Commercial Courts Act 2015, Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Section 13, Section 29A, Section 37, appealability, maintainability, interim order, arbitral tribunal
 20 Nov, 2026
Listen in 01:20 mins | Read in 51:00 mins
EN
HI

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Vs. M/s Srilakshmi Srinivas Jute Mills Pvt Ltd and Sri NS R Chandra Prasad

  Andhra Pradesh High Court COMMERCIAL COURT APPEAL NO: 13 OF 2026
Link copied!

Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant challenged an order passed by the Special Judge for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes, Visakhapatnam, which had allowed an application for extension of ...

Bench

Applied Acts & Sections

No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

1

Date of reserved for orders : 09.09.2026

Date of pronouncement : 20.11.2026

Date of uploading : 20.11.2026

APHC010260982026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

FRIDAY, THE 20

th

DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D RAMESH

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

COMMERCIAL COURT APPEAL NO: 13 OF 2026

Between:

1. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.,, represented by its Authorized

Officer, Divisional Office -III, Gajuwaka, Visakhapatnam - 530026.

...APPELLANT

AND

1. M/s Srilakshmi Srinivas Jute Mills Pvt Ltd, rep.by its Authorized Person,

Sri.K.Govindarajulu, Director, Having its Registered Office at Bobbili Road,

Rajam, Vizianagaram District, Andhra Pradesh - 532127.

2. Sri N S R Chandra Prasad, , Sole Arbitrator, T-1/812, Swan Lake

Apartments, Sangeetha Nagar, Kukatpally, Hyderabad - 500072

...RESPONDENTs

The Appellant prefers this Memorandum of Commercial Courts Appeal

seeking to Set-A-Side the Order/ Judgment dated 15/04/2026, in CAOP No.

5/2026 on the file of the court of the Special Judge for Trial and Disposal of

Commercial Disputes, Visakhapatnam

2

IA NO: 1 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances

stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be

pleased to stay the operation of the Order dated 15/04/2026 passed in

CAOP No. 5/2026 on the file of the court of the Special Judge for Trial and

Disposal of Commercial Disputes, Visakhapatnam pending disposal of the

main COMCA and pass

Counsel for the Appellant: KIRAN KUMAR VADLAMUDI

Counsel for the Respondents: S.MOHANA RAO

The Court made the following order:

3

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D.RAMESH

AND

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

COMMERCIAL COURT APPEAL NO: 13 OF 2026

ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice A. Hari Haranadha Sarma)

Introductory:-

[i] This is an appeal filed under Section 13 of Commercial Courts

Act r/w Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The

challenge in this appeal is against the orders dated 15.04.2026 passed in

CAOP No.5 of 2026 by the Special Judge for Trial and Disposal of

Commercial Disputes, Visakhapatnam [For short ‘the Commercial Court’], in

terms of Section 29A(4) and (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

[ii] Respondent No.1 before the Commercial Court is the appellant.

Respondent No.2 before the Commercial Court and in the present appeal is

only a formal party – learned Arbitrator.

2. An application was filed before the Commercial Court in terms of

Sections 29A (4) and 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

seeking for extension of the mandate of the learned Arbitral Tribunal for a

further period of (8) eight months from the date of disposal of the said

application. The application was opposed by the appellant, disputing the

grounds set out in support of the extension and raising various objections,

4

inter alia with regard to the maintainability of the proceedings, insufficiency

of the grounds pleaded for extension, absence of a cause of action, abuse of

the process of law, pendency of proceedings before the National Company

Law Tribunal (NCLT), and attributing delay to the conduct of the petitioner.

3. Learned Special Judge for the Commercial Court allowed the

application extending the mandate period, granting (7) months time i.e., from

29.12.2025 to 29.07.2026.

4. Aggrieved by the same the present appeal is filed disputing granting

of such time.

Hearing:-

5. (i) Heard Sri Kiran Kumar Vadlamudi, learned counsel for the

appellant and Sri Rohit Benerjee, Sri Joydeep Sen, Sri Sin Guru Sai

Krishna, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

(ii) A preliminary objection is raised as to the maintainability of the

present appeal in terms of Section 13 of Commercial Courts Act, against an

order passed under Sections 29A(4), 29A(5) of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. It is contended that no appeal lies under Section 13

of Commercial Courts Act against an order of such nature, as the said

provision does not envisage orders passed under Sections 29A(4) and

29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are appealable orders. It is

further contended that the scope of Section 13 of Commercial Courts Act is

5

confined to appeals against the orders enumerated under Order XLIII of

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or orders appealable under Section 37 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act and does not extend to orders of any other

nature.

(iii) The learned counsel for the respondent in the present appeal

has vehemently contended that the appeal can be maintainable only in

respect of the orders where a specific right of appeal is conferred under the

relevant statute, and the right of appeal is not an inherent or vested right

unless expressly conferred by the statute; in the absence of such statutory

conferment, an appeal cannot be maintained against every order passed by

a Court. It is further contended that the scope of Section 13 of the

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is limited to the circumstances specifically

contemplated therein. In support of his contentions and in opposition to the

maintainability of the appeal, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the

following decisions:

1) Fuerst Day Lawson Limited Vs. Jindal Exports Limited

1

2) Kandla Export Corporation and Another Vs. OCI Corporation

and Another

2

3) BGS SGS Soma JV Vs. NHPC Limited

3

1

(2011) 8 SCC 333

2

(2018) 14 SCC 715

3

(2020) 4 SCC 234

6

(iv) Answering the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the

appellant, apart from relying upon the decision in Kandla Export

Corporation’s case (cited 2 supra), has also placed reliance on the very

same decision in BGS SGS Soma JV’s case (cited 3 supra), and contended

that the present appeal is very much maintainable and the arguments of the

learned counsel for the respondent with regard to the maintainability of the

appeal are devoid of merit and do not warrant consideration, hence, the

grounds urged in the appeal can be considered. However, learned counsel

for the respondent insisted for deciding the maintainability of the appeal.

