APHC010578042008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF

ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3365]

TUESDAY ,THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF JUNE

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE DR V R K KRUPA SAGAR

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1299/2008

Between:

Tarala Vijaya Babu, ...APELLANT

AND

The State Of Andhra Pradesh ...RESPODENT

Counsel for the Apellant:

1. D KRISHNA MURTHY

Counsel for the Respodent:

1. A GAYATHRI REDDY Standing Counsel for ACB cum Spl.

PP

2

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL :

THE HON’BLE JUSTICE Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to Yes/No

see the fair copy of the Judgment?

______________________________

Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR, J

3

* HON'BLE JUSTICE Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR

+ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1299/2008

% 25.06.2024

# Between:

Tarala Vijaya Babu, ...APELLANT

AND

The State Of Andhra Pradesh ...RESPODENT

! Counsel for the Appellant(s) : Sri D KRISHNA MURTHY

^ Counsel for Respondent(S): Sri A GAYATHRI REDDY

Standing Counsel for ACB cum Spl. PP

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. 1993 CRI.L.J.2051

2. AIR 1958 SC 124

3. 1979 CRI.L.J.633 (SC)

4. (2005) 8 SCC 370

5. (2015) 14 SCC 186

6. MANU/AP/1042/2003

4

7. MANU/TN/0138/1994

8. 1953 CRI.L.J.1310

9. MANU/RH/1539/2016

10. MANU/SC/0045/1996

11. AIR Online 1996 SC 177

12. 2010 SCC Online AP 151

13. 2014 SCC Online AP 163

The Court made the following:

5

THE HON’BLE JUSTICE Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1299 of 2008

JUDGMENT:

1. This appeal by the accused under Section 374(2) of the

CrPC is against the conviction recorded against him by the

learned trial court. During the relevant period, he was a Work

Inspector, Grade II in the office of Executive Director, A.P

Housing Board Division Office, Visakhapatnam. On the

prosecution initiated by the Inspector of Police, Anti-Corruption

Bureau, Visakhapatnam Range, he was charged for the offences

under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (herein after referred to as

Act, 1988). Section 7 is about a public servant taking gratification

other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. Section

13 is about criminal misconduct by a public servant. Section

13(1)(d) provides that a public servant is said to commit an

offence of criminal misconduct if he by corrupt or illegal means

obtains for himself any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.

Section 13(2) provides the punishment for criminal misconduct.

The learned Special Judge for ACB cases - Cum - III Additional

District and Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam duly tried the case

as per C.C.No.7 of 2004 and by a judgment dated 27.09.2008

found this appellant/ accused not guilty for the offence under

section 7. However, it found him guilty for the offence under

section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988. After

affording an opportunity of due hearing to the appellant/accused,

6

it convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for one year and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- with a default sentence

of simple imprisonment for two months. By the present appeal,

the convict impugns the said judgment.

2. Sri D. Krishna Murthy, the learned counsel for appellant

and Smt.A.Gayathri Reddy, the learned standing counsel for ACB

– Cum – Special Public Prosecutor for respondent/ State

submitted their arguments. Written submissions were also filed on

behalf of State.

3. Excepting the crime incident, all the other facts are not in

dispute. The learned trial court gave a very detailed account of all

the facts. The Andhra Pradesh Housing Board constructed

houses at Rathnagiri, HB Colony, Pothinamallayya Palem,

Visakhapatnam District. One such house is MIG II-99 bearing

Door No.15-149. It was allotted to PW.1. Ex.P5 sale deed dated

16.11.2002 was executed by the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board

in favour of PW.1 and this sale deed was registered on

18.11.2002. The sale consideration was Rs.77,879/-. The

execution of registration of sale deed took place only after PW.1

paid the entire sale consideration. At the relevant time, the

appellant/ accused was endowed with duties which include

attending the registration and delivering the registered sale deeds

to the allotees/ beneficiaries such as PW.1. It was in the context

of these facts, the crime incident allegedly emerged.

