[1]

WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

WP(C) No. 942 of 2016

Tensubam Khomei Singh, aged about 40 years, S/o (L) T. Mohan

Singh, CISF No. 964651076, a resident of Ningomthongjao

Kitnapanung, P.O. & P.S. Imphal & Irilbung, District Imphal East,

Manipur.

... Petitioner

-Versus-

1. Union of India, represented by Secy. Home Affairs, Shastribhavan

New Delhi.

2. Director General CISF H.Q CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, 13-Block,

New Delhi – 110003.

3. CO, CIS, Unit Oil Duliajan, Dribugarh, Assam.

… Respondents

BEFOR E

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH

For the Petitioner :: Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar, Sr. Advocate

asstd. by Mr. W. Jamon, Advocate

For the respondents :: Mr. W. Darakeshwor, Sr. Panel counsel

Date of Hearing :: 28-07-2026

Date of Judgment & Order :: 10-08-2026

JUDGMENT & ORDER

[1] Heard Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar, learned Senior Advocate assisted

by Mr. W. Jamon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and

Mr. W. Darakeshwor, learned senior panel counsel appearing for the

respondents.

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

[2] This judgment and order is to be read in continuation and in

conjunction with the earlier proceeding dated 28-07-2026, which are

as under:-

“28-07-2026

“[1] Heard Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar, learned Senior Advocate

assisted by Mr. W. Jamon, learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner and Mr. W. Darakeshwor, learned senior panel

counsel appearing for the respondents.

“[2] The present writ petition was earlier disposed of by

passing a judgment and order dated 14-02-2023 allowing the

present writ petition by quashing and setting aside the

impugned order dated 25-09-2009 dismissing the petitioner

from service and further directing the respondents to reinstate

the petitioner in service forthwith with all consequential service

benefits.

“[3] The respondents filed an appeal against the said

judgment and order dated 14-02-2023 passed by this court,

which was registered as WA No. 57 of 2023. Taking into

consideration the main ground raised by the appellant

(respondents herein) that the writ petitioner did not challenge

the order dated 25-09-2009 dismissing him from service as well

as the order dated 30-12-2009 rejecting the appeal filed by the

petitioner against his dismissal order, the appellate court

allowed the said writ appeal filed by the respondents, vide

judgment and order dated 12-09-2023 passed in WA No. 57 of

2023. By the said judgment and order dated 12-09-2023, the

appellate court remanded back the present writ petition for

consideration by giving liberty to the writ petitioner to file an

application for amendment of the prayer made in the writ

petition. The operative portion of the aforesaid judgment and

order are as under:-

“20. In view of the above, without going into the merits of

the rival contentions, we are of the view that it would be

appropriate to remand the matter to the learned Single

Judge for consideration by giving liberty to the

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

respondent/ writ petitioner to file an application for

amendment of the prayer for inclusion of the prayer for

challenging the order of the disciplinary authority as

well as the order of the appellate authority.”

“21. Accordingly, the writ appeal stands disposed of. The

matter is remanded back to the learned Single Judge so

as to enable the respondent to make necessary

application for amendment for inclusion of the prayer

challenging the order of the disciplinary authority as

well as the appellate authority. There will be no order

as to costs.”

“[4] Pursuant to the said judgment and order passed by the

Division Bench of this court in WA No. 57 of 2023, the writ

petitioner has sought for amendment of the writ petition and

upon allowing such amendment application, the writ petitioner

filed a recast petition. In the recast petition, the petitioner

sought for granting the following reliefs:-

“(i) Issue rule nisi calling upon the respondents to show

cause as to why the prayer prayed for by the petitioner

shall not be granted after hearing them make the rule

absolute. Call for the records of the case.”

“(ii) Issue a writ of Certiorari to quash and set aside the

impugned dismissal order dated 25-09-2009 (Annexure

– A/3) as well as the order of the appellate authority

dated 30-12-2009 (Annexure -A/4) as they are not

sustainable in the eyes of law.”

“(iii) Issue a writ of Mandamus by directing the respondents

to reinstate the petitioner to his service with full back

wages and all other consequential service benefits.”

“(iv) Pass any other appropriate writ/ order/ direction that

this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper.”

“[5] The respondents have also filed their counter affidavit to

the recast petition. In fact, the parties have exchanged their

pleadings and exchange of pleadings have been completed.”

“[6] I have heard at length the submission advanced by the

learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner. The

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

learned counsel appearing for the petitioner reiterated the

same arguments advanced earlier on behalf of the petitioner. I

have also heard the submission advanced by Mr. W.

Darakeshwor, learned senior panel counsel appearing for the

respondents. The learned counsel submitted that he also

endorsed and reiterated the arguments advanced on behalf of

the respondents, which have been recorded by this court in the

earlier judgment and order.”

“[7] After hearing the arguments advanced by both the

counsel appearing for the parties, judgment is reserved.”