Hence, this Court is constrained to answer the maintainability of the appeal

as a preliminary objection.

6. Now, the point that arises for consideration is,

Whether an appeal is maintainable under Section 13 of

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 against on order passed by the

Commercial Court in terms of Section 29A (4) and (5) of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996?

7. (i) The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that,

in view of the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Fuerst Day

Lawson Limited’s case (cited 1 supra), the Arbitration and Conciliation Act

1996 being a self -contained Code, the applicability of the general law

governing appeals is not possible. It is, therefore, contended that the

present appeal is not maintainable under Section 37 of the Arbitration and

7

Conciliation Act, 1996. Further, by placing reliance on the observations of

the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kandla Export Corporation’s case (cited 2

supra), the learned counsel would submit that an appeal under Section 13 of

the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, would lie only against orders passed by a

Commercial Court or Commercial Division covered by Order XLIII of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or by Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. It is contended that Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act does not encompass orders passed under Section 29A

thereof within its ambit. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that the

present appeal is not maintainable under Section 13 of the Commercial

Courts Act.

(ii). Further, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the

observations made in BGS SGS Soma JV’ s case (cited 3 supra) and

submitted that the jurisdictional aspect has been exhaustively considered by

the Hon'ble Apex Court therein. It is contended that, the observations are to

the effect that, where an order is passed beyond the categories of orders

specifically contemplated under Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, or Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,

no appeal would lie under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

(iii) He would also submit that, while examining the scope of

Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 with reference to Section 37

of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and placing reliance on the decision in

8

Kandla Export Corporation’s case (cited 2 supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court

in BGS SGS Soma JV’s case (cited 3 supra), considered the maintainability

of the appeal against the orders passed under Section 50 of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act. The findings recorded therein would drive one to the

conclusion that an appeal against the order, which does not fall within the

ambit of either Order XLIII of the CPC or Section 37 of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, is not maintainable under Section 13 of the Commercial

Courts Act. Consequently the present appeal is liable to be rejected.

8. Answering the same, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the observations in Kandla Export Corporation’s case (cited 2 supra) and

BGS SGS Soma JV’ s case (cited 3 supra) were made in the context of

questioning the orders passed in terms of Section 50 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, which falls outside Part I of the said Act and relating to

international arbitration. He would further submit that Section 50 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act operates independently and specifically

provides for the maintainability of the appeals against the orders

enumerated therein, subject to an express bar that no second appeal shall

lie against such orders. Therefore, the observations made by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in that context cannot be extended to attract any bar under

Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, insofar as the

maintainability of the present appeal is concerned.

9

Analysis:-

9. Before answering the contentions, it is found relevant to refer to the

provisions of Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 37 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Section 13 of the Commercial Courts

Act 2015

[i] Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:-

Appeal from orders - An appeal shall lie from the following orders under

the provisions of section 104, namely:-

“(a) an order under rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented

to the proper Court [except where the procedure specified in rule 10A

of Order VII has been followed]; (b) [*****]

(c) an order under rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case

open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit;

(d) an order under rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case

open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte

[*****]

(f) an order under rule 21 of Order XI; (g) [*****]

(i) an order under rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a

document or of an endorsement;

(j) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or

refusing to set aside a sale;

[(ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of rule

106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application,

that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 105 of

that Order is appealable.]

(k) an order under rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the

abatement or dismissal of a suit;

(l) an order under rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave;

(m) [*****]

10

(n) an order under rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application (in a case

open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit;

[(na) an order under rule 5 or rule 7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an

application for permission to sue as an indigent persons:] ; (o) [*****]

(p) orders in interpleader-suits under rule, rule 4 or rule 6 or Order

XXXV; (q) an order under rule 2, rule 3 or rule 6 of Order XXXVIII;

(r) an order under rule 1, rule 2 [rule 2A], rule 4 or rule 10 of Order

XXXIX; (s) an order under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order XL; (t) an order of

refusal under rule 19 of Order XLI to re-admit, or under rule 21 of

Order XLI to re-hear, an appeal; (u) an order rule 23 [or rule 23A] of

Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the

decree of the Appellate Court; (v) [*****]

(w) an order under rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for

review.

[ii] Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act:-

“37. Appealable orders:

(1)[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in

force, an appeal] [Substituted 'An appeal' by Act No. 33 of 2019, dated

9.8.2019.] shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court

authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing

the order, namely:

(a)[ refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;

(b)granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;

(c)setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section

34.

(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order of the arbitral Tribunal,

(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of

section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this

section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal

to the Supreme Court.”

11

[iii] Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act 2015:-

“13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial

Divisions.

(1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Commercial Court or

Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial

Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of sixty days from the

date of judgment or order, as the case may be:

Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a

Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically enumerated

under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as amended by this

Act and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in

force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or

decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in

accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

10. (i) If a commercial dispute is entertained by a Commercial Court,

the provisions of the CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, are

applicable thereto, an appeal against an order passed thereon, as provided

under Order XLIII of CPC, is maintainable under Section 13 of the

Commercial Courts Act. To this extent, there can be no quarrel. In so far as

an order passed by a Commercial Court in a matter arising out of or relating

to Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, if such an order is appealable under

Section 37 of the said Act, an appeal is maintainable under Section 13 of the

12

Commercial Courts Act, read with Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act. This is also clear.

