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Date of reserved for Judgment :23.12.2025

Date of Pronouncement :10.04.2026

Date of uploading :10.04.2026

APHC010515702012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3520]

FRIDAY,THE TENTH DAY OF APRIL

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 69/2012

Between:

1. T. KRISHNAMMA & 7 OTHERS, W/O M.SUBRAMANYAM CULTIVATION

R/O MADANAPALLI ROAD, PALAMANER CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

2. T. MARIAMMA, W/O LATE BHASKA R CULTIVATION R/O

VEDURUKUPPAM VILLAGE & MANDAL, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

3. MINOR ANIL KUMAR, S/O LATE BHASKAR REP. BY HIS MOTHER AND

NATURAL GUARDIAN, MARIAMMA R/O VEDURUKUPPAM VILLAGE &

MANDAL, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

4. MINOR T. VAMSI, S/O LATE BHASKAR REP. B Y HIS MOTHER AND

NATURAL GUARDIAN, MARIAMMA R/O VEDURUKUPPAM VILLAGE &

MANDAL, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

5. VASANTHA, W/O LATE T. GANGADHARAM CULTIVATION R/O

DEVARAGUDIPALLI VILLAGE, VEDURUKUPPAM MANDAL,

CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

6. T. CHIRANJEEVI, S/O LATE T. GANG ADHARAM CULTIVATION R/O

DEVARAGUDIPALLI VILLAGE, VEDURUKUPPAM MANDAL,

CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

7. T. RAJA, S/O LATE T. GANGADHARAM CULTIVATION R/O

DEVARAGUDIPALLI VILLAGE, VEDURUKUPPAM MANDAL,

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CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

8. MUTHYALAMMA, W/O VENKATARAMANA CULTIVATIO N R/O MOGHILI

VILLAGE, BANGARUPALEM MANDAL, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

...APPELLANT(S)

AND

1. A SRINIVASULU 2 OTHERS, S/O A. KRISHNAIAH OWNER OF THE

VEHICLE R/O D.NO. 22 -978, RAMNAGAR COLONY, CHITTOOR

CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

2. M/S NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD , REP. BY ITS BRANCH

MANAGER, BRANCH OFFICE P V N COMPLEX, SESHAPEERAN

STREET, CHITTOOR, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

3. THE DEPOT MANAGER, APSRTC, BUS BEARING NO. AP 09/Z -7964

CHITTOOR, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

...RESPONDENT(S):

Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be

pleased toagainst the decree and award dt. 13-9-2011 made in MVOP No. 7 of

2007 on the file of the Court of the VIII Addl. District Judge (FTC) Cum-

Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chittoor.

Counsel for the Appellant(S):

1. S V MUNI REDDY

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1. N MOHAN KRISHNA

2. ARAVALA RAMA RAO(SC FOR APSRTC KKAC)

3. .

4. T S RAYALU

The Court made the following:

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

M.A.C.M.A.No.69 of 2012

JUDGMENT:

Introductory:

1. Claimants in M.V.O.P.No.7 of 2007 on the file of the Chairman, Motor

Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-VIII Additional District Judge (FTC), Chittoor (for

short “the learned MACT”), feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of their petition

filed under Section 166 (1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, filed the present

appeal invoking Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

2. Claim was made for awarding a compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- for the

death of one Eswaramma (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) in a road

traffic accident caused by the driver of the tipper lorry bearing No.AP 03 T 3744

(hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”), owned by respondent no.1

and insured with respondent No.2, while the deceased was travelling in

A.P.S.R.T.C. bus bearing No.AP 09 Z 7964 belonging to Respondent Nos.3 and

4, before the learned MACT.

3. Claimant No.1 is the daughter and claimant No.2 is the daughter-in-law;

claimant Nos.3 and 4 are the grand children, claimant No.5 is the daughter-in-

law; claimant Nos.6 to 8 are the grand children of the deceased. Husband of

claimant No.2 and father of claimant Nos.3 and 4, one Bhaskar, is the son of the

deceased, as he died, claimant Nos.2 to 4 are the dependents of the deceased,

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claimant No.5 is the daughter-in-law and claimant Nos.6 to 8 are the children of

one T. Gangadharam, son of the deceased. Contending that all the claimants are

dependents on deceased and her legal heirs, they claimed a compensation of

Rs.2,50,000/- .

4. For the sake of convience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as “the

claimants” and “the respondents” as and how they are arrayed before the learned

MACT.

