

The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.

However, it is made clear that it is open to the

High Court to decide any issue except the applicability

of Section 24(2) of the Land Acquisition Act which is

pending consideration before the Constitution Bench

of this Court in Indore Development Authority and

Ors. Etc. v. Manoharlal and Ors. Etc., in SLP (C) No.

9036-9038 of 2016 and connected matters.

Pending applications, if any, shall also stand

disposed of.”

(emphasis supplied)

10.2In Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) the Supreme Court

considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the landowners that in view

of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013, which has come into force on 1 January

2014, the subject land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act, 1894

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have lapsed. The question for decision, before the Supreme Court, related to

true meaning of the expression “compensation has not been paid” occurring

in Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013. After dealing with the relevant provisions

of both the Acts and, in particular, Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 in depth,

the Supreme Court in paragraphs 19 and 20 observed thus:

“19.Now, this is admitted position that award was made

on 31.01.2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to

receive the compensation and since they did not receive

the compensation, the amount (Rs.27 crores) was

deposited in the government treasury. Can it be said that

deposit of the amount of compensation in the

government treasury is equivalent to the amount of

compensation paid to the landowners/persons

interested? We do not think so. In a comparatively recent

decision, this Court in Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes

and Others v. State of Goa and Another, 2011 11 SCC

506] relying upon the earlier decision in Prem Nath

Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corpn. of India Ltd., 1996 2

SCC 71, has held that the deposit of the amount of the

compensation in the state's revenue account is of no avail

and the liability of the state to pay interest subsists till the

amount has not been deposited in the court.

20.From the above, it is clear that the award

pertaining to the subject land has been made by the

Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years

prior to the commencement of the Act, 2013. It is also

admitted position that compensation so awarded has

nether been paid to the landowners/persons interested nor

deposited in the court. The deposit of compensation

amount in the government treasury is of no avail and

cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid

to the landowners/persons interested. We have,

therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject

land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have

lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013.”

(emphasis supplied)

10.3In short, the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)

held that, if the compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the

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landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the court, the acquisition

proceedings will have to be declared as lapse.

10.4It would be advantageous to have a glance at the conclusions arrived at

by the majority in Indore Development Authority judgment to understand

why the third Judge on the Bench, while concurring with the view expressed

by the majority, recorded independent conclusions in paragraph 216. The

conclusions in paragraph 153 recorded by the majority, while answering the

questions, observed thus:

“153. Our answers to the questions are as follows:

Q. No. I :- The word ‘paid’ in - section 24 of the

Act of 2013 has the same meaning as ‘tender of payment’

in Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894. They carry the same

meaning and the expression ‘deposited’ in Section 31(2)

is not included in the expressions ‘paid’ in section 24 of

the Act of 2013 or in ‘tender of payment' used in section

31(1) of the Act of 1894. The words ‘paid'/tender' and

‘deposited' are different expressions and carry different

meanings within their fold.

In section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 in the

expression ‘paid', it is not necessary that the amount

should be deposited in court as provided in section

31(2) of the Act of 1894. Non-deposit of compensation

in court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 does not

result in a lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of

the Act of 2013. Due to the failure of deposit in court,

the only consequence at the most in appropriate cases

may be of a higher rate of interest on compensation as

envisaged under section 34 of the Act of 1894 and not

lapse of acquisition.

Once the amount of compensation has been

unconditionally tendered and it is refused, that would

amount to payment and the obligation under section

31(1) stands discharged and that amounts to discharge

of obligation of payment under section 24(2) of the Act of

2013 also and it is not open to the person who has refused

to accept compensation, to urge that since it has not been

deposited in court, acquisition has lapsed.

Claimants/landowners after refusal, cannot take

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advantage of their own wrong and seek protection under

the provisions of section 24(2).

Q. No. II :- The normal mode of taking physical

possession under the land acquisition cases is drawing of

Panchnama as held in Banda Development Authority

(supra).

