IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi

C.O. 1586 of 2010

Syed Mahamudul Muswi And Another

Vs.

The District Magistrate and Collector, Malda and Others

For the petitioners : Mr. Probal Mukherjee, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Tapan Kr. Mahapatra, Adv.

For the State : Mr. Falguni Bondopadhyay, Sr. Govt. Adv.

Ms. Smita Pal, Adv.

For the opposite party No. 2 : Mr. Syed Nazmul, Adv.

Heard on : 23.09.2026

Judgment on : 13.10.2026

Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J.:-

1. The instant revisional application is filed in assailment of the

Order No. 794 dated March 24, 2010 passed by the learned District

Judge, Malda in O.C. Suit No. 06 of 1916.

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2. By the impugned order the learned District Judge, directed that

the Waqf Board of West Bengal is to decide all the matters relating to

administration and maintenance of the Baish Hajari Estate Malda and

Dinajpur as per provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 and all disputes are to

be decided by the Waqf Tribunal, constituted as per provisions of Section

83 of the Waqf Act, 1995 and from March 24, 2010, any joint Mutawalli

appointed by the order of the authority are not permitted and have no

power to act as joint Mutawalli.

3. Learned senior advocate for the petitioner stated that the Order

No. 749 dated June 14, 2006 was not challenged by the Board of Waqf,

West Bengal till date, so the said order is binding upon the parties. The

joint Mutawallis administered the estate since then and represented the

Waqf estate. He further submitted that the suit under which the

impugned order was passed was a suit in respect of scheme for

management of the properties belonging to Waqf which was instituted

when there was no legislation on waqf. Nevertheless, after waqf laws

came into force, the civil court exercising the powers of a scheme court,

cannot be said to have lost jurisdiction. In support of such contention,

learned senior advocate relied upon (2014) 16 Supreme Court Cases 51

(Bhanwar Lal and Another v. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Waqf and

Others).

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4. Learned senior advocate for the petitioners further stated that

the learned District Judge did not issue any show cause notice and did

not proceed separately for removal of joint Mutawallis but on the basis of

alleged complaint filed by some interested persons and so called

employees of the Waqf estate against the petitioners, held that the joint

Mutawallis were mismanaging the estate, and passed the impugned

order on March 24, 2010, removing the joint Mutawallis from the said

estate and directing the Board of Waqf, West Bengal to decide all matters

regarding the administration of the estate.

5. Learned senior advocate for the petitioners also stated that the

learned District Judge, Malda passed the impugned Order No. 794 dated

March 24, 2010, extinguishing the right of the petitioners to discharge

the office of Mutawalli, without hearing the petitioners, in violation of the

principles of natural justice. In support of his contention learned senior

advocate relied upon 1967 SCC OnLine SC 15 (State of Orissa v.

Binapani Dei) and (1978) 1 Supreme Court Cases 405 (Mohinder

Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others).

6. Learned senior advocate also contended that the impugned order

was passed by the learned trial court exceeding its jurisdiction and a

court having the powers of superintendence over such co urt, has the

authority to examine the orders passed by such courts in order to keep

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them within the contours of the powers vested in such courts. To such

proposition, learned senior advocate cited the authority of (2015) 5

Supreme Court Cases 423 (Radhey S hyam v. Chhabi Nath).

7. The learned advocate for Board of Waqfs, West Bengal contended

that when the suit was filed in 1916, the ‘Musalman Waqfs’ were not

regulated by any statute. Thereafter, the Musalman Waqf Act of 1923

was passed, followed by the Bengal Waqf Act, 1934 and then the Waqf

Act of 1954 was passed which was superseded by the Waqf Act, 1995

which applied to all public waqfs.

8. Learned advocate for the Board of Waqfs, referring to Section 63

and 66 of the 1995 Act, contended that the Board is the only authority

under Section 63 of the Act of 1995 to manage waqf properties, after the

codified laws relating to waqf took over and appointment of Mutawalli.

On such premise, a prayer was made for recalling of the Order No. 749

dated June 14, 2006. To such proposition, the learned advocate for the

Board of waqf relied upon an unreported decision of the Full Bench of

the Madras High Court passed in WP (MD) No. 24333 of 2025 (J.

Ilayas and Another v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others).

9. Learned advocate for the Board of Waqf also submitted that the

petitioner was provided with sufficient opportunity to be heard. In fact,

on the date of impugned order, learned advocate for the petitioner was

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present in court and the order was passed in his presence. Therefore, the

allegation of violation of principles of natural justice has no legs to stand.