[3] The facts of the present case in a nutshell is that the petitioner

was serving as a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force

(CISF) and was posted at CISF, Unit Oil Duliajan, Assam during 2007-

2019. On 17-09-2019 while the petitioner was detailed for duty along with

another Constable, the Assistant Commandant along with one Inspector

came for making a surprise checking and found out that the petitioner

and the other Constable were not present at their duty post. The said

Officer found the petitioner and the other Constable smoking and sitting

with arms and ammunitions far away from their duty post and both of

them were under the influence of alcohol. The petitioner and the other

Constable were called to the barrack for briefing and further action. After

the briefing was over and while the aforesaid Inspector was endorsing

his checking report, the petitioner lost his temper and cocked his rifle and

aimed it at the Assistant Commandant and also scared other fellow force

personnel present there not to come near him and to leave the spot. On

seeing the aggressive behaviour of the petitioner, the Personal Security

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

Officer of the Assistant Commandant promptly intervened and tried to

overpowered the petitioner by grabbing him and also tried to snatch away

the rifle, however, during the process the petitioner fired four rounds from

his rifle and one of the bullets hit the left thigh of a Constable, who was

the Driver of the Assistant Commandant. Ultimately the petitioner was

overpowered and the arms and ammunitions allotted to him was

deposited in the unit Kote.

[4] For his extreme act of indiscipline, the authorities initiated

criminal proceedings against the petitioner by registering an FIR,

however the petitioner was ultimately acquitted of the charges made

against him in the criminal proceedings. The petitioner was, however,

dismissed from service by issuing the order dated 25-09-2009 impugned

in the present writ petition. The petitioner was dismissed from his service

by the authorities without holding any departmental enquiry and without

following due procedure prescribed under Rule 36, 37 and 38 of the

CISF Rules, 2001. The statutory appeal filed by the petitioner was also

rejected by the appellate authority by issuing an order dated 30-12-2009.

[5] Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the

petitioner submitted that the authorities dismissed the petitioner from his

service without holding any departmental enquiry as mandated under

Rule 36, 37 and 38 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001

and without affording any opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself.

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

The authorities issued the impugned order dated 25-09-2009 purportedly

in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 39 (ii) of the CISF Rules,

2001. The learned counsel submitted that the only reason given by the

authorities for dispensing with holding any enquiry is that the petitioner

created a situation by intimidating other force personnel so much so that

a situation had been created wherein there was a palpable sense of fear

among the witnesses and no one was willing to come forward to depose

against the petitioner. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner,

the authorities should have first initiated a departmental proceeding

against the petitioner by framing the article of charges against him

mentioning the list of prosecution witnesses and only when the said

witnesses did not turn up during the departmental enquiry, the

disciplinary authority can say that because of the sense of fear, the

witnesses are not willing to come forward to depose against the

petitioner. The learned counsel submitted that in the present case, the

authorities without initiating any departmental proceeding straightaway

resorted to the provisions of Rule 39 (ii) of the CISF Rules, 2001 and

dismissed the petitioner from service by completely overlooking the

mandatory provisions of Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2001 and without

affording any opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself. The learned

counsel also submitted that there were several eye witnesses at the time

of occurrence of the incident including the Assistant Commandant and

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

an Inspector, who are superior Officers of the petitioner and there is

absolutely no possibility or capability of the petitioner intimidating such

higher Officers and that the disciplinary authority straightaway resorted

to the provisions of Rule 39 (ii) in a most arbitrary and malafide manner

and dismissed the petitioner from his service. The learned counsel

vehemently submitted that such action of the authorities cannot

withstand the scrutiny of law and the same deserves to be interfered with

by quashing and setting aside the impugned orders dated 25-09-2009

and 30-12-2009. In support of the arguments, the learned counsel cited

the following judgments:-

1. (1991) 1 SCC 362, “Jaswant Singh V. State of Punjab &

ors.”

“4. Article 310 of our Constitution which engrafts the pleasure

doctrine of the English common law is, however, qualified

by the opening words “except as expressly provided by

this Constitution”, Article 311 is one such express

provision. According to clause (1) thereof, a person who is

a member of a civil service cannot be dismissed or

removed from service by an authority subordinate to that

by which he was appointed. Clause (2) next provides that

no such person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced

in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been

informed of the charges against him and given a

reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those

charges. Then comes the first proviso with which were

are not concerned. The second proviso has three clauses

but we are concerned with clause (b) only. Clause (b) of

that second proviso reads as under:

“Provided further that this clause shall not apply –

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for

some reason, to be recorded by that authority in

writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such

inquiry.”

