REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Miscellaneous Application No.1630 of 2020

in

Writ Petition (C) No.880 of 2016

SURAZ INDIA TRUST … Petitioner

Versus

UNION OF INDIA …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1.The raison d’etre of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain the dignity of

the institution of judicial forums. It is not a vindictive exercise nor are

inappropriate statements by themselves capable of lowering the dignity of a

Judge. These are often ignored but where despite all latitude a perennial

litigant seeks to justify his existence by throwing mud at all and sundry, the

Court has to step in.

2.In order to understand the contours of the present dispute, nothing

more is required than to turn to the judgment of this Court in WP(C)

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No.880/2016 dated 01.05.2017. This judgment is not an origination but in

some sense a culmination. Mr. Rajiv Daiya, claims to be the spirit behind

Suraz India Trust (for short ‘Trust’), which has been filing a large number of

cases both in Rajasthan and in Delhi. A perusal of the judgment dated

01.05.2017 would show that Mr. Daiya as Chairman of the Trust has been

canvassing matters in person. These petitions are stated to be public interest

litigations. A list of cases filed by him was prepared in the proceedings in

WP(C) No.880/2016, numbering 12 before this Court alone. Further, as per

the summary prepared by the Registry, there were 64 different proceedings

in these 12 cases as mentioned in para 3 of the aforementioned judgment.

The Court formed a prima facie view that the litigation initiated by the Trust

was thoughtless and frivolous. Liberty was granted to Mr. Daiya to make a

voluntary statement, if he considered it appropriate that Suraz India Trust

will henceforth not file any petition urging a cause in public interest.

Thereby, the Court made it clear to him that if he did so the matter would be

closed and no further consequences would follow. In the alternative, he was

asked to file a response to establish the bona fides of the Trust. Mr. Daiya

wanted to prosecute the matter without filing a written response despite the

opportunity. He claimed to have been dissatisfied by the Court, both on the

administrative and judicial side, with their manner of dealing with his

representations. Thereafter, he forwarded a disparaging communication to

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the residential offices of Hon’ble Judges. The endeavour, if one may say,

was to browbeat the Registry at that time. He sought to make

representations to the President of India and the Prime Minister too. In the

text of grievances made by the Trust, disparaging remarks were contained

therein not only with reference to the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court but

also with reference to the Judges of this Court. The vilification extended to

all levels of judicial officers in the State of Rajasthan as also the Chief

Justice and other Judges of that Court. The Bench opined that extremely

important matters are taken up for consideration on a daily basis and judicial

time gets wasted because individuals not competent to assist the Court insist

without due cause to be granted a prolonged hearing. A misconceived

petition in that case was not only dismissed, but a direction was issued that

the Trust shall henceforth refrain from filing any cause in public interest

before any Court in this country and that it will equally apply to Mr. Rajiv

Daiya. Exemplary costs of Rs. 25 lakhs were imposed on Mr. Rajiv Daiya,

to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Welfare Trust

within three months from the date of the order, failing which the costs would

be recovered from Mr. Rajiv Daiya through his personal proceeds, if

necessary. The matter was directed to be listed in case costs were not

deposited.

3.The costs were not deposited and Mr. Daiya filed an application on

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21.08.2017 seeking to submit unconditional apology with a prayer that the

costs imposed on him of Rs. 25 lakhs be waived and that he be pardoned

against charges of contempt. In MA No. 507 of 2017, Mr. Daiya requested

the court to not enforce the judgment dated 01.05.2017 passed in WP(C) No.

880 of 2016 as he had moved for sanction of prosecution to the President of

India. The Court, on 21.08.2017 ordered that the letter requesting sanction of

prosecution written by Mr. Daiya to the President of India qua the Judges

who presided over the Bench be placed on record. Thereafter on 05.12.2017,

the application of Mr. Daiya was dismissed observing that the Bench was not

inclined to modify the order and the Registry was directed to proceed as per

law.

4.MA No. 1158 of 2017 was placed before this Court by the Registry as

Mr. Daiya had failed to withdraw all pending cases filed by the Trust in

accordance with paragraph 27 of the judgment dated 01.05.2017. Since costs

were not deposited all applications and writ petitions filed by the Trust and

Mr. Daiya were directed to be dismissed with the direction to the Registry

not to accept any application or petition filed by either by the Trust or Mr.

