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Surinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana

  Supreme Court Of India Criminal Appeal /1791/2008
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Case Background

●In this appeal judgement and order passed by Punjab and Haryana High Court are challenged.

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Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1791 OF 2008

SURINDER SINGH …APPELLANT

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1.In this appeal judgment and order dated 01/11/2007

passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is under

challenge.

2.The appellant is original accused no. 1. He was tried

along with Hazura Singh–original accused no. 2, Narata

Singh–original accused no. 3 and Kaushalya – original

accused no. 4 for offences punishable under Sections 498A

Page 2 and 304B of the IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge

Yamuna Nagar in Sessions Case No. 60 of 1994. Appellant is

the husband of deceased Anita ( “the deceased” or

“Anita”). Accused no. 2 is his father, accused no. 3 is his

uncle and accused no. 4 is his mother.

3.The deceased was daughter of Ram Lal. Admittedly,

she was married to the appellant on 24/04/1994. According

to the prosecution, the accused were not satisfied with the

quality and quantity of the dowry given at the time of

marriage. They used to taunt and beat the deceased. At

times, they used to keep her hungry. She had informed her

brothers and father about this ill-treatment and harassment.

Her brother Ashok Kumar and his brother-in-law Pawan

Kumar went to the house of the accused and protested. At

that time the accused told Ashok Kumar that if he had so

much affection for his sister he should give Rs.60,000/- for

the business of the appellant. Ashok Kumar expressed his

helplessness to meet the demand. Ashok Kumar sent his

younger brother Satish Kumar to bring the deceased home,

2

Page 3 but, the accused told him that he should take the deceased

home after some days. On 22/07/1994 the uncle of the

appellant i.e. accused no. 3 - Narata Singh went to the house

of the parents of the deceased and told them that Anita-the

deceased had committed suicide by burning herself. Ashok

Kumar accompanied by his father, brother Satish Kumar and

brother-in-law Pawan Kumar went to the house of the

accused. The burnt dead body of Anita was found kept on a

cot in the verandah. Ashok Kumar, then, went to P.S.

Yamunanagar and lodged FIR Exhibit-PK. On completion of

investigation the accused came to be charged as aforesaid.

4.The prosecution examined, inter alia, PW-6 Satish

Kumar and PW-7 Ashok Kumar, who unfolded the

prosecution story about the ill-treatment meted out to the

deceased. PW-9 Dr. V.K. Nagpal conducted the post-mortem

and gave report Exhibit-PH. PW-11 Maharaj Singh, DSP, who

conducted the investigation, gave details of investigation.

3

Page 4 5.The accused denied the allegations of demand of dowry

and harassment to the deceased. The appellant in his

statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. stated

that the deceased was well looked after. Lot of affection was

shown to her. When she was carrying, proper medical

treatment was given to her. She developed complications

and pregnancy had to be terminated. The doctors told her

that whenever she conceives she will have problem of

bleeding. The deceased was last examined on 19/07/1994.

After her abortion the deceased was in depression and,

therefore, she committed suicide. The accused examined

three doctors. They are DW-1 Dr. Mrs. Iqbal Kaur, DW-2 Dr.

Fitu Mago and DW-3 Dr. C. Vijayendra. DW-4 Anil Kumar, the

brother-in-law produced letter Exhibit-DF received by him

from the deceased.

6.The trial court by its judgment and order dated

01/08/1998 convicted the appellant and other accused for

offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC and

sentenced them to undergo RI for seven years each. The

4

Page 5 accused were also convicted for offence punishable under

Section 498A of the IPC and sentenced to suffer RI for two

years each. They were ordered to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-

each, in default, they were directed to undergo RI for six

months. The substantive sentences were ordered to run

concurrently.

7.The accused carried an appeal to the Punjab and

Haryana High Court. The High Court acquitted accused nos.

2 to 4 on the ground that allegations made against them

were vague and that they were living separately from the

appellant. The High Court, however, confirmed the

conviction and sentence of the appellant, hence, this appeal

to this Court.

8.Learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Nidhesh

Gupta submitted that since on the same set of evidence all

the other accused have been acquitted the appellant should

also have been acquitted because no part of the evidence

involves the appellant alone. Counsel submitted that there is

5

Page 6 nothing on record to establish that the deceased was

subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant.

