As per case facts, a claimant appealed against the dismissal of their motor accident claim, which sought compensation for injuries sustained in an accident. The incident involved the claimant's motorcycle ...
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Date of reserved for orders : 10.04.2026
Date of pronouncement : 01.07.2026
Date of uploading : 01.07.2026
APHC010008872012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3520]
WEDNESDAY, THE 1
st
DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 1406/2012
Between:
1. S.VENKATA REDDY, S/O.LATE PAKKI REDDY R/O.H.NO.45/24-K-
55-1, AMEENA ABBAS NAGAR, VENKAT RAMANA COLONY,
...APPELLANT
AND
1. ANDNADA RAO 2 ORS, S/O.LATE KRISHNA RAO, MAJOR OWNER
OF AUTO BEARING NO.AP 28 W 1176 R/O.H.NO.76/116/322/33,
GANESH NAGAR, KURNOOL.
2. MD NAWAZ KHAN, S/O.NOT KNOWN, MAJOR POLICY HOLDER OF
AUTO BEARING NO.AP 28 W 1176 R/O.H.NO.4-2- 5, VIKARABAD,
RANGA REDDY DISTRICT.
3. M/S BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED,
REP BY ITS MANAGER O/O.G.E.PLAZA, AIRPORT ROAD,
YERWADA, PUNE.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC before the High Court
2
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P V V SATYANARAYANA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. T V SRI DEVI
2. .
The Court made the following:
3
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.No.1406 of 2012
JUDGMENT:
Introductory:
The Claimant in M.V.O.P.No.437 of 2007 on the file of the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Family Court-cum-IV Additional District
Judge, Kurnool [for short ‘the learned MACT”], feeling aggrieved by the
dismissal of the claim made against the respondents, for the injuries
sustained by him, in the motor vehicle accident, filed the present appeal,
questioning the order and decree dated 15.02.2012 passed therein.
2. 1
st
respondent is the owner, 2
nd
respondent is the Policyholder, and
the 3
rd
respondent is the Insurance Company, with which the auto bearing
No.AP 28 W 1176 [hereinafter referred as ‘the offending vehicle’] was insured.
3. For the sake of convenience, parties will be herein after referred as the
claimant/petitioner and the respondents as and how they are arrayed before
the learned MACT.
Case of the claimant/petitioner:-
4. [i] On the fateful day i.e., on 21.11.2006 when the petitioner was
travelling on his motorcycle bearing No.AP 21 E 9354 on the way to home
near SP bungalow, Kurnool, one auto bearing No.AP 28 W 1176, [hereinafter
referred as offending vehicle], came in an opposite direction, in a rash and
4
negligent manner, dashed the motorcycle, thereby the accident occurred.
The petitioner sustained multiple injuries including fracture to his right wrist
and grievous injury to his knee joint. He was taken to Govt. Hospital,
Kurnool.
[ii] Later he was shifted to Viswabharati Super Specialty Hospital,
Kurnool and from there to Apollo Hospital, Hyderabad for better treatment
and incurred expenditure of Rs.30,000/- towards medical and attendant
charges.
[iii] The petitioner was aged about ‘39’ years, hale and healthy
earning Rs.3,000/- per month. He became disabled. Hence, entitled for
compensation.
5. 1
st
respondent is the registered owner and the 2
nd
respondent is the
policy holder, remained ex-parte.
6. The 3
rd
respondent-Insurance company filed its counter.
Case of the 3
rd
respondent-Insurance Company:-
7. [i] There was no negligence on the part of the driver of the auto.
[ii] The petitioner shall prove the pleaded accident, negligence of
the driver of the auto, injuries suffered, expenditure incurred for the
treatment, age, occupation and income, loss of income as well as valid and
effective driving license to the petitioner for driving the motorcycle.
5
[iii] There was no fitness for the offending vehicle, whereby there is
violation of the Police conditions. Hence, the Insurance Company is not
liable.
Evidence:-
8. [i] Claimant is examined as PW1, one Dr.B.V.Subba Reddy
Doctor, who treated the claimant/petitioner is examined as PW2. Claimant
relied on certified copies of Ex.A1-FIR, Ex.A2- Wood Certificate, Ex.A3-
Charge Sheet, Ex.A4- Lokadalath Docket orders. Ex.A5- Panchayath Bunch
of medical bills and prescriptions. Ex.A6- Discharge Summary issued
Viswabharathi Hospital. Ex.A7- Bills issued by Viswabharathi Hospital,
Kurnool. Ex.A8 - Test Reports. Ex.A9- Treatment Certificate with Bills.
Ex.A10 - Neuro clinic Prescription. Ex.A11- Medical check-up prescription by
Apollo Hospital, Hyderabad. Ex.A12- Tax Registration Certificate, Ex.A13-
SSC Certificate, Ex.A14- Driving License, Ex.A15- X-rays taken at
Viswabharati Hospital, Ex.A16- I.T. Returns, Ex.A17-Thasildar Certificate,
Ex.X1 is the Case sheet of the Viswabharati Hospital.