4. Two more facts are to be noticed here. For the house,

originally the prescribed area was 111.11 square yards. It

7

seemed that for some of the plots abutting the houses, a small

piece of extra land was there. In such circumstances, the Andhra

Pradesh Housing Board offered to sell that extra piece of land to

the allotees. For the house allotted to PW.1, there was 65.97

square yards of site abutting it and the worth evaluated to it was

Rs.23,090/-. Thus, the total extent of the land became 177.08

square yards. She had paid the extra price also for that.

Therefore, for the entire extent of 177.08 square yards, Ex.P5

registered sale deed was executed in her favour. Another fact to

be noticed is that during the relevant time, there was a scheme

under which the allotees were given a gift cheque of Rs.1,000/-

by the Board. Ex.P2 is the said gift cheque. Ex.P3 is the receipt

signed by PW.1 in token of the receipt of the said gift cheque.

5. Coming to the material facts, the allegations are that after

Ex.P5 sale deed was registered on 18.11.2002, the appellant/

accused made a telephone call to PW.1 on 22.11.2002 informing

her that the house registration was completed and she was asked

to come to the office and collect her documents. The allegation is

that the appellant/ accused during this telephonic conversation

demanded PW.1 to bring and pay him Rs.1,000/-. On 23.11.2002,

PW.1 went to his office to collect her documents and the gift

cheque, but the appellant demanded her to pay Rs.1,000/- and

then receive the document and the cheque. She told him that she

would come on 25.11.2002 and do it accordingly. However, as

she was reluctant to bribe the accused, she approached ACB

police on 24.11.2002 and narrated the incident and lodged Ex.P1

written complaint at 5.00pm. The then Dy.S.P, Visakhapatnam/

8

PW.5 asked her to come at 2.30 pm on 25.11.2002 along with the

demanded bribe amount. He conducted his confidential enquiry

and having been satisfied about the genuineness of the

allegations made in Ex.P1, he appraised his superiors and

obtained requisite permissions and registered case in

Cr.No.28/RC/WLR/2002 under sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with

13(2) of the Act, 1988 and the FIR is Ex.P19. The Crucial date is

25.11.2002. PW.2 went and met PW.5 and ACB decided to lay a

trap and accordingly it summoned the services of PW.2 who was

the then Assistant Director of Mines and Geology and another

individual Sri Appala Naidu (not tendered for evidence). In their

presence, the genuineness of allegations made in Ex.P1 were

ascertained from PW.1 and Ex.P9/ pre-trap proceedings were

made. PW.1 brought one currency note of Rs.1,000/-

denomination. It was smeared with required chemical powder

and was given to PW.1 and the police party along with mediators

and PW.1 reached a place near the office of the accused/

appellant and PW.1 went inside and found the accused in his

seat and asked for the documents and the cheque and when he

demanded Rs.1,000/-, she gave him the Rs.1,000/- currency note

smeared with chemical powder/M.O.5 and he received it and kept

in his shirt pocket (shirt as M.O.8) and the registered sale deed

and the gift cheque were all handed over to her. She came out of

the office and gave the designated signal and the raid party went

and reached the accused and his both hands were subjected to

chemical test and his right hand fingers on touching the solution,

the solution turned pink and on questioning the accused/

appellant, he voluntarily produced Rs.1,000/- currency note that

9

he received from PW.1. His shirt pocket inner lining was

subjected to chemical tests and that turned pink and since during

the pre-trap proceedings, the currency note number was recorded

and the same was compared as against Rs.1,000/- currency note

produced by the accused and the same stood tallied. The

accused/ appellant was questioned, and his statement was

independently recorded by the mediators. This was confronted to

PW.1 and she denied the truth of what the accused officer

allegedly stated to them and evidencing all the incidents, post-

trap proceedings/Ex.P18 were prepared. All the necessary

statutory formalities were completed. From the office of the

accused, various registers as per Exs.P3, P11, P17 and P20

were seized. Accused was arrested and was released on bail

then and there itself. PW.5 also prepared Ex.P10/ rough sketch of

the scene offence and he seized the shirt of accused officer and

gave him a T-shirt to wear. He served Ex.P18/ post-trap

proceedings on accused and obtained a written acknowledgment

from him in this regard. He made his reports and forwarded the

reports and material objects to the court and informed his

superiors through radio message. Statement of PW.1 was

recorded under Section 164 CrPC by a learned Magistrate.

