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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6932 OF 2015

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT)

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

AAM AADMI LOKMANCH & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS

WITH

C.A. NO. 5971 OF 2019

C.A. NO. 4379 OF 2018

C.A. NO. 2741 OF 2020

(ARISING OUT OF DIARY NO. 19018 OF 2018)

C.A. NO. 6862 OF 2018

C.A. NO. 2742 OF 2020

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 28178 OF 2018)

C.A. NO. 11803 OF 2018

C.A. NO. 2743 OF 2020

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1706 OF 2019)

C.A. NO. 2744 OF 2020

(ARISING OUT OF DIARY NO. 1632 OF 2019)

J U D G M E N T

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1.Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 28178/2018, 1706/2019, Diary No. 19018 of

2018 and 1632 of 2019. With consent of counsel for the parties, they were tagged

with the companion civil appeals and heard finally.

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2.On 06 June, 2013, when Ms. Vishakha Wadekar, was driving her car with

her young daughter, Sanskruti Wadekar she had no inkling that danger lurked

round the corner of the highway; over-mining at the height of 75 x 30 ft, in Gut

No. 112, resulted in the destruction of a small hill by the side of the national

highway. The resultant debris and a part of the hill collapsed and slid down to the

road, claiming the lives of Ms. Vishakha and her daughter. The directions made by

the Pune bench of the National Green Tribunal, on an application by a registered

organization, (the respondent in the appeal, the Aam Aadmi Lokmanch, hereafter

“Lokmanch”) are the subject matter of the appeals (CA 6932/2015 by NHAI; CA

5971/2019; CA 11803/2018 and CA 6862/2018) before this court. The other

appeals by special leave question the judgments and orders of the Bombay High

Court, which upheld the regulations framed pursuant to the order of the NGT. The

High Court negatived the challenge to those regulations in the writ petitions

presented before it.

3.The facts in brief are that the National Highways Authority of India

(hereafter “NHAI”) had entered into an agreement with M/s P.S. Toll Road (Pvt.)

Ltd., a unit/undertaking of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (which is arrayed as the

ninth respondent; PS Toll Road (Pvt.) Ltd. hereafter referred to as “the

concessionaire”) on 10.03.2010 for the maintenance and operation of the Pune-

Satara section of National Highway No. 4, to an extent of 140 kms. The scope of

the agreement included construction of the project (i.e. the highway stretch) as well

as its operation and maintenance for a period of 24 years. The agreement included

stipulations mandating safety to the highway users (clause 18.1.1). The NHAI was

duty bound to appoint experienced safety consultants for carrying out safety audits

of Project Highways (clause 18.1.2), the expenditure for which was to be borne by

the concessionaire (clause 18.1.3). An elaborate highway monitoring mechanism

was also contemplated by the agreement (clause 19.1) through which by the

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seventh of each month, an independent engineer was to furnish a report after due

inspection (of the operation and maintenance arrangements), containing defects or

deficiencies (clauses 19.2). Additionally, the independent engineer was to require

the concessionaire to carry out specified tests for confirming that the highway was

operated in accordance with applicable standards (clause 19.3). Other stipulations

included, inter alia, requirements that the concessionaire had to carry out remedial

measures (Clause 19.4.1) within a period of 15 days after receipt of the report of

the independent engineer. The concessionaire was put to terms in that if relevant

repairs or remedial measures were not undertaken, the NHAI could recover

damages in terms of Clause 17.8.

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Another obligation cast on the concessionaire

was to send a periodic report of various occurrences, including “unusual

occurrences on the Project Highway” such as death or injury to any person (clause

19.6), any obstruction, or “flooding of Project Highway”.

4.In the meanwhile, the fifth respondent (who has filed CA 5971/2019 against

the NGT’s order, hereafter referred to as “Rathod”) on 03.01.2011 applied to the

Government of Maharashtra for a license to extract minor minerals. This license

was sought in respect of land bearing survey number 112A to look more to an

extent of 5 acres and 93 cents. The license was granted by the appropriate authority

of the government. By clause 1 of the terms of this license, the period of the

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In terms of Clause 19.4.2, the measure of damages which NHAI could recover was calculable in terms of each

days delay in complying with the remedial measures suggested by the engineer, based on the “higher (a) 0.5% of

the Average Daily Fee and (b) 0.1% of the cost of such repair or repair estimated by the Independent Engineer” The

same clause (17.8.1) stated that:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in this agreement, should the actual traffic exceed the design

capacity during any year or part thereof and the Concessionaire fails to repair or rectify any defect or deficiency set

forth in the Maintenance Requirements within the period specified therein, it shall be deemed to be in breach of this

agreement and the Authority shall be entitled from such date to recover damages, to be calculated and paid for each

day of the delay until the breach is cured, at the higher of (a) 5% (five percent) of Average daily fee and 1% (one

percent) of the cost of such repair or rectification as estimated by the Independent Engineer, for the balance period

of the concession. The recovery of such damages shall be without prejudice to the rights of the Authority under this

agreement, including the right of termination thereof.”

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license was two months; clause 5 stated that for extraction and minor minerals

digging, work could not exceed more than 20 feet down side of the land surface.

5.Apparently soon after the license was taken over, certain demands were

made regarding construction of a connecting road to the village. The materials on

record by way of letters written to the local panchayat are to the effect that as a

result of construction of the highway and due to the passage of time the existing

road had been washed away. Consequently, the 2 km stretch from the left side of

the new tunnel going up to the village was virtually non-existent. The panchayat

requested that the road should be strengthened and widened.

6.On 31.01.2011, the local authorities of the State government issued a show

cause notice to Rathod alleging that debris were stored illegally on the site. It was

alleged that this was contrary to Section 48 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue

Code, 1966 (hereafter “land revenue code”). Again, on 16.06.2011, the local

panchayat issued a notice (which is on the record) stating that as a result of mineral

extraction, the natural flow of rainwater was being obstructed. The notice also

added that two heavy machines in non-performing condition were lying idle on the

land and two JCB machines were also stationed there. Rathore evidently received

these notices; this is attested by his replies to the Tehsildar and other local

authorities. After obtaining a report from the local officials, the Tehsildar, Bhor

issued an order directing payment of 1,271,200 by Rathod for violation of the

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land revenue code on account of illegal extraction and use of minor minerals.

7.This activity of excavation and piling of debris, did not go unnoticed on the

part of NHAI; it wrote to the Collector of Pune, pointing out that:

“…large scale and indiscriminate excavation in the upper side hills of

New Katraj Tunnel at both ends is in progress. Due to this excavation,

drainage system above and near tunnel has been affected. This may

lead to seepage of water inside tunnel roof thereby collapse of walls

and ceiling of tunnel resulting in collapse of tunnel and may lead to

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major mishap. The collapse in tunnel will block the entire traffic of

NH4 from Mumbai/Pune to Bangalore and vice versa leading to

chaotic situation.”

The letter also mentioned specifically that Rathod had been notified; it sought

action from the state government.

8.In the early hours of the morning of 6

th

June, 2013, due to the monsoon,

there was heavy rainfall at Mauje Shindewadi Tehsil, Bhor and the surrounding

areas. Water flowing through the hills at Mauje Shindewadi entered the road near

the octroi post of the Pune Municipal Corporation, at Mauje Shindewadi Tehsil

Bhor, District Pune, on NH-4, with great force. This created an obstacle in the form

of a large sheet of water. Under these conditions, when the Alto car driven by

Vishakha Wadekar and her daughter Sanskruti, was obstructed, they alighted to

wade across to safety; however, the water gushed with great intensity and swept

them away, resulting in their death. The resulting magisterial inquiry under Section

176, Code of Criminal Procedure resulted in a report dated 04.10.2013. The Sub-

Divisional Magistrate who inquired into the incident appointed an expert, whose

report was considered; he also visited the site and held several hearings. During the

hearings, pursuant to notices issued to various parties, the statements of Rathod,

the local police authorities, eyewitnesses (Abhay Arvind Ranade, Vineet Vasant

George and relatives of the deceased), the Project Director (General Manager) of

NHAI, the team leader of the independent engineering firm associated with

checking quality of maintenance of the highway, etc. were recorded.

9.Soon after the incident, the Lokmanch, through its president, filed an

application under Section 14(1) read with Sections 16 and 18 of the National Green

Tribunal Act, 2010 (hereafter “the NGT Act”), seeking mandatory injunction to

restore natural contours at the foot base of the hill that had been destroyed by

Rathod. Besides, general relief by way of directions to other respondents to take

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necessary action for the protection of hills from destruction and for maintaining

foot base design of the hills in the natural survey was sought.

10.The material produced before the NGT by the State of Maharashtra in the

form of an affidavit revealed that large scale destruction of hills by individuals and

concerns who had been given short term mining licenses, had occurred. According

to the affidavit, there were 62 cases, and in many cases “hill-cutting” was resorted

to by developers. The state had apparently imposed fines and penalties for these

illegal activities.

11.The NGT, in its impugned order, commenting on the role of Rathod, held as

follows, while justifying the imposition of liability upon that respondent:

“It appears from the record that land Survey No. 112, is owned by the

Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and their family members. There are hills in

the said land. They illegally cut hills without permission and extract

minor mineral, which reduced height of hill, circumference of the hill

and or peripheral nature, surface of the hill in question. Acts of the

Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 made the area of hill fragile, susceptible to

danger to the ecology and support of natural soil. In such a case, mere

recovery of additional royalty would not be a proper remedial measure.

At many places, the hill cutting is noticed prior to and after the

pathetic incident and now inquiry is undertaken by the concerned

revenue officials.”

12.Thereafter, the NGT based on its reasoning that the regulation of some

activities, especially involving anything affecting hills has to be strictly regulated,

directed as follows:

“12. The question may arise as to what is the meaning of expression

'Hill'. General perception is that it would depend upon ocular

assessment of the area, which is rounded land that is higher than the

land surrounded by it, but is not expected to be as high as mountain. In

other words, it is usually rounded natural elevation of land, lower than

a mountain. There is no particular definition of the word 'Hill'. The

Oxford Dictionary gives meaning of word 'Hill' as follows:

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Hill - noun a naturally raised area of land, not as high or

craggy as a mountain, a sloping stretch of road: they were

climbing a steep hill in low gear, a heap or mound of

something, a hill of sliding shingle.

The wordbook has given meaning of expression 'Hill' as follows:

231 "Hill is an elevation of the earth's surface that has a

distinct summit. It has much less surface area than a mountain

and is lower in elevation. Hills rise less than 305 metres above

the surrounding area, whereas mountains always exceed that

height. However, a hill is not simply Small Mountain. It is

formed in a considerably different way.

Hills may be classified according to the way they were

formed and the kinds of materials they are made of. There are

two types, constructional and destructional. Constructional

hills are created by a built-up of rock debris or sand deposited

by glaciers and wind. Oval-shaped landforms called drumlins

and sand dunes are samples of this type. Destructional hills are

shaped by the deep erosion of areas that were raised by

disturbances in the earth's crust. Such hills may consist of

limestone overlying layers of more easily eroded rock."

13. Draft Development Control Regulation Plan (DCR) of Pune is yet

not approved by the PMC or Government. The cutting of hill by the

Respondent Nos. 5 and 6, created destruction to render a part of land

useless, including development thereof for plantation of trees. It goes

without saying that the destruction of hill could not have occurred

without connivance or at least purposeful act or omission by the

Project Proponent i.e. NHAI (Respondent No. 9). It is in the affidavit of

Mr. Rajeskumar Kundal, that agreement requires to take necessary

steps for stoppage of illegal construction activity at Katraj hill top.

However, a Notice dated 25th April, 2011, was issued to the

Respondent No. 5 and copy of the same was marked to the Tehsildar,

Bhor before occurrence of the incident. The Collector, Pune was

requested to look into the matter. The authorities were thus, asked to

take appropriate steps for stoppage of illegal activity in order to avoid

major mishap and to ensure not to occur. They stated that one Mrs.

Vishakha Vadekar, and her daughter died due to water flow, which

gushed from the hill top and poured on the road.

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14. We do not find any significant material to show that the Respondent

No. 9 (NHAI) has taken reasonable steps to avoid the untoward

incident. We do not find copies of the complaint made by NHAI to the

authority. Assuming for a moment that such communications were

made at the fag end of April, 2011, yet, it was responsibility of NHAI to

persuade said authority or the higher authority about inaction after

2011. The incident of raining in which Mrs. Vishakha Vadekar and her

daughter had flown away, is said to have occurred on 10th July, 2013.

Obviously, the Respondent No. 9, appears to have kept silence for

about two (2) years, inspite of knowledge that the work of hill cutting

was going on. In our opinion, NHAI (Respondent No. 9) perhaps was

likely to be impliedly benefited due to the illegal act of hill cutting due

to availability of murum, stones and soil for the work for its project.

The contractor of NHAI was, therefore, interested in keeping the

fingers crossed.

15. Considering probability and circumstances appearing on record,

we have no hesitation in holding that there took place degradation of

environment to large extent due to hill cutting at Katraj. We have

further no hesitation in holding that the hill cutting occurred due to

illegal acts of the Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and with or due to act of

omission of the Respondent No. 9. They are liable to pay compensation

to the legal representatives of the victims of incident in question. They

are also liable to pay restitution charges and penalty for causing

damage to the environment, in order to avoid such incident in future.

16. We deem it proper to give certain further directions to the

concerned authority. In keeping with these findings, we direct:

17. a) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall pay amount of Rs. 50

Lakhs as joint penalty imposed on them for causing environmental

damage in the nearby area of Katraj, due to the hill-cutting.

b) This amount shall be deposited with Collector (Pune) within six (6)

weeks, else Collector can recover the amount as arrears of Land

Revenue. This amount shall be deposited by Collector in special

escrow account, and the amount be spent for environmental protection

and conservation activities, including hill protection and conservation

in the district.

c) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall jointly and severally pay

amount of Rs. 15 Lakhs towards compensation to the legal

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representatives of deceased Mrs. Vishakha Vadekar, and her daughter if

identity of legal representatives is proved before the Collector. The

above three (3) Respondents shall immediately within four (4) weeks,

deposit such amount in the office of Collector, Pune for payment to the

legal representatives of deceased in the incident. The Collector may

issue a publication for locating legal representatives of above deceased

women for payment of compensation and pay to them compensation

after satisfaction of identity of the legal representatives by making due

proportion as provided under the relevant provisions of the Succession

Act.

d) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall also deposit amount of Rs. 10

Lakhs with the office of Collector for plantation of trees in order to

restore damage caused to environment, though it may not be a

sufficient remedy.

e) The Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 shall give instructions to the

concerned revenue officials working within all districts to have regular

vigil within their areas to verify whether fringes or nearby any hill or

hill-top construction is/are noticed and if found to be so, due inquiry

may be made as to whether it is authorized or unauthorized. So also,

instructions may be issued to the Municipal authorities to ensure that

no construction permission shall be given to any

construction/development work, which is being proposed and is

located at a distance may be of 100 ft. away from lowest slope i.e.

incline of any hill within its territorial limits, as well as hill-tops,

except for Bamboo cottages.

f) In case of emergency or public purpose, the Hill cutting may be done

by the concerned office of the Collector/Commissioner by passing a

reasoned order or if so required by Law as provided under the

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the Regulations thereunder.”

