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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 5089 1998

Appeal (civil) 5090 1998

PETITIONER:

T. SUDHAKAR PRASAD

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

GOVT. OF A.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/12/2000

BENCH:

K.G.Balakrishnaa, R.C.Lahoti

JUDGMENT:

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J U D G M E N T

R.C. Lahoti, J.

Administrative Tribunals set up under the provisions

of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, do they or do they

not have power to punish for their contempt? Whether after

the decision of this court in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union

of India & Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261, Section 17 of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter, the Act

for short) does not survive and has been rendered

unconstitutional or otiose? These questions of far-reaching

implications to the administration of justice through

tribunals arise for consideration in these appeals.

A cursory view of factual backdrop. An application

(Contempt Application No.562/1996 in O.A. No.35574/1991)

invoking the contempt jurisdiction of Andhra Pradesh

Administrative Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act and

seeking initiation of proceedings against the Principal

Secretary, Irrigation and CAD Department was filed

complaining of willful disobedience by the latter of an

order passed by the Tribunal in favour of the applicant.

The Tribunal initiated the proceedings. The State of A.P.

and the Principal Secretary filed a writ petition (CWP

No.34841/1997) in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh laying

challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to take

cognizance of the contempt case. In another matter an

application (Contempt Case No. 1054/1998) invoking contempt

jurisdiction of the High Court, without approaching the

Tribunal under section 17 of the Act, and complaining of

willful disobedience of an order passed by the Andhra

Pradesh Administrative Tribunal was filed before the High

Court. In both the matters, question arose whether such

proceedings were appropriately maintainable before the High

Court or the Administrative Tribunal. The issue has been

disposed of by a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court

holding as under:- (1) that in view of the decision

rendered by the Supreme Court in L. CHANDRA KUMAR V. UNION@@

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OF INDIA & ORS. (supra), Section 17 of the Administrative

Tribunals Act, 1985, no more survives;

(2) that consequently, the Administrative Tribunals

set-up under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 cannot

exercise the contempt jurisdiction under Section 17 of the

said Act, as the same had become non est under law;

(3) the contempt proceedings in Contempt Application

No. 562 of 1996 on the file of the Andhra Pradesh

Administrative Tribunal are set aside as being devoid of

jurisdiction. But, this will not prelude the respondents 1

to 6 in Writ Petition No. 34841 of 1997 from approaching

this Court for punishing the contempt of A.P.

Administrative Tribunal relating to the decision rendered in

O.A. No.35574 of 1991 by following the procedure as

applicable to the contempt of subordinate courts provided

under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and

the rules made thereunder by the Andhra Pradesh High Court;

and

(4) that similarly, the petitioner in CC No.1054 of

1998 has to approach this court only by following the

procedure as applicable to the contempt of subordinate

courts provided under the provisions of Contempt of Courts

Act, 1971 and the rules made thereunder by the Andhra

Pradesh High Court and not directly.

Accordingly, the High Court has directed the contempt

application pending before it to be dealt with by following

the procedure applicable to contempt of subordinate courts

and the contempt application filed in the Tribunal has been

directed to be dismissed as one before forum without

jurisdiction with liberty to the applicant to initiate the

proceedings afresh by following the procedure as stated by

the High Court. These appeals have been filed feeling

aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court taking the view

as aforesaid.

A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that

the Division Bench has traced the history of the

establishment of Administrative Tribunal by referring to the

relevant provisions of Constitution (Forty-second Amendment)

