2026:HHC:12221

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

RSA No. 257 of 2025

Date of decision: 09.04.2026.

The Government of H.P. & others ...Appellants.

Versus

Ajay Kumar & others ...Respondents.

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

For the appellants : Mr. Manish Thakur, Deputy

Advocate General.

For the respondents : Mr. Devender K. Sharma, Advocate.

Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):

The present appeal arises out of judgment and

decree, as passed by the learned Additional District Judge,

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. dated 01.07.2025 in Civil

Appeal No. 37 of 2024, whereby the appeal filed by the

present appellants has been dismissed and the judgment

and decree, as passed by the learned Civil Judge, (Sr.

Division) Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. dated 30.03.2024

in Civil Suit No. 168 of 2015, have been affirmed.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that plaintiff

Shyam Lal (since deceased through LRs.) filed a suit for

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the

judgment?

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declaration with consequential relief of injunction over land

comprised in Khewat No. 220, Khatauni No. 254, bearing

Khasra No. 672, measuring 00 -02-76 hectares, situated at

Mohal Nawahi, Hadbast No. 368, Illaqua Suranga, Tehsil

Sarkagbat Distt. Mandi (HP). It is averred that the suit land

prior to settlement operation, which took place in the area

concerned in the year of 1968 -1969, comprised in Khata

Khatauni No.80 min/183 bearing Khasra No. 494 (old)

corresponding to Khasra No. 657 (new), land measuring 00-02-

76 hectare and thereafter in consolidation operation which

effected in the year 1990-1991, the suit land carved in Khata

Khatauni No. 190/228 bearing Khasra No. 657 (old)

corresponding to Khasra No. 672 (new), land measuring 00-02-

76 hectare, Nakal Missal Hakiyat Bandobast Jadid, Mouza

Nabahi/368 and Nakal Missal Hakiyat consolidation of the

year 1993-94 of Mauza Nabahi Tehsil Sarkaghat, District

Mandi, H.P., was jointly owned by plaintiff alongwith proforma

defendants and in possession of proforma defendants No. 7 & 8

in the revenue record.

3. It is averred that the suit land before the settlement

operation was in joint ownership and possession of

predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff as well as of proforma

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defendants and after their death the property was inherited by

plaintiff alongwith proforma defendants or their predecessor-in-

interest to the extent of their entitled share respectively.

4. It is further submitted that the department of

HPPWD had constructed a road namely “Ghumarwin to

Sarkaghat” through the suit land and when the

respondents/plaintiffs objected to the same, assurance was

given to the plaintiffs that they shall be duly compensated on

account of utilization of the suit land and it is only on their

assurance that the plaintiffs permitted the officials of the State

to raise the construction of the road over the suit land. In the

revenue record, classification of the land has been depicted as

“gair mumkin road”. Since the defendants have utilized the

land of the plaintiffs without adopting due process of law

including payment of amount, therefore, the plaintiffs filed a

suit to declare their rights of due compensation qua the suit

land.

5. As per the averments as made in the plaint the

cause of action arose to the plaintiffs to file suit firstly on

29.04.2008 and thereafter on 07.12.2011 when the suit land

was not found to have been mentioned in the Notification as

issued by the State under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

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The plaintiffs were under impression that on account of the

promises as made by the officials of the defendants, the suit

land shall be acquired and compensation shall be duly paid to

the affected parties. Therefore, the suit for declaration and

injunction was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants.

6. The suit was contested by the defendants by raising

preliminary objections with regard to maintainability, cause of

action, mis-joinder and nonjoinder of necessary parties,

suppression of facts etc. It was admitted that road namely

“Ghumarwin-Sarkaghat” was constructed in the year 1955 -

1960. It was averred that the road was constructed by the

Public Works Department after complying with the codal

formalities which were required for the construction of the road.

It was averred that at the time of construction of the road, no

objection of any kind was raised by affected parties including

the plaintiff. Further it was averred that the suit is barred by

limitation and that the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit

on account of his conduct since no objection was raised by him

with respect to the construction of the road at the relevant time.

