IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

I. RSA-598-1995 (O&M)

Swaran Kaur . . . . Appellant

Vs.

Jagdish Ram and Others . . . . Respondents

II. RSA-742-1995

Jagdish Ram . . . . Appellant

Vs.

Smt. Swaran Kaur . . . . Respondent

III. RSA-599-1995 (O&M)

Swaran Kaur . . . . Appellant

Vs.

Jagdish Ram and Others . . . . Respondents

IV. RSA-741-1995

Jagdish Ram . . . . Appellant

Vs.

Smt. Swaran Kaur . . . . Respondent

V. COCP-1396-2017 (O&M)

Swaran Kaur . . . . Appellant

Vs.

Jagdish Ram and Others . . . . Respondents

VI. COCP-1397-2017 (O&M)

Swaran Kaur . . . . Appellant

Vs.

Jagdish Ram and Another . . . . Respondents

****

RSA-598-1995 (O&M); COCP-1396-2017 (O&M);

COCP-1397-2017 (O&M); RSA-599-1995 (O&M);

RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

Reserved on: 22.04.2026

Pronounced on: 15.05.2026

Pronounced fully/opera>ve part: Fully

****

CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Argued by:- Mr. Sanjay Kaushal, Senior Advocate with

Mr. A.P. Se#a, Advocate for the

appellant(s) in RSA Nos.598 and 599 of 1995;

for the pe##oner(s) in COCP Nos.1396 and 1397 of 2017;

for the respondent(s) in RSA Nos.741 and 742 of 1995.

Mr. Radhe Shyam Sharma, Advocate for the

appellant(s) in RSA No.741 and 742 of 1995;

for the respondent(s) in RSA Nos.598 and 599 of 1995.

****

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

This judgment shall govern and dispose of four Regular Second

Appeals, as #tled above, along with two Contempt of Court pe##ons. The four

appeals arise out of two civil suits ins#tuted by Smt. Swaran Kaur against Jagdish

and others. Each of the par#es to the suits has filed two appeals i.e., two by the

plain#ff and two by the defendants.

2. In order to maintain clarity and avoid any confusion, the par#es in

all these appeals are being referred to as per their original status before the

learned trial Court. The records of both the suits, as well as the connected

appeals, were requisi#oned and have been duly perused and considered.

3. The dispute in both suits pertains to agricultural land comprised in

the following Khewats:

Khewat/Khatoni No. Total Area

591/779 211 Kanal 7 Marla

938/1327 89 Kanal 16 Marla

Total Area 301 Kanal 3 Marla

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RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

4. Smt. Harnam Kaur, a co-sharer to the extent of one-fourth share in

both the aforesaid Khewats, alienated her share measuring 75 Kanal 6 Marla

through a registered sale deed dated 01.06.1990 in favour of defendants Jagdish

and others, for a stated considera#on of ₹1,60,000/-. Similarly, another co-

sharer, Piara Singh, sold his one-third share measuring 100 Kanal 7 Marla in the

same Khewats to the very same vendees vide sale deed dated 21.07.1990.

5. Aggrieved by the said transac#ons, Smt. Swaran Kaur, also claiming

to be a co-sharer in the suit land, ins#tuted two separate suits seeking

possession by way of pre-emp#on in respect of both sale transac#ons.

6. In Civil Suit No. 52 of 1991, rela#ng to the sale executed by Smt.

Harnam Kaur, the plain#ff pleaded that the sale had been effected without

no#ce to her, in contraven#on of the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emp#on Act.

It was further alleged that the sale considera#on men#oned in the sale deed

was fic##ous and inflated. According to the plain#ff, the actual considera#on

was only ₹60,000/-, whereas ₹1,60,000/- was fraudulently inserted in collusion

with the vendor. Claiming a superior right of pre-emp#on as a co-sharer, and

asser#ng that the defendants were strangers to the khewat, the plain#ff sought

a decree for possession by way of pre-emp#on of the land measuring 75 Kanal 6

Marla.

7. Similarly, in Civil Suit No. 57 of 1991, pertaining to the sale by Piara

Singh, the plain#ff challenged the transac#on on iden#cal grounds. It was

alleged that though the sale deed recorded considera#on of ₹1,80,000/-, the

actual amount paid was only ₹80,000/-. Reitera#ng her status as a co-sharer and

asser#ng lack of no#ce of the sale, the plain#ff sought pre-emp#on of the land

in ques#on.

8.1 The defendants contested both suits by filing wriAen statements

raising, inter alia, preliminary objec#ons. It was contended that the plain#ff was

not reflected as a co-sharer in the revenue record and had procured a false,

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COCP-1397-2017 (O&M); RSA-599-1995 (O&M);

RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

collusive decree to fabricate such status. According to the defendants, the

plain#ff had acted in collusion with the vendors to defeat their lawful rights.

8.2 It was specifically pleaded that prior to the impugned sale deeds,

the vendors—Smt. Harnam Kaur and Piara Singh, had entered into an

agreement to sell dated 09.03.1990 in favour of the defendants for the en#re

land measuring 175 Kanal 12 Marla for a total considera#on of ₹11,41,500/-.