Counsel submitted that, in any case, the prosecution has

failed to establish that the alleged cruelty and harassment

was in connection with dowry. The allegations are too

general and vague. No specific allegations are made against

the appellant therefore Section 304B of the IPC is not

attracted. Presumptions under Section 304B of the IPC and

Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also do not

arise in this case. The witnesses have made only bald

statements. No independent witnesses like neighbours have

been examined to prove that the deceased was treated with

cruelty. Thus, the conviction of the appellant under Section

304B of the IPC is not sustainable. In this connection

counsel relied on Surinder Kaur and anr. v. State of

Haryana

1

, Durga Prasad and anr. v. State of Madhya

Pradesh

2

and Geeta Mehrotra and anr. v. State of

Uttar Pradesh and anr.

3

Counsel further submitted that

so far as demand of Rs.60,000/- is concerned, no date of

1

(2004) 4 SCC 109

2

(2010) 9 SCC 73

3

(2012) 10 SCC 741

6

Page 7 demand is mentioned, therefore, it is not possible to say that

this alleged demand was made soon before the death.

Moreover, the demand was made for business of the

appellant, therefore, it cannot be called a dowry demand. In

this connection counsel relied on Vipin Jaiswal (A-I) v.

State of Andhra Pradesh represented by Public

Prosecutor

4

. . Drawing our attention to letter Exhibit-DF

dated 16/07/1994 counsel submitted that this letter was

written by the deceased just 15 days before the date of

incident to DW-4 Anil Kumar, who is brother-in-law of the

appellant. In that letter she has made no grievance about

the alleged harassment or cruelty. In fact, she has made

fond reference to the members of the appellant’s family.

This shows that allegations of harassment and cruelty are

false. Counsel also drew our attention to the evidence of

the doctors examined by the appellant in support of his

defence. He submitted that it is clear from their evidence

that while the deceased was pregnant she was bleeding and,

therefore, her pregnancy had to be terminated. The

4

(2013) 3 SCC 684

7

Page 8 deceased was told that she may not conceive a child.

Thereafter, the deceased went into depression. She appears

to have committed suicide while in depression. In the

circumstances, the appellant cannot be convicted under

Section 304B and 498A of the IPC. His conviction and

sentence deserves to be set aside.

9.Learned counsel for the State of Haryana Mr. Kamal

Mohan Gupta submitted that PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7

Ashok Kumar, brothers of the deceased, have unfolded the

prosecution case. They are reliable and trustworthy

witnesses. They have described the ill-treatment meted out

to the deceased and the demand of dowry made by the

appellant. Counsel submitted that the demand of

Rs.60,000/- related to the appellant’s business. The

evidence of PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7 Ashok Kumar

makes reference to the specific date of demand and specific

amount, which was demanded by the appellant. Counsel

submitted that deceased Anita died within 94 days of

marriage. There can be no doubt that her death caused by

8

Page 9 burns was otherwise than under normal circumstances. The

conviction of the appellant is legal and perfectly justified

and, therefore, the appeal be dismissed.

10.The evidence of PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7 Ashok

Kumar, brothers of the deceased, gives us the prosecution

story. PW-7 Ashok Kumar is the complainant, hence, we

shall first advert to his evidence. He stated that the

deceased was married to the appellant on 20/04/1994. The

accused were not satisfied with the quality and the quantity

of the dowry given by them at the time of marriage. They

used to taunt the deceased and the deceased had told him

about this many times. The accused used to demand

Rs.60,000/- for the business of the appellant or for getting

him some job. PW-7 Ashok Kumar further stated that once

he and his brother-in-law Pawan Kumar visited the house of

the appellant to request the accused to treat the deceased

properly. According to him, the accused told him that if he

had so much affection for his sister he should pay

Rs.60,000/- to them. He expressed inability to do so. On

9

Page 10 05/07/1994 the deceased came to their house and even at

that time she told them about the demand of Rs.60,000/-.