It was further averred that the defendants paid compensation

to the land owners with respect to the construction and since

the record is about more than 63 years old and though every

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efforts were made to trace the record but, the same could not

be done. Therefore, the defendants sought the dismissal of the

suit on the ground of limitation and on the principle of

estoppel.

7. The plaintiffs filed the replication reiterating the

contents of the plaint.

8. On 09.11.2023, following issues came to be

framed by the learned Trial Court:-

“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration to

the effect that plaintiff and proforma defendants

have right to compensation qua the suit land which

is being used and appropriated by the defendants

in the construction of HPPWD road, as prayed? OPP

2. Whether the plaintiff, is entitled for the decree of

mandatory injunction, directing defendants to

acquire the suit land within the ambit of law for

using the same as road to give adequate and

appropriate compensation of the suit land to the

plaintiff, as prayed? OPP

3. Whether plaintiff is entitled for decree of permanent

prohibitory injunction, as prayed? OPP

4. Whether suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD

5. Whether suit is liable to be dismissed for non

disclosure of cause of action, as alleged? OPD

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6. Whether suit of plaintiff is bad for non-joinder and

mis-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD

7. Whether suit of plaintiff is barred by limitation, as

alleged? OPD

8. Whether plaintiff is estopped from filing present suit

by his own act and conduct, as alleged? OPD

9. Whether plaintiff is entitled for special cost for filing

false and frivolous suit, as alleged? OPD

10. Relief.”

9. The learned trial Court directed the respective

parties to adduce evidence in support of contention and vide its

judgment and decree dated 30.03.2024, the suit filed by

plaintiff was decreed to the effect that the plaintiff and proforma

defendants have right to compensation of the suit land as per

their share in the land in suit and the defendants were also

directed not to cause further interference over the suit land

until they acquired it in accordance with law.

10. Feeling dissatisfied, defendants/appellants preferred

an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sarkaghat,

Mandi on 03.06.2024 The First Appellate Court vide its

judgment and decree dated 01.07.2024 dismissed the appeal

preferred by the present appellants-State.

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11. Still feeling aggrieved, the State/appellants have

preferred the present Regular Second Appeal challenging the

impugned judgments and decrees as passed by the Courts

below.

12. It is contended by the learned Additional Advocate

General that the judgments and decrees as passed by the

learned Courts below are erroneous and are liable to be

quashed and set-aside. He further submits that the Courts

below have not decided the case in hand in accordance with law

and the decree as passed by the learned trial Court could not

have been passed by directing the defendants/appellants to

acquire the land which was utilized for the construction of the

road and by ordering the payment of amount of compensation.

13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondents/plaintiffs have defended the judgments and

decrees as passed by the Courts below. He has contended that

as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court, no person can

be deprived of his properties without process of law. He submits

that there are concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below

and the same do not call of any interference.

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14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties

and have also gone through the material available on the

case file.

15. With the consent of the parties, the case is

finally heard at admission stage.

16. The Court of the first instance as also the First

Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the

plaintiffs/respondents was utilized for construction of

Ghumarwin-Sarkaghat link road without payment of

compensation to them. No dispute has been raised as to such

findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the

defendants/State that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs after

considerable period and the same was time barred. In

alternative, it was contended that since the plaintiffs/

respondents remained silent for such a long period, they were

estopped from raising the stale claim. Principle of acquiescence

has also been sought to be applied against the

plaintiffs/respondents on the premise that the

plaintiffs/respondents were aware about the construction of

road and the road was constructed with their implied consent

and now they cannot, turn around to raise objections against

the construction of road.

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17. The defendants/appellants are constituents of a

welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot

claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on

the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right

could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of

adverse possession by the other.

18. Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not in

possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had

consented for construction of road through the suit land.

19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that

no person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without

any legal sanction and without following the due process of law

and depriving her payment of just and fair compensation. The

State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot

arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the

Constitution. The Court has held as follows:

“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and

perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly

expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to

property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article

31 in Part III of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State

Of Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31

guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could not

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be deprived without due process of law and upon just and

fair compensation.

12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental

right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act,

1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a

welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300

A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no

person shall be deprived of his property save by authority

of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his

property except in accordance with the procedure

established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,

though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be

inferred in that Article The State of West Bengal v. Subodh

Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana

Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.