[ii] On behalf of the respondent- Insurance Company, one
S.Raghu, legal executive was examined as RW 1, and an employee from
RTO Office, Kurnool was examined as RW 2. The respondent-Insurance
Company relied on Ex.B1- Insurance Policy. Ex.B2- letter addressed to the
Superintendent of Police by the Insurance Company requesting for
investigation. Ex.B3- similar letter addressed to the Circle Inspector of
6
Police. Ex.B4 -driving license extract of one Goodenna. Ex.B5 – R.C. copy of
auto bearing number AP 28 W 1176. Ex.P6 -permit copy for the same. Ex.P7
- notice copy addressed to the Respondent No.1 from the Insurance
Company as to the claim made to Ex.B8 returned postal cover. Ex.B9
authorization letter from RTA, deputing to submit certificates before the
Court. [When the letter addressed to the Court from the RTO, RW2 together
to give evidence how the said document is marked on behalf of the
insurance company is not clear.] Ex.B10 - driving license extract, Ex.B11 –
R.C. of the offending vehicle.
Findings of the learned MACT:-
9. [i] The petitioner is injured and eyewitness. Certified copies of
Exs.A1- FIR, Ex.A3 – Charge Sheet supports his evidence as to the
accident. There is no evidence other than the evidence of PW.1 to show the
occurrence of the accident and there was inordinate delay in lodging the FIR
from 21.11.2006 to 01.04.2007. Delay is not properly explained. The reason
that due to hospitalization, report could not be given in time is not convincing.
When there was hospitalization, the medico legal case should have been
registered.
[ii] The delay appears to be for partly implicating the auto, case
against the driver of the offending vehicle, which was ended in acquittal due
to compounding in terms of Section 320(2) of CrPC even before the charge
sheet is filed. Hence, respondents No.1, 2 and the Insurance Company
7
cannot be made liable. As none of the respondents can be made liable, there
is no need to discuss the entitlement of the claimant and the quantification of
the compensation.
Arguments in the appeal:
For the petitioner/appellant :-
10. [i] Delay in lodging of FIR cannot be a ground to reject the
claim. But learned MACT has given more importance to the same. The
learned MACT failed to appreciate the evidence improper in legal and logical
perception particularly when charge sheet is filed and no steps are taken by
the Insurance Company to examine any witness including the other
respondents.
For the Insurance Company/3
rd
respondent:-
11. Planting of offending vehicle is the defence of the Insurance Company.
Therefore, the dismissal of the claim is properly done.
12. Perused the record. Thoughtful consideration is given to the
arguments advanced by both sides.
13. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are –
1) Whether the pleaded accident dated 21.11.2006 has occurred
due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle bearing No.AP
8
28 W 1176 [offending vehicle], by its driver? and whether the
petitioner sustained injuries due to the said accident?
2) Whether the petitioner/appellant is entitled to compensation? If
so, to what quantum and against which of the respondents?
3) Whether the dismissal of the claim by the Learned MACT under
the impugned order and decree dated 15.02.2012 is proper ?
4) What is the result of the appeal?
Point No.1:-
14. It is clear from the law and settled practice that any claim made for
compensation in terms of Motor Vehicles Act, the record maintained by the
Police in discharge of their official findings can be relied on. In the context
of objections, it is also relevant to note that the appreciation of evidence in
answering the question of fact as to negligence in a motor accident claim and
other relevant aspects learned MACT can rely on the official records
adopting the theory of probability with a holistic approach.
Statutory and Precedential guidance is as follows:-
15 (i). As per Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the State
Governments are entitled to make rules for the purpose of carrying effect to
the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.
(ii). In relation to claims before the learned MACT, Rule 455 to Rule
476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, vide Chapter No.11 provides
9
comprehensive guidance. As per Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules,
1989, the claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim basing on the
registration certificate of the vehicle, Insurance Policy, copy of FIR and Post-
mortem certificate etc.
16. As per Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, learned
Tribunal can relied on the crime record. The official acts done are presumed
to be proper until a contrary is proved particularly when some statutory
recognition is given to such official records.
17. It is relevant to note that in view of the summary nature and mode of
enquiry contemplated under Motor Vehicles Act and social welfare nature of
legislation the Tribunal shall have holistic view with reference to facts and
circumstances of each case. It is sufficient if there is probability. The
principle of standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied
while considering a claim seeking compensation for the death or the injury on
account of road accident. The touch stone of the case, the claimants shall
have to establish is preponderance of probability only. The legal position to
this extent is settled and consistent.
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal
Road Transport Corporation
1
, in para 15 observed as follows:
“15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a
holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that
strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular
manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants
1
2009 (13) SCC 530
10
were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance
of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not
have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have
taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the
parties..”