The s#pulated date for execu#on of the sale deed was fixed as 15.06.1990. An

amount of ₹85,000/- was ini#ally paid as earnest money, followed by a further

payment of ₹1,25,000/- on 22.03.1990, which was duly endorsed on the

agreement. It was alleged that thereaCer, the vendors, in collusion with the

plain#ff, engineered a fraudulent decree to defeat the prior contractual rights of

the defendants.

9. In the wriAen statement rela#ng to the sale by Smt. Harnam Kaur,

the defendants further asserted that the actual considera#on paid was

₹4,94,000/-, out of which ₹2,10,000/- had been paid earlier under an

agreement to purchase, and the balance at the #me of execu#on of the sale

deed. However, a lesser amount of ₹1,60,000/- was shown by the vendor in the

sale deed to avoid obtaining income tax clearance. The defendants claimed to

be illiterate persons, who were misled by the vendor and her associates. They

also denied that the sale had been executed without no#ce to the plain#ff.

Addi#onally, they claimed reimbursement of expenses incurred towards stamp

duty, registra#on charges, construc#on of 3–4 rooms for ₹75,000/-, and land

levelling expenses of ₹18,000/-, in case the suit was decreed.

10. With respect to the sale by Piara Singh, the defendants pleaded

that an earlier agreement to sell dated 20.06.1990 had been executed at the

rate of ₹48,600/- per acre, pursuant to which ₹4,00,000/- had been paid. The

sale deed was to be executed on 01.08.1990. However, the vendor executed the

sale deed prematurely on 21.07.1990. The total sale considera#on was stated to

be ₹6,09,627/-, out of which ₹4,00,000/- was paid on 20.06.1990, ₹1,80,000/-

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RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

before the Sub-Registrar, and ₹29,627/- prior to execu#on. It was again asserted

that only ₹1,80,000/- was reflected in the sale deed by the vendor to evade

income tax formali#es. Allega#ons of collusion between the plain#ff and the

vendor were reiterated. The defendants also claimed en#tlement to

reimbursement of expenses including stamp duty, registra#on charges, pe##on-

writer’s fee, construc#on expenses of ₹50,000/-, and land improvement costs of

₹20,000/-.

11. The plain#ff filed replica#ons to both wriAen statements, denying

the asser#ons made therein and reitera#ng her claims.

12. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed necessary

issues in both suits, and the par#es led evidence in support of their respec#ve

cases.

13. The learned trial Court, vide judgment dated 04.11.1992, decreed

Civil Suit No. 52 of 1991 rela#ng to the sale effected by Smt. Harnam Kaur,

thereby gran#ng a decree for possession by way of pre-emp#on in favour of the

plain#ff, Smt. Swaran Kaur. While doing so, the trial Court held that the defen-

dants had incurred an expenditure of ₹75,000/- aCer the purchase of the land

towards construc#on of three rooms. Consequently, apart from the sale consid-

era#on of ₹1,60,000/-, the defendants were held en#tled to reimbursement of

the said amount, along with ₹20,501.50/- incurred on stamp and registra#on

charges and ₹48.50/- towards scribing of the sale deed. Accordingly, the suit

was decreed subject to payment of a total amount of ₹2,55,550/- by the plain-

#ff, aCer adjus#ng the one-fiCh pre-emp#on money already deposited.

14. The aforesaid judgment led to filing of the appeal before the

learned District Judge, Sirsa by the defendants. The first Appellate Court, vide

judgment dated 21.12.1994, concurred with the findings of the trial Court inso-

far as the plain#ff’s right of pre-emp#on was concerned. However, the decree

was modified on the ques#on of considera#on and consequen#al payments.

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RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

The suit was ul#mately decreed subject to payment of ₹4,98,700/- in total, com-

prising ₹4,60,000/- as the actual sale considera#on, ₹18,000/- towards improve-

ment expenses, and ₹20,700/- towards stamp and registra#on charges, aCer ex-

cluding the amount already deposited by the plain#ff.

15. Aggrieved by the modifica#on made by the first Appellate Court,

both par#es approached this Court by way of separate Regular Second Appeals.

RSA No. 598 of 1995 has been preferred by the plain#ff Smt. Swaran Kaur, chal-

lenging the enhancement of sale considera#on as determined by the learned

District Judge. On the other hand, RSA No. 742 of 1995 has been filed by the de-

fendants, inter alia, contending that the plain#ff was not a co-sharer in the suit

Khewats and that the decree dated 19.04.1990, on the basis of which she

claimed such status, was collusive and not binding upon their rights. It is thus

contended that the decree for pre-emp#on has been erroneously granted by

the Courts below and that the suit deserves dismissal.

16. Insofar as Civil Suit No. 57 of 1991, pertaining to the sale executed

by Piara Singh measuring 100 Kanal 7 Marla, is concerned, the learned trial

Court, vide judgment dated 23.11.1992, dismissed the suit. The trial Court held

that the decree dated 19.04.1990 in favour of the plain#ff was collusive in na-

ture and, therefore, incapable of conferring upon her the status of a co-sharer.

Consequently, it was held that the plain#ff did not possess a superior right of

pre-emp#on, leading to dismissal of the suit.

17. The plain#ff preferred Civil Appeal No. 36 of 1992/93 against the

said judgment. The learned District Judge, Sirsa, ac#ng as the first Appellate

Court, vide judgment dated 21.12.1994, reversed the findings of the trial Court.