12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private

property, without following due process of law, would be

violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right

under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed

on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:

“ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in

Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in

exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may

interfere with the right of property of a person by

acquiring the same but the same must be for a

public purpose and reasona ble compensation

therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)

12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this

Court held that:

“21. If the right of property is a human right as also

a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken

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away except in accordance with law. Article 300A

of the Constitution protects such right. The

provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right,

keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of

the Constitution of India, must be strictly

construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC

627.

12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of

U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as

a basic human right in the following words:

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by

different political thinkers that some amount of

property right is an indispensable safeguard

against tyranny and economic oppression of the

Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty

cannot long subsist without the support of property.

"Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist"

was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that

property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if

other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus

among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)

12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7

this Court held as follows :

“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the

powers of the State that no person shall be

deprived of his property save by authority of law.

There has to be no deprivation without any sanction

of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not

acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A.

In other words, if there is no law, there is no

deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case,

the Appellant could not have been forcibly

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dispossessed of her property without any legal

sanction, and without following due process of law,

there is no deprivation.”

12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been

forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal

sanction, and without following due process of law, and

depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC

596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental

right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.

12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her

predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is

completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority

and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant

of her property by the State.

12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,

the State could not have deprived a citizen of their

property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed

on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &

Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State

must comply with the procedure for acquisition,

requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The

State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law

cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided

by the Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar

held that the right to property is now considered to be not

only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human

right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been

considered in the realm of individual rights such as right

to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human

rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension.

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12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State

before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous

possession of the land for over 42 years, it would

tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a

welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of

adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a

person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title

over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be

permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the

doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its

own citizens, as has been done in the present case.

12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and

laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable

to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a

case of a continuing cause of action, or if the

circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.

Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,

which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in

the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon

the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy

claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no

period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise

their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so

compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its

jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat

it.

12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &

Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact

situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which

state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put

forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service

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jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to

them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for

educational facilities and other categories of similar cases,

etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that

lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from

seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been

violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of

T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of

the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different

scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over

possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without

any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked

repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The

State must either comply with the procedure laid down for

acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible

statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)

13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate

person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has

been deprived of her private property by the State without

resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The

Appellant has been divested of her right to property

without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over

half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a

continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily

expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal

sanction or following due process of law. The present case

is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since

the State has admitted that the land was taken over

without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any

procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary

jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the

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Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to

the appellant.

20. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in

(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs.

State of H.P. and others has held as under:

“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that

nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due

process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this

dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King’s

Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir

Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in

several judgments, this court has repeatedly held that

rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the

State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating

that it has acted within the confines of legality, and

therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of

law.

15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this

court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must

be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and

even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v.

State of Punjab19 this court rejected the contention that

the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be

removed by an executive order, and instead concluded

that the executive action taken by the State and its

officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule

of law. This court, in another case - State of Uttar Pradesh

and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20, held:

“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume

possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee,

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even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by

forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry'

in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods

to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a

lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is

juridical possession and forcible dispossession is

prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise

than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact

that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher

or better position. On the contrary, it is under an

additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that

all actions of Government and Governmental authorities

should have a 'legal pedigree'”.

16. Given the important protection extended to an

individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied

earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in

Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet

while acquiring land, the question remains – can the

State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its

legal responsibility towards those from whom private

property has been expropriated? In these facts and

circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable,

and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and

fairness.

17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s

actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the

injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them

to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of

acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred

only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such

judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend

the benefit of the court’s directions to those who

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specifically approached the courts. The State’s

lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of

initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in

respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had

approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other

land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in

CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No.

1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage,

the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring

land required for public use in the manner prescribed by

law.

18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches

which conclude either way – as contended by both sides

in the present dispute – however, the specific factual

matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the

appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself

behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation;

there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in

a much earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport

Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:

‘11…..."Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of

Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.

Where it would be practically unjust to give a

remedy, either because the party has, by his

conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded

as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his

conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not

waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a

situation in which it would not be reasonable to

place him if the remedy were afterwards to be

asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and

delay are most material.