Case of the claimants:

5. Deceased was aged 55 years, selling milk, attending agricultural work and

she was earning Rs.3,000/- per month. On the fateful day i.e.12.09.2002 at about

06:15 p.m., she boarded A.P.S.R.T.C. bus bearing No.AP 09 Z 7964 to go to

Ponnai to attend a function. When the bus was near M.M.N. Nursery Garden on

Chittoor-Puttur Road, the offending vehicle came in the opposite direction in a

rash and negligent manner and dashed the A.P.S.R.T.C. bus, causing accident,

which resulted in serious injuries to the deceased. She was shifted to

Government Head Quarters hospital, Chittoor, where she was treated as an

inpatient for three days. Thereafter, she was admitted in Bindu Nursing Home,

Chittoor as an inpatient. Again, she was admitted as an inpatient for four or five

days in Government Head Quarters Hospital, Chittoor and she died on

31.01.2003.

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6. A case in Crime No.111 of 2002 was registered, which was ultimately

ended in conviction vide C.C.No.58 of 2003. On admission of guilt, the driver of

the offending vehicle as convicted under Section 252 Cr.P.C and sentenced to

pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (IDSI) for two months for the offence under Section 338

IPC, to pay a fine of Rs.500/- (IDSI) for one month for the offence under Section

337 IPC and also to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (IDSI) for one month for the offence

under Section 279 IPC.

7. Respondent No.1, being the owner and respondent No.2, being the insurer

of the offending vehicle, are liable to pay the compensation. Though there is no

negligence on the part of the driver of the A.P.S.R.T.C., respondent Nos.3 and 4

are also liable as the accident occurred due to collision.

Case of respondents:

8. Respondent No.1 remained ex parte before the learned MACT.

Case of respondent No.2:

9. There was no negligence on the part of the driving of the driver of the

offending vehicle. The driver of the bus did not follow the traffic rules. Age,

occupation, income of the deceased shall be proved. Further, the driving licence

particulars of the driver of the offending vehicle and the insurance details shall be

properly shown. The death of the deceased due to the accident and dependency

of the claimants have no basis. The medical expenditure incurred for the

treatment of the deceased shall be proved.

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Case of respondent Nos.3 and 4:

10. The accident occurred due to negligent driving of driver of the lorry / the

offending vehicle. The death of the deceased due to the accident shall be

proved. The wound certificate shows that the injuries are simple, hence they do

not lead to death. The claimants, since residing separately, cannot be

considered as dependents. Age, occupation and income of the deceased

claimed by the petitioners are baseless.

Evidence:

11. Claimant No.5 was examined as P.W.1. She has spoken about the

relationship of the claimants with the deceased and the death of deceased due to

the accident, as well as the age, occupation and income of the deceased. The

deceased was working as a coolie and earning Rs.40/- per day by selling milk.

12. One Y. Nagabhooshanamma, an eye witness to the accident, was

examined as P.W.2. She travelled along with the deceased in the bus. She also

sustained injuries in the accident. She is clear, even during cross-examination,

that the driver of the offending vehicle is responsible for the accident.

13. P.W.3 / Y. Chandraiah, who got acquaintance with the deceased, stated

the income of the deceased as Rs.3,000/- per month. He has asserted during

cross-examination that he is a neighbour.

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14. P.W.4 / Dr. D. Mohan Reddy deposed that he can identify the signatures

as per the record and that one Dr. B. Venkataswamy examined the deceased

aged „60‟ years and found swelling of lower end of left humerus, suspected

fracture. He has asserted that he has worked along with Dr. B. Venkataswamy.

15(i). P.W.5 / Dr.B. Venkataswamy deposed that he has examined the deceased

aged about 60 years and found the following injuries:

1) Swelling of lower end of left humorous? # humorous

2) A lacerated injury 5 C.M. x 1 C.M x bone deep on right frontal region.

(ii). He has further stated that he referred the deceased to a Radiologist and

X-rays are taken which are shown as follows:

1) X-Ray No:3970/12-09-2002 shows fracture of lower end of left

humerus.

2) X-Ray skull shows no boney injuries.

(iii). As per his opinion, injury No.1 is grievous in nature and injury No.2 is

simple in nature. Both the injuries might have been caused due to a road traffic

accident. He has also clearly asserted that injury No.1 is grievous and that due

to fat embolism it may cause death.