(ii) Now, the controversy raised for consideration is, in respect of

orders which are neither covered by Order XLIII of the CPC nor made

appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, whether

an appeal is maintainable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act,

2015, against every order passed by a Commercial Court, in view of Section

13(1) of the said Act.

11. The applicability of Section 37 and the context in which the said

provision operates is not in dispute. Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically enumerates the orders against which an

appeal is maintainable. The orders appealable under Section 37 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, are as follows:

1) An order refusing to refer the parties to the Arbitration under

Section 8,

2) An order granting or refusing any interim measure under Section 9,

3) An order setting aside or refusing to set aside arbitral award under

Section 34,

4) An order accepting a plea under Sub-sections (2) or ( 3) of Section

16 of the Act that the Arbitral Tribunal lacks jurisdiction or is

exceeding the scope of its authority; and

13

5) An order granting or refusing to grant any interim measure under

Section 17 by the Arbitral Tribunal.

12. As per Section 13(1) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015,

Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Commercial Court or

Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal within sixty (60)

days, before the Commercial Appellate Division of that High

Court.

The proviso to Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015

specifically provides that an appeal shall lie from the orders passed by a

Commercial Division or a Commercial Court, as enumerated under Order

XLIII of CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It

is very much clear that an order passed under 29A of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act is not falling within the ambit of the appealable orders

enumerated under Section 37 of the said Act.

13. In this context, it is found appropriate to refer to the observations of

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the authorities cited supra, which are as follows:

1) Kandla Export Corporation and Another Vs. OCI Corporation

and Another [Cited 2 supra] vide para 13 to 15 reads as follows:

“ 13. Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, with which we are

immediately concerned in these appeals, is in two parts. The main provision

is, as has been correctly submitted by Shri Giri, a provision which provides for

appeals from judgments, orders and decrees of the Commercial Division of

14

the High Court. To this main provision, an exception is carved out by the

proviso. The primary purpose of a proviso is to qualify the generality of the

main part by providing an exception, which has been set out with great felicity

in CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. [CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959

Supp (2) SCR 256 : AIR 1959 SC 713] , thus: (SCR pp. 266-67 : AIR pp. 717-

18, paras 9-10)

“9. … The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the

main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the

main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main

enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it

as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject

which is foreign to the main enactment.

‘8. … it is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered

with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso.’

Therefore, it is to be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.

(Per Das, C.J. in Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of J&K [Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of

J&K, 1957 SCR 51 : AIR 1957 SC 281 : 1957 Cri LJ 404] , SCR p. 59 : AIR p.

284, para 8). Bhagwati, J., in Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. CST [Ram Narain Sons

Ltd. v. CST, (1955) 2 SCR 483 : AIR 1955 SC 765] , said: (SCR p. 493 : AIR

p. 769, para 10): “10. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a

particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by

the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it

has been enacted as a proviso and to no other.”

10. Lord Macmillan in Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway Co. Ltd. v.

Bezwada Municipality [Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway Co. Ltd. v.

Bezwada Municipality, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 7 : (1943-44) 71 IA 113] laid

down the sphere of a proviso as follows: (IA p. 122 : SCC OnLine PC)

‘… The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case

which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and

its effect is confined to that case. Where, as in the present case, the language of the

main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on

the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude, from it by implication what

clearly falls within its express terms.’

The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to

the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have

been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the

language of the main enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose

of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the

enactment clearly says unless the words of the proviso are such that that

is its necessary effect.

15

14. The proviso goes on to state that an appeal shall lie from such

orders passed by the Commercial Division of the High Court that are

specifically enumerated under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Code, 1908, and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. It will at once be

noticed that orders that are not specifically enumerated under Order 43

CPC would, therefore, not be appealable, and appeals that are

mentioned in Section 37 of the Arbitration Act alone are appeals that can

be made to the Commercial Appellate Division of a High Court.

15. Thus, an order which refers parties to arbitration under Section 8, not

being appealable under Section 37(1)(a), would not be appealable under

Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Similarly, an appeal

rejecting a plea referred to in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the

Arbitration Act would equally not be appealable under Section 37(2)(a)

and, therefore, under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act.”

2) In BGS SGS Soma JV Vs. NHPC Limited [cited 3 supra] the

observations made in paras 12 to 20, which read as follows:

“ 12. The interplay between Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and

Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, has been laid down in

some detail in the judgment in Kandla Export Corpn. [Kandla Export

Corpn. v. OCI Corpn., (2018) 14 SCC 715 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 664] The

precise question that arose in Kandla Export Corpn. [Kandla Export

Corpn. v. OCI Corpn., (2018) 14 SCC 715 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 664] was

as to whether an appeal, which was not maintainable under Section 50 of

the Arbitration Act, 1996, is nonetheless maintainable under Section

13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In this context, after setting

out various provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the

Arbitration Act, 1996, this Court held : (SCC pp. 727, 729, 731-34, paras

13-15, 20-22 & 27)

16

“13. Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, with which we are

immediately concerned in these appeals, is in two parts. The main provision is,

as has been correctly submitted by Shri Giri, a provision which provides for

appeals from judgments, orders and decrees of the Commercial Division of the

High Court. To this main provision, an exception is carved out by the proviso.

…”

14. The proviso goes on to state that an appeal shall lie from such orders

passed by the Commercial Division of the High Court that are specifically

enumerated under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and

Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. It will at once be noticed that orders that are

not specifically enumerated under Order 43 CPC would, therefore, not be

appealable, and appeals that are mentioned in Section 37 of the Arbitration

Act alone are appeals that can be made to the Commercial Appellate Division

of a High Court.