Thus the English doctrine incorporated in Article 310

which is qualified by the opening words “except as

expressly provided by this Constitution” is subject to

Article 311(1) and (2) which contains safeguards against

termination from service. However, the second proviso to

Article 31(2) is again in the nature of an exception and lays

down that in cases catalogued in clauses (a), (b) and (c)

thereof the requirement of an inquiry can be dispensed

with. The scope of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution

was examined by this Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram

Patel wherein by majority this Court held that once the

requirements of the relevant clause of the second proviso

are satisfied, the services of a civil servant can be

terminated without following the audi alteram partem rule.

It was held that since the requirement of Article 311(2) was

expressly excluded by the second proviso, there was no

question of introducing the same by the black door. On this

line of reasoning, the majority held that Chellappan case

was not correctly decided. It, therefore, took the view that

it is not necessary to offer a hearing to the civil servant

even on the limited question of punishment. Insofar as

clause (b) is concerned this Court pointed out that two

conditions must be satisfied to sustain any action taken

thereunder. These are (i) there must exist a situation which

renders holding of any inquiry “not reasonably

practicable”; and (ii) the disciplinary authority must record

in writing its reasons in support of its satisfaction. Of

course the question of practicability would depend on the

existing fact-situation and other surrounding

circumstances that is to say, that the question of

reasonable practicability must be judged in the light of the

circumstances prevailing at the date of the passing of the

order. Although clause (3) of that article makes the

decision of the disciplinary authority in this behalf final

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

such finality can certainly be tested in a court of law and

interfered with if the action is found to be arbitrary or mala

fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or merely a

ruse to dispense with the inquiry. Also see: Satyavir Singh

v. Union of India, Shivaji Atmaji Sawant v. State of

Maharashtra and Ikramuddin Ahmed Borah v.

Superintendent of Police, Darrang.”

“5. The impugned order of April 7, 1981 itself contains the

reasons for dispensing with the inquiry contemplated by

Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of the said

order, which we have extracted earlier, gives two reasons

in support of the satisfaction that it was not reasonably

practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the

appellant. These are (i) the appellant has thrown threats that

he with the help of other police employees will not allow

holding of any departmental enquiry against him and (ii) he

and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical injury

to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer. Now as

stated earlier after the two revision applications were

allowed on October 13, 1980, the appellant had rejoined

service as Head Constable on March, 5, 1981 but he was

immediately placed under suspension. Thereafter, two

show cause notices dated April 4, 1981 were issued

against him calling upon him to reply thereto within 10 days

after the receipt thereof. Before the service of these notices

the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place

on the morning of April 5, 1981 at about 11:00 a.m. In that

incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm

with a knife. He was, therefore, hospitalised and while he

was in hospital the two show cause notices were served

on him at about 10:00 p.m. on April 6, 1981. Before the

appellant could reply to the said show cause notices

respondent 3 passed the impugned order on the very next

day i.e. April 7, 1981. Now the earlier departmental

enquiries were duly conducted against the appellant and

there is no allegation that the department had found any

difficulty in examining witnesses in the said inquiries. After

the revision applications were allowed the show cause

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

notices were issued and 10 days time was given to the

appellant to put in his replies thereto. We, therefore,

enquired from the learned counsel for the respondents to

point out what impelled respondent 3 to take a decision

that it was necessary to forthwith terminate the services of

the appellant without holding an inquiry as required by

Article 311(2). The learned counsel for the respondents

could only point out clause (iv)(a) of sub-para 29(A) of the

counter which reads as under:

“The order dated April 7, 1981 was passed as

the petitioner’s activities were objectionable. He was

instigating his fellow police officials to cause

indiscipline, show insubordination and exhibit

disloyalty, spreading discontentment and hatred, etc.

and his retention in service was adjudged harmful.”

This is no more than a mere reproduction of

paragraph 3 of the impugned order. Our attention was not

drawn to any material existing on the date of the

impugned order in support of the allegation contained in

paragraph 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown threats

that he and his companions will not allow holding of any

departmental enquiry against him and that they would not

hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well

as the enquiry officer if any such attempt was made. It was

incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the court the

material in existence at the date of the passing of the

impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction

recorded by respondent 3 in the impugned order. Clause

(b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) can be invoked

only when the authority is satisfied from the material

placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to

hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the

following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram case:

“A disciplinary authority is not expected to

dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or

arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order

to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the

department’s case against the government servant is

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weak and must fail.”

The decision to dispense with the departmental

enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit

of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the

concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is

incumbent on those who support the order to show that the

satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the

outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In

the counter filed by respondent 3 it is contended that the

appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices,

instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the

superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the

witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry

was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides it is

difficult to understand how he could have given threats, etc.

when he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material

respondent 3 came to the conclusion that the appellant had

thrown threats as alleged in paragraph 3 of the impugned

order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned order it seems

the satisfaction was based on the ground that he was

instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with

other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and

dissatisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation is

based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981

reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not

forthcoming. It is no one’s contention that the said SHO was

threatened. Respondent 3’s counter also does not reveal if

he had verified the correctness of the information. To put it

tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3

of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent

material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry

envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. We are,

therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground alone the

impugned order cannot be sustained.”