(iv). During cross-examination, nothing is elicited to doubt the injury leading to

the death of the deceased, though P.W.5 was clear and specific that the injury

may lead to death.

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16(i). P.W.6 / Medical Superintendent, District Head Quarters Hospital, Chittoor,

deposed that there was a second-time admission of the deceased in the hospital

due to accident injures. He has referred that there was a cerebrovascular

accident (CVA), which means blockage of blood vessels in the brain due to

thrombus or embolus. Thrombus means clotting of blood at a local area of the

blood vessel and embolus means blood clotting from a peripheral region to the

brain.

(ii). CVA can occur in any elderly person; it cannot be related to any accident

and may be a normal phenomenon. When a cerebral vessel ruptures, it results in

cerebral canal haemorrhage and may lead to death of a person.

17(i). R.W.1 is the driver of the offending vehicle. He has stated that when the

bus tried to overtake a tractor, the bus dashed the tripper lorry / the offending

vehicle, attributed negligence to the driver of the bus. He has claimed that the

criminal case ended in acquittal, whereas he has admitted during cross-

examination that he admitted the guilt and paid the fine on conviction.

(ii). He went to the extent of stating that no case was registered against him.

What he stated appears to have been said in disguise.

Findings of the learned MACT:

On negligence:

18. In view of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and Ex.A1 to A3, the

negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle is accepted.

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On entitlement and liability:

19. The death of the deceased is on 31.01.2003 at Devaragudipalle Village,

but not while undergoing treatment. The deceased was treated twice as an

inpatient and was discharged and the death is 3½ months after the accident.

Therefore, the death is natural but not due to accident injuries. There is no

dependency for the claimants. Therefore, the claimants are not entitled for any

compensation and the petition is liable to be dismissed.

20. Heard both sides extensively. Perused the record. Thoughtful

consideration is given to the arguments advanced by both sides.

21. Claimants / appellants disputed the dismissal as not correct and

respondents argued that dismissal of claim is justified.

22. Points that arise for determination in this appeal are:

1) Whether the dismissal of the claim petition by the learned MACT under

the impugned judgment dated 13.09.2011 is proper and whether the

petitioners are not entitled for any compensation? If so against whom?

2) What is the result of the appeal?

Point No.1:

Negligence:

23. In a case between Smt. Sukhinder Anand vs. Khaza Vazir Ali (Minor)

and Others

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, this Court observed that when the driver of the offending vehicle

1

1994 SCC OnLine AP 20: AIR 1994 AP 343

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pleaded guilty before the Court, there is no necessity of adducing the evidence

about the proof of negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle.

24. It is clear from the evidence, particularly the judgment in C.C. No.58 of

2003 on the file of the V Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Chittoor,

covered by Ex.A3, with reference to the charge sheet covered by Ex.A2, that the

accused was convicted and sentenced to pay fine. No further discussion or

evidence is necessary in view of the admission and conviction. Hence,

negligence stands accepted.

Locus standi of legal heirs-dependants:

Jurisprudence:

25. The legal position regarding locus standi of a person to make a claim for

compensation in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act, in the event of death of a

person, was addressed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Gujarat State Road

Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and

another

2

. The interpretation of expression "legal representative" with reference

to the Fatal Accidents Act and the Motor Vehicles Act was considered by the

Hon‟ble Apex Court and the observations in paragraph Nos.10 to 13 of the

judgment are relevant. They are as follows:

10. Amongst the High Courts in India there is a cleavage in the opinion as

regards the maintainability of action under S.110-A of the Act by persons

other than the wife, husband, parent and child of the person who dies on

2

1987 Supreme (SC) 522; 1987 ACJ 561; 1987 3 SCC 234

11

account of a motor vehicle accident. All these cases are considered by the

High Court of Gujarat in its decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai

Taljabhai, ( AIR 1977 Guj 195) (supra). The first set of cases are those

which are referred to in paragraph 5 of the above decision which lay down

that every claim application for compensation arising out of a fatal

accident would be governed by the substantive provisions in Ss. 1-A and 2

of the 1855 Act and no dependent of the deceased other than the wife,

husband, parent or child would be entitled to commence an action for

damages against the tortfeasors. Amongst these cases are P. B. Kader v.