Reasoning and Findings :-
Accident - negligence:-
19. [i] In the light of the statutory presidential guidance, the evidence
on record require examination and appreciation. The claimant deposed as
PW1. He is an injured and eyewitness to the accident. Accident is not in
dispute even according to the letter correspondence of the contesting
respondent viz., Insurance Company to the Superintendent of Police.
Claimant as PW1 categorically deposed about the occurrence of the
accident, hospitalisation, continuation of treatment at various hospitals. The
date of accident is 21.11.2006. Ex.A8- Test reports are dated 23.11.2006 to
26.11.2006. During cross-examination of PW1, concentration was made on
the driving license of the petitioner.
[ii] Negligence is attributed to the petitioner. Negligence of the
driver of the auto is disowned. The petitioner, as PW1 stated that since he
was hospitalised because of the injuries, did not give report to the Police. He
has denied the suggestion that he managed the police to foist a false case.
For the question that he has colluded with the owner of the vehicle, he said
that he do not know who is the owner, as on the date of cross examination
11
also. Here, it is pertinent to note that owner of the offending vehicle and the
policy holder remained ex parte. The Policy runs with the vehicle. The core
accusation, whether the vehicle is involved in the accident or not, much
stress is there from the Insurance Company that the vehicle bearing No.AP
28 W 1176 referred as offending vehicle, did not involve in the accident.
[iii] In Ex.A1-F.I.R., the vehicle number is mentioned. No doubt the
F.I.R. is with a delay. The reason for the delay is mentioned as delay
occurred in obtaining the original wound Certificate. Further, there is
reference to both the original wound certificate and MLC intimation also in
Column No.14. Proper person to deny the involvement is vehicle owner of
the offending vehicle, but he remained ex parte. No steps are taken by the
Insurance Company to examine the owner. Whether any investigation has
got done by the Insurance Company and what happened to the investigator’s
report and why the said investigator is not examined for the Insurance
Company is not known.
[iv] Ex.A3 is the charge sheet, in which the crime vehicle details are
mentioned as AP 28 W 1176. Driver is known as Pinjari Badenna. Driving
licence particulars of the said Badenna also obtained by the Insurance
Company and got marked, which suggests that they have the details of the
driver including the address etc. Notices were got dispatched to the owner
also by the Insurance Company. Why no steps are taken to summon either
the driver or the owner of the offending vehicle is not whispered. Ex.A4 is the
docket proceedings that the matter is settled before the Lok Adalat and the
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defacto complainant and the accused have compounded the offence in terms
of Section 320(8) of Cr.P.C. The involvement of the driver -Badenna is
beyond doubt in view of the Lokadalat proceedings. The alleged violation
relating to the absence of a valid and effective driving licence, or any other
breach of policy conditions, is not made out.
[v] Evidence of RW.1 and RW.2 would at the best show that the
Insurance Company has reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police
and Inspector of Police, about the planting of the offending vehicle without its
involvement. No further steps are taken. There is no denial from the
respondents No.1 and 2 as to the involvement of the offending vehicle. The
defence of the Insurance Company is that there is collusion between the
petitioner and the owner of the offending vehicle.
[vi] Whether mere allegation of collusion is sufficient to establish
such a serious defence, is an important question. The written statement of
the 2
nd
respondent would drive to understand that all defences available are
taken including the contradictions, absence of driving licence to the driver of
the offending vehicle, driving licence for the victim/petitioner and attribution of
collusion to the petitioner with the Police and the owner of the vehicle, self-
negligence of the petitioner in lodging the FIR. As no steps are taken to
summon respondents No.1 and 2, collusion cannot be believed.
[vii] As per Ex.A2 wound certificate would show that the injuries are
caused due to road traffic accident caused by an auto. In view of the
evidence of PW1, the injured eye witness and in view of the official
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documents- Exs.A1 to Ex.A4, involvement of the offending vehicle is
acceptable. Negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle is also
acceptable in the light of the statutory and precedential guidance mentioned
above.
[viii] With regard to the delay, this Court finds it proper to note that
treatment to the victim/petitioner is more important than giving a complaint to
the Police. Mere delay in giving report to Police is no ground to reject the
claim. At this juncture, this Court finds it proper to refer to the observations
of the Hon'ble Apex Court made in a case between Ravi and Badrinarayan
and Others
2
relevant para numbers 17 to 19 reads as follows :-
“17. It is well settled that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground to
doubt the claimant's case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are, we
cannot expect a common man to first rush to the police station immediately
after an accident. Human nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of
kith and kin to such an extent that they give more importance to get the victim
treated rather than to rush to the police station. Under such circumstances,
they are not expected to act mechanically with promptitude in lodging the FIR
with the police. Delay in lodging the FIR thus, cannot be the ground to deny
justice to the victim.