Rathod, the NHAI and three other appellants (Patel India Pvt Ltd, Fern

Constructions (India) Ltd and D.B. Realty Ltd.) have preferred appeals against the

impugned order of the NGT; their grievance is from the general directions issued in

the impugned order, implicating buildings near hills.

13.In the second set of matters, i.e. the appeals by special leave, the facts are

that acting on the directions of the NGT, the State of Maharashtra invoked its

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powers under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,

1966 (for short "MRTP Act") and directed, by a notification/circular dated

14.11.2017 that development (relating to construction) was impermissible in an

area abutting hills up to 100 feet.

14.By the impugned common judgment, the High Court held that there was no

denial that the power to issue such directions or circulars existed by way of the

amended Section 154 and that such power was essential. The court further held that

no individual or entity could claim any absolute right and contend that he could

develop or construct anywhere and that the directions contained in the notification

supplemented bye-laws and building codes already in place in Mumbai and Pune.

It was also observed that:

“In Regulation 2 we have the definitions and as far as Part II is

concerned, that is general planning and building requirements.

Regulation 11.1 says that no piece of land shall be used as site for

construction of building if the site is hilly and having gradient more

than 1:5. Thus, these stipulations are already in place. What the

National Green Tribunal brought to the notice of the authorities is in-

discriminable cutting of hills in the Katraj Ghat. This unauthorized

construction by breaking of hills resulted in an accident. That is why

the NGT directed that on hill tops and hill slopes and the portion at the

foot of the hill and surrounding 100 feet, no construction activity

should be permitted and no development permission be issued and

such directions be issued to the Municipal Corporations and

Municipal Councils. Bearing in mind that there are in place legal

provisions restricting the development activity on hill top and hill

slope zones, all that the NGT and this Government Resolution directs

is that in cases where there has already been a permitted development

activity within 100 feet of the hill, then, no permission for additional

construction be granted nor any development be permitted by

sanctioning additional Floor Space Index (FSI) or Transferable

Development Rights (TDR). In the event in sanctioned development

plans if area of the above nature is in buildable zone, then, for

carrying out development in such zone and while granting individual

development permissions, an area of 100 feet surrounding the hills

should be demarcated as non-buildable. It can be used as open space,

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road etc. We are surprised that an order and direction of the NGT

traceable to and in accordance with the planning law it challenged

before us. Further, the directions of the State Government, which are

but reiteration of the existing regulations, are under challenge. The

impugned Government Resolution is in consonance with the provisions

of the MRTP Act and the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article

21 and 48 thereof.

24. We are not in agreement with Dr. Sathe, Mr. Godbole and Dr. Saraf

that merely because such directions are issued in exercise of the

powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 154, the development

Plan for the limits of the Municipal Corporations, namely Pune and

Mumbai is altered or modified. We are also not impressed by their

argument that by such a Government Resolution, a modification is

brought about in the Development Control Regulations and all this is

without recourse to the specific powers conferred by the MRTP Act. In

other words, these are bypassed and by a Government Resolution, the

above stand amended. In that regard our attention has been invited to

the provisions in the MRTP Act enabling modifications or changes in

the Development Plan and the procedure prescribed in that behalf.

25. We do not see any modification to the plan being brought about by

the subject Government Resolution. If at all, the directions therein

complement the provisions of the Development Control Regulations for

the cities of the Mumbai and Pune or the concerned Municipal

Corporation/Municipal Council areas. As it is, there was no permission

to construct buildings other than a electric sub-stations, water works

etc. on hill tops. As far as these slopes are concerned, by their very

nature, a hill slides down and if the slope is steep, then, no

construction activity can be carried out. There is no guarantee or

assurance that any construction activity in such areas would be able to

withstand a landslide or accidents, resulting from erosion of the hills

on account of natural reasons. It is experienced that human

intervention is necessarily not responsible for a landslide, mudslide

etc. On account of natural causes and calamities, such events can

occur. Apart from that, the occurrence increases because of human

intervention including a construction activity carried out at the foot of

the hill or on top thereof. It is also possible if the hill is cut from its

sides indiscriminately. It is also possible if there is damage to a hill

while extracting minor minerals. The hill then becomes uneven. Then,

it is not possible to prevent any calamity. Hence, in order to take care

of the natural calamities and which have occurred in various places in

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the State of Maharashtra recently and also on account of unrestricted

and unregulated breaking and cutting of the hills resulting in accidents

endangering human life and safety that these supplemental directions

have been issued. If they are for efficient administration of the Act and

if they subserve larger public interest, then no fault can be found with

the Government Resolution. Each of the operative directions, namely,

serial Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of this Government Resolution subserve this

object and purpose. If the Government Resolution has been issued after

the attention of the Government has been invited to an accident in

Katraj Ghat occurring due to unauthorized and illegal cutting of hills,

then, it is not as if the State Government has construed it as a

command or a binding order and issued the subject Government

Resolution. The attention of the State Government being invited to such

illegal and unauthorized so also uncontrolled, unregulated and

unrestricted hill-cutting, that in order to prevent the same, the

Government stepped in. It took recourse to its power conferred by

section 154 of the MRTP Act in order to prevent future occurrences of

this nature. If accidents and calamities can be prevented by timely

intervention of the State Government in this manner, then, we do not

think that on the specious and unsubstantiated pleas of the petitioners,

we should strike down the Government Resolution.”

15.The NHAI in its appeal contends that the NGT fell into error in issuing

sweeping directions against it without considering that was no evidence to

establish that it was in any way responsible for the degradation of the environment,

which led to the tragedy. It is urged by Senior Counsel Mr P.S. Narasimha that the

NGT’s findings are contrary to established facts and have also resulted in grave

miscarriage of justice. He highlighted that there was no material on record to

establish that the NHAI was in any way culpable or had failed to perform a public

duty or neglected to avert a foreseeable calamity. Elaborating on this, it was urged

that the illegal mining activity was not carried on within the right-of-way or the

carriageway of the highway. What occurred was the result of an act of God, i.e.

extremely heavy rains, which resulted in flooding on the highway caused entirely

on account of the debris collected which acted to obstruct the smooth flow of

water.

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16.It was highlighted that in any case, the NHAI could not be held responsible

or made liable for the occurrence which led to the tragedy. Mr Narasimha also

argued that the NGT did not return any finding that the construction of the highway

was in any way contrary to environmental clearances or permissions secured by the

NHAI. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal in so far as they pertained to the

neglect or alleged omission of the NHAI, were contrary to law. He urged that the

findings were illogical and irrational, and deserve to be set aside.

17.The NHAI also highlights that it wrote letters to the local administration on

24.04.2011 and 15.07.2011, seeking its intervention on account of the illegal

mining and activities and hill destruction, for which Rathod was responsible.

However, the State government did not take any action. Likewise, Rathod did not

take any remedial steps or cease the activity. The resultant tragedy entirely on

account of the omissions of the state's authorities to take action and the neglect and

culpable negligence on the part of Rathod, was the cause of the tragedy and the

events which led to the loss of two lives. It was also emphasized that the direction

to pay compensation was contrary to legal principles and undermined the law. It

was argued that neither the NHAI nor its concessionaire had any control over the

activities of the state, which granted the mining licences. Rathod, the licensee, had

continued illegal mining in the vicinity causing the accumulation of debris. This in

turn, resulted in the obstruction of a culvert which resulted in collection of a large

volume of water. A huge sheet of water gushed out into the highway, sweeping

away the car, tragically resulting in the death of two individuals. It was argued that

in these circumstances, the NHAI could not be saddled with the responsibility of

either paying damages to the dependents and legal representatives of the deceased

nor could it be made liable to restore the environment through the payment of 50

₹

lakhs or any part of it.

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18.Rathod urges that the NGT’s findings against him are contrary to law. He

argues that the NGT did not implead those who had standing, i.e. the legal

representatives of the deceased; in fact, they had filed a civil suit, claiming

compensation against him, as well as the NHAI and the state, for alleged

negligence and tortious liability. In those proceedings, the court is bound to record

evidence and render findings based on the facts. The NGT could not thus have

unilaterally, based on a one-sided view of the materials, held that he was liable.

19.It was submitted that the allegation that Rathod was primarily responsible

for degradation of the hill, which clogged the culverts and water channels,

resulting in the tragedy, was contrary to the facts. Mr. Vijay Verma, counsel for

Rathod, relied on some portions of the magisterial report to say that the NHAI had

the report of an independent engineer, who had pointed to certain deficiencies on

the part of the concessionaire. Therefore, to hold him responsible for the tragedy,

and direct him to pay a huge sum of 15 lakh and further pay amounts towards

₹

environmental damage, was unwarranted.

20.It was argued that the NGT could not have issued directions with respect to

payment of any sums, in the absence of any application by the legal representatives

of the deceased. It is further argued in Rathod’s appeal that apart from issuing

notice for recovery of amounts towards alleged illegal mining, neither the state

authorities nor the NHAI took any positive remedial action for strengthening the

culvert and the catch water drains which were in disrepair, and constructed on the

hill above the tunnel for drainage of rainwater. The masonry on the culvert for

draining water was choked due to lack of maintenance. Such maintenance was the

sole responsibility of the concessionaire and for that, the NHAI had to be held

liable. It is also highlighted that Section 18 of the NGT Act mandates that the

procedure established by the statute to exercise jurisdiction had to be followed.

Since the legal heirs of the deceased had not applied to the NGT for any relief and

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had instead approached the civil court claiming compensation on account of wilful

neglect and culpable inaction on the part of NHAI, the NGT ought to have left the

matter for proper decision in accordance with the evidence led. Instead the NGT

took upon itself the task of a judging the appellant as one of those responsible for

the incident. It is emphasised that the mining activity carried on was in accordance

with the license and if there was any irregularity that was cured on payment of

fine. So far as the collection of debris which ultimately led to the overflow of water

and the deaths of two individuals goes, it is argued that the proper functioning of

the drainage system would have ensured that such collection of vast quantities of

water would not have occurred. Therefore, the inaction of the NHAI in taking

timely action and intervening with the state authorities, led to the tragic incident.

The responsibility for this incident could not have been placed at the doorstep of

Rathod. The actions of Rathod, it is stated were too remote and could not have

been the subject of damages at all.

21.In the appeals (by special leave as well as the statutory appeals by third

parties), where the grievance is on account of the directions issued by the State of

Maharashtra under Section 154 of the MRTP Act, the third party appellants

challenge the order of the NGT arguing that the provisions of the NGT Act,

especially sections 14, and 19 do not authorise that tribunal to issue sweeping and

unilateral directions requiring stoppage and cessation of all manner of building

activity or developments within hundred feet of hill slopes. It is highlighted that

such sweeping directions are illogical and are not based on any scientific study or

analysis. It is argued that the NGT has issued general directions couched in a vague

manner in para 17 (e) of its order.

22.These appellants argue that the Bombay High Court also fell into error and

did not appreciate that the entire basis of the Directions/Resolution of 14.11.2017

by the State of Maharashtra were the directions issued by the NGT. Highlighting

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various provisions of the MRTP Act, learned counsel argued that wherever

development codes were formulated, they were in accordance with established

principles, after following the prescribed procedure. Based upon these codes and

the building regulations framed by various town planning departments, clearances

and permissions/approval for development and construction were issued. It was

argued that the mandatory and sweeping nature of the directions in para 17 (e) by

the NGT has resulted in these directions being embodied in the impugned

resolution, which has a catastrophic effect on those clearances.

23.Learned senior counsel, Mr. Shyam Divan, highlights that apart from the fact

that the definition of ‘hill’ is vague, and even the regulations under the MRTP Act

are silent in this regard, the NGT failed to consider that the impact of its directions

and the impugned notification, in hilly terrains where the population is

concentrated in particular areas, in small towns, semi urban and rural areas would

be devastating inasmuch as all nature of buildings would be banned. It is pointed

out that hill development is based upon consideration of individual local soil

conditions, the stability of the surrounding terrain, etc. All these are taken into

account by individual local town planning authorities when they permit or refuse

permission to individual development or construction projects. The uniform

adoption of the “no construction within the hundred feet area” rule, it is submitted,

is completely contrary to well-established principles of town planning.

24.It is argued that the directions issued by the state government impugned in

the writ petitions before the Bombay High Court, are contrary to the provisions of

the MRTP Act inasmuch as they amount to supplanting provisions of the existing

master plan and other development codes, which have the force of law and were

framed after widespread consultations. It is pointed out that the provisions of the

MRTP Act require that any change in such codes or master plans would have to be

made after mandatory due consideration of objections, which are to be preceded by

17

publication of the proposals. By directing the state government to follow the order

in paragraph 17(e), the NGT in fact made directions contrary to law. It is argued

that the state also acted contrary to the express provisions of the MRTP Act

inasmuch as it did not follow the procedure required by the Act to change the

master plan and the development codes.

25.It is further submitted that the NGT’s directions were the basis of the state

government's notification. It was argued that the state government’s blind

adherence to these directions amounted to abdication of its duties, was in

contravention of express provisions of the MRTP Act and also amounted to acting

on the dictates of another authority. It was submitted that for these reasons, the

impugned notification cannot be sustained. Counsel relied on the decision of this

court in Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd. & Ors.

2

to highlight that the NGT has a narrow and circumscribed jurisdiction in regard to

issuing directions as well as ordering compensation.

26.The Lokmanch justified the order of the NGT and blamed the NHAI, the

concessionaire, Rathod and the state government for not taking adequate and

timely measures in public interest. It is alleged that proper channels were not

created and maintained alongside the highway to avoid water clogging on the main

carriageway. It is argued that existing water channels were extremely narrow and

were incapable of handling significant volumes, and that even those channels were

clogged due to construction debris which had fallen on the sides. It is pointed out

that under Section 4 of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereafter “Highways

Act”) “highways” include lands appurtenant thereto, all bridges, culverts, tunnels,

causeways and other structures constructed on or over the highway and all fences,

trees, posts, etc. The duty of keeping them in good repair, clearly was that of the

NHAI and the concessionaire.

