* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. NARENDAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY

WRIT PETITION No.42518 of 2022

% 11.01.2024

# T.A. Waheed Saheb, S/o Mohammed Sab,

Aged 53 years, Occupation: Assistant Engineer/

Mandal Engineer (PR), MPP, Krishnagiri Mandal,

Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh State. …. Petitioner

Versus

$ The State of Andhra Pradesh, represented

by its Principal Secretary to Government,

Panchayat Raj and Rural Development

Department, Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi,

Guntur District & 2 others …. Respondents

! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri G.V.L. Murthy

! Counsel for the Respondents : G.P for Panchayat Raj

Sri T.C.Krishnan

Sri J.Sudheer

G.P for Services-IV

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:1) (1976) 2 SCC 901

2) (1967) 2 SCR 703 : AIR 1967 SC 1427 : 65 ITR 34

3) 1987 (Supp) SCC 207

4) (1983) 3 SCR 372 : (1983) 3 SCC 567 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 433

5) (1967) 2 SCR 703, 717 : AIR 1967 SC 1427

6) 1975 Supp SCR 491 : (1973) 3 SCC 1 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 1

7) (1972) 3 SCR 898 : (1972) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1973 SC 441

8) (1975) 2 SCR 979 : (1975) 1 SCC 319 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 36

2

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. NARENDAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY

WRIT PETITION No.42518 of 2022

# T.A. Waheed Saheb, S/o Mohammed Sab,

Aged 53 years, Occupation: Assistant Engineer/

Mandal Engineer (PR), MPP, Krishnagiri Mandal,

Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh State. …. Petitioner

Versus

$ The State of Andhra Pradesh, represented

by its Principal Secretary to Government,

Panchayat Raj and Rural Development

Department, Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi,

Guntur District & 2 others …. Respondents

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 11.01.2024

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. NARENDAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may

be allowed to see the Order? Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of Order may be marked

to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair

copy of the Order ? Yes/No

_____________

G. NARENDAR, J

________________

NYAPATHY VIJAY, J

3

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. NARENDAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY

WRIT PETITION No.42518 of 2022

ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice G.Narendar)

Heard Sri P.Surendar Rao, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the petitioners, Learned Special G P (Panchayat Raj) for the

respondents 1 & 2 and Sri J.Sudheer, Learned Counsel for

respondent No.3.

2. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the petitioners,

it is apparent that the issue, which this Court is called upon to

adjudicate lies in a very narrow compass i.e., whether the ratio fixed by

the Government between two streams of recruitment i.e., direct

recruits and promotee’s can be altered in exercise of its executive

powers?

3. The issue in our opinion is no more res integra and has attained

finality at the hands of the Hon’ble Apex Court, where a Three Judge

Bench of the Apex Court in V.B. Badami and others vs. State of

Mysore and Others

1

has held in Paras 35 to 37 as under:-

1

(1976) 2 SCC 901

4

“35. The Government confirmed the direct recruits and the appellants

by adjustment of vacancies within their respective quota and

determined their seniority in accordance with Rule 2(b) of the

Seniority Rules. Seniority is based on confirmation as full member of

the service in the substantive vacancy.

36. In S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India

2

it was said that when the

quota was fixed for the two sources of recruitment the quota could not

be altered according to exigencies of the situation. It was held there

that the promotees who had been promoted in excess of the prescribed

quota should be held to have been illegally promoted. In Bishan

Sarup's case (supra) it was held that when it was ascertained that not

more than 1/3 of the vacancies were to go to the promotees and the

rest to the direct recruits, the ratio was not made dependent on

whether any direct recruit was appointed in any particular year or not.

The promotees were entitled to 1/3 of the vacancies in any particular

year, whether or not there was direct recruitment by competitive

examination in that year.

37. Two principles are established in the decision referred to. One is

that quotas which are fixed are unalterable according to exigencies of

situation. Quotas which are fixed can only be altered by fresh

determination of quotas under the relevant rule. The other is that one

group cannot claim the quota fixed for the other group either on the

ground that the quotas are not filled up or on the ground that because

there has been a number in excess of quota the same should be

absorbed depriving the other group of quota.”