Daiya vide order dated 08.02.2018.

5.MA No.1630 of 2020 by way of an Office Report was placed before

the Court on 29.09.2020 informing that the costs had not been deposited by

the Trust. This aspect was also confirmed by the Secretary of the Supreme

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Court AOR Welfare Trust since the costs had to be deposited with the said

entity. That being the position on the said date an order was passed issuing

notice to the Trust. Instead of responding to the same, Mr. Daiya sought

from the Registry the note sheets on the basis of which the directions had

been sought by the Registry vide e-mail dated 16.10.2020. This was

followed by an e-mail dated 09.02.2021. In view of the peremptory nature

of the order dated 08.02.2018 the said letter was sought to be circulated for

directions to accept the applications at the filing counter. On 12.02.2021 the

Court noted that there was no basis for demanding the note sheets. In view of

the obdurate stand of Mr. Daiya and non-appearance in pursuance of the

notices served, bailable warrants were directed to be issued for his

production in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount.

6.At that stage Mr. Daiya did a volte face and moved IA No.36444/2021

on 22.02.2021 seeking to submit an unconditional apology with an audit

report showing his assets in compliance with the order dated 29.09.2020.

The factum of this IA was placed on record by the Registry. The Court was

informed that the same was not accepted on 22.02.2021, once again, because

of the peremptory nature of the order.

7.Now there was another U-turn by Mr. Daiya, who addressed a letter

dated 11.03.2021 to the Attorney General of India. In this letter, consent was

sought to initiate proceedings for criminal contempt against the Assistant

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Registrar of the PIL Section, Section X and Section XVI-A and other

officials for obstructing and interfering with administration of justice by not

letting the matter of Mr. Daiya be decided on merits of the case.

Simultaneously consent was also sought for filing contempt proceedings

against the then Chief Justice of India Shri J.S. Khehar (since retired),

Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) as they

were the three Judges party to the judgment passed on 01.05.2017 on the

ground that the Judges were obstructing the meritorious decision making of

various petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. On

14.03.2021, Mr. Daiya sent a letter to the Registrar stating that he had filed

an application for unconditional apology and producing details of assets in

compliance with the order dated 29.09.2020, however, that the same be

considered by a Bench comprising the Chief Justice of India. On

15.03.2021, the Bench directed Mr. Daiya to place on record his current

sources of income, more so, as he had claimed that he was in a Government

job. He was directed to give a complete list of his movable and immovable

assets, if any. Further, since he was claiming to be in a Government job he

should give his last salary slip which would show emoluments being

received by him along with deductions being made.

8.On 23.03.2021 the Attorney General sent two letters to Mr. Daiya

denying him initiation of contempt proceedings in respect of both the letters

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dated 11.03.2021. Mr. Daiya, however, addressed two letters dated

26.03.2021 and 27.03.2021 to the Attorney General with identical content,

stating that he should be granted an opportunity to place the entire record

before him. On 26.03.2021, an e-mail was addressed to the Assistant

Registrar (PIL Section) stating that one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) should

recuse himself as he had moved for sanction of prosecution before the

President of India against him. The letter addressed to the President was also

attached. This was in the context of the action he wanted to take against the

Coram which passed the order dated 01.05.2017 as according to him it

fulfilled the requirements of an offence under Section 219 of the Indian

Penal Code (Public servant in judicial proceedings corruptly making reports,

etc. contrary to law). On 27.03.2021, an e-mail was sent reminding the

Attorney General of the letter sent earlier on 26.03.2021.

9.On 02.04.2021, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of

India requesting information to take suo motu cognizance of the criminal

complaint against the Assistant Registrar and officers/officials of the PIL

(Writ) Section.

