IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 14
TH
DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
WRIT APPEAL NO.1116 OF 2022 (LA-KHB)
BETWEEN:
1 . THE COMMISSIONER
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD (KHB)
KAVERI BHAVAN
BENGALURU-560 009
2 . THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD
KAVERI BHAVAN, BENGALURU-560 009
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. H.L. PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 .
1(a).
SRI. NARASIMHAIAH @ KUNTANNA
S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH
SINCE DECEASED, REP. BY LRS
SRI. N. SHIVANANJAPPA
S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH @ KUNTANNA
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
R/AT No.255/1, 1
ST
D MAIN ROAD
7
TH
CROSS, VALAGERAHALLI
KENGERI SATELLITE TOWN
BENGALURU-560 060
1(b)
. SRI. N. NAGARAJU
S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH @ KUNTANNA
2
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
R/AT No.1064, 1
ST
D MAIN ROAD
7
TH
'A' CROSS, KENGERI SATELLITE TOWN
BENGALURU-560 060
1(c)
. SRI. N. GANGADHARAPPA
S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH @ KUNTANNA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
1(d). SRI. N. GIRISH
S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH @ KUNTANNA
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
RESPONDENTS No.1(c) & 1(d) ARE
R/AT No. 265, 7
TH
CROSS
VALAGERAHALLI, KENGERI SATELLITE TOWN
BENGALURU-560 060
2 . SRI. MUNIKRISHNA
S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
R/AT. VALAGERAHALLI VILLAGE
KENGERI HOBLI, BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU-560 060.
3 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001
REP. BY UNDER SECRETARY
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. N.S. SRIRAJ GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R1(a) TO R 1(d)
AND C/R2, REP. BY GPA HOLDER;
SMT. MAMATHA SHETTY, AGA FOR R3)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS A ND
SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 08.08.2022 PASSE D
BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P.No.63796/2016 (L A-
KHB).
3
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 15.12.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)
This writ appeal is preferred by the respondents in Writ
Petition No.63796/2016 (LA-KHB) challenging the order
dated 08.08.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge.
2. We have heard Shri H.L. Pradeep Kumar, learned
Counsel appearing for the appellants, Shri N.S.Sriraj Gowda,
learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1[a to d] &
caveator/respondent No.2 and Smt. Mamatha Shetty,
learned Additional Government Advocate appearing fo r
respondent No.3.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:-
The appellant - Board initiated acquisition proceedings
for the purpose of development of residential sites and to
construct housing facilities.
The acquisition proceedings
4
commenced with an issuance of a Preliminary Notific ation
under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('1894
Act' for short) dated 23.06.1990, proposing acquisition of
land measuring 1 acre 11 guntas in Sy.No.22/2B. At the
relevant time, revenue records indicated that the n otified
extent fell entirely within Sy.No.22/2.
A Durasti Phodi carried out in the year 1989 resulted in
bifurcation of Sy.No.22/2. Consequent to this bifurcation,
the acquired extent of 1 acre 11 guntas of land came to fall
within the newly assigned Sy.No.22/2B. Upon this bei ng
brought to the notice of the authorities, the Final Notification
dated 30.05.1993 under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act was
issued specifically in respect of Sy.No.22/2B.
A Possession Certificate dated 11.11.1993 was
thereafter issued under Section 16(2) of the 1894 Act, and
the appellants were deemed to have taken possession of the
acquired portion of land in Sy.No.22/2B as of that d ate.
Owing to subsisting disputes regarding title over
Sy.No.22/2B, the compensation amount relating to tha t
survey number was deposited before the City Civil C ourt,
5
Bangalore under Section 30(1) of the 1894 Act and th e
same was communicated to the Assistant Registrar, C ity
Civil Court, Bengaluru, by letter dated 30.08.1996.
After a lapse of nearly 24 years from passing of th e
Final Notification, the respondents approached this Court by
filing a Writ Petition in W.P.No.63796/2016, the same was
allowed by Order dated 08.08.2022. The learned Sing le
Judge proceeded to quash and declare the lapse of
acquisition proceedings insofar as the respondents’ property
was concerned. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the
appellants have approached this Court.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellan ts
contended that the respondents suppressed the mater ial
facts and that the writ petition was filed with mal a fide
intention to defraud the appellants. It is further contended
that due to severe ill-health of the learned counse l on
record, the appellants were ineffectively represented in the
writ proceedings before the learned Single Judge. A s a
result, they were unable to file objections to the writ petition
and they could not effectively defend their case.