4. From a reading of the above, it is apparent that the sanctity of

the quota rule cannot be violated in any manner whatsoever, but only

in the manner as is provided under the rules, more particularly, the

2

(1967) 2 SCR 703 : AIR 1967 SC 1427 : 65 ITR 34

5

observation in Para 36 that the quota rule cannot be violated to suit or

alter according to exigencies of a situation, which is the case that is

now canvassed before this Court. It is contended that as there was

lack of promotional avenues for the promotees, the State has taken

resort to Rule 31 and has proceeded to alter the quota, which the

Hon’ble Apex Court has held to be impermissible & illegal.

That apart, even a bare reading of Rule 31 of A.P. State & Subordinate

Service Rules, 1996, would leave no doubt in the mind of this Court

that there is no compliance with the mandate of Rule 31 itself. The

said Rule 31 reads as under:-

“31. Relaxation of Rules by the Governor:-

Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the special rules, the Governor

shall have the power to relax any rules contained in these rules or special rules, in favour

of any person or class of persons, in relation to their application to any member of a

service or to any person to be appointed to the service, class or category or a person or a

class of persons, who have served in any civil capacity in the Government of Andhra

Pradesh in such manner as may appear to be just and equitable to him, where such

relaxation is considered necessary in the public interest or where the application of such

rule or rules is likely to cause undue hardship to the person or class of persons

concerned.” (Emphasis’ by this Court).

5. A bare perusal of the above rule would indicate that it can be

exercised only in particular circumstances and none of the

circumstances enumerated under Rule 31 appear to be prevailing at

the time of issuance of the G.O, invoking the Rule 31.

6

6. The quota rule again came into consideration before the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Gonal Bihimappa vs. State Of Karnataka & Ors

3

and the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe and held in

Paras 8, 9, 10 and 11 as under:-

8. It is a well settled position of law that where recruitment is from

two sources to a service, a quota rule can be applied fixing the limits

of recruitment from the two sources. (H. C. Sharma v. MCD

4

.)

First Aspect

9. In S.G. Jaisinghani V. Union of India

5

, a Constitution Bench of

this Court observed:

The Solicitor-General on behalf of respondents 1, 2 and 3 submitted

that the quota rule was merely an administrative direction to determine

recruitment from two different sources in the proportion stated in the rule

and a breach of that quote rule was not a justiciable issue. The Solicitor-

General said that there was, however, substantial compliance with the

quota rule.... We are unable to accept the argument of the Solicitor-General

that the quota rule was not legally binding on the government.

It is not disputed that Rule 4 of the Income Tax Officers (Class I, Grade II)

Service Recruitment Rules is a statutory rule and there is a statutory duty

cast on the government under this rule to determine the method or

methods to be employed for the purpose of filling the vacancies and the

number of candidates to be recruited by each method. In the letter of the

Government of India dated October 18, 1951 there is no specific reference

to Rule 4, but the quota fixed in their letter must be deemed to have been

fixed by the Government of India in exercise of the statutory power given

under Rule 4. Having fixed the quota in that letter under Rule 4, it is not now

open to the Government of India to say that it is not incumbent upon it to

follow the quota for each year and it is open to it to alter the quota on

3

1987 (Supp) SCC 207

4

(1983) 3 SCR 372 : (1983) 3 SCC 567 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 433

5

(1967) 2 SCR 703, 717 : AIR 1967 SC 1427

7

account of the particular situation…. We are of opinion that having fixed the

quota in exercise of their power under Rule 4 between the two sources of

recruitment, there is no discretion left with the Government of India to alter

that quota according to the exigencies of the situation or to deviate from

the quota, in any particular year, at its own will and pleasure. As we have

already indicated, the quota rule is linked up with the seniority rule and

unless the quota rule is strictly observed in practice, it will be difficult to

hold that the seniority rule i.e., Rule 1 (f) (iii) and (iv), is not unreasonable

and does not offend Article 16 of the Constitution. (Underlining by this

Court).

In Badami case (1) this aspect was examined by the court. The learned

Chief Justice spoke for the three-Judge Bench thus: [SCC pp. 908-11 SCC

(L&S) pp. 360-63, paras 29, 34, 36-39].

