IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay

WPA 5361 of 2015

Tarun Pan

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Ashis Kr. Chowdhury

: Mr. B.B. Bera

: Mr. Rohal Paul

: Mr. Siddhartha Roy

Judgment Reserved on : 08.04.2026

Judgment on : 20.05.2026

Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :-

1. Let an order of the Supreme Court dated December 04, 2014,

passed in Writ Petitions (Civil) No. 39 of 2013,

3/51/257/258/206/824 of 2014 and 94/294 of 2012 , be

mentioned at the threshold. All these cases have been disposed of

by the Supreme Court by dint of the said order. Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 94 of 2012 is relevant, for the purpose of this judgment. Let

the relevant portion of the said order dated December 04, 2014, be

quoted, as follows: -

“4. In our opinion, this matter can be decided by the High Court under its

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we transfer

this matter before the Calcutta High Court for the consideration and early

disposal after affording opportunity of hearing of both the parties.

5. Interim order dated 7

th

November, 2013 passed by the High Court of Calcutta

in Writ Petition No. 1019 of 2013, which is pending consideration before the

Calcutta High Court, shall continue in this writ petition as well till the final

disposal of the matter by the High Court.

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Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 94 of 2012, 294 of 2012, 3 of 2014, 51 of 2014, 257 of

2014, 258 of 2014, 206 of 2014, 824 of 2014

In view of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 39 of 2013 , all these writ

petitions are disposed of in the same terms, observations and directions.”

2. Thus, the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 94 of 2012, having been

transmitted to this Court, has subsequently been registered as

W.P. No. 5361 (W) of 2015. Vide an ord er of this Court dated

December 18, 2015, the writ petition has been directed not to be

maintainable for the then petitioner No. 1/an unregistered

teachers’ association, but maintainable only for the other

petitioner Sri Tarun Pan. The Court directed in the said order

dated December 18, 2015 that particulars of the petition No.

1/association shall stand deleted from the cause title.

3. The writ petitioner has been represented by Mr. Ashis Kr.

Chowdhury. The respondent/West Bengal Central School Service

Commission (in short “SSC”), though appeared initially through

the learned Advocate Dr. Sutanu Kumar Patra, but at the later

stage of hearing, it has not turned up any further. Hence, hearing

of the case has been finally concluded and closed in absence of the

respondent/SSC.

4. Subject matter of challenge in this case is a vacancy notification

dated December 29, 2011 published by the SSC. According to the

writ petitioner, the same is contrary to the law and therefore, is

liable to be set aside. He, therefore, has prayed for setting aside of

the said notification dated December 29, 2011; the petitioner

submits that relaxation of condition prescribing essential

qualification, as afforded by the authority has transgressed and

violated the procedure prescribed under the law. That, it has been

an arbitrary exercise of power and jurisdiction by the authority. He

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has prayed for the relief that all available trained persons be

appointed as against the available vacant 55000 posts; for this the

upper age limit of the trained persons be relaxed in order to enable

them to be appointed; that the authority may be directed to follow

Schedule I of the notification dated April 28, 2003, for

appointment of assistant teachers in the State.

5. The background facts of these may be summerised in the following

manner: -

The vacancy notification dated December 29, 2011 has

been published allegedly in violation of the guidelines of National

Council for Teacher Education (in short NCTE). The petitioner says

that the minimum qualification mandatory for appointment of

teachers in upper primary, secondary and higher secondary

schools, as per NCTE guidelines is the B.Ed. degree, that is the

training qualification. The writ petitioner’s allegation is that the

respondent authority has misutilised the provision made in

notification of Government of India dated June 01, 2011, in which

relaxation of essential mandatory minimum qualification, has been

allowed on certain contingencies. According to the petitioner, the

same has been provided to combat an unforeseen situation when

number of trained persons might fall short of number of vacancies.