6
5. It is further contended that the 1 Acre 11 guntas
of the acquired portion in Sy.No.22/2B was notified under
the Final Notification issued under Section 6(1) of the 1894
Act and was reflected in the Record of Rights, Tenancy, and
Crops of that date. However, this was not considered by the
learned Single Judge. Further, the finding of a lapse under
Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation an d
Resettlement Act, 2013 ('2013 Act' for short), is i n
contravention to the two fold test laid down by the Apex
Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal
reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129, as Award amount of
Rs.2,91,690/- was deposited before the City Civil Court on
30.08.1996 and possession of land was taken over on
24.09.1993 and a declaration under Section 16(2) of the
1894 Act was also published on 11.11.1993. Therefor e,
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is not attracted to l and in
Sy.No.22/2B. It is also contended that possession could not
be taken due to pending litigation and subsisting j udicial
orders maintaining status quo. The period during which
7
acquisition proceedings were stalled by Court orders ought
to have been excluded by the learned Single Judge.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants
places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court i n the
case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal
and Ors, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129.
7. The learned counsel appearing for respondents
No.1 and 2 contended that pursuant to Durasti Phodi
conducted in 1989, Sy.No.22/2 stood bifurcated and
renumbered as Sy.No.22/2B, measuring 1 acre 11 gunta s.
However, the Preliminary Notification dated 23.06.1 990
reflects only 24 guntas, and the appellants’ claim that they
acquired 1 acre 11 guntas under the Preliminary Notification
is stated to be false and contrary to the record. It is further
contended that several residential and commercial u nits
were constructed on the land long ago and that the
respondents No.1 and 2 are in actual physical possession.
8. It is further contended that although both the
Preliminary and the Final Notifications were issued for
8
Sy.No.22/2B, no award was passed and no possession w as
ever taken by the appellants. Reliance is placed on
Annexure-F, wherein the appellants themselves admitted the
existence of several residential units and further failed to
dispute the pleadings or documents produced by the
respondents before the learned Single Judge.
9. It is further contended that the appelleants' claim
of possession is false and there is no mahazar evid encing
taking of possession has been produced. It is also contended
that mere reliance on paper possession or possessio n
certificates under Section 16(2) of the 1894 Act is
insufficient without proof of actual physical possession. It is
also contended that the appellants were never in possession
of the lands in question and the learned Single Judge rightly
appreciated the evidence on record.
10. We have considered the contentions advanced.
We had already considered the contentions of the pa rties
and had passed an order dated 28.01.2025 as follows:-
"We have heard the learned counsel appearing
for the appellants-Housing Board and learned Senior
9
Counsel appearing for the respondents No.1 & 2 in
this appeal.
2. Considerable argument has been placed
on record by the learned counsel for the appellants
on the basis of the brief synopsis that has been filed
by the appellants. It is submitted that the writ
petition was filed in respect of three items of
property. It is submitted that in respect of third item
of property i.e., 23 guntas in Sy.No.22/4 of
Valagerahalli Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru South
Taluk, the said property was not subject to any
notification at all and that it was subject to direct
purchase by the Karnataka Housing Board by
document dated 06.08.1988 which was produced
along with I.A.No.2/2022 of the writ appeal. It is
contended that the property had been directly
purchased by the Housing Board for valuable
consideration and that the contentions with regard to
applicability of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, (for short,
'the 2013 Act') have no application in respect of the
said property.
3. Further, it is submitted that in respect of
29 guntas of property in Sy.No.22/3 of Valagerahalli
Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, the
preliminary notification and final notification were
issued on 23.06.1990 and 30.05.1992, respectively.
However, a Civil Suit was filed owing to an inter se
title dispute between the parties and an order of
status quo was passed in RFA No.1368/2009, which
10
is still in force. It is submitted that due to the orders
passed by the Civil Court, further action would not be
taken by the Housing Board in the matter.
4. It is contended that in respect of 1 acre
and 11 guntas in Sy.No.22/2B of Valagerahalli
Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk,
preliminary notification was issued on 23.06.1990,
final notification was issued on 30.05.1992, award
was passed on 23.08.1993, possession was taken on
11.11.1993 and compensation was paid on
04.09.1995.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the respondents No.1 & 2 would submit that in
respect of 29 guntas in Sy.No.22/3 and 23 guntas in
Sy.No.22/4, the contentions of the Housing Board are
not seriously disputed and that serious contentions
are not being raised in respect of those two
properties.