It was held that the plain#ff was en#tled to exercise the right of pre-emp#on in

respect of the sale executed by Piara Singh. Accordingly, the suit was decreed

subject to payment of ₹6,03,200/-, aCer adjus#ng the amount already de-

posited by the plain#ff at the #me of ins#tu#on of the suit.

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RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

18. This judgment dated 21.12.1994 of the first appellate court has

also been challenged by both par#es through separate appeals. RSA No. 599 of

1995 has been filed by the plain#ff Smt. Swaran Kaur, assailing the determina-

#on of sale considera#on, contending that the actual considera#on paid was

only ₹1,80,000/-. Conversely, RSA No. 741 of 1995 has been preferred by the

defendants, who assert that the trial Court had rightly concluded that the de-

cree dated 19.04.1990 in favour of the plain#ff was collusive, and hence, she

lacked the status of a co-sharer and the corresponding right of pre-emp#on. The

defendants accordingly pray for seHng aside the judgment of the first Appellate

Court and restora#on of the trial Court’s judgment dismissing the suit.

19.1 It may further be no#ced that during pendency of RSA No.598 of

1995, CM No.4391-C of 2006 was disposed of by a Co-ordinate Bench of this

Court on 14.07.2006, whereby respondents Jagdish and others, who were the

vendees, were permiAed to alienate the land in dispute in favour of Shiv

Shambhu Sharma. Such permission, however, was made subject to the condi-

#on that the proposed sale deed would specifically recite that the transfer shall

remain subject to the final decision of the appeal. The Court had also directed

that a copy of the sale deed be placed on the record of the case. Shiv Shambhu

Sharma had, in support of the said applica#on, filed an affidavit sta#ng that he

had no objec#on to incorpora#on of the aforesaid condi#on in the sale deed to

be executed in his favour.

19.2 A similar order dated 14.07.2006 was passed in CM No.4393-C of

2006 arising out of RSA No.599 of 1995 permiHng aliena#on of the land in

favour of the same proposed vendee.

20.1 Subsequently, Smt. Swaran Kaur filed COCP No.1396 of 2017 in

RSA No.598 of 1995 under Sec#ons 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act al-

leging deliberate and willful disobedience of the order dated 14.07.2006 by

Jagdish and others as well as by Shiv Shambhu Sharma. The principal allega#on

raised in the pe##on was that even prior to obtaining permission from this

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Court, respondents Jagdish and others had already executed a General Power of

AAorney dated 18.05.2006 in favour of Shiv Shambhu Sharma in respect of the

disputed property, but the said fact was inten#onally concealed from the Court

while seeking permission to alienate the land.

20.2 It was further alleged that despite the specific condi#ons imposed

by this Court, neither was the GPA suitably amended so as to incorporate the

s#pula#on that the transfer would remain subject to the final outcome of the

appeals, nor was any copy of the sale deed placed on the record of the case. Ac-

cording to the pe##oner, the conduct of Jagdish and others as well as Shiv

Shambhu Sharma amounted to clear viola#on of the order dated 14.07.2006.

20.3 The pe##oner further alleged that Shiv Shambhu Sharma, ac#ng

on the strength of the aforesaid GPA, subsequently transferred the disputed

property in favour of his wife Smt. Geeta Sharma in the year 2012 in a clandes-

#ne manner, again without disclosing the pendency of the appeals or the condi-

#ons imposed by this Court. It was pleaded that the pe##oner remained un-

aware of both the GPA and the subsequent transfer in favour of Geeta Sharma

un#l par##on proceedings were ini#ated by Geeta Sharma in the year 2016.

20.4 During the aforesaid proceedings, the pe##oner allegedly discov-

ered not only the earlier transac#ons but also the fact that she had been pro-

ceeded against ex parte. An applica#on moved by her for seHng aside the ex

parte proceedings came to be dismissed on 17.10.2016, where against an ap-

peal was stated to be pending before the Collector.

20.5 On the basis of the aforesaid allega#ons, prayer was made in COCP

No.1396 of 2017 for ini#a#ng contempt proceedings against Jagdish and others

as well as Shiv Shambhu Sharma for inten#onal and willful viola#on of the order

dated 14.07.2006 passed by this Court.

21. COCP No.1397 of 2017 was thereaCer filed by Smt. Swaran Kaur in

RSA No.599 of 1995 raising substan#ally similar allega#ons regarding viola#on

Page 8 of 23

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RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

of the order dated 14.07.2006.

22. Upon no#ce being issued in the contempt pe##ons, respondent

Jagdish Ram was reported to have expired, whereas the remaining respondents

entered appearance through their learned counsel.

23. Both the contempt pe##ons were thereaCer ordered to be heard

along with the connected Regular Second Appeals.

24. It may further be no#ced that during pendency of COCP No.1396

of 2017, the pe##oner moved CM No.15440-CII of 2019 seeking permission to

place on record addi#onal documents Annexures P-6 to P-13, besides CM

No.15441-CII of 2019 under Order I Rule 10 CPC for impleadment of Saroop

Singh, Halqa Patwari, Ellenabad; Sanjay Choudhary, Tehsildar, and Rajendra

Verma, Tehsildar, as addi#onal respondents in the contempt proceedings.

