Gem and Jewellery Export Promotion Council; State of Maharashtra; Entertainment Duty Act 1923; IIJS; IIJS Signature; business-to-business exhibition; Section 2(a); Civil Appeal; Supreme Court; S.V.N. Bhatti; N. V. Anjaria
 19 Nov, 2026
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The Gem And Jewellery Export Promotion Council Vs. The State Of Maharashtra And Others

  Supreme Court Of India CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1889 OF 2015
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Case Background

As per case facts, the Appellant, a company established to promote the export of gems and jewellery, organizes annual business-to-business trade exhibitions (IIJS and IIJS Signature). These events are characterized ...

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2026 INSC 1246

1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1889 OF 2015

THE GEM AND JEWELLERY EXPORT

PROMOTION COU NCIL …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

1. The Appellant is a Company incorporated under Section 25 of the

Companies Act, 1956 (“Act, 1956”) under the aegis of the Ministry of

Commerce, Government of India. The Appellant was constituted with the main

objectives of supporting, protecting, maintaining, increasing, and promoting

the export of gems and jewellery, including pearls, coloured gemstones,

diamonds, synthetic stones, fashion jewellery, gold and other precious metal

jewellery and articles thereof, by such methods as may be necessary or

expedient for the export of articles.

2. As part of its objectives, the Appellant organises annual exhibitions

titled India International Jewellery Show (“IIJS”) and “IIJS Signature”, which

provide a platform for interaction among exporters, other jewellers of the

country, and foreign buyers visiting the show. The Appellant claims that these

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exhibitions, through IIJS and IIJS Signature, are major steps towards making

India, especially Mumbai, a major international trading centre for diamonds

and other gems and jewellery.

3. In the subject Appeal, the Appellant challenges the Judgment and Order

dated 04.03.2013 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, which upheld

the Order dated 30.11.2012 of the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division,

Mumbai/Respondent No. 2, and modified the Order dated 31.07.2012 of the

Additional Collector, Mumbai Suburban District/Respondent No. 3. The

background to the above Orders can be summarised as follows:

3.1 The Appellant, an entity under Section 25 of the Act, 1956, organises

trade promotion exhibitions of gems, etc., in Mumbai. Under the Rules for

Licensing and Controlling Places of Public Amusement (excluding Cinemas)

and Performances of Public Amusement, including Melas and Tamashas,

1960 (as it stood then), framed under the Bombay Police Act, 1951, organisers

of large gatherings in Mumbai must obtain a Police Licence/NOC. Respondent

No. 4 incorporated a mandatory requirement in its Application Form, requiring

applicants to furnish an NOC from Respondent No. 3. Ahead of the August

IIJS 2011 show, the Appellant tendered Rs. 38,91,250/- under protest on

19.07.2011 to obtain the NOC from Respondent No. 3 under the Bombay

Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 (“Act, 1923”). The Entertainment Duty Officer

subsequently demanded additional payments, bringing the total amount

deposited under protest to Rs. 62,76,875/-.

3.2 On 13.10.2011, the Appellant applied to Respondent No. 3 for an NOC

for IIJS Signature 2012, on the ground that the event was a trade exhibition

outside the ambit of the Act, 1923. Respondent No. 3 replied on 28.11.2011,

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stating that the Appellant either pay tax or apply to the Revenue Department

for an exemption from the payment of Entertainment Duty. On 07.12.2011,

the Appellant clarified that it was seeking non-taxability/lack of jurisdiction

under Section 2(a) and not seeking an exemption under Section 6(3) of the

Act, 1923. On 24.12.2011, the Police insisted that the Appellant obtain an

NOC from Respondent No. 3. The Appellant deposited Rs. 11,96,938/- under

protest, with a cover letter dated 03.01.2012. After the exhibition, the

Appellant demanded a refund on 24.01.2012.

3.3 In response to the Appellant’s demand for a refund, Respondent No. 3

issued an Assessment Order demanding an additional Rs. 1,32,47,750/ - for

IIJS 2011. On 10.05.2012, the High Court of Bombay, in W .P. No. 4527 of

2012, quashed the Assessment Order dated 17.03.2012. On 27.06.2012,

Respondent No. 3 passed an Order reiterating the demand of Rs.

1,32,47,750/-. The Appellant filed W.P. No. 6544 of 2012 before the High

Court of Bombay, and on 20.07.2012, the High Court again quashed the

Assessment Order and remanded the matter.