2. 1991) 1 SCC 729, “Chief Security Officer & ors. Vs.

Singasan Rabi Das”

“5. In our view it is not necessary to go into the submissions made

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

by Dr. Anand Prakash because we find that in this case the

reason given for dispensing with the enquiry is totally

irrelevant and totally insufficient in law. It is common ground

that under Rules 44 to 46 of the said Rules the normal

procedure for removal of an employee is that before any order

for removal from service can be passed the employee

concerned must be given notice and an enquiry must he held

on charges supplied to the employees concerned. In the

present case the only reason given for dispensing with that

enquiry was that it was considered not feasible or desirable to

procure witnesses of the security/other Railway employees

since this will expose these witnesses and make them

ineffective in the future. It was stated further that if these

witnesses were asked to appear at a confronted enquiry they

were likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults and even

their family members might become targets of acts of violence.

In our view these reasons are totally insufficient in law. We fail

to understand how if these witnesses appeared at a confronted

enquiry, they are likely to suffer personal humiliation and

insults. These are normal witnesses and they could not be said

to be placed in any delicate or special position in which asking

them to appear at a confronted enquiry would render them

subject to any danger to which witnesses are not normally

subjected and hence these grounds constitute no justification

for dispensing with the enquiry. There is total absence of

sufficient material or good grounds for dispensing with the

enquiry. In this view it is not necessary for us to consider

whether any fresh opportunity was required to be given before

imposing an order of punishment. In the result the appeal fails

and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.”

[6] At the outset, Mr. W. Darakeshwor, learned senior panel

counsel appearing for the respondents raised the following two

preliminary objections regarding maintainability of the present writ

petition:-

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

a) All the incidents in the present case happened within the state

of Assam and the dismissal order was also issued at Duliajan,

Assam and as such, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to

entertain the present writ petition;

b) Under section 9(2-A) of the Central Industrial Security Force

Act, 1968 and Rule 54 of the CISF Rules, 2001, there is

provision for preferring a revision petition against the order of

dismissal, however, without exhausting such statutory

remedies, the petitioner approached this court directly by filing

the present writ petition. Accordingly, the present writ petition

is liable to be dismissed.

[7] In connection with the first preliminary objection, the learned

counsel for the respondents submitted that the cause of action for

preferring the present writ petition arose in the state of Assam inasmuch

as all the incidents occurred within the state of Assam and the dismissal

order was also issued at Duliajan, Assam and as such, this Court has no

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. In support of

his contentions, the learned counsel cited the judgment of the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the case of "Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India

& ors." reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329 wherein it has been held as

under:-

“16. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there

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WP(C) No. 942 of 2016 Contd…/-

cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of

action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within

the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the

light of the nature and character of the proceedings under

Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ

petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right

claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within

the territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.”

[8] In connection with the second preliminary objection, it has

been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the

petitioner preferred an appeal dated 23-10-2009 against the impugned

dismissal order and the said appeal was rejected by the appellate

authority by issuing an order dated 30-12-2009 and the said order was

communicated to the petitioner. Subsequently, in response to the

representations submitted by the wife of the petitioner, the authorities

also wrote two letters dated 03-03-2010 and 23-04-2010 informing the

wife of the petitioner that the appellate authority had duly considered

and rejected the appeal filed by her husband and also informing her that

her husband may prefer a revision petition to the concerned revisioning

authority within six months from the date of the appellate order.

However, the petitioner did not submitted any revision petition despite

the information given by the authorities under the said two letters dated

03-03-2010 and 23-04-2010.

It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the

respondents that under section 9(2-A) of the Central Industrial Security

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Force Act, 1968 and Rule 54 of the CISF Rules, 2001, there is provision

for preferring a revision petition against an order passed by the appellate

authority and that the petitioner without exhausting the statutory remedy

of preferring a revision petition against the appellate order directly

approached this court by filing the present writ petition. Accordingly, the

present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. In support of his

contentions, the learned council cited the following judgments:-

1. AIR 1964 SC 1419 “Thansingh Nathmal & ors. Vs. The

Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & ors.”

“7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order for reference

could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the

Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose

out of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to

invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed, the

appellants moved the High Court challenging the competence

of the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and

invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under

Art. 226 and sought to re-open the decision of the taxing

authorities on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High

Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide

terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions

except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided

in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is

discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to

do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it

will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed

limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an

alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or

other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not

entertain a petition for a writ under Art. 226, where the

petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being

unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy.

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Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a

determination of questions which demand an elaborate

examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which

the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a

court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to

correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction

under Art. 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by

statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved

petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another

jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a

statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining

a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the machinery

created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the

party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.