18. In cases of delay, the courts are required to examine the evidence
with a closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents of the FIR should also be
scrutinized more carefully. If the court finds that there is no indication of
fabrication or it has not been concocted or engineered to implicate innocent
persons then, even if there is a delay in lodging the FIR, the claim case
cannot be dismissed merely on that ground. The purpose of lodging the FIR in
such type of cases is primarily to intimate the police to initiate investigation of
criminal offences.
2
(2011) 4 SCC 693 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 426
14
19. Lodging of FIR certainly proves the factum of accident so that the
victim is able to lodge a case for compensation but delay in doing so cannot
be the main ground for rejecting the claim petition. In other words, although
lodging of FIR is vital in deciding motor accident claim cases, delay in lodging
the same should not be treated as fatal for such proceedings, if claimant has
been able to demonstrate satisfactory and cogent reasons for it. There could
be a variety of reasons in genuine cases for delayed lodgment of FIR. Unless
kith and kin of the victim are able to regain a certain level of tranquility of mind
and are composed to lodge it, even if, there is delay, the same deserves to be
condoned. In such circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much
more significance than delay in lodging thereof supported by cogent reasons.”
[ix] Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in a case between Tamil
Nadu State Transport Corporation, rep by General Manager v.
P.Shanthi
3
, while answering similar contention as to the delay in lodging FIR
and standard of proof required in motor accidents claims cases, referring
several judgments, found that –
“17. It is the well settled law that proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are
summary in nature and it is suffice to consider, whether there is any
preponderance of probability, as to the manner of accident, as detailed in the
claim petition. Strict proof of evidence is not required.
18. At this juncture, this Court also deems it fit to consider a decision in
Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1369 :
(2005) 4 CTC 540 (SC), wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained
the distinction between a tort and crime, where negligence is the fact, required
to be proved and at Paras 13 to 17, held as follows:
“13. The moral culpability of recklessness is not located in a desire to
cause harm. It resides in the proximity of the reckless state of mind to the
state of mind present when there is an intention to cause harm. There is, in
other words, a disregard for the possible consequences. The consequences
entailed in the risk may not be wanted, and indeed the actor may hope that
3
2017 SCC OnLine Mad 38431
15
they do not occur, but this hope nevertheless fails to inhibit the taking of the
risk. Certain types of violation, called optimizing violations, may be motivated
by thrill-seeking. These are clearly reckless.
14. In order to hold the existence of Criminal rashness or Criminal
negligence it shall have to be found out that the rashness was of such a
degree as to amount to taking a hazard knowing that the hazard was of such a
degree that injury was most likely imminent. The element of criminality is
introduced by the accused having run the risk of doing such an act with
recklessness and indifference to the consequences. Lord Atkin in his speech
in Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1937] A.C. 576, stated,—
“Simple lack of care such as will constitute Civil liability is not
enough; for purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of
negligence; and a very high degree of negligence is required to be
proved before the felony is established.”
Thus, a clear distinction exists between “simple lack of care” incurring
Civil liability and “very high degree of negligence” which is required in Criminal
cases. Lord Porter said in his speech in the same case—
“A higher degree of negligence has always been demanded in order to
establish a criminal offence than is sufficient to create civil liability.
(Charlesworth & Percy, ibid, para 1.13)
15. The fore-quoted statement of law in Andrews has been noted with
approval by this Court in Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 59. The Supreme Court has dealt with and pointed out with
reasons the distinction between negligence in Civil law and in criminal law.
Their Lordships have opined that there is a marked difference as to the effect
of evidence, viz. the proof, in Civil and Criminal proceedings. In Civil
proceedings, a mere preponderance of probability is sufficient, and the
defendant is not necessarily entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt;
but in Criminal proceedings, the persuasion of guilt must amount to such a
moral certainty as convinces the mind of the Court, as a reasonable man,
beyond all reasonable doubt. Where negligence is an essential ingredient of
the offence, the negligence to be established by the Prosecution must be
culpable or gross and not the negligence merely based upon an error of
judgment.
16. Law laid down by Straight, J. in the case Reg v. Idu Beg, 1881 SCC
OnLine All 103 : (1881) 3 All. 776, has been held good in cases and noticed in
Bhalchandra Waman Pathe v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 26
16
: 1968 Mah LJ 423, a Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court. It has been
held that while negligence is an omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do; Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable
neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution
to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in
particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the
charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the Accused person to have
adopted.
17. In our opinion, the factor of grossness or degree does assume
significance while drawing distinction in negligence actionable in tort and
negligence punishable as a crime. To be latter, the negligence has to be gross
or of a very high degree.”