15. Thus, an order which refers parties to arbitration under Section 8, not

being appealable under Section 37(1)(a), would not be appealable under

Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Similarly, an appeal rejecting a

plea referred to in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act

would equally not be appealable under Section 37(2)(a) and, therefore, under

Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act.

***

20. Given the judgment of this Court in Fuerst Day Lawson [Fuerst Day

Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2011) 8 SCC 333 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ)

178] , which Parliament is presumed to know when it enacted the Arbitration

Amendment Act, 2015, and given the fact that no change was made in Section

50 of the Arbitration Act when the Commercial Courts Act was brought into

force, it is clear that Section 50 is a provision contained in a self-contained

code on matters pertaining to arbitration, and which is exhaustive in nature. It

carries the negative import mentioned in para 89 of Fuerst Day Lawson [Fuerst

Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2011) 8 SCC 333 : (2011) 4 SCC

(Civ) 178] that appeals which are not mentioned therein, are not permissible.

This being the case, it is clear that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts

Act, being a general provision vis-à-vis arbitration relating to appeals arising

out of commercial disputes, would obviously not apply to cases covered by

Section 50 of the Arbitration Act.

21. However, the question still arises as to why Section 37 of the

Arbitration Act was expressly included in the proviso to Section 13(1) of the

Commercial Courts Act, which is equally a special provision of appeal

contained in a self-contained code, which in any case would be outside

Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. One answer is that this was done

ex abundanti cautela. Another answer may be that as Section 37 itself was

amended by the Arbitration Amendment Act, 2015, which came into force on

the same day as the Commercial Courts Act, Parliament thought, in its

wisdom, that it was necessary to emphasise that the amended Section 37

would have precedence over the general provision contained in Section 13(1)

of the Commercial Courts Act. Incidentally, the amendment of 2015 introduced

one more category into the category of appealable orders in the Arbitration

Act, namely, a category where an order is made under Section 8 refusing to

refer parties to arbitration. Parliament may have found it necessary to

emphasise the fact that an order referring parties to arbitration under Section 8

is not appealable under Section 37(1)(a) and would, therefore, not be

appealable under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Whatever may

be the ultimate reason for including Section 37 of the Arbitration Act in the

proviso to Section 13(1), the ratio decidendi of the judgment in Fuerst Day

Lawson [Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2011) 8 SCC 333 :

17

(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 178] would apply, and this being so, appeals filed under

Section 50 of the Arbitration Act would have to follow the drill of Section 50

alone.

22. This, in fact, follows from the language of Section 50 itself. In all

arbitration cases of enforcement of foreign awards, it is Section 50 alone that

provides an appeal. Having provided for an appeal, the forum of appeal is left

“to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from such orders”. Section 50

properly read would, therefore, mean that if an appeal lies under the said

provision, then alone would Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act be

attracted as laying down the forum which will hear and decide such an appeal.

***

27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different angle. Given the

objects of both the statutes, it is clear that arbitration itself is meant to be a

speedy resolution of disputes between parties. Equally, enforcement of foreign

awards should take place as soon as possible if India is to remain as an equal

partner, commercially speaking, in the international community. In point of fact,

the raison d'être for the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act is that

commercial disputes involving high amounts of money should be speedily

decided. Given the objects of both the enactments, if we were to provide an

additional appeal, when Section 50 does away with an appeal so as to

speedily enforce foreign awards, we would be turning the Arbitration Act and

the Commercial Courts Act on their heads. Admittedly, if the amount contained

in a foreign award to be enforced in India were less than Rs 1 crore, and a

Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie,

in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. However,

if in the same fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs 1 crore or

more, if the appellants are correct, enforcement of such award would be

further delayed by providing an appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial

Courts Act. Any such interpretation would lead to absurdity, and would be

directly contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Commercial Courts

Act viz. speedy resolution of disputes of a commercial nature involving a sum

of Rs 1 crore and over. For this reason also, we feel that Section 13(1) of the

Commercial Courts Act must be construed in accordance with the object

sought to be achieved by the Act. Any construction of Section 13 of the

Commercial Courts Act, which would lead to further delay, instead of an

expeditious enforcement of a foreign award must, therefore, be eschewed.

Even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is

clear that they are best harmonised by giving effect to the special statute i.e.

the Arbitration Act, vis-à-vis the more general statute, namely, the Commercial

Courts Act, being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration.”

13. Given the fact that there is no independent right of appeal

under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which merely

provides the forum of filing appeals, it is the parameters of Section 37 of

the Arbitration Act, 1996 alone which have to be looked at in order to

determine whether the present appeals were maintainable. Section

37(1) makes it clear that appeals shall only lie from the orders set out in

sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) and from no others. The pigeonhole that the

High Court in the impugned judgment [NHPC Ltd. v. Jaiparkash

Associates Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 1304 : (2019) 193 AIC 839]

18

has chosen to say that the appeals in the present cases were

maintainable is sub-clause (c). According to the High Court, even where

a Section 34 application is ordered to be returned to the appropriate

court, such order would amount to an order “refusing to set aside an

arbitral award under Section 34”.

