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TARA CHAND KHATRI

v.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS.

November 26. 1976

[A. N. RAY, c. J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJJ

Serl' ice matter-Disciplinary A whority-Recording reasons-When obli­

gatory.

Higlz Court-If 11nder a d11ty to enq11ire into allegatiom of mala fides.

The appellant, a school teacher under the Delhi Municipal Corporation. was

dismissed from service

by the Deputy Commissioner (Education) after

follow­

ing the procedure prescribed under the Regulations. His appeal to the Com­

missioner of the Corporation was dismissed and his writ petition was dismissed

in limine by the High Court. On further appeal to this Court it was contended

that ( 1) the order of dismissal was invalid for the reason that the Commissioner

being the appointing authority, the Deputy Commissioner was incompetent to

dismiss him and the regulation conferring power on the Deputy Commissioner

to dismiss a municipal employee drawing less than Rs. 350 being inconsistent

with

s. 95 of the Delhi Municipal

Corporatiori Act 1957 is void; (2) s'nce die

disciplinary authority had neither recorded its findings nor given its reasons

in the order of dismissal it

is vitiated and ( 3) the petition should not

have

been dismissed in limine by the Hi~h Court.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : ( 1) The

appellant's appointment having been made by the Deputy

Commissioner, who possessed plenary powers in that behalf by virtue of the

delegation of power to him, there was neither any legal

bar to his dismissal

by that authority

nor a breach of the first proviso to s. 95 (1). In his writ

petition before the High Court the appellant failed to make any averment

regarding the incompetence of the Deputy Commissioner to pass the impugned

order and the

'invalidity of the regulaHon. None of his pleas was tenable in

view of the order of the Commissioner delegating his powers to the Deputy

Commissioner, his actual appointment

as an Assistant Teacher by the Deputy

Commissioner and regulation

T being consistent with s. 9 5 ( 1) of the Act. [204

E & CJ

The Mana;:ement of D.T.U. v. Shri B.B.L. Hajeley & Anr. [1973] 2 S.C.R.

114 and

Municipal Corporation of. Delhi v. Ram

Partap Singh (Civil Appeal

No.

2449(N) of 1969 delivered on January 8, 1976), held inapplicable.

(2)(a) Although it may be necessary for the disciplinary authority to

record

it~ provisional conclusions in the notice calling upon the delinquent

officer to show cause why the proposed punishment be not imposed upon him

if it differs from the findings arrived

at by the enquiry officer with regard to the· charge, it is not obligatory to do so in case the disciplinary authority con­

curs w:'.th the findings of the enquiring officer. {205 Fl

In the instant case it is apparent from the order of the Deouty Commissioner

that

he

;,greed with the findings of the Enquiring Otlicer. [208 AJ

State of Orissa v. Govinddas Pande (Civil Appeal No. 412 of 1958 decided

on December 10, 1962) and State of Assam & Anr. v. Vinwl Kumar Pandit

A.LR 1963 S.C. 1612 f'ollowed.

1

(b) While it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority . ,

e.xercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order '

if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by

••

I

TARA CHAND v. M. CORPN. (Jaswant Singh, J.) 199

1he enquiring officer in view of the sc~eine of a particular . f'.nactme~t or the

rules made thereunder,

it would be laymg down the propos1tlon a

little too

broadly to say that even an order

of concurrence must be supported by reasons.

it cannot be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order

simply because it

is brief and not elaborate. Every case has to be judged in

the light

of its own facts.

[208 BJ

Sardar Govindrao & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1965] 1 S.C.a. 678,

A

Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India & Ors. [1967] 3 S.C.R. 302, Travancore B

Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India [1970] 3 S.C.R. 40, Mahabir Prasad Santosh

Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1971] 1 S.C.R. 201, Rangnath v. Daulatrao &

Ors. [1975] 1 S.C.C. 686 and The Siemens Engineering & Mano;facturinf.( Co. of

illdia Ltd. v. The Union of India & Anr. [1976] 2 S.C.C. 981, inapplicable.

(c) M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466 contains a,

correct statement of law. In Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India, [1967] · 3

S.C.R. 302 this Court did not make any observations which can be interpreted

as overruling the majority judgment in the former case. In view of the

.amendment of r.

55 of

the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 th., dec'sion in

Bhaf.(at Raja' s case was different from M.P. Industries case which had bee11;

renderep on the unamended r. 55 of the Rules. [212 A; 211 Bl

(3) The High Court was not wrong in dismissing the writ petition in Ii mine

because a prima facie case requiring investigation had not been made out by

the appellant. The High Court would be justified in refusing to carry

on

investigation into the allegations of ma/a fides if necessary particulars of the

charge making out a

prima, facie case are not given in lhe petition. Since the

bunlen of establishing ma/a fides lies very heavily on the person wlm alleges

them and the allegations made in regard thereto, ill the writ petition were not

sufficient to establish malus animus. The High Court was justified in dismissing

-the petition without issuing notice to the other side. [212 C-D]

CrvrL APPELLATE

JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2471 of 1972.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the

28th March 1972 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 179 /72.