25.1 In the said applica#ons, while reitera#ng the allega#ons already

levelled in the contempt pe##ons, it was further pleaded that the appeal pre-

ferred by the pe##oner against the order dated 17.10.2016 had been dismissed

by the Collector without properly considering her objec#ons. ThereaCer, the

Halqa Kanungo was directed to accept Naksha ‘Bay’ and prepare Naksha ‘Jim’,

which was ul#mately prepared and presented before the Assistant Collector on

04.08.2017. The same was approved on the very same day and the par##on

proceedings were accordingly finalized.

25.2 The pe##oner further asserted that Shiv Shambhu Sharma had

never intended to honour either the undertaking furnished before this Court or

the condi#ons incorporated in the order dated 14.07.2006. According to the pe-

##oner, aCer securing rights through the General Power of AAorney, Shiv

Shambhu Sharma transferred the disputed land in favour of his wife Smt. Geeta

Sharma without obtaining any permission from this Court and without disclos-

ing that the property remained subject to the outcome of the pending appeals.

Page 9 of 23

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RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

25.3 It was further alleged that despite having knowledge of the pen-

dency of the contempt proceedings, Shiv Shambhu Sharma con#nued to create

third-party rights in the property. Reference was made to sale deeds dated

05.11.2018 and 21.11.2018, whereby por#ons of the disputed land were al-

legedly alienated in favour of Smt. Sukhjinder Kaur wife of Jasveer Singh, Smt.

Maya Devi wife of Ram Singh, and Smt. SampaH Devi wife of Satyanarayan,

again without disclosing the condi#ons imposed by this Court in its order dated

14.07.2006.

25.4 The pe##oner also levelled allega#ons against the revenue author-

i#es by asser#ng that the order dated 14.07.2006 was very much within their

knowledge, inasmuch as the same found men#on in the Jamabandi for the year

2012-13 as well as in the corresponding Roznamcha entries. Despite this, the

said condi#on was allegedly omiAed from the subsequent Jamabandis for the

year 2017-18, thereby facilita#ng further aliena#on of the disputed property. On

that basis, allega#ons of deliberate connivance and willful disobedience were

raised against Swaroop Singh, Halqa Patwari, Ellenabad, Sanjay Choudhary,

Tehsildar, and Rajendra Verma, Tehsildar, and a prayer was made for their im-

pleadment and for ini#a#on of contempt proceedings against them as well.

26. The applica#ons and contempt pe##ons were accomp anied by

various documents including the order dated 09.09.2004 restraining aliena#on

of the property without permission of this Court; affidavit of Shiv Shambhu

Sharma furnished while seeking permission to purchase the property; order

dated 14.07.2006 permiHng transfer subject to the outcome of the appeals;

General Power of AAorney executed in favour of Shiv Shambhu Sharma; subse-

quent sale deed executed in favour of Smt. Geeta Sharma; orders passed during

par##on proceedings; cer#ficate of par##on; copies of contempt no#ces; and

subsequent sale deeds executed in favour of third par#es.

27. Learned counsel for the par#es have been heard at length and the

en#re record has been carefully perused.

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RSA-741-1995; RSA-742-1995

28.1 Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in

RSA Nos.598 and 599 of 1995, who is also represen#ng the pe##oners in COCP

Nos.1396 and 1397 of 2017, contended that though the learned first Appellate

Court was not jus#fied in enhancing the sale considera#on men#oned in the

sale deeds executed by Smt. Harnam Kaur and Piara Singh in favour of respon-

dents Jagdish and others, yet the appellants were not seriously pressing the is-

sue of considera#on in view of the more substan#al grievance regarding deliber-

ate viola#on of the order dated 14.07.2006 passed by this Court.

28.2 It was argued that Shiv Shambhu Sharma had furnished a specific

affidavit before this Court while seeking permission to purchase the disputed

property, wherein he had undertaken that the sale in his favour would remain

subject to the final outcome of the appeals and that the requisite s#pula#on

would be incorporated in the sale deed. Despite such undertaking and despite

the specific direc#ons contained in the order dated 14.07.2006, neither was the

condi#on incorporated in the General Power of AAorney executed earlier in

favour of Shiv Shambhu Sharma nor was any copy of the sale deed placed on

the record of the case.

28.3 Learned senior counsel further submiAed that Shiv Shambhu

Sharma thereaCer transferred the property in favour of his wife Smt. Geeta

Sharma and subsequently both of them created third-party rights by aliena#ng

the disputed land in favour of several purchasers, thereby further complica#ng

the maAer and rendering the orders passed by this Court ineffec#ve.

28.4 It was further argued that the revenue authori#es were equally

guilty of deliberate disobedience inasmuch as, despite having full knowledge of

the order dated 14.07.2006, they failed to reflect the said condi#on in the Jama-

bandi for the year 2017-18. According to learned counsel, omission of the said

condi#on enabled subsequent purchasers to acquire the property under the im-

pression that it was free from encumbrances and unconnected with pending li#-

ga#on.

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28.5 On these premises, prayer was made for ini#a#ng contempt pro-

ceedings against Jagdish and others, Shiv Shambhu Sharma and the concerned

revenue officials.