2

2019 SCC OnLine SC 221.

18

27.So far as the Rathod’s role is concerned, learned counsel, Ms. Shilpa

Chohan, submitted that the NGT acted well within its rights and acted within its

jurisdiction in entertaining and proceeding with the application, under Sections 14

read with 16 and 18 of the NGT Act. The Lokmanch sought mandatory injunction

to restore the natural contour at the foot base of the hills, particularly the hill that

was destroyed by the private respondents. It was submitted that apart from the

enquiry report of the magistrate /sub-divisional officer, a report was also

commissioned by the NGT through the local tehsildar; that report dated

15.09.2014 disclosed that unauthorised hill destruction under the pretext of minor

mineral extraction was widespread during 2011-2013. This report showed that as

many as 62 cases of hill destruction (mostly indulged in by developers), came to

light. Many of these occurred without obtaining any permit or authorisation and

were plainly illegal.

28.It is argued further that the private respondents were permitted to extract

minor minerals only for a short period. However, they exceeded not only the

permit, but also went further and destroyed the hill for the purpose of mining

minerals. This over-mining as well as hill destruction was not within the

permission or the terms of the license. It is highlighted that “hill cutting” or hill

destruction causes shortening of hills, poses a potential danger of soil erosion and

reduces vegetation, forestry, flora and fauna, and deprives natural support to the

earth, therefore ultimately posing an environmental hazard to nearby areas,

including residential areas. It is argued that the destruction of hills results in the

distortion of the flow of streams and rivers, which change their courses resulting in

heavy loss to human life and also to flora and fauna, besides at times, destruction

of property. It is submitted that the NGT's decision requiring payment of

compensation was within its jurisdiction; to support this, learned counsel relied

upon the provisions of Schedule II to the NGT Act, particularly referring to the

19

heads of compensation relief for damages that can be claimed and granted, i.e.

death, permanent, temporary, or total, or partial disability or other injury, damages

to private property, expenses incurred by the government for any administrative or

legal action, or to cope with any harm or damage, including compensation for

environmental degradation and restoration of the quality of the environment. It was

submitted that the statutory basis for calculating these damages under Schedule II

to the NGT Act is provided by Section 15, which empowers the NGT to provide

relief and compensation to victims of pollution in terms of Schedule I for

restitution of property, restitution of environment, and also importantly Section 17,

which empowers the NGT to direct the payment of compensation on account of

death of or injury to any person or damage to property, under all any of the heads

specified in Schedule II, which is the result of any accident or is an adverse impact

of any activity or operational process. It is submitted that there is nothing in the

enactment which confines the jurisdiction of the NGT to adjudicate complaints,

especially those relating to fatalities caused by environmental damage, to

applications initiated by legal representatives or persons directly affected. It is

submitted that if a particular accident or incident is so widespread as to affect an

entire area, it would be well within the jurisdiction of the NGT to entertain an

application made by anyone. Learned counsel highlighted the difference in

phraseology between Sections 15 and 17 on the one hand, and Section 18 on the

other. It is submitted that Section 18(2) clearly is without prejudice to the

provisions contained in Section 16 and primary jurisdiction can be invoked by the

Tribunal upon being moved by anyone in this regard.

29.Ms. Chohan cited the decision of this court in Mantri Technoze Pvt. Ltd. v

Forward Foundation

3

to say that the NGT could legitimately issue directions

which are binding on all other statutory authorities. She also relied on Section 33

3

2019 (18) SCC 494

20

of the NGT Act, emphasizing that the enactment overrides all other enactments.

Reliance was also placed on the decision in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of

India.

4

30.The State of Maharashtra supported the arguments made on behalf of the

Lokmanch. It was pointed out that the jurisdiction to issue general directions to

preserve and protect the environment, through restitution orders is found in Section

15(1)(c) of the NGT Act. It is also submitted that the power and jurisdiction to

order compensation in the case of death, is independent and can be invoked in case

of fatal accidents, as is evident from the provisions of Schedule II. The state further

argues that the judgment of the Bombay High Court too is unexceptionable,

inasmuch as it correctly appreciated and upheld the exercise of regulatory power

under Section 154 of the MRTP Act. Counsel urged that the said provision was

amended in 2015 and in the absence of any challenge to it, the exercise of power

after due consideration of relevant factors, could not be countenanced.

The Issues

31.Four issues arise for consideration. Firstly, the jurisdiction of the NGT to

award compensation; secondly the merits and soundness of the NGT’s decision to

award compensation and the legal principles applicable; thirdly, the NGT’s wide

directions with respect to the ban on construction in and around foothills and lastly,

the vires of the directions/notifications issued under Section 154, MRTP Act.

I.Jurisdiction of the NGT

32.The relevant provisions of the NGT Act are extracted below:

“2. Definitions. — (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

4

2019 (15) SCC 401

21

(m) “substantial question relating to environment” shall include an

instance where—

(i) there is a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental

obligation by a person by which—

(A) the community at large other than an individual or group of

individuals is affected or likely to be affected by the environmental

consequences; or

(B) the gravity of damage to the environment or property is

substantial; or

(C) the damage to public health is broadly measurable;

(ii) the environmental consequences relate to a specific activity or a

point source of pollution;

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

14. Tribunal to settle disputes.—(1) The Tribunal shall have the

jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to

environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to

environment), is involved and such question arises out of the

implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I.

(2) The Tribunal shall hear the disputes arising from the questions

referred to in sub-section (1) and settle such disputes and pass order

thereon.

(3) No application for adjudication of dispute under this section shall be

entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of six

months from the date on which the cause of action for such dispute first

arose:

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was

prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said

period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty

days.”

15. Relief, compensation and restitution.—(1) The Tribunal may, by an

order, provide,—

(a) relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other

environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in the

22

Schedule I (including accident occurring while handling any

hazardous substance);

(b) for restitution of property damaged;

(c) for restitution of the environment for such area or areas,

as the Tribunal may think fit.

(2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property and

environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1)

shall be in addition to the relief paid or payable under the Public

Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991).

(3) No application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution

of property or environment under this section shall be entertained by the

Tribunal unless it is made within a period of five years from the date on

which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose:

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was

prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said

period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty

days.

(4) The Tribunal may, having regard to the damage to public health,

property and environment, divide the compensation or relief payable

under separate heads specified in Schedule II so as to provide

compensation or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the

damaged property or environment, as it may think fit.

(5) Every claimant of the compensation or relief under this Act shall

intimate to the Tribunal about the application filed to, or, as the case may

be, compensation or relief received from, any other court or authority.”

“16. Tribunal to have appellate jurisdiction.—Any person aggrieved by,

(a) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencement of the

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellate authority under

Section 28 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,

1974 (6 of 1974);

(b) an order passed, on or after the commencement of the National

Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the State Government under Section 29

of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of

1974);

23

(c) directions issued, on or after the commencement of the National

Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by a Board, under Section 33-A of the

Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974);

(d) an order or decision made, on or after the commencement of the

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellate authority under

Section 13 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess

Act, 1977 (36 of 1977);

(e) an order or decision made, on or after the commencement of the

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the State Government or

other authority under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act,

1980 (69 of 1980);

(f) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencement of the

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the Appellate Authority

under Section 31 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution)

Act, 1981 (14 of 1981);

(g) any direction issued, on or after the commencement of the National

Green Tribunal Act, 2010, under Section 5 of the Environment

(Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986);

(h) an order made, on or after the commencement of the National

Green Tribunal Act, 2010, granting environmental clearance in the

area in which any industries, operations or processes or class of

industries, operations and processes shall not be carried out or

shall be carried out subject to certain safeguards under the

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986);

(i) an order made, on or after the commencement of the National Green

Tribunal Act, 2010, refusing to grant environmental clearance for

carrying out any activity or operation or process under the

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986);

(j) any determination of benefit sharing or order made, on or after the

commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the

National Biodiversity Authority or a State Biodiversity Board under

the provisions of the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (18 of 2003),

may, within a period of thirty days from the date on which the order or

decision or direction or determination is communicated to him, prefer an

appeal to the Tribunal:

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant

was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said

24

period, allow it to be filed under this section within a further period not

exceeding sixty days.

17.Liability to pay relief or compensation in certain cases.

(1) Where death of, or injury to, any person (other than a workman) or

damage to any property or environment has resulted from an accident or

the adverse impact of an activity or operation or process, under any

enactment specified in Schedule I, the person responsible shall be liable

to pay such relief or compensation for such death, injury or damage,

under all or any of the heads specified in Schedule II, as may be

determined by the Tribunal.

(2) If the death, injury or damage caused by an accident or the adverse

impact of an activity or operation or process under any enactment

specified in Schedule I cannot be attributed to any single activity or

operation or process but is the combined or resultant effect of several

such activities, operations and processes, the Tribunal may, apportion

the liability for relief or compensation amongst those responsible for

such activities, operations and processes on an equitable basis.

(3) The Tribunal shall, in case of an accident, apply the principle of no

fault

18.Application or appeal to Tribunal.

(1) Each application under sections 14 and 15 or an appeal under

section 16 shall, be made to the Tribunal in such form, contain such

particulars, and, be accompanied by such documents and such fees as

may be prescribed.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in section 16, an

application for grant of relief or compensation or settlement of dispute

may be made to the Tribunal by--

(a) the person, who has sustained the injury; or

(b) the owner of the property to which the damage has been caused; or

(c) where death has resulted from the environmental damage, by all or

any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

(d) any agent duly authorised by such person or owner of such

property or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as

the case may be; or

(e) any person aggrieved, including any representative body or

organisation; or

25

(f) the Central Government or a State Government or a Union

territory Administration or the Central Pollution Control Board or a

State Pollution Control Board or a Pollution Control Committee or a

local authority, or any environmental authority constituted or

established under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986)

or any other law for the time being in force:

Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have

not joined in any such application for compensation or relief or

settlement of dispute, the application shall be made on behalf of, or, for

the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal

representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as

respondents to the application:

Provided further that the person, the owner, the legal representative,

agent, representative body or organisation shall not be entitled to make

an application for grant of relief or compensation or settlement of

dispute if such person, the owner, the legal representative, agent,

representative body or organisation have preferred an appeal under

section 16.

(3) The application, or as the case may be, the appeal filed before the

Tribunal under this Act shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as

possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the application,

or, as the case may be, the appeal, finally within six months from the

date of filing of the application, or as the case may be, the appeal, after

providing the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

29. Bar of jurisdiction.—(1) With effect from the date of establishment of

the Tribunal under this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to

entertain any appeal in respect of any matter, which the Tribunal is

empowered to determine under its appellate jurisdiction.

(2) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle dispute or entertain

any question relating to any claim for granting any relief or

compensation or restitution of property damaged or environment

damaged which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, and no

injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the

Tribunal in respect of the settlement of such dispute or any such claim

for granting any relief or compensation or restitution of property

damaged or environment damaged shall be granted by the civil court.”

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

26

“33. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act, shall

have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other

law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by

virtue of any law other than this Act.”

33.A plain reading of the above provisions of the NGT Act would reveal that

the tribunal possesses two kinds of power and jurisdiction: one, primary

jurisdiction under Sections 14-15, and appellate jurisdiction under Section 16.

Under Section 14, the NGT has the power to adjudicate upon disputes relating to

“civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including

enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is involved” relating to the

implementation of “the enactments specified in Schedule I” [Section 14 (1)]. The

other provisions [Sections 14(2) and (3)] are incidental to the primary jurisdiction

under Section 14(1). Section 15, on the other hand, is couched in wide terms.

Section 15(1) provides that compensation or damages can be given by the NGT to

“victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the

enactments specified in the Schedule I” [Section 15 (1)(a)]; for restitution of

property damaged [Section 15(1)(b)] and for restitution of the environment for

such area or areas [Section 15(1)(c)]. Section 15(2) is procedural; Section 15(3)

prescribes the period of limitation for applications. Section 15(4) enables the NGT

to, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment,

“divide the compensation or relief payable under separate heads

specified in Schedule II so as to provide compensation or relief to the

claimants and for restitution of the damaged property or environment, as

it may think fit.”

34. The enactments specified under Schedule I are the Water (Prevention and

Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)

Cess Act, 1977; the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; the Air (Prevention and

Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; the

Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; and the Biological Diversity Act, 2002.

27

35. Schedule II reads as follows:

“SCHEDULE II [See sections 15(4) and 17(1)] HEADS UNDER WHICH

COMPENSATION OR RELIEF FOR DAMAGE MAY BE CLAIMED

(a) Death;

(b) Permanent, temporary, total or partial disability or other injury or

sickness;

(c) Loss of wages due to total or partial disability or permanent or

temporary disability;

(d) Medical expenses incurred for treatment of injuries or sickness;

(e) Damages to private property;

(f) Expenses incurred by the Government or any local authority in

providing relief, aid and rehabilitation to the affected persons;

(g) Expenses incurred by the Government for any administrative or legal

action or to cope with any harm or damage, including compensation for

environmental degradation and restoration of the quality of

environment;

(h) Loss to the Government or local authority arising out of, or

connected with, the activity causing any damage;

(i) Claims on account of any harm, damage or destruction to the fauna

including milch and draught animals and aquatic fauna;

(j) Claims on account of any harm, damage or destruction to flora

including aquatic flora, crops, vegetables, trees and orchards;

(k) Claims including cost of restoration on account of any harm or

damage to environment including pollution of soil, air, water, land and

eco-systems;

(l) Loss and destruction of any property other than private property;

(m) Loss of business or employment or both;

(n) Any other claim arising out of, or connected with, any activity of

handling of hazardous substance.”

36.A conjoint reading of Sections 14, 15 and the Schedules would lead one to

infer that the NGT has circumscribed jurisdiction to deal with, adjudicate, and

wherever needed, direct measures such as payment of compensation, or make

28

restitutionary directions in cases where the violation (i.e. harm caused due to

pollution or exposure to hazards, etc.) are the result of infraction of any enactment

listed in the first schedule. Yet, that, interpretation, in the opinion of this court, is

not warranted.

37.The reference to Schedule II, in Section 15(4) is not merely by way of events

which are actionable in relation to harm caused due to the acts resulting in

violation of any enactment under Schedule I. The wide language of that provision

enables the tribunal (NGT) to direct, inter alia, payment of compensation, “having

regard to the damage to public health, property and environment”. This

interpretation is borne out by a reading of Section 17(2) regarding the

apportionment of liability for payment of compensation.

38.In the decision of this court reported as Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi

5

,

this court held that ponds constituted public utility and were meant for common

use. The court held that ponds could not be allotted or commercialised, and that

filling up of ponds was illegal. Recently, in Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of

Environment & Ors

6

, the Court quoted and applied the observations in Hinch Lal

(supra), in the context of an appeal directed against an order of the NGT which had

summarily dismissed an application under Sections 14 and 15 of the NGT Act

seeking directions to cease the filling up of ponds in the Greater Noida Industrial

Development Area.