Further investigation was done by PW.6/ the inspector of police.

He examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. He

applied to the sanctioning authority seeking prosecution sanction.

Vice-Chairman and Housing Commissioner of Andhra Housing

Board, Gruhakalpa, Mukarrmjahi Road, Hyderabad issued

Ex.P21/ prosecution sanction orders dated 10.02.2004. On

completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed.

10

6. Learned special Judge took cognizance and summoned the

accused and furnished him with necessary copies of the

document. After seeing that the accused was represented by his

learned counsel to defend him, it conducted charge hearing and

framed charges under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Act, 1988.

When the charges were read over and explained to him, the

accused pleaded not guilty.

7. At the trial, the prosecution examined PW.1 to 7 and they

were tendered for cross-examination and the defence examined

them in cross. Prosecution exhibited Exs.P1 to P21 and M.O.1 to

8. The incriminating material on record was offered to the

accused under section 313 CrPC granting him an opportunity to

explain. He denied the truth of the evidence. Defence did not

adduce any evidence on its behalf. Learned Special Judge heard

the arguments advanced on both sides and considered the

material on record and passed the impugned judgment.

9. At the trial, the fact that MO.5/ Rs.1,000/- currency note

was given to accused by PW.1 and was received by the accused

remain admitted and undisputed. Explaining that circumstance,

the version of the defence was that PW.1 was to pay charges

totalling Rs.555/- consisting of Rs.390/- towards registration

charges and Rs.95/- towards user charges and Rs.70/- towards

typing charges. Since PW.1 did not pay them, the accused officer

himself paid them and therefore towards repayment of it, MO.5/

Rs.1,000/- was given by PW.1 to him. Explaining it, he further

said that he did not have the exchange to pay the remaining

balance, PW.1 told him to keep the money with him and she

11

would go out and search for exchange and would come back.

She went out and then this false case was foisted. According to

defence, the motive for this false case was that towards excess

piece of land, PW.1 wanted its registration without payment of

consideration but the accused officer denied for that and

therefore PW.1 nurtured grudge over him and implicated him in

this false case.

10. Learned trial court considered the entire material on record

and considered the arguments advanced on both sides and finally

found that the allegations made against the accused were proved

by the consistent evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the

allegations were proved beyond reasonable doubt. It did not find

any merit in the contention of defence and stated that the version

put forth by the defence could not be believed because if really

accused officer had made such payments, he wo uld have

obtained receipts and would have given them to PW.1 when she

came to him for receiving the registered document and the gift

cheque. Since, he did not show any such receipts, the version

could not be believed. The learned trial court further stated that

the accused officer is only obliged to discharge his duties and

PW.1 was not his kith and Kin for him to invest money and get the

documents registered without the necessary payments being

made by the allottee/ PW.1. For those reasons, it negatived the

contentions raised by the defence. Since the learned trial court

was satisfied with the evidence, it convicted him and sentenced

him as indicated earlier.

12

11. The principal challenge raised in this appeal by the learned

counsel on behalf of the appellant/ accused is that Ex.P21 –

sanction orders are not in accordance with law. Learned counsel

contended that the evidence on record disclosed that ACB

furnished a specimen draft sanction order and the sanctioning

authority mechanically and without application of mind singed it.

Since such sanction is not in accordance with law, the very

cognizance is vitiated and as a consequence, the entire trial and

conviction shall be set aside.

12. As against it, the learned standing counsel for ACB – cum –

special public prosecutor contended that the sanctioning authority

considered the entire material on record and after due application

of mind decided to grant sanction and accordingly passed Ex.P21

sanction orders and there is nothing to interfere by this court. It is

further argued that before the trial court accused did not raise any

challenge about legality of Ex.P21 sanction order and therefore

such a contention cannot be raised here in the appeal for the first

time. In this regard, the attention of the court is drawn to Section

19(3)and 19(4) of the Act, 1988.