29.1 Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-

vendees as well as the alleged contemnors argued that both the suits them-

selves were wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed. Drawing aAen#on

to the pedigree table, learned counsel submiAed that vendors Smt. Harnam

Kaur and Piara Singh were closely related to the plain#ff Smt. Swaran Kaur,

whereas the defendants were complete strangers to the family and village af-

fairs and had no knowledge of the alleged collusive arrangements inter se the

plain#ff and the vendors.

29.2 It was argued that both the vendors had entered into an agree-

ment to sell dated 09.03.1990 in favour of the defendants with respect to their

en#re shares measuring 175 Kanal 12 Marla, with the target date for execu#on

of the sale deed fixed as 15.06.1990. However, aCer execu#on of the said agree-

ment and prior to the target date, Mohinder Singh, who was the real brother of

Piara Singh and brother-in-law of Smt. Harnam Kaur, inten#onally suffered a col-

lusive decree dated 19.04.1990 in favour of his son Karnail Singh and daughter-

in-law Smt. Swaran Kaur, thereby crea#ng co-sharership rights in their favour in

both the joint Khewats.

29.3 According to learned counsel, it was only by virtue of the said col-

lusive decree that Smt. Swaran Kaur acquired the status of co-sharer and be-

came capable of ins#tu#ng the present suits for pre-emp#on. It was further

submiAed that the decree dated 19.04.1990 was never reflected in the revenue

record and the defendants were throughout unaware of such proceedings. In

these circumstances, it was contended that the defendants had been defrauded

by the plain#ff and her close rela#ves ac#ng in collusion with each other.

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29.4 Learned counsel further argued that the aforesaid circumstances

had been rightly appreciated by the learned trial Court while dismissing Civil

Suit No.57 of 1991, but both the Courts below in Civil Suit No.52 of 1991 and

the learned first Appellate Court in Civil Suit No.57 of 1991 failed to properly ap-

preciate the fraudulent and collusive nature of the decree dated 19.04.1990.

29.5 Another limb of the argument raised on behalf of the respondents

was that the plain#ff herself had specifically pleaded in both the suits that she

had no no#ce or knowledge of the impugned sales. However, despite raising

such plea, neither of the vendors namely Smt. Harnam Kaur and Piara Singh was

impleaded as a party to the suits, nor were they examined as witnesses.

Learned counsel submiAed that once compliance with Sec#ons 19 to 21 of the

Punjab Pre-emp#on Act was specifically put in issue, non-impleadment of the

vendors assumed great significance and materially affected the maintainability

of the suits. It was further pointed out that even Karnail Singh, husband of the

plain#ff who appeared as PW-2, did not depose that the plain#ff had no no#ce

of the sales.

29.6 On the strength of the above submissions, learned counsel con-

tended that the suits were liable to be dismissed not only on account of collu-

sion but also for non-impleadment of necessary par#es, especially keeping in

view the seAled principle that the right of pre-emp#on is a weak right and can

be defeated by all lawful means. Reliance in this regard was placed upon Jhab-

bar Singh (deceased) through LRs and others v. Jagtar Singh, 2023 (14) SCC

199 and Smt. Chawli Devi (since deceased) thr her LRs v. Inderpal and ors., RSA

No.941 of 1991 decided on 04.11.2024.

30.1 In reply, learned senior counsel for the plain#ff/pre-emptor con-

tended that non-impleadment of the vendors was not fatal to the suits, as the

vendors were at best proper par#es and not necessary par#es. It was argued

that an effec#ve decree for pre-emp#on could s#ll be passed in their absence.

Reliance was again placed upon Jhabbar Singh (deceased) through LRs and

Page 13 of 23

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others v. Jagtar Singh (supra), as also upon Mange Ram and anr. v. Shiv Cha-

ran and ors., RSA No.2458 of 1991 decided on 23.08.2024.

30.2 On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, learned senior counsel

prayed for dismissal of RSA Nos.741 and 742 of 1995 filed by Jagdish and others,

for allowing RSA Nos.598 and 599 of 1995 preferred by the plain#ff, and for ini#-

a#on of contempt proceedings against the respondents, Shiv Shambhu Sharma

and the concerned revenue officials.

31. This Court has thoughQully considered the rival submissions ad-

vanced on behalf of the par#es and has carefully gone through the en#re

record.

32. At the very outset, it deserves no#ce that there is no dispute with

regard to the founda#onal facts. It stands admiAed that prior to execu#on of

the two impugned sale deeds by Smt. Harnam Kaur and Piara Singh in favour of

Jagdish and others, both the vendors had already entered into an agreement to

sell dated 09.03.1990 in favour of the defendants-vendees. It is equally undis-

puted that the decree dated 19.04.1990, on the basis whereof the plain#ff

claims to have acquired status as a co-sharer, came to be suffered aCer execu-

#on of the aforesaid agreement to sell but before the target date fixed therein

for execu#on of the sale deeds.

33. In these circumstances, the principal ques#on which arises for

considera#on is whether the decree dated 19.04.1990 was genuinely intended

to seAle pre-exis#ng rights or whether the same was a collusive arrangement

deliberately engineered to create a right of pre-emp#on in favour of the plain#ff

so as to defeat the prior contractual rights of the defendants.