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But in every case, if an argument against

relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded

upon mere delay, that delay of course not

amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the

validity of that defence must be tried upon

principles substantially equitable. Two

circumstances, always important in such cases,

are, the length of the delay and the nature of the

acts done during the interval, which might affect

either party and cause a balance of justice or

injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far

as relates to the remedy."

19. The facts of the present case reveal that the

State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,

actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as

required by law, only to those for which it was

specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all

those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which

is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article

31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly

warranted consideration, and intervention by the

High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This

court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the

name of the aggrieved had been deleted from

revenue records leading to his dispossession from

the land without payment of compensation – held:

6“Having heard the learned counsel for the

appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected

before the court by the appellants is utterly

untenable and not worthy of emanating from any

State which professes the least regard to being a

welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned

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counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should

be gracious enough to accept its mistake and

promptly pay the compensation to the respondent,

the State has taken an intractable attitude and

persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and

reasonable claim of the respondent.

Ours is a constitutional democracy and the

rights available to the citizens are declared by the

Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted

by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution,

Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,

which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be

deprived of property save by authority of law.—No

person shall be deprived of his property save by

authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find

utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the

respondent's property by the appellants who are

State authorities. In our view, this case was an

eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction

of the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution…

20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while

dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held

as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)

“11“There are authorities which state that delay

and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.

Most of these authorities pertain to service

jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong

done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory

dues, claim for educational facilities and other

categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true

that there are a few authorities that lay down that

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delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking

remedy, even if his fundamental right has been

violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution,

the case at hand deals with a different scenario

altogether. The functionaries of the State took over

possession of the land belonging to the appellants

without any sanction of law. The appellants had

asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of

compensation. The State must either comply with

the procedure laid down for acquisition, or

requisition, or any other permissible statutory

mode.”

21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court

finds that the contentions raised by the State, do

not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected.

The State has merely averred to the appellants’

alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but

has not placed any material on record to

substantiate this plea. Further, the State was

unable to produce any evidence indicating that the

land of the appellants had been taken over or

acquired in the manner known to law, or that they

had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to

note that this was the State’s position, and

subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as

well, in the other writ proceedings.”

21. The similar position has been reiterated and relied

upon in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court by the Hon’ble

Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of 2022, titled as

Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

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& another dated 20.10.2023. After relying upon the judgment

of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi & Sukh Dutt Ratra’s case, the

Court held as follows:

“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has

categorically held that contention advanced by the State

of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is

liable to be rejected especially when it is not in dispute

that petitioner are suffering continuous loss coupled with

the fact that they repeatedly requested the authorities to

initiate acquisition proceedings.

8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it

clearly emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of

their land, without following due process of law. If it is so,

ground raised by the respondents that petitioners have

made their land available with consent, is of no

consequence rather, this court, having taken note of the

fact that the land of petitioners stands utilized for the

construction of road in question, is compelled to agree

with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners

that her clients are entitled for compensation qua the land

utilized by respondents for construction of road in

question.

10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for

construction of road but till date, they have not been paid

any amount, which action of the respondent -State

certainly amounts to forcible dispossess ion of the

petitioners from their land, which is violative of provision

contained under Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India.

14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed

Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has

held that entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area

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and without workable roads, no communication is

possible; every person is entitled to life as enjoined in

Article 21 of the Constitution of India; every person has

right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to

move freely, throughout the territory of India; for the

residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life

itself. Stand taken by the respondents that there was a

policy for providing roads on demand of residents as a

favour to them on conditions that they would not claim

compensation, cannot be sustained because such stand is

violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of

Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex

Court has held that though right to property is not a

fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right

under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also a

human right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no

person can be deprived of his property save by the

authority of law. No doubt, State possesses the power to

take or control the property of the owner of the land for

the benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged to

compensate the injury by making just compensation.”

22. The Courts below, after appreciating the oral as well

as documentary evidence placed on record and on the basis of

the title, decreed the suit as filed by the respondents and have

rightly came to the conclusion that they are entitled for

declaration and amount of compensation on account of

utilization of suit land.