Thatchamma, AIR 1970 Ker 241 and Dewan Hari Chand v. Municipal

Corpn. of Delhi, AIR 1973 Delhi 67. The second group of cases are those

referred to in Para 6 of the decision of the Gujarat High court. They are

Perumal v. Ellusamy Reddiar, 1974 Acc CJ 482 (Mad) and the Vanguard

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hanumantha Rao, 1975 Acc CJ -344 (Andh Pra).

These cases lay down that while the compensation payable under S.1-A

of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 is restricted to the relatives of the

deceased named therein the compensation payable under S. 2 thereof

may be awarded in favour of the representatives of the deceased who are

entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased. The third group of cases

are those referred to in para 7 of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

They are Mohmammed Habibullah v. K. Seethammal, AIR 1967 Mad 123;

Veena Kumari Kohli v. Punjab Roadways, 1967 Acc CJ 297 (Punj) and

Smt. Ishwari Devi Malik v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Delhi 183 which take

the view that a claim for compensation arising out of the use of a motor

vehicle would be exclusively governed by the provisions of Ss. 110 to 110-

F of the Act and bears no connection to claims under the 1855 Act and the

Claims Tribunal need not follow the principles laid down under the latter

Act. Having considered all the three sets of decisions referred to above,

Ahmadi, J. who wrote the judgment in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai

Taljabhai, ( AIR 1977 Guj 195) (supra) came to the conclusion that an

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application made by the nephews of the deceased who died on account of

a motor vehicle accident was clearly maintainable under S. I 10-A of the

Act.

11. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in

consonance with the principles. of justice, equity and good conscience

having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal

representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a

motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of

compensation and that is provided by S. 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These

provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every

injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal

to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided

in S. 110-B of the Act to specify the person or persons to whom

compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation

payable and its apportionment as required by S. 110-B of the Act amongst

the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed

under S. 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with wellknown

principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers,

sisters and brothers children and sometimes foster children live together

and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the

bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no

justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the

Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been

substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to

cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of

the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira. v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, ( AIR 1977

Guj 195) (supra) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor

vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under S. 110-A of the Act

if he is a legal representative of the deceased.

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12. We have carefully gone through the decision of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh in Budha v. Union of India, (AIR 1981 Madh Pra 151)

(supra). We feel that the view taken in that decision is a narrow one and

does not give full effect to the object with which Ss. 110-A and 110-B of

the Act were enacted. We overrule the said decision.

13. Before concluding we may add that although the Act was extensively

modified after the receipt of the report of the Law Commission, Parliament

did not choose to amend S. 110-A of the Act by defining the expression

1egal representatives in relation to claims under Chapter VIII of the Act as

the spouse, parent and children of the deceased as recommended by the

Law Commission. The Law Commission had observed in its 85th report

that it would be appropriate to assign to the expression legal

representative the same meaning as had been given to the expression

representative for the purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act. 1855 and that

would effectively carry out the purpose of social justice underlying Chapter

VIII of the Act, to which the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was the nearest

approximation. This recommendation was made after referring to the

divergent views expressed by the various High Courts on the meaning of

the expression legal representatives in S. 110-A of the Act. The fact that

Parliament declined to take any action on the recommendation of the Law

Commission of India suggests that Parliament intended that the

expression legal representative in S. 110-A of the Act should be given a

wider meaning and it should not be confined to the spouse, parent and

children of the deceased.

26. It is relevant to note that a claim made even by a nephew of the deceased

was found maintainable by the Gujarat High Court and the same was found in

consonance with the principles. However, the test of dependency shall be kept

in view.

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27. In Montford brothers of St. Gabriel and Another vs. United India

Insurance & Another

3

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court examined the maintainability of a

claim made by a charitable society to which the deceased was a member and

serving by dedicating all his service. In that context, the interpretation of the

word/term "legal representative" as to whether it includes even “intermeddlers”

etc. was considered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court. As per the factual matrix of the

said case, when a member in complete dedicated service of the organization

died and when the society made a claim and the claim was allowed by the

Tribunal, the award was questioned by way of a writ petition, which was allowed

considering the scope of the Fatal Accidents Act and the term "legal

representative" etc. The Hon‟ble Apex Court found that the claim is tenable and

that the Insurance Company is liable.