M. K. Ramamul'l.hi, K. B. Rohatagi, V. K. Jain and M. M.

Kashyap, for the Appellant.

S. N. Andley, B. P. Maheshwal'i· and Suresh Sethi, for the Respon­

dents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

JASWANT SINGH, J. This appeal by 'special leave is directed against

the judgment and order dated March 28, 1972 of the High Court of

Delhi dismissing in limine the writ petition filed by the appellant herein.

The facts essential for the purpose of this appeal are : The appellant

was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on temporary basis in the pay

scale of Rs. 68-170, which was subsequently revised

to Rs. 118-225,

in the Primary

~chool, Northern Railway Colony II run by the Educa­

tion Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, with effect

from October

l, 1958. He was confirmed on the said post on

Septem­

ber 30, 1959. On August 28, 1964, he was transferred to the Senior

Basic Middle School of the Corporation in Panna lamirpur, Narela

II.

In September, 1967, he was assigned the work of teaching certain

·subjects to both the sections of Class V. In section A of Class V, there

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200 SUPREME COUkT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R.

_..,.

was at that time a student named Surinder Kumar, son of Dhan Raj.

On. September 6, 1967, Dhan ~aj made a written complaint to the Edu­

cat10n Officer of the Corporat10n, a copy of which he endorsed to the

Head Master of the School, alleging therein that the appellant had

sensually misbehaved with his son, Surinder Kumar in the School Pre­

mises during the recess time on 2nd and 4th September, 1967. On

October 5, 1967, the Education Officer suspended the appellant. On

April 15, 1968, the Assistant Education Officer, Rural North Zone,

was directed by his superior to prepare a charge sheet against the appel-

lant whereupon a charge sheet was drawn up and served on the latter

on November 16, 1968. Therefore, the Director of Inquiries,

who was

deputed to enquire into the matter proceeded to hold the enquiry and

on consideration

0£ the evidence ·adduced before him, he submitted a

report on May 20, 1969, ,holding that the charge levelled against the

appellant had been established. On receipt of the report and perusal

thereof, the Deputy Commissioner, Education

of the

'Corporation pass·

ed the following order on May 20, 1969 :

"I have gone through the report of the Inquiry Officer and

agree with

his findings. The Inquiry Officer has held the

charge of committing an immoral act with a student

of Class

D V, levelled against Shri Tara Chand Khatri,

A/T (Respon­

dent)

as proved. Such an act on the part of a teacher is

most unbecoming, serious and reprehensible. I propose to

impose the penalty of 'dismissal' from service which shall be a

disqualification for future employment on the

respondent."

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Consequent upon the pas'sing of this order, a notice was issued

t<>

the appellant requiring him to show cause why the penalty of dismissal

from service be not imposed on him. On July 11, 1969, the appellant

submitted his representation in reply to the show cause notice. By

order dated July 30, 1968, the Deputy Commissioner, rejected the re­

presentation of the appellant and imposed the penalty of dismiSsal from

service upon him. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant preferred an

appeal to the Commissioner of the Corporation on August 29, 1969,

under regulation

11 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Con­

trol and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 (hereinafter referred to

as 'the

Regulations') which was rejected by the Commissioner on September

13, 1969.

On October 11, 1971, the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition

No. 1032 of 1969 in the High Court of Delhi challenging the aforesaid

order of his dismissal from service. The High Court allowed the

petition on the ground that the order of the Appellate Authority was

made in violation of the requirements of regulation 15 of the Regu­

lations and directed the Appellate Authority to dispose

of the appeal afresh on merits keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the

case

as

alw the requirements of Regulation 15 of the Regulation.

While disposing of the writ petition, the learned Judge added that if

the appellant still felt aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Autho­

rity he would

be at liberty in appropriate proceeding3 not only to

challenge the order

of the Appellate Authority but the order of

the­

disciplinary authority as well. On remand, the Commissioner of the

Corporation who happened to be an officer different from the one who

rejected the appellant's appeal on the former occasion heard the appe-

1

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TARA CHAND v. M. CORPN. (Jaswant Singh, 1.) 201

Hant at considerable length but rejected the appeal by an elaborate

order dated January 5, 1972. The appellant ther~upon fil~d writ

petition No. 179 of 1972 in the High Court of ~el~1 chall~ngmg.the

order dated July 30, 1969 of the Deputy Comm1ss10ner, Education,

as well as the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 5, 1972.