20. In view of the settled legal position and in view of the continuous
treatment of the petitioner in various hospitals, pleaded and shown covered
by the medical evidence, the objection of delay in lodging FIR pressed into
service by the Insurance Company found fit to be ignored. Since with regard
to the accident there is no oath against oath, this Court finds it appropriate to
accept the evidence of PW.1 in the light of the crime record covered by
Ex.A1-FIR, Ex.A2-wound certificate, Ex.A3- charge sheet, and Ex.A4-Lok
Adalath settlement Docket evidencing the compounding of criminal case
under Section 320(8) of Cr.P.C, and concludes that the accident occurred
due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle bearing No. AP 28 W 1176 /
offending vehicle, and the involvement of the said vehicle in the accident
stands established.
17
21. For the reasons aforesaid, point No.1 is answered in favour of the
petitioner concluding that the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle
is the cause for the accident and that the petitioner/claimant has suffered
injuries in the said accident. Hence, entitled for the compensation.
Point No.2:-
22. This Court finds it appropriate to observe that some Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunals are avoiding recording the findings on the issue touching
the quantification of compensation despite sufficient evidence is available, on
the premise that the Tribunal has answered the issue touching the
entitlement against the claimants for compensation, basing on the findings
on negligence or on the involvement of the vehicle. The findings on
negligence or the involvement of the vehicle stand on one footing. There is
possibility, that the appellate court, being the last Court of fact, may come to
the conclusion that the appreciation of evidence available by the first
Court/Tribunal is erroneous or important evidence is ignored, and
consequently arrive at a different finding with regard to negligence or the
involvement of the vehicle on the strength of the evidence available on
record. Then, with regard to the quantification of compensation, there will be
no findings of the Trial Court or Tribunal available for consideration by the
appellate Court. Remanding the matter after a considerable lapse of time
merely for the purpose of quantification of compensation would result
traumatization for the claimants, and unnecessary financial burden on the
18
tort-feasors, who may ultimately be liable to pay the compensation, at least
on the interest component. Therefore, it would be a good practice for the
Tribunals to quantify the compensation in every case, where the necessary
evidence is available, even if the Tribunal ultimately concludes that the
respondents are not liable to pay compensation for valid reasons. But
avoiding the exercise of quantification altogether, despite the availability of
evidence, cannot be appreciated.
23. The learned MACT ought to have addressed the issue relating to the
quantum of compensation as well. Having framed all the issues for
determination, the learned MACT ought to have rendered findings on each of
them. Since the evidence is available on record, this Court, being the first
appellate Court and the final Court on facts, can appreciate the evidence and
quantify the compensation with remittance to the Tribunal to avoid delays in
the interest of justice.
Precedential Guidance:
24. A reference to parameters, for quantifying the compensation under
various heads, addressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court is found necessary, to
have standard base in the process of quantifying the compensation, to which
the claimant is entitled.
(i) With regard to awarding just and reasonable quantum of
compensation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baby Sakshi Greola vs.
19
Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Anr.
4
, arising out of SLP(c).No.10996 of 2018
on 11.12.2024, considered the scope and powers of the Tribunal in awarding
just and compensation within the meaning of Act, after marshaling entire
case law, more particularly with reference to the earlier observations of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court made in Kajal V. Jagadish Chand and Ors.
5
,
referred to various heads under which, compensation can be awarded, in
injuries cases vide paragraph No.52, the heads are as follows:-
S. No. Head Amount (In ₹)
1. Medicines and Medical Treatment xxxxx
2. Loss of Earning Capacity due to Disability xxxxx
3. Pain and Suffering xxxxx
4. Future Treatment xxxxx
5. Attendant Charges xxxxx
6. Loss of Amenities of Life xxxxx
7. Loss of Future Prospect xxxxx
8. Special Education Expenditure xxxxx
9. Conveyance and Special Diet xxxxx
10. Loss of Marriage Prospects xxxxxx
_________
Total Rs. … xxxxxx
_________
(ii). Hon’ble Apex Court in Yadava Kumar Vs. Divisional Manager,
National Insurance Company Limited and Anr.,
6
vide para No.10, by
referring to Sunil Kumar Vs. Ram Singh Gaud
7
,as to application of
multiplier method in case of injuries while calculating loss of future earnings,
in para 16 referring to Hardeo Kaur Vs. Rajasthan State Transport
Corporation
8
, as to fixing of quantum of compensation with liberal approach,
4
2025 AIAR (Civil) 1
5
2020 (04) SCC 413
6
2010(10)SCC 341
7
2007 (14) SCC 61
8
1992(2) SCC 567
20
valuing the life and limb of individual in generous scale, in para 17 observed
that :-
“The High Court and the Tribunal must realize that there is a distinction between
compensation and damage. The expression compensation may include a claim for
damage but compensation is more comprehensive. Normally damages are given
for an injury which is suffered, whereas compensation stands on a slightly higher
footing. It is given for the atonement of injury caused and the intention behind grant
of compensation is to put back the injured party as far as possible in the same
position, as if the injury has not taken place, by way of grant of pecuniary relief.
Thus, in the matter of computation of compensation, the approach will be slightly
more broad based than what is done in the matter of assessment of damages. At
the same time it is true that there cannot be any rigid or mathematical precision in
the matter of determination of compensation.”