4. On 31.07.2012, Respondent No. 3 passed a fresh Order holding the

Appellant liable for Rs. 97,09,500/- in respect of IIJS 2011, adjusting Rs.

62,76,875/- and demanding the balance of Rs. 34,32,625/-. The findings are

as follows:

A. Section 2(a) of the 1923 Act is inclusive and explicitly includes the term

“any exhibition”. Therefore, any display of articles where admission is

conditioned on payment falls within the statutory net.

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B. Relied on the State Government’s communication dated 30.05.2011 to

conclude that the event was treated as taxable by the State Administration,

thereby precluding any jurisdictional defence.

C. That 7,000 exhibitor badges were issued, and 919 surplus passes were

treated as unauthorised, non-duty-paid admissions, thereby imposing

entertainment duty and a one-and-a-half-times statutory penalty.

D. Fixed the gross liability for IIJS 2011 at Rs. 97,09,500/-, adjusted Rs.

62,76,875/- paid under protest, and directed the recovery of the balance of

Rs. 34,32,625/- as arrears of land revenue.

5. On 17.08.2012, while disposing of W.P. No. 7807 of 2012 by Consent

Minutes, the High Court directed the Police Authorities to grant an NOC for

IIJS 2012 without insisting on a Collector's NOC, permitted the Appellant to

file a Statutory Appeal, and directed the Appellant to deposit Rs. 94,32,625/-

(Rs. 34,32,625/- arrears and Rs. 60,00,000/- advance for IIJS 2012).

6. The Appellant filed Entertainment Appeal No. 685 of 2012 before

Respondent No. 2 and deposited Rs. 94,32,625/ -. On 30.11.2012,

Respondent No. 2 held that the trade show was taxable under Section 2(a),

reduced the Assessment for IIJS 2011 to Rs. 45,40,125/- by deleting the levy

and the one-and-a-half-times statutory penalty on 919 exhibitor passes, and

ordered a refund of the excess amount. The findings are as follows:

A. The events constitute “entertainment” under Section 2(a), and the

presence of delegate fees constitutes “payment for admission” under Section

2(b) of the Act, 1923.

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B. Since the events charge high entry fees and exhibitors derive

commercial and monetary benefits from trade interactions, they meet the

requirements of an entertainment exhibition.

C. The Appellant paid Entertainment Duty without objection between

2006 and 2009 and obtained a State Tax exemption in 2005, suggesting that

the Council historically recognised the show as taxable.

D. It accepted the Appellant’s audited evidence showing that only 6,081

exhibitor passes had been distributed, not 7,000. Consequently, it quashed

the duty and the one-and-a-half-times statutory penalty imposed on the 919

passes, recalculated the net duty for IIJS 2011 at Rs. 45,40,125/-, ordered a

refund of Rs. 51,69,250/- for IIJS 2011, and directed the adjustment of the

IIJS 2012 duty against the Rs. 60,00,000/- advance deposit.

7. The Appellant filed W.P. No. 653 of 2013 before the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay. The prayers include a declaration that the annual IIJS

and IIJS Signature events organised by the Appellant do not constitute

“entertainment” under the Act, 1923, and that these exhibition events are not

exigible to Entertainment duty under the Act, 1923. The Appellant also prayed

for certiorari to quash the Orders dated 31.07.2012 and 30.11.2012 of

Respondent Nos. 3 and 2. Subject to the outcome of the above two principal

prayers, the Appellant prayed for a refund of the Entertainment Duty levied

and collected from the Appellant.

8. In the above background, the issue for consideration in the present

Appeal is whether the pure and simple business-to-business trade exhibitions

organised by the Appellant under the banners of IIJS and IIJS Signature fall

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within the definition of “entertainment” under Section 2(a) and are exigible

under Section 3 of the Act, 1923.