This petition was, as already stated, summarily dismissed without the

issue of a notice

to the respondents. The appellant then made an

application to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court but the

same was also rejected.

Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Ramamurthi has

vehemently contended that the appointing authority of

tl~e app~J~ant

beincr the Commissioner under section 92, of the Dellu M11mc1pal

Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), his dis­

missal from service by the Deputy Commissioner

(Education)-an

authority subordinate

to the Commissioner is illegal. The counsel

has next urged that regulation 7 of the Regulatious and the Schedule

referred to therein conferring power on the Deputy Commis1sioner to

dismiss a municipal officea: or other employee drawing a monthly

salary of less than Rs. 350/-being inconsistent with section 95 of the

Act

is void and consequently the impugned order of the appellant's

dismissal from service passed in exercise of that power

is also illegal

and invalid. The counsel has further contended that the impugned

order of the appellant's dismissal from service being a quasi-judicial

order is vitiated

as the disciplinary authority has neither recorded its

findings with respect to the charge drawn up against the appellant

as1

required by regulation 8(9) of the Regulations nor has it given its

reasons for passing the order. The counsel has lastly urged that the

High Court ought not to have dismissed

tlhe petition in limine without

calling upon the respondents to file the return

as

it raised not only

arguable points of law

but also contained allegations of male fides

against the respondents. We shall deal with these

points ser'iatim.

But before embarking o~ that task, we consider it apposite to refer to

a

few provisions of the Act and regulations which have an important

bearing on the case.

Under section

92(1) (b)

of the Act, as in force at the relevant

time the power o~ appointing municipal officers and other municipal

employees whether temporary or permanent, to posts ca~rying a mini­

mum monthly salary (exclusive of allowances) of less than three

hundred and

fifty rupees was vested in the Commissioner.

Sub­

section (1) of section 95 of the Act provided that every municipal

officer

or other municipal employee shan be

liable.. . . . . . . . to be

censured, reduced in rank, compulsorily retired, removed or dismissed'

for any breach of any departmental regulation3 or of discipline or for

carelcs.sness, unfitness, negl~t of duty or other misconduct by such

au.thonty as. may be, prescnbed by regulations. The first proviso to

this sub-section, however, contained the following .rider:-

"Provided that no such officer or other employee as

aforesaid shall be reduced in rank, compulsorily retired,

removed or dismissed by any authority subordinate to that

by which he was appointed."

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202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1977] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 491 of the• Act which is in the nature of an enabling pro-

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vision provided as. under;-

"The Commissioner may by order direct that any power con­

ferred or any duty imposed on him by or under this Act

shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions,

if

any, as may be specified in the onler, be exercised and per­

formed also by any officer or other municipal employee

specified

in

the order."

It is admitted by the appellant that in; exercise of the power con­

ferred on him under sedion 491 of the Act, the Commissioner had

vide

his order No. (1)58 Law Corp-1 dated April 7, 1958, directed

that all the powers conferred on

him under the various provisions

of

the Act would be exercised also by th11 Deputy Commissioner subject

to

his supervision, control and revision.

Regulation 7 of the Regulations and the Schedule

referred to there­

in read

as

under:-

"Regulation 7: The authority specified in column 1 of the

Schedule may impose on any of the municipal officers or

other municipal employees specified there against in colu­

mn 2 thereof any of the penalties specified there against in

column 3 thereof. Any such officer or employee may

appeal against the order imposing upon him any of those

penalties to the authority specified in column 4

of the said

Schedule." ·

SCHEDULE

D~scription of posts Authority competent Penalties

to impose penalties

Posts whose minimum Deputy Commissioner All

monthly salary (exclu-

sive of allowances) is

less than three hundred

and fifty rupees.

Do. Any municipal officer

(i) & (ii)

or employee to

whom powers to

im-

pose penalties is de-

1 egated under sec-

tion 491.

Appcllrte

Authority

Ccrrn1issicrcr

Deputy Co­

n1issioncr

It would also be advantageous to refer to regulation 8 of the

Regulations in

so far

ais it is relevant for the purpose of this appeal.

"Regulation 8: . . . . . . . . . . . .

i

J

TARA CHAND v. M. CORPN. (laswant Singh, I.)

(9) The Disciplinary Authodty, shall, if it. is .not the

foquiring Authority, consider the record of mqmry and

record

its findings on each charge.