2. 2017-I-LLJ-606 (Megh) “Roshan Thakuri Vs. Union of India

& ors.”

“3. On perusal of the said para, it appears that the petitioner's

statutory appeal was rejected and observed by the respondent

that the petitioner had not exhausted the alternative

departmental statutory remedy available to the writ petitioner

under section 9(2A) of CISF Act 1968 and as per rule 54 of CISF

Rules 2011 by way of revision. In the case of Sh. Khiali Ram v.

Union of India and others passed in CWP No. 3080 of 2009 dated

27-05-2016 and ultimately came to the conclusion that;

"Accordingly, the present petition is permitted to be withdrawn

with liberty granted to the petitioner to avail alternative remedy

available to him under the provisions of the Central Industrial

Security Force Act, 1968 and is further directed that in any case

such revision etc. is filed by the petitioner within a period of

eight weeks from today, the concerned authority shall

adjudicate the same on merits without entering into the

question of limitation etc."

“4. After hearing the submission advanced by the learned counsel

for the petitioner, learned CGC for the respondents, Mr. R. Deb

Nath did not deny the proposition of law referred by the

petitioner counsel. So, after hearing both the parties and

considering the affidavit and the judgment referred above, it is

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hereby ordered that the petitioner is at liberty to avail

alternative remedy available to him under CISF Act, 1968 and

he can place the revision before the appropriate authority or

court within 4(four) weeks from the date of this order and the

authority concerned shall adjudicate his grievances on the

basis of merit of the case without going to the question of

limitation.”

[9] On the merit of the case also, it has been submitted by Mr. W.

Darakeshwor that under Rule 39 of the Central Industrial Security Force

Rules, 2001, the disciplinary authority is empowered to dismiss the

service of the petitioner without holding any departmental enquiry as

contemplated under Rule 36 to 38 if the disciplinary authority is satisfied

that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry in the manner provided

under the said rules. For ready reference, the provisions of the Rule 39

of CISF Rules, 2001 are reproduced hereunder:-

“39. Special procedure in certain cases. – Notwithstanding anything

contained in rules 36 to 38 –

(i) Where any penalty is imposed on an enrolled member of

the Force on the ground of conduct which has led to his

conviction on a criminal charge; or

(ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to

be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably

practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in

these rules; or

(iii) Where the President is satisfied that in the interest of the

security of the State, it is not expedient to hold any inquiry

in the manner provided in these rules, the disciplinary

authority may consider the circumstances of the case and

make such orders thereon as it deems fit:

Provided that the enrolled member of the Force may

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be given an opportunity of making representation against

the penalty proposed to be imposed before any order is

made in case under clause (i).”

[10] The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that

in paragraph 7 and 8 of the impugned order dated 25-09-2009, the

authorities have clearly recorded the reasons for dispensing with holding

any department enquiry against the petitioner before dismissing him

from service. It has also been submitted that the actions of the authorities

are not based wholly on extraneous or irrelevant grounds nor is it a case

of extraneous or abuse of power and that the truth or correctness or

adequacy of the materials available before the authorities, who have

exercise power conferred under the enactment, cannot be revalued or

weighed by this court while exercising power of Judicial Review. It has

been vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that even if some of

the material or reason on which the action is taken is found to be

irrelevant or not vary material, this court cannot interfere so long as there

is some relevant materials available on which the action of the authorities

can be sustained. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel

relied on the following judgments:-

1. 2012 SCC Online Del. 888, “Manojit Ghosh Vs. Union of

India & ors.”

“21. Thus clearly the only obligation that needs to be complied with

while dispensing with the enquiry is that the Disciplinary

Authority is required to record valid reasons in writing for

doing so. In the present matter as discussed above the

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Disciplinary Authority had cited various reasons on the basis

of which he deemed it fit to dispense with the enquiry.

However, as per the petitioner these reasons are neither valid

nor sufficient to justify the Disciplinary Authority’s decision of

dispensing with the enquiry.”

“22. Thus it is imperative to consider the scope of judicial review

about the reasons given by the Disciplinary authority while

dispensing with the enquiry. The Apex Court has analyzed this

aspect in a catena of cases of some of which are as follows:

“23. In Union of India. v. Tulsiram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416 the scope

of judicial review has been considered at length. In para 138, of

the said judgment it has been held that in order to decide

whether the reasons are germane to Clause (b) of Article 311(2),

the Court must put itself in the place of disciplinary authority

and consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable

man acting in a reasonable way would have done. The relevant

para is as follows:

“138. Where a government servant is dismissed, removed or

reduced in rank by applying Clause (b) or an analogous

provision of the service rules and the approaches either

the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under

Article 32, the court will interfere on grounds well

established in law for the exercise of power of judicial

review in matters where administrative discretion is

exercised. It will consider whether Clause (b) or an

analogous provision in the service rules was properly

applied or not. The finality given by Clause (3) of Article

311 to the disciplinary authority's decision that it

was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not

binding upon the court. The court will also examine the

charge of mala fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In

examining the relevancy of the reasons, the court will

consider the situation which according to the

disciplinary authority made it come to the conclusion

that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.