Act, 1976, the Administrative Tribunals Act, and exploring

the nature of contempt jurisdiction exercised by the

superior courts for punishing the contempt of the courts and

Tribunals subordinate to the High Courts. The High Court

has extracted and reproduced extensively from the

Constitution Bench judgment of this court in Supreme Court

Bar Association Vs. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 and

also analysed in its own way the decision of this court in

L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and therefrom drawn the following

deductions (vide para 14 of the impugned judgment), which

will be useful to reproduce so as to appreciate the

reasoning of the High Court :- 14. As such, it is clear

that in the State, the High Court is the only superior court

and the superior Court of Record. The High Court is the

custodian of the dignity and majesty of law in the State,

concerning not only itself but also all courts subordinate

to it. Subordinate courts/Tribunals have not been empowered

to punish contempt of themselves. They have to report to

the High Court in the prescribed form and then the High

Court will exercise the said power. It is well settled that

when a statute specifically provides for the exercise of a

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power by named authority, the ambit and location of that

power is to be sought only as prescribed by the said statute

and not otherwise. The submission of the learned Amicus

Curiae that without contempt power, the Administrative

Tribunals would become ineffective, cannot be considered, as

the power of court/Tribunal over a cause has no relevance to

and does not determine its power to deal with a contempt of

itself. A reading of Section 30 would make the things very

clear that what is independently conferred upon the Tribunal

is to deal with exfacie curiae contempt under Section 228 of

Indian Penal Code, which power also is vested in the other

subordinate courts/tribunals, to the exclusion of High Court

in view of provision to Section 10 of Contempt of Courts

Act, 1971. As such, the legislative intent is clear that

only against offences committed against the public servants

in discharge of their judicial functions, the Administrative

Tribunals Act makes an independent provision analogous to

that of the other subordinate courts/tribunals. That,

Administrative Tribunals are subordinate to High Court,

admits of no doubt, as such Tribunals exercise the judicial

power of the State and are amenable to the Jurisdiction of

judicial review and judicial superintendence of the High

Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The

tribunal cannot be said to have the contempt power sui

generis. The status of the Administrative Tribunal is on

par with any other subordinate court like district Courts

and other Tribunals amenable to the jurisdiction of the High

Courts, with only exception that the Administrative

Tribunals are conferred with power of judicial review of

legislative action also, because of the verdict in CHANDRA

KUMARs case (supra). But, such conferment of power by the

Supreme Court in CHANDRA KUMARs case enabling the

Administrative Tribunal to exercise the power of judicial

review of legislative action cannot elevate the status of

the Administrative Tribunal to that of High Court. Further,

if the contempt power is exercised by the Administrative

Tribunal, them under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts

Act, 1971, the matter is directly appealable to the Supreme

Court as of right and the decision on thereon by the apex

court becomes final. It is incomprehensible that when the

Supreme Court has ruled in CHANDRA KUMARs case that no

judgment rendered by the Administrative Tribunals in service

matter can be directly appealable the Supreme Court under

Article 136 of the Constitution, that the contempt

jurisdiction still vests in the Administrative Tribunals, as

in that event, the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court will

be violated, as against the exercise of contempt power by

the Administrative Tribunal, the matters have to go directly

to the Supreme Court by way of appeal and that too, as of

right. The contempt power cannot be exercised by the

Administrative Tribunal concurrently with the High Court, as

there is no such scheme either constitutional under Article

215 or statutory under Contempt of Court Act, 1971. We

cannot also accede to the contention that the contempt power

can be exercised by the Administrative Tribunal subject to

judicial review of the said exercise by the Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution, for the same reason that if

the contempt power is exercised by the Administrative

Tribunal, this courts jurisdiction is barred, as there is a

right of appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 19 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the power which is intended

for exercise, as of right, by the Supreme Court of India can

never be usurped by the High Court under the guise of

exercising the jurisdiction under the Article 226/227 of the

Constitution of India.

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[emphasis supplied]

We will shortly revert back to testing the correctness

of the reasoning adopted and the conclusions drawn by the

High Court. We proceed to deal with the relevant

constitutional and statutory provisions. Constitution

(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced Part XIV-A -

Tribunals engrafting Articles 323A and 323B into the body

of the Constitution. We are not concerned with Article 323B

dealing with tribunals for other matters. We are concerned

with administrative tribunals dealt in Article 323A which is

reproduced as under :- 323A. Administrative Tribunals. -

(1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or

trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints

with respect of recruitment and conditions of service of

persons appointed to public services and posts in connection

with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any

local or other authority within the territory of India or

under the control of the Government of India or of any

corporation owned or controlled by the Government.