10.In the aforesaid context when the matter was listed on 05.04.2021,

Mr. Daiya sought to excuse himself from appearing before the Court on

account of Covishield vaccination. He had not complied with the orders and

was seeking to wriggle out of the proceedings by raising all kinds of

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objections, i.e., that the matter should not be heard by the Bench but by a

bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. It was, thus, observed that this

was not the prerogative of Mr. Daiya, and the Chief Justice had despite his

letter continued to permit the same Bench to deal with the matter. Since

Mr. Daiya was found to be bent upon violating the directions of the Court,

the Court deemed it appropriate to issue notice of contempt to Mr. Daiya

returnable on 12.04.2021. Incidentally, Mr. Daiya, despite the aforesaid

request, was present in Court and accepted notice. On the issue of

Government job, he stated that what he was referring to was the fact that he

was a Stenographer in a legal office, but deployed with the State of

Rajasthan. Notice was thus issued to State of Rajasthan to verify the factum

in view of non-cooperative attitude of Mr. Daiya.

11.On 08.04.2021, Mr. Daiya filed a report with details of his movable

and immovable assets. He claimed to have regularly taken loans for meeting

various requirements, which were being deducted from his emoluments. In

the liabilities he sought to put forth the expenses towards his daughter’s

study apart from the liability of marriage of his daughter. He submitted that

he had no sufficient funds to make payment of the costs.

12.In the next proceedings held on 12.04.2021, the State of Rajasthan

was asked to give information about the employment of Mr. Daiya and

whether the activities he was carrying on were permissible while being so

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engaged and drawing salary from the State. The request made for

appointment of an Amicus for Mr. Daiya was declined as he had been

appearing in person practically in all cases.

13.On 03.05.2021, an affidavit was filed by the State of Rajasthan

informing that Mr. Daiya was working in the office of the Government

Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General at Jodhpur, which was an office

separate from the office of the Advocate General of the State. He had been

issued show cause notice under relevant service rules applicable and had

been suspended and transferred since his conduct before various courts as

the Chairman of the Trust was in violation of the relevant service rules.

Against this, Mr. Daiya had filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High

Court, being S.B. Civil Writ No.6864/2021. Thus, on 06.05.2021 in the

proceedings it was noted that the State had moved for vacation of interim

order and the State would take steps to commence the process for recovery

of costs as ‘arrears of land revenue’.

14.On 10.05.2021, Mr. Daiya filed an application for recalling/review of

the order dated 06.05.2021. It was claimed that he was not given a chance to

be heard and that the proceedings for recovery were a nullity. It was his case

that the dismissal of the recovery proceedings in MA No.507/2017 by a

Bench of three Judges on 21.08.2017 was binding on the present Bench. He

conveniently ignored that the said proceedings recorded only his submission

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with the direction to place an application that he had moved for sanction of

prosecution before the President of India. The order passed in M.A.

No.507/2017 on 05.12.2017 was to the effect that Mr. Daiya’s prayer to

modify the order was actually declined and the Registry was directed to

proceed as per law (for recovery of costs).

15.Once again on 08.07.2017, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to the

Registrar stating that he had filed a complaint with the President of India

against one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.), for conducting an inquiry under

In-House procedure vide letter dated 07.06.2021. A reminder was sent on

08.07.2021 and once again, requesting that the matter be listed before a

Bench of which one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) was not a member. He

had also sought some RTI query.

16.On 09.07.2021 the attention of the Court was invited to the letter of

Mr. Daiya. It was found that all kinds of pleadings were being made in an

issue of what was simply of recovery of costs from the Trust/Mr. Daiya

Letters were also written to scandalise the Court and prevent the Court from

taking action to ensure recovery of costs. It was, thus, clearly an endeavour

to browbeat the Court which the Court would not countenance. Contempt

notice was issued to Mr. Daiya as to why he should not be proceeded against

and sentenced for his endeavour to scandalise the Court returnable on the

next date, i.e., 04.08.2021. Thereafter, Mr. Daiya sought adjournment as he

10

had undergone some surgery and the State counsel was asked to verify when

Mr. Daiya would be able to attend the Court proceedings as per medical

advice. On 18.08.2021 it was noticed that as per the affidavit filed on behalf

of the State of Rajasthan, affirmed on 16.08.2021, in pursuance of the

medical advice, the contemnor had resumed his duties on 11.08.2021. His

endeavour to seek adjournment by four months was found not acceptable. It

was further noted that the contumacious conduct continued and that Mr.