If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the

recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority

would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by Clause

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(b) and would take the case out of the purview of that

clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand

invalidated. In considering the relevancy of the reasons

given by the disciplinary authority the court will not,

however, sit in judgment over them like a court of first

appeal. In order to decide whether the reasons are

germane to Clause (b), the court must put itself in the

place of the disciplinary authority and consider what in

the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in

a reasonable way would have done. The matter will have

to be judged in the light of the then prevailing situation

and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the

question whether the inquiry should be dispensed with

or not in the cool and detached atmosphere of a court

room, removed in time from the situation in question.

Where two views are possible, the court will decline to

interfere.”

“24. Similarly in Union of India v. Balbir Singh 1998 (5) SCC 216, the

Supreme Court considered the scope of judicial review of the

order of the Competent Authority to terminate the services of

an employee without holding an inquiry. After placing reliance

on its earlier judgments in A.K. Kaul v. Union of India

MANU/SC/0267/1995; and S.R. Bommai v. Union of India

MANU/SC/0444/1994, it observed that the order of the Authority

can be examined to ascertain whether it stood vitiated either

by malafides or is based on wholly extraneous and/or

irrelevant grounds. However, it was also observed that the

Court cannot sit in appeal over such an order or substitute its

own decision for the satisfaction of the Authority, so long as

there is a material before the Authority which is relevant for

arriving at his satisfaction about dispensation of inquiry. The

Supreme Court enumerated the following principles about the

scope of judicial review in such a case:

(i) That the order would be open to challenge on the ground

of malafides or being based wholly on extraneous and/or

irrelevant grounds;

(ii) The burden is upon the authority who has passed the order

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to establish that circumstances which warranted the

application of the provisions Article 311(2) were existing

and the authority concerned had been subjectively

satisfied on that count;

(iii) Even if some of the material, on which the action is taken,

is found to be irrelevant, the Court would still not interfere

so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the

action;

(iv) The truth or correctness of the material cannot be

questioned by the Court, nor will it go into the adequacy of

the material and it will also not substitute its opinion for that

of the Authority;

(v) The ground of malafides takes in, inter alia, situations

where the proclamation is found to be clear case of abuse

of power or what is sometimes called as fraud on power;

and

(vi) The Court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse of power

and will make allowance for the fact that the Authority is

the best judge of situation and it was also in possession of

information and material, on which the decision was based.

However, its opinion/decision may not be conclusive.”

2. (2003) 9 SCC 75, “Sahadeo Singh & ors. Vs. Union of India

& ors.”

“6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the records. Having done so, we find it difficult to accept

the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants.

Before the disciplinary authority decided to dispense with

the inquiry exercising the power under Rule 47 of the Rules,

three internal enquiries were conducted by the officials of

the Railway Protection Force. A perusal of these enquiry

reports clearly shows that though there were witnesses who

had seen the incident of theft of rice bags from the goods

train in question to which the appellants and others were

parties, none of them was willing to either give a statement

in writing or give evidence apprehending danger to his life.

The facts narrated in these internal reports clearly go to

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show that these appellants were in league with certain

desparate miscreants, therefore, the locals who witnessed

the theft were not willing to come forward to give any

evidence, therefore, the disciplinary authority, in our

opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that it would be

impracticable for the Railways to hold an enquiry wherein

witnesses could be examined to establish the misconduct

of the appellants. From the preliminary reports, it is clear

that these appellants were involved in the theft of the rice

bags from 733 UP goods train on 25-2-1983 and in view of

the apprehension expressed by the witnesses, the Railways

was not in a position to hold a proper enquiry. In these

circumstances, in our opinion, the authorities rightly

invoked Rule 47 of the Rules.”

[11] I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel

appearing for the parties at length and also carefully examined the

materials available on record.

With regard to the first preliminary objection raised by the

learned counsel appearing for the respondents, it can be seen from

examination of the record that both the petitioner and his wife are

residents of Imphal East District, Manipur and that the wife of the

petitioner submitted a statutory appeal to the concerned appellate

authority against the order of dismissal. The said appeal was rejected by

the appellate authority by issuing an order dated 30-12-2009 and the said

order was duly communicated to the petitioner at his residential address

in Imphal East District through registered post.

In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that

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cause of action arose partly in the State of Manipur and accordingly,

this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition.