PW-7 Ashok Kumar further stated that on 21/07/1994 they

received a message that Anita should be taken home. He

sent his brother PW-6 Satish Kumar to bring his sister home

but the accused did not send her. On 22/07/1994 Narata

Singh, uncle of the appellant, came to their house and told

them that Anita had committed suicide. PW-7 Ashok Kumar

went to the house of the accused along with his brother PW-

6 Satish Kumar, his father and brother-in-law Pawan Kumar.

He saw the dead body of his sister kept in a verandah. He,

then, lodged FIR Exhibit-PK. It is pertinent to note that in the

FIR also PW-7 Ashok Kumar has stated that the accused

demanded Rs.60,000/-, for the business of the appellant or

for getting him some job. PW-6 Satish Kumar corroborates

PW-7 Ashok Kumar. PW-6 Satish Kumar also stated that

accused were not satisfied with the dowry and they used to

taunt his sister for bringing less and inferior quality of dowry.

He stated that the accused used to beat the deceased and

keep her hungry and the deceased used to tell them about

1

Page 11 the misbehaviour of the accused whenever she came home.

He further stated that on 05/07/1994 the deceased told him

that the accused are demanding Rs.60,000/- for investing in

the business of the appellant. They expressed their

helplessness to pay the amount. The accused continued to

beat the deceased. He further stated that on 21/07/1994

PW-7 Ashok Kumar received a message from his sister that

she should be brought to their house. He, then, went to the

appellant’s house to bring the deceased home. The accused

asked him to fulfill their demand before taking his sister with

him to his house. He returned home alone. PW-6 Satish

Kumar further stated that on 22/07/1994 Narata Singh, uncle

of the appellant came to their house and informed them that

Anita had committed suicide. He went to the house of the

appellant along with his father and brother and found that

the dead body of Anita was kept in the verandah. Thus, the

evidence of these two witnesses establishes that the

deceased was treated with cruelty. She was subjected to

harassment in the appellant’s house because the dowry

given in the marriage was inadequate and not of good

1

Page 12 quality. It is also established that the accused wanted

Rs.60,000/- for investing in the appellant’s business or for

getting him some job.

11.The fact that the marriage took place on 20/04/1994 is

not disputed. Anita died on account of burns in the

appellant’s house. Her death was otherwise than under

normal circumstances. She died just within 94 days of the

marriage. It is true that the relatives of the appellant have

been acquitted on the ground that there are no specific

allegations against them. It is argued that, therefore, the

appellant should also be acquitted because the allegations

are general as against him also. We are unable to agree

with this submission. There is a great difference between

the allegations levelled against the relatives of the appellant

and the appellant. The entire prosecution story revolves

around the appellant. The demand of Rs.60,000/- relates to

the appellant. The witnesses are specific on this point. PW-

7 Ashok Kumar has stated so in the FIR also. Therefore, the

appellant’s case stands on a different footing.

1

Page 13 12. It is further argued that neither PW-7 Ashok Kumar nor

PW-6 Satish Kumar have stated the exact date on which they

went to the house of the accused when the demand for

Rs.60,000/- was made and, therefore, it is not possible to

locate the date on which demand for Rs.60,000/- was made.

Resultantly, it is not possible to say whether the demand

was made soon before the death of Anita. We have no

hesitation in rejecting this submission.

13.Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states

that when the question is whether a person has committed

the dowry death of a woman, and it is shown that soon

before her death such woman has been subjected by such

person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with,

any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such

person had caused the dowry death. Section 304B of the IPC

states that where the death of a woman is caused by any

burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal

circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is

1

Page 14 shown that soon before her death she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her

husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,

such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband

or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Thus,

the words ‘soon before’ appear in Section 113B of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304B of the IPC. For

the presumptions contemplated under these Sections to

spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or

harassment was caused soon before the death. The

interpretation of the words ‘soon before’ is, therefore,

important. The question is how ‘soon before’? This would

obviously depend on facts and circumstances of each case.

The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It

relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to

person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental

cruelty is also of different shades. It can be verbal or

emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman.

It can be giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear

ones. It can be depriving her of economic resources or

1

Page 15 essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her

movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside

world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical

cruelty could be actual beating or causing pain and harm to

the person of a woman. Every such instance of cruelty and

related harassment has a different impact on the mind of a

woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a

lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which degrade

her dignity may remain etched in her memory for a long

time. Therefore, ‘soon before’ is a relative term. In matters

of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag

may differ from case to case. This must be kept in mind

while examining each case of dowry death.

14.In this connection we may refer to judgment of this

Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab

5

where this Court

considered the term ‘soon before’. The relevant

observations are as under:

5

(2000) 5 SCC 207

1

Page 16 “… … … “Soon before” is a relative term which

is required to be considered under specific

circumstances of each case and no straitjacket

formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.