9. The Appellant's case on these exhibitions is that they are purely

business-to-business platforms, with exhibitors and visitors being

traders/manufacturers of gems, jewellery, etc. The Appellant collects a high

registration charge to encourage interested business visitors to attend the

exhibitions. The general public and individual consumers are barred from

registering and entering the said exhibition. To ensure participation by

interested buyers, the Appellant has put in place a stringent, scrutinising

procedure. Visitors have to fill out an Application Form, and upon scrutiny of

all credentials furnished by the Applicant, entry is facilitated, however, upon

payment of the Entry Fee. Undeniably, the event is a business-to-business

facilitation platform, resulting in a high volume of business in the trade of

gems, pearls, fashion jewellery, etc. As part of our narrative, we have preferred

to substantially adopt the Appellant's view for claiming relief against the levy

of Entertainment Duty under the Act, 1923. The Respondents' case is set out

in Orders dated 31.07.2012 and 30.11.2012. Hence, it is not reiterated for

brevity. Through the impugned Judgment, W.P. No. 653 of 2013 is dismissed,

and hence the Civil Appeal.

10. We have heard Mr. Aman Raj Gandhi and Mr. Bharat Bagla, learned

Counsel for the parties.

11. Advocate Aman Raj Gandhi, appearing for the Appellant, argues that

the IIJS and IIJS Signature exhibitions do not fall within the definition of

Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923. The Orders dated 31.07.2012 and 30.11.2012

are based on an erroneous understanding of the IIJS and IIJS Signature

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exhibitions, and the levy of Entertainment Duty on the Appellant is per se

illegal. Entry to the exhibition is not free and may be subject to an Entry fee.

The general public is not allowed as a matter of right. An interested business

visitor must fill out an application supported by trade and business

credentials, and upon scrutiny, entry to the event is allowed. The exhibitions

are a pure and simple business-to-business proposition, without attracting

any of the fastenings of the exhibition, namely shows of diversion, providing

food, display of skill, art, etc. The decisive factor in attracting the definition of

entertainment under the Act, 1923 ought not to be the mode of entry, i.e.,

payment of an Entry Fee to the exhibition. The exhibition conducted by the

Appellant does not satisfy the four crucial tests laid down by this Court in

M/s Geeta Enterprises & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.

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The impugned Judgment

has placed undue emphasis on the turnover from the exhibition and relied on

inapplicable parameters.

12. Advocate Bharat Bagla, appearing for the Respondents, argues that the

controversy in the Appeal is not about the interpretation of Section 2(a) of the

Act, 1923, i.e., the definition of “entertainment”. The controversy is whether

the exhibition organised by the Appellant falls within the definition of

entertainment under Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923. He relies on the averments

in the Writ Petition filed before the High Court and argues that the exhibition

falls within the definition of entertainment under Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923.

The screening procedure for entry cannot be understood as restricting entry

that is not open to the general public. From the admitted circumstances, it is

1 (1983) 4 SCC 202.

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argued that the nature of the activity at the exhibition may not be a decisive

factor. The threshold question is whether the employment of the words

“includes” and “any exhibition to which persons are admitted for payment” in

Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923, brings within its scope the features with which

the Appellant organises the exhibition. The first limb of the definition is

attracted to the circumstances of the case, and no exception can be taken to

the findings recorded in the impugned Judgment.

13. We have taken note of the submissions and perused the record.

14. Let us, at the outset, summarise the consideration and conclusion of

the impugned Judgment. The findings of the High Court are as follows:

A. Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923, defines “entertainment” using the word

“includes,” which, by Statute, extends the ordinary lexical meaning to

encompass “any exhibition... to which persons are admitted for payment”. The

duty of the Court while interpreting the taxing Statutes is to give effect to the

plain meaning of the words used in the Statute.

B. Relying on Geeta Enterprises (supra), it was held that entertainment

includes displays of any kind, even if purely educational or commercial,

provided admission to the premises is charged.

C. The requirement of “public colour” does not mandate open access to the

indiscriminate public. It is satisfied when an event is open to a defined

segment of the public, such as domestic and international trade buyers.

D. Entertainment inherently involves gratification. Since IIJS generated

over Rs. 5,000 crore in trade orders, the commercial exposure and financial

returns exhibitors derived constituted “monetary gratification,” thereby

satisfying the legal threshold for entertainment.

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E. The scale of the exhibition, with an event budget exceeding Rs. 20 crore,

1,600 stalls set up at a cost of Rs. 150–200 crore, marketing across 110 cities

globally, and delegate fees up to Rs. 9,000 (US $100 for some participants),

together with the luxury character of gems and jewellery, constitutes material

evidence that the exhibition constitutes taxable entertainment under the Act,

1923.