(iii). In Rajkumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Another
9
, the Hon’ble Apex
Court summarized principles to be followed in the process of quantifying the
compensation after referring to socio economic and practical aspects from
which, the claimants come and the practical difficulties, the parties may face
in the process of getting disability assessed and getting all certificates from
either the Doctors, who treated, or from the medical boards etc. principles
summarized vide para No.19 are as follows:
19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do
not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the
whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the
percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the
percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the
percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where
the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that the
percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as the
percentage of permanent disability).
9
2011 (1) SCC 343
21
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined
him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent
disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of
permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something
that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to
the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different
percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons,
depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age,
education and other factors.
(iv) In Sidram vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and
Anr.
10
vide para No.40, the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the general
principles relating to compensation in injury cases and assessment of future
loss of earning due to permanent disability by referring to Rajkumar’s case,
and also various heads under which compensation can be awarded to a
victim of a motor vehicle accident.
(v) In Sidram’s case, reference is made to a case in R.D.
Hattangadi V. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd.
11
. From the observations
made therein, it can be understood that while fixing amount of compensation
in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical
consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the
disability caused. But, all these elements have to be viewed with objective
standards. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations
of matter which rest in awarding speculation or fancy, though conjecture to
some extent is inevitable.
10
2023 (3) SCC 439
11
1995 (1) SCC 551
22
25. [i] PW2 –Dr.B.V. Subba Reddy, is the Doctor, who treated the
petitioner. He deposed that on 22.11.2006 petitioner was admitted to Viswa
Bharati Super Specialty Hospital with a fracture of right wrist joint and right
ring finger, surgery was done on right wrist joint, plates and screws fixed on
24.11.2006. He was discharged on 28.11.2006. Ex.X1 - case sheet was
issued by the Viswa Bharathi Hospital. Ex.A15 are the X-rays taken at Viswa
Bharathi Hospital and Ex.A8 are the prescriptions given by him. Even after
discharge the patient approached him for regular checkup on 04.12.2006,
14.12.2006 and 27.12.2006. There is deformity of right ring finger. There is
difficulty in holding objects. Physiotherapy is advised. During the cross
examination it is listed that PW2 did not give MLC intimation and the same
will be done by the Nursing home authorities. He do not know whether MLC
intimation is given to police authorities.
[ii] As per Ex.X1-MLC intimation is given at Government General
Hospital outpost. As per Ex.A2-wound certificate, out of (4) injuries, injury
No.1 is grievous and (3) other are simple in nature. Ex.A5 medical bills are
standing for Rs.24,432/-. They are coupled with the prescriptions. Ex.A6 and
Ex.A7 also containing the treatment record of Viswa Bharathi Hospital. Ex.A7
is around Rs.2,000/-. Ex.A8 is the Test Reports. Ex.A9 is the Treatment
Certificate with Bills. Ex.A11 is another bunch of Bills issued by Apollo
Hospital, Hyderabad. They are standing around Rs.25,000/-.
[iii] From the evidence on record, the following aspects can be safely
inferred and believed:-
23
1) The petitioner suffered four injuries. Three among them are simple.
2) Petitioner was treated in three different hospitals.
3) PW.2 –Doctor, treated the petitioner. There is no evidence
indicating permanent disability.
4) Income can be taken on notional basis, for want of proper proof.
5) Income tax returns filed unable to lend sufficient contribution.
6) Hospitalization and intermediate treatment can be accepted.
[iv] In the light of the evidence and probable inferences mentioned above,
the entitlement of the petitioner for the compensation under various heads,
found as follows:-
Sl.
No.
Head Fixed by this Appellate
Court
1. Pain and suffering
a) grievous injury (1)
b) Simple injuries (3)
Rs.25,000/-
Rs.20,000/-
Rs.10,000/-
2. Extra nourishment, nervous shock etc., Rs.5,000/-
3. Medical expenditure/treatment Rs. 50.000/-
4. Attendant charges Rs.10,000/-
5. Transportation Rs.10,000/-
6. Loss of earning capacity during treatment
@5,000/-p.m.
Rs.20,000/-
Total: Rs.1,50, 000/-
Interest (per annum) 7.5%
24
Liability:-
26. The defence of the delay is found fit to be ignored and when once it is
shown that the offending vehicle is involved, as the Policy being in force, the
Insurance Company is liable unless the violations are made out. Violations
for want of driving license or any fundamental breach of Policy conditions are
not shown. Therefore, the Insurance Company is liable to pay the
compensation. Fraud, collusion etc., among the owner of the vehicle and the
claimant is not shown with any evidence. Hence, the excuse of the
Insurance Company is not acceptable. Therefore, the Insurance Company is
liable to pay compensation in view of the Policy –Ex.B1. Hence, all the
respondents, particularly respondent No.3 is liable.