39.Long ago, in State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone & Ors

7

, this court made

following observations:

“6. Rivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resources constitute a

Nation's natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away

and exhausted by any one generation. Every generation owes a duty

5

2001 (6) SCC 496

6

2019 SCC OnLine SC 1510

7

1981 (2) SCC 205

29

to all succeeding generations to develop and conserve the natural

resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of

mankind. It is in the interest of the nation. It is recognised by

Parliament. Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the public

interest that the Union should take under its control the Regulation of

mines and the development of minerals. It has enacted the Mines and

Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 ...”

40. Likewise, in Lafarge Umiam Mining (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.

8

these pertinent observations were made:

“75. Universal human dependence on the use of environmental

resources for the most basic needs renders it impossible to refrain from

altering the environment. As a result, environmental conflicts are

ineradicable and environmental protection is always a matter of degree,

inescapably requiring choices as to the appropriate level of

environmental protection and the risks which are to be regulated. This

aspect is recognised by the concepts of "sustainable development". It is

equally well settled by the decision of this Court in Narmada Bachao

Andolan Vs. Union of India that environment has different facets and

care of the environment is an ongoing process. These concepts Rule out

the formulation of an across-the-board principle as it would depend on

the facts of each case whether diversion in a given case should be

permitted or not, barring "no go" areas (whose identification would

again depend on undertaking of due diligence exercise). In such cases,

the margin of appreciation doctrine would apply.”

41. Recently, in State of Meghalaya and Ors. vs. All Dimasa Students Union,

Dima-Hasao District Committee & Ors.

9

this court had affirmed a part of the

decision of the NGT issuing directions in respect of large-scale mining in the state

of Meghalaya, on the ground that it had an adverse impact on the environment.

This was despite the fact that mining and the subject of mines is not specified in

the list of enactments under the first schedule. The court also approved the NGT’s

directions, appointing experts, to assess the impact of such mining on the

environment.

8

2011(7) SCC 338

9

2019 (8) SCC 177

30

42.The legal position and jurisdiction of NGT was considered by this court in

Mantri Techzone (supra) where it was held that the NGT has “special jurisdiction”

for “enforcement of environmental rights.” It was held that:

“41. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is provided under Sections 14, 15

and 16 of the Act. Section 14 provides the jurisdiction over all civil

cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including

enforcement of any legal right relating to environment) is involved.

However, such question should arise out of implementation of the

enactments specified in Schedule I.

42. The Tribunal has also jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) of the

Act to provide relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and

other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in

Schedule I. Further, under Section 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c) the Tribunal

can provide for restitution of property damaged and for restitution of

the environment for such area or areas as the Tribunal may think fit. It

is noteworthy that Section 15(1)(b) & (c) have not been made

relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act. Rightly so, this grants a

glimpse into the wide range of powers that the Tribunal has been

cloaked with respect to restoration of the environment.

43. Section 15(1)(c) of the Act is an entire island of power and

jurisdiction read with Section 20 of the Act. The principles of

sustainable development, precautionary principle and polluter pays,

propounded by this Court by way of multiple judicial pronouncements,

have now been embedded as a bedrock of environmental

jurisprudence under the NGT Act. Therefore, wherever the

environment and ecology are being compromised and jeopardized, the

Tribunal can apply Section 20 for taking restorative measures in the

interest of the environment.

44. The NGT Act being a beneficial legislation, the power bestowed

upon the Tribunal would not be read narrowly. An interpretation

which furthers the interests of environment must be given a broader

reading. (See Kishsore Lal v. Chairman, Employees' State Insurance

Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579, para 17). The existence of the Tribunal

without its broad restorative powers under Section 15(1)(c) read with

Section 20 of the Act, would render it ineffective and toothless, and

shall betray the legislative intent in setting up a specialized Tribunal

specifically to address environmental concerns. The Tribunal,

specially constituted with Judicial Members as well as with Experts in

31

the field of environment, has a legal obligation to provide for

preventive and restorative measures in the interest of the environment.

45. Section 15 of the Act provides power & jurisdiction, independent

of Section 14 thereof. Further, Section 14(3) juxtaposed with Section

15(3) of the Act, are separate provisions for filing distinct applications

before the Tribunal with distinct periods of limitation, thereby amply

demonstrating that jurisdiction of the Tribunal flows from these

Sections (i.e. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act) independently. The

limitation provided in Section 14 is a period of 6 months from the date

on which the cause of action first arose and whereas in Section 15 it is

5 years. Therefore, the legislative intent is clear to keep Section 14

and 15 as self-contained jurisdictions.

46. Further, Section 18 of the Act recognizes the right to file

applications each under Sections 14 as well as 15. Therefore, it

cannot be argued that Section 14 provides jurisdiction to the Tribunal

while Section 15 merely supplements the same with powers. As stated

supra the typical nature of the Tribunal, its breadth of powers as

provided under the statutory provisions of the Act as well as the

Scheduled enactments, cumulatively, leaves no manner of doubt that

the only tenable interpretation to these provisions would be to read

the provisions broadly in favour of cloaking the Tribunal with effective

authority. An interpretation that is in favour of conferring jurisdiction

should be preferred rather than one taking away jurisdiction.

47. Section 33 of the Act provides an overriding effect to the

provisions of the Act over anything inconsistent contained in any

other law or in any instrument having effect by virtue of law other

than this Act. This gives the Tribunal overriding powers over anything

inconsistent contained in the KIAD Act, Planning Act, Karnataka

Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (“KMC Act”); and the Revised

Master Plan of Bengaluru, 2015 (“RMP”). A Central legislation

enacted under Entry 13 of List I Schedule VII of the Constitution of

India will have the overriding effect over State legislations. The

corollary is that the Tribunal while providing for restoration of

environment in an area, can specify buffer zones around specific lakes

& water bodies in contradiction with zoning regulations under these

statutes or the RMP.”

43.It is noteworthy that this court clearly held that under Section 15(1)(b) and

15(1)(c), the NGT has the power to make directions and provide for “restitution of

32

property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas as

the Tribunal may think fit. It is noteworthy that Section 15(1)(b) & (c) have not

been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act.” Though a direction for

compensation under Section 15(1)(a) is relatable to violation of enactments

specified under the first schedule, the power under Section 17 appears to be cast in

wider terms.

44.As noticed earlier, Section 17 (1) refers to first schedule enactments; it talks

of death of, or injury to, any person “or damage to any property or environment”

which “has resulted from an accident or the adverse impact of an activity or

operation or process, under any enactment” in Schedule I. One of the enactments

is the Environment Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter “EPA”).

45.The definition of “environment” under the EPA is wide and is an inclusive

one: "environment" includes water, air and land and the inter- relationship which

exists among and between water, air and land, and human beings, other living

creatures, plants, micro-organism and property”.

10

Similarly, “environmental

pollutant” and “environmental pollution” are defined as follows:

"environmental pollutant" means any solid, liquid or gaseous

substance present in such concentration as may be, or tend to be,

injurious to environment;

11

"environmental pollution" means the presence in the environment of

any environmental pollutant;

12

Section 3 (1) of the EPA confers upon the Central Government, wide power in relation

to protection of the environment:

“3. POWER OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO TAKE MEASURES

TO PROTECT AND IMPROVE ENVIRONMENT.- (1) Subject to the

provisions of this Act, the Central Government, shall have the power

10

Section 2 (a) EPA

11

Section 2 (b) EPA

12

Section 2 (c) EPA

33

to take all such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the

purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the environment

and preventing controlling and abating environmental pollution.”

46.Long back, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India

13

this court recognized the

potential harm to the environment caused by mining operations:

“Legal parameters

45.The natural sources of air, water and soil cannot be utilised if the

utilisation results in irreversible damage to environment. There has

been accelerated degradation of environment primarily on account of

lack of effective enforcement of environmental laws and non-

compliance of the statutory norms. This Court has repeatedly said that

the right to live is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the

Constitution and it includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free

water and air for full enjoyment of life. (See Subhash Kumar v. State

of Bihar [(1991) 1 SCC 598.)

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

47.The mining operation is hazardous in nature. It impairs ecology

and people's right to natural resources. The entire process of setting up

and functioning of mining operation requires utmost good faith and

honesty on the part of the intending entrepreneur. For carrying on any

mining activity close to township which has tendency to degrade

environment and is likely to affect air, water and soil and impair the

quality of life of inhabitants of the area, there would be greater

responsibility on the part of the entrepreneur. The fullest disclosures

including the potential for increased burdens on the environment

consequent upon possible increase in the quantum and degree of

pollution, has to be made at the outset so that the public and all those

concerned including authorities may decide whether the permission can

at all be granted for carrying on mining activity. The regulatory

authorities have to act with utmost care in ensuring compliance of

safeguards, norms and standards to be observed by such entrepreneurs.

When questioned, the regulatory authorities have to show that the said

authorities acted in the manner enjoined upon them. Where the

regulatory authorities, either connive or act negligently by not taking

prompt action to prevent, avoid or control the damage to environment,

13

(2004) 12 SCC 118

34

natural resources and people's life, health and property, the principles of

accountability for restoration and compensation have to be applied.”

47.Acting under the provisions of the EPA, the Central Government had issued

a notification on 14.09.2006, mandating Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

in exercise of its power under Section 3(2) of the EPA read with Rule 5 of the rules

framed thereunder. In terms of this notification, environment impact assessment

and clearance was necessary for different processes and industries. Mining too,

was included as part of the notification; the only exception was that minor mineral

leases for an area below five hectares were exempted. Clearly, therefore, the

Central Government included within the purview of the EPA, major and minor

mineral extraction.

48.Several irregularities were noticed over a period of time, with regard to

minor mineral extraction, including sand, and there was need for introducing

stringent regulations for those activities. A report of the then Ministry of

Environment and Forests (MoEF, now MoEF&CC) submitted in 2010 was critical

of the prevailing norms. As a result, this court and the NGT issued orders and

directives making ECs compulsory for projects less than five hectares. The Central

Government too initiated measures.

49.The following observations of this court were made in Deepak Kumar v.

State of Haryana

14

:

“18.Comments and inputs from various States and experts were also

invited so as to prepare a report for consideration of MoEF. Based on

the discussion held and subsequent inputs received, a draft report was

prepared and circulated to all members for their further inputs. The

report was further discussed on 29-1-2010 for its finalisation. The

observations/comments made during the meeting were incorporated

in the report and it was again circulated to all members for their

consideration. The report so circulated was ultimately finalised. The

14

(2012) 4 SCC 629

35

decision taken by MoEF affects generally the mining of minor

minerals including the riverbed mining throughout the country.

19.For an easy reference, we may extract the issues and

recommendations made by MoEF, which are as follows:

“4.0. Issues and recommendations

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

It may thus be observed that minerals have been classified into major

and minor minerals based on their end use rather than level of

production, level of mechanisation, export and import, etc. There do

exist some minor mineral mines of silica sand and limestone where the

scale of mechanisation and level of production is much higher than

those of industrial mineral mines. Further, in terms of the economic

cost and revenue, it has been estimated that the total value of minor

minerals constitutes about 10% of the total value of mineral

production whereas the value of non-metallic minerals comprises only

3%. It is, therefore, evident that the operation of mines of minor

minerals need to be subject to some regulatory parameters as that of

mines of major minerals.

Further, unlike India there does not exist any such system based

on end usage in other countries for classifying minerals into major

and minor categories. Thus, there is a need to relook at the definition

of ‘minor minerals’ per se.

It is, therefore, recommended that the Ministry of Mines along

with Indian Bureau of Mines, in consultation with the State

Governments may re-examine the classification of minerals into major

and minor categories so that the regulatory aspects and environment

mitigation measures are appropriately integrated for ensuring

sustainable and scientific mining with least impacts on environment.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

4.5.Requirement of mine plan for minor minerals

36

At present, most of the State Governments have not made it

mandatory for preparation of mining plan in respect of minor

minerals. In some States like Rajasthan, eco-friendly mining plans are

prepared, which are approved by the State Mining Department. The

eco-friendly mining plans so prepared, though conceptually welcome,

are observed to be deficient and need to be made comprehensive in a

manner as is being done for major minerals. Besides, the aspects of

reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas, progressive mine

closure plan, as in vogue for major minerals could be introduced for

minor minerals as well.

It is recommended that provision for preparation and approval of

mine plan, as in the case of major minerals may appropriately be

provided in the rules governing the mining of minor minerals by the

respective State Governments. These should specifically include the

provision for reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out area,

progressive mine closure plan and post mine land use.

4.6. Creation of separate corpus for reclamation/rehabilitation of

mines of minor minerals

Mining of minor minerals, in our country, is by and large an

unorganised sector and is practised in haphazard and unscientific

manner. At times, the size of the leasehold is also too small to address

the issue of reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas. It may,

therefore, be desirable that before the concept of mine closure plan for

minor minerals is adopted, the existing abandoned mines may be

reclaimed and rehabilitated with the involvement of the State

Government. There is thus, a need to create a separate corpus, which

may be utilised for reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas.

The respective State Governments may work out a suitable mechanism

for creation of such corpus on the ‘polluter pays’ principle. An

organisational structure may also need to be created for undertaking

and monitoring these activities.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

4.8. Uniform minor mineral concession rules

The economic value of the minor minerals excavated in the country is

estimated to contribute to about 9% of the total value of the minerals

37

whereas the non-metallic minerals contribute to about 2.8%. Keeping

in view the large extent of mining of minor minerals and its significant

potential to adversely affect the environment, it is recommended that

model mineral concession rules may be framed for minor minerals as

well and the minor minerals may be subjected to a simpler regulatory

regime, which is, however, similar to major minerals regime.

4.9. Riverbed mining

4.9.1. Environment damage being caused by unregulated riverbed

mining of sand, bazari and boulders is attracting considerable

attention including in the courts. The following recommendations are

therefore made for the riverbed mining:

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

5.0. Conclusion

Mining of minor minerals, though individually, because of smaller

size of mine leases is perceived to have lesser impact as compared to

mining of major minerals. However, the activity as a whole is seen to

have significant adverse impacts on environment. It is, therefore,

necessary that the mining of minor minerals is subjected to simpler

but strict regulatory regime and carried out only under an approved

framework of mining plan, which should provide for reclamation and

rehabilitation of the mined out areas. Further, while granting mining

leases by the respective State Governments location of any eco-fragile

zone(s) within the impact zone of the proposed mining area, the linked

rules/notifications governing such zones and the judicial

pronouncements, if any, need be duly noted. The Union Ministry of

Mines along with the Indian Bureau of Mines and respective State

Governments should therefore make necessary provisions in this

regard under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)

Act, 1957, Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and adopt model

guidelines to be followed by all States.”