That, the question of relaxation of essential mandatory minimum

qualification arises only at a point of time like this. According to

the writ petitioner there was no such imminent urgency due to any

shortfall in the number of the trained eligible persons, so that the

authorities could impose relaxation condition and appoint

untrained teachers, leaving aside the petitioner, who otherwise

qualifies the eligibility criteria, in terms of qualification including

training qualification. Rather, at the relevant point of time, a total

of 82, 517 trained and qualified persons were available for being

appointed.

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6. Mr. Chowdhury, Learned Advocate for the writ petitioner has

submitted that the Supreme Court in WP (C) No. 94 of 2012, has

granted interim order inter alia that “we however make it clear that

the appointment made of untrained teachers shall abide by the

decision of the writ petition”, (order dated April 23, 2014).

7. It is submitted that during the period when such interim order of

the Supreme Court was in v ogue, the respondent/SSC, by

violating the same has conducted the recruitment process and the

State has given appointment to the untrained person leaving aside

the qualified trained persons. According to Mr. Chowdhury,

learned Advocate for the writ petitioner, the same is not only in

violation of the Rules of NCTE but also of the order of the Supreme

Court. Thus, all appointments given to the untrained persons, is

stated to be illegal and unsustainable.

8. Mr. Chowdhury, learned Advocate has further submitted that the

State has ignored and suppressed the material data and fact at the

time of imposing relaxation of condition of essential qualification

required. It is submitted that at the material point of time 145

B.Ed. Training Institutions were operating in the State and 14477

candidates were passed out from there, in each academic year.

That, initially 7210 vacancies were declared which was

subsequently increased. The State has declared in the affidavit-in-

opposition that a total 82517 trained persons applied for in the

recruitment process. Only 16871 of them were given appointment

to the total 46401 available vacancies. Therefore, he has stated

that appointment of 19269 untrained persons is illegal which is

subject to and shall abide by the decision in the instant writ

petition, as has been directed by the Supreme Court.

9. According to the petitioner, B.Ed. is the mandatory qualification

for appointment in the post of assistant teacher in any schools as

per NCTE guidelines but the Government of West Bengal issue d

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the recruitment notification dated 29.12.2011 by allowing the non-

B.Ed candidates to participate in the selection process as such the

notification itself is bad in law and liable to cancel; that the

respondent authorities conducted the RLST, 2012 in conn ection

with the notification of 29.12.2011 by giving appointment to the

19269 non-trained candidates by deprived the trained candidates

like that of the petitioners which is absolutely illegal and violation

of the guidelines of the NCTE norms as such the appointments of

the non-trained candidates are liable to cancel and SSC are legally

bound to give appointments to the trained candidates like that of

the petitioners; that the relaxation for appointment of non-trained

candidates was obtained from the HRD, G overnment of India by

suppression of facts that under the West Bengal that time there

were not sufficient trained candidates for appointment to the post

of assistant teacher in different Schools

10. Also that, all persons similarly situated should be treated

similarly. It is submitted that only because one person has

approached the Court that would not mean the other persons

similarly situated should be treated differently. That, in Tania

Ghosh & Ors vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors all-the

trained candidates have been directed to be given appointment. As

such the petitioner is also legally entitled to get the appointment

as a similarly situated candidate; that in the recruitment process

the essential qualification cannot be relaxed where the relaxation

has not been provided for in the statutory Rules itself and the

relaxation thereof bereft of any sanction by the statute tantamount

to gross arbitrariness in exercise of power by the authority. In the

instant case relaxation of essential qualification for appointment of

non-trained candidates in the place of trained candidates was

made after the selection process was over. As such the acts and

actions of the authorities are illegal and in violation of the principle

of law that the essential qualification cannot be relaxed and any

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appointments which is contrary to the law would be void in law.

Such illegality cannot be regularized and any appointment which

was made in violation of the law, would be a nullity.