-23-

23. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no

person can be deprived of his property without adopting due

process of law, therefore, under such circumstances, the plea

as set up by the appellants-State is not tenable in the facts and

circumstances of the case, once they have utilized the land of

the villagers without adopting due process of law. Now the plea

as raised by the present appellants is not permissible that too

at the stage of Regular Second Appeal. There are concurrent

findings of fact by the Courts below.

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments

has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No

doubt, second appellate court exercising the pow er under

Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on

limited grounds such as - (a) where the finding is based on

inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the

relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on

misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not

case in hand.

25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope

of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.

Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:

“18. It has been noted time and again that without

insisting for the statement of such a substantial question

-24-

of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the

same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been

issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals

without adhering to the procedure prescribed under

Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a

number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish

between a question of law and a substantial question of

law. In exercise of the powers under this section in

several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate

court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept

in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an

inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a

substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in

accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The

conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly

fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no

court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds.

The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable

grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be

disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers

under this section. Further, a substantial question of law

has to be distinguished from a substantial question of

fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v.

Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held

that : "The proper test for determining whether a question

of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our

opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or

whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of

the parties and if so whether it is either an open question

in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by

the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free

from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.

-25-

If the question is settled by the highest court or the

general principles to be applied in determining the

question are well settled and there is a mere question of

applying those principles or that the plea raised is

palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial

question of law.

" 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to

investigate the grounds on which the findings were

arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first

appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court

should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the

trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has

rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the

same is no ground for interference in second appeal when

it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory

reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of

circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one

drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered

by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other

approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however,

interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by

the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to

the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled

position on the basis of pronouncements made by the

Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or

arrived at by ignoring material evidence.

20. to 22 xx xx xx xx

23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be

debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a

binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on

the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar

as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a

-26-

question of law "involving in the case" there must be first

a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question

should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact

arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to

decide that question of law for a just and proper decision

of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time

before the High Court is not a question involved in the

case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,

therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each

case whether a question of law is a substantial one and

involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall

consideration being the need for striking a judicious

balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice

at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding

prolongation in the life of any lis.”

26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.

Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267 , has held as follows:-

“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the

aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be

determined by a court of fact after appreciating the

evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate

court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a second

appellate court exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC

can interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds,

such as, (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible

evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of relevant

admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading

of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is not

the case here.

17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in

paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement

-27-

(Exb. A-2) made on the back of a registered document

(Exb. A-1) after considering the oral evidence led by the

plaintiff-appellant and the circumstance that

signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were not

disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank

paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in

paragraph 29 of its judgment was not addressed by the

High Court. In fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy

defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed that

genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our view, the

High Court fell in error here. While exercising powers

under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have interfered

with the finding of fact returned by the first appellate

court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate

court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the

evidence available on record as also the circumstance that

signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document

(Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while

disturbing the finding of the first appellate court, the High

Court did not hold that the finding returned by the first

appellate court is based on a misreading of evidence, or is

in ignorance of relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus,

there existed no occasion for the High Court, exercising

power under Section 100 CPC, to interfere with the finding

of the first appellate court regarding payment of

additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above

the sale consideration fixed for the transaction. 18. Once

the finding regarding payment of additional sum of

Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first appellate

court is sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold

that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not ready and willing to

perform its part under the contract particularly when Rs.

-28-

4,70,000, out of total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was

already paid and, over and above that, additional sum of

Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 &

D-2. This we say so, because an opinion regarding

plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform its part

under the contract is to be formed on the entirety of

proven facts and circumstances of a case including

conduct of the parties. The test is that the person claiming

performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he

has treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to

fulfill his obligation and accept performance when the

time for performance arrives.”

27. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for

the parties.

28. No question of law much less substantial

question of law arises in the present appeal.

29. Consequently, the present appeal being devoid of

any merit is dismissed. No order as to the costs. Pending

applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

30. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.

(Romesh Verma)

Judge

9

th April, 2026.

(kck)