( 1

O) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to

its findings on the charges, is of the opinion that. any of th.e

penalties specified in regulation 6 should be imposed, it

shall :-

(a) furnish to the municipal officer or other munici­

pal employee a copy of. t~e ~eport of the ~nqui~ing Autho­

rity and, where the

D1sc1pl111ary

A~thonty. JS not tihe

Inquiring Authority, a statement o~ its fin<;ngs t,?ge~her

with brief reasons for disagreement, 1f any, with the nndmgs

of the Inquiring Authority; and

(b)

give him a notice stating the action proposed to be

taken

in regard to

hinl and calling upon him to submit within

a specified time such representation as he may wish to make

against the proposed action.

( 11) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the

representation,

if any, made by the municipal officer or other

municipai employee in response to the notice under sub­

regulation

(10) and determine what penalty, if any, should

be inlposed on the municipal officer or other municipal em­

ployee and pass appropriate orders on the case.

(12) Orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority shall

be communicated to the municipal officer or other municipal

employee who shall also be suppliecl with a copy of the

report of the Inquiring Authority and where the Disciplinary

Authority

is not the Inquiring Authority, a statement of its

findings together. with brief reasons for disagreement, if any,

with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, unless they have

already been snpplied to him."

203

Having noticed the relevant provisions, we now pass on to consi­

der the contentions raised on

beha1f of the appellant. Adverting to the

first two contentions raised before

us on behalf of the appellant, it

may be stated that neither of

themi appear from the record to have

been raised before the High Court. It was not the case 0£ the

appellant in the petition

filedi by him under Article

226 of the Consti­

tution that since his appointment

as an Assistant Teacher was actually

made by the Commissioner, the Deputy' Commissioner was

not

competent to dismiss him from service. What was asserted hy him

at that stage is contained! in ground No. VI of the petition and may

be reproduced below for facility of reference:-

''.Because, in any. case, respondent No. 3 has no jurisdic­

t11m to \1ear the appeal. Under section 92 of the Dell1i

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, the petitioner could bd

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204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1977] 2 S.C.R.

appointed only by the Commissioner and under s~ction 95

of tht said Act, he should be the dismissing authority. In

the present case, however, the Commissioner had l:Jy noti­

fication undeQ sec~ion 491 of the said Act, delegated his

power to the Deputy Commissioner under Circular No.

4( l) /8-Law Corp. 1 dated 7.4.1958. The dismissing

order was made by the Deputy Commissioner ;is dclegatee

i.e. as exercising the powers of the Commissioner. The

Commissioner, therefore, could not sit

in appeal on such

an

o:;der. Only the Standing Committee of the Curporation

could have heard the appeal."

The omission to make the aforesaid av(erments in the writ petition

regarding the incompetence of the Deputy Commissioner to pass the

impugned order of dismissal from service and invalidity of regulation

7 of the Regulations appears to be due to the. fact that the appellant

folly realised that none of these pleas could be tenable in view of the

aforesaid order No. ( 1) 58 Law Corp. 1 dated April 7, 1958 made by

the Commissioner delegating all his powers to the Deputy Com­

missioner his actual appointment as

an Assistant Teacher by the

Deputy Commissioner and regulation 7 of the Regulations which far

from being repugnant to section/

95 of the Act is perfectly consistent

with

it as sub-section ( l) of that section itself makes a municipal em­

ployee liable to be compulsorily retired, removed or dismissed etc.

by

such authority as may be prescribed by the Regulation. The prohibition

contained in

t!he first proviso to this Sub-section i1> confined in its

operation only to a casd where an officer or employee of the Corpora­

tion

is retired, removed or dismissed by an authority

subordinat~ to

that by which he was appointed.

In the instant case, the appellant's

appointment having been made

by. the Deputy Commissioner, who

possessed plenary powers

in that behalf by

viirtue of the aforesaid dele­

gation ordeir, there was neither any legal bar to the appellant's dis­

missal from service by that very authority

nor a breach of

tho first

proviso to sub-section (1) of section 95 of the Act.

The decision of this Court in. The Management uf D.T.U. v. Shri

B. B. L. Hajelay & Anr.(

1

)

sought to be relied upon by Mr. Rama­

murthi related to

an appointment which rested on

a deeming pro­

vision and is not at all helpful to the appellant. Respondent No. 2

in that case was originally employed as a driver in the Deihi Road:

Transport Authority which had been constituted under the Delhi Road

Transport Authority Act, 1950. By section 516( l) (a) of the Delhi

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 which came into force in January,

1958,

.the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950, was repealed

and the functions of the Delhi Road Transport Authority wore taken

over by· the Corporation by virtue of several other

provisions of the

Act. Under section 511 of that Act i.e. the Delhi :tvlunicipal Cor­

poration Act, 1957, every officer and employee of the Transport

Authority including respondent No. 2 stood transferred and become

an officer and employee of the Corporation and under section

92(1)

(b) read with section 516(2) (a) of the Act, the said respondent was

(I) [1973] 2 S.C.R. 114.