In working out the quota rule, these principles are generally followed. First,

where rules prescribe quota between direct recruits and promotees, confirmation

or substantive appointment can only be in respect of clear vacancies in the

permanent strength of the cadre. Second, confirmed persons are senior to those

who are officiating. Third, as between persons appointed in officiating capacity,

seniority is to be counted on the length of continuous service. Fourth, direct

recruitment is possible only by competitive examination which is the prescribed

procedure under the rules. In promotional vacancies, the promotion is either by

selection or on the principle of seniority-cum-merit. A promotion could be made in

respect of a temporary post or for a specified period but a direct recruitment has

generally to be made only in respect of clear permanent vacancy either existing or

anticipated to arise at or about the period of probation is expected to be

completed. Fifth, if promotions are made to vacancies in excess of the promotional

quota, the promotions may not be totally illegal but would be irregular.

The promotees cannot claim any right to hold the promotional posts unless the

vacancies fall within their quota. If the promotees occupy any vacancies which are

within the quota of direct recruits, when direct recruitment takes place, the direct

recruits will occupy the vacancies within their quota. Promotees who were

occupying the vacancies within the quota of direct recruits will either be reverted

or they will be absorbed in the vacancies within their quota in the facts and

circumstances of a case.

8

The important principle is that as long as the quota rule remains neither

promotees can be allotted to any of the substantive vacancies of the quota of

direct recruits nor recruits can be allotted to promotional vacancies. The result is

that direct recruitment vacancies between September 11, 1959 and October 26,

1964 cannot be occupied by any promotees. The fact that direct recruits were

confirmed on October 26, 1964 will not rob the direct recruits of their quota which

remained unfilled from December 2, 1957.

In S. G. Jaisinghani V. Union of India (5) it was said that when the quota was

fixed for the two sources of recruitment the quota could not be altered according

to exigencies of the situation. It was held there that the promotees who had been

promoted in excess of the prescribed quota should be held to have been illegally

promoted. In Bishan Sarup Gupta v. Union of India

6

it was held that when it was

ascertained that not more than one-third of the vacancies were to go to the

promotees and the rest to the direct recruits, the ratio was not made dependent

on whether any direct recruit was appointed in any particular year or not.

The promotees were entitled to one-third of the vacancies in any particular year,

whether or not there was direct recruitment by competitive examination in

that year.

Two principles are established in the decision referred to. One is that quotas

which are fixed are unalterable according to exigencies of situation. Quotas which

are fixed can only be altered by fresh determination of quotas under the relevant

rule. The other is that one group cannot claim the quota fixed for the other group

either on the ground that the quotas are not filled up or on the ground that

because there has been a number in excess of quota the same should be absorbed

depriving the other group of quota. (Underlining by this Court).

In Bachan Singh v. Union of India

7

the two appellants were promoted in the

years 1958 and 1959. The respondents were appointed by direct recruitment in

1962, 1963 and 1964. The respondents were confirmed in their posts before the

appellants. The applicants contended that the respondents who were directly

appointed after the appellants had been promoted were not to be confirmed in

permanent posts before the applicants. It was held that the direct recruits were

6

1975 Supp SCR 491 : (1973) 3 SCC 1 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 1

7

(1972) 3 SCR 898 : (1972) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1973 SC 441

9

confirmed against permanent vacancies within their quota. The earlier

confirmation of direct recruits though appointed later was upheld on the ground

that they fell within their quota of permanent vacancies.

A.K.Subraman v. Union of India

8

on which the appellants relied also held

that each quota would have to be worked independently on its own force. In that

case the Assistant Executive Engineers who were initially entitled to three-fourth

and subsequently to two- third of the vacancies while Assistant Engineers who

were entitled initially to one-fourth and subsequently to one-third of such

vacancies were held to be entitled to their respective quotas independent of the

fact that whether any person from one class or the other was promoted or not. It

was illustrated by saying that if there were three vacancies in a year, two would go

to the Assistant Executive Engineers and one would go to the Assistant Engineers

and even if there were not eligible Assistant Executive Engineers who could be

promoted to fill in two vacancies belonging to their quota, one vacancy is to be

filled up by promotion of an Assistant Engineer, if he was eligible. Similarly, if two

vacancies belonging to the quota of Assistant Executive Engineers are to be filled by

Assistant Engineers for want of availability of eligible Assistant Executive Engineers

the appointment of Assistant Engineers to fill in those two vacancies would be

irregular because they would have to be pushed down to later years when their

appointment could be regularised as a result of absorption in their lawful quota for

those years.