13. In response to this, the learned counsel for appellant

contended that a plea in challenge to the sanction orders can

even be taken for the first time before an appellate court.

14. For appellant, the learned counsel cited: -

1. N.P.Lotlikar V. C.B.I.

1

1

1993 CRI.L.J.2051

13

2. Jaswant Singh V. State of Punjab

2

3. Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed V. State of A.P

3

4. State of Karnataka Through CBI V. C.Nagarajaswamy

4

5. Nanjappa V. State of Karnataka

5

15. On behalf of respondent/ State, learned standing counsel

cited

1. The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh

V. P.Subhash Chandra Reddy

6

2. K.Nachimuthu V. State

7

3. State V. S.N.Mehra

8

4. Prakash Dharu V. State of Rajasthan

9

5. Superintendent of Police (C.B.I) V. Deepak Chowdary

10

6. State of Madhya Pradesh V. Dr.Kris hna Chandra

Saksena

11

7. K.Srinivasulu V. The Government of A.P

12

2

AIR 1958 SC 124

3

1979 CRI.L.J.633 (SC)

4

(2005) 8 SCC 370

5

(2015) 14 SCC 186

6

MANU/AP/1042/2003

7

MANU/TN/0138/1994

8

1953 CRI.L.J.1310

9

MANU/RH/1539/2016

10

MANU/SC/0045/1996

11

AIR Online 1996 SC 177

14

8. O.M.Debara V. The Government of Andhra Pradesh

13

16. Learned counsel for appellant also submitted that the

defence taken by the accused should have been considered by

the learned trial court and it committed an error in not accepting

the contention. That the judgment of the trial court is against law

and weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. Learned

counsel prays this court to set aside the impugned judgment. As

against it, learned standing counsel for ACB – Cum – Special

Public Prosecutor submits that the judgment of the trial court is in

accordance with the evidence on record and is in accordance

with law and it requires no interference.

17. Therefore, the following points fall for consideration: -

1. Whether Ex.P21 prosecution sanction order dated

10.02.2004 is not in accordance with law and that

resulted in mis-carriage of justice?

2. Whether the evidence on record, beyond reasonable

doubt, disclosed the complicity of the accused/

appellant for the offences under Sections 13(1)(d) read

with Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988?

3. Whether the impugned judgment, on facts or law,

require interference?

12

2010 SCC Online AP 151

13

2014 SCC Online AP 163

15

POINT No.1: -

18. At page No.10 and 11 of the impugned judgment, the

learned trial court recorded that in terms of Section 2(c) of the

Act, 1988, the accused/ appellant is found to be a public servant.

To this extent, there is no challenge in this appeal on behalf of the

appellant.

19. Since the accused is a public servant, previous sanction is

necessary for prosecution as mandated in Section 19 of the Act,

1988. Ex.P21 is the sanction proceedings. It was issued by Vice

Chairman and Housing Commissioner. It bears his signature. At

the trial, proof of this document was required. In terms of Section

45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the signature on Ex.P21 was

required to be proved. It was in such circumstances, the officer

who worked as a secretary under the Vice Chairman was

examined by the prosecution as PW.7. He said that Sri

Satyanarayana Murthy, IAS was the Vice Chairman of the AP

Housing Board and he worked under him. He said that the

prosecution file was rooted through him and he placed the

material before his Vice Chairman. He also said that Ex.P21

bears the signature of the Vice Chairman and the Vice Chairman

granted sanction only after verifying the report and the entire

material submitted by the ACB police. He also showed to the

court his own signing initial on Ex.P21 proceedings. In his cross-

examination, he stated that a specimen draft sanction order was

furnished by ACB Police along with all the other material records.