Q. No. III :- The provisions of section 24 of the

Act of 2013, do not revive barred or stale claims such

claims cannot be entertained.

Q. No. IV :- Provisions of section 24(2) do not

intend to cover the period spent during litigation and

when the authorities have been disabled to act under

section 24(2) due to the final or interim order of a court

or otherwise, such period has to be excluded from the

period of five years as provided in section 24(2) of the

Act of 2013. There is no conscious omission in section

24(2) for the exclusion of a period of the interim order.

There was no necessity to insert such a provision. The

omission does not make any substantial difference as to

legal position.

Q. No. V :- The principle of actus curiae neminem

gravabit is applicable including the other common law

principles for determining the questions under section 24

of the Act of 2013. The period covered by the final/

interim order by which the authorities have been deprived

of taking possession has to be excluded. Section 24(2)

has no application where Court has quashed acquisition.

The questions referred to are answered

accordingly.”

(emphasis supplied)

10.5In this backdrop, in Indore Development Authority (supra), the third

Judge, insofar as Section 24 (2) is concerned, held thus:

“216. The questions posed by the references stand

answered by me as follows:

I. QUESTION NO. 1 : The acquisition

proceedings do not lapse if the amount is deposited in

the Treasury and such fact is made known to the

claimants by the competent authority as required in

law. Only interest is attracted, in case if the deposit is not

made in Court. Consequently, I am unable to persuade

myself to agree with the outcome of Pune Municipal

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Corporation (AIR 2014 SC 982) (supra). However,

according to me the judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) is not rendered in per incuriam.

In view of the above, the judgment in Pune

Municipal Corporation (supra) may have to be

reconsidered by a larger bench, inasmuch as Pune

Municipal Corporation (supra) was decided by a

bench of three judges. The Registry is directed to place

the papers before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for

appropriate orders.

II. QUESTION NO. 2 AND QUESTION NO. 3 :

For the aforementioned reasons, I am unable to persuade

myself to agree with Sree Balaji (supra), and the

samestands overruled. Question No. 2 and Question No.

3 posed by the reference stand answered as follows:

i. The conscious omission referred to in

paragraph 11 of the judgment in Sree Balaji

(supra) does not make any substantial

difference to the legal position with regard to

the exclusion or inclusion of the period

covered by an interim order of the Court for

the purpose of determination of the

applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

In fact, excluding such periods of interim stay

from the calculation of the time period of five

years under S. 24(2) makes a reading of the

Act more consistent.

ii. The principle of “actus curiae

neminemgravabit”, or that the act of the court

should not prejudice any parties, would be

applicable in the present case to exclude the

period covered by an interim order for the

purpose of determining the question with

regard to taking of possession as contemplated

in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

11.In this backdrop, it would be advantageous to have a look at Section 24

of the Act, 2013, which reads thus:

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of

1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. –

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in

any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), –

(a)where no award under section 11 of the said

Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions

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of this Act relating to the determination of compensation

shall apply; or

(b)where an award under said section 11 has

been made, then such proceedings shall continue under

the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the

said Act has not been repealed.

(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section

(1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated

under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where

an award under the said section 11 has been made five

years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but

the physical possession of the land has not been taken or

the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings

shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate

Government, if it is so chooses, shall initiate the

proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance

with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and

compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings

has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries,

then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for

acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition

Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with

the provisions of this Act.”

11.1Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 begins with non obstante clause. The

provision has overriding effect over sub-section (1). Section 24 (2) provides

that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act,

1894, where an award has been made five years or more prior to the

commencement of the Act, 2013 and either of the two contingencies is

satisfied, viz; (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken, or (ii)

the compensation has not been paid, such acquisition proceedings shall be

deemed to have lapsed. In Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), the

Supreme Court observed that on the lapse of such acquisition proceedings, if

the appropriate government still chooses to acquire such land, then, it has to

initiate the proceedings afresh under the Act, 2013.