14. Interestingly, under the proviso to Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial

Courts Act, 2015, Order 43 CPC is also mentioned. Order 43 Rule (1)(a) reads as

follows:

“1. Appeals from orders.— An appeal shall lie from the following orders under

the provisions of Section 104, namely—

( a) an order under Rule 10 of Order 7 returning a plaint to be

presented to the proper court except where the procedure specified in Rule

10-A of Order 7 has been followed;”

This provision is conspicuous by its absence in Section 37 of the

Arbitration Act, 1996, which alone can be looked at for the purpose of

filing appeals against orders setting aside, or refusing to set aside

awards under Section 34. Also, what is missed by the impugned

judgment [NHPC Ltd. v. Jaiparkash Associates Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine

P&H 1304 : (2019) 193 AIC 839] is the words “under Section 34”. Thus,

the refusal to set aside an arbitral award must be under Section 34

i.e. after the grounds set out in Section 34 have been applied to the

arbitral award in question, and after the Court has turned down such

grounds. Admittedly, on the facts of these cases, there was no

adjudication under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 — all that

was done was that the Special Commercial Court at Gurugram

allowed an application filed under Section 151 read with Order 7 Rule

10 CPC, determining that the Special Commercial Court at Gurugram

had no jurisdiction to proceed further with the Section 34 application,

and therefore, such application would have to be returned to the

competent court situate at New Delhi.

19

15. Shri Anurabh Chowdhury referred to a number of judgments in which

a well-settled proposition was elucidated i.e. that an appeal is a creature

of statute, and must either be found within the four corners of the statute,

or not be there be at all. In support thereof, he referred to MCD v.

International Security & Intelligence Agency Ltd. [MCD v. International

Security & Intelligence Agency Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 250] (at paras 14 and

15), and Arcot Textile Mills Ltd. v. Regl. Provident Fund Commr. [Arcot

Textile Mills Ltd. v. Regl. Provident Fund Commr., (2013) 16 SCC 1 :

(2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 358] (at para 20). He also referred to a recent Delhi

High Court judgment reported as South Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Tech

Mahindra [South Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Tech Mahindra, 2019 SCC

OnLine Del 11863] , in which the Delhi High Court held that an order

[Tech Mahindra Ltd. v. NDMC, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 13342] of a Single

Judge, which directed the deposit of 50% of the awarded amount, would

not be appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 read with

the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

In the course of discussion the Delhi High Court said : (South Delhi

Municipal Corpn. case [South Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Tech Mahindra,

2019 SCC OnLine Del 11863] , SCC OnLine Del paras 12-13)

“12. In view of the above discussions, we conclude that the

present appeal is not maintainable. The appellant's remedy clearly lies

elsewhere. An attempt was made to urge that no litigant can be

deprived of remedy if there is a grievance : ubi jus ibi remedium;

however, that argument is wholly without substance because an

appeal, it has been repeatedly emphasised, is a specific creation of

statute and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. This was explained

pithily in Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar [Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, (1974) 2

SCC 393] , in the following terms : (SCC p. 397, para 15)

‘15. … There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and

the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a

suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at

one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit,

howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no right to sue. A

suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough

that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is

quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore

an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law.

20

That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of

statute.’

13. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the present appeal is

plainly not maintainable by virtue of provisions of the Commercial

Courts Act, 2015; the appeal is therefore dismissed. No costs.”

16. Shri Chowdhury also referred to another Delhi High Court

judgment reported as Harmanprit Singh Sidhu v. Arcadia Shares &

Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. [Harmanprit Singh Sidhu v. Arcadia Shares &

Stock Brokers (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5383 : (2016) 234

DLT 30] , in which a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court

allowed [Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. Harmanprit

Singh Sidhu, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6625] an application for

condonation of delay in filing a Section 34 petition. The Division

Bench, in holding that an appeal against such an order would not be

maintainable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, read with

the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 held : (Harmanprit Singh Sidhu case

[Harmanprit Singh Sidhu v. Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd., 2016

SCC OnLine Del 5383 : (2016) 234 DLT 30] , SCC OnLine Del para 10)

“10. Coming to Section 37(1), it is evident that an appeal can

lie from only the orders specified in clauses (a), (b) or (c). In

other words, an appeal under Section 37 would only be

maintainable against (a) an order refusing to refer the parties

to arbitration under Section 8 of the A&C Act; (b) an order

granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9 of

the A&C Act; or (c) an order setting aside or refusing to set

aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The

impugned order [Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v.

Harmanprit Singh Sidhu, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6625] is

clearly not relatable to Section 8 or 9 of the A&C Act. It was

sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the

appellant that the present appeal would fall within Section

37(1)(c) which relates to an order “setting aside” or “refusing

to set aside” an arbitral award under Section 34. We are

unable to accept this proposition. By virtue of the impugned

order, the arbitral award dated 10-9-2013 has not been set

aside. Nor has the court, at this stage, refused to set aside

the said arbitral award under Section 34 of the A&C Act. In

fact, the appellant in whose favour the award has been

made, would only be aggrieved if the award were to have

21

been set aside in whole or in part. That has not happened.

What the learned single Judge has done is to have condoned

the delay in re-filing of the petition under Section 34. This has

not, in any way, impacted the award.”

17. The reasoning in this judgment in Harmanprit Singh Sidhu

[Harmanprit Singh Sidhu v. Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers (P)

Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5383 : (2016) 234 DLT 30] commends

itself to us, as a distinction is made between judgments which

either set aside, or refuse to set aside, an arbitral award after the

court applies its mind to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, as

against preliminary orders of condonation of delay, which do not in

any way impact the arbitral award that has been assailed.

18. However, Smt Acharya relied heavily upon the Division Bench

judgment of the Delhi High Court in Antrix Corpn. Ltd. [Antrix Corpn.

Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] On

the facts of that case, on 28-2-2017 [Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd. v.