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TARA CHAND v. M. CORPN. (Jaswant Singh, J.) 205

to be deemed to have been appointed by the General Manager (Trans­

port). Thr respondent in that case thus being required by fiction

of law to

be taken to have been appointed by the General Manager,

he could nol have been removed from service in May, 1963 hy the

Assistant General

Manager-an authority subordinate to the General

Manager-in view of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 95

of the Act despite the fact that the functions of the General Manager

had been

delegated to the Assistant General Manager in May, 1961.

In that case, it was made clear by this Court that the <Ynly consequence

of the delegation order was that if after 1961, the Assistant General

Manager

had made the appointment of respondent No. 2, he would

have

no doubt been entitled to remove him from service but the posi-

tion had to

be deterrn(med with reference to the tim.:: ·when he was

absorbed

in the Corporation which was in January, 1958.

The

j-Jdgment of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.

Ram Pra.tap Singh(

1

)

is

also not he:pful to the appellant as in that

case, the appointment was

in fact made by the Commissionor

while

the dismissal was by the Deputy Commissioner.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the first two contentions raised

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on behalf of the appellant which are totally misconceived are repelled. D

The third contention advanced by

Mr. Ramamurthi that the

impugned order

of the appellant's dismissal from service is vitiated as

the disciplinary authority has neither recorded its findings with respect

to the charge drawn up against the appellant as required by regulation

8(9) of the Regulations nor has it given its reasons for passing

the

order cannot also be countenanced as it overlooks the dedsions of this E

Court, which fully cover the case.

Regarding the first limb o{ the contention, it may be stated that

although it n~ay be necessary for the disciplinary authority to record:

its provisional conclusions in the notice calling upon the delinquent

officer to show causei why the proposed punishment be not imposed

upon

11im if it differs from the findings arrived at hy the enquiring

officer with regard to the charge, it

is not obligatory to do so in case

the disciplinary authority concurs with the findings

ot the enquiring

officer. We are supported in this view by two decisions of this Court

in State of Orissa v. Govinddas Panda(

2

) and State of Assam & Anr.

v. Bimal Kumar Pandit(3). In Govinddas Panda's case (supra) where

the notice im1ed under Article 311 (2) did not expressly state that

the State Government had accepted the findings recorded by · the

enquiring officer against the Government servant in question and where

even the nature of the punishment which was propos·~d to be inflicted!

on him was not specifically and clearly indicated, this Court while

reversing the conclusions oti the Orissa High Court that the notice

was defective and so that provisions: of Article 311

(2) had been con­

travened

observed:-

(1) C.A. No. 2249 (N.) of 1969 decided on

8-1-1976.

(2) C.A. No. 412 of 1958 decided on 10-12-1962.

(3) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1612.

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206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1977] 2 S.C.R.

"In the context, it must have been obvious to the n:spondent

that the punishment proposed was removal from service and

the 1espondent was called upon to show cause against that

punishment. On a reasonable reading of the notice, the.

only conclusion a~ which one can arrive is that the appellant

(the State) accepted the recommendation of the Administra­

tive Tribunal

and asked the respondent to show cause against the proposed punisbment, namely, that of removal from

service."

In Bimal Kumar Pandit's case (supra) whik reversing the judg­

ment and order of the High Court allowing the writ pehtion filed by

the respondent against his reduction in rank on the ground that the

notice ~erved upon him under Article 311(2) of the Constitution was

void as it did not expressly and specifically indicatci either the con­

clusiorns of the dismissing authority or the findings recorded by the

enquiring officer or that the dismissing authority accepted the findings

of the enquiring officer and unless

that course was adopted, it would

not be

dear that

the dismissing authority had applied its mind and

had provisionally come to some conclusion both in regard to the guilt

of the public officer

and the punishment which his

miscondw;t deserv­

ed the Constitution Bench of this Court observed :

"It may be conceded that it is desirable that the dismissing

authority i>hould indicate in the second notice its concurrence

with the conclusions of the enquiring officer before it i>sues

the said notice under Article 311 (2). But the question

which calls for our decision is it the dismissing authority

does not expressly say that it has accepted the findings of the

enquiring officer against the delinquent officer, does that

introduce such an infirmity in the proceedings

as to make _tho final order invalid ? We are not prepared to answer

this question in the affirmative. It seems to us that it

would

be plain to the delinquent officer that the issuance of th(, notice indicating the provisional conclusions of the dis­

missing authority as

to the punishment that should be im­posed on him obviously and clearly implies that the findings

recorded against him by the enquiring officer have been

ac1:epted by the dismissing authority; otherwise there would

be no sense or purpose in issuing the notice under Article

311(2)."