In this regard, we can gainfully refer to the judgment rendered by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union

of India & ors.” reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329 wherein the Hon’ble Apex

Court after considering a number of its earlier judgments held as under:-

“9. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid decisions

resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the

citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, clause (1-A) was

inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth)

Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as

clause (2) by the Constitution (Forth-second) Amendment Act,

1976. The amended clause (2) now reads as under:-

“226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs – (1)

Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court

shall have power, throughout the territories in relation

to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person

or authority, including in appropriate cases, any

Government, within those territories, directions, orders

or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,

mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or

any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights

conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue

directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority

or person may also be exercised by any High Court

exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within

which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for

the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the

seat of such Government or authority or the residence

of such person is not within those territories.

(3) - (4) * * *

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On a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause

(2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ when the

person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is

located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action

wholly or partially arises within the court’s territorial

jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226 (2)

of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned

the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the

Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has

not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the

Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is

necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can

succeed. The term ‘cause of action’ as appearing in clause (2)

came for consideration time and again before this Court.”

“17. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the

documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the

appellant reported sickness on account of various ailments

including difficulty in breathing. He was referred to hospital.

Consequently, he was signed off for further medical treatment.

Finally, the respondent permanently declared the appellant

unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart

muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the

Government of India issued an order on 12-4-2011 cancelling

the registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the

letter was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar

where he was staying after he was found medically unfit. It

further appears that the appellant sent a representation from his

home in the State of Bihar to the respondent claiming disability

compensation. The said representation was replied by the

respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address

in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation.

It is further evident that when the appellant was signed off

and declared medically unfit, he returned back to his home in

the District of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all claims

and filed representation from his home address at Gaya

and those letters and representations were entertained by

the respondents and replied and a decision on those

representations were communicated to him on his home

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address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant was suffering from

serious heart muscles disease (dilated cardiomyopathy) and

breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place,

wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with

regard to his disability compensation. Prima facie, therefore,

considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of

action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court

where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from

disability compensation.”

[12] With regard to the second preliminary objection raised by the

learned counsel appearing for the respondents, it is found on record that

in response to the representations submitted by the wife of the petitioner

to the DG/CISF and the Hon’ble President of India, the authorities of the

CISF wrote two letters dated 03-03-2010 and 23-04-2010 addressed to

the wife of the petitioner informing her about rejection of the statutory

appeal filed on behalf of the petitioner and also informing her that the

petitioner can prefer a revision petition to the concerned revisioning

authority within six months from the date of the appellate order. It is also

found on record that after the petitioner was acquitted from the charges

made against him in the criminal trial and as per the information given by

the authorities under the aforesaid two letters dated 03-03-2010 and 23-

04-2010, a representation dated 30-04-2014 as well as reminder dated

16-07-2014 was submitted on behalf of the petitioner to the Director

General, CISF with a request for revoking the dismissal order and to

reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential service benefits.

However, there is nothing on record to show that the respondents have

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considered and disposed of the said representation dated 30-04-2014.

[13] Under section 92(2-A) of the CISF Act, 1968, it is provided that

any member of the force aggrieved by an order passed in appeal can

prefer a revision petition against the order to such authority as may be

prescribed within a period of six months from the date on which the order

was communicated to him. Under Rule 54 of the CISF Rules, 2001, it is

provided, inter-alia, that any authority superior to the authority making

the order may either on his own motion or otherwise call for the records

of any enquiry and revised any order made under the said rules and may

confirm, modify or set aside the order etc.

[14] In the present case after the petitioner was acquitted from all

charges made against him in the criminal trial and in terms of the

instruction given by the authorities under their aforesaid letters dated 03-

03-2010 and 23-04-2010, a representation dated 30-04-2014 was

submitted to the Director General, CISF, who is the superior authority to

both the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, on behalf

of the petitioner with a request for revoking the dismissal order and for

reinstating the petitioner in his service with all consequential benefits.

[15] In my considered view, the DG, CISF has the power and

authority to entertain and consider the aforesaid representation dated

30-04-2010 submitted on behalf of the petitioner in terms of the

provisions under Rule 54 of the CISF Rules, 2001. Accordingly, this court

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is of the considered view that there is no merit in the second preliminary

objection raised by the counsel for the respondents and that the present

writ petition is maintainable.

[16] With regard to the merit of the present case, there is no dispute

that the petitioner had been dismissed from service without holding any

departmental enquiry as mandated under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules,

2001 and without affording him any opportunity of defending himself. It is

also an admitted fact that the impugned order dated 25-09-2009 had

been issued by the disciplinary authority by exercising the power

provided under Rule 39 (ii) of the CISF Rules, 2001. According to the

learned counsel for the respondents, the reasons for dispensing with the

departmental enquiry is clearly recorded under paragraph 7 and 8 of

the impugned dismissal order. The said paragraphs are reproduced

hereunder for ready reference:-

“07. AND WHEREAS, CISF No. 964651076 Constable T.K. Singh

has been allotted family quarter located at South Bank, but

at the time of said incident, he was living in the location

barrack line (Bachelor Accommodation) along with other

fellow constables. There are creditable information received

from various sources that CISF No. 964651076 Constable

T.K. Singh had created state of fear by instigating and

threatening fellow CISF personnel by eulogizing his action

of defiance against a Gazetted Officer.”