(2) A law made under clause (1) may, -

(a) provide for the establishment of an administrative

tribunal for the Union and a separate administrative

tribunal for each State or for two or more States;

(b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the

power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be

exercised by each of the said tribunals;

(c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as

to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed by the

said tribunals;

(d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 136, with

respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause

(1);

(e) provide for the transfer to each such

administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any

court or other authority immediately before the

establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the

jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on

which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after

such establishment.

(f) repeal or amend any order made by the President

under clause (3) of article 371D;

(g) contain such supplemental, incidental and

consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees)

as Parliament may deem necessary for the effective

functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and

the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals.

(3) The provisions of this article shall have effect

notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this

Constitution or in any other law for the time being in

force.

[emphasis supplied]

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In pursuance of Article 323A of the Constitution the

Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 to

provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative

Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to

recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed

to public services and posts in connection with the affairs

of the Union or of any State or of any local or other

authority within the territory of India or under the control

of the Government of India or of any Corporation or society

owned or controlled by the Government. On coming into force

of the Act and constitution of the Central Administrative

Tribunal all the jurisdiction, powers and authority

exercisable immediately before that day by all courts, which

would include the High Courts (except the Supreme Court) in

relation to the matters specified in Section 14(1) of the

Act came to be conferred on the Tribunal. Section 17 gives

the Tribunal power to punish for contempt which reads as

under :

17. Power to punish for contempt. - A Tribunal

shall have, and exercise, the same jurisdiction, powers and

authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court

has and may exercise and, for this purpose, the provisions

of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), shall have

effect subject to the modifications that :

(a) the references therein to a High Court shall be

construed as including a reference to such Tribunal;

(b) the references to the Advocate- General in Section

15 of the said Act shall be construed.

(i) in relation to the Central Administrative

Tribunal, as a reference to the Attorney- General or the

Solicitor-General or the Additional Solicitor- General; and

(ii) in relation to an Administrative Tribunal for a

State or a Joint Administrative Tribunal for two or more

States, as a reference to the Advocate-General of the State

or any of the States for which such Tribunal has been

established.

[emphasis supplied]

Section 22 provides that a Tribunal shall not be bound

by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 but shall be guided by the principles of natural

justice and subject to the other provisions of the Act and

of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal

shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the

fixiing of places and times of its enquiry and deciding

whether to sit in public or in private. Sub-section (2)

empowers the Tribunal to decide the application before it on

a perusal of documents and written representations and after

hearing such oral arguments as may be advanced. Sub-section

(3) confers on the Tribunal specified powers of a Civil

Court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of

specified matters. Section 27 provides that the order of a

Tribunal finally disposing of an application or an appeal

shall not be called in question in any court including a

High Court. On a Tribunal being functional, Section 28

excludes the jurisdiction of all courts, including High

Court, but not the Supreme Court, Industrial Tribunal,

Labour Court or other Authority constituted under the

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law

from exercising any jurisdiction, power or authority in

relation to matters falling within the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal.

Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India

declare Supreme Court and every High Court to be a Court of

Record having all the powers of such a court including the

power to punish for contempt of itself. These articles do

not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the Supreme

Court and the High Courts. They merely recognise a

pre-existing situation that the Supreme Court and the High

Courts are courts of record and by virtue of being courts of

record have inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of

themselves. Such inherent power to punish for contempt is

summary. It is not governed or limited by any rules of

procedure excepting the principles of natural justice. The

jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is

inalienable. It cannot be taken away or whittled down by

any legislative enactment subordinate to the Constitution.

The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in

addition to and not in derogation of Articles 129 and 215 of

the Constitution. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act,

1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise

of jurisdiction contemplated by the said two Articles.

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India &

Anr.- (1998) 4 SCC 409, the plenary power and contempt

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court came up for the

consideration of this Court and in that context Articles

129, 142, 144 and 215 of the Constitution were noticed.