11. Mr. Chowdhury, learned advocate for the petitioner has referred to

the following judgments: -

i. PURUSHOTTAM VS CHAIRMAN, M.S.E.B AND OTHERS

[(1999) 6 SCC 49 / (1999) 0 Supreme (SC) 642] [Para. 4]

Duly selected candidate could not be denied appointment on the

pretext that Panel's term had expired and post had been filled up

by someone else.

ii. STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS VS MAMATA MOHANTY

[(2011) 3 SCC 436 / (2011) 0 Supreme (SC) 160] [Para. 41, 42,

50, 59]

Essential qualification-cannot be condoned and relaxation of

educational qualification cannot be permitted where the relaxation

cannot be permitted in the Statutory Rules violating that the

appointment would be nullity.

iii. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS VS C. LALITHA

[(2006) 2 SCC 747 / (2006) 1 Supreme 640] [Para. 29]

Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time

postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated

similarly. Only because one person has approached the court that

would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated

differently.

iv. PRAMOD KUMAR VS U.P. SECONDARY EDUCATION

SERVICES COMMISSION [(2008) 7 SCC 153 / (2008) 0

Supreme (SC) 433] [Para. 16, 18]

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If the essential educational qualification for recruitment to a post

is not satisfied, ordinarily the same cannot be condoned. Such an

act cannot be ratified. An appointment which is contrary to the

statute/statutory rules would be void in law. An illegality cannot

be regularized.

v. MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPN. AND

OTHERS VS RAJENDRA BHIMRAO MANDVE AND OTHERS

[(2001) 10 SCC 51] [Para. 7]

Avoid reopening the selection process and/or dislocating the

persons to appoint the petitioners for adjustment of equities.

vi. RAM VIJAY KUMAR AND OTHERS VS STATE OF BIHAR

AND OTHERS [(1998) 9 SCC 227 / (1997) 0 Supreme (SC)

1189] [Para. 4 (i)]

Direction upon the Commission to conduct a special selection for

the purpose of appointment on these unfilled posts from amongst

the applicants/petitioners.

vii. RAMESH KUMAR VS UNION OF INDIA [(2015) 14 SCC 335

/ (2015) 0 Supreme (SC) 761] [Para. 14, 15]

When the administration has wrongly denied his due then in that

case the full benefits should be given to the candidates.

12. In their affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent/SSC has furnished

the following information: -

“(i) Total number of vacancies advertised :

46401 (Forty six thousand four hundred one). It is to be noted that after

publication of the advertisement for 12th Regional Level Selection Test, 2011

(12th RLST, in short) conducted by the West Bengal Central School Service

Commission a large number of vacancies were declared by the Government of

West Bengal following the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education

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Act, 2009 and after inclusion of those subsequently declared vacancies the total

number of vacancies came to 46401 (Forty six thousand four hundred one)

against which the selection process through 12th RLST was held.

(ii) Total number of appointment letters issued to the candidates :

The West Bengal Regional School Service Commissions only recommend

candidates to the reported vacancies. It does not issue any appointment letter.

Therefore, this point is answered by stating that the total number of

recommendation letters issued to the candidates, as on 24.3.2015, was 30006

(Thirty thousand and six).

Appointment letters are issued to the recommended candidates by the Schools

concerned.

(iii) Total number of appointees candidates who secured between 45% to 50% at

the graduation level:

7653 (Seven thousand six hundred fifty three). Out of these 7653 candidates

2971 (Two thousand nine hundred seventy one) candidates were recommended

against general vacancies and 4682 (Four thousand six hundred eighty two)

candidates were recommended against reserved category vacancies.

(iv) Total number of appointees who secured less than 45% at the graduation

level :

As the West Bengal Regional School Service Commission only make

recommendation and does not give any appointment the point is answered by

stating that the total number of recommended candidates who secured less

than 45% marks at the graduation level was 5211 (Five thousand two hundred

eleven). Out of these 5211 recommended candidates 1713 (One thousand seven

hundred thirteen) candidates were against general vacancies and 3498 (three

thousand four hundred ninety eight) candidates were against reserved category

vacancies.”