10. Learned advocate representing the State of West Bengal submitted

that the impugned order was passed by a scheme court, the s uit being

initiated prior to coming into force of any law governing the waqf.

However, he submitted that at the relevant point of time, when the

impugned order was passed, Waqf Act, 1995 was in operation. Section 32

of such Act, exclusively empowers the Board of Waqf for the management

of waqf properties. He further submitted that in terms of Section 66 of

the Act of 1995, where a deed of waqf or any decree or order of a court or

any scheme of management of any waqf empowers for appointment and

removal of mutawalli to any court or other authority, other than the

Board of waqf, in such eventuality, such powers shall be exercised by the

State.

11. Learned Senior Government Advocate for the state also submitted

that the impugned order is based on the prevailing laws and does not call

for any interference. Learned Senior Government Advocate for the State

also relied upon the authority of the Full Bench of Madras High Court

cited on behalf of the Board of waqf. He further submitted that the

appointment of the petitioners as joint mutawallis was not backed by the

provisions in the statute of the Act of 1995. Interference by this court, to

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the impugned order, would negate the provisions. Learned Senior

Government Advocate for the State also supported the submissions made

on behalf of the Board of Waqf to the effect that there was no violation of

principles of natural justice as alleged by the petitioners.

12. As noted above, the Baish Hajari Estate Malda and Dinajpur,

Waqf estate, was formed by virtue of bequeath by three consecutive

sanads issued by the Badshah Shah Alam (Mughal Emperor), East India

Company and Nawab Nazim of Murshidabad in the name of Syed

Sadiruddin-ul-Muswi.

13. It was the case of the petitioners that the management of the

administration of the Estate was vested with the Collector. The

successors of the erstwhile ancestors who were in management, claimed

themselves individually to be Mutawalli of the said estate.

14. A suit being O.C. Suit No. 06 of 1916 was filed by the then

collector of Malda under Section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the

Court of learned District Judge, Rajshahi (now Bangladesh) on 28

th

August, 1916, against the successors of the erstwhile ancestors who

were claiming to be Mutawallis of the said estate. Thereafter, the learned

District Judge passed an order, framing a scheme of administration and

accordingly Waqf estate was managed by the predecessors of the

petitioner headed by the learned District Magistrate and other members.

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15. The petitioners made out a further case that after the removal of

their father (predecessor), Syed Aminul Muswi from Mutawalliship, the

petitioners prayed before the learned District Judge for being appointed

as Mutawalli. The District Judge by its Order No. 749 dated June 14,

2006, appointed the petitioners as joint Mutawallis of the said Waqf

estate.

16. The Board of Waqfs, West Bengal had taken out an application

with the following prayers:

a) to grant leave to be impleaded as an intervenor in the said

suit being O.C. Suit No. 06 of 1916 and

b) to issue a notice upon the opposite parties (including Collector

of Malda and joint Mutawallis purportedly appointed by order

No. 749 dated June 14, 2006).

The said application was affirmed on July 14, 2006.

17. By the impugned order, the petitioners being joint mutawallis

under order dated June 14, 2006 were directed not to act as such

mutawallis until the matter is decided by the Board of waqf. The

impugned order also directed to take administration of the waqf estate. It

also directed that after the administration of the waqf estate is taken over

by the Board of waqf, henceforth, any matter related to the maintenance

of waqf estate was to be decided by the Waqf Board in terms of the

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provisions of Waqf Act, 1995. The order also stipulated that henceforth,

all disputes relating to the waqf estate was to be decided by the Waqf

Tribunal constituted as per the provisions of Section 83 of the Waqf Act

and from such date, the joint mutawallis appointed by the authorities

were directed not to act as such mutawallis. The entire administration of

the waqf estate was directed by the impugned order to be exercised by

the Board of Waqf. Besides that, the impugned order also vacated its

earlier order by which the petitioners were appointed as joint mutawallis.

18. As evident, the petitioners have assailed the impugned order firstly,

on the ground that no opportunity of being heard, was afforded to the

petitioner and therefore, the impugned order was passed in violation of

principles of natural justice. In Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that,

“12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made by Dr

S. Mitra. But the report, of that enquiry officer was never

disclosed to the first respondent. Thereafter the first

respondent was required to show cause why April 16, 1907

should not be accepted as the date of birth and without

recording any evidence the order was passed. We think that

such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic

concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that

the order is administrative in character, but even an

administrative order which involves civil consequences, as

already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of

natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case

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of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving

an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and

meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were

admittedly taken, the High Court was, in our judgment, right

in setting aside the order of the State.”