Antrix Corpn. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7229 : (2017) 238 DLT

103] , a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court ruled that

Antrix's petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 before

the Bangalore Court was not maintainable, and that Devas' petition

under Section 9 was maintainable, the bar under Section 42 of the

Arbitration Act, 1996 being inapplicable. The order also held that

consequently, Antrix's petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration

Act, 1996 before the Bangalore City civil court would not be

maintainable, inasmuch as Devas' petition filed in Delhi under

Section 9 was filed earlier. The learned Single Judge then listed the

matter for hearing on merits and directed Antrix to file an affidavit of

an authorised officer, enclosing therewith its audited balance

sheets, and profit and loss accounts for the past three years. Antrix

then appealed against this order, to which a preliminary objection

was taken, stating that this appeal would not be maintainable under

Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. After setting out Section 13

of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and Sections 37 and 42 of the

22

Arbitration Act, 1996, the Division Bench noticed Harmanprit Singh

Sidhu [Harmanprit Singh Sidhu v. Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers

(P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5383 : (2016) 234 DLT 30] in para

39, without at all adverting to para 10 of the judgment (which is set

out hereinabove). Thereafter, the Court held as follows : (Antrix

Corpn. Ltd. case [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd.,

2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] , SCC OnLine Del paras 42-44)

“42. While undeniably, the learned Single Judge in the impugned

order [Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. Harmanprit Singh

Sidhu, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6625] has not decided the Section 9

petition finally and had listed the matter for hearing on merits, Antrix

states that the impugned order is indistinguishable from an order under

Section 9. Devas however, argued that the sequence of events has not

been completed. Antrix should face an adverse order under Section 9

before it can approach this Court in appeal. On this issue, significant

reliance has been placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in

Samson Maritime [Samson Maritime Ltd. v. Hardy Exploration &

Production (India) Inc., 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 9122 : (2016) 2 LW 342]

. In that case, the Court held : (Samson Maritime case [Samson

Maritime Ltd. v. Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc., 2016 SCC

OnLine Mad 9122 : (2016) 2 LW 342] , SCC OnLine Mad para 23)

‘ 23. … The learned counsel appearing for the respondent

made an attempt to contend that the application seeking for furnishing of

details of assets cannot be construed as an interim measure or interim

relief contemplated under Section 9 of the said Act. I am not convinced

to accept the said contention for the reason that those details are sought

for by the applicant only to seek for consequential or follow up relief in

the event of the respondent's failure to furnish securities. Therefore, as

the relief sought for in this application is having a direct bearing on the

relief sought for in the other applications seeking for furnishing

securities, it cannot be said that this relief seeking for details of the

assets is outside the scope of Section 9. Therefore, I find that the

application filed seeking for details of the assets is also maintainable.’

43. The Court in Samson Maritime [Samson Maritime Ltd. v. Hardy

Exploration & Production (India) Inc., 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 9122 :

(2016) 2 LW 342] reasoned that an application seeking for furnishing of

details of assets would also amount to an interim measure under

Section 9, because the reason that those details are sought are only to

seek consequential or follow up relief in the event of the respondent's

failure to furnish securities. Therefore, an order mandating a party to

disclose his assets or file his accounts would also be an interim

measure within the meaning of Section 9. In this case, through para 57

of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge had directed Antrix to

file an affidavit of an authorised officer, enclosing therewith its audited

balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for the past three years.

Keeping in mind the view of the Court in Samson Maritime [Samson

Maritime Ltd. v. Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc., 2016 SCC

OnLine Mad 9122 : (2016) 2 LW 342] , which this Court is in agreement

23

with, this would also in effect be a Section 9 order as those details are

sought for the purpose of adjudicating whether consequential relief

could be given to Devas of securing the amount due from the arbitral

award against Antrix. Moreover, this Court cannot take a doctrinaire and

unbending approach in this matter, when it is clear that Antrix has

suffered all but one remaining blow through the impugned order, and

therefore, the Court should not wait till it suffers the final blow (that of

the final Section 9 order) before it can assume jurisdiction over the

appeal. The Court's direction to Antrix to furnish an affidavit along with

the particulars sought, is to aid its order with respect to a possible

distraint, attachment or further such consequential order towards interim

relief. Such an order would not be made unless the Court directs this as

a prelude, or important step towards the inevitable interim order, which

would be just consequential. Therefore, the Court finds that Antrix's

appeal against the impugned order is maintainable.

44. This Court also finds merit in Antrix's argument that as regards

the Single Judge's observations that the Bangalore Court cannot

proceed with the matter, the impugned order is really final. It precludes

in effect, Antrix from proceeding with its Section 34 petition before that

court (in turn based on the pending Section 9 petition before that court).

If Antrix were to accept the ruling, the effect would be to denude the

Bangalore Court of jurisdiction. It was contended—and correctly, in this

Court's opinion that whereas a court acts within jurisdiction in deciding

whether it has or does not have jurisdiction over a cause of a matter, the

declaration by it about the lack of jurisdiction of another court, based on

the appreciation of the matter before the latter court is undeniably an

adverse order. Allowing that to stand would prejudice Antrix for all

times.” (emphasis in original)

19. It can be seen that the reasoning in this judgment would have no

application to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench held

that directing Antrix to file an affidavit, enclosing therewith its audited

balance sheets and profit and loss account for the last three years, is

itself an interim order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act,

1996. The further reasoning of the Court that the direction to Antrix to

furnish an affidavit is to aid a future interim order, which would be just

consequential, does not commend itself to us. A step towards an

interim order would not amount to granting, or refusing to grant, any

measure under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The case is also

distinguishable for the reason that, as regards the Bangalore Court,

which cannot proceed further with the matter, the impugned order

therein is really final and would, therefore, also be appealable under

Section 37. For all these reasons, this judgment is wholly

distinguishable and would not apply to the facts of the present case.