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12.Before we proceed further, we make it clear that we are not dealing

with or interpreting or considering applicability of the provisions contained

in Section 24 of the Act, 2013. The challenge raised to the acquisition

proceedings (notifications under Sections 4 and 6 read with Section 17 of the

Act, 1894) is on two grounds, firstly, the compensation has not been paid or

deposited in the Court, and secondly, the physical possession of the land had

not been taken at any point of time and, thereafter, it deemed to have lapsed

under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013. Insofar as petitioners' case that the

acquisition deemed to have lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 on

the ground that the compensation has not been paid or deposited in the Court

as held by the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is

concerned, we leave it open to either seek declaration that acquisition

proceedings deemed to have lapsed or to claim compensation under the Act,

2013 after the Supreme Court answer the reference (upholding the view

expressed in Pune Municipal Corporation). In other words, it would be open

to the petitioners, even if they do not succeed in establishing their case that

the physical possession was not taken after the award under Section 11 of the

Act, 1894 was made, to seek direction to the appropriate government to

initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or to seek compensation under the Act,

2013 if the reference is answered and the view expressed in Pune Municipal

Corporation is upheld or the view expressed in Indore Development

Authority is overruled. We, thus, proceed to consider the petitioners' case

whether possession was taken after the award under Section 11 had been

made or they continued to be in possession of the lands even after the

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acquisition proceedings was concluded in 1985-86 and, therefore, the

acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act, 1894 have lapsed.

13.We have carefully perused the Sector-34 layout plan, which is

admittedly, a public document alongwith the photographs placed on record. It

clearly shows that Khasra Nos. 312, 313, 315 and part of Khasra No. 314 are

used for construction/development of 60 metre, 12 metre wide roads and 20

metre green belt. Khasra Nos. 532 and 533 are also clearly seen in the layout

plan where, according to the respondent authorities, the petitioners have

encroached upon after the Act, 2013 came into force and the order of status

quo was granted by this Court in the instant writ petition. In view of specific

stand taken by the petitioners on affidavit and the submission advanced in

support thereof, we are not examining the case of encroachment over Khasra

Nos.532 and 533, and at the cost of repetition, observe that, if there is any

encroachment over these Khasra numbers, the respondent-Authority may

remove the same forthwith. Having due regard to the Sector-34 layout plan

coupled with the photographs placed on the record, it is clear to us that

Khasra Nos. 312, 313, 315 and part of Khasra No. 314, i.e. lands in dispute,

are already developed as roads, green belt, service road etc. Only a small

portion of the land which was left out from the acquisition of Khasra No. 314

is a part of the green belt where a temple, constructed long before the

acquisition, exists. This small portion (one biswa in Khasra 314) seems to be

in possession of the petitioners. According to the respondent-Authority, the

petitioners taking advantage of their possession over the small portion of land

(one Biswa), it is alleged, that they are encroaching other portion of the green

belt by making construction of sheds. The entire green belt area, including

18

temple, according to the respondent Authority, has already been covered with

fence/compound wall upto two and half feet with the metal (grills) railing

which is usually constructed to protect park/garden. Petitioners do not dispute

that this wall was constructed by the respondent Authority and the alleged

encroachment is within the four walls of the park/garden. If the petitioners'

case was true, why did they allow construction of the wall covering the green

belt area. We see from the photographs, which are not in dispute, temporary

sheds are erected by petitioners and large number of cattle all over the area

within the walls. Even if it is assumed, as stated by petitioners, that the

portion of land where they are presently residing, is having abadi, the fact

remains that the entire lands in dispute, except small portion of Khasra No.