28. Further, the Hon‟ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Dr. Gangaraju

Sowmini and Another vs. Alavala Sudhakar Reddy and another

4

, examined

the sustainability of the claim made by a sister for the death of her brother. The

objection of the Insurance company was that she is not dependent of the

deceased was discarded. The Court examined the point as to whether non-

dependent heir of the deceased who died in a motor accident, is entitled to lay

claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, where

there is no other dependent legal heir claiming compensation. It was situation of

3

2014 Supreme (SC) 58; 2014 1 ACC 461; 2014 4 SCC (Cri) 628

4

2016 Supreme (AP) 95; 2016 3 ACC 208

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conflicting judgments and a reference was made to a Full Bench, The Full Bench

has considered the case with reference to Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1939 and other related provisions including Section 163-A of the

Motor Vehicles Act. In the said judgment, reference was made to various

judgments, including Montford brothers of St. Gabriel and Another vs. United

India Insurance & Another (3 supra) and Gujarat State Road Transport

Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another (2 supra)

and also the Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, for interpretation

of the word "legal representative" with reference to Section 2(11) of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. The observations made in para 16 of the judgment as to

the interpretation of the word/term "legal representative" and who can make a

claim are found relevant in the present case, which are as follows:

16. In view of the clear and unambiguous language under Section 166 of the

Motor Vehicles Act, it is clear that application can be made either by the

injured or the legal representatives of the deceased. Though „legal

representative‟ is not defined under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988, from Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, it is clear that

the definition of „legal representative‟ is given same meaning as defined

under Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the judgment

of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Manjuri Bera‟s case (9 supra), it is clear that the

compensation which is payable on account of no fault liability will form part of

the estate of deceased. In that view of the matter, there is no basis for

contending that the application is to be filed only by the dependants. As we

have held that dependency is a matter to be taken into consideration for

award of compensation and merely because one is not dependant, that by

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itself, is no ground for not entertaining any claim made for grant of

compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. In view of the clear language

under Section 166 of the Act and in view of the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in Manjuri Bera‟s case (9 supra), wherein, it is held that the

compensation to be awarded under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act

will form part of the estate of deceased, and further, as the Act also provides

for compensation on other conventional heads, we are of the view that the

non-dependant also can lay a claim by filing application under Section 166 of

the Act. It is also to be noticed that the situations may arise, where, one may

have suffered injuries initially but ultimately after filing a claim, may have

succumbed to such injuries also. In such an event, lot of amount would be

spent towards hospitalisation etc., and as already discussed in the judgment

of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Montford Brothers‟ case (5 supra), it is common

in the Indian society, where, the members of the family who are not even

dependant also can extend their support monetarily and otherwise to the

victims of accidents to meet the immediate expenditure for hospitalization

etc., in such cases, unless the legal representatives are allowed to continue

the proceedings initiated by the person who succumbs to injuries

subsequently, such claims will be defeated and that will also defeat the very

object and intentment of the Act. Any such measure would be wholly un-

equitable and unjust. Plainly, that would never be intent of any piece of

legislation. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the language under

Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 r/w. Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor

Vehicles Rules, 1989, we are of the view that even the legal representatives

who are non-dependants can also lay a claim for payment of compensation

by making application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

29. Claimant No.1 is the daughter of the deceased. Two sons of the deceased

appear to have died and the widow of two sons and the children of the said two

sons are the claimants. Therefore, their legal heir status and dependency are

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obvious in the context of the sons predeceased the deceased and there is a clear

assertion that claimants are depending on the deceased. Therefore, their

entitlement for compensation need not be doubted In the light of the observations

in the judgments cited above. Therefore, the claimants are entitled for

compensation.

Death of deceased due to accident:

30. Date of accident is 12.09.2002. Death of deceased is 31.01.2003. The time

gap between the death and the accident is 3½ months. In the interregnum

period, admittedly, there was admission and discharge of the deceased from the

hospital. Absence of post-mortem by itself cannot straightway lead to an

inference that the death is not due to accident injuries. Disposal of the criminal

case before the concerned Judicial First Class Magistrate on admission was

done for the offences for which the accused was charge-sheeted by the date of

such judgment and admission.

31. Now, the crucial point requiring appreciation is whether the death of the

deceased is relatable to the accident. In this context, this Court finds it proper to

note the evidence of Dr. B. Vekataswamy, who treated the deceased. As per the

treatment done by Dr. B. Venkataswamy to the deceased, it is spoken to by

Dr. D. Mohan Reddy, P.W.4. There is no much gap between the accident

injuries and the death.