(emphasis supplied)

20.The Report clearly indicates that operation of mines of minor

minerals needs to be subjected to strict regulatory parameters as that

of mines of major minerals. It was also felt necessary to have a relook

to the definition of “minor minerals” per se. The necessity of the

preparation of “comprehensive mines plan” for contiguous stretches

38

of mineral deposits by the respective State Governments may also be

encouraged and the same be suitably incorporated in the Mineral

Concession Rules, 1960 by the Ministry of Mines.

21.Further, it was also recommended that the States, Union

Territories would see that mining of minor minerals is subjected to

simpler but strict regulatory regime and carried out only under an

approved framework of mining plan, which should provide for

reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas. Mining plan

should take note of the level of production, level of mechanisation,

type of machinery used in the mining of minor minerals, quantity of

diesel consumption, the number of trees uprooted, export and import

of mining minerals, environmental impact, restoration of flora and

host of other matters referred to in the 2010 Rules. A proper

framework has also to be evolved on cluster of mining of minor

minerals for which there must be a Regional Environmental

Management Plan. Another important decision taken was that while

granting of mining leases by the respective State Governments,

location of any eco-fragile zone(s) within the impact zone of the

proposed mining area, the linked rules/notifications governing such

zones and the judicial pronouncements, if any, need to be duly noted.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

28.The Central Government also should take steps to bring into

force the Minor Minerals Conservation and Development Rules, 2010

at the earliest. The State Governments and UTs also should take

immediate steps to frame necessary rules under Section 15 of the

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 taking

into consideration the recommendations of MoEF in its Report of

March 2010 and model guidelines framed by the Ministry of Mines,

Government of India. Communicate the copy of this order to MoEF,

Secretary, Ministry of Mines, New Delhi; Ministry of Water

Resources, Central Government Water Authority; the Chief

Secretaries of the respective States and Union Territories, who would

circulate this order to the Departments concerned.

29.We, in the meanwhile, order that leases of minor minerals

including their renewal for an area of less than five hectares be

granted by the States/Union Territories only after getting

environmental clearance from MoEF. Ordered accordingly.”

39

50.By virtue of a notification,

15

environmental clearance is necessary even for

minor mineral extraction where the area of operation is less than 5 hectares; the

procedure has been outlined under Appendix XI of that notification. Clearly,

therefore, mining of even minor minerals, when resorted to on a large scale (i.e.

where more than a few leases or permits are granted), has a potential impact on the

environment. In the facts of this case, the state had granted no less than 62 minor

mineral permits in the vicinity; unauthorized activity (in the form inter alia, of

over-mining and piling of debris) had resulted in the imposition of the penalty.

Clearly, there was violation of the EPA in the present case, because Rathod’s

mining lease covered an area in excess of 5 hectares; it fell within the regulatory

notification of 2006. There is nothing on record to show that the relevant clearance

was obtained by Rathod. Plainly, therefore, the facts of the present case disclosed

violation of the EPA- an enactment listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act. This meant

that the NGT’s jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) and Section 17 could not have

been disputed.

51.This court is of the considered opinion that the expression “environment”

and “environmental pollution” have to be given a broader meaning, having regard

to Parliamentary intent to ensure the objective of the EPA. It effectuates the

principles underlying Article 48A of the Constitution of India. The EPA is in

essence, an umbrella legislation enacting a broad framework for the central

government to coordinate the activities of various central and state authorities

established under other laws, such as the Water Act and Air Act. The EPA also

effectively enunciates the critical legislative policy for environment protection. It

changes the narrative and emphasis from a narrow concept of pollution control to a

wider facet of environment protection. The expansive definition of environment

15

No. 3181 dated 14 August, 2018, published by the Government of India, in the Official Gazette

40

that includes water, air and land “and the interrelation which exist among and

between water, air and land, other human creatures, plants, micro-organisms and

property” give an indication of the wide powers conferred on the Central

Government. A wide net is cast over the environment related laws. The EPA also

empowers the central government to comprehensively control environmental

pollution by industrial and related activities. For these reasons, and in view of the

above discussion, it is held that the NGT correctly assumed jurisdiction, having

regard to the nature of the accident in the facts of this case.

II.Was the direction to pay compensation towards death, and damages towards

restitution justified?

52.In the present case, the deceased were concededly travelling on the highway.

The incident of flooding occurred, and was caused due to clogging of the water

channels. The report of the sub divisional magistrate indicated that the Inspecting

Engineer (Arvi Associates, a firm) had given a report after inspection. On behalf of

the independent engineering firm appointed by the NHAI, an oral deposition was

given before the sub-divisional officer. It was stated that the roadside channel and

culvert from where water is disposed of, had been rendered screen blinded and a

pipeline of 1.2 m diameter existed there for disposal of water. The necessity of

remedial action was communicated to the concessionaire, before the occurrence of

the accident. It was also stated that in terms of the instructions of the NHAI, the

concessionaire was informed about the deficiency on 15.05.2013 and by a further

letter dated 04.06.2013. An action plan for completing pre-monsoon work was

sought from the concessionaire. However, the concessionaire did not submit an

action plan despite lapse of one month.

53.The SDO’s report noted that the culvert had been constructed from the new

tunnel and was existing from 2004. Apparently a 1m diameter pipe was positioned

in the culvert and had made a causeway. One hotel also had constructed an

41

approach road and placed a 950 MM pipe. The existing drainage capacity of the

octroi post and the hotel was insufficient due to heavy rains as a result of which

rainwater was not totally drained. This water started accumulating on the road.

Certain ramps were also constructed by Tata Motors for its convenience; they were

removed by the concessionaire; nevertheless, the ramps were prepared again. The

existing cross drainage provision was of a sub-culvert -type structure and the size

at the time of the old highway was 1m x 1 m. The report further observed that the

natural drainage and sides of hills of the highway was adversely affected and had

been tampered with. The disposal of water on the right side overhead of the tunnel

through the cross train on the old highway via the catch drain and subsequently the

channels for the water flow were choked due to development work and adversely

affected the clearance of rain water. The report indicates that after the accident on

06.06.2013, the local administration cleared the debris which had created

obstacles, to facilitate the free flow of water into the catch drain culvert and further

flow of water.

54.The legal position regarding highways is outlined in two enactments, i.e. the

National Highways Act, 1956 (“the Highways Act”) and the NHAI Act. The

provisions of the Highways Act, to the extent they are relevant are as follows:

“4. National highways to vest in the Union. — All national highways

shall vest in the Union, and for the purposes of this Act “highways”

include—

(i) all lands appurtenant thereto, whether demarcated or not;

(ii) all bridges, culverts, tunnels, causeways, carriageways and other

structures constructed on or across such highways; and

(iii) all fences, trees, posts and boundary, furlong and milestones of

such highways or any land appurtenant to such highways.

5. Responsibility for development and maintenance of national

highways.—It shall be the responsibility of the Central Government to

develop and maintain in proper repair all national highways; but the

42

Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,

direct that any function in relation to the development or maintenance

of any national highway shall, subject to such conditions, if any, as

may be specified in the notification, also be exercisable by the

Government of the State within which the national highway is situated

or by any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government

or to the State Government.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

8A. Power of Central Government to enter into agreements for

development and maintenance of national highways — (1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central

Government may enter into an agreement with any person in relation

to the development and maintenance of the whole or any part of a

national highway.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, the person

referred to in sub-section (1) is entitled to collect and retain fees at

such rate, for services or benefits rendered by him as the Central

Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify

having regard to the expenditure involved in building, maintenance,

management and operation of the whole or part of such national

highway, interest on the capital invested, reasonable return, the

volume of traffic and the period of such agreement.

(3) A person referred to in sub-section (1) shall have powers to

regulate and control the traffic in accordance with the provisions

contained in Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of

1988) on the national highway forming subject-matter of such

agreement, for proper management thereof.”

55.Section 16 of the NHAI Act spells out the functions of the NHAI; it reads as

follows:

“16. Functions of the Authority.— (1) Subject to the rules made by

the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the

Authority to develop, maintain and manage the national highways and

any other highways vested in, or entrusted to, it by the Government.

rules made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the

function of the Authority to develop, maintain and manage the

national highways and any other highways vested in, or entrusted to,

it by the Government.”

43

56.Acting in furtherance of its powers, the NHAI entered into an agreement

with the concessionaire for the construction, operation and maintenance of the

highway in question (i.e. the stretch of 140 kms on which the accident occurred).

The question is whether the NHAI, which indisputably owns and controls the

highway, and on whose behalf it was constructed, and for which the maintenance

and operation agreement was entered into, led to a duty of care, to the users (of the

highway).

57.This issue had arisen in Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal

Nakum

16

in the context of certain facts. The deceased used to travel on a railway

season ticket to Rajkot to attend to his office work. One day whilst he was on the

footpath on the way to his office, a roadside tree suddenly fell on him, resulting in

serious injuries on the head and other parts of the body, and later died in the

hospital. The High Court allowed the writ petition. This court noted the distinction

between a common law duty of care owed to members of the public, and whether

liability could be imposed upon a local authority for breach of its statutory duty.

The court noticed previous English decisions

17

and stated that

“18. The question emerges as to when would the breach of statutory

duty under a particular enactment give rise to tortious liability? The

statutory duty gives rise to civil action. The statutory negligence is sui

generis and independent of any other form of tortious liability. It

would, therefore, be of necessity to find out from the construction of

each statutory duty whether the particular duty is general duty in

public law or private law duty towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff must

show that (a) the injury suffered is within the ambit of statute; (b)

statutory duty imposes a liability for civil action; (c) the statutory duty

was not fulfilled; and (d) the breach of duty has caused him injury.

These essentials are required to be considered in each case. The

action for breach of statutory duty may belong to the category of

either strict or absolute liability which is required, therefore, to be

16

(1997) 9 SCC 552

17

Gorris v. Scott [(1874) 9 Exch 125] and Kilgollan v. William Cooke & Co. Ltd. (1956) 2 All ER 294, CA]

44

considered in the nature of statutory duty the defendant owes to the

plaintiff; whether or not the duty is absolute; and the public policy

underlying the duty. In most cases, the statute may not give rise to

cause of action unless it is breached and it has caused damage to the

plaintiff, though occasionally the statute may make breach of duty

actionable per se. The burden, therefore, is on the plaintiff to prove on

balance of probabilities that the defendant owes that duty of care to

the plaintiff or class of persons to whom he belongs, that defendant

was negligent in the performance or omission of that duty and breach

of duty caused or materially contributed to his injury and that duty of

care is owed on the defendant. If the statute requires certain

protection on the principle of volenti non fit injuria, the liability

stands excluded. The breach of duty created by a statute, if it results in

damage to an individual prima facie, is tort for which the action for

damages will lie in the suit. One would often take the Act, as a whole,

to find out the object of the law and to find out whether one has a

right and remedy provided for breach of duty. It would, therefore, be

of necessity in every case to find the intention of legislature in

creating duty and the resultant consequences suffered from the action

or omission thereof, which are required to be considered. No action

for damages lies if on proper construction of statute, the intention is

that some other remedy is available. One of the tests in determining

the intention of the statute is to ascertain whether the duty is owed

primarily to the general public or community and only incidentally to

an individual or primarily to the individual or class of individuals and

only incidentally to the general public or the community. If the statute

aims at duty to protect a particular citizen or particular class of

citizens to which the plaintiff belongs, it prima facie creates at the

same time corelative right vested in those citizens of which plaintiff is

one; he has remedy for enforcement, namely, the action for damages

for any loss occasioned due to negligence or for failure of it. But this

test is not always conclusive.

19. Duty may be of such paramount importance that it is owed to all

the public. It would be wrong to think that on an action, the duty could

be enforced by way of damages when duty is owed to a section of

public and cannot be enforced if an individual sustains damages to

whom the Corporation owes no duty and no private interest is

infringed. Breach of statutory duty, therefore, requires to be examined

in the context in which the duty is created not towards the individual,

but has its effect on the right of individual vis-à-vis the society.

45

Statutory duty generally is towards public at large and not towards an

individual or individuals and the corelative right is vested in the

public and not in private person, even though they may suffer

damages. The duty in such a case is to be enforced by way of criminal

prosecution or by way of injunction at the suit under Section 192 of

CPC or with leave of court under Order I, Rule 8 CPC by public-

spirited person or in any appropriate manner to enforce the right and

not by way of private action for damages. In that situation, the

legislature, while recognising the private right vested in an injured

individual, may intend that it shall be maintained solely by some

special remedy provided for a particular case and not by ordinary

method of an action for damages as penalty or compensation.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

24. Generally, a public authority entrusted with no statutory

obligation to exercise a power, does not come under common law duty

of care to do so but by conduct the public authority may place itself in

such a situation that it attracts the duty of care which calls for

exercise of the power. Common illustration is provided by an action in

which an authority in the exercise of its functions, if it had created a

danger, thereby subjecting itself to a duty of care for the safety of

others which must be discharged by an exercise of its statutory power

or by giving necessary warnings. It is the conduct of the authority in

creating the danger that attracts the duty of care as envisaged in

Sheppard v. Borough of Glossop [(1921) 3 KB 132 : 1921 All ER Rep

61, CA] . The statute does not by itself give rise to a civil action but it

forms the formulation on which the common law can build a cause of

action….

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

39. It can be seen that ordinarily the principle of the law of negligence

applies to public authorities also. They are liable to damages because

by a negligent act or failure to act when they are under a duty to act

or for a failure to consider whether to exercise a power conferred on

them with the intention that it would be exercised if and when public

interest requires it. Where the public authority has decided to exercise

a power and has done it negligently a person who has acted in

reliance on what the public authority has done, may have no difficulty

in proving that the damages which he has suffered have been caused

by the negligence. Where the damage has resulted from a negligent

46

failure to act there may be greater difficulty in proving causation and

requires examination in greater detail. …”

58.In the UK, the duty of a highway authority was described by Diplock L.J. in

Griffiths v. Liverpool Corporation

18

as follows:

“The duty at common law to maintain, which includes a duty to repair

a highway, was not based in negligence but in nuisance. It was an

absolute duty to maintain, not merely a duty to take reasonable care to

maintain, and the statutory duty which replaced it was also absolute.”

Again, Diplock, LJ stated in Burnside v. Emerson

19

described the duty as follows:

“in such good repair as renders it reasonably passable for the

ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year

without danger caused by its physical condition.”