At another place, the Court observed :

"We ought, however, to all that if the dismissing authority

differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, it is

necessary that its provisional conclusions in that behalf

should

be specified in the second notice. It may be that

the report makes findings in favour of the delinquent officer,

but the dismissing authority disagrees

with the said findings

and proceeds

to issue the notice under Article 311(2). In

;

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/

TARA CHAND v. M. CORPN. (Jaswant Singh, J.) 207

such a case, it would obviously be necessary that the dis­

missing authority should expressly state that it differs from

the findings recorded in the enquiry report and then indic~e

the nature of the action proposed tq be taken against Vhe

delinquent officer. Without such an express statement in

the notice, it would

be impossible to issue the notice at all .

There may also be cases in which the enquiry report may

make findings in favour of the delinquent officer on some

issues and against him on other issues. That

is precisely

what has happened in the present case.

If the dismissing

authority accepts all the said

findings in their entirety, it is

another matter; but if the dismissing authority accepts the

findings recorded against the delinquent officer and differs

from some or all of those recorded in his favour and

proceeds

to specify the nature of th~ action proposed to be taken on

its

own conclusions, it

would be necessary that the said

conclusions should be brie:fly indicated in the notice. In

this category of cases, the action proposed to be taken would

be based not only on the findings recorded against the delin­

quent officer in the enquiry report, but also on the view of

the dismissing authority that the other charges not held

proved by the enquiring officer are according to the dis­

missing authority, proved. In order to

give the delinquent

officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Art.

311 (2), it is essential that the conclusions provisionally

reached by the dismissing authorty must, in such cases, be

specified in the notice. But where the dismissing authority

purports to proceed to issue the notice against the delinquent

officer after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety, it

cannot be said that the dismissing authority must say that

it

has so accepted the report. As we have already indicated,

it

is desirable that even in such cases a statement to that

effect should be made. But we

dd not think that the

words in Art.

311 ( 2) justify the view that the failure to

make such a statement amounts to contravention

of Art.

311 (2). . . . . . . There is no doubt ·that after the report

is received, appropriate authority must apply its mind to the

report and must provisionally decide whether the findings

recorded in the report should be accepted or not.

It is only

if the findings recorded in the report against the Government

servant are accepted by the appropriate authority that it has

to provisionally decide what action should be taken against

him. But this does not mean that in every case, the

appropriate authority

is under a constitutional obligation to

state in the notice that it has accepted the adverse findings

recorded by the enquiring officer before it indicates the

nature of the action proposed to be taken against the delin­

quent officer."

I In the instant case, the incorrectness of the first limb of the con-

tention is apparent from a bare reading of the aforesaid order passed

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R.

A by the Deputy Commissioner on May 20, 1969 which clearly states

that

he agrees with the findings of the enquiring officer. Reading

the order

as a whole, it becomes crystal clear tha~ the disciplinary

authority· held the charge drawn up against the appellant as proved.

. The second limb of the third contention raised on behalf

of the

B

appellant which

also overlooks the decisions of the Constitution Bench

of this Court does not commend itself to us. In this connection,

we would like to make it clear that while

it may oe necessary

fo1' a

c

D

E

F

G

H

disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial func­

tions to state the reasons it support of its order if it differs from the

conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the emquir­

ing officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules

made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition a little too

broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported

by reasons. It cannot also, in our opinion, be laid down as a gene-

ral rule that an order

is a non-speaking order simply because it is

brief and not elaborate. Every case, we think, has to be judged in

the

lil.ght of itsi own facts and circumstances. Reference in this

connection may be made witlt advantage to a catena of decisions.

In -Simal Kumar Pandit's case (supra) it was categorically laid down

by the Constitution Bench o!f this Court that it was not a requirement

of Article 311 (2) that irt every case, the punishing authority should

in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause give not only the

punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for

coming

to that conclusion. In that case, it

wa:; clarified that the

view is not justified that the appropriate authority must state its own

grounds

or reasons for proposing to take any specific action against the delinquent Government servant.

In State of Madras v. A. R. Srinivasan(') the Constitution Bench

of this Court while repelling the contention advanced on behalf of the

respondent that the State Government's order compulsorily retiring

him from service was bad ms it did not give reasor,s for accepting the

findirtgs of the enquiring tribunal and imposing the penalty of com­

pulsory retirement observed

as follows:-

"Mr. Setalvad for the respondent attempted to argue that

the impugned order

gives no reasons why the appellant

accepted the findings

of the Tribunal. Disciplinary pro­

ceedings taken against the respondent, says Mr.

Setalvad, are

in the nature

of quasi-judicial proceedings

md when the

appellant passed the impugned order against the respon­

dent, it was actirtg in a quasi-judicial character. That

being so, the appellant should have indicated some reasons

as to

why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal, and since

no reasons are given, the order should be struck down on

that ground alone.