F. The absence of ramp walks, musical performances, or fashion shows

does not affect taxability as entertainment. The distinction from the India

International Jewellery Week (IIJW), where duty was paid under Section

2(b)(viii) on sponsorships, did not exempt IIJS from being an exhibition under

Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923.

G. The impugned Judgment d istinguished the Madhya Pradesh High

Court ruling in Calico Mills Ltd. v. State of M.P.

2

on the facts, holding that in

Calico Mills (supra), the nominal Rs. 2 entry coupon was set off against cloth

purchases, meaning there was no real admission charge, whereas the

Appellant levied a standalone, non-refundable admission fee.

H. The impugned Judgement dismissed the Appellant’s reliance on the

Constitution Bench ruling in Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of U.P.

3

, which

held that Entry 62 of List II, i.e., Taxes on luxuries, entertainments,

amusements, betting and gambling, is restricted to activities of luxury,

leisure, and pleasure. It was held that Godfrey Phillips (supra) addressed the

constitutional validity of a Statute, whereas the Appellant had not formally

2 AIR 1961 MP 257.

3 (2005) 2 SCC 515.

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challenged the constitutional vires of Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923, in its writ

petition.

I. Having found the exhibitions taxable under the 1923 Act, the challenge

to the Police condition requiring a Collector’s NOC failed.

15. The Appellant relies heavily on the ratio of Geeta Enterprises (supra). It

is, hence, contextual to summarise the ratio as under:

A. When interpreting non-technical and non -scientific statutory

expressions, courts must interpret terms according to their plain, natural,

and popular sense as understood in common parlance, rather than searching

for technical or scientific definitions. “Entertainment” denotes anything that

provides amusement, diversion, recreation, pleasure, sport, or agreeable

occupation of time.

B. The use of the word “includes” in a statutory definition indicates that

the Legislature did not intend to restrict or confine the term to narrow limits,

but rather to enlarge its scope. Section 2(3) of the U.P. Entertainment and

Betting Tax Act, 1937 (“Act, 1937”) states that “entertainment includes any

exhibition, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are

admitted for payment”. This inclusive language deliberately accommodates

diverse and evolving forms of amusement and games, precluding any

restrictive interpretation.

C. In Paragraph 12, this Court laid down criteria for determining whether

an activity qualifies as “entertainment” under Section 2(3) of the Act, 1937:

1. The show, performance, game, or sport must have a public character,

meaning it is open to the public in a hall, parlour, theatre, or other

public premises where people are invited or attend.

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2. The activity must provide amusement or diversion, whether or not it

requires some degree of skill. For example, tombola or club games that

require skill remain taxable entertainment.

3. Even if entry through the building or hall’s threshold is free, the activity

qualifies as entertainment if the exhibitor derives pecuniary gain from

providing the facility.

4. The brevity of the show, the fact that the person who pays operates the

machine and derives the amusement directly, or the sharing of revenue

between parlour owners and console manufacturers does not alter the

character of “entertainment”.

D. The timing, stage, and mechanical method of levying a charge do not

alter its legal character as "payment for admission to an entertainment".

Section 3 of the Act, 1937 levies tax on all payments for admission to any

entertainment. Allowing individuals to enter a physical parlour free of cost

while conditioning the activation of the video show on inserting a 50-paise

coin is merely a deferred collection mechanism. The coin insertion directly

pays for admission to the visual and interactive performance of that specific

game.

E. The degree of skill required to participate in an activity is legally immaterial

when determining whether the activity provides entertainment.

F. The presence of an educational or informative element does not dilute,

negate, or exclude the recreational character of an entertainment under a

fiscal statute.

12

16. Before we discuss the applicability of the ratio in Geeta Enterprises

(supra), let us examine the definition of “entertainment” under Section 2(a) of

the Act, 1923, as follows:

“[(a) “entertainment” includes any exhibition, performance,

amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for

payment, or, in the case of television exhibition with the aid

of any type of antenna with a cable network attached to it or

cable television or Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting

Service, for which persons are required to make payment by

way of contribution or subscription or installation and

connection charges or any other charges collected in any

manner whatsoever but does not include magic show and

temporary amusement including games and rides.”

17. Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923 defines entertainment, and the word

“includes” appears in the Definition Clause. The Definition Clause is to be

interpreted in light of the principles laid down in the following precedents:

A. Commissioner of Sales Tax, State of Gujarat v. Union Medical Agency

4

:

When a word or phrase is defined in the interpretation clause, that definition

prima facie governs whenever the word or phrase is used in the body of the

statute. But where the context makes the definition clause inapplicable, a

defined word, when used in the body of the statute, may have to be given a

meaning different from that contained in the interpretation clause; all

definitions given in an interpretation clause are, therefore, normally enacted

subject to the usual qualification “unless there is anything repugnant in the

subject or context”, or “unless the context otherwise requires”. Even in the

absence of an express qualification to that effect, such a qualification is

always implied.

4 (1981) 1 SCC 51.

13

B. Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Coop. Bank Employees Union

5

: It is

trite that when the word “means” is used in the definition clause of any

statute, what follows is intended to be exhaustive. When the word “means” is

used in a definition, it is a “hard-and-fast” definition, and no meaning other

than that set out in the definition can be assigned to it.

6

On the other hand,

when the word “includes” is used in a definition, the legislature does not

intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not

exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning,

but its scope will be extended to include matters that, in their ordinary

meaning, may or may not be included.

18. This Court in Forest Range Officer

7

held that in the interpretation of

statutes, the word “includes” is generally used as a word of extension. When

used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the words

or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. The construction to be

adopted to the meanings of the words and phrases is that the cardinal rule

for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed

according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of

the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be

necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense.

The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of

the lawgiver. An interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word

does not take away its ordinary meaning. An interpretation clause of the

5 (2007) 4 SCC 685.

6 Lord Esher, M.R., in Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665: 60 LJQB 726: 65 LT 110.

7 Forest Range Officer & Ors. v. P. Mohammed Ali & Ors. 1993 Suppl (3) SCC 627.

14

inclusive definition is not meant to prevent the word from receiving its

ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that word would be properly

applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing

in the context or the subject-matter to the contrary, to be applied to something

to which it would not ordinarily be applicable. An interpretation clause should

be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or

equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of those which are plain.

Another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is

that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of

words for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning of the term must

be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be

comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should

be so construed.

19. On the above Rules, literally read, Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923 can be

captured as under:

(i) Entertainment includes any exhibition to which persons are

admitted for payment.

(ii) Entertainment includes performance to which persons are admitted

for payment.

(iii) Entertainment includes any amusements to which persons are

admitted for payment.

(iv) Entertainment includes any game to which persons are admitted for

payment.

(v) Entertainment includes any sport to which persons are admitted for

payment.

15

20. The literal construction of the Definition Clause, by giving due and

permissible meaning to the word, includes that the first limb of the definition

clause deals with the 5 events, i.e., exhibitions, performances, amusements,

games, or sports. The words “to which persons are admitted for payment”

would be the deciding factor in determining whether an event falls within, or

in determining the scope of “entertainment” under Section 2(a) of the Act,

1923. The exhibitions to which persons are admitted for payment are a

threshold verification of a person’s entry into the event. Geeta Enterprises

(supra) has examined the meaning available to the word “exhibition”, and for

brevity, we do not reiterate what has been well considered in Geeta Enterprises

(supra). The facts of Geeta Enterprises (supra) are slightly better than those of

the case on hand in the sense that, in Geeta Enterprises (supra), there is no

Entry Fee at the threshold, but there is a Fee for availing entertainment.

Notwithstanding the same, it has been held that there is gratification for

availing entertainment. Examining the circumstances from this perspective,

we notice that, in the case at hand, entry into the IIJS and IIJS Signature is

on payment. Further, exhibitions showcase the merchandise of the

participating traders. The entry is on payment, and upon entry, even if it is a

business-to-business transaction, the same cannot be taken away from the

definition of “entertainment” under the Act, 1923. The requirement of filling

up the form for entry can be for more than one purpose, including security

reasons, and cannot be taken advantage of to wriggle out of an otherwise plain

and simple reading of “entertainment” in Section 2(a) of the Act, 1923. The

Appellant's case is sufficient to hold that the exhibition falls within the

definition of Section 2(a) of the Act, and the instance said in Section 3 is

16

attracted. The impugned Judgment has considered the Appellant’s activity, in

the form of a course of exhibitions, in detail. We are in full agreement with the

impugned Judgment.

21. For the above reasons, the Civil Appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending

application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.

...……….…………………J.

[S.V.N. BHATTI]

....…………………………J.

[N. V. ANJARIA]

New Delhi;

November 19, 2026.

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