It was further elicited from him that the contents of Ex.P21

prosecution sanction order are almost similar to the said

16

specimen draft sanction order. When it was suggested to him that

the sanctioning authority did not apply its mind and did not

properly verify the material, he promptly denied it as incorrect and

not true. According to PW.7, the appointing authority as well as

dismissal authority for a work inspector is the Chief Engineer. Be

it noted that according to both sides, Vice Chairman and

Commissioner of AP Housing Board is superior to the Chief

Engineer.

20. It is from what was deposed by PW.7 about draft specimen

sanction order furnished by ACB and its contents are almost

similar to what is contained in Ex.P21, the learned counsel for

appellant contended that it was a mechanically passed order and

cannot be considered as a valid sanction order. It is in this regard,

learned counsel for appellant cited the precedent. In N.P.Lotlikar

V. C.B.I’s case (supra 1), the Hon’ble Bombay High Court stated

that there is no fault on part of the prosecuting authority in

submitting a draft sanction order and the sanctioning authority

considering the same. Therefore, as a matter of principle,

submission of a draft order and consideration of the same and

then passing the sanction order by itself is not illegal though the

sanctioning authority was required to arrive at its subjective

satisfaction that the case warranted a prosecution. In that

particular case, the draft sanction order produced before the

sanctioning authority was riddled with glaring omissions and there

were blunders in it. The sanctioning authority verbatim adopted

that draft and passed the sanction orders which repeated all

those blunders and glaring errors. It was in such circumstances;

17

the sanctioning order was found not in accordance with law. In

Jaswant Singh V. State of Punjab’s case (supra 2), their

Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stated that the

facts constituting the offences charged shall bear their mention in

the sanction order. The sanction order must disclose that the

sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting such

offence. It is only then one could say that the sanctioning

authority had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances. In

Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed V. State of A.P’s case (supra 3), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stated that there must be

evidence to see what material was considered by the sanctioning

authority. Since only on consideration of necessary material alone

the sanctioning authority be said to have applied its mind. That

was a case where a note was put up by the commissioner and

the sanction was granted by the standing committee and the

sanction order merely read that as per the note it has granted

sanction. What was there in the note and what facts constituted

offences necessitating sanction for prosecution were completely

missing in the sanction order. Even during the trial, the note of the

commissioner was not placed for consideration of the trial court. It

was in those circumstances, their Lordships said that there was

no primary or secondary evidence to prove the contents of the

note of the commissioner and therefore the sanction orders were

not maintainable at law.

It is relevant to notice Section 19(3) and 19(4) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : -

18

Section 19:- Previous sanction necessary for

prosecution.—

(1)……….

(2)………..

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge

shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal,

confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or

any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required

under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a

failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the

ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction

granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such

error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of

justice;

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on

any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of

revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any

inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the

absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such

sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice

19

the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection

could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in

the proceedings.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant

sanction;

(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference

to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the

instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a

specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.

In State of Karnataka Through CBI V.

C.Nagarajaswamy’s case (supra 4) and in Nanjappa V. State

of Karnataka’s case (supra 5), their Lordships considered

Section 19 of the Act, 1988 and held that on a conjoint reading of

Section 19(3) and Section 19(4) of the Act, 1988, it appears

clearly that an appellate court can also consider the validity of

sanction orders only in those cases where the erroneous sanction

order occasioned failure of Justice, and in such cases, the

appellate court can interfere and not otherwise.

