No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
A
TELCO CONVOY DRIVERS MAZDOOR SANGH & ANR.
-v.
~
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
APRIL 28, 1989
B [MURARI MOHON DUTT AND T.K. THOMMEN, JJ.)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Sections JO and 12-Jndustrial y
Dispute--Appropriate Government-Power to make a reference~
Nature of-Whether includes power to delve into merits of dispute-
1
Formation of opinion by Government-Whether dispute 'Exists or is
Apprehended'-Whether same thing as to adjudicate the dispute on its -c
merits-Court-When can direct the Government to make a reference.
The appellant-Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh, represen-
'r
ted to the Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Lid. (TELCO) demand-
ing
that all convoy drivers should be given permanent status and
D facilities
that are available lo the permanent employees of
TELCO. The
Deputy Labour Commissioner refused lo make a reference under
section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 because of the opinion
of the Law Department that there was no relationship of master and
servant between TELCO and the convoy drivers.
E The appellant-Sangh filed a writ petition in the High Court pray- +-·
ing for a writ of mandamus commanding the State llf Bihar lo refer the
dispute under section lO(l) of the Act. The High Court dismissed the
petition
but granted liberty to the appellant-Sangh to reagitate the
•
matter before the appropriate Government.
F On a further representation also the Deputy Labour Commis-
sinner refnsed to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act. '-'(
Again, the appellant-Sangh moved a writ petition in the High Court
which summarily dismissed the petition holding that the appellants had )...
failed to satisfy that they were employed by the TELCO. Hence this
appeal by Special leave. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Court
G being
of the view that the Government should be given one more chance
to consider the question of making a reference, kept the appeal pending
and directed the Government to reconsider the question of referring the
.,....-
dispute. Upon reconsideration also the Government refused to make a
reference under section 10(1) of the Act. On the question: whether an
appropriate Government exercising power to make a reference under
H section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 can delve into the
802
•
DRIVERS MAZDOOR SANGH v. STATE OF BIHAR 803
I
_ _) merits of the dispute and adjudicate upon the dispute itself.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment
of the High
Court,
HELD: 1. In considering the question of making a reference
'j under section IO( I), the Government is entitled to form an opinion as to
' lwhether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended". The forma
rtion of opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is
apprehended" is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on
- its merits. [807 A]
2. While exercising power under section 10(1) of the Act, the
function
of the appropriate Government is an administrative function
and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function, and in performing this
administrative function the Government cannot delve into the merits of
the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the tis, which
would certainly be in excess
of the power conferred on it by section
10 of
the Act. [S07F]
Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, [1985] 3 S.C.R. 686;
M.I'. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. The State of M.P., [1985] 2
S.C.R. 1019 and Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, Jullundhur,
[197S] 2 S.C.R. 793 applied.
2.1
In the instant case, the dispute is as to whether the convoy
drivers are employees or workmen, of TELCO, that is to say, whether
there is relationship of employer and employees between
TELCO and
the convoy drivers, the same cannot be decided by the Government in
',. exercise of its administrative function under section 10(1) of the Act.
A
B
c
D
E
Therefore, the
State Government was not justified in adjudicating the F
~ said dispute. [807B, 807H, SOSA]
~--{
3. There may b~ exceptional cases in which the State Govern
ment may come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse
or frivolous and do not merit a reference. But the Government should
be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view G
to declining reference and Courts will always be vigilant whenever
the Government attempts to usnrp the powers of the Tribunal for
adjudication
of valid disputes, and that to allow the Government to
do so would be to render section IO and section 12(5) of the Act
nugatory.
[SOMA-Cl '
H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
A M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. The Staie of M.P., [19S5] 2 ~-
S.C.R. 1019 applied.
4. In the instant case, in
view of the fact that the Government has
persistently
declined to make a reference and even after reconsideration
has adjudicated the dispute itself, the dispute should
be adjudicated by
B the Industrial Tribunal.
[SOSE] Y,
The State of Bihar is directed to make a reference of the disput~
raised by the Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh to an appropriate
Industrial Tribunal under section 10(1) oftbe Act. [SOSH, S09A] -
C Sankari Cement Alai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam v. Govern-
ment of Tamilnadu, [19S3] 1 L.L.J. 460; Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Y
Haryana, [19S5] 3 S.C.R. 6S6; M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v.
