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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 4751 of 1992

PETITIONER:

REGISTRAR (ADMN.), HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK

RESPONDENT:

SISIR KANTA SATAPATHY (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANR. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/09/1999

BENCH:

DR. A.S. ANAND CJ & K. VENKATASWAMI & G.B. PATTANAIK & S.P. KURDUKAR & M.

JAGANNADHA RAO

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

1999 ( 2 ) Suppl. SCR 473

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. VENKATASWAMI, J. An independent judiciary is one of the basic features

of the Constitution of the Republic. In this case, however, we are not

concerned with the various provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing

independence of judiciary but with a limited issue about the scope and

extent of control of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary to the

exclusion of the executive for maintenance of its independence. Our

Constitution has zealously guarded the independence of judiciary. In S. P.

Gupta, etc. v. Union of India & Anr., etc., [1981] Supp. SCC 87, this Court

held that independence of judiciary is doubtless a basic structure of the

Constitution but the said concept of independence has to be confirmed

within the four corners of the Constitution and cannot go beyond the

Constitution. This Court in All India Judges' Association & Ors., etc.v..

Union of India & Ors., etc., [1993] 4 SCC 288 held :

"In view of the separation of the powers under the Constitution, and the

need to maintain the independence of the judiciary to protect and promote

democracy and the rule of law, it would have been ideal if the most

dominant power of the executive and the legislature over the judiciary,

viz., that of determining its service conditions had been subjected to some

desirable checks and balances. This is so even if ultimately, the service