As per case facts, the appellant's bamboo mat was confiscated, leading to a legal dispute. The Bombay High Court reversed an earlier order that directed the release of the bamboo ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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PETITIONER:
SURESH LOHIYA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/08/1996
BENCH:
G.N.RAY, B.L.HANSARIA
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
HANSARIA. J.
Whether bamboo mat as a forest-produce as is this
expression known to the Indian forest Act ? requires our
determination on this appeal. This question would decide
Whether the order of confiscation of bamboo mat belonging to
the appellant was in accordance with law. The Bombay High
Court, having been approached in revision by the State
against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge directing
release of the bamboo mat, has reversed the order being of
the view that the product confiscated was "forest-produce".
The owner of the bamboo mat has approached this Court by
filing this appeal.
2. "Forest-produce" has been defined in The Indian Forest
Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as below:
"2(4) "forest-produce" includes :-
(a) the following she their found
in, or brought from, a forest or
not, that is to say timber,
charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu,
wood-oil, resin, natural varnish,
bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua
seeds, kuth and myrabolams, and
(b) the following when found in, or
brought from a forest, that is to
say -
(i) trees and leaves, flowers and
fruits, and all other parts or
produce not herein before
mentioned, of trees.
(ii) plants not being trees
(including grass, creepers, reeds
and moss), and all parts or produce
of such plants,
(iii) wild animals an skins, tusks,
horns, bones, silk, horns, honey
and was, and all other parts or
produce of animals, and
(iv) peat, surface soil, rock and
minerals (including lime-stone,
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laterite. mineral oils, and all
products of mines or quarries)."
We must also note the definition of "timber" as given
in sub-clause (6) and of "tree' in sub-clause (7) - the same
being as below :
"(6) " timber' includes trees when
they have fallen or have been
felled, and all wood whether cut up
or fashioned or hollowed out for
any purpose or not; and
(7) "tree" includes palms, bamboos,
stumps, brush-wood and canes."
3. The High Court's decision is principally based on a
conjoint reading of definition of "timber" and "tree". It
has stated that as definition of "tree" includes bamboo, and
as definition of "timber" includes tree, even a fashioned
bamboo would be a tree. It was then stated that "forest-
produce" having been defined as any produce of tree in sub-
clause (i) of clause (b) of sub section (4), bamboo mat is
forest-produce. In taking this view the High Court differed
from what had been held Gujarat High Court in Fatesang Gimba
Vasava Vs. State of Gujarat High Court in Fatesang Gimba
Vasava vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 Gujarat 9.
4. Shri Bhatia, appearing for the appellant, who was duly
assisted by Ms. Verma, submitted that the High Court erred
in holding that a product like bamboo mat would be forest-
produce by relying on the definition of "timber" because
that definition is in two parts and the second part which
speaks of "all wood ......fashioned....... or not" has no
application so far trees are concerned, which have been
dealt in the first part of the definition. It has also been
urged that bamboo mat being a separate commercial product
what was stated by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang's case
merits our acceptance.
5. Shri Dholakia, who was duly assisted by Shri Jadhav,
however, contends that if bamboo mat is held to be not a
forest-produce, the object of the Act would be frustrated
inasmuch as it would debar the forest authorities to inquire
about the removal of such goods from the forests, which
would be used as a handle by unscrupulous dealers to denude
the country of his forest wealth. To buttress his
submission, reference has been made in the definition of
"produce" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which reads : the
expression 'produce of mines or minerals' does not
necessarily mean produce in its native state; coke may be
such produce, although by combustion its chemical nature is
changed."
6. We have given our considered thought to the rival
contentions. It appears to us that the High Court erred in
taking the abovesaid view by referring to the definition of
"timber" inasmuch as we agree with Shri Bhatia that the
second part of the definition does not take within its fold
fashioned bamboo as that part is relatable to wood, and not
tree. We have said so because the definition of tree
includes even canes, and a cane cannot be taken as a wood,
even if a tree could be. But then, the High Court has also
referred to sub-clause (i) (supra) which speaks of produce
of tree as well. As to this, submission of the appellant's
counsel has been that when sub-clause (i) is read as a whole
the same would clearly indicate that such produce of tree
alone is contemplated which is a natural growth or product
like flowers and fruits. This submission has force when the
definition of forest-produce is read in its entirety which
would show that the definition either includes nature's
gifts like charcoal, mahua flowers or minerals. Wild animals
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of which sub-clause (iii) speaks of is also a God's gift and
not man-made. Wherever the legislature wanted to include
article produced with the aid of human labour, it has said
so specifically as would appear from sub-clause (iv), as it
speaks, apart from minerals etc. of "all products of mines
or quarries".
7. The legislature having defined "forest-produce", it is
not permissible to us to read in the definition something
which is not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest
wealth is required to be preserved; but, it is not open to
us to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at
hand is to iron out cresses; it cannot weave a new texture.
If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for
the legislature to take care of the same.