The State of M.P., [19S5] 2 S.C.R. 1019 and Nirmal Singh v. State of
Punjab, [19S4] 2 L.L.J. 396; applied.
D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2534
of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.1.1988 of the High -1-
Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1852of 1987.
E G.B. Pai, S.K. Sinha for the Appellants.
f
Shanti Bhushan, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Misra, S.B. Upadhyay and
B.B. Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DUTT, J. Special leave is granted. Heard learned Counsel for
the parties.
The appellants, Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh,
Jamshedpur, and another, have preferred this appeal against the judg-
G ment
of the
Patna High Court whereby the High Court dismissed the
writ petition of the appellants challenging the order of the State
of Bihar refusing to make a reference of the disputes raised by the
appellants to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act,
1947, hereinafter referred to as
"the Act".
H The appellant-Sangh represents about 900 convoy drivers. By a
~--
DRIVERS MAZDOOR SANGH v. STATE OF BIHAR (DUTT, J.] 805
~·
letter of demand dated October 16, 1986 addressed to the General
Manager
of the Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd., Jamshed-
A
pur (for short
"TELCO"), the Sangh demanded that permanent status
should be given
by the management to all the convoy drivers, and that
they should also be given all the facilities
as are available to the perma-
nent employees of
TELCO on the dates of their appointment. The said
-'f
demand proceeds on the basis that the convoy drivers are all workmen B
~f TELCO. The dispute that has been raised in the said letter of
1 demand is principally whether the convoy drivers are workmen and/or
employees of TELCO or not. In other words, whether there is rela-
-
tionship of employer and employees between TELCO and the convoy
drivers.
The Deputy Labour Commissioner
by his letter dated February
c
'--( 26, 1979 informed the appellant-Sangh that in view of the opinion of
the Law Department
of the year 1973 to the effect that there was no
relationship of master and servant between
TELCO and the convoy
drivers, the demands of the convoy drivers did not come within the
purview of the Act and, accordingly, it
was not possible to take any D
action in regard to the dispute of convoy drivers under the Act. The
appellant-Sangh being aggrieved
by the said refusal to make a refer-
--t
ence under section 10(1) of the Act, moved before the Ranchi Bench
of the Patna High Court a writ petition praying for a writ of mandamus
commanding the State of Bihar to refer the dispute under section 10(1)
of the Act. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, who heard the E
writ petition, took the view that the letter of the Deputy Labour Com-
missioner only referred to the Law Department's opinion of the year
1973 without indicating in what context and under what circumstances,
h'e rejected the demand for a reference. In that view of the matter, the
,'l'c
learned Judge granted liberty to the Sangh to reagitate the mater
before the appropriate Government and expressed the hope that the
J'
--1
appropriate Government would consider the matter in a proper pers-
pective in the light of the documents and the materials that would be
placed by the Sangh, in accordance with faw. The writ petition was
dismissed subject, however, to the observation and direction men-
tioned above.
-.; G
Pursuant to the liberty granted
by the High Court, the
Sangh
made a representation to the Government for a reference of the dis-
pute under section 10(1) of the Act. The Deputy Labour Commis-
sioner, Jamshedpur,
by his letter dated November 6, 1986 gave the
same reply and refused to make a reference'.
H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
Again, the appellant-Sangh moved a writ petition before the /'-·
High Court and, as stated already, the High Court summarily dismis-
sed the same holding that tl\e appellants had failed to prima facie
satisfy that they were employed either by TELCO or by the Telco
Contractors' Association. Hence this appeal.
B
It has been urged by Mr.
Pai, learned Counsel appearing on
behalf
of the appellants, that the Government exceeded its jurisdiction,
¥
in purporting to decide the dispute raised by the appellant-Sangh i~
the said letter of demand. Counsel submits that in the facts and
circumstances
of the case, the Government should have made a refer-
ence to the Industrial Tribunal under section
10(1) of the Act for the
C adjudication
of the dispute of the convoy drivers and should not have
embarked upon the task of deciding the dispute
on its merits through
the Deputy Labour Commissioner. On the other hand, it has been vehemently urged by Mr. Shanti
Bhusan, learned Counsel appearing on benalf of TELCO, that the
D Government has the jurisdiction to consider whether
any industrial
dispute exists
or not and, in considering the same, as the Government
found that the convoy drivers were not even workmen of
TELCO or,
in
other words, there had been no relationship of master and servants
between
TELCO and the convoy drivers, the Government refused to
make a reference of the dispute under section 10(1) of the Act. It is
E submitted that the refusal by the Government to make a reference was
perfectly within its jurisdiction inasmuch as, in the opinion of the
Government, there
was no existence of any industrial dispute.