13. As none appears to represent the said respondent, the statement

made in the affidavit-in-opposition as above are taken as the

defense of the said respondent in this case.

14. There have been several rounds of litigation concerning the

process of recruitment in the State in 12

th

RLST. In Tania Ghosh

and Others versus State of West Bengal and Others [W.P.No.

P a g e | 9

1019 (w) of 2013 vide the order dated February 7, 2013] , the

Court had ordered that in the 12

th

RLST preference in

appointment must be given first to candidates who possess

minimum qualifications (B.Ed) as pres cribed by the NCTE

guidelines dated August 25, 2010; that it is only there after that

unqualified candidates were to be appointed subject to vacancies.

15. The orders of this Court dated August 26, 2020 [by the Hon’ble

Single Bench in W.P. No. 477 (w) of 2018 along with other writ

petitions], January 12, 2021 [by the Hon’ble Division Bench in

M.A.T No. 619 of 2020 along with the other appeals] and March

19, 2021 [in review petition No. RVW 19 of 2021 along with the

other review petitions] assumes importance along with the order

passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated July 21, 2022 in

Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 13810 - 13817 of 2021 [and

other Special Leave Petitions]. It can be concisely stated that the

Courts in those orders have dismissed the petitioner’s challenge on

various grounds as to the process of recruitment in 12

th

RLST in

the State.

16. In order dated August 26, 2020, the Hon’ble Single Bench has held

as follows:

“3. The subject matter of challenge is the recruitment process to the post of

Assistant Teachers initiated pursuant to the advertisement No. 01/AT/11 dated

29.12.2011 issued by the West Bengal School Service Commission (SSC).

**** **** **** **** ****

44. In so far as allegation of the petitioners that the SSC has not followed the

dicta that qualified candidates must be given first preference and it is only

thereafter that unqualified candidates would be given appointment, the writ

petitioners have not been able to demonstrate any impropriety after inspecting

all the panels and waiting lists, produced before this Court by the SSC.

45. Not a single case of any person enlisted in the panels have been shown to

have been disentitled. Counsels for the petitioners have also not been able to

point out a single case of any candidate having been appointed contrary to the

P a g e | 10

dicta in Tania Ghosh Case (Supra). The arguments of the petitioners must,

therefore, be deemed as academic, speculative and based on conjecture and

surmise.

**** **** **** **** ****

53. What is clear is that there were admittedly 46,401 final vacancies and only

2,9575 candidates were empanelled. The SSC has answered that suitable

number of candidates were not available. The same must be accepted as the

only logical answer albeit as a fait accompli. It is not known whether the

vacancies were either carried forward to the next year or filled up by any other

manner.

54. However merely because there are available unemployed candidates the

State cannot be compelled to fill them up as already decided by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Vinodan T and others Vs. University at Calicut

reported in (2002) 4 SCC 726. Even a selected candidate does not have a vested

right to be appointed merely because vacancy exists. In the instant case none of

the petitioners have been able to demonstrate that there were qualified

candidates to be appointed. This Court cannot enter into roving enquiry as

regards marks and rank of each individual candidate.

55. Also relevant case of Jitendra Kumar and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Anr.

Reported in (2008) 2 SCC 161 where the Supreme Court has held that State for

valid reasons can refuse to fill up vacancies as already stated hereinabove, the

SSC has indicated on affidavit that they did not find suitable candidates to fill all

46401 vacancies. At paragraph 47 it was held as follows :-

"47. It is, therefore, evident that whereas the selectee as

such has no legal right, the superior court in exercise of its

judicial review would not ordinarily direct issuance of any

writ in absence of any pleading and proof of mala fide or

arbitrariness on its part. Each case, therefore, must be

considered on its own merit."