We are not prepared to accept the

argum~nt. In deal­

ing with the question as to whether it is obiigatory on the

C9 A.LR. 1966 S.C. 1827=(1966) 2 S.C.W.R. 524.

;

..

)

TARA CHAND v. M. CORPN. (Jaswant Singh, J.) 209

State Government to give reasons in support of the order

imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer, we cannot over­

look the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against such a

delinquent officer begin with an enquiry conducted

by an

.officer appointed in that behalf. That enquiry is foLowed

by a report and the Public Service Commission

!s consulte.d

· where necessary. Having regard to the matenal which 1s

thus made available to the State Government and which is

made available to the delinquent officer also, it seems to us

somewhat unreasonable

to suggest that the

State Govern­

ment must record its reasons why it accepts the findings of

the Tribunal.

It is conceivable that if the

State Government

does

not accept

the findings of the Tribunal which may be

in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes

to impose

a penalty

on the delinquent offic_er, it should give reasons

whv it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal, though

even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons

:should be detailed or elaborate. But where the State

Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which

are against the delinquent officer, we do not think as a

matter of law, it could

be said that the

State Government

cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in

accordance with the findings

of the Tribunal unless it gives

reasons to show why the said findings were accepted

by it.

The prpceedings are, no doubt, quasi-judicial, but having

regard to the manner in which these enquiries

are conducted,

we

do not think an obligation can be imposed on the

State

Government to record reasons in every case.'·

Jn Som Datt Datta v. Union of India & Ors.(I) while approving the

English law and practice and overrufa1g the contention advanced on

behalf

of the petitioner that the orders of the Chief of the Army

Staff

confirming the proceedings of the Court-Martial under section 164 of

the Army

Act and the order of the Central Government dismissing the

appeal of the petitioner under section 165 of

the Army Act were illegal

and ultra vires as they did not give reasons in support df the orders,

the Constitution Bench of this

Court

summed up the legal position

as follows : ---

Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or

statutory rule either expressly or by necessary implication,

there

is no legal obligation that the statutory tribunal should

give reasons for its decision..

T~ere is also no general princi­

ple

or any rule of natural 1ust1ce that a statutory tribunal sho~l.d always and in every case give reasons in support of its

dec1s1on.

In Madhya Prade.ch Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors'.(2) this

Court repelled the conten~ion of co?nsel ~or tfie .appellant 1hal. every

0rder appealable under Article 136 of the Conshtut10n must be a speak: ..

(I) [1969] S.C.R. 176.

tzl /l).'i'>) 1 <;.C.R. 466-A.T.R. 1966 S.C. 671.

-1'458SCI/76

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R.

ing order and the omission to give reasons for the decision is of itself

a sufficient gruund ror quashing it and held that an order ot an adminis­

trative tnbunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced

to be invalid on tne sole ground that u does not give reasons tor rejec­

tion. While distinguishing the case of Harinngar Sugar Mills Ltd. v.

Sh yam Sunder J hu111hunwala(

1

)

where the Central Government rever­

sed

the decision or the State Government without giving reasons for

reversal, this Court pointed out that there was a vital d1tlercnce bet­

ween the order of reversai by the appellate authority and the order of

affirmance by the revising authority and that

if the revising authority

rejects a revision

apphcat10n stating that there was no valid ground for

interference with the order of the subordinate authority in such a case,

it could not be held !hat tlie order was arbitrary or that there was no

trial of the revision application. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speak­

ing for himself in that case observed

:-

"Ordinarily, the appellate or rcvisional tribunal shall give

its own reasons succinctly; but in a case of af!irmance where

the original tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate

tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case

may be, agreeing with those reasons."

In Judicial Revie_w of Administrative Action (Second Edition).

Prof. S. A. de Smith has observed at page 418 as follows :-

"If the record is incomplete (e.g. because reasons or find­

ings of material fact are omitted), has the court power

to

order the tribunal to complete its record? It is common ground

that the court has no inherent power to

co:npel a tribuna1

to give reasons for its decisions. .

.......

If, of course, a

tribunal

is required by statute to declare its reasons or its find­

ings

on the material

fac1l5, an order of marulamus may be ob­

tained to compel the tribunal to perform its legal duty

....

Where a tribunal that is not expressly obliged to give

reason~

for its decisions chooses not to give any reawns for a parti­

cular decision, it

is not permissible to infer on that

·ground

alone that its reasons for that decision were bad in law. Even

if it gives reasons, which are

ex facie insufficient in law to

support its decision, the court will not necessarily assume

that these are the sole reasons

on which the tribu'nal has based

its decision. (See Cf.