After conclusion
of the hearing, we took the view that the
Government should be given one more chance to consider the ques-
F ti
on of making a reference and, accordingly, we by our order dated
March
30, 1989 directed the Government to reconsider the question of
referring the dispute raised
by the convoy drivers to the Industrial
Tribunal under section
10 of the Act, keeping the appeal pending
before us.
13 The learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Government,
has produced before
us an order dated April 13, 1989 of the Govern
ment whereby the Government has, upon a reconsideration of the
matter, refused to make a reference under section
10( l) of the Act. In
refusing to make a reference, the Government has adjudicated the
dispute on its merits.
+
-
-
•
DRIVERS MAZDOOR SANGH v. STATE OF BIHAR {DUTT, J.] 807
-~ It is true that in considering the question of making a reference
A
B
under section 10(1), the Government is entitled to form an opinion as
to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended", as urged
by Mr. Shanti Bhusan. The formation of opinion as to whether an
industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended" is not the same thing as to
adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits. In the instant case,
as
already stated, the dispute is as to whether the convoy drivers are _,-\employees or workmen of TELCO, that is to say, whether there is
,rrclationship of employer and employees between TELCO and the
convoy drivers. In considering the question whether a refen, ~
should be made or not, the Deputy Labour Commissioner and/or the
Government have held that the convoy 5frivers are not workmen and,
accordingly, no reference can be made. Thus, the dispute has been
decided by the Government which is, undoubtedly, not permissible.
~· .•.
c
It is, however, submitted on behalf of TELCO that unless there
is relationship of employer and employees
or' in other words, unless
those who are raising
the disputes are workmen, there cannot be any D
existence of industrial dispute within the meaning of the term as
defined
in section 2(k) of the
Act. It is urged that in order to form an
opinion as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended,
one of the factors that has to be considered by the Government is
whether the persons who are raising the disputes are workmen or not
within the meaning of the definition as contained
in section 2(k) of the
E
Act .
Attractive though the contention is,
we regret, we are unable to
accept the same.
It is now well settled that, while exercising power
under section
10( 1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate
Government
is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi-F
judicial function, and that
in performing this administrative function
the Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take
upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be
in
excess of the power conferred on it by section
10 of the Act. See Ram
Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, [1985) 3 SCR 686; M.P. Irrigation
Karamchari Sangh v. The State of M.P., [1985) 2 SCR 1019 and G
Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, Jullundur, [1978) 2 SCR 793.
Applying the principle laid down by this Court in the above
decisions, there can
be no doubt that the Government was not justified
in deciding the dispute. Where, as
in the instant case, the dispute is H,
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
A whether the person raising the dispute are workmen or not, the same ~
cannot be decided by the Government in exercise of its administrative
function
under section
10(1) of the Act. As has been held in M.P.
Irrigation Karamchari Sangh's case (supra), there may be exceptional
cases in which
the
State Government may, on a proper examination of
B
c
the demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either
perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. Further, the
Government should be very slo»: to attempt an examination of the
demand with a view to declining reference .and Courts will always ~
vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the '
Tribunal for adjudication of valid disputes, and that to allow the
Government to do so would be to render section 10 and section 12(5)
of the Act nugatory.
We
are, therefore, of the view that the
State Government, which "f'
is the appropriate Government, was not justified in adjudicating the
dispute, namely, whether the convoy drivers are workmen or emp-
D loyees of TELCO or not and, accordingly, the impugned orders of the
Deputy Labour Commissioner acting on behalf of the Government
E
F
G
and that of the Government itself cannot be sustained.