314, was acquired in 1985-86 itself and possession was taken to develop it as

a part of planned city. It is clearly reflected in the award-1987, in which

petitioners' father's statement was recorded. In any case, having regard to the

nature of sheds/structures erected by petitioners, which are temporary in

nature, it cannot be stated that they are old structure, existing for the last 30-

40 years, as claimed by them. Counsel for the petitioners could not point out

either on the basis of photographs or otherwise, any pacca construction on the

lands, in particular the green belt area, either new or old, except the temple in

Khasra No. 314. We are satisfied that the petitioners were dispossessed in

1985-86 itself. Thereafter, they allowed developments, as referred to above,

in their lands, kept quite for long time and suddenly in 2001, started making

encroachment taking advantage of their possession over one biswa land in

Khasra No.314. The petitioners cannot succeed in seeking declaration that

the acquisition deemed to have lapsed on the ground that the physical

19

possession of the lands had not been taken and they continued to be in

possession even after the award was made.

14.A planned city has come up with wide roads, service roads, green belts,

parks, gardens, residential as well as commercial complexes in Sector-34,

including the lands in dispute, over a period of time. The petitioners' lands

are used for the development. In view thereof, even if it is ultimately held

that the entire acquisition proceedings deemed to have lapsed on the ground

that compensation has not been paid or deposited in Court, it would be open

to the respondent authorities to either issue fresh notification, acquire the said

lands under the Act, 2013 and, in which case, they would be at the most

entitled for compensation as prescribed under the said Act. In our opinion,

the claim of the petitioners that they were never dispossessed, is dishonest.

15.Insofar as the question whether the acquisition deemed to have lapsed

on the ground that the compensation has not been paid or deposited in Court

is concerned, will have to be considered only after the reference is answered

by a larger Bench in Indore Development Authority.

16.In this backdrop, we would also like to consider whether delay in

challenging the notifications is fatal and the writ petition is liable to be

dismissed on the ground of laches. While dealing with this question, we are

conscious of the fact that if the Supreme Court, while dealing with the

reference, ultimately holds that non-payment of compensation or depositing

the same in Court would have the effect of acquisition being lapsed, then the

petitioners would be entitled to seek appropriate relief by either seeking

revival of these petitions or by filing another petitions and perhaps the

respondent authorities will have to issue fresh notification for acquisition of

20

the lands in dispute under the provisions of the Act, 2013 and/or to pay

compensation under the said Act. We are of the considered opinion that the

case tried to be made out, insofar as possession of the lands in dispute is

concerned, apart from it being afterthought/dishonest, is made out either to

take benefit of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 24 of

the Act, 2013 or to perpetuate their possession by way of encroachment. We

have already recorded our findings that petitioners had lost possession over

the lands in dispute and started to encroach in 2001 and asserting their right

over the lands only after the Act, 2013 came into force.

17.In this connection, we would like to have glance at few judgments of

the Supreme Court. This question will have to be examined in the backdrop

of the finding of facts recorded by us in the foregoing paragraph that the

possession of the lands was taken and were developed for the purpose for

which they were acquired.

17.1In State of Mysore Vs V K Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190, the Supreme

Court observed that the claimant was not entitled to challenge the validity of

a Section 4 notification after an unreasonable lapse of time. In other words,

challenge to the validity of a Section 4 notification can be made and also

entertained, if it is made within a reasonable time of the publication of the

notification. In State of Tamil Nadu Vs L Krishnan, AIR 1996 SC 497, the

Supreme Court observed that the delay in challenging the notification was

fatal and the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground of

laches only and exercise of power under Article 226 after the award was

made, was held to be unjustified. Similarly, in State of Maharashtra Vs

Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991, the Supreme Court held that if the land

21

acquisition proceedings stood finalised, interference by the writ Court,

quashing the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6, was

unwarranted and uncalled for. Exercise of jurisdiction in such a case cannot

be said to be judicious and reasonable. [Also see Girdharan Prasad Missir

Vs State of Bihar, (1980) 2 SCC 83, and H D Vora Vs State of

Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 866].

17.2In State of Rajasthan Vs D R Laxmi, (1996) 6 SCC 445, the

Supreme Court observed that even void proceedings need not be set at naught

if the parties have not approached the Court within reasonable time, as

judicial review is not permissible at a belated stage. The relevant

observations in paragraph 9 read thus:

"9. Recently, another Bench of this Court in

Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial

Development & Investment Co. (P) Ltd.