24

We may also advert to the fact that our judgment in Kandla [Kandla

Export Corpn. v. OCI Corpn., (2018) 14 SCC 715 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 664] was

delivered on 7-2-2018, and was missed by the Division Bench in Antrix

Corpn. Ltd. [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del

9338] , as the Division Bench had reserved judgment on 6-12-2017

[Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd. FAO (OS) (Comm) No. 67 of 2017,

order dated 6-12-2017 (Del)] , even though it ultimately pronounced the

judgment on 30-5-2018 [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018

SCC OnLine Del 9338] . The judgment in South Delhi Municipal Corpn.

[South Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Tech Mahindra, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11863] was

decided after reference was made to Kandla [Kandla Export Corpn. v. OCI

Corpn., (2018) 14 SCC 715 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 664] , resulting in a deposit

order being held to be not appealable under Section 37 of the

Arbitration Act, 1996.

20. It is clear, therefore, that the appeals filed in the present case do

not fall within Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and are not

maintainable.”

14. (i) The judgment in BGS SGS Soma JV ’s case is rendered by Full

Bench, and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

appealability particularly with reference to Section 13 of the Commercial

Courts Act, 2015 are clearly addressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

(ii) It was a case arose out of a dispute concerning the jurisdiction

of the Court with reference to the seat of arbitration and the return of a

petition presented under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

When the same was challenged by filing an appeal under Section 37 of the

said Act read with Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, as to

25

maintainability of the appeal with a special focus on the point that whether

the appeal would lie under Section 13 of the Act.

15. Further it is relevant to note the observations of the Division Bench of

the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Synergies Casting Ltd. v. National

Research Development Corporation and Anr.

4

, wherein a reference was

made to Fuerst Day Lawson Limited’s case (cited 1 supra), Kandla Export

Corporation’s case (cited 2 supra), BGS SGS Soma JV’s case (cited 3 supra),

and discussion was made as to the interplay of section 37 of Arbitration and

Conciliation Act and Section 13 (1) (a) of Commercial Courts Act. It was a

case of challenge to the orders passed by a Commercial Division of the

Hon’ble High Court of Delhi directing the deposit of certain amounts, while

entertaining an application under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation

Act. In that scenario whether appeal is maintainable in terms of Section 37

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act read with Section 13 of the

Commercial Courts Act was considered and finally it was observed in para

11 of the judgment that the impugned order neither sets aside nor refuses to

set aside the arbitral award, and therefore, did not fall within the scope of

Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Accordingly, it was

held that the appeal is not maintainable under Section 13 of the Commercial

Courts Act.

4

2025 SCC OnLine Del 177

26

16. (i) One of the objectives of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 is to minimize the procedural constraints and to ensure expeditious

resolution of the disputes between the parties. The objective of the

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is almost similar viz., expeditious adjudication

of commercial disputes. A cap or restriction on the right of the appeal under

the respective enactments will have its own objective and legislative wisdom

behind it.

(ii) A bare reading of Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act,

2015 would suggest that any person aggrieved by a decision of a

Commercial Court is entitled to prefer an appeal. But, the conjoint reading

of the said provision Section 13(1) with its proviso and Section 13(2) makes

it clear that the right of appeal is limited to the orders specifically

enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996. The proviso to Section 13(1) and Section 13(2),

therefore, operates as a statutory limitation. The argument that the

situations provided under Order XLIII of the CPC or Section 37 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act are in addition, cannot be accepted. If appeal

is provided against every decision there is no need to specify a particular

category of order against which appeal would lie.

17. The word ‘decision’ is qualified by other words ‘decree’ or ‘order’ in the

provision. While the provision under Section 13(1) is referring to the

27

expression ‘decision’, the heading of the Section referring to “decrees”,

whereas the proviso to Section 13(1) specifically refers to ‘orders’ passed by

the Commercial Division or the Commercial Court. Even Section 13(2) is

regulating the scope of appeals against the orders by conspicuously

mentioning that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a

Commercial Division and Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance

with the provisions of the Act. Thus, the appeals against orders,

contemplated under the proviso to Section 13(1), can be confined only to

such orders that are appealable under Order XLIII of the CPC and Section

37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

18. It is also relevant to note that, in the context of an order returning of an

application filed under Section 34 the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

the Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to examine the scope and interplay

of Section 37 of the said Act and Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act,

2015 as held in BGS SGS Soma JV’s case [cited 3 supra]. Further, in

Kandla Export Corporation’s case [cited 2 supra] the Hon’ble Apex Court

considered a similar issue concerning the maintainability of an appeal

against an order not falling within the categories enumerated under Section

37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and held that Section 13 of the

Commercial Courts Act does not provide an independent right of appeal

against such an order.

28

19. With regard to understanding and interpretation of a proviso to a

statutory provision and function of a proviso, was addressed by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v.

Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union and

Another Banks Employees Union

5

, paras 9 and 10 reads as follows:-

“9. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of

the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the

proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. As was stated in

Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey [(1880) 5 QBD 170 : 42 LT 128] (referred

to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash

Chandra Yograj Sinha [AIR 1961 SC 1596] and Calcutta Tramways Co.

Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta [AIR 1965 SC 1728] ), when one finds a

proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso,

the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of

the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with

a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the

main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a qualification

of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to

be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment

to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and

ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. “If the

language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the

5

(2004) 1 SCC 574:2003 SCC OnLine SC 1427

29

provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these

provisions by implication from a proviso,” said Lord Watson in West

Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. [1897 AC 647 : 66 LJCh

726 : 77 LT 284 (HL)] Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the

provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main

provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. [See

A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran [1992 Supp (1) SCC 304 : 1992 SCC

(L&S) 975 : (1992) 19 ATC 493 : AIR 1991 SC 1406] , Tribhovandas

Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal [(1991) 3 SCC 442 : AIR

1991 SC 1538] and Kerala State Housing Board v. Ramapriya Hotels (P)

Ltd. [(1994) 5 SCC 672] ]

“ This word (proviso) hath diverse operations.