6. The said submission is recorded.
7. However, with regard to 1 acre and 11
guntas of property in Sy.No.22/2B, it is contended by
the learned Senior Counsel for respondents No.1 & 2
that durasth phodi was conducted as early as on
20.06.1989 even according to the Housing Board and
that property in question was assigned a new sub-
division number as 22/2B. It is submitted that it is
thereafter that the notification was issued on
23.06.1990 but the preliminary notification showed 1
acre and 35 guntas of property in Sy.No.22/2 and not
in sub-division Sy.No.22/2B. It is further submitted
11
that the property had actually not been taken
possession of and that there were residential houses
in the property and the property had been put to use
for construction of houses even after the alleged
notification under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, issued on 11.11.1993.
8. It is submitted that in the light of the
specific provision and language of Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act, it is clear that physical possession of
the property was not taken even after the award was
passed in 1993 and therefore the acquisition had
lapsed. It is further contended that it was for the
appellants to have raised the contentions
appropriately before the learned Single Judge and in
view of the fact that the writ petition was filed in
2016 and the matter was pending till 2022, without
any objections having been placed on record, the
appellants have lost their right to raise these factual
contentions before this Court in appeal. It is further
contended that there are several residential houses in
1 acre 11 guntas of the property in Sy.No.22/2B and
that no steps whatsoever have been taken by the
Housing Board pursuant to the notifications dated
23.06.1990 and 30.05.1992, respectively even after
allegedly passing the award in 1993 for taking
physical possession, forming of any layout or for
construction of residential houses in the property.
9. Having considered the contentions
advanced, we are of the opinion that the question
with regard to lapsing of the notification in respect of
1 acre 11 guntas of property in Sy.No.22/2B requires
12
a consideration. We make it clear that in respect of
other two extents of property, the appeal requires to
be allowed and the submissions made by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for respondents No.1 & 2
shall stand recorded and the directions of the learned
Single Judge with regard to those two properties shall
stand vacated.
10. However, with regard to 1 acre 11
guntas in Sy.No.22/2B, the appellants shall place
further instructions on record showing whether the
notices have been issued pursuant to preliminary
notification dated 23.06.1990. The mahazar for
having taken possession of the property pursuant to
the notification under Section 16 of the Land
Acquisition Act dated 11.11.1993 shall also be placed
on record.
11. List this matter on 10.02.2025 for
necessary material to be placed on record. Further
the instructions as to what has occurred in respect of
the properties which have been notified and acquired
pursuant to the notification dated 23.06.1990 shall
also be placed on record.
Interim order granted earlier shall remain in
force till the next date of hearing."
11. Therefore, though the prayer in the Writ Petition
is in respect to an extent of 1 acre 11 guntas along with 1
gunta of kharab land in Sy.No.22/2B; land measuring 29
13
guntas along with 4 guntas of kharab land in Sy.No. 22/3
and also land measuring 23 guntas in Sy.No.22/4 of
Valagerahalli village, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk,
the appeal survives for consideration only in respect of 1
acre 11 guntas of property in Sy.No.22/2B.
12. Thereafter, on 12.03.2025, a memo was placed
on record producing a copy of the Preliminary Notif ication
dated 23.06.1990 along with endorsements made by th e
khatedars of having received the notice as well as the copy
of the Notification. Further, the copy of the Final Notification
dated 30.05.1992 with endorsements of the khatedars in
respect of the property in question are also produced. It is
clearly seen from the said documents that notice has been
received by the legal representatives of the khated ars in
respect of 1 acre 11 guntas of property in Sy.No.22 /2. In
the Final Notification, the properties specifically shown as 1
acre 11 guntas with 1 gunta of kharab land and the survey
number is correctly recorded as 22/2B. Here also, th e
endorsements of the legal representatives of the khatedars
are shown. Further, a mahazar dated 24.09.1993, wh ich is
14
also placed on record by the appellants would show that the
possession of the property including 1 acre 11 gunt as of
land in Sy.No.22/2B has been duly taken.
13. It is clear that the Preliminary Notification issued
in respect of the property was dated 23.06.1990 and the
Final Notification was dated 30.05.1992. Though, it is
contended by the learned counsel for the respondent s that
an award was not passed in respect of 1 acres and 1 1
guntas of property in Sy.No.22/2B, it is asserted by the
appellants that award was passed on 11.03.1994 gran ting
compensation of Rs.2,91,690/-. It is stated that ow ing to
disputes regarding title over the property in question, the
compensation was deposited before the City Civil Court and
the same was communicated to the Assistant Registra r, City
Civil Court, Bengaluru, by letter dated 30.08.1996
14. It is further contended that after possession was
taken over, the fact was reflected in the record of rights.