56. The petitioners have not been able to demonstrate any malafides on the

part of the SSC in the process of selection. There could be at the most a case of

some unnecessary publication of the combined merit list but the subsequent

steps cannot be called a complete infraction of Rules. No specific illegality or

improper selection has been pointed out the petitioners.

17. The writ petition was dismissed for the reasons quoted above.

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18. In order dated January 12, 2021 the Division Bench in appeal has

inter alia held:

“The contention of the appellants before us as well as before the learned Single

Judge was that the remaining vacancies could not be filled up beyond 29575

candidates was irrational, illegal and they have a right for appointment in view

of the existences of the vacancies. The contention of the SSC, on the other hand,

appears to be that the Central Commission has fixed qualified marks and it is in

the academic interest that the Commission did not fill up the remaining

vacancies. The learned Advocate General appearing before us has also stated

that it is a decision of an expert body not to fill up vacancies beyond 29575 and

in the event of academic interest, the Court may not extend the said benefit to

the remaining candidates. While it is true that a candidate empanelled, has no

indefeasible right to get appointment to the post for which he has been

selected, at the same time, there has to be some justification for the appointing

authority not to fill up the vacancies when such vacancies have not been fully

exhausted. In the instant case, we find that the SSC has given some justification

for not filling up remaining vacancies as to the basis to fill up the vacancies is

governed by Rule 7(2) of the Recruitment Rules and it is not for the Court to

decide whether the views of the expert body not to fill up vacancies were proper

or justified since the Court is not the selecting authority or the authority who

shall fix the qualifying marks or the bench mark for that purpose. It has to be

left to the discretion of the authorities concerned. However, such actions are not

totally immuned for judicial review if it is actuated by malice or malafide or

suffers from any illegality. As mentioned earlier the writ petitioners/appellants

could not substantiate their claim on malafide or discrimination or illegality

with regard to the candidates who were so far selected. The entire record was

before them for inspection. All the candidates have the opportunity to scrutinize

the list and to find out if there have been any irregularity. The reliance upon the

audit report does not advance the case of the petitioner as they have

participated in the selection process and just because they are unsuccessful now

at this stage they cannot rely upon such report to substantiate their claim. They

are not contending before us that the selection of candidates who have been

empanelled namely 29,575 has been illegally included or the list prepared is

contrary to the Recruitment Rules.”

19. Finally, the Supreme Court in the order dated July 21, 2022, has

held in the following manner:

“(9) The actual grievance of the petitioners is that though the total number of

vacancies, for the filling up of which the selection was held, was 46401, the

respondents eventually empanelled only 29575 candidates, that too after

empanelling more than about 36000 candidates in the first instance. According

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to the petitioners, the respondents have done so, by increasing the bench

mark/bar after releasing the first merit list and that, therefore, this is a case of

the respondents changing the rules of the game after the game commenced.

(10) But the above argument is wholly unsustainable. The fundamental principle

of service jurisprudence is that it is not necessary for the Government to fill up

all the posts for which notification was issued. It requires no legal expertise to

accept the proposition that no one has a fundamental right to be appointed to a

civil post/service. The right that an individual has is only for consideration for

selection.

(11) Though the petitioners attempted to make a mountain out of a molehill,

the long and short of the story is that after notifying 46401 vacancies, the

respondents first empanelled about 36000 candidates and later reduced the size

of the panel to 29575. All the learned counsel for the petitioners agreed that

they have no right to seek a direction to the respondents to fill up all the posts

notified, though some of the counsel attempted to argue that after the advent

of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, schools are

obliged to maintain pupil teacher ratio and that, therefore the candidates have

a vested right to seek the filling up of all vacancies. But the said contention is

very shallow, since the right conferred by the said Act is upon the children to

education and not upon the teachers to seek appointment.