Sometime it worketh a qualification or limitation; sometime a

condition; and sometime a covenant.” (Coke upon Littleton,

18th Edn., p. 146.)

“If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause

which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier

clause, the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant, and the

earlier clause prevails…. But if the later clause does not

destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be

read together and effect is to be given to the intention of the

parties as disclosed by the deed as a whole” (per Lord

Wrenbury in Forbes v. Git [(1922) 1 AC 256 : 1921 All ER Rep

Ext 770 : 126 LT 616 (PC)] ).

A statutory proviso “is something engrafted on a preceding

enactment” (R. v. Taunton, St. James [(1829) 9 B&C 831 : 109 ER

309] , ER p. 311).

“The ordinary and proper function of a proviso coming after

a general enactment is to limit that general enactment in certain

instances” (per Lord Esher in Barker, Re [(1890) 25 QBD 285 : 59

LJQB 331 (CA)] ).

30

10. A proviso to a section cannot be used to import into the

enacting part something which is not there, but where the enacting part is

susceptible to several possible meanings, it may be controlled by the

proviso.(See Jennings v. Kelly [1940 AC 206:(1939) 4 All ER 464 (HL)] .)”

20. The heading of Section 13 of Commercial Courts Act is

“Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions”, Sub-

section (1) of Section 13 is “ Any person aggrieved by the decision of the

Commercial Court or Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to the

Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of sixty days from the

date of judgment or order, as the case may be.” The section clearly suggests

that an appeal is provided against the decision of Commercial Court. But,

proviso to Section 13(1) of the Act, is controlling/regulating the appeals from

such orders, by specifically referring to Order XLIII of CPC and Section 37 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as may be applicable. Therefore, the

appeal against the decree and judgment covered by order XLI will fall within

the section 13(1). So far as the orders passed by a commercial Court they

shall get regulated by proviso to Section 13(1) and 13(2), to answer the

question whether an appeal lie against an order. What kind of the orders

are appealable shall be examined with reference to the Order XLIII CPC or

Section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act.. However with regard to

judgments and decrees fallowing the judgment the appelability of such

31

judgment & decrees or deemed decrees, shall be covered by Section 13(1)

as the case may be in view of the wording decision of Commercial Court or

Commercial division. This shall be purposive and harmonious interpretation

and understanding of section 13 and the proviso there to. Therefore, it is

clear that upon exercise of power under Section 29 A (4) & (5) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, order will follow and consequently Section

13 (1) of the Commercial Courts Act is not applicable for filing appeal

against such orders .

21. In the result, in view of the above findings, the appeal is dismissed as

not maintainable. It is needless to mention that the period of seven (7)

months granted by the Commercial Court shall operate from the date of

receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand

closed.

____________________

JUSTICE D. RAMESH

___________________________________

JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

Date: 20 .11.2026

Pnr

Speaking No Reasoned Yes

Reportable Yes Non-reportable No

32

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D.RAMESH

AND

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

COMMERCIAL COURT APPEAL NO: 13 OF 2026

20.11.2026

Pnr

33

* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D RAMESH

AND

*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

% 20.11.2026

COMMERCIAL COURT APPEAL NO: 13 OF 2026

# 1. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.,, represented by its Authorized

Officer, Divisional Office -III, Gajuwaka, Visakhapatnam - 530026.

Appellant

Vs.

$ M/s Srilakshmi Srinivas Jute Mills Pvt Ltd, rep.by its Authorized Person,

Sri.K.Govindarajulu, Director, Having its Registered Office at Bobbili

Road, Rajam, Vizianagaram District, Andhra Pradesh – 532127 and

Another

...Respondents

! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri Kiran Kumar Vadlamudi

! Counsel for the Respondents : Sri S.Mohana Rao

< Gist :

> Head Note :

? Cases referred :

(2011) 8 SCC 333

(2018) 14 SCC 715

(2020) 4 SCC 234

2025 SCC OnLine Del 177

34

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D.RAMESH

AND

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

COMMERCIAL COURT APPEAL NO: 13 OF 2026

# The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.,, represented by its Authorized

Officer, Divisional Office -III, Gajuwaka, Visakhapatnam - 530026

Appellant

Vs.

$1. M/s Srilakshmi Srinivas Jute Mills Pvt Ltd, rep.by its Authorized

Person, Sri.K.Govindarajulu, Director, Having its Registered Office at

Bobbili Road, Rajam, Vizianagaram District, Andhra Pradesh –

532127 and Another.

...Respondents

DATE OF COMMON ORDER PRONOUNCED: 20.11.2026

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE D.RAMESH

AND

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may

be allowed to see the Order? Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of Order may be marked

to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair

copy of the Order ? Yes/No

______________________

JUSTICE D. RAMESH

__________________________________

JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA

Reference cases

Description

Legal Notes

Add a Note....

Advance Search Tool

💡 How to Get the Best Legal Answers:

1. Keep it simple: Frame your question in plain language.

2. Add scope: Tag @ a court, judge, year, or act section for accurate results.

3. Attach files: Upload a PDF only if you are using a private document.

🌍 Ask in your language: English • Hindi • Assamese • Bangla • Gujarati • Kannada • Malayalam • Marathi • Odia • Punjabi • Tamil • Telugu • Urdu


💡 New Advocate? Don’t worry! Working without senior support today? Turn on Client Advisory to get instant legal strategies, practical angles, and precedent-backed options for your client.

Add research context Type to filter