This Court held that courts of record enjoy power to punish

for contempt as a part of their inherent jurisdiction; the

existence and availability of such power being essential to

enable the courts to administer justice according to law in

a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the

majesty of law and prevent interference in the due

administration of justice (para 12). No act of Parliament

can take away that inherent jurisdiction of the Court of

Record to punish for contempt and Parliaments power of

legislation on the subject cannot be so exercised as to

stultify the status and dignity of the Supreme Court and/or

the High Courts though such a legislation may serve as a

guide for their determination of the nature of punishment

which a Court of Record may impose in the case of

established contempt. Power to investigate and punish for

contempt of itself vesting in Supreme Court flows from

Articles 129 and 142 (2) of the Constitution independent of

Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (para 21).

Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for

the punishment which shall ordinarily be imposed by the High

Court in the case of an established contempt. This section

does not deal with the powers of the Supreme Court to try or

punish a contemnor in committing contempt of the Supreme

Court or the courts subordinate to it (paras 28, 29,37).

Though the inherent power of the High Court under Article

215 has not been impinged upon by the provisions of the

Contempt of Courts Act, the Act does provide for the nature

and types of punishments which the High Court may award.

The High Court cannot create or assume power to inflict a

new type of punishment other than the one recognised and

accepted by Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

In L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. -

(1997) 3 SCC 261 the matter had come up before the

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seven-Judges Bench of this Court consequent upon a reference

made by a Division Bench of this Court which doubted the

correctness of a five-Judges Constitution Bench of this

Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India - (1987) 1

SCC 124 and felt the need of the same being comprehensively

reconsidered. This Court framed three broad issues for its

consideration and proceeded to consider the constitutional

validity of Articles 323A, 323B and several provisions of

the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. We need not

extensively reproduce several conclusions arrived at by the

Constitution Bench (excepting where necessary); it would

suffice to briefly summarise the conclusions of the

Constitution Bench insofar as necessary for our purpose.

The Constitution Bench held that the jurisdiction conferred

upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles

226 and 32 of the Constitution respectively is a part of the

inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. The power

of judicial review over legislative action vesting in the

High Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under

Article 32 of the Constitution are an integral and essential

feature of such basic structure and therefore their power to

test the constitutional validity of legislations can never

be ousted or excluded (paras 73, 78). The power vested in

the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over

the decisions of all courts and tribunals within their

respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure

of the Constitution and a situation where the High Courts

are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that

of constitutional interpretation is equally to be avoided

(para 79). Though the subordinate judiciary or tribunal

created under ordinary legislations cannot exercise the

power of judicial review of legislative action to the

exclusion of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, there is

no constitutional prohibition against their performing a

supplemental - as opposed to a substitutional - role in this

respect. Clause (3) of Article 32 itself contemplates that

Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise

within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of

the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause

(2), without prejudice to the powers conferred on the

Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2).

The Constitution Bench further held that if the power

of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution

described time and again as the heart and soul of the

Constitution, can be additionally conferred upon any other

Court, there is no reason why the same situation would not

subsist in respect of the jurisdiction conferred upon the

High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. So long

as the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles

226/227 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 32 is

retained, there is no reason why the power to test the

validity of the legislations against the provisions of the

Constitution cannot be conferred upon Administrative

Tribunals or Tribunals under Articles 323A and 323B (para

89). The basic structure theory of the Constitution

prohibits the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles

226 in respect of the power of judicial review being wholly

excluded but the same can certainly be additionally

conferred on courts and tribunals. The Constitution Bench

specifically overruled the plea that the Tribunals should

not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of

legislations is questioned because that would defeat the

very purpose of constituting the tribunals. To allay the

fears sought to be projected before the Constitution Bench,

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this Court held that the decisions of the Tribunal will be

subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division bench

of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the

Tribunal concerned falls as this would serve dual purpose :