1

, re-examined the

entire case law and had held that once the land was vested

in the State, the Court was not justified in interfering with

the notification published under appropriate provisions of

the Act. Delay in challenging the notification was fatal

and writ petition entails with dismissal on grounds of

laches. It is thus, well-settled law that when there is

inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all

steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become

final, the Court should be loathe to quash the

notifications. The High Court has, no doubt,

discretionary powers under Article 226 of the

Constitution to quash the notification under Section

4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be

exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic

consideration. When the award was passed and

possession was taken, the Court should not have

exercised its power to quash the award which is a

material factor to be taken into consideration before

exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no

third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a

ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High

Court was not right in interfering with the discretion

exercised by the learned single Judge dismissing the writ

1C.A. No. 286 of 1989, decided on 6-9-96 (see infra)

22

petition on the ground of laches. Reliance was placed by

Shri Sachar on M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi

2

, in

particular para 8, wherein it was held that compliance of

the requirements is mandatory and non-compliance

thereof renders all subsequent proceedings connected

therewith unexceptionably illegal; but the question is what

will be its effect. That was not the question in that case,

since no award had come to be passed. In Nutakki

Sesharatanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition

3

, a two-

Judge Bench of this Court had held that if the

requirements of Section 4 are not complied with, all

proceedings had become invalid and possession was

directed to be re-delivered to the appellant. We are of the

view that the ratio therein is not correctly laid down. The

question whether violation of the mandatory provisions

renders the result of the action as void or voidable has

been succinctly considered in Administrative Law by

H.W.R. Wade (7th Edn.) at pp. 342-43 thus:

"The truth of the matter is that the

court will invalidate an order only if the

right remedy is sought by the right person in

the right proceedings and circumstances.

The order may be hypothetically a nullity,

but the court may refuse to quash it because

of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he

does not deserve a discretionary remedy,

because he has waived his rights, or for some

other legal reason. In any such case the

'void' order remains effective and is, in

reality, valid. It follows that an order may be

void for one purpose and valid for another; and

that it may be void against one person but valid

against another. A common case where an

order, however void, becomes valid is where a

statutory time-limit expires after which its

validity cannot be questioned. The statute does

not say that the void order shall be valid; but by

cutting off legal remedies it produces that

result."

(emphasis supplied)

17.2.1 The Supreme Court, in the facts of that case, also considered the

question whether Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration were

2(1992) 2 SCC 168

3(1992) 1 SCC 114

23

required to be quashed and, while dealing with this question, observed that

the Court has to consider the conduct of the parties and the effect thereof.

Under the scheme of the Act, after the possession of the land was taken either

under Section 17 (2) or Section 16, the land stands vested in the State free

from all encumbrances. Thereafter, there is no provision under the Act to

divest the State of title which validly came to vest in it. Under Section 48 (1),

before the possession is taken, the State Government is empowered to

withdraw from the acquisition by its publication in the Gazette and not

thereafter.

17.3We would also like to refer to the observations made by the Supreme

Court in Senjeevanagar Medical & Health Employees' Cooperative

Housing Society Vs Mohd Abdul Wahab, (1996) 3 SCC 600, which are

relevant for our purpose. The relevant observation reads thus:

"That apart, as facts disclose, the award was made

on 24-11-1980 and the writ petition was filed on 9-8-

1982. It is not in dispute that compensation was deposited

in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. It is asserted by the

appellant Society that possession of the land was

delivered to it and the land had been divided and allotted

to its members for construction of houses and that

construction of some houses had been commenced by the

date the writ petition was filed. It would be obvious that

the question of division of the properties among its

members and allotment of the respective plots to them

would arise only after the Land Acquisition Officer had

taken possession of the acquired land and handed it over

to appellant Society. By operation of Section 16 the land

stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In

Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P.

4

, the question arose:

whether notification under Section 4(1) and the

declaration under Section 6 get lapsed if the award is not

made within two years as envisaged under Section 11-A?