19. In Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) it was observed that,

“66. It was argued, based on rulings relating to natural

justice, that unless civil consequences ensued, hearing was

not necessary. A civil right being adversely affected is a sine

qua non for the invocation of the audi alteram partem rule.

This submission was supported by observations in Ram Gopal

[Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of M.P., (1969) 2 SCC 240 :

(1970) 1 SCR 472] , Col. Sinha [Union of India v. Col. J.N.

Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791] . Of course, we

agree that if only spiritual censure is the penalty, temporal

laws may not take cognizance of such consequences since

human law operates in the material field although its vitality

vicariously depends on its morality. But what is a civil

consequence, let us ask ourselves, bypassing verbal booby-

traps? ‘Civil consequences’ undoubtedly cover infraction of not

merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties,

material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its

comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in

his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. “Civil” is defined by

Black (Law Dictionary, 4th Edn.) at p. 311:

………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………….”

20. However, in the case at hand, the impugned order notes that the

order was passed in presence of and upon hearing learned advocate for

10

the petitioners. At the time of hearing, learned senior advocate for the

petitioners submitted that although, the advocate on behalf of the

petitioner was present and heard while passing the impugned order but

no written objection was invited and such action on the part of learned

trial court was in violation of the principles of natural justice. I am

afraid; such submission on behalf of the petitioners cannot be accepted.

The impugned order also does not record that any liberty to file written

objection was sought on behalf of the petitioners. In that view of the

facts, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have not been able to make

out a case that the impugned order was passed in violation of the

principles of natural justice.

21. So far as the other ground set forth by the petitioners, it transpires

from the records made available that the waqf estate in question was

being managed by the scheme court. There was no law governing the

waqfs when the dedication was made into the subject waqf. It was

brought within the jurisdiction of court for framing a scheme for the

management of waqf estate. Subsequently, several legislations governing

waqfs came into being and ultimately, when the impugned order was

passed, Waqf Act, 1995 was in vogue. The order appointing the

petitioners as joint mutawallis was passed by the scheme court,

independent of any legislative provision.

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22. Section 32 of the said Act of 1995 delineates the powers and

functions of the Board of Waqf, which are as follows:

“32. Powers and functions of the Board.—(1) Subject to any

rules that may be made under this Act, the general

superintendence of all auqaf in a State shall vest in the Board

established or the State; and it shall be the duty of the Board

so to exercise its powers under this Act as to ensure that the

auqaf under its superintendence are properly maintained,

controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly

applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such

auqaf were created or intended:

Provided that in exercising its powers under this Act in respect

of any waqf, the Board shall act in conformity with the

directions of the waqif, the purposes of the waqf and any

usage or custom of the waqf sanctioned by the school of

Muslim law to which the waqf belongs.

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared

that in this sub-section, “waqf” includes a waqf in relation to

which any scheme has been made by any court of law,

whether before or after the commencement of this Act.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power,

the functions of the Board shall be—

(a) to maintain a record containing information relating to

the origin, income, object and beneficiaries of every waqf;

(b) to ensure that the income and other property of auqaf

are applied to the objects and for the purposes for which

such auqaf were intended or created;

(c) to give directions for the administration of auqaf;

(d) to settle schemes of management for a waqf:

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Provided that no such settlement shall be made without giving

the parties affected an opportunity of being heard;

(e) to direct—

(i) the utilisation of the surplus income of a waqf

consistent with the objects of waqf;

(ii) in what manner the income of a waqf, the objects of

which are not evident from any written instrument,

shall be utilised;

(iii) in any case where any object of 1[waqf] has ceased

to exist or has become incapable of achievement, that so

much of the income of the waqf as was previously

applied to that object shall be applied to any other

object, which shall be similar, or nearly similar or to the

original object or for the benefit of the poor or for the

purpose of promotion of knowledge and learning in the

Muslim community:

Provided that no direction shall be given under this

clause without giving the parties affected, an

opportunity of being heard.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, the powers of

the Board shall be exercised—

(i) in the case of a Sunni waqf, by the Sunni members of

the Board only; and

(ii) in the case of a Shia waqf, by the Shia members of

the Board only:

Provided that where having regard to the number of the Sunni

or Shia members in the board and other circumstances, it

appears to the Board that the power should not be exercised

by such members only, it may co-opt such other Muslims

being Sunnis or Shias, as the case may be, as it thinks fit, to

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be temporary members of the Board for exercising its powers

under this clause;

(f) to scrutinise and approve the budgets submitted by

mutawallis and to arrange for auditing of account of

auqaf;

(g) to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with

the provisions of this Act;

(h) to take measures for the recovery of lost properties of

any waqf;

(i) to institute and defend suits and proceedings relating to

auqaf;

(j) to sanction lease of any immovable property of a waqf

in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules

made thereunder:

Provided that no such sanction shall be given unless a

majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the

Board present cast their vote in favour of such transaction:

Provided further that where no such sanction is given by

the Board, the reasons for doing so shall be recorded in

writing.