(12) None of the petitioners who went before the High Court ever contended

that any candidate who secured lesser marks than them got included in the final

panel comprising of 29575 persons. This means that the first panel of the size of

36140 candidates merely got shrunk, without violating the rule of merit or

seniority. Once this aspect is not disputed, it should have taken no time for any

Court to throw the petitions out of Court.

**** **** **** **** **** ****

(19) At the outset it should be pointed out that there is no rule which states that

a person whose name is included in the panel should invariably be appointed.

The definition of the word “panel” shows that “panel” is nothing but a list

containing the names of as many candidates as there are vacancies. Rule 12(8)

contemplates the preparation of a panel as well as a waiting list. The words

used in Rule 12(8)(a) are “a panel of candidates found fit for appointment”.

Merely because a person is found fit for appointment, he cannot compel the

respondents to appoint him, unless he is able to demonstrate that less

meritorious candidates have been appointed. Therefore, the entire foundation

of the case of the petitioners is shallow.

**** **** **** **** **** ****

(24) In view of the above, all the Special Leave Petitions are completely devoid

of merits and are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions

are dismissed. No costs.”

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20. Hence accordingly, it is also the contention of the respondent/SSC

that the dispute raised in the instant writ petition has already

been set at rest by the decisive and final verdict of the Court which

stands binding on all the parties and the process cannot be

challenged any further.

21. To this however, Mr. Chowdhury has certain denial and objections

to raise. He submits that the challenge in the writ petition and the

consequent appeal and the Special Leave Petition which have been

earlier dismissed by the Courts, was regarding irregularities in the

combined merit list, reservation categories, due to breach of Rule

12(5), vacancy issues, placement of lower meritorious candidates

at a higher up position in the combined merit list etc, principally

relating to the alleged illegality and irregularity which had taken

place within the process itself. He says that, as opposed to the

same, the petitioner in the instant writ petition has challenged the

vacancy notification itself dated December 29, 2011 on the ground

of its being not in conformity with the NCTE Rules and Guidelines.

That the petitioner’s challenge here strikes at the very initiation of

the process and the alleged illegality would arrest the entire

process of recruitment at the threshold and thus the petitioner’s

challenge is unrelated and not connected with the grievances and

challenges of the petitioners in the above noted cases. Mr.

Chowdhury, learned advocate has submitted that those cases,

therefore, cannot be stated to be similar with the instant writ

petition and decision in one cannot bind the petitioner in the

other.

22. The objection raised by the writ petitioner that the earlier rounds

of litigation pertained only to irregularities committed during the

recruitment process and not to the legality of the vacancy

notification itself, does not commend acceptance. Upon a

meaningful reading of the pleadings and the issues decided in the

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earlier writ petitions, appeals and the Special Leave Petitions, it

becomes evident that all such proceedings substantially emanated

from and revolved around the very same recruitment process

initiated pursuant to the vacancy notification dated December 29,

2011 issued in connection with the 12th RLST. The controversy

regarding participation and appointment of untrained candidates,

alleged deviation from the NCTE norms, relaxation of minimum

qualifications and consequential deprivation of trained candidates

formed the foundational and inseparable basis of the challenge

throughout the entire batch of litigations. The legality of the

recruitment process could not have been examined in isolation

from the legality of the notification by which such process itself

was set into motion. Hence, the present attempt to segregate the

challenge to the notification from the broader challenge to the

recruitment process is more illusory than real and amounts merely

to a change in form without any substantial distinction in subject

matter.

23. Moreover, the orders passed by the Hon’ble Single Bench, the

Hon’ble Division Bench and finally the Hon’ble Supreme Court,

while considering the validity of the recruitment undertaken under

the 12th RLST, have conclusively upheld the process and declined

interference with the appointments already made. The issue

concerning appointment of untrained candidates vis-à-vis trained

candidates, which is also the core grievance in the instant writ

petition, thus stood conclusively adjudicated and attained finality.