21. It is in the light of the principles laid down in the above

rulings Ex.P21 has to be decided. A perusal of Ex.P21 shows that

it is in four typed pages. It consists of all the details concerning

the accused and PW.1 and about allotment of house to PW.1. It

thereafter, contains a narration of all the facts from 18.10.2002

and about intimation given to PW.1 concerning extra area of land

20

and as to what had happened and then it mentions about the

events that took place in November, 2002 and payment of

Rs.10,500/- by PW.1 towards stamp duty and registration charges

and then it narrated the facts about Rs.1,000/- being demanded

by the accused. It contained the details as to events that took

place on 22.11.2002 and about the telephonic conversation

between the accused and PW.1 and then the incident that took

place on 23.11.2002 and PW.1 personally meeting the accused

officer and then it went on referring to PW.1 lodging a complaint

on 24.11.2002 with ACB and mentions about the decision of ACB

to lay a trap and about successful trap that was laid. In the other

paragraphs and pages it also mentioned that the version given by

the accused to ACB at the trap and that it has considered the

same and found it not satisfactory. At paragraph No.9 at page

No.3, it recorded that the facts on record indicated to it that they

constitute offences punishable under Section 7 and Section

13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988. It also made a

mention that it had carefully examined the entire material placed

before it which include copy of first information report, pre-trap,

post-trap, mediator’s report and other records of investigation

etc., and then finally granted sanction for prosecution.

22. Thus on the face of Ex.P21, it discloses a full consideration

of facts and due application of mind to the facts and thereafter

granting sanction. Ex.P21 also discloses very clearly that the

facts the sanctioning authority considered are the facts that are

borne out from the first information report, pre-trap proceedings,

post-trap proceedings and some other relevant papers.

21

Therefore, Ex.P21 by itself never allow anyone to think that there

was no application of mind. In other words, one cannot say that it

is a mechanically passed order. One has to say that Ex.P21 is an

order passed on due application of mind.

23. That a draft order was produced and was considered by the

sanctioning authority is the evidence of PW.7. The draft sanction

order was not brought on record either by the prosecution or by

the defence. Going by the evidence of PW.7, the draft order and

Ex.P21 contain almost same contents. Whether utilising a draft

sanction order itself is impermissible or not is the question that

arises for consideration. In N.P.Lotlikar V. C.B.I’s case (supra 1)

cited by the appellant itself indicates that a sanctioning authority

considering a draft sanction order produced by the prosecuting

agency is always in accordance with law. In Prakash Dharu V.

State of Rajasthan’s case (supra 9), the Hon’ble Rajasthan

High Court held that it is common knowledge that the sanction

orders are drawn up after an active discussion is held between

the sponsoring and the sanctioning authority. In its opinion, the

draft sanction if prepared would virtually be an expression of the

sanctioning authority. Even if it is accepted for arguments sake,

that the draft sanction and the order according sanction are

identical, then too, it hardly affects the merits of the order granting

sanction because the narration of facts mentioned therein would

not have been deviated in the slightest. In State V. S.N.Mehra’s

case (supra 8 ). It held that if the sanctioning authority perused

the papers placed before it, it must be deemed to have exercised

its mind about it and therefore such a sanction order cannot be

22

called defective. In Superintendent of Police (CBI) V. Deepak

Chowdary’s case (supra 10), their Lordships of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India held “the grant of sanction is only an

administrative function…..What is material at that time is that the

necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the

offence have to be placed before the sanctioning authority and it

has to consider the material. Prima facie, the authority is required

to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute

the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The

grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act, the need to

provide an opportunity of hearing to the accused before according

sanction does not arise. In K.Srinivasulu V. The Government of

A.P’s case (supra 12), it was held that an order of sanction could

not be considered in a pedantic manner. The order of granting

sanction must be demonstrative of the fact that there had been

proper application of mind on part of the sanctioning authority. It

need not contain detailed reasons. It must clearly indicate the

specific provision of a section for which sanction for prosecution is

granted.

24. On applying the above principles to the case at hand, it is

crystal clear that Ex.P21 is an appropriately passed sanction

order. Learned counsel for appellant referring to page No.4 of

Ex.P21 points out a word “him” used therein and argued that the

sanctioning authority merely copied the draft sanction order and

therefore the word “him” finds place in Ex.P21. As otherwise, it

would have mentioned the word “me” or “this authority”. This vain

attempt on part of the appellant has no force. For appreciating the

23

submission of the learned counsel, paragraph No.10 in Ex.P21 is

reproduced here: -

“And whereas, the Vice Chairman and Housing

Commissioner, A.P.Housing Board, Hyderabad, being the

competent authority to remove the aforesaid Sri Tarala

Vijaya Babu, Work Inspector, Grade – II, Office of the

Executive Engineer (Hg), Visakhapatnam Division,

A.P.Housing Board, from the service, after fully and

carefully examining the material placed before him (i.e.