Daiya was under a misconception that by endeavouring to scandalise the

Court he could get away with it. Bailable warrants in the sum of Rs.10,000/-

with one surety of the like amount were issued directing his presence.

17.The petitioner filed a response to the contempt proceedings and on

06.09.2021 filed an application for impleading the Secretary, Law and Legal

Affairs Department, Government of Rajasthan, Registrar, Supreme Court of

India, one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) and B. Sunita Rao, Secretary of the

Supreme Court AOR Welfare Trust. He also sought the placement of the

complaint before the Chief Justice of India and, on 07.09.2021, he further

sought adjournment by 4-5 months so as to enable response by the Chief

Justice of India to his earlier letter as reasoned orders were not being passed

by the Bench. On 08.09.2021, in pursuance of the bailable warrants

Mr. Daiya appeared and we heard him at some length along with learned

Additional Solicitor General and learned counsel for the State. As had

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transpired earlier, in the end the petitioner stated that he wanted to tender an

unqualified apology and sought to withdraw all what he had said. We told

him that he was at liberty to file what he pleased within three days and we

would take that into consideration while passing our orders and the judgment

was reserved. Thereafter, an application was filed, being IA No.114626/2021

seeking to place what he calls an “unconditional apology” and further

seeking review by IA No.114629/2021. It does not mention as to what

review was being sought.

18.The so-called unconditional apology is again a recital of his alleged

grievances in the earlier proceedings. It seeks to canvas that the proceedings

for recovery of costs had actually come to an end, which was factually not so

as it was his endeavour to seek modification of the order of costs. The same

was declined while permitting the Registry to take action for recovery. Since

the recovery did not take place, the Registry had placed the matter before the

Court. Thereafter, he had made a grievance about the chargesheet served on

him by the State Government in terms of his employment, an aspect with

which we are not directly concerned with. He has mentioned that he seeks

redressal of various grievances in various proceedings he has filed, claiming

the applicability of the doctrine of impossibility in relation with payment of

costs. He has referred to various petitions filed before the Rajasthan High

Court.

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19.On a careful reading of the aforesaid we can hardly categorise the

same as an unconditional apology.

20.We have penned down all these details not only to record the conduct

of Mr. Daiya as Chairman of the Trust prior to the order being passed in

WP(C) No.880/2016, but continuously thereafter. In the submissions he

sought to suggest that he was compelled to take this course of action to

ensure that the proceedings he files in different courts are not interceded or

terminated on account of his inability to pay costs. This can hardly be a

course of action which is permissible. We would like to emphasise on the

kind of actions Mr. Daiya has embarked upon in a simple issue of recovery

of costs. In fact, the State counsel referred to communications addressed by

him to the State Government, once again, seeking to threaten the officers

who had initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. But for the fact that

Mr. Daiya appears in person and seeks to canvas his case with such clear

understanding, it could possibly have given rise to the apprehension that he

was not all there. It also appears that he is under constant legal advice

beyond his abilities to address the Court by the very nature of pleadings he

files.

21.Insofar as Miscellaneous Application No.1630/2020 is concerned, in

our view, nothing more has to be directed than what was already been stated

on 06.05.2021, i.e., the State Government should take steps to commence

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process of recovery of costs as ‘arrears of land revenue’ and the recovery

amount be remitted to the beneficiary as per the order already passed in

WP(C) No.880/2016 on 01.05.2017. Other than that, no further directions

are required as the recovery would naturally depend on the available

resources of both the Trust and Mr. Daiya. In the direction passed by this

Court on 01.05.2017 it was observed “failing deposit, the above costs shall

be recoverable from Mr. Rajiv Daiya, its Chairman, through his personal

proceeds, if necessary.”

22.In fact, if Mr. Daiya had just merely expressed his inability to pay the

amount as per his affidavit, the matter could have been left at that, with, of

course, the natural consequences as contained in the order dated 01.05.2017

which disabled him from filing public interest litigations. After all, there

cannot be a birthright to file public interest litigations and the level of

assistance and the nature of causes as canvassed has already been adversely

commented upon in the order dated 01.05.2017.