59. Later, in Haydon v. Kent County Council

20

Lord Denning M.R. explained

that while the duty to maintain the highway meant an absolute duty to ensure that it

was in a condition to be used as a highway and to ensure safety, it did not include

the duty to ensure at all times that the road surface was kept clean. It was clarified

however, that the issue had to be considered in each case, and it was to be

considered whether the authority had taken reasonable steps to keep it in good

repair after being notified about obstruction:

“If section 41 is to be construed as capable of imposing a duty to take

remedial measures to deal with ice and snow on a highway, or

footway, which is in good physical repair, so that whether in

particular circumstances that duty has arisen is to be decided ‘as a

question of fact and degree,’ it would seem that the facts relevant to

determining whether the duty has arisen would be essentially similar

to those relevant to deciding whether a breach of the duty has been

proved and whether the statutory defence under section 58 has been

made out. Parliament did not define those facts for the purpose of

section 41. The concept of the passing of sufficient time to make it

prima facie unreasonable for the highway authority to have failed to

take remedial measures must presuppose some idea of the amount and

18

[1967] 1 Q.B. 374

19

[1968] 1 W.L.R. 1490

20

[1978] Q.B. 343

47

nature of the resources for dealing with snow and ice which are or

ought to be available to the authority, and of the order of priority

among different carriageways and footways which guides or which

ought to guide the authority; and of the necessary degree of urgency

in using those resources. No such guidance is given in the statute with

reference to proof of the arising of the duty.”

60.In Stovin v Wise

21

, the defendant emerged from a side road and ran down the

plaintiff, because she was not keeping a proper look-out. When she was sued for

damages, the defendant joined the County Council as a third party because the

visibility at the intersection was poor and they said that the Council, which had the

duty to maintain the road should have done something to improve it. The council

had statutory powers which would have enabled the necessary work to be done and

there was evidence that the relevant officers had decided in principle that it should

be done, but they had not taken steps to do it. The House of Lords held that there

was no duty of care in private law based on the statutory duty, and that “Drivers of

vehicles must take the highway network as they find it”. It was held that statutory

power could not be converted into a common law duty. The council had done

nothing which, apart from statute, would have attracted a common law duty of

care. It had done nothing at all. The only basis on which it was a candidate for

liability was that Parliament had entrusted it with general responsibility for the

highways and given it the power to improve them and take other measures for the

safety of their users. Lord Hoffmann observed,

“In summary, therefore, I think that the minimum preconditions for

basing a duty of care upon the existence of a statutory power, if it can

be done at all, are, first, that it would in the circumstances have been

irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect a

public law duty to act, and secondly, that there are exceptional

grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires

compensation to be paid to persons who suffer loss because the power

was not exercised.”

21

1996 (3) All ER 801

48

61.Stovin (supra) and its enunciation that the existence of a public duty did not

per se extend to a private duty of care to take special measures, unless exceptional

features were proved, was followed in Gorringe v. Calderdale Metropolitan

Borough Council

22

. The entire law was re-examined and the correct position,

restated in a recent judgment by the UK Supreme Court in Robinson v. Chief

Constable of West Yorkshire Police

23

, which observed as follows:

“32 At common law, public authorities are generally subject to the

same liabilities in tort as private individuals and bodies: see, for

example, Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils KB 275 and Mersey

Docks and Harbour Board v Gibbs (1866) LR 1 HL 93. Dicey

famously stated that “every official, from the Prime Minister down to

a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for

every act done without legal justification as any other citizen”: The

Law of the Constitution, 3rd ed (1889), p 181. An important exception

at common law was the Crown, but that exception was addressed by

the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, section 2.

33.Accordingly, if conduct would be tortious if committed by a

private person or body, it is generally equally tortious if committed by

a public authority: see, for example, Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home

Office [1970] AC 1004, as explained in Gorringe’s case 2004 (1)

WLR 1057, para 39. That general principle is subject to the possibility

that the common law or statute may provide otherwise, for example by

authorising the conduct in question: Geddis v Proprietors of Bann

Reservoir (1878) 3 App Cas 430. It follows that public authorities are

generally under a duty of care to avoid causing actionable harm in

situations where a duty of care would arise under ordinary principles

of the law of negligence, unless the law provides otherwise.

34.On the other hand, public authorities, like private individuals

and bodies, are generally under no duty of care to prevent the

occurrence of harm: as Lord Toulson JSC stated in Michael’s case

[2015] AC 1732, para 97, “the common law does not generally

impose liability for pure omissions”. This “omissions principle” has

22

2004 (1) WLR 1057

23

2019 (2) All ER 1041

49

been helpfully summarised by Tofaris and Steel, “Negligence Liability

for Omissions and the Police” [2016] CLJ 128:

“In the tort of negligence, a person A is not under a duty to take care

to prevent harm occurring to person B through a source of danger not

created by A unless (i) A has assumed a responsibility to protect B

from that danger, (ii) A has done something which prevents another

from protecting B from that danger, (iii) A has a special level of

control over that source of danger, or (iv) A’s status creates an

obligation to protect B from that danger.”

35 As that summary makes clear, there are certain circumstances in

which public authorities, like private individuals and bodies, can

come under a duty of care to prevent the occurrence of harm: see, for

example,

Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 and

Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619, as

explained in Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, paras 39–40. In the

absence of such circumstances, however, public authorities generally

owe no duty of care towards individuals to confer a benefit upon them

by protecting them from harm, any more than would a private

individual or body: see, for example, Smith v Littlewoods

Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241, concerning a private body, applied

in Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] AC 874, concerning a

public authority.

36 That is so, notwithstanding that a public authority may have

statutory powers or duties enabling or requiring it to prevent the harm

in question. A well known illustration of that principle is the decision

of the House of Lords in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent

[1941] AC 74. The position is different if, on its true construction, the

statutory power or duty is intended to give rise to a duty to individual

members of the public which is enforceable by means of a private

right of action. If, however, the statute does not create a private right

of action, then “it would be, to say the least, unusual if the mere

existence of the statutory duty [or, a fortiori, a statutory power] could

generate a common law duty of care”: Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR

1057, para 23.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

50

40However, until the reasoning in the Anns case was repudiated, it

was not possible to justify a rejection of liability, where a prima facie

duty of care arose at the first stage of the analysis from the

foreseeability of harm, on the basis that public bodies are not

generally liable for failing to exercise their statutory powers or duties

so as to confer the benefit of protection from harm. Instead, it was

necessary to have recourse to public policy in order to justify the

rejection of liability at the second stage. That was accordingly the

approach adopted by the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in a

series of judgments, including Hill’s case [1989] AC 53. The need to

have recourse to public policy for that purpose has been superseded

by the return to orthodoxy in Gorringe’s case. Since that case, a

public authority’s non-liability for the consequences of an omission

can generally be justified on the basis that the omissions principle is a

general principle of the law of negligence, and the law of negligence

generally applies to public authorities in the same way that it applies

to private individuals and bodies.

41Equally, concerns about public policy cannot in themselves

override a liability which would arise at common law for a positive

act carried out in the course of performing a statutory function: the

true question is whether, properly construed, the statute excludes the

liability which would otherwise arise: see Gorringe’s case 2004 (1)

WLR 1057, para 38, per Lord Hoffmann.

42That is not to deny that what might be described as policy

considerations sometimes have a role to play in the law of negligence.

As explained earlier, where established principles do not provide a

clear answer to the question whether a duty of care should be

recognised in a novel situation, the court will have to consider

whether its recognition would be just and reasonable.”

62.In Yetkin v. Mahmood

24

, where injury was caused to a highway user by

shrubs which had overgrown and impeded visibility, the court upheld the claim for

damages. The court observed as follows:

“…The planting of vegetation in the raised beds of the central

reservation is obviously a reasonable exercise of the authority’s

powers but to plant shrubs which will grow so large as to obscure the

view and then not to ensure that they are trimmed back is a negligent

exercise of those powers. The judge held that that failure was a cause

24

2011 QB 827

51

of this accident. It is not suggested that he was not right so to hold. I

have no doubt that, in the circumstances of this case, the local

authority had a common law duty of care towards the claimant,

notwithstanding her own negligence, that that duty was breached and

that the breach was a cause of the accident. There was no need for the

judge to consider whether the danger created by the bushes amounted

to a trap or enticement. It follows in my judgment that the judge erred

in dismissing the claim. He should have held that primary liability

was established.”

63.A similar approach was indicated by this court in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi

v. Sushila Devi

25

(where a tree fell on a passer-by causing injury) the court upheld

the findings that the municipal corporation was liable, stating that:

“13.By a catena of decisions, the law is well settled that if there is a

tree standing on the defendant's land which is dried or dead and for

that reason may fall and the defect is one which is either known or

should have been known to the defendant, then the defendant is liable

for any injury caused by the fall of the tree (see Brown v. Harrison

[1947 WN 191 : 63 TLR 484], Quinn v. Scott [(1965) 1 WLR 1004 :

(1965) 2 All ER 588] and Mackie v. Dumbartonshire County Council

[1927 WN 247] ). The duty of the owner/occupier of the premises by

the side of the road whereon persons lawfully pass by, extends to

guarding against what may happen just by the side of the premises on

account of anything dangerous on the premises. The premises must be

maintained in a safe state of repair. The owner/occupier cannot

escape the liability for injury caused by any dangerous thing existing

on the premises by pleading that he had employed a competent person

to keep the premises in safe repairs. In Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v.

Subhagwanti [AIR 1966 SC 1750] a clock tower which was 80 years'

old collapsed in Chandni Chowk, Delhi causing the death of a number

of persons. Their Lordships held that the owner could not be

permitted to take a defence that he neither knew nor ought to have

known the danger. “[T]he owner is legally responsible irrespective of

whether the damage is caused by a patent or a latent defect,” — said

their Lordships. In our opinion the same principle is applicable to the

owner of a tree standing by the side of a road. If the tree is dangerous

in the sense that on account of any disease or being dead the tree or

its branch is likely to fall and thereby injure any passer-by then such a

25

(1999) 4 SCC 317 at page 323

52

tree or branch must be removed so as to avert the danger to life. It is

pertinent to note that it is not the defence of the Municipal

Corporation that vis major or an act of God such as a storm, tempest,

lightning or extraordinary heavy rain had occurred causing the fall of

the branch of the tree and hence the Corporation was not liable.”

This approach that a statutory corporation or local authority can be held

liable in tort for injury occasioned on account of omission to oversee, or defective

supervision of its activities contracted out to another agency, was also followed in

Vadodara Municipal Corporation v Purshottam V. Muranji

26

.

64.The terms of the agreement which the NHAI entered into with the

concessionaire clearly contemplated the safety of highway users (Clause 18.1.1)

and an elaborate highway monitoring mechanism (Clause 19.1). The agreement

also required any unusual occurrences to be reported; an independent engineer was

required to, and did inspect the highway. The reports of the inspecting engineer

reveal that the deficiencies by way of narrowing of water channels, and the unusual

collection of debris, were noted. Even before the incident, the NHAI was alive to

this; it had separately written to Rathod, and later to the local administration about

it through its letter dated 15.04.2011. That letter is revealing; it inter alia, states

that:

“During pre-monsoon rains all the excavated muck has been

carried to NH4 alongwith rain water and block Satara bound traffic

lane for quite some time. The problem will be severe during heavy

rains of July and August.

As such safety of highway and tunnel is completely at stake due

to indiscriminate cutting of hills on upper side of tunnel and both the

end.”

65.Having regard to the duty imposed on the NHAI by virtue of Sections 4 and

5 of the Highways Act, read with Section 16 of the NHAI Act, there can be no

manner of doubt that the NHAI was responsible for the maintenance of the

26

2014 (16) SCC 14

53

highway, including the stretch upon which the accident occurred. The report of the

sub-divisional officer clearly shows that inspection reports were furnished to the

NHAI shortly before the incident, highlighting the deficiencies; also, the NHAI’s

correspondence with Rathod, and the local administration, reveal that it was aware

of the danger and likelihood of risk to human life, and the foreseeability of the

event that actually occurred later. Further, letters addressed by the local

administration and the NHAI to Rathod similarly show that it was incumbent upon

him to take remedial action. The failure of the NHAI to ensure remedial action, and

likewise the failure by Rathod to take measures to prevent the accident, prima

facie, disclose their liability.

66.The absence of legal representatives or heirs of the deceased in the

proceedings, or the fact that they had initiated independent civil action, in the

opinion of this court, was not an impediment, nor could it have precluded the NGT

from exercising its jurisdiction, given the gravity of the matter and the danger

posed to the members of the public. The initiation of civil action did not mean that

the NGT had to either reject the application (as far as it claimed relief for the

accident), or await the outcome of the civil suit. This position is clear from the

proviso to Section 18(1) which reads as follows:

“Provided that where all the legal representatives of the

deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation or

relief or settlement of dispute, the application shall be made on behalf

of, or, for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased

and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be

impleaded as respondents to the application.”

67. The above provision clearly implies that an application without impleading

the legal heirs cannot be rejected. At the most, the tribunal has to implead all legal

heirs. In the present case, that procedure was not followed. However, the legal

heirs have instituted a suit. The ends of justice would be served if that suit (Special

Civil Suit No. 890 of 2014 before the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division,

54

Pune) is directed to revive and continue it; a direction is issued to the concerned

court (Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune). The directions in this

regard by the NGT, towards payment of compensation are to be regarded as

indicative of a prima facie determination. Consequently, the direction to the NHAI

and Rathod, jointly making them liable to pay 15 lakhs is justified. It is clarified

₹

that the civil suit will now proceed, and based on evidence, the court would finally

decide the issue of liability, and make such further consequential orders or decrees

as may be found necessary in this regard, towards apportioning of liability of the

NHAI, Rathod, the state or any other party (including the concessionaire). This

court’s order shall not be treated as conclusive; the trial court shall independently

proceed to evaluate the evidence and hear the parties on the merits of their

submissions. The restitutionary order by the NGT, directing payment by Rathod

and NHAI of 10 lakhs too, in this court’s opinion, cannot be found to be at fault.

₹

It is upheld. The NHAI and Rathod shall comply with the directions of the NGT

and deposit the sum of 15 lakhs with the said court within four weeks, in equal

₹

proportion. The sum 10 lakhs shall be deposited in the same proportion, in court,

₹

to be disbursed to the state government for restoring the environment and carrying

out afforestation/planting of trees etc.

Point Nos III and IV: Correctness of NGT’s directions contained in Para 17 (e) of

its impugned order, and the legality of the order/notification of the state of

Maharashtra, issued under Section 154, MRTP Act

68.As to the third point, two issues arise for consideration - firstly, the power of

the NGT to issue directions banning development and building activities of the

kind contained in Para 17(e) of its impugned order, and secondly, the correctness of

the procedure adopted while issuing such directions, in this case.

55

69.In the All Dimasa Student Union case

27

, this court considered the nature of

powers and jurisdiction of NGT. The relevant discussion is as follows:

“156. What are the powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunal given under the

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 has to be looked into to consider the

above submission? Insofar as jurisdiction of the Tribunal is concerned, we

have already noticed Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 19 of the

Act deals with procedure and powers of the Tribunal. Section 19 which is

relevant for the present case is as follows

28

:

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

157. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that the Tribunal shall not

be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure

but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. What sub-

section (1) meant to convey is that the Tribunal is not shackled with

the procedure laid down by CPC for conducting its proceedings. Sub-

section (2) of Section 19 empowers the Tribunal with powers to

regulate its own procedure. Section 19(2) confers vide powers on the

27

See f.n.9 (supra).