“08. AND WHEREAS, CISF No. 964651076 Constable T.K. Singh

has created a situation by intimidating other Force

personnel so much so that a situation has been created

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wherein there is a palpable sense of fear among the

witnesses and no one is willing to come forward to depose

against the said Constable in inquiry.”

[17] It is an undeniable fact that at the time of occurrence of the

incident, there were many eye witnesses including the Assistant

Commandant, the Inspector, the PSO and the Driver of the Assistant

Commandant. As at least two of the aforesaid four witnesses are high

ranking Officers of the CISF and as the petitioner, who is a mere

Constable, had been placed under suspension, this Court failed to

understand as to how in such situation the petitioner can intimidate the

said Officers from deposing against him. Moreover, it is also on record

that at the time of the criminal trial against the petitioner, as many as

seven prosecution witnesses including all the aforesaid four CISF

personnel were examined.

[18] In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that

there is total absence of sufficient materials or good grounds for

dispensing with the enquiry and that the reasons given by the authorities

for dispensing with the enquiry are totally insufficient in law. In my

considered view, the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraphs

7 & 8 of the impugned dismissal order is contrary to the materials available

on record and the said reasons are not fortified by any independent

material to justify the dispensing of the enquiry envisaged under Rule 36

of the CISF Rules and accordingly, I am of the considered view that on

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this ground alone, the impugned orders cannot be sustained.

[19] On careful perusal of the judgments cited by the learned

counsel appearing for the respondents, this Court is of the considered

view that the facts and circumstances under which the said judgments

have been passed are totally different from the facts and circumstances

of the present case and accordingly, the said judgments are of no help

to the respondents. In the case of “U.P. State Electricity Board

Vs. Pooran Chandra Pandey & ors.” reported in (2007) 11 SCC 92, the

Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-

“12. As observed by this Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu

Sekhar Misra (vide AIR pp. 651-52, para 13):

13. …. A decision is only an authority for what it actually

decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and

not every observation found therein nor what logically

follows from the various observations made in it. On this

topic this is what Earl of Halsbury, L.C. said in Quinn v.

Leathem: (All ER p. 7 G-I)

‘Before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood and

what was decided therein, there are two observations of

a general character which I wish to make, and one is to

repeat what I have very often said before- that every

judgment must be read as applicable to the particular

facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the

generality of the expressions which may be found there

are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but

governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case

in which such expressions are to be found. The other is

that a case is only an authority for what it actually

decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a

proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.

Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is

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necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must

acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”

“13. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat & others (vide SCC

p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:

“18. ….The ratio of any decision must be understood in the

background of the facts of that case. It has been said long

time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually

decides, and not what logically follows from it.”

“14. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. (vide

SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court observed:

“59. ….It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or

additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential

value of a decision.”

“15. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani a

decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual

situation. In the same Judgment this Court also observed:

(SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)

“9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without

discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the

fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.

Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid`s

theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken

out of their context. These observations must be read in

the context in which they appear to have been stated.

Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes.

To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it

may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy

discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not

to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret

judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words

are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving

Dock Co. Ltd. vs. Horton (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermot

observed: (AII ER p. 14 C-D)

‘The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by

treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they

were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of

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interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract

from the great weight to be given to the language actually

used by that most distinguished judge.

10. In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. (All ER p. 297 g-h)

Lord Reid said, Lord Atkin`s speech ... is not to be treated

as if it were a statutory definition. It will require

qualification in new circumstances. Megarry, J. in

Shepherd Homes Ltd. V. Sandham (No. 2) observed: (AII ER

p. 1274d)

‘One must not, of course, construe even a reserved

judgment of Russell, L. J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;’

And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board Lord Morris

said: (AII ER p. 761c)

‘There is always peril in treating the words of a speech

or judgment as though they were words in a legislative

enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial

utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a

particular case.’

11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact

may make a world of difference between conclusions in

two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on

a decision is not proper.

12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of

applying precedents have become locus classicus:

‘Each case depends on its own facts and a close

similarity between one case and another is not enough

because even a single significant detail may alter the

entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid

the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by

matching the colour of one case against the colour of

another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a

case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not

at all decisive.

*** *** ***

Precedent should be followed only so far as it

marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead

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wood and trim off the side branches else you will find

yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep

the path of justice clear of obstructions which could

impede it.”

[20] For the findings and reasons given hereinabove, the present

writ petition is allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned

orders dated 25-09-2009 and 30-12-2009. The respondents are

further directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with all

consequential benefits.

With the aforesaid directions, the present writ petition is

disposed of. Parties are to bear their own costs.

JUDGE

FR / NFR

Devananda