Davies v.

Price [1958] 1 Y.L.R. 434

at 440 and R. v. Minister of Hous~ng and Local Gover~

ment, ex. P. Chichester R.D.C. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 587) ."

Before concluding th\: discussion in regard to the third contention,

we may point out that oone of the decisions viz.

Sardar Govindrao

&:

Ors. v. State of Madha Pradesh(2) Bhagat Raja v. The Union of

India & Ors.('!) Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India(•) Mahabir

Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors.(") Rangnath v. Da.ulat­

rao

&

Ors. (6) and Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Company of

India Ltd. v. The Union of India(

7

)

on which Mr. Ramamurthi has

(l) [1962] 2

S.C.R. 339. (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R.673.

(3) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 302. (4) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 40.

(5) [1971] 1 S.C.R. 201. (6) [1975 · 1 S.C.C. 686.

(7) [1976] 2

s.c.c 981.

.,

•

TARA CHAND v. M. CORPN. (Jaswant Singh, J.) 211

heavily leaned has anything to do with disciplinary proceedings. At A

such, they have little bearing

on the point with

Which we are at present

concerned.

We would also like to point out that the observations in Travancore

Rayon Ltd. v.

Union of India (supra) that in Bhagat Raja v. The Union

of India & Ors. (supra)_, this Court in effect overruled the judgment of

the majority in

Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v.

Union of India &

Ors. (supra) seem to have crept therein through some oversight. A

careful perusal of the decision

in Bhagat Raja v. The

Union of India &

Ors. (supra) would show that this Court did not make any observations

therein which can be interpreted as overruling the majority judgment in

Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v.

Union of India & Ors. (supra). It

is also worthy of note th~i"t in Bhagat Raja's case (supra), the amend­

ment of rule 55 of the M_ineral Concession Rules, 1960 introduced in

July, 1965 laid down a special procedure in regard to revisions.

It re­

quired the Central Gove.rnment to send copies

of the application for

revision to all the impleaded parties including the person to whom a

lease had been granted calling upon them to make such comments as

they might like to make

y<ithin three months from the date of the issue

of the communication and on receipt of the comments from any party

to send copies thereof to the other parties calling upon them to make

further comments as they might like

to niake within one month from

the date of the issue of the communication.

It also provided that the

revision application, the communications containing comments and

counter comments referred

to above would constitute the record of the

case. Thus under the amended rule, the party whose application was

rejected got

an ample opportunity of showing to the Central Govern­

ment by reference not only to the record which was before the

State

Government but by reference to. the fresh material as well that the

State Government was misled in its consideration of the matter or that

its decision was based on irrelevant considerations. This

is evident

from the following observations-made in

Bhagat Raja v. The

Union

of India & Ors. (supra) :

"The o~d rule 55 was replaced by a new rule which came

into force on 19th July, 1965. Whereas the old rule directed

the Central Government to consider comments on the petition

of review by the State Government or other authority only,

the new rule

is aimed at calling upon all the parties including

the

State Government to make their comments in the matter

and the parties are given the right to make further comments

on those made by the other or others.

In effect, the parties are

given a right

to bring forth material which was not before the

State Government. It is easy to see that an unsuccessful party

·may challenge the grant of ,a lease in favour of another by

pointing out defects or demerits which did not come to the

knowledge of the State Gov~rnment. The order in this case

does not even purport to show that the comments and coun­

ter comments which were before the Central Government in

this case, had been considered."

The above observations leave no manner of doubt that it was in

view of the amendment in rule 55 of the "Mineral Concession Rules,

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R.

1960 that the decision in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India & Ou.

(supra) was different from Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union

of 1.ndia & Ors. (supra) which had been rendered on the unamended

rule

55 of the said Rules. In our opinion, therefore, the observations

made in

Madhya

Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.

(supra) contain a correct statement of law.

In view of the foregoing, we do not find any merit in the third

contention raised on behalf of the appellant.

This brings

us to the last contention raised by Mr. Ramamurthi that

the writ petition should not

haver been dismissed by the High Court in

limine

in view of the fact that it contained allegations of mala

{ides

against the respondents. We are unable to accept this contention. It

has been held time and again by this Court that the High Court would

be justified in refusing (o carry on investigation into the allegations of

mala [ides if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima jl

f acce case are not given in the writ petition. Keeping in view the well

established rule that the burden of establishing

mala

[ides lies very

heavily on the person who alleges it and considering all the allegations

made by the appellant in regard thereto,

we do not think that they

could be considered

as sufficient to establish malus animus. The High

Court was, therefore, not wrong in dismissing the petition

in limine on

seeing that a

prima facie case requiring investigation had not been made

out.

In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the

circumstances of the case without any order as

to costs.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

4

1