10. Badami’s case referred to several authorities of the court and clearly drew out

the judicial consensus on the point in issue by concluding that the quota rule had to

be strictly enforced and it was not open to the authorities to meddle with it on the

ground of administrative exigencies.

11. The scheme in force relating to the services for fixing inter se seniority takes

into account the filling up of the vacancies in the service from the two sources on

the basis of the quota and, therefore, fixation of inter se seniority in the Gradation

List has to be worked out on the basis of quota.”

8

(1975) 2 SCR 979 : (1975) 1 SCC 319 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 36

10

7. A reading of the above would reveal that the Apex Court in the

subsequent Judgment has reiterated the position as settled by the

Three Judge Bench in Badami’s case. That apart, the refrain of the

respondents that the petitioners have done precious little, apart from

approaching the Tribunal and that the petitioners have not taken any

effective steps to fulfill the direction issued by the Tribunal and that

they should have resorted to litigation in the form of writ petitions to

ensure implementation of the order or ought to have initiated contempt

proceedings for not implementing the orders, is to state the least

obnoxious and a inequitable stand. The object of the State is to ensure

a litigation free administration and not encourage resort to litigation. If

the said contention is accepted, it would amount to this Court being a

party to an act, which has the audacity to defy lawful directions. That

apart, we reject the said contention keeping in view the nature of the

direction issued by the Tribunal. The operative portion of the orders

rendered in O.A reads as under:-

“7. The Respondents did not dispute the quota provided under the Special

Rules. When there are Special Rules fixing the quota in a particular category, the

general rules will not prevail and the special rules prevail over the general rules.

Since the quota under the Rules is fixed at 50% for direct recruits, the Respondents

are not expected to confine the other recruitment only to 50% and they are not

entitled to reduce the quota meant for direct recruits. The Respondents did not

mention whether any amendment to the Rules was brought even till to-day. This

shows that they are acting only on the basis of the executive instructions without

amendment to the Rules. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the reduction of

quota from 50% to 30% for direct recruits is illegal and arbitrary and the orders

11

issued by the Government from time to time reducing the quota of direct recruits

from 50% to 30% are illegal. The Respondents are directed to maintain 50% quota

for direct recruits from the date of reduction of direct recruits quota from 50% to

30% and prepare the seniority list of Asst. Engineers accordingly and consider the

cases of the applicants for promotion to the post of Deputy Executive Engineer on

the basis of the said seniority list. The O.A is disposed of accordingly. M.A. is closed.

No order as to costs.”

8. From a reading of the above, it is apparent that the order is

nothing but a direction to the competent authority to act in accordance

with law in the matter of settling the lis. That apart, we are also of the

opinion that the observations are a direct answer to the contention that

the Government Servants should have resorted to multiple rounds of

litigation. The Apex Court has categorically disapproved such conduct.

We have perused the G.O.Ms.No.237, dated 20.02.2006. A cursory

reading of the G.O would indicate that it is the law laid down by the

Hon’ble Apex Court as noted supra. That apart, we observe that the 2

nd

respondent has admitted to achieve indirectly what could not have

been achieved directly. If the source of appointments to a post are

more than one and if quotas are fixed under the rules for each source,

then it is not open to exceed the quota under the rule i.e., quota rule,

then the same could not have been breached by granting appointments

to a percentage of persons in excess of the quota fixed under the rule

by resorting to the provisions of Rule 31 i.e., relaxation.

12

9. As noted supra, Rule 31 pertaining to relaxation does not invest

the authority with the latitude to exercise the power arbitrarily but only

in the circumstances mandated there under. Be that as it may. The law

with regard to tinkering with the quota can be achieved only by

amending the CADA under recruitment rules and cannot be determined

in any other manner. As the quota has been fixed by the respondent-

State in exercise of its discretion by inviting the relevant rules, in our

opinion, the power of relaxation cannot be exercised to carryout

amendments. As acceptance of such a position would amount to

permitting the party to achieve indirectly what he could not have

achieved directly. That apart, it is no more res integra that the power

to alter or amend the rules cannot be exercised by resorting to

executive power as provided under Articles 162 and 309 of the

Constitution of India. A bare reading of the Articles would belie any

such notions.