It has been already stated that we had given one more chance to
the Government to reconsider the matter and the Government after +
reconsideration has come to the same conclusion that the convoy
drivers are
not workmen of TELCO thereby adjudicating the dispute itself. After having considered the facts and circumstances of the case
and having given our best consideration in the matter, we are of the
view
that the dispute should be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal
and, as the Government has persistently declined to make a reference
under section
10(1) of the Act, we think we should direct the Govern-
ment to make such a reference. In several instances this Court had to
direct the Government to make a reference under section 10( 1) when
the Government had declined to make such a reference and this Court
was of the view that such a reference should have been made. See
Sankari Cement Alai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam v. Government of
Tamilnadu, [1983] 1 LLJ 460; Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana,
[1985] 3 SCR 686; M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. The State of
M.P. [1985] 2 SCR 1019 and Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab, [1984] 2
LLJ 396.
In the circumstances, we direct the State of Bihar to make a
H reference
under section
10( 1) of the Act of the dispute raised by the
-
-
DRIVERS MAZDOOR SANGH v. STATE OF BIHAR [DUTT, J.] 809
-~ Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh by its letter dated October 16, A
· 1986 addressed to the General Manager TELCO (Annexure R-4/ 1 to
the Special Leave Petition), to an appropriate Industrial Tribunal
within one month from today.
The appeal
is allowed and the judgment of the High Court and
the impugned orders are set aside. There will, however, be no order as
-1 ~~costs.
'T.N.A. Appeal allowed.
B
In the pivotal case of TELCO Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Ors., the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment clarifying the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and the government's limited power to make a reference. This 1989 ruling, now accessible on CaseOn, remains a cornerstone of labour law, establishing a clear line between the administrative function of forming an opinion and the judicial function of adjudicating a dispute.
The case originated from a simple yet profound demand by the Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh, representing around 900 drivers. They sought permanent employee status with Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO), along with the associated benefits. The core of their claim was that they were workmen of TELCO, establishing a master-servant relationship.
However, the Government of Bihar, acting as the 'appropriate Government,' repeatedly refused to refer this dispute to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Citing a decade-old opinion from its Law Department, the government concluded that no master-servant relationship existed between the drivers and TELCO. Consequently, it deemed there was no 'industrial dispute' to refer under Section 10(1) of the Act. Even after the Sangh approached the High Court and was granted liberty to re-present their case, the government stood firm. The High Court eventually dismissed a subsequent writ petition, prompting the Sangh to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appropriate Government, while exercising its power under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, could delve into the merits of a dispute and effectively adjudicate it. Specifically, could the government decide the fundamental question of whether the drivers were 'workmen' as a prerequisite to making a reference?
The Supreme Court reiterated the established legal principle governing Section 10(1). The provision empowers the government to refer a dispute to a Tribunal if it forms an opinion that an industrial dispute “exists or is apprehended.” The Court clarified that this function is purely administrative, not judicial or quasi-judicial. The government's role is to arrive at a subjective satisfaction about the existence of a dispute, not to determine its outcome. As affirmed in precedents like Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana and M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. The State of M.P., forming an opinion on the existence of a dispute is fundamentally different from adjudicating the dispute on its merits.
Applying this rule, the Supreme Court found that the State of Bihar had clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. Instead of merely assessing whether a dispute existed, the government took upon itself the task of deciding the central point of contention: the employment status of the convoy drivers. This determination is a complex issue of fact and law that can only be resolved by a Tribunal after examining evidence from both parties.
The Court observed that while the government can refuse to make a reference in exceptional cases where demands are 'perverse or frivolous,' the present case did not fall into that category. The question of whether an employer-employee relationship exists is a substantial dispute that warrants adjudication. By deciding this issue itself, the government had usurped the power of the Industrial Tribunal, effectively rendering the dispute resolution mechanism of the Act nugatory.
Understanding the nuances between administrative opinion and judicial adjudication is critical for legal practice. Legal professionals can quickly grasp these distinctions with CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs, perfect for analysing pivotal rulings like this one on the go.
The Supreme Court concluded that the government's refusal to refer the dispute was unjustified and an excess of its power. Given the government's persistent refusal, even after being given an opportunity to reconsider during the appeal, the Court found it necessary to intervene decisively. It allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment and the government's orders, and issued a direct command. The Court directed the State of Bihar to make a reference of the dispute to an appropriate Industrial Tribunal within one month.
In essence, the Supreme Court held that the government's power under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is limited to forming a prima facie opinion on the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. It cannot step into the shoes of a judicial body to decide the merits of the claims. By determining that the convoy drivers were not workmen, the State of Bihar adjudicated the dispute, which was beyond its administrative function. Therefore, the Court mandated the government to refer the matter for proper adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal.
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