27. In view of the discussion made above, point No.2 is answered in favour
of the petitioner/claimant concluding that the petitioner/claimant is entitled for
compensation of Rs.1,50, 000/- @7.5% p.a. from the date of petitioner till the
date of deposit/realization. Though respondents 1 to 3 are jointly and
severally liable, particularly respondent No. 3 is liable to pay. Point No.2 is
answered accordingly.
Point No.3:
28. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the impugned
order and decree passed by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.437 of 2007
25
dismissing the claim petition, is not proper and the same is liable to be set
aside. Point No.3 is answered accordingly.
Point No.4:-
29. In the result, the appeal is allowed, as follows:
(i) The order and decree dated 15.12.2012 in M.V.O.P.No.437 of
2007 passed by the learned MACT are set-aside.
(ii) M.V.O.P.No.437 of 2007 is allowed as follows:
(a) Claimant is entitled for a compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- with
interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of
petition till the date of deposit/realization.
(b) Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are jointly and severally liable.
However, Respondent No.3/ Insurance Company is liable in
view of the Insurance Policy.
(iii) Time for payment/deposit of the compensation amount is two (2)
months.
(a) If the petitioner/claimant furnishes the bank account
number within (15) days from today, Respondents No.3/
Insurance Company shall deposit the amount directly into
the bank account of the petitioner/ claimant and file the
necessary proof before the learned MACT.
26
(b) If the petitioner/claimant fails to comply with (iii)(a) above,
Respondent No.3/Insurance Company shall deposit the
amount before the learned MACT and the
petitioner/claimant is entitled to withdraw the amount at
once on deposit.
(iv) There shall be no order as to costs in the appeal.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal
shall stand closed.
____________________________
A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J
Date: 01 .07.2026
Note:-
L.R. Copy be marked.
B/o.
Pnr
Whether the order is:
Speaking √ Non-speaking -
Reportable √ Non-reportable -
27
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A. No.1406 of 2012
% 01.07.2026
# S.Venkata Reddy, S/O.Late Pakki Reddy R/O.H.No.45/24-K-55-1,
Ameena Abbas Nagar, Venkat Ramana Colony, Kurnool Town and District.
. …. Appellant
Versus
$ Andnada Rao, S/o.Late Krishna Rao, Major Owner Of Auto Bearing
No.AP 28 W 1176 R/O.H.No.76/116/322/33, Ganesh Nagar, Kurnool
And 2 Others.
…. Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri P.V.V.Satyanarayana
! Counsel for the Respondents : Mrs. T. V. Sridevi.
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
2009 (13) SCC 530
(2011) 4 SCC 693 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 426
2017 SCC OnLine Mad 38431
2025 AIAR (Civil) 1
2020 (04) SCC 413
2010(10)SCC 341
2007 (14) SCC 61
1992(2) SCC 567
2011 (1) SCC 343
2023 (3) SCC 439
1995 (1) SCC 551
28
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A. No.1406 of 2012
# S.Venkata Reddy, S/O.Late Pakki Reddy R/O.H.No.45/24-K-55-1,
Ameena Abbas Nagar, Venkat Ramana Colony, Kurnool Town and District.
. …. Appellant
Versus
$ Andnada Rao, S/o.Late Krishna Rao, Major Owner Of Auto Bearing
No.AP 28 W 1176 R/O.H.No.76/116/322/33, Ganesh Nagar, Kurnool
And 2 Others.
…. Respondents
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 01.07.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may
be allowed to see the Order? Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of Order may be marked
to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
copy of the Order ? Yes/No
____________________________
A. HARIHARANADHA SARMA, J
29
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.No.1406 of 2012
01.07.2026
Pnr
In a landmark judgment that redefines the standards for adjudicating **Motor Accident Claim Compensation** and clarifies principles of **Insurance Liability in Accidents**, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati has delivered a significant ruling in MACMA No. 1406 of 2012. This significant ruling on **Motor Accident Claim Compensation** and **Insurance Liability in Accidents** is now comprehensively documented on CaseOn, offering legal professionals and students unparalleled access to its intricate details.
This case revolved around an appeal filed by S. Venkata Reddy (the claimant/appellant) against an order from the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Family Court-cum-IV Additional District Judge, Kurnool (referred to as the 'learned MACT'). The MACT had dismissed his claim for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The High Court, presided over by the Honourable Sri Justice A. Hari Haranadha Sarma, meticulously re-examined the evidence and legal precedents.
The accident occurred on November 21, 2006, near SP bungalow, Kurnool. The claimant, while riding his motorcycle (AP 21 E 9354), was hit by an auto (AP 28 W 1176), driven in a rash and negligent manner. The claimant suffered severe injuries, including a fracture to his right wrist and a grievous injury to his knee. He underwent extensive treatment across multiple hospitals, incurring significant medical expenses.
The claimant, a 39-year-old earning Rs. 3,000 per month, asserted that his injuries led to disability, entitling him to compensation. The auto's owner and policyholder (Respondents 1 and 2) remained ex-parte, while the Insurance Company (Respondent 3) contested the claim.
The 3rd respondent, the Insurance Company, denied any negligence on the part of the auto driver. They questioned the accident's occurrence, the extent of injuries, and the claimant's income. A primary defense was the allegation of 'planting' the offending vehicle, suggesting the auto was falsely implicated. They also argued that the offending vehicle lacked fitness, violating police conditions, and thus absolving them of liability. Furthermore, they alleged collusion between the claimant and the vehicle owner.
The High Court framed four crucial points for determination in this appeal:
The High Court underscored that claims under the Motor Vehicles Act are guided by the principle of 'preponderance of probability' rather than 'proof beyond reasonable doubt'. Relying on Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules 455 to 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the Court reiterated that official records like registration certificates, insurance policies, FIRs, and post-mortem certificates hold significant weight. The judgment cited the Supreme Court's observations in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, emphasizing a holistic approach and that strict proof may not always be achievable for claimants.
Addressing the MACT's overemphasis on the delay in lodging the FIR, the High Court referenced precedents like Ravi and Badrinarayan and Others. These rulings clarify that delay in filing an FIR should not automatically dismiss a claim, especially when valid reasons (like hospitalization and immediate treatment) exist, and there's no indication of fabrication. Human nature often prioritizes treatment over immediate police reporting. The Madras High Court's decision in Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation v. P.Shanthi further reinforced the summary nature of MACT proceedings and the distinction between civil and criminal negligence, where strict proof is not mandated for the former.
The Court outlined established guidelines for awarding just and reasonable compensation, referring to various Supreme Court judgments:
CaseOn.in further empowers legal professionals by offering 2-minute audio briefs that distill complex rulings like this into easily digestible summaries, crucial for quick analysis of such intricate motor accident claim compensation judgments.
The High Court found the MACT's reasoning for dismissing the claim flawed. It accepted the claimant's (PW1) testimony as an injured eyewitness, which was strongly corroborated by documentary evidence including the FIR (Ex.A1), Wound Certificate (Ex.A2), Charge Sheet (Ex.A3), and Lok Adalat Docket (Ex.A4).
Crucially, the Court rejected the MACT's concern about the delay in lodging the FIR, citing the continuous hospitalization and treatment as a valid and human reason. It emphasized that treatment takes precedence over immediate police reporting and that the delay did not suggest fabrication, especially since a charge sheet was filed. The Court also dismissed the Insurance Company's defense of 'planting' the vehicle and alleged collusion, noting a lack of evidence. The Insurance Company failed to summon the owner or driver or produce any investigator's report to substantiate their claims. The acquittal of the driver through compounding under Section 320(8) CrPC was also deemed irrelevant for civil liability under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Based on the preponderance of probability and available evidence, the High Court concluded that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the auto driver, and the offending vehicle was indeed involved.
The High Court critically observed that MACTs should quantify compensation in every case where evidence is available, even if they initially decide against entitlement. This practice prevents delays and additional burdens if the decision is overturned on appeal. The High Court, acting as the first appellate court, proceeded to quantify the compensation.
Based on medical evidence (PW2's testimony, Ex.X1 case sheet, Ex.A15 X-rays, Ex.A8 prescriptions, Ex.A5, A7, A9, A11 medical bills), the Court confirmed the claimant suffered one grievous and three simple injuries. While there was no evidence of permanent disability, the Court adopted a notional income basis to calculate lost earning capacity.
The compensation was itemized as follows:
This brought the total compensation to Rs. 1,50,000/-.
The High Court held that since the offending vehicle's involvement was established, and the insurance policy (Ex.B1) was in force, the Insurance Company was liable. No fundamental breach of policy conditions (like lack of driving license or vehicle fitness) or fraud/collusion was proven by the insurer. Therefore, all respondents (owner, policyholder, and Insurance Company) were held jointly and severally liable, with the Insurance Company bearing the primary responsibility for payment.
Given its detailed re-evaluation of the evidence and application of legal precedents, the High Court concluded that the MACT's original dismissal of the claim was improper and unsustainable.
In light of its findings, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the MACT's order and decree dated 15.12.2012. The original claim petition (M.V.O.P.No.437 of 2007) was allowed, granting the claimant compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/-. This amount is to be paid with an interest rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of the petition until the date of deposit/realization. Respondents 1, 2, and 3 are held jointly and severally liable, with the Insurance Company (Respondent No.3) primarily responsible for the payment due to the existing insurance policy. The payment must be made within two months, preferably directly into the claimant's bank account if furnished within 15 days.
This judgment serves as a pivotal reference for several reasons:
For legal professionals and students specializing in motor accident claims, this judgment offers invaluable insights into the nuanced application of law and evidence, shaping future litigation strategies and understanding of judicial discretion.
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
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