(i) the power of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of

the Constitution to judicially review the legislative action

would be saved, and (ii) it will be ensured that frivolous

claims were filtered through the process of adjudication in

the Tribunal, and additionally the High Court will have the

benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of

use to it in finally deciding the matter (para 91). The

Constitution Bench emphasised the necessity of ensuring that

the High Courts are able to exercise judicial

superintendence over the decisions of the Tribunals under

Article 227 of the Constitution and held (vide para 91) :-

Having regard to both the aforestated contentions, we hold

that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to

Article 323- A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be

subject to the High Courts writ jurisdiction under Articles

226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the

High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the

particular Tribunal falls.

The power of Supreme Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution to hear appeals by special leave against the

orders of the Tribunals on matters specified in Section

14(1) of the Act having been specifically saved by Section

28 thereof, the Constitution Bench consistently with the

view taken by it laid down the methodology to be adopted.

No appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie

before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution; instead, the aggrieved party will be entitled

to move the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution and from the Division Bench decision of the

High Court the aggrieved party can move the Supreme Court

under Article 136 of the Constitution. Thus, the

Constitution Bench succeeded in preserving intact the

inalienable jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles

226/227 of the Constitution and also effectuating the

appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article

136 of the Constitution over the decisions of the Tribunal

subject to their being filtered through and in that process

being subject to test by the High Courts in their judicial

review jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional powers of the Tribunal were

summarised by the Constitution Bench as under (vide para@@

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93):-@@

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1. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where

the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However,

in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for

the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our

constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such

an obligation. Their function in this respect is only

supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will

be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the

respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently

also have the power to test the vires of subordinate

legislations and rules. However, this power of the

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Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The

Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the

vires of their parent statutes following the settled

principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act

cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In

such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached

directly.

2. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered

in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate

upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be

subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their

respective High Courts. The Tribunals will, however,

continue to act as the only courts of first instance in

respect of the areas of law for which they have been

constituted; meaning thereby that it will not be open for

litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases

where they question the vires of statutory legislations

(except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates

the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.

The Constitution Bench concluded as under :-

We hold that clause (2) (a)(d) of Article 323-A and

clause (3)(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude

the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court

under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are

unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the exclusion

of jurisdiction clauses in all other legislations enacted

under the aegis of Articles 323- A and 323-B would, to the

same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction

conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and

upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constituiton

is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our

Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted,

other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role

in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and

32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article

323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of

the competence to test the constitutional validity of

statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these

Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a

Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction

the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will,

nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance

in respect of the areas of law for which they have been

constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants

to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where

they question the vires of statutory legislations (except

where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal

is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and

constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we

have indicated.

The Constitution Bench invoked the doctrine of

prospective overruling and made its directions to come into

effect prospectively, i.e., from the date of its judgment.

It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has not

declared the provisions of Article 323-A (2)(b) or Article

323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the

Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under

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appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been

compared to like courts of first instance and then

proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative

Tribunals having been held to be equivalent to court or

tribunals subordinate to High Court the jurisdiction to hear

their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals

and the only course available to them was either to make a

reference to High Court or to file a complaint under Section

193, 219 and 228 of IPC as provided by Section 30 of the

Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the

Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High

Court for the purpose of Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to

judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution the right to file an

appeal to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the

Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the Act

was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of the Act

became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any

basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the

judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar

Association (supra) or L. Chandra Kumar (supra) or any

other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in

so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the

High Courts under Articles 226/227 could not be taken away

by conferring the same on any court or Tribunal and

jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now

legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of

High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning

tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such

jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or

supplementally on any Court or Tribunal which is not a

concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in

view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2)(b) of Article

323-A specifically empowers the Parliament to enact a law

specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power

to punish for contempt, being conferred on administrative

tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of

the Act derives its legislative sanctity therefrom. The

power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself

under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the

jurisdiction power and authority to hear and decide the

matters covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act

having been conferred on the administrative tribunals the

jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken

away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the

High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters

now falling within the jurisdiction of tribunals if those

matters would have continued to be heard by the High court

has now been conferred on the administrative tribunals under

Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as

vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the

Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose,

firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the

Tribunals are not courts of record. While holding the

proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the tribunal remains

a tribunal and so would be amenable to jurisdiction of High

Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution subject to

the well-established rules of self- restraint governing the

discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending

proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of

the tribunals. However any order or decision of tribunal

punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the

Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order

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appealed against in view of the specific provision contained