Once the superior Courts have authoritatively pronounced upon

the validity of the recruitment process arising out of the same

notification and concerning the same body of candidates, any

further adjudication in the present writ petition would inevitably

reopen issues already settled and thereby offend the principles of

finality in litigation, judicial discipline and public policy underlying

the doctrine analogous to res judicata and constructive res

P a g e | 15

judicata. The petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate, under a

different drafting of reliefs, matters which substantially stood

concluded in the earlier proceedings.

24. It is also of significance that the reliefs sought in the instant writ

petition, namely annulment of appointments of untrained

candidates and consequential appointment of trained candidates,

are intrinsically connected with and dependent upon the validity of

the very recruitment process which has already been upheld by

the competent Courts. Any contrary determination at this stage

would not only create irreconcilable conflict with the binding

judgments rendered earlier but would also unsettle rights and

appointments which have attained conclusiveness over a

prolonged period of time. Therefore, the cause raised herein having

substantially merged with and been answered in the earlier rounds

of litigation, nothing survives for independent adjudication in the

present writ petition and the same has consequently been

rendered infructuous.

25. Apart from the above, this Court also finds that the writ petitioner

has failed to establish any enforceable legal right warranting

issuance of a writ in his favour. It is not clear from the materials

placed on record as to whether the petitioner was at all empanelled

or recommended in the selection process. Even assuming that the

petitioner had participated in the recruitment process, there is no

cogent pleading or material disclosing the precise position secured

by him in the merit list or identifying any specific less meritorious

candidate who allegedly superseded him an d obtained

appointment in derogation of his rights. In absence of such

foundational facts, the allegation of arbitrariness or hostile

discrimination remains vague and unsubstantiated. It is a settled

principle of service jurisprudence that a writ Court doe s not

proceed on mere conjectures or general allegations, particularly in

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matters concerning large scale public recruitment, unless clear

infringement of an identifiable legal right is demonstrated.

26. Even otherwise, mere inclusion of a candidate in a panel or select

list does not confer upon such candidate any indefeasible or vested

right to appointment. The doctrine is too well settled to require

elaboration that empanelment only creates a right to be considered

and not an enforceable right to claim appointment as a matter of

course. Unless the relevant statutory rules expressly mandate

filling up of all advertised vacancies, the State or the recruiting

authority retains discretion to determine the extent of

appointments to be made, depending upon administra tive

exigencies, policy considerations, financial implications and overall

public interest. Judicial review in such matters remains confined

to examining arbitrariness, mala fides or patent illegality. In the

present case, no such element has been successfully demonstrated

by the petitioner.

27. Further, the reasonableness of the decision and the recruitment

process undertaken pursuant to the 12th RLST notification has

already received judicial approval in the earlier rounds of litigation

culminating before the Hon’ble Division Bench and thereafter the

Hon’ble Supreme Court. Once the competent appellate forum has

examined the recruitment exercise and found the actions of the

authorities to be justified and legally sustainable, the same carries

considerable binding and persuasive force while adjudicating the

present writ petition arising out of the selfsame process. The

petitioner has failed to show that any statutory provision,

mandatory rule or enforceable guideline has been violated in a

manner causing direct legal injury to him personally. In absence of

proof of breach of a legal or statutory right, no writ of mandamus

can be issued merely on the basis of an abstract grievance or

perceived unfairness. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article

P a g e | 17

226 of the Constitution is fundamentally premised upon existence

of a corresponding legal duty and its breach affecting the

petitioner’s accrued legal right, neither of which stands established

in the present case.

28. There is yet another aspect of the matter which goes to the root of

the maintainability of the present writ petition. The instant

proceeding is neither a public interest litigation instituted in

accordance with the principles governing public law remedies nor

a representative action maintainable on behalf of an identifiable

class of persons. As would appear from the records, the writ

petition originally instituted also in the name of an unregistered

association was, by order of this Court dated December 18, 2015,

held to be not maintainable insofar as the said association was

concerned and was directed to proceed only at the instance of the

individual petitioner. Consequently, the scope of adjudication

became confined strictly to the personal and enforceable legal

rights, if any, of the writ petitioner himself and not to any

generalized grievance concerning the recruitment process or

alleged prejudice suffered by other candidates.