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32. P.W.5 / Dr. B. Venkataswamy stated that injury No.1 i.e. swelling of the

lower end of the left humerus, is grievous and due to fat embolism, it may cause

death. Throbmus, i.e. clotting of blood in a local area of a blood vessel, may also

be occasioned due to the age factor of an elderly person; this does not by itself

make out that death cannot be related to the accident injuries. To the extent of

injuries sustained/stated by the deceased, treatment undergone, expenditure

incurred, attendant charges, transportation expenditure etc. are also factors to be

taken note of, but unfortunately, the learned MACT has discarded the entire

claim without any empathetical concern in respect of the claim made by the poor

victims, forgetting the social welfare nature of the legislation. Empathetical

concern on the part of the stakeholders in administration including the Tribunal is

necessary, in respect of social welfare legislations and holistic approach towards

the cases necessary, which, in fact, has been advised by the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court while examining motor accident claims.

33. In Rajkumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Another

5

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court

summarized principles to be followed in the process of quantifying the

compensation after referring to socio economic and practical aspects from which,

the claimants come and the practical difficulties, the parties may face in the

process of getting disability assessed and getting all certificates from either the

5

2011 (1) SCC 343

19

Doctors, who treated, or from the medical boards etc. principles summarized vide

para No.19 are as follows:

19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:

(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do

not result in loss of earning capacity.

(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole

body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of

earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of

earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent

disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of

evidence, concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is

the same as the percentage of permanent disability).

(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him

subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give

evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss

of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the

Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.

(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages

of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the

nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other

factors.

34. A poor labourer (women) travelling in a bus, meet with an accident,

undergone treatment for two times by admission into hospital, ultimately the

episode ended in her death. If this leaves the dependents or legal heirs without

any remedy for the mishap, it is a case of failure of justice. The best evidence

possible with the parties has been placed by the claimants. Upon examining the

time gap, continuity of treatment and the evidence of P.Ws.4 to 6, the doctors, it

20

can be concluded that the death can be related to the accident injuries,

particularly in the context of the age of the deceased being „60‟ years as per the

evidence and wound certificate.

35. Parameters on which the compensation can be quantified in death cases

are addressed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the following case:

Quantum of compensation:

Precedential guidance:

36(i). For having uniformity of practice and consistency in awarding just

compensation, the Hon‟ble Apex Court provided guidelines as to adoption of

multiplier depending on the age of the deceased in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors.

vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.

6

and also the method of calculation

as to ascertaining multiplicand, applying multiplier and calculating the

compensation vide paragraph Nos.18 and 19 of the Judgment.

(ii). Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs.

Pranay Sethi and Others

7

case directed for adding future prospects at 50% in

respect of permanent employment where the deceased is below 40 years, 30%

where deceased is between 40-50 years and 15% where the deceased is

between 50-60 years. Further, in respect of self-employed etc., recommended

addition of income at 40% for the deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the

6

2009 (6) SCC 121

7

2017(16) SCC 680

21

deceased is between 40-50 years and at 10% where the deceased is between

50-60 years. Further, awarding compensation under conventional heads like

loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenditure at Rs.15,000/-,

Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively is also provided in the same Judgment.

(iii). Further in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram and

Others

8

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that the compensation under the head

of loss of consortium can be awarded not only to the spouse but also to the

children and parents of the deceased under the heads of parental consortium

and filial consortium.

Just Compensation:

37. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others

9

, the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in para Nos.10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows:

10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in

excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in

this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh,

(2003) 2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , it was

held as follows: (SCC p. 280)

“10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to „make

an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it

to be just‟. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the

8

(2018) 18 SCC 130

9

(2013) 9 SCC 54

22

compensation is that it must be „just‟. There is no other limitation or

restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.”

The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance

Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 :

(2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 987] and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)

1213]

11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard

to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now

become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or

technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate,

as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the

compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the

vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned

by the victim.

38. The deceased was aged about „60‟ years. She was working as a labourer

and also vending milk as per P.W.3. Her income was claimed at Rs.100/- per day

and Rs.3,000/- per month. Upon considering the socio-economic circumstances

of the year 2001, the income claimed is found reasonable and in view of the age,

adding future prospects does not arise. The annual income comes to

Rs.36,000/-. 1/3

rd

of the income can be deducted towards personal expenditure.