34. The answer to the aforesaid ques#on becomes evident upon ex-

amina#on of the pedigree table and the revenue record produced on the file.

35. The Jamabandi for the year 1982-83 pertaining to both the Khe-

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wats reveals that Bagh Singh and his three sons namely Piara Singh, Mohinder

Singh and Inder Singh were recorded as co-owners to the extent of one-fourth

share each. Subsequently, upon the death of Inder Singh, his share devolved

upon his widow Smt. Harnam Kaur and daughter Balwinder Kaur to the extent

of one-eighth share each.

36. The aforesaid revenue entries clearly establish that Mohinder

Singh was the real brother of vendor Piara Singh and brother-in-law of vendor

Smt. Harnam Kaur. The evidence on record further demonstrates that Mohinder

Singh was ac#vely par#cipa#ng in the nego#a#ons and transac#ons with the de-

fendants-vendees. PW-1 Smt. Swaran Kaur, in her tes#mony, admiAed the in-

volvement of Mohinder Singh in the sale transac#ons. This aspect has also been

specifically no#ced by the learned trial Court while deciding Civil Suit No.57 of

1991. The significance of this circumstance cannot be overlooked. Once Mohin-

der Singh himself was closely associated with the vendors and the transac#ons

in favour of the defendants, he could not have independently asserted any su-

perior right so as to defeat the agreement already executed in favour of the de-

fendants. It is in this background that the decree dated 19.04.1990 assumes

considerable importance.

37. The record reveals that instead of himself aAemp#ng to challenge

the proposed transac#on, Mohinder Singh suffered a decree in favour of his son

Karnail Singh and daughter-in-law Smt. Swaran Kaur. It was only by virtue of the

said decree that Smt. Swaran Kaur acquired status as a co-sharer in the joint

Khewats and thereby became en#tled to ins#tute the present suits for pre-emp-

#on.

38. The #ming of the decree, therefore, is extremely significant. The

decree was suffered aCer execu#on of the agreement to sell dated 09.03.1990

and before the s#pulated date for execu#on of the sale deeds. Such sequence of

events, coupled with the close familial rela#onship amongst the par#es, leaves

liAle room for doubt that the decree was engineered with the sole object of cre-

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a#ng a right of pre-emp#on in favour of the plain#ff so as to frustrate the con-

tractual rights already accrued in favour of the defendants.

39. Another circumstance, which strengthens the plea of collusion is

that the decree dated 19.04.1990 was never reflected in the revenue record.

Had the decree genuinely represented a bona fide seAlement of rights, the nat-

ural course would have been to get the same sanc#oned and incorporated in

the revenue entries. The absence of any such muta#on or reflec#on in the rev-

enue record lends considerable support to the conten#on of the defendants

that the decree was merely a device created for purposes of li#ga#on.

40. It also deserves no#ce that defendants Jagdish and others were

not par#es to the proceedings culmina#ng in the decree dated 19.04.1990. Con-

sequently, they had no occasion to contest the same or even to become aware

of the arrangement allegedly entered into amongst the close family members of

the vendors. Nevertheless, the effect of the decree directly prejudiced the rights

of the defendants because it was only aCer obtaining status as a co-sharer

through the said decree that the plain#ff ins#tuted the present suits seeking to

pre-empt both the sale transac#ons.

41. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Court in

Civil Suit No.57 of 1991 rightly appreciated the aforesaid circumstances while

holding the decree dated 19.04.1990 to be collusive in nature. The learned trial

Court had rightly relied upon the Division Bench judgment of the Lahore High

Court in Shan/ Devi and ors. v. Firm Hira Lal Sheo Narain thr Shiv Karan Das

and ors., AIR 1941 Lahore 402, wherein it was held that when a third party

seeks protec#on against the effect of a collusive judgment, such party is en#tled

to contend that the decree should be treated as void insofar as his rights are

concerned, even though it may remain binding inter se the par#es to the de-

cree. The Division Bench further observed that in cases involving allega#ons of

collusion, direct evidence of conspiracy is seldom available. A party alleging col-

lusion is not expected to establish that he had overheard the par#es conspiring

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together or had access to the details of the arrangement. It is sufficient if the

surrounding circumstances clearly demonstrate that the natural and inevitable

effect of the arrangement was to defeat the legi#mate rights of another person

and no plausible explana#on for such arrangement is forthcoming.

42. The aforesaid principle squarely applies to the facts of the present

case. Here, the necessary and inevitable consequence of the decree dated

19.04.1990 was to create co-sharership rights in favour of Smt. Swaran Kaur af-

ter execu#on of the agreement to sell and thereby enable ins#tu#on of suits for

pre-emp#on against the defendants. No independent or bona fide reason for

suffering such decree has been brought on record.

43. Similar principles were reiterated in Sewa Singh v. Smt. Chal/ and

ors., 1988 SLJ 327, wherein it was held that where surrounding circumstances

unmistakably point towards a deliberate aAempt to defeat pre-exis#ng rights of

a third party, the Court would be jus#fied in drawing an inference of collusion.

44. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,

this Court is sa#sfied that the decree dated 19.04.1990 was not a bona fide ad-

judica#on of rights but a collusive arrangement inten#onally brought about to

defeat the contractual and proprietary interests already created in favour of the

defendants-vendees.