8. We may also state that according to us the view taken
by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang's case is correct,
because though bamboo as a whole is forest produce, if a
product, commercially new and distinct, known to the
business community as totally different is brought into
existence by human labour, such an article and product
would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of this
expression leaves nothing to doubt that it would dot take
within its fold an article or thing which is totally
different from, forest-produce, having a distinct
character. May it be stated that where a word or an
expression is defined by the legislature, courts have to
look to that definition; the general understanding of it can
not be determinative. So, what has been stated in Strouds'
Judicial Dictionary regarding a "produce" can not be
decisive. Therefore, where a product from bamboo is
commercially different from it and in common parlance taken
as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed
within the expression "forest-produce" as defined in section
2 (4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. that
bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the
commercial world, has not been disputed before us and
rightly.
9. In view of all the above, we hold that bamboo mat is
not a forest-produce in the eye of the Act, and so, allow
the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High
Court and state that the order of confiscation passed by the
Conservator of Forest was not in accordance with law.
The landmark Supreme Court ruling in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra and Another delves into the critical legal question surrounding the Definition of Forest Produce under the Indian Forest Act, 1927. This pivotal judgment, which clarified the Bamboo Mat Legal Status, is now available for in-depth analysis on CaseOn, highlighting its significant implications for environmental law and commercial practices.
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether a bamboo mat, a manufactured product, falls within the ambit of 'forest-produce' as defined in the Indian Forest Act, 1927. This determination was crucial for deciding the legality of an order confiscating bamboo mats belonging to the appellant.
The Court meticulously examined the definitions provided in the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (referred to as 'the Act'):
This section broadly defines 'forest-produce' to include:
'Timber' includes trees when they have fallen or been felled, and all wood, whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose.
'Tree' includes palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood, and canes.
The Supreme Court carefully analyzed the arguments presented by both parties and the reasoning of the lower courts.
The Bombay High Court, in its revisional order, had deemed bamboo mats as 'forest-produce.' Its reasoning hinged on a conjoint reading of the definitions of 'timber' and 'tree.' Since 'tree' includes bamboo, and 'timber' includes trees (even fashioned wood), the High Court concluded that a fashioned bamboo product like a mat would also be 'forest-produce' under Section 2(4)(b)(i), which refers to 'any produce of tree.' The High Court had, in doing so, differed from a previous Gujarat High Court ruling in Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat.
The appellant, Suresh Lohiya, contended that the High Court erred. His counsel argued that the definition of 'timber' has two parts, and the second part ('all wood...fashioned') primarily concerns wood and not 'trees' in general. Given that bamboo, though a 'tree,' is not always considered 'wood' (e.g., canes are also 'trees' but not 'wood'), this part of the definition should not extend to fashioned bamboo products. Furthermore, the appellant emphasized that a bamboo mat is a distinct commercial product, significantly transformed from its original state as bamboo.
The State of Maharashtra argued that classifying bamboo mats as non-'forest-produce' would frustrate the Act's purpose, allowing unscrupulous dealers to exploit forest resources. They referenced Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, suggesting that 'produce' can include items whose chemical nature has changed (like coke from minerals).
The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the appellant.
Firstly, it clarified that the second part of the 'timber' definition (pertaining to 'all wood...fashioned') does not apply to fashioned bamboo. The Court reasoned that 'tree' encompasses items like canes, which are not 'wood.' Therefore, the High Court's interpretation of 'timber' including fashioned bamboo as 'wood' was flawed.
Secondly, regarding Section 2(4)(b)(i) ('produce of tree'), the Court highlighted that the overall scheme of the 'forest-produce' definition primarily covers natural growths or products (e.g., flowers, fruits). It noted that where human labor is intended to create a product (e.g., 'products of mines or quarries'), the Act explicitly states so. The absence of such specific inclusion for man-made products from bamboo strongly indicated that such transformed items were not intended to be 'forest-produce.'
The Court stressed that when a legislature defines a term, courts must adhere to that definition and not import external meanings or create new textures. It acknowledged the importance of preserving forest wealth but stated that legislative gaps could not be filled by judicial interpretation.
For legal professionals and students seeking to quickly grasp the nuances of such complex environmental law cases, CaseOn.in offers invaluable resources. Our 2-minute audio briefs provide a concise yet comprehensive analysis of these specific rulings, making it easier to stay informed and understand key legal precedents.
Crucially, the Supreme Court agreed with the Gujarat High Court's view in Fatesang's case: if a product, though derived from forest produce, becomes commercially new and distinct through human labor, it ceases to be 'forest-produce.' Since it was undisputed that a 'bamboo mat' is a commercially distinct product from raw bamboo, it could not be encompassed within the statutory definition.
In light of its detailed analysis, the Supreme Court held that a bamboo mat is not a 'forest-produce' within the meaning of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Bombay High Court's judgment, and declared that the confiscation order for the bamboo mat was not in accordance with law.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra and Another definitively clarified that a commercially distinct product, such as a bamboo mat, created through human labor, does not fall under the statutory definition of 'forest-produce' in the Indian Forest Act, 1927. This decision overturned a High Court order that had deemed the mat 'forest-produce' and upheld the appellant's right to his property.
This judgment serves as a vital precedent for several reasons:
Please note that all information provided in this blog post is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice regarding their specific circumstances. CaseOn assumes no liability for any actions taken based on the information presented herein.
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