Upon considering the nature and extent of dependency of the claimants, the

contribution of the deceased to the claimants can be considered as Rs.24,000/-

per annum, which can be considered as the multiplicand. For the age group of

„60‟ years, the applicable multiplier is „9‟. When the same is applied, the

23

entitlement of the claimants under the head of loss of dependency comes to

Rs.2,16,000/- (Rs.24,000/- x 9).

39. Claimant No.1, being the daughter, is entitled for parental consortium. The

other claimants are not directly related to consider their entitlement under the

head of loss of consortium. All the claimants together are entitled for funeral

expenditure of Rs.15,000/- and loss of estate of Rs.15,000/- in terms of the

observations of the Hon‟ble Apex Court and towards medical expenditure at

Rs.25,000/-.

40. In view of the reasons and evidence referred above, the entitlement of the

claimants for reasonable compensation, in comparison to the compensation

awarded by the learned MACT, is found as follows:

Head Fixed by this

Court

(i) Loss of dependency Rs.2,16,000/-

(ii) Loss of estate Rs.15,000/-

(iii) Loss of Consortium Rs.40,000/-

@ claimant No.1

(iv) Funeral expenses Rs.15,000/-

(v) Medical expenditure Rs.25,000/-

Total compensation awarded Rs.3,11,000/-

Interest (per annum) 6%

41. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the discussion made above, the

order and decree dated 13.09.2011 passed by the learned MACT in

M.V.O.P.No.7 of 2007 found not sustainable on law or facts. Accordingly, the

24

same is set-aside and the claimants are entitled for compensation of

Rs.2,86,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of petition

till the date of realization. Point framed is answered accordingly.

Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimants are

otherwise entitled:-

42. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what

claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court holding

that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed.

For the said proposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following

observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in:

(1) Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others

10

, at para 21 of the

judgment, that –

“..there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award

compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the

Tribunal/Court is to award “just” compensation, which is reasonable on the

basis of evidence produced on record.”

(2) Kajal vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors.

11

at para 33 of the judgment, as

follows:-

“33. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the

amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident

claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case,

10

(2003) 2 SCC 274

11

2020 (04) SCC 413

25

the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be

awarded especially where the claimant is a minor.”

(3) Ramla and Others vs. National Insurance Company Limited and

Others

12

at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:-

“5. Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs

25,00,000 in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the

compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same

as mentioned supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award

compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the

Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to

award “just compensation”. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and

welfare legislation. A “just compensation” is one which is reasonable on

the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have

become time-barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to

claim an enhanced amount. The courts are duty-bound to award just

compensation.”

Point No.2:

43. In the result, the appeal is allowed.

(1) The order and decree dated 13.09.2011 passed by the learned

MACT in M.V.O.P.No.7 of 2007 dismissing the petition are set-aside, and

the M.V.O.P.No.7 of 2007 is allowed as follows:

(i) The claimants are entitled for a compensation of Rs.3,11,000/-

with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of petition till

the date of realization.

12

(2019) 2 SCC 192

26

(ii) The claimants are liable to pay the Court fee for the enhanced

part of the compensation before the learned MACT.

(iii) Respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the learned MACT are liable

to pay the compensation.

(iv) Apportionment:

(a) Claimant No.1, daughter of the deceased, is entitled for

Rs.1,11,000/- with proportionate interest and costs.

(b) Claimant Nos.2 to 4, daughter-in-law and grandchildren of the

deceased, are entitled for Rs.30,000/- each with proportionate

interest.

(c) Claimant Nos.5 and 8, daughter-in-law and granddaughter of the

deceased, are entitled for Rs.30,000/- each with proportionate

interest.

(d) Claimant Nos.6 and 7, grandsons of the deceased, are entitled for

Rs.25,000/- each with proportionate interest.

(v) The time for payment /deposit of the amount is two months.

(a) If the claimants furnish the bank account number within 15 days

from today, respondent Nos.1 and 2 shall deposit the amount

directly into the bank account of the claimants and file necessary

proof before the learned MACT.

27

(b) If the claimants fail to comply with clause (v)(a) above, the

respondents shall deposit the amount before the learned MACT

and the claimants are entitled to withdraw the amount at once on

deposit.

(2) There shall be no order as to costs, in the appeal.

44. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall

stand closed.

____________________________

A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J

Date:10.04.2026

Knr

28

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

M.A.C.M.A.No.69 of 2012

10.04.2026

Knr