in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with

Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Section 17 of Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of

legislation by reference. The provisions of Contempt of

Courts Act are not as if lifted and incorporated in the text

of Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of

legislation by incorporation); they remain there where they

are yet while reading the provisions of Contempt of Courts

Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will be so read as

to read the word Tribunal in place of the word High

Court wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set

out in Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.

Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for

appeals. In its text also by virtue of Section 17 of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the word High Court

shall be read as Tribunal. Here, by way of abundant

caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-tribunal

appeals i.e. appeal from an order or decision of a member

of a Tribunal sitting singly to a bench of not less than two

members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative

Tribunals Act, 1985. The question of any order made under

the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a

member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of

business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate

government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal

before a Bench of two or more members of Tribunal therefore

does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal

punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the

Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the

case of L. Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that orders of

tribunal holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for

contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of High

Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of

remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the

Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction

between orders passed by Administrative Tribunal on matters

covered by Section 14 (1) of Administrative Tribunals Act

and orders punishing for contempt under section 19 of the

Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of

Administrative Tribunals Act, is this : as against the

former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided,

but as against the later statutory remedy of appeal is

provided by Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act itself.

Subordination of Tribunals and courts functioning

within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can be

either judicial or administrative or both. The power of

superintendence exercised by the High Court under Article

227 of the Constitution is judicial superintendence and not

administrative superintendence, such as one which vests in

the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution over

subordinate courts. Vide para 96 of L. Chandra Kumars

case, the Constitution Bench did not agree with the

suggestion that the tribunals be made subject to the

supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts within whose

territorial jurisdiction they fall, as our constitutional

scheme does not require that all adjudicatory bodies which

fall within the territorial jurisdiction of any High Court

should be subject to its supervisory jurisdiction.

Obviously, the supervisory jurisdiction referred to by the

Constitution Bench in para 96 of the judgment is the

supervision of the administrative functioning of the

tribunals as is spelt out by discussion made in paras 96 and

97 of the judgment.

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Jurisdiction should not be confused with status and

subordination. The Parliament was motivated to create new

adjudicatory fora to provide new, cheap and fast-track

adjudicatory systems and permitting them to function by

tearing of the conventional shackles of strict rule of

pleadings, strict rule of evidence, tardy trials,

three/four-tier appeals, endless revisions and reviews __

creating hurdles in fast flow of stream of justice. The

administrative tribunals as established under Article 323-A

and the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 are an alternative

institutional mechanism or authority, designed to be not

less effective than the High Court, consistently with the

amended constitutional scheme but at the same time not to

negate judicial review jurisdiction of constitutional

courts. Transfer of jurisdiction in specified matters from

the High Court to the administrative tribunal equates the

tribunal with the High Court in so far as the exercise of

judicial authority over the specified matters is concerned.

That, however, does not assign the administrative tribunals

a status equivalent to that of the High Court nor does that

mean that for the purpose of judicial review or judicial

superintendence they cannot be subordinate to High Court.

It has to be remembered that what has been conferred on the

administrative tribunal is not only jurisdiction of the High

Court but also of the subordinate courts as to specified

matters. High Courts are creatures of Constitution and

their judges hold constitutional office having been

appointed under the Constitution. The Tribunals are

creatures of statute and their members are statutorily

appointed and hold statutory office. In State of Orissa Vs.