(k) to administer the Waqf Fund;

(l) to call for such returns, statistics, accounts and other

information from the mutawallis with respect to the waqf

property as the Board may, from time to time, require;

(m) to inspect, or cause inspection of, waqf properties,

accounts, records or deeds and documents relating

thereto;

(n) to investigate and determine the nature and extent of

waqf and waqf property, and to cause, whenever

necessary, a survey of such waqf property;

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(na) to determine or cause to be determined, in such

manner as may be specified by the Board, market rent of

the waqf land or building;

(o) generally do all such acts as may be necessary for the

control, maintenance and administration of auqaf.

(3) Where the Board has settled any scheme of management

under clause (d) or given any direction under clause (e) of sub-

section (2), any person interested in the waqf or affected by

such settlement or direction may institute a suit in a Tribunal

for setting aside such settlement or directions and the decision

of the Tribunal thereon shall be final.

(4) Where the Board is satisfied that any waqf land, which is

a waqf property, has the potential for development as an

educational institution, shopping centre, market, housing or

residential flats and the like, market, housing flats and the

like, it may serve upon the mutawalli of the concerned waqf a

notice requiring him within such time, but not less than sixty

days, as may be specified in the notice, to convey its decision

whether he is willing to execute the development works

specified in the notice.

(5) On consideration of the reply, if any, received to the notice

issued under sub-section (4), the Board, if it is satisfied that

the mutawalli is not willing or is not capable of executing the

works required to be executed in terms of the notice, it may,

take over the property, clear it of any building or structure

thereon, which, in the opinion of the Board is necessary for

execution of the works and execute such works from 1[waqf]

funds or from the finances which may be raised on the

security of the properties of the waqf concerned, and control

and manage the properties till such time as all expenses

incurred by the Board under this section, together with

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interest thereon, the expenditure on maintenance of such

works and other legitimate charges incurred on the property

are recovered from the income derived from the property:

Provided that the Board shall compensate annually the

mutawalli of the concerned waqf to the extent of the average

annual net income derived from the property during the three

years immediately preceding the taking over of the property

by the Board.

(6) After all the expenses as enumerated in sub-section (5)

have been recouped from the income of the developed

properties, the developed properties shall be handed over to

mutawalli of the concerned waqf.”

23. Section 32 of the Act of 1995 not only empowers the Board of waqf

with the general powers of superintendence of the management of waqf

properties but also empowers it to appoint and remove mutawallis in

accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1995. The said provision of

law also declares that the general superintendence of all auqaf in a State

shall vest in the Board established or the State; and it shall be the duty

of the Board so to exercise its powers under this Act as to ensure that

the auqaf under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled

and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects

and for the purposes for which such auqaf were created or intended. The

provisio appended to sub-section (1) to Section 32 also clarified that in

exercising its powers under the Act of 1995 in respect of any waqf, the

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Board shall act in conformity with the directions of the waqif, the

purposes of the waqf and any usage or custom of the waqf sanctioned by

the school of Muslim law to which the waqf belongs. Such waqf referred

in such sub-section, included a waqf in relation to which any scheme

has been made by any court of law, whether before or after the

commencement of this Act.

24. By the impugned order, the learned trial court has merely

reiterated the powers of the Board, which it is empowered under the

provisions of the Act of 1995, and relegated the matter to be decided by

the Board of Auqaf constituted under the Act. In terms of Section 69 of

the Act of 1995, the Board of Auqaf is empowered to frame scheme for

administration of waqf and such powers include removal of mutawallis.

In any case, the Board of Auqaf constituted under the provisions of the

Act of 1995 is responsible for general superintendence of all the auqaf

created in the State.