29. In proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the existence

of a judicially enforceable legal right and a corresponding

infringement thereof constitutes the foundational requirement for

invocation of writ jurisdiction. A person cannot maintain a writ

petition merely on the basis of a perceived illegality in the abstract

or on the assertion that the authority has acted contrary to law

unless such action demonstrably invades or prejudicially affects

his own legal or statutory rights. The writ jurisdiction is essentially

remedial and not advisory in character. In the present case, the

petitioner has failed to establish that he possessed any accrued or

vested right to appointment, that he was unlawfully excluded

despite superior merit, or that any candidate demonstrably lower

P a g e | 18

in merit was preferred over him in violation of statutory rules. In

absence of proof of personal legal injury, the petitioner cannot seek

to assail the entire recruitment process in the nature of a roving or

generalized challenge.

30. The doctrinal distinction between a public interest litigation and

an individual service dispute also assumes significance in the

present context. Service matters ordinarily do not lend themselves

to adjudication in a representative or public interest capacity

except in exceptional situations expressly recognised in law. Since

the present writ petition has not been instituted as a bona fide

public interest litigation satisfying the procedural and substantive

requirements governing such proceedings, the petitioner cannot

seek to enlarge the scope of the lis beyond his individual cause of

action. Once the petitioner failed to demonstrate infringement of

any enforceable legal or statutory right personal to him, the writ

petition itself became unsustainable in law and no relief under

Article 226 can be granted on the basis of broad allegations

touching the recruitment process in general.

31. In view of the findings recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the specific allegations advanced by the

writ petitioner do not warrant any further independent

adjudication on merits. The challenge raised by the petitioner

substantially overlaps with and forms part of the very same

controversy concerning the 12th RLST recruitment process which

has already travelled through multiple rounds of litigation before

the Hon’ble Single Bench, the Hon’ble Division Bench and

ultimately the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The issues relating to

relaxation of qualification norms, appointment of untrained

candidates, alleged deprivation of trained candidates and legality

of the recruitment exercise have thus already received

authoritative judicial consideration and attained finality. Once the

P a g e | 19

broader legality of the recruitment process has been upheld by the

superior Courts, reopening individual facets of the same

controversy at this stage would not only be contrary to the

doctrine of finality of litigation but would also result in judicial

inconsistency and uncertainty in matters long settled.

32. Furthermore, the petitioner having failed to establish any

subsisting legal right personal to him, any adjudication upon the

factual allegations made in the writ petition would remain merely

academic and hypothetical in nature. Courts exercising

jurisdiction under Article 226 do not ordinarily undertake

determination of abstract questions or enter into exhaustive

factual scrutiny where no effective or enforceable re lief can

ultimately follow. Since the petitioner has neither established a

vested right to appointment nor demonstrated that he suffered

actionable prejudice by reason of any identifiable illegality

committed against him personally, adjudication of the remaining

allegations would serve no fruitful legal purpose.

33. It is also relevant that the reliefs sought by the petitioner, if

entertained at this belated stage, would inevitably disturb a

recruitment process and appointments which have stood

concluded for years and which have already been protected and

affirmed by judicial pronouncements of superior forums. The

principles of certainty, stability and repose in public

administration require that disputes relating to large scale

recruitment processes attain quietus at some definite stage.

Endless reopening of concluded issues on fragmented or

reformulated grounds would be contrary to sound judicial policy

and public interest. Therefore, this Court finds that the allegations

sought to be canvassed by the petitioner no longer survive for

substantive adjudication and need not be examined any further.

P a g e | 20

34. For the reasons as discussed above, the Court finds no merit in

the instant writ petition and the same is dismissed.

35. Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to

the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)