The Apex Court in Indore Development Authority 's case
(supra), has clearly held that once possession is taken of the
acquired property under Sections 16 and 17 of the 1894 Act,
15
the vesting is complete. It is specifically held in paragraph
258 of the said decision, which reads as follows:-
"258. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with
possession and the statute has provided under Sections
16 and 17 of the 1894 Act that once possession is taken,
absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and
vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting
specified under Section 16, takes place after vario us
steps, such as, notification under Section 4, declaration
under Section 6, notice under Section 9, award unde r
Section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision
of vesting of property absolutely free from all
encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not on ly
the possession vests in the State but all other
encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of
the landholder ceases and the State becomes the
absolute owner and in possession of the property.
Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the
property. He cannot have any animus to take the
property and to control it. Even if he has retained the
possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after
possession has been taken by the State, he is a
trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for
his benefit and on behalf of the owner."
15. It is further held that Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act, where the award has been passed and the procee dings
are pending, but where physical possession of the land has
not been taken or compensation has not been paid, t he
16
proceedings will lapse. The Apex Court clearly held that
even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lap se.
Therefore, in a case where an award is passed and
compensation is deposited, even the contention that
physical possession is not taken cannot lead to a lapse of
the proceedings. In this regard, it is apposite to extract the
findings of the Apex Court in paragraph No.102 of Indore
Development Authority 's case (supra):-
"102. In Ranchhoddas Atmaram v. Union of India,
a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that if there
are two negative conditions, the expression “or” has to
be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the
clauses must be fulfilled. It was observed: (AIR p. 938,
paras 13-15)
“13. It is clear that if the words form an
affirmative sentence, then the condition of one
of the clauses only need be fulfilled. In such a
case, “or” really means “either” “or”. In Shorter
Oxford Dictionary, one of the meanings of the
word “or” is given as ‘A particle co-ordinating
two (or more) words, phrases or clauses
between which there is an alternative’. It is
also there stated, ‘The alternative expressed by
“or” is emphasised by prefixing the first
member or adding after the last, the associated
adv. EITHER’. So, even without “either”, “or”
alone creates an alternative. If, therefore, the
sentence before us is an affirmative one, then
we get two alternatives, any one of which may
be chosen without the other being considered
at all. In such a case it must be held that a
penalty exceeding Rs 1000 can be imposed.
17
14. If, however, the sentence is a negative
one, then the position becomes different. The
word “or” between the two clauses would then
spread the negative influence over the clause
following it. This rule of grammar is not in
dispute. In such a case, the conditions of both
the clauses must be fulfilled and the result
would be that the penalty that can be imposed
can never exceed Rs 1000.
15. The question then really comes to this:
Is the sentence before us a negative or an
affirmative one? It seems to us that the
sentence is an affirmative sentence. The
substance of the sentence is that a certain
person shall be liable to a penalty. That is a
positive concept. The sentence is therefore not
negative in its import.”
Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under
the old law, under Section 24(2) if both steps have not
been taken i.e. neither physical possession is taken, nor
compensation is paid, the land acquisition proceedings
lapse. Several decisions were cited at the Bar to say
that “or” has been treated as “and” and vice versa.
Much depends upon the context. In Yashpal v. State of
Chhattisgarh, the expression “established or
incorporated” was read as “established and
incorporated”. In RMDC, to give effect to the clear
intention of the legislature, the word “or” was read as
“and”."
This position is reiterated by the Apex Court in it s
decisions including Delhi Development Authority v. Anita
Singh and others reported in (2023) 6 SCC 113 among
others.
18
16. In the instant case, the appellants had produce d
the specific material and records, which clearly demonstrate
that an award has been passed in respect of the writ petition
schedule property and the compensation amount is
deposited before the City Civil Court. There is also clear
material produced to indicate that possession had b een
taken by drawing up a mahazar. The contention that the
land acquisition proceedings were legally unsustainable also
cannot be considered in the light of the specific materials
placed on record by the appellants. In the said
circumstances, we are of the opinion that, the cont ention
that the land owner remained in possession of the property
cannot make a difference to the situation. We further find
that the writ petition had been filed after an inordinately
long delay of 26 years from the date of the Prelimi nary
Notification, without any satisfactory reason having been
shown for the delay.
17. In the above factual situation, we are of the
opinion that the appeal is liable to succeed. Accordingly:-
(i) The writ appeal is allowed.
19
(ii) The order dated 08.08.2022 passed by the
learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
No.63796/2016, is hereby set aside.
(iii) The Writ Petition No.63796/2016 is
dismissed.
Pending Interlocutory Applications shall stand disposed
of.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
cp*
Legal Notes
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