A Bench of three Judges had held that once possession

was taken and the land vested in the Government, title

to the land so vested in the State is subject only to

4(1993) 4 SCC 369

24

determination of compensation and to pay the same to

owner. Divesting the title to the land statutorily vested

in the Government and reverting the same to the

owner is not contemplated under the Act. Only

Section 48 (1) gives power to withdraw from

acquisition that too before possession is taken. That

question did not arise in this case. The property under

acquisition having been vested in the appellants, in the

absence of any power under the act to have the title of the

appellants divested except by exercise of the power under

Section 48(1), valid title cannot be defeated. The

exercise of the power to quash the notification under

Section 4 (1) and the declaration under Section 6

would lead to incongruity. Therefore, the High Court

under those circumstances should not have interfered

with the acquisition and quashed the notification and

declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively.

Considered from either perspective, we are of the view

that the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ

petition."

(emphasis supplied)

16.4The Supreme Court in Smt Sudama Devi Vs Commissioner & Ors,

1983 (2) SCC 1, observed that there is no period of limitation prescribed by

any law for filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. While

so observing, the Supreme Court further observed that no such period of

limitation can be laid down either under the Rules made by the High Court or

by practice. For every case, it would have to be decided on the facts and

circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have

to be done without taking into account any specific period as period of

limitation. In Hari Singh & Ors Vs State of U P & Ors, AIR 1984 SC

1020, the Supreme Court was dealing with a matter where a writ petition was

filed before the High Court challenging the notifications under Section 4 and

Section 17(4) o the Act, 1894 after two and a half years. In this case, the

25

Supreme Court observed that the writ petition filed after a delay of nearly

two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only.

17.5In State of Orissa Vs Dhobei Sethi & Anr, (1995) 5 SCC 583, the

Supreme Court while dealing with the SLP arising from the provisions of the

Act, 1894, after noticing inordinate delay of seven years in challenging the

notifications under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) and Section 6,

observed that the writ petition having been filed after seven years, the High

Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches.

Similarly, in State of Karnataka & Ors Vs S M Kotrayaya & Ors, (1996)

6 SCC 267, the Supreme Court rejected the contention urged on behalf of the

petitioners that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches

on the ground that it was filed just after coming to know of the relief granted

by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation

for delay and laches. The Supreme Court observed that such a plea is wholly

unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches.

17.6The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs L Krishnan, AIR

1996 SC 497, while dealing with a civil appeal arising from the judgment of

the Madras High Court allowing a batch of writ petitions and quashing three

notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Act 1894, held that the delay in

challenging the notification was fatal and the writ petitions were liable to be

dismissed on the ground of laches only and exercise of power under Article

226, after the award had been made, was held unjustified. The observations

made by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay

Vs Industrial Development Investment Co Pvt Ltd & Ors, AIR 1997 SC

482, are also relevant for our purpose. The Supreme Court while dealing with

26

an appeal arising from the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court

reversing the judgment of the learned Single Judge and quashing the award

under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 and the notification dated 06.09.1972

issued under Section 6 read with Section 126(2) of the Maharashtra Regional

Town Planning Act as invalid, held in paragraphs 19 and 29 as under:

"19…If the interested person allows the

grass to grow under his feet by allowing the acquisition

proceedings to go on and reach its terminus in the

award and possession is taken in furtherance

thereof and vested in the State free from all

encumbrances, the slumbering interested person

would be told off the gates of the Court that his

grievance should not be entertained. ...

29...when there is inordinate delay in filing

the writ petition and when all steps taken in the

acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court

should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High

Court has, no doubt, discretionary power under

Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification

under Section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6. But

it should be exercised taking all relevant

factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was

passed and possession was taken, the Court should not

exercise its power to quash the award which is a

material factor to be taken in to consideration before

exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no

third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a

ground for interference."