This expression is pregnant with the idea of

proximity test. The term “soon before” is not

synonymous with the term “immediately before”

and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as

used and understood in Section 114, Illustration

(a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply

that the interval should not be too long between

the time of making the statement and the death. It

contemplates the reasonable time which, as

earlier noticed, has to be understood and

determined under the peculiar circumstances of

each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the

circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or

harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a

particular instance but normally refer to a course

of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a

period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or

demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it

shall be deemed to be “soon before death” if any

other intervening circumstance showing the non-

existence of such treatment is not brought on

record, before such alleged treatment and the

date of death. It does not, however, mean that

such time can be stretched to any period.

Proximate and live link between the effect of

cruelty based on dowry demand and the

consequential death is required to be proved by

the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or

harassment based upon such demand and the

date of death should not be too remote in time

which, under the circumstances, be treated as

having become stale enough.”

1

Page 17 Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of

dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and

the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be

applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on facts and

circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and

sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law.

15.The evidence of brothers of Anita show that after

marriage Anita was unhappy in the matrimonial house

because of the ill-treatment meted out to her. Anita died

otherwise than under normal circumstances in her husband’s

house within three months and four days of marriage. It is,

indeed, a very short period. The cruelty was spread over the

short period covering the date of her marriage till her

death displaying a course of conduct. In her case, in our

opinion, cruelty caused to her on any day from the date of

her marriage i.e. 20/04/1994 till the date of her death i.e.

22/07/1994 could be cruelty caused ‘soon before’ her death.

Therefore, even if date of their visit to the appellant’s house,

when the demand was made, is not stated by Anita’s

1

Page 18 brothers in the court, that hardly makes any difference. In

any case, the brothers have stated that on 05/07/1994 Anita

came to their house and told them about the demand. Anita

died shortly thereafter.

16. That takes us to the next submission that Rs.60,000/-

were demanded after the marriage for the business of the

appellant, and, therefore, it is not a dowry demand. In this

connection, reliance is placed on Vipin Jaiswal. In that

case the appellant therein was married to the deceased on

22/02/1996. The case of the prosecution was that ever since

the marriage, the deceased was subjected to physical and

mental torture by the appellant and others for not getting

sufficient dowry. The trial court convicted all the accused

under Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC. The High Court

acquitted the relatives of the appellant-husband, but,

confirmed his conviction. It is pertinent to note that while

acquitting the appellant this Court took note of the fact that

the deceased had left a suicide note in which she had stated

that nobody from her husband’s family was responsible for

1

Page 19 her death. The High Court while noting that the allegations

against the appellant were general in nature stated that the

demand of Rs.50,000/- was made six months after the

marriage and that was for enabling the appellant therein to

purchase a computer and for setting-up his own business.

This Court held that demand made for purchasing a

computer, six months after the marriage, was not a demand

in connection with marriage and was not a dowry demand

within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,

1961. Vipin Jaiswal is not applicable to the present case.

Explanation to Section 304B of the IPC states that for the

purpose of this sub-section, dowry shall have the same

meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, so far as it is

material to this case, states that dowry means any property

or valuable security given or agreed to be given either

directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other

party to the marriage at or before or at any time after the

marriage in connection with the marriage of the said party.

Thus, the emphasis is on property or valuable security given

1

Page 20 ‘at or before’ or ‘at any time after’ the marriage in

connection with marriage. The amount or things demanded

must, therefore, have a nexus with the marriage. In this

case both the brothers i.e. PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7

Ashok Kumar, brothers of the deceased, have clearly stated

that the accused were unhappy by the quality and quantity

of the dowry and the deceased was being taunted and

beaten-up for that. The words ‘insufficient and inferior

quality of dowry’ are important. They indicate that the

transaction of giving dowry was not complete. Sufficient

quantity of dowry was not given and that transaction was

sought to be completed by asking for Rs.60,000/- after the

marriage for the business of the appellant. This demand has

a connection with the marriage. Therefore, in our opinion

Vipin Jaiswal is not applicable to the present case.