10. Further, a useful reference could be made to the Division Bench

ruling of the Karnataka High Court rendered in the case of

M.V. Dixit and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors., wherein it

has been pleased to hold in Paras 22, 23, 24 and 25 as under:-

13

22. After the coming into force of the Civil Services Act, creation and abolition of

posts (i.e. specifying different categories of posts in different branches of Public

Service, specifying the total number of posts and nature of posts in each category

and the scales of pay admissible to each category) can only be by way of Rules

made in the manner prescribed in Section 3(2) of the said Act and not by any

executive order issued under Article 162 of the Constitution. The field of Regulation

of creation and abolition of posts, method of recruitment and conditions of service

is now occupied by an enactment of State Legislature. Therefore, exercise of the

power in regard to regulation of the matters falling in the occupied field can only

be in accordance with the said Act and not otherwise by an executive order.

23. It is contended by the promotes/Transferees belonging to Publ ic

Works/Irrigation Department that Section 3(1) merely provides that the State

Government may, by notification, make rules relating to recruitment and conditions

of service, and specify different categories of posts, number of posts, nature of

posts and scale of pay; and nat Section 3(1) is only an enabling provision

permitting the State to make Rules in the manner stipulated and until Rules are

made under 3(1), the executive power is not taken away in regard to matters

specified in Section 3(1). It is submitted that as no Rule as contemplated in Section

3(1) has been made prescribing the cadre strength of the Accounts

Superintendents or their number and nature of posts in each category in respect of

Public Works or Irrigation Department, the executive power of State to create or

abolition of posts is not taken away; and as a consequence, the State can by

executive order, bifurcate any cadre or create a cadre by reducing the strength of

an existing cadre and at the same time, create new cadre consisting of the

downgraded posts. A combined reading of Article 162 of the Constitution and

Section 3 of the Civil Services Act shows that the said contention is not tenable. As

noticed above, executive power in regard to a subject comes to an end when a law

is made in regard to such subject by the State Legislature and such law occupies

the field. Prior to the enactment of Karnataka State Civil Services Act, the

recruitment and conditions of services were not regulated by any law made by the

Legislature. In those circumstances, the manner of recruitment and the minimum

qualifications therefore were regulated by Rules made under Article 309; and the

creation and abolition of posts with prescription of cadre strength and pay scales

were regulated by executive orders under Article 162. Once the Karnataka Civil

14

Services Act, 1978 enacted and came into force on 4.3.1992, the field relating to

recruitment and conditions of service (including creation of abolition of posts, fixing

the number and nature of posts) became a field occupied by law made by the

State Legislature. The law is made in regard to 'recruitment in a wider sense which

includes not only the method of Recruitment, but also creation and abolition of

posts by specifying different categories of posts in different branches of public

service specifying total number of posts, nature of such posts and scales of pay

admissible to such posts. As the field relating to creation and abolition of posts is

occupied by an enactment of the State Legislature, regulating the entire field of

recruitment, the State can abolish or create posts only by making rules as

contemplated in Section 3(2) of the Karnataka Civil Services Act and not by an

executive order under Article 162. We are therefore of the view that the cadre

strength of I Accounts Superintendents in public works and Irrigation departments

could not have been altered by government by issuing an executive order under

Article 162 on 5.12.2001.

24. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that all rules relating to matters referred

to in Sub-section (1) and in force on the date of commencement of the Civil

Services Act shall be deemed to be the rules made under Sub-section (1) of

Section 3 and shall continue in force until they are modified or replaced by rules

made under the said Act. Four types of Rules are mentioned in Sub-section (3) of

Section 3 one of which is rules made by the Government under any law for the

time being in force. When the State Government issues a notification sanctioning

the establishment of any particular cadre, or creating or abolishing any post or

determining the strength of each cadre and character of the post therein, such a

notification issued in exercise of executive power under Article 162 will have to be

considered as "Rules made by the Government under any law for the time being in

force". In fact, it is of some interest to note that whenever the State establishes

service cadres for any Department, the notification is issued in two parts, normally

on the same day. All cadre and recruitment rules made by the State Government

prior to the coming into force of the Civil Services Act in the year 1992, consisted

of two parts, the first part of the Notification containing an executive order under