45. Having examined the en#re maAer in the aforesaid perspec#ve,

this Court is of the considered opinion that the decree dated 19.04.1990, on the

basis whereof Smt. Swaran Kaur claims to have acquired co-sharership rights in

the joint Khewats, was not a bona fide transac#on intended to recognize any

genuine pre-exis#ng right. Rather, the surrounding circumstances unmistakably

indicate that the sole object behind suffering the said decree was to create an

ar#ficial founda#on for ins#tu#ng suits for pre-emp#on and thereby defeat the

prior contractual rights already created in favour of defendants Jagdish and oth-

ers through the agreement to sell dated 09.03.1990.

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46. The chronology of events assumes great significance. The agree-

ment to sell in favour of the defendants had already come into existence and

substan#al rights had accrued thereunder. It was only thereaCer that Mohinder

Singh, who was closely related to both the vendors and the plain#ff, suffered

the decree in favour of his son Karnail Singh and daughter-in-law Smt. Swaran

Kaur. The #ming of the decree, the close familial rela#onship amongst all con-

cerned, the absence of any reflec#on of the decree in the revenue record, and

the subsequent ins#tu#on of the present suits for pre-emp#on immediately af-

ter the sale transac#ons, collec#vely leave no manner of doubt that the decree

was a calculated device intended to defeat the rights of the vendees.

47. In the opinion of this Court, a person who acquires the status of

co-sharer through such a collusive arrangement cannot be permiAed to invoke

the equitable jurisdic#on rela#ng to pre-emp#on so as to unseAle a prior lawful

transac#on.

48. Apart from the aforesaid aspect, there exists another serious legal

infirmity in the plain#ff’s case. Under Sec#on 19 of the Punjab Pre-emp#on Act,

a co-sharer becomes en#tled to exercise the right of pre-emp#on only where

the intended sale has taken place without no#ce to such co-sharer. Conversely,

where no#ce of the intended sale has been duly given, the right is required to

be exercised within the prescribed period. Thus, the ques#on whether the pre-

emptor had no#ce or knowledge of the transac#on assumes considerable im-

portance in adjudica#on of a suit for pre-emp#on.

49. In the present case, the specific plea raised by the plain#ff in both

the suits was that she had neither any no#ce nor knowledge of the intended

sales. This asser#on was specifically denied by the defendants in their wriAen

statements. Once such a factual controversy arose, the burden squarely lay

upon the plain#ff to establish that the mandatory requirements contemplated

under Sec#ons 19 to 21 of the Act had not been complied with.

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50. However, despite having raised such plea, the plain#ff neither im-

pleaded the vendors namely Smt. Harnam Kaur and Piara Singh as par#es to the

respec#ve suits nor chose to examine either of them as witnesses, even though

both of them were closely related to her. Significantly, the vendors were the

most material witnesses on the issue whether no#ce regarding the intended

sale had or had not been given to the plain#ff. Even Karnail Singh, husband of

the plain#ff, who appeared as PW-2, did not specifically depose that the plain#ff

had no knowledge of the sale transac#ons or that no no#ce had been given to

her.

51.1 In these circumstances, non-impleadment of the vendors cannot

be treated as a mere technical defect. Rather, it goes to the very root of the

maAer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jhabbar Singh (deceased) through LRs

and others v. Jagtar Singh, 2023 (14) SCC 199, while relying upon U.P. Awas

Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (dead) by LRs, AIR 1995 SC 724, drew a dis-

#nc#on between a “necessary party” and a “proper party” and observed that

where a suit for pre-emp#on is founded upon alleged non-compliance with

statutory no#ce requirements, the presence of the vendor becomes highly de-

sirable, if not altogether necessary, for complete and effec#ve adjudica#on of

the dispute.

51.2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

“As held by this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (dead)

by LRs AIR 1995 SC 724, necessary party is one without whom no order can be

made effec#vely, and a proper party is one in whose absence an effec#ve order

can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision

on the ques#on involved in the proceedings. When a right to pre-empt the sale

was claimed by the plain#ff alleging that the mandatory provisions contained in

Sec#on 19 were not complied with by the owner or seller, his presence as party

defendant was desirable along with the other defendants to effec#vely and fi-

nally decide the disputes between the par#es.”

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52. The aforesaid principle has also been followed by this Court in

Ram Singh and ors. v. Hari Singh and anr. (RSA No.1273 of 1993 decided on

20.12.2024).

53. Thus, although Order I Rule 9 CPC provides that no suit shall ordi-

narily fail on account of misjoinder or non-joinder of par#es, yet the Court is un-

der an obliga#on to ensure that all persons whose presence is necessary for

complete and effec#ve adjudica#on are before the Court.

54. In the peculiar facts of the present case, where the plain#ff’s al-

leged co-sharership itself arises from a suspicious decree; absence of no#ce is

specifically pleaded; such plea is specifically denied by the defendants; the ven-

dors are close rela#ves of the plain#ff; and the vendors alone were the best per-

sons to depose regarding compliance or non-compliance of statutory no#ce,

their non-impleadment assumes substan#al significance and materially affects

the maintainability of the suits.