(emphasis supplied)

17.7In Northern Indian Glass Industries Vs Jaswant Singh & Ors, AIR

2003 SC 234, the Supreme Court while dealing with a case arising from the

provisions of the Act, 1894, in paragraph 9, observed thus:

“...There is no explanation whatsoever for the

inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely

because full enhanced compensation amount was not

paid to the respondents, that itself was not a ground to

condone the delay and laches, in filing the writ petition.

In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering

27

restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that

the land acquired was not used for which it had been

acquired. It is well-settled position in law that after

passing the award and taking possession under Section

16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the

Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the

land is not used for the purpose for which it is

acquired, the land owner does not get any right to ask

for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution

of the possession.”

(emphasis supplied)

17.8 In May George Vs Special Tahsildar & Ors, (2010) 13 SCC 98, the

Supreme Court in paragraphs 28, observed thus:

“28. In fact, the land vests in the State free from all

encumbrances when possession is taken under Section 16 of

the Act. Once land is vested in the State, it cannot be

divested even if there has been some irregularity in the

acquisition proceedings. In spite of the fact that Section 9

notice had not been served upon the person interested, he

could still claim the compensation and ask for making the

reference under Section 18 of the Act. There is nothing in the

Act to show that non-compliance therewith will be fatal or

visit any penalty.

(emphasis supplied)

17.9 In Leelawanti & Ors Vs State of Haryana & Ors, (2012) 1 SCC 66,

the Supreme Court in paragraphs 13 and 21, observed thus:

“13. We have considered the respective submissions

and examined the records. In our view, the High Court did not

commit any error by not entertaining the appellants' challenge

to the acquisition of land because they did not offer any

explanation for the long time gap of more than three decades

between the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 i.e.

1976 and filing of the writ petition i.e. 2007.

21. ... That apart, the factual matrix of the present

case shows that the acquired land was used for

construction of feeder and return channel for thermal

plant and after the public purpose as specified in the

acquisition notification was fulfilled, the land was

transferred to HSEB and now it is with Respondent 2 i.e.

Haryana Power Generation Corporation. This being the

position, the High Court cannot be said to have committed

28

any error by declining the appellants' prayer for issue of a

mandamus to the respondents to return the acquired

land.”

(emphasis supplied)

17.10 In V Chandrasekaran & Anr Vs Administrative Officer & Ors,

(2012) 12 SCC 133, the Supreme Court in paragraphs 25, 26 and 31,

observed thus:

“25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is

vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be

divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even

if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated

period. [Vide Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar

5

, U.P. Jal

Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.

6

, Allahabad Development

Authority v. Nasiruzzaman

7

, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of

T.N.

8

and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar

9

.]

26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored

to the tenure holders/persons interested, even if it is not

used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for

any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be

withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of

the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once

the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in

the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide State of M.P. v.

Vishnu Prasad Sharma

10

, Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash

Sharma

11

, Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P.

12

, Rajasthan

Housing Board v. Shri Kishan

13

and Dedicated Freight

Corridor Corpn. of India v. Subodh Singh

14

.)

31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to

mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State,

free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the

landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for

which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes

persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a

right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the

acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither

has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person

interested nor can such person claim any right of restitution on

5(1995) 6 SCC 31

6(1996) 3 SCC 124

7(1996) 6 SCC 424

8(2000) 4 SCC 322

9(2005) 1 SCC 558 : AIR 2005 SC 492

10AIR 1966 SC 1593

11(1970) 2 SCC 149 : AIR 1970 SC 1576

12(1993) 4 SCC 369 : AIR 1993 SC 2517

13(1993) 2 SCC 84

14(2011) 11 SCC 100 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 604

29

any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory

amendment to this effect.”

(emphasis supplied)

17.11 In P Chinnanna & Ors Vs State of A P & Ors, (1994) 5 SCC 486,

the Supreme Court in paragraph 11, observed thus:

“11. ... In fact, in relation to acquisition proceeding

involving acquisition of land for public purposes, the court

concerned must be averse to entertain writ petitions

involving the challenge to such acquisition where there is

avoidable delay or laches since such acquisition, if set

aside, would not only involve enormous loss of public

money but also cause undue delay in carrying out projects

meant for general public good. ...”