28

“19. Procedure and powers of Tribunal.—(1) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure.

(3) The Tribunal shall also not be bound by the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

(4) The Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers

as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, in respect of the following

matters, namely—

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, requisitioning any

public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office;

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;

(f) reviewing its decision;

(g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte;

(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte;

(i) pass an interim order (including granting an injunction or stay) after providing the parties concerned

an opportunity to be heard, on any application made or appeal filed under this Act;

(j) pass an order requiring any person to cease and desist from committing or causing any violation of any

enactment specified in Schedule I;

(k) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(5) All proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the judicial proceedings within the meaning

of Sections 193, 219 and 228 for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code and the Tribunal shall be

deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973.”

56

Tribunal insofar as its procedure is concerned. Section 19(4) vests

some powers as are vested in the civil court, while trying a suit, in

respect of matters enumerated therein. The use of the expression

“shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by CPC” is not akin

to saying that procedure as laid down by CPC is in no manner

relevant to the Tribunal. Further, Section 19(1) also does not mean

that the Tribunal cannot follow any procedure given in CPC. One

provision of CPC inserted by Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1-2-

1977 is Order 26, which is relevant for present inquiry. Order 26 Rule

10-A provides as follows:

“10-A. Commission for scientific investigations.—(1) Where

any question arising in a suit involves any scientific investigation

which cannot, in the opinion of the Court, be conveniently conducted

before the Court, the Court may, if it thinks it necessary or expedient

in the interests of justice so to do, issue a commission to such person

as it thinks fit, directing him to inquire into such question and report

thereon to the Court.

(2) The provisions of Rule 10 of this Order shall, as far as may

be, apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under this Rule

as they apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under Rule

9.”

158. Rule 10-A provides that where any question arising in a suit

involves any scientific investigation which cannot, in the opinion of

the Court, be conveniently conducted before the Court, the Court may,

if it thinks necessary or expedient in the interests of justice so to do,

issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit, directing him to

inquire into such question and report thereon to the Court. Rule 10-A

is enabling power to the courts to obtain report from such persons as

it thinks fit when any question involves with the scientific

investigation. The powers under Rule 10-A which are to be exercised

by the Court can very well be used by NGT to obtain reports by

experts. NGT as per the statutory scheme of NGT has to decide

several complex questions pertaining to pollution and environment.

The scientific investigation and report by experts are necessary

requirements in appropriate cases to come to correct conclusion to

find out measures to remedy the pollution and environment. We do not,

thus, find any dearth of jurisdiction in NGT to appoint a committee to

submit a report. We may further say that while asking an expert to

give a report, NGT is not confined to the four corners of Rule 10-A

57

rather its jurisdiction is not shackled by strict terms of Order 26 Rule

10-A as per Section 19(1) as noticed above.”

70.The court also took note of Rule 24 of the National Green Tribunal (Practice

and Procedure) Rules, 2011 (framed under Sections 4(4) and 35 of the NGT Act).

29

This court then held as follows:

“160. Rule 24 empowers the Tribunal to make such orders or give

such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its

order or to secure the ends of justice. Rule 24 gives wide powers to

the Tribunal to secure the ends of justice. Rule 24 vests special power

to the Tribunal to pass orders and issue directions to secure the ends

of justice. Use of words “may”, “such orders”, “gives such

directions”, “as may be necessary or expedient”, “to give effect to its

orders”, “order to prevent abuse of process”, are words which enable

the Tribunal to pass orders and the above words confer wide

discretion.

163. The object for which the said power is given is not far to seek. To

fulfil the objective of the NGT Act, 2010, NGT has to exercise a wide

range of jurisdiction and has to possess wide range of powers to do

justice in a given case. The power is given to exercise for the benefit

of those who have right for clean environment which right they have

to establish before the Tribunal. The power given to the Tribunal is

coupled with duty to exercise such powers for achieving the objects.

In this regard reference is made to the judgment of this Court in L.

Hirday Narain v. CIT [L. Hirday Narain v.CIT, (1970) 2 SCC 3s55] ,

wherein this Court was examining provision empowering authority to

do something. This Court laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 359)

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

164. We, thus, are of the considered opinion that there is no lack of

jurisdiction in NGT to direct for appointment of committee or to

obtain a report from a committee in the given facts of the case.”

29

The said rule reads as follows:

“24. Order and directions in certain cases. — The Tribunal may make such orders or give such directions

as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of

justice.”

58

71.The power and jurisdiction of the NGT under Sections 15(1)(b) and (c) are

not restitutionary, in the sense of restoring the environment to the position it was

before the practise impugned, or before the incident occurred. The NGT’s

jurisdiction in one sense is a remedial one, based on a reflexive exercise of its

powers. In another sense, based on the nature of the abusive practice, its powers

can also be preventive.

72.As a quasi-judicial body exercising both appellate jurisdiction over

regulatory bodies’ orders and directions (under Section 16) and its original

jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the NGT Act, the tribunal, based on

the cases and applications made before it, is an expert regulatory body. Its

personnel include technically qualified and experienced members. The powers it

exercises and directions it can potentially issue, impact not merely those before it,

but also state agencies and state departments whose views are heard, after which

general directions to prevent the future occurrence of incidents that impact the

environment, are issued.

73.Courts in the US, notably the US Supreme Court, have been faced with

problems arising from regulatory adjudication. The scope of such decision making

which resembles an adjudicatory outcome by courts, was considered in Securities

Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.

30

This case arose from an order of the

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) refusing to approve a utility company's

bankruptcy reorganization plan, due to that plan's favourable treatment of

management's stock purchases during the reorganization period. The SEC

originally had based its disapproval on its understanding of general corporation law

principles. The Supreme Court initially struck down that decision as a misreading

of the principles.

On remand, the SEC reaffirmed its rejection of the reorganization

plan. But this time, the SEC relied on its interpretation of the standards of the

30

332 U.S. 194 (1947)

59

Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. When the Supreme Court decided

the appeal for the second time, it affirmed the SEC's order. The court clarified that

SEC would be allowed to establish such an interpretation by means of a

particularized order rather than a general regulation and observed that:

“Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a

statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general

rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others

must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In

performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an

administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule

or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the

exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. In other words,

problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could

not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the

absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had

sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying

its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may

be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture

within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the

agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case

basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a

very definite place for the case by case evolution of statutory

standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule

or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primary in the

informed discretion of the administrative agency.”

74.Similar observations were made by this court in PTC India v. Central

Electricity Regulatory Commission

31

. The court stated as follows, after analysing

the provisions of the Electricity Act 2003:

“49. On the above analysis of various sections of the 2003 Act, we

find that the decision-making and regulation-making functions are

both assigned to CERC. Law comes into existence not only through

legislation but also by regulation and litigation. Laws from all three

sources are binding. According to Professor Wade, “between

31

2010 (4) SCC 603

60

legislative and administrative functions we have regulatory

functions”. A statutory instrument, such as a rule or regulation,

emanates from the exercise of delegated legislative power which is a

part of administrative process resembling enactment of law by the

legislature whereas a quasi-judicial order comes from adjudication

which is also a part of administrative process resembling a judicial

decision by a court of law.

50. Applying the above test, price fixation exercise is really legislative

in character, unless by the terms of a particular statute it is made

quasi-judicial as in the case of tariff fixation under Section 62 made

appealable under Section 111 of the 2003 Act, though Section 61 is an

enabling provision for the framing of regulations by CERC. If one

takes “tariff” as a subject-matter, one finds that under Part VII of the

2003 Act actual determination/fixation of tariff is done by the

appropriate Commission under Section 62 whereas Section 61 is the

enabling provision for framing of regulations containing generic

propositions in accordance with which the appropriate Commission

has to fix the tariff. This basic scheme equally applies to the subject-

matter “trading margin” in a different statutory context as will be

demonstrated by discussion hereinbelow.”

75.The NGT’s directions, though placed in the context of its adjudicatory role,

have a wider ramification in the sense that its rulings constitute the appropriate

norm which are to be followed by all those engaging in similar activities.

Therefore, its orders, contextually in the course of adjudication, also establish and

direct behaviour appropriate for future guidance. In these circumstances, given the

panoply of the NGT’s powers under the NGT Act, which include considering

regulatory directions issued by expert regulatory bodies under the Water

(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, the Air (Prevention and Control of

Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Biodiversity Act, 2002 it has to be held that general

directions for future guidance, to avoid or prevent injury to the environment for

appropriate assimilation in relevant rules, can be given by the NGT.

61

76.Turning next to the question of the correctness of the general directions

contained in Para 17(e) of the NGT’s order, this court has no manner of doubt that

such directions were improper and not justified in the facts of this case. What the

NGT had before it, was the report of the SDM and a report commissioned about

the nature of the incident. Based on these limited inputs, the tribunal concluded-

without any rationale and based on no scientific or technical evidence, or experts’

opinion, that development and construction should not be carried out within 100

feet of a “lowest slope i.e. incline of any hill within its territorial limits, as well as

hill-tops”. The decisions of this court, including the All Dimasa Students Union

case (f.n. 9); Mantri Technoze Pvt. Ltd case (f.n.3); the Hanuman Laxman Aroskar

case (f.n. 4) and the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board case (f.n. 2) all show that

the NGT resorted to the appointment of technical and scientific experts in the

relevant field, who studied the issue, made site inspections and furnished reports.

Such reports were subjected to discussion by the parties before the NGT, who were

also given the opportunity of objecting to or making representations against such

reports. Based on a final consideration of all these materials, and the submissions

of parties before it, the NGT proceeded to issue directions. This procedure was

wholly overlooked by the NGT in the present case. As a result, it is held that the

said tribunal’s directions were improper and are procedurally indefensible. The

directions contained in Para 17(e) are therefore set aside.

77.To consider the last issue, i.e. validity of the notification/direction issued by

the state government, it is necessary to briefly outline provisions of the MRTP Act.

The MRTP Act was framed and enacted for the purpose of use, planning and

development in the regions (of Maharashtra). This was through the establishment

of Regional Planning Boards, New Town Development Authorities and Special

Planning Authorities, as the case may be, for specified “notified areas”. The Act

provides for the preparation of development plans, appointment of Special

62

Planning Authorities for notified areas, and creation of new towns for designated

areas by means of development authorities. The MRTP Act also enables

compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes in respect of the plans and for

purposes connected therewith. The Act provides for an elaborate procedure for

preparation of the regional plan by a Regional Planning Board (“the board”) and

development plan by any planning authority. The board has to follow the procedure

contained in Chapter II(C). Section 16 provides the procedure – the regional boards

have to (after necessary survey) prepare land-use maps for the region, and prepare

a draft regional plan, after which they have to publish a notice about the plan in the

Official Gazette, inviting objections and suggestions from any person with respect

to the draft plan. The board has to refer the objections, suggestions and

representations received by it to the Regional Planning Committee (“the

committee” hereafter) appointed under Section 10 for consideration and report.

The committee, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the affected

persons has to submit its report to the board, after which the board has to prepare

the regional plan after considering the suggestions, objections and representations

and the report of the committee. This is to be submitted to the State Government

for approval. On approval of the plan by the State Government under Section 15,

the final regional plan has to be published under Section 17.

78.Chapter III deals with the procedure for preparation of development plans by

a planning authority. Section 23 provides that the planning authority should make a

declaration of its intent to prepare such a plan and publish the same in the Official

Gazette, inviting suggestions or objections from the public within a period of not

less than sixty days from the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette.

Thereafter under Section 26, the planning authority has to prepare a draft

development plan, not later than two years from the date of notice published under

Section 23, and publish the notice in the Official Gazette stating that the

63

development plan has been prepared, once again inviting objections or suggestions

from any person with respect to the draft plan within a period of sixty days from

the notice. Section 27 provides that the planning authority having regard to, and

guided by the proposals made in the regional plan, shall not carry out any

modification therein without prior concurrence of the Regional Planning Board.

Section 28 mandates the planning authority to consider suggestions or objections

received by it under Section 26(1) and provide a reasonable opportunity of being

heard to any person including the representatives of the Government who may

have filed any objections or suggestions, and thereafter modify or change the plan

in such manner, as provided under Section 28(4). Section 29 further provides for

modification of the draft development plan, which is of substantial nature. By this,

a planning authority or the Town Planning Officer is required to publish a notice in

the Official Gazette inviting objections and suggestions from any person with

respect to the proposed modification not later than sixty days from the date of such

notice. The section then requires the authority concerned to consider all objections

and suggestions received by it and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to

any person including representatives of government departments who may have

filed any objections or made any suggestions in respect of the draft development

plan before making such modifications or changes in the draft development plan.

Section 30 requires the planning authority to submit the draft plan to the State

Government for approval, within twelve months from the date of publication of the

notice under Section 26 that the draft plan has been prepared. Section 31 provides

that the State Government may, after consulting the Director of Town Planning by

notification in the Official Gazette, sanction the draft development plan submitted

to it for the whole area, or separately for any part thereof, either without

modification, or subject to such modifications as it may consider proper, or return

the draft development plan to the planning authority for modifying the plan as it

may direct, or refuse to accord sanction. It further provides that where the

64

modifications proposed to be made by the State Government are of a substantial

nature, the State Government has to follow the procedure contemplated under

Section 28 to give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the objectors before

finalizing the modification.

79.Section 37 confers powers on a planning authority to carry out such

modification in a final development plan as will not change its character. This

power could be exercised by a planning authority after publishing a notice in the

Official Gazette and in such other manner as may be determined by it inviting

objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the proposed

modification, not later than one month from the date of such notice. This section

also enjoins the planning authority to serve notice on all persons affected by the

proposed modification and, after giving a hearing to any such persons, submit the

proposed modification (with amendments, if any) to the State Government for

sanction. Section 40 provides for appointment of a Special Planning Authority for

developing certain notified areas, and Section 40(1)(c) provides that the State

Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint Bombay

Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) established under the

Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority Act, 1974 to be the Special

Planning Authority for developing any undeveloped area specified in the

notification as a notified area. Section 116 then lays down that a Special Planning

Authority shall have all the powers of a planning authority as provided in Chapter

VII of the MRTP Act for the special purpose of acquisition of such land in the

notified area either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act.