55. It is also important to keep in mind the seAled legal principle that

the right of pre-emp#on is a very weak right and can be defeated by all lawful

and legi#mate means. As far back as in Bishan Singh and others v. Khazan

Singh and another, AIR 1958 SC 838, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the

nature of the right of pre-emp#on and held that such right is merely a right of

subs#tu#on enabling the pre-emptor to step into the shoes of the vendee. The

Court further held that preference being the essence of the right, the pre-emp-

tor must establish a superior right and that the right itself, being weak in nature,

can be defeated by all legi#mate methods.

56. The aforesaid principle has consistently been reiterated by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Barasat Eye Hospital and ors. v. Kaustabh Mondal,

(2019) 19 SCC 767; Raghunath (deceased) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (deceased)

thr LRs and ors., (2021) 12 SCC 501; and subsequently in Jhabbar Singh (de-

ceased) thr LRs and ors. v. Jagtar Singh, (supra).

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57. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court is

unable to hold that the plain#ff possessed any legally enforceable superior right

of pre-emp#on.

58. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the plain#ff had ac-

quired co-sharership rights by virtue of the decree dated 19.04.1990, the same

being a collusive arrangement intended to defeat the rights of the defendants,

cannot form a legi#mate founda#on for enforcement of the weak right of pre-

emp#on. Furthermore, the suits themselves suffer from a serious defect owing

to non-impleadment of the vendors despite the central issue regarding no#ce

under Sec#on 19 of the Act.

59. Consequently, this Court has no hesita#on in holding that the

plain#ff is not en#tled to seek pre-emp#on of the impugned sale deeds and that

both the suits were liable to be dismissed.

60. Insofar as COCP Nos.1396 and 1397 of 2017 are concerned, the

principal grievance raised by the pe##oner is that despite the condi#onal per-

mission granted by this Court vide order dated 14.07.2006 permiHng aliena#on

of the disputed property in favour of Shiv Shambhu Sharma, the respondents

deliberately violated the condi#ons imposed therein and subsequently created

third-party rights in the property. Allega#ons have also been levelled against the

revenue authori#es for allegedly facilita#ng subsequent transfers despite knowl-

edge of the pendency of the appeals and the condi#ons imposed by this Court.

61. This Court has duly considered the allega#ons raised in the con-

tempt pe##ons as well as the material placed on record by the pe##oner.

62. There can be no dispute with the seAled proposi#on that orders

passed by a Court are required to be obeyed in their leAer and spirit and that

any deliberate or willful disobedience thereof may invite contempt jurisdic#on.

At the same #me, it is equally well seAled that contempt jurisdic#on is essen-

#ally discre#onary in nature and is intended primarily to uphold the majesty

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and authority of the Court rather than to adjudicate disputed civil rights be-

tween par#es.

63. In the present case, the alleged acts cons#tu#ng contempt arise

out of interim orders passed during pendency of the Regular Second Appeals.

However, by virtue of the findings recorded hereinabove, this Court has already

concluded that the plain#ff herself was not en#tled to seek pre-emp#on of the

impugned sale transac#ons and that both the suits ins#tuted by her were liable

to be dismissed.

64. Once the substan#ve rights asserted by the plain#ff themselves

fail, no enforceable equitable claim survives in her favour on the strength of the

interim protec#on granted during pendency of the proceedings. The alleged

subsequent aliena#ons or crea#on of third-party rights may, at best, give rise to

ques#ons concerning the validity or legal effect of such transfers inter se the

par#es concerned, but the same would not jus#fy con#nua#on of contempt

proceedings in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.

65. This Court is also of the considered opinion that the allega#ons

levelled against the revenue authori#es involve disputed factual issues rela#ng

to revenue entries and subsequent transac#ons, which cannot appropriately be

adjudicated in exercise of contempt jurisdic#on.

66. Consequently, no sufficient ground is made out for proceeding fur-

ther in COCP Nos.1396 and 1397 of 2017 or for ini#a#ng contempt ac#on

against the respondents or the revenue officials sought to be impleaded.

67. As a necessary corollary, CM No.15441-CII of 2019 filed under Or-

der I Rule 10 CPC seeking impleadment of Saroop Singh, Halqa Patwari, Ellen-

abad, Sanjay Choudhary, Tehsildar, and Rajendra Verma, Tehsildar, as par#es to

the contempt proceedings also does not survive for considera#on and is accord-

ingly dismissed.

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68. CM No.15440-CII of 2019 seeking permission to place addi#onal

documents on record is allowed and the documents annexed therewith are

taken on record, subject to all just excep#ons.

69. In view of the en#re discussion made hereinabove, RSA Nos.598

and 599 of 1995 filed by Smt. Swaran Kaur are dismissed, whereas RSA Nos.741

and 742 of 1995 filed by Jagdish and others are allowed. The judgments and de-

crees passed by the learned first Appellate Court decreeing the suits for pre-

emp#on are hereby set aside and, consequently, both the suits ins#tuted by

Smt. Swaran Kaur stand dismissed.

70. COCP Nos.1396 and 1397 of 2017 are also dismissed. All pending

miscellaneous applica#ons, if any, shall stand disposed of. Par#es are leC to bear

their own costs. Ordered accordingly.

(DEEPAK GUPTA)

JUDGE

15.05.2026

Neeka Tuteja

Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes/No

Whether reportable? Yes/No

Uploaded on.: 15.05.2026

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