Article 162 relating to establishment of State services cadre, specifying the

strength of the cadre, number and character of the posts and the scales of pay;

and the second part of the notification containing the rules made in exercise of

power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution regulating the method of

15

recruitment and prescribing the minimum qualification. Both parts of the

notification are together referred to as the 'cadre and recruitment rules'. The cadre

and Recruitment Rules (Vol 1) compiled by the General Administration Department

has more 30 of such cadre and recruitment rules made between 1959 and 1961.

We may refer to some of them by way of illustrations.

(i) The Mysore Public Works Department Engineering Services Cadre and Recruitment Rules

issued as per notification No. GAD/8/GRR/57 dated 3.12.1960 made up of the first part issued

under Article 162 relating to establishment of the services cadres and second part under Article

309 of the Constitution relating to regulating the recruitment. Rules 1959 of issued as per

notification.

(ii) The Mysore State Accounts Services Cadre and Recruitment No. GAD 13 GRR 57 dated

26.5.1959 made up of the first part issued under Article 162 establishing the several cadres

under the Mysore State Accounts service and the second part issued under Article 309,

regulating recruitment.

Therefore a notification issued under Article 162 sanctioning the

establishment of the State service cadres and indicating the strength and nature of

each cadre and the scale of pay of such cadre have all along been treated as

'Rules' made by the government under the law for the time being in force. They

will therefore be rules, which will be deemed to be the rules made under Sub-

section (1) of Section 3 and will therefore continue in force until they are modified

or replaced by the Rules made under the Act. In view of the categorical provision

in Sub-section (3) of Section 3, after the State Civil Services Act, 1978 came into

force, the State can modify or replace any notification or Government control

relating to establishment of cadres or fixing the strength of the cadre or number

and character of the posts only by the rules made in terms of Section 3(2) of the

Civil Services Act and not by any Executive order under Article 162.

25. It is stated that exercise of executive power under order dated 5.12.2001 was

nothing but a repetition of exercise of such power under order dated 18.6.1999

and that order was upheld by a learned Single Judge of this Court in KARNATAKA

STATE ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATIO N v. STATE OF

KARNATAKA A ORS. As that decision has attained finality, it is contended by the

promotees/transferees that the subsequent order dated 5.12.2001 on the very

same lines is not open to challenge.”

16

We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by

the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka.

11. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that the petitions, without doubt warrant appropriate direction

from this Court to the competent authority to review the anomaly.

12. It is fairly submitted that what is now prepared is the provisional

seniority list. Though a provisional seniority list would not give a cause

of action, but in view of the fact that any elbow room to the competent

authority to continue in the chosen path would result in docket

explosion and as it is apparently contrary to the settled position in law

and as the issue is no more res integra we deem it appropriate to

entertain the Writ Petition by issuing the following directions:-

i) The 2

nd

respondent is directed to consider the law as settled by the Apex

Court in Gonal Bihimappa’s case and V.B. Badami’s case, the law as

explained by the Division Bench of High Court of Karnataka in M.V. Dixit’s

case and the observations of this Court, herein above and thereafter to

proceed to afford an opportunity to the parties to submit their objections to

the proposed seniority list and after hearing the parties, the competent

authority shall prepare and finalize the seniority list.

ii) This order shall be notified by the 2

nd

respondent in its website and

objections shall be called for by granting at least 15 days period enabling

the employees to file their statements and thereafter the process shall be

expedited and completed within a period of two (2) months from the date

of completion of the hearings at any rate within 6 months from the date of

publication of the notification inviting the objections.

17

13. The Writ Petition is partly allowed. There shall be no order

as to costs. As a sequel, pending applications, if any, shall

stand closed.

_____________

G. NARENDAR, J

________________

NYAPATHY VIJAY, J

Date: 11.01.2024

IS

Note: L.R Copy be marked.

18

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. NARENDAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NYAPATHY VIJAY

W.P.No.42518 of 2022

Date: 11.01.2024

IS

Note: L.R Copy be marked.