17.We are mindful of the fact that in Vipin Jaiswal this

Court relied upon Appasaheb and anr. v. State of

Maharashtra

6

. In that case the accused was convicted

under Section 304B read with Section 34 of IPC. The

6

(2007) 9 SCC 721

2

Page 21 incident had taken place on 15/09/1991. The deceased was

married to the accused about 2 ½ years prior to the date of

the incident. The deceased consumed poison and died in

the house of the accused. The allegations were that there

was a demand for money and consequent beating of the

deceased. The evidence disclosed that the demand was

made for defraying expenses of manure etc. This Court held

that a demand for money on account of some financial

stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or

for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for

dowry as the said word is normally understood. This Court

held that being a penal provision Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961 will have to be construed strictly.

18.It is true that penal provisions have to be construed

strictly. However, we may mention that in Murlidhar

Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra

7

this Court was

dealing with the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

Speaking for this Court, Krishna Iyer, J. held that any narrow

7

(1976) 3 SCC 684

2

Page 22 and pedantic, literal and lexical construction of food laws is

likely to leave loopholes for the offender to sneak out of the

meshes of law and should be discouraged and criminal

jurisprudence must depart from old canons defeating

criminal statutes calculated to protect the public health and

the nation’s wealth. Similar view was taken in Kisan

Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra

8

. In State of

Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni

9

, while

dealing with Section 135 of the Customs Act and Rule 126-

H(2)(d) of the Defence of India Rules, a narrow construction

given by the High Court was rejected on the ground that that

will emasculate these provisions and render them ineffective

as a weapon for combating gold smuggling. It was further

held that the provisions have to be specially construed in a

manner which will suppress the mischief and advance the

object which the legislature had in view.

19.While we reiterate what this Court has said in

Appasaheb that a penal statute has to be construed strictly,

8

(1977) 1 SCC 300

9

(1980) 4 SCC 669

2

Page 23 in light of Kisan Trimbak and Natwarlal Damodardas,

we are of the opinion that penal statute, even if it has to be

strictly construed, must be so construed as not to defeat its

purport. Harassment of a married woman in an Indian

household is a peculiar phenomenon. In most cases it is

seen that the husband or the members of his family are

never satisfied with what they get as dowry. The wife’s

family is expected to keep fulfilling this insatiable demand in

some form or the other for some period of time after

marriage. Such demands are also fulfilled by parents of the

wife for fear of their daughter being ill-treated. The courts of

law cannot lose sight of these realities. The presumption

under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the

presumption under Section 304B of the IPC have a purpose.

These are beneficent provisions aimed at giving relief to a

woman subjected to cruelty routinely in an Indian household.

The meaning to be applied to each word of these provisions

has to be in accord with the legislative intent. Even while

construing these provisions strictly care will have to be taken

to see that their object is not frustrated.

2

Page 24 20.As stated by this Court in Appasaheb a demand for

meeting financial stringency may not fall within the ambit of

the term ‘dowry’ as defined under the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Similarly, a demand of money made six months after

marriage for setting-up computer business of the husband

may not be covered by the term dowry as stated in Vipin

Jaiswal. But, in this case, the demand is made to complete

and fulfill the demand of dowry made prior to the marriage.

The appellant’s grievance was about the inferior and

insufficient dowry given by the deceased’s family and after

marriage that was sought to be fulfilled by asking for

Rs.60,000/- for setting-up appellant’s business or for getting

him some job. Insufficient dowry given to the appellant was

sought to be supplemented by the demand of Rs.60,000/-.

The present case, therefore, stands on a different footing.

Section 304B of the IPC is clearly attracted to this case.

21.It was argued that the evidence of the doctors

examined by the appellant show that the deceased’s

2

Page 25 pregnancy was terminated, that she was told that she may

not conceive a child again and, that, thereafter, she was in

depression. It is argued that, therefore, she committed

suicide. It is not possible to accept this submission. Even if

the pregnancy of the deceased was terminated, that would

not necessarily lead to depression. In fact, DW-3 Dr. C.

Vijayendra, who terminated the pregnancy of the deceased

stated that it is not necessary that a patient may suffer from

depression after termination of pregnancy. Neither DW-1 Dr.

Mrs. Iqbal Kaur or DW-2 Dr. Mrs. Ritu Mago stated that the

deceased was in depression. They stated that there was no

imminent danger to the life of the deceased. No medical

record was produced to show that the deceased was in

depression and she was taking medicine for the same.