23.M.A. No.1630/2020 is thus closed with the aforesaid order.

24.However, that unfortunately cannot be the end of the matter.

25.Let us say at the inception that the easier path is to recuse or give up

the matter instead of inviting so much trouble. But then that is not the course

for which the Judges have taken oath. Sometimes the task is unenviable and

difficult but it must be performed for the larger good of the institution. Such

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litigants cannot be permitted to have their way only because they can plead

and write anything they feel like and keep on approbating by sometimes

apologising and then again bringing forth those allegations. We have thus

chosen the more difficult path.

26.Now turning to the conduct of Mr. Daiya, which is apparent from the

judgment as aforesaid.

27.We are enlightened in respect of the course of action we follow by

judicial precedents. We would first like to turn to the judgment in Roshan

Lal Ahuja, In Re:

1

. Disparaging remarks and aspersions deliberately and

repeatedly made against the Supreme Court and its Judges in memorandum

of writ petition and in representation made before the President of India in

connection with order of reduction in rank and subsequent dismissal from

service of the contemnor was held to bring down the image of judiciary in

the estimation of public and to bring administration of justice into disrepute.

The contemnor was directed to suffer four months simple imprisonment and

pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-.

28.Suffice to note that even in the said proceedings, after tendering

apology, ostensibly on the ground that it was desired by the Judges, once

again, the contemnor showed no redemption for his behaviour. The

observations by Justice A.S. Anand (as he then was) in paras 11, 12 & 13 are

1

 1993 Supp (4) SCC 446.

15

as under:

“11. The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers

by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they

desire is on the increase and it is high time that serious note is

taken of the same. No latitude can be given to a litigant to

browbeat the court. Merely because a party chooses to appear in

person, it does not give him a licence to indulge in making such

aspersions as have the tendency to scandalise the court in relation

to judicial matters.

12. Ordinarily, courts of law do not initiate proceedings to commit

a person for contempt of court where there is mere technical

contempt or where the contemnor satisfies the court that he was

truly repentant for his action. Judgments of the court are open to

criticism. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to

fair and reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments,

even if, put-spoken, but made without any malice or attempting to

impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in

proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt of

court. Lord Denning in Reg v. Commissioner of Police of the

Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn, 1968 (2) WLR 1204 made some

pertinent observations in this regard. In the words of the Master of

Rolls:

Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done

in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and

our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal

or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will

remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot

reply to their criticism. We cannot enter into public

controversy. Still less into political controversy.

However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and

calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of judiciary

in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of

justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute the

courts must bester themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty

of law. No litigant can be permitted to over step the limits of fair, bona

fide and reasonable criticism of a judgment and bring the courts

generally in disrepute or attribute motives to the Judges rendering the

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judgment. Perversity, calculated to undermine the judicial system and

the prestige of the court, cannot be permitted for otherwise the very

foundation of the judicial system is bound to be undermined and

weakened and that would be bad not only for the preservation of Rule

of Law but also for the independence of judiciary. Liberty of free

expression is not to be confused with a licence to make unfounded,

unwarranted and irresponsible aspersions against the Judges or the

courts in relation to judicial matters. No system of justice can tolerate

such an unbridled licence. Of course "Justice is not a cloistered virtue;

she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though

outspoken, comments of ordinary men", but the members of the public

have to abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in

the administration of justice and exercise their right of free criticism

without malice or in any way attempting to impair the administration

of justice and refrain from making any comment which tends to

scandalise the court in relation to judicial matters.

13. The contemnor in the present case let alone showing any remorse

or regret has adopted an arrogant and contemptuous attitude. His

conduct in circulating the 'note for directions' adds insult to injury. Of

course, the dignity of the court is not so brittle as to be shattered by a

stone thrown by a mad man, but, when the court finds that the

contemnor has been reckless, persistent and guilty of undermining the

dignity of the court and his action is, motivated, deliberate and

designed, the law of contempt of court must be activised.”