80.So far as plans and developments that were approved before the impugned

notification was issued, this court is of the opinion that they cannot be disturbed

and the right of the applicants, be they developers, builders or owners of land or

plots, cannot be prejudiced or adversely affected. This is evident from a ruling of

65

this court in T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member

32

. This court stated that

town planning legislations (like the MRTP Act) are regulatory; and that when a

development plan is in force during the proposal for its amendment, courts should

not interfere with them on the assumption that the approved plan for building or

development, would not be eventually permitted. It was held that:

“Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive development

plan as proposed by the Authority would ultimately be accepted by the

State or not is uncertain. It is yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a

development plan must conform to the provisions of the Act. As

noticed hereinbefore, the State has called for objection from the

citizens. Ecological balance no doubt is required to be maintained

and the courts while interpreting a statute should bestow serious

consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite, are

ordinarily a part of the town planning legislation. If in the legislation

itself or in the statute governing the field, ecological aspects have not

been taken into consideration keeping in view the future need, the

State and the Authority must take the blame therefor. We must assume

that these aspects of the matter were taken into consideration by the

Authority and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be

intermeddled with so long as an appropriate amendment in the

legislation is not brought into force.”

81.This court has ruled, that even modification to an existing development plan,

under the MRTP Act, under Section 37, is in the nature of a legislative function.

This court had observed under Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Promoters and Builders

Assn

33

speaking of Section 37 (1) that:

“4.Reading of this provision reveals that under clause (1), the

Planning Authority after inviting objections and suggestions

regarding the proposed amendment and after giving notice to all

affected persons shall submit the proposed modification for sanction

to the Government. Deliberation with the public before making the

amendment is over at this stage. The Government, thereafter, under

clause (2) is given absolute liberty to make or not to make necessary

32

(2006) 8 SCC 502

33

(2004) 10 SCC 796

66

inquiry before granting sanction. Again, while according sanction, the

Government may do so with or without modifications. The

Government could impose such conditions as it deems fit. It is also

permissible for the Government to refuse the sanction. This is the true

meaning of clause (2). It is difficult to uphold the contrary

interpretation given by the High Court. The main limitation for the

Government is made under clause (1) that no authority can propose

an amendment so as to change the basic character of the development

plan. The proposed amendment could only be minor within the limits

of the development plan. And for such minor changes it is only normal

for the Government to exercise a wide discretion, by keeping various

relevant factors in mind. Again, if it is arbitrary or unreasonable the

same could be challenged. It is not the case of the respondents herein

that the proposed change is arbitrary or unreasonable. They

challenged the same citing the reason that the Government is not

empowered under the Act to make such changes to the modification.

5.Making of DCR or amendments thereof are legislative functions.

Therefore, Section 37 has to be viewed as repository of legislative

powers for effecting amendments to DCR. That legislative power of

amending DCR is delegated to the State Government. As we have

already pointed out, the true interpretation of Section 37(2) permits

the State Government to make necessary modifications or put

conditions while granting sanction. In Section 37(2), the legislature

has not intended to provide for a public hearing before according

sanction. The procedure for making such amendment is provided in

Section 37. Delegated legislation cannot be questioned for violating

the principles of natural justice in its making except when the statute

itself provides for that requirement. Where the legislature has not

chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it

and it is not permissible to read natural justice into such legislative

activity. Moreover, a provision for “such inquiry as it may consider

necessary” by a subordinate legislating body is generally an enabling

provision to facilitate the subordinate legislating body to obtain

relevant information from any source and it is not intended to vest any

right in anybody. (Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. [(1987) 2

SCC 720], SCC paras 5 and 27. See generally H.S.S.K. Niyami

v.Union of India [(1990) 4 SCC 516] and Canara Bank v. Debasis

Das [(2003) 4 SCC 557: 2003 SCC (L&S) 507].) While exercising

legislative functions, unless unreasonableness or arbitrariness is

pointed out, it is not open for the Court to interfere. (See generally

67

ONGC v. Assn. of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat

[1990 Supp SCC 397].) Therefore, the view adopted by the High

Court does not appear to be correct.

82. This issue was again underscored by this court in Machavarapu Srinivasa

Rao v. Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali, Mangalagiri Urban Development Authority,

34

where it was held as follows, in respect of provisions of the Andhra Pradesh

(Urban Areas) Development Act, 1975:

“20. An analysis of the above-noted provisions shows that once the

master plan or the zonal development plan is approved by the State

Government, no one including the State Government/Development

Authority can use land for any purpose other than the one specified

therein. There is no provision in the Act under which the Development

Authority can sanction construction of a building, etc. or use of land

for a purpose other than the one specified in the master plan/zonal

development plan. The power vested in the Development Authority to

make modification in the development plan is also not unlimited. It

cannot make important alterations in the character of the plan. Such

modification can be made only by the State Government and that too

after following the procedure prescribed under Section 12(3).”

83.In a decision which concerned change in development plan under the MRTP

Act, this court observed that any changes in a development or master plan involve

consultations and a high degree of expertise, in MIG Cricket Club v. Abhinav

Sahakar Education Society

35

:

“28. It is well settled that the user of the land is to be decided by the

authority empowered to take such a decision and this Court in

exercise of its power of judicial review would not interfere with the

same unless the change in the user is found to be arbitrary. The

process involves consideration of competing claims and requirements

of the inhabitants in present and future so as to make their lives

happy, healthy and comfortable. We are of the opinion that town

planning requires high degree of expertise and that is best left to the

34

(2011) 12 SCC 154

35

(2011) 9 SCC 97

68

decision of the State Government to which the advice of the expert

body is available. In the facts of the present case, we find that the

power has been exercised in accordance with law and there is no

arbitrariness in the same.”

84.Now, under the provisions of the MRTP Act

36

, regional plans and

development plans have to take into account features such as soil conservation,

preservation of natural features, prevention of flooding etc, while factoring

planning for each city or area concerned. In turn, such regional and development

plans would constitute the blueprint for local town planning authorities to grant or

refuse permission to individual applicants. In these circumstances, the use of

Section 154 of the MRTP Act, in the present case, in fact amounted to a

modification of all plans - regional, development, etc. Such modification (by way

of absolute prohibition in construction) was not preceded by any manner of public

consultation, much less previous invitation of objections or consideration of the

views of affected parties. It is in this background that one has to consider the

argument of the state, which found favour with the High Court, that such

notification was issued in public interest.

85.The unamended Section 154 of the MRTP Act read as follows:

“154 Control by the State Government

(1) Every Regional Board, Planning Authority and Development

Authority shall carry out such directions or instructions as may be

issued from time to time by the State Government for the efficient

administration of this Act.

(2) If in, or his connection with, the exercise of its powers and

discharge of its functions by the Regional Board, Planning Authority

or Development Authority under this Act, any dispute arises between

the Regional Board, Planning Authority or Development Authority,

36

Section 14 and 22

69

and the State Government, the decision of the State Government on

such dispute shall be final.”

86. Section 154 (1) was amendment by a substitution (with effect from

22.04.2015). The new provision [Section 154 (1)] reads as follows:

“154. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules

or regulations made thereunder, the State Government may, for

implementing or bringing into effect the Central or the State

Government programmes, policies or projects or for the efficient

administration of this Act or in the larger public interest, issue, from

time to time, such directions or instructions as may be necessary, to

any Regional Board, Planning Authority or Development Authority

and it shall be the duty of such authorities to carry out such directions

or instructions within the time-limit, if any, specified in such

directions or instructions.”

87.Directions can be issued “notwithstanding” any other provisions of the Act,

“for implementing or bringing into effect the Central or the State Government

programmes, policies or projects or for the efficient administration of this Act or in

the larger public interest, issue, from time to time.” No doubt, the non-obstante

clause has an overriding effect on other provisions of the Act. However, if one

keeps in mind that the preparations of regional and development plans are in terms

of specific provisions which outline detailed procedures that have to be necessarily

followed, in the absence of which, time and again courts have intervened and held

that such modifications (without following prescribed procedure or without

prescribed consultations) are illegal, the power has to be resorted to for good and

adequate reasons. The direction, impugned in the present case, on the face of it, is

not premised on any central or state government programmes, policies or projects.

The impugned notification reads as follows:

GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA

URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

70

Madam Cama Road

Hutatma Rajguru Chowk

Mantralaya, Mumbai 4000032

Government Resolution No. TPS-1817/ANS-90/97/UD-13

dated 14 November 2017

The Development schemes are prepared for area in jurisdiction of

planning authorities under the Maharashtra Regional Development

and Town Planning Act, 1966. In the context of unauthorised

constructions undertaken by hill cutting, at Katraj Ghat District Pune,

the Hon'ble National Green Tribunal, Pune has, by order dated 19

May 2015 in Application Number 4/2014, issued orders and instructed

to inform all Mahanagar Palik/Nagarpalika in the state not to give any

development permission for constructions on the hilltop and 100 feet

distance from the hill slopes. A provision already exists in development

control regulations that no development is permissible on the hilltop

and no hill slopes having a gradient of more than 1:5. Considering the

order dated 19 May 2015 of the Hon'ble National Green Tribunal in

exercise of powers under section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional

Town Development and Town Planning Act 1966 the following the

directions were issued to all planning authorities in the state:

DIRECTIONS

1.The planning authorities while preparing development plan for area

in their jurisdiction or amending them in respect of undeveloped

portion abutting the hills upto 100 feet should be shown as No

development/Open space Reservation.

2.In the event the 100 area abutting hills, has already been developed,

in that area no permission be granted for additional FSI or TDR.

3.In the event the 100 feet area abutting hills is under No

Development Zone as per sanctioned Development plan, then while

granting permission for Development for further 100 feet area

abutting/contiguous thereto should be permitted only for non-

buildable purposes such as open space, road et cetera.

In the name of and by order of the

71

Hon'ble Governor State of Maharashtra”

88.There are several authorities for the proposition that though an administrative

order need not necessarily comply with principles of natural justice such as granting

hearing, yet, administrative decisions or orders have to be based on some reasons. In

Shri. Sitaram Sugar Mills Company v. Union of India,

37

(which concerned the zoning

regulations for the purpose of levy sugar under the relevant statutory order, in terms of

the Essential Commodities Act), the Supreme Court held as follows:

“Power delegated by statute is limited by its terms and subordinate to

its objects. The delegate must act in good faith, reasonably, intra vires

the power granted, and on relevant consideration of material facts.

All his decisions, whether characterised as legislative or

administrative or quasi-judicial, must be in harmony with the

Constitution and other laws of the land. They must be “reasonably

related to the purposes of the enabling legislation”. If they are

manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an

unauthorised end or do not tend in some degree to the

accomplishment of the objects of delegation, court might well say,

“Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they

are unreasonable ultra vires.

A repository of power acts ultra vires either when he acts in excess of

his power in the narrow sense or when he abuses his power by acting

in bad faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds

or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross

unreasonableness.”

89. In Cellular Operators Association v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of

India,

38

this court held that subordinate regulatory legislation, can be set aside in

judicial review, if they show no rationale or are arbitrary:

“62. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Quality of Service

Regulations and the Consumer Regulations must be read together as

part of a single scheme in order to test the reasonableness thereof.

37

(1990) 3 SCC 223

38

(2016) 7 SCC 703

72

The countervailing advantage to service providers by way of the

allowance of 2% average call drops per month, which has been

granted under the 2009 Quality of Service Regulations, could not

have been ignored by the impugned Regulation so as to affect the

fundamental rights of the appellants, and having been so ignored,

would render the impugned Regulation manifestly arbitrary and

unreasonable.

63. Secondly, no facts have been shown to us which would indicate

that a particular area would be filled with call drops thanks to the

fault on the part of the service providers in which consumers

would be severely inconvenienced. The mere ipse dixit of the

learned Attorney General, without any facts being pleaded to this

effect, cannot possibly make an unconstitutional regulation

constitutional. We, therefore, hold that a strict penal liability laid

down on the erroneous basis that the fault is entirely with the service

provider is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. Also, the payment

of such penalty to a consumer who may himself be at fault, and which

gives an unjustifiable windfall to such consumer, is also manifestly

arbitrary and unreasonable. In the circumstances, it is not necessary

to go into the appellants' submissions that call drops take place

because of four reasons, three of which are not attributable to the

fault of the service provider, which includes sealing and shutting down

towers by municipal authorities over which they have no control, or

whether they are attributable to only two causes, as suggested by the

Attorney General, being network-related causes or user-related

causes. Equally, it is not necessary to determine finally as to whether

the reason for a call drop can technologically be found out and

whether it is a network-related reason or a user-related reason.

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

66. The reason given in the Explanatory Memorandum for

compensating the consumer is that the compensation given is only

notional. The very notion that only notional compensation is awarded,

is also entirely without basis. A consumer may well suffer a call drop

after 3 or 4 seconds in a voice call. Whereas the consumer is charged

only 4 or 5 paise for such dropped call, the service provider has to

pay a sum of rupee one to the said consumer.

This cannot be called notional at all. It is also not clear as to why the

Authority decided to limit compensation to three call drops per day or

how it arrived at the figure of Re 1 to compensate inconvenience

73

caused to the consumer. It is equally unclear as to why the calling

party alone is provided compensation because, according to the

Explanatory Memorandum, inconvenience is suffered due to the

interruption of a call, and such inconvenience is suffered both by the

calling party and the person who receives the call. The receiving party

can legitimately claim that his inconvenience when a call drops, is as

great as that of the calling party. And the receiving party may need to

make the second call, in which case he receives nothing, and the

calling party receives Re 1 for the additional expense made by the

receiving party. All this betrays a complete lack of intelligent care and

deliberation in framing such a regulation by the Authority, rendering

the impugned Regulation manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.”

90. In the present case, the State of Maharashtra has not shown any material

or file containing the reasons behind the directive of 14.11.2017. It is not in dispute

that the direction was consequential to, and solely based on the directions of the

NGT in Para 17(e). As noticed earlier, those directions were not based on any

scientific evidence or report of any technical expert. Furthermore, even the

impugned notification does not specify what constitutes “hills”, and how they can

be applied in towns and communities set in undulating areas and hilly terrain. This

is not only vague, but makes the directions arbitrary as they can be applied at will

by the concerned authorities. More importantly, they amount to a blanket change of

all regional and development plans. While such directions can be issued, if

situations so warrant, such as in extraordinary or emergent circumstances, the

complete absence of any reasons why the state issued them, coupled with the lack

of any supporting expert report or input, renders it an arbitrary exercise. That they

are based only on the NGT’s orders, only underlines the lack of any application of

mind on the part of the State, while issuing them.

91. For the above reasons, we hold that the impugned judgment of the

Bombay High Court cannot be sustained; it is set aside. Consequently, the

74

directions in the notification under Section 154 (dated 14.11.2017) are hereby

quashed.

92.In view of the above discussions, CA 6932/2015 and CA 5971/2019 are

hereby disposed of in terms of the directions in this judgment. The other appeals by

special leave by third parties, against the NGT’s order, and the order of the NGT,

are partly allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order on costs.

.......................................................J

[ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN]

.......................................................J

[S. RAVINDRA BHAT]

.......................................................J

[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN ]

New Delhi,

July 14, 2020.