There is nothing on record to show that the deceased was

told that she will never conceive a child. It is not, therefore,

possible to say that the deceased committed suicide

because she was in depression. Reliance was placed on a

letter, allegedly written by the deceased to her husband’s

brother-in-law. It was submitted that this letter does not

2

Page 26 indicate that the deceased was tortured or harassed. In fact,

in this letter the deceased has fondly referred to the

members of the appellant’s family. PW-6 Satish Kumar and

PW-7 Ashok Kumar have not admitted that this letter was

written by their sister. It is also improbable that the

deceased would write a letter to the brother-in-law of her

husband. Assuming that she wrote such a letter, she would

never complain about the ill-treatment meted out to her in

her matrimonial house to the brother-in-law of her husband.

In any case, even if this letter is held to be genuine, that

does not dilute the evidence of PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7

Ashok Kumar. This submission, therefore, does not impress

us and is rejected.

22.None of the judgments relied upon by the appellant’s

counsel help the appellant. They turn on their own facts. In

Surinder Kaur the demand was made 2 ½ years prior to

the death of the deceased and, therefore, it was held that

allegations were not proximate to the death of the deceased

hence, Section 304B of the IPC was not attracted. In that

2

Page 27 case the appellants before this Court were the relatives of

Surinder Kumar, the husband of the deceased. There were

no direct allegations against them. Considering all these

circumstances they were acquitted. This case will have no

application to the present case.

23.In Durga Prasad the appellants were convicted under

Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC. This Court acquitted

them by giving benefit of doubt on the ground that except

for certain bald statements made by the witnesses alleging

cruelty and harassment to the deceased-wife no other

evidence was produced to prove that she committed suicide

because of cruelty and harassment. This case is also not

applicable to the instant case because here the demand of

Rs.60,000/- specifically relates to the appellant, therefore, it

cannot be said that qua the appellant there are no specific

allegations. Here the harassment and cruelty is inextricably

linked to the appellant.

2

Page 28 24.In Geeta Mehrotra the High Court had refused to

quash the complaint filed against the appellant(1), who was

sister-in-law of the complainant and appellant(2), who was

brother-in-law of the complainant, under Sections 498A, 323,

504 and 506 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961, on the ground that the question of

alleged lack of territorial jurisdiction cannot be decided by it

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The High Court left it open

to the appellants to move the trial court. While quashing the

proceedings this Court took note of the fact that the

marriage between the complainant wife and her husband

was dissolved by an ex-parte decree of divorce. This Court

was of the view that in the circumstances proceedings

initiated prior to the divorce decree ought not to be

prosecuted further. This Court also took into consideration

the fact that there were no specific allegations against the

appellants, who were relatives of the husband. It appears

that in the complaint there was only a casual reference to

the appellants. The instant case stands on different footing

because here evidence is adduced and the appellant is

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Page 29 convicted. The brothers of the deceased have stated on

oath that Rs.60,000/- were demanded for the appellant’s

business and for that amount the deceased was harassed

and treated with cruelty. That cruelty led to her death in

unnatural circumstances.

25.Before closing, the most commonplace argument must

be dealt with. In all cases of bride burning it is submitted

that independent witnesses have not been examined. When

harassment and cruelty is meted out to a woman within the

four walls of the matrimonial home, it is difficult to get

independent witnesses to depose about it. Only the inmates

of the house and the relatives of the husband, who cause the

cruelty, witness it. Their servants, being under their

obligation, would never depose against them. Proverbially,

neighbours are slippery witnesses. Moreover, witnesses

have a tendency to stay away from courts. This is more so

with neighbours. In bride burning cases who else will,

therefore, depose about the misery of the deceased bride

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Page 30 except her parents or her relatives? It is time we accept this

reality. We, therefore, reject this submission.

26.We are, therefore, of the view that the prosecution has

successfully proved its case against the appellant. The trial

court and the High Court have concurrently held the

appellant guilty of offences punishable under Sections 304B

and 498A of the IPC. We have no hesitation in endorsing the

view taken by the trial court which is confirmed by the High

Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant is

on bail. His bail bonds stand cancelled. He shall surrender to

the concerned court.

.…………………………..J.

(Ranjana Prakash

Desai)

.…………………………..J.

(Madan B. Lokur)

New Delhi;

November 13, 2013.

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Page 31 3

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