copy of first information report, pre trap and post trap

Mediators Reports and other records of investigation etc.,)

in respect of the above said allegation and having regard to

the circumstances of the case consider that the said public

servant Sri Tarala Vijaya Babu, Work Inspector, Grade – II

O/o E.E., A.P.Housing Board, Visakhapatnam, should be

prosecuted in a court of law for the aforesaid offences”

25. A reading of the above makes it clear that use of the word

“him” does not reflect that there was no application of mind on

part of the sanctioning authority concerning the facts it

considered.

26. From the discussion made above, this court holds that

Ex.P21 is a legally valid sanction order and it does not suffer from

any defects. It has to be stated that the appellant has not pointed

out occasioning of any injustice to him even if Ex.P21 is

considered as a defective sanction order. If that is the case, as

the law provides, there is no warrant for this court to interfere. The

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learned trial court properly considered the aspect of sanction

though it was not argued before it. Hence this point is answered

against the appellant.

POINT Nos.2 and 3: -

27. This court has gone through all the evidence on record.

The consistent version of PW.1 was that towards registration

charges, she had paid (Rs.8,000/- + Rs.2,500/-) totalling

Rs.10,500/-. As Ex.P series documents indicate, it was only after

all payments due were made, the registration of sale deed was

done. If there was any amount due there should have been some

letter or notice addressed to the allotee/ PW.1 by the office of the

Housing Board. There were no such proceedings as is evident

from the record. That indicates nothing was due from PW.1. The

version of the appellant that he expended Rs.555/- towards

certain charges was a theory suggested by him to prosecution

witness and was denied by them. From the record, he did not

demonstrate any such money spent by him. There was neither

oral evidence nor documentary evidence in that regard. Thus, it

was a theory based on no facts. Learned trial court rightly

considered all the facts and circumstances and held that if really

accused had paid, he would have certainly obtained receipts for

such payments and would have certainly tendered them to PW.1

when she came to receive the documents from him. The fact that

he did not tender any such receipts to her is a clear indication that

there were no such payments made by him.

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28. While cross-examining PW.1, the defence suggested to her

that without any demand from the accused, she handed over

Rs.1,000/- to him. She denied it was false. It is rightly argued by

the prosecution before the trial court as well as here that the

immediate response of the accused when he was questioned

about receiving Rs.1,000/- does not indicate that he expended

any money for registration. A fact is a truth. If really there was a

fact, he would have told the same when he was questioned about

receiving Rs.1,000/- from PW.1. The fact that he failed to say it is

indicative that there were no facts on his behalf which means the

version he has been now arguing is a version he has developed

only to circumvent the prosecution. The Learned trial court rightly

rejected the version of the defence. This court finds no error in

the approach of the trial court and finds no error in appreciation of

the evidence on its part and finds no error in considering the law.

Therefore, there was nothing to interfere by this Court. There are

no merits in the appeal. Hence, point Nos.2 and 3 are also

answered against the appellant.

29. This court by order dated 24.10.2008 in Crl.A.M.P.No.2034

of 2008, the execution of substantive sentence was suspended

and bail was granted to the appellant. During hearing of this

appeal, the appellant has been on bail. Therefore, he should

surrender before the learned trial court to undergo the sentence.

30. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the

conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant/ accused

in the judgment dated 27.09.2008 of learned III Additional District

and Sessions Judge – Cum – Special Judge for ACB Cases,

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Visakhapatnam in C.C.No.7 of 2004 is confirmed. The appellant/

accused – Sri Tarala Vijaya Babu shall submit himself before the

learned trial court on or before 04.07.2024 failing which the

learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge – Cum –

Special Judge for ACB Cases, Visakhapatnam shall secure his

presence and enforce the punishment.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,

shall stand closed.

_____________________________

Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR, J

Date: 25.06.2024

Dvs

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THE HON’BLE JUSTICE Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1299 of 2008

Date: 25.06.2024

Dvs