25. In case, the deed of dedication creating a waqf or any order or

scheme passed by a court empowers any authority other than the Board

of Auqaf, to manage the waqf properties, State gets to exercise such

powers notwithstanding anything contained in the deed, decree, order or

scheme, in terms of the provisions of Section 66 of the Act of 1995. Such

17

view was upheld by the Madras High Court in J. Ilayas (supra). The said

provision reads as follows:

“66. Powers of appointment and removal of mutawalli when to

be exercised by the State Government.—Whenever a deed of

waqf or any decree or order of a court of any scheme of

management of any waqf provides that a court or any

authority other than a Board may appoint or remove a

mutawalli or settle or modify such scheme of management or

otherwise exercise superintendence over the waqf, then,

notwithstanding anything contained in such deed of waqf,

decree, order or scheme, such powers aforesaid shall be

exercisable by the State Government:

Provided that where a Board has been established, the State

Government shall consult the Board before exercising such

powers.”

26. In Bhanwar Lal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down

that,

“13. On a conjoint reading of Section 7 and Section 85, the

legal position is summed up as under:

13.1. In respect of the questions/disputes mentioned in sub-

section (1) of Section 7, exclusive jurisdiction vests with the

Tribunal, having jurisdiction in relation to such property.

13.2. The decision of the Tribunal thereon is made final.

13.3. The jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of

any dispute/question or other matter relating to any wakf,

wakf property for other matter, which is required by or under

this Act, to be determined by a Tribunal.

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13.4. There is however an exception made under Section 7(5)

viz. those matters which are already pending before the civil

court, even if the subject-matter is covered under sub-section

(1) of Section 6, the jurisdiction of civil court would continue

and the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to determine those

matters.”

27. In Radhey Shyam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down

the principles making distinction in respect of Article 226 vis-à-vis Article

227 of the Constitution of India. It lays down that,

“23. The Bench then referred to the history of writ of certiorari

and its scope and concluded thus : (Surya Dev Rai case

[Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675] , SCC

pp. 687-90, paras 18-19 & 24-25)

“18. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar case [Naresh Shridhar

Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 :

(1966) 3 SCR 744] was cited before the Constitution

Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra case [Rupa Ashok Hurra v.

Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388] and considered. It has

been clearly held : (i) that it is a well-settled principle

that the technicalities associated with the prerogative

writs in English law have no role to play under our

constitutional scheme; (ii) that a writ of certiorari to call

for records and examine the same for passing

appropriate orders, is issued by a superior court to an

inferior court which certifies its records for examination;

and (iii) that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another

High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a

writ to a different Bench of the High Court; much less

can the writ jurisdiction of a High Court be invoked to

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seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme

Court. The High Courts are not constituted as inferior

courts in our constitutional scheme.

19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders

and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the

High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***

24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of th e

Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram

v. Radhikabai [Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Hapur, 1986 Supp

SCC 401] . Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the

original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under

Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only

supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the

provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915

excepting that the power of superintendence has been

extended by this article to tribunals as well. Though the power

is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power

under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in

appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate

courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and

not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in

cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as

when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction

which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction

which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of

justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being

exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the

limits of jurisdiction.

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25. Upon a review of decided cases an d a survey of the

occasions, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction

to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory

jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and

circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the

distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost

obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has

become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as

one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution,

though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial

pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality

of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference

between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is

an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court;

exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original

jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate, revisional

or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the

record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by

the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court

if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or

quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of

supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not only quash or

set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it

may also make such directions as the facts and

circumstances of the case may warrant, maybe, by way of

guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which

it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or

guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High

Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may

substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned

decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made.

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Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is

capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf

of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable

of being exercised suo motu as well.”

28. A submission has been made on behalf of the petitioners that the

learned judge visited the properties in question without notice and

imputed his own knowledge in passing the impugned order. However, as

it transpires, the learned scheme court, taking note of the various

provisions of the Act of 1995, simply abdicated its role as scheme court

in favour of a statutory institution i.e. Board of Auqaf, which action is

quite in consonance with the provisions of the Act. Rights of the parties

are yet to be decided by the Board of Auqaf, of course, in consideration of

the terms of dedication in the deed of waqf and the intention of wakif

with regard to the purpose of waqf, for which it was created.

29. Therefore, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove, I am of

the view that by the impugned order, the scheme court relegated the

matter to be decided by the appropriate authority under the Act of 1995

which the appropriate authority i.e. Board of Auqaf was entitled to

decide. As such, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order.

The same is hereby affirmed.

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30. Consequently, the instant revisional application being C.O. 1586

of 2010 is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs and thus,

disposed of.

31. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all

formalities.

[MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.]