(emphasis supplied)

17.12 In Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai Vs M Meiyappan & Ors,

(2010) 14 SCC 309, the Supreme Court in paragraph 21 observed thus:

“21. In the present case, as already stated, the

respondents did not furnish any explanation as to why it took

them 16 years to challenge the acquisition of their lands,

when admittedly they were aware of the acquisition of their

lands and had in fact participated in these proceedings before

the Land Acquisition Collector. We have no hesitation in

holding that the High Court ought not to have entertained the

writ petition of the respondents after 16 years of the passing

of the award. The High Court should have dismissed the writ

petition at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches on

the part of Respondents 1 to 17, notwithstanding its earlier

decision in WP No. 2244 of 1991, which decision, according

to the appellant, was otherwise distinguishable.”

18.Thus, it is well settled that challenge to the validity of Section 4 and/or

6 notifications can be made and also entertained, if it is made within a

reasonable time of publication of the notifications. In other words, the delay

in challenging the notifications is fatal and the writ petition entails with

dismissal on the ground of latches. Where the award has been passed and the

possession has also been taken, it is well settled that the Court should not

30

exercise its power to quash the acquisition proceedings once possession was

taken and the land vested in the Government, title to the land so vested in the

State is subject only to determination of compensation and to pay the same to

owner. Divesting the title to the land statutorily vested in the Government and

reverting the same to the owner, in our opinion, is not contemplated either

under the Act, 1894 or the Act, 2013.

19.If the interested person allows the acquisition proceedings to go on and

reach its terminus in the award and possession is taken in furtherance thereof

and vested in the State free from all encumbrances, a litigant, as observed by

the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra),

would be told off the gates of the Court that his grievance should not be

entertained. If the challenge as raised in the petition is entertained and

allowed, that would cause enormous loss to the public money.

20.In the present case, the petitioners not only allowed the respondents to

complete the acquisition proceedings in 1985-86 but also allowed the

development of a planned city and then suddenly started asserting their rights

once again, more particularly, after introduction of the Act, 2013. Such a

litigant, under any circumstances, cannot be allowed to encroach the acquired

land or to remain in possession thereof. The very purpose of acquisition of

the lands and its development as a planned city would stand frustrated, if the

claim of the petitioners is either entertained or allowed. While so observing,

we also, at the cost of repetition, observe that the petitioners are entitled for

compensation only or to seek fresh acquisition under the Act, 2013, if

reference is answered by the Supreme Court upholding the view in Pune

Municipal Corporation (supra) and nothing further.

31

21.Thus, looking at the case from any angle, the petition challenging the

acquisition after 29 years on the ground that possession was not taken must

fail. In other words, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,

challenge to the acquisition on the ground that the possession of the lands

was not taken or they were never dispossessed and, hence, the acquisition

deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, is not

sustainable in law. If the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, however,

ultimately uphold the view/opinion expressed in Pune Municipal

Corporation, the petitioners would, at the most, be entitled for compensation

under the provisions of the Act, 2013.

22.In the result, Writ-C No 34893 of 2014 is dismissed. Public Interest

Litigation (PIL) No. 3195 of 2018 is allowed in terms of prayers made in the

petition, with liberty to the petitioners to seek direction to the appropriate

Government to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or to seek compensation

under the provisions of the Act, 2013, in the event Supreme Court answers

the reference and upholds the view expressed in Pune Municipal

Corporation's case. We direct the respondent-Authority to remove the

encroachment from the lands, except one Biswa land in Khasra No.314,

where temple exists, and from Khasra Nos.532 and 533 forthwith, and if

necessary, with the police aid.

23.05.2018

AHA

(Dilip B Bhosale, CJ)

(Suneet Kumar, J)