Bhagaban Sarangi, (1995) 1 SCC 399, it was held that

administrative tribunal is nonetheless a tribunal and so it

is bound by the decision of the High Court of the state and

cannot side-track or bypass it. Certain observations made

in the case of T.N. Seshan, Chief Election Commr. of India

Vs. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 611, may usefully be

referred to. It was held that merely because some of the

service conditions of the Chief Election Commissioner are

akin to those of the Supreme Court judges, that does not

confer the status of a Supreme Court judge on the C.E.C..

This court observed __ Of late it is found that even

personnel belonging to other fora claim equation as High

Court or Supreme Court Judges merely because certain

jurisdictions earlier exercised by those Courts are

transferred to them not realising the distinction between

constitutional and statutory functionaries. We are

therefore clearly of the opinion that there is no anathema

in the tribunal exercising jurisdiction of High Court and in

that sense being supplemental or additional to the High

Court but at the same time not enjoying status equivalent to

High Court and also being subject to judicial review and

judicial superintendence of the High Court.

Incidentally we may refer to a 3-judges bench decision

of this Court in Krishnan & Anr. Vs. Krishnaveni and Anr.

- (1997) 4 SCC 241. Section 397 of Code of Criminal

Procedure 1973 confers concurrent revisional jurisdiction on

High Court and Sessions Judge. The two fora are alternative

to each other. Once an order of subordinate Court is

subjected to revision before Sessions Judge, a second

revision before High Court does not lie. Still, this Court

held, the exercise of inherent power and power of

superintendence vesting in High Court under Sections 482 and

483 read with 401 of the Code was not excluded. The power

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of the High Court of continuous supervisory jurisdiction is

of paramount importance to examine the correctness, legality

or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or

passed as also regularity of proceedings of all inferior

criminal courts. Such jurisdiction shall however be

exercised in cases of grave miscarriage of justice, abuse of

the process of the courts, the required statutory procedure

not complied with, failure of justice or order passed or

sentence imposed by the Magistrate requiring correction lest

grave miscarriage of justice should ensue.

Section 30 of the Act was also referred to by the High

Court to support its conclusions. Section 30 is merely

declaratory of the proceedings before a tribunal being

judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219

and 228 of the Penal Code. By no stretch of reasoning,

Section 30 could have been held as impinging upon the power

conferred on the tribunal by Section 17 of the Act and to

hold further that in case of contempt of its lawful

authority the only remedy available to tribunal was to have

recourse to Section 30 to the exclusion of power to punish

for contempt conferred by Section 17.

Contempt jurisdiction is exercised for the purpose of

upholding the majesty of law and dignity of judicial system

as also of the courts and tribunals entrusted with the task

of administering delivery of justice. Power of contempt has

often been invoked, as a step in that direction, for

enforcing compliance of orders of courts and punishing for

lapses in the matter of compliance. The majesty of judicial

institution is to be ensured so that it may not be lowered

and the functional utility of the constitutional edifice is

preserved from being rendered ineffective. The proceedings

for contempt of court cannot be used merely for executing

the decree of the court. However, with a view to preserving

the flow of the stream of justice in its unsullied form and

in unstinted purity willful defiance with the mandate of the

court is treated to be contemptuous. Availability of

jurisdiction to punish for contempt provides efficacy to

functioning of the judicial forum and enables the

enforcement of the orders on account of its deterrent affect

on avoidance. Viewed from this angle the validity of

Section 17 of the Act is protected not only by sub-clause

(b) of Clause (2) of Article 323-A but also by sub-clause

(g) thereof.

For the foregoing reasons the appeals are allowed.

The judgment of the High Court is set aside. CWP No.34841

of 1998 filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh laying

challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with

its own contempt is directed to be dismissed. The Tribunal

shall now proceed ahead with the proceedings pending before

it as per law. Contempt Case No.1054/1998 filed before the

High Court invoking its contempt jurisdiction is directed to

be transferred to the Tribunal for being dealt with under

Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Complete record of the proceedings shall be transmitted by

the High Court to the Tribunal. The appeals stand disposed

of accordingly. No order as to the costs.

. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . CJI