29.The aforesaid shows that there is no absolute licence when appearing

in person to indulge in making aspersions as a tendency to scandalise the

Court in relation to judicial matters. Motivated and calculated attempts to

bring down the image of the judiciary in estimation of public and impair the

administration of justice must bester themselves to uphold their dignity and

the majesty of law. In the current context if seen, the grievance arises on

account of the inability of the contemnor to file public interest petitions on

account of costs being imposed, which he claims to be unable to pay and the

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consequences thereof of not being able to prosecute his petitions, which are

large in number. The contemnor has apparently made a profession of filing

public interest petitions of subjects of which he may not know much and

then seeking to scandalise the Court to grant him relief failing which he will

continue to scandalise the Court.

30.In Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors.

2

which arose in suo motu contempt petition

after the conviction of Mr. Mathews Nedumpara, an advocate. In those

proceedings, the Court while not finally sentencing him to imprisonment

instead gave him a suspended sentence and barred him from practice for a

specified period of time before this Court

3

. This resulted in another round on

account of complaints against the Indian Bar Association and by some

person claiming to be the National Secretary of Human Rights Security

Council wherein they had sought to send contemptuous complaints to the

President of India and the Chief Justice of India (a somewhat similar

situation in the case at hand). Shri Nedumpara sought discharge on the

ground that he did not really know those people. A Bench of this Court

debated the powers of the Supreme Court in relation to dealing with the

contempt in the light of Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution of India

read with in conjunction with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The

provisions read as under:

2

 2020 SCC Online SC 407.

3

 Mathews Nedumpara, In Re, (2019) 19 SCC 454.

18

“9. Article 129 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

“129. Supreme Court to be a court of record. The Supreme

Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers

of such a court including the power to punish for contempt

of itself.”

A bare reading of Article 129 clearly shows that this Court being a

Court of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Record

including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a

constitutional power which cannot be taken away or in any manner

abridged by statute.

10. Article 142 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court

and orders as to discovery, etc. (1) The Supreme

Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree

or make such order as is necessary for doing complete

justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any

decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable

throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be

prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and,

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until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as

the President may by order prescribe.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf

by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects

the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power

to make any order for the purpose of securing the

attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any

documents, or the investigation or punishment of any

contempt of itself.”

31.In the context of the aforesaid it was opined that the comparison of the

two provisions show that whereas the founding fathers felt that the powers

under clause (2) of Article 142 could be subject to any law made by the

Parliament, there is no such restriction as far as Article 129 is concerned.

The power to punish for contempt is a constitutional power vested in this

Court which cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative

enactment. We have little doubt that what the contemnor has been

endeavouring is to have his way or, alternatively, I will throw mud at all and

sundry, whether it be the Court, its administrative staff or the State

Government so that people, apprehensive of this mud thrown, may back off.

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We refuse to back off and are clear in our view that we must take it to its

logical conclusion.

32.We may note that the notice issued on 09.07.2021 was a composite

notice issued to proceed against him as well as to sentence him for his

endeavour to scandalise the Court.

33.We are of the view that the contemnor is clearly guilty of contempt of

this Court. His actions to scandalise the Court cannot be countenanced. He

continues with his contumacious behaviour. The apologies submitted by him

are only endeavours to get out of the consequences again followed by

another set of allegations, thus, a charade. The last apology can hardly be

called an apology seeing the contents. This Court has held that an apology

cannot be a defence, a justification can be accepted if it can be ignored

without compromising the dignity of the Court (Vishram Singh

Raghubanshi v. State of U.P.

4

). There is, as already stated, no remorse on

the part of the contemnor which we find in the present case.

34.The only next question is whether he has a right to be heard on

sentence in the background of the facts that the notice sent to him by our

order is both to be proceeded against him on merits and on sentence for his

endeavour to scandalise the Court. It is a contempt on the face of the Court

by the reason of the pleadings filed by him. We are not mandated in view of

4

 (2011) 7 SCC 776.

21

the aforesaid to give him a hearing on the issue of sentence but would still

give him one more chance and, thus, consider it appropriate to list the

petition to hear the contemnor on the question of final sentence.

...……………………………J.

[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]

...……………………………J.

[M.M. Sundresh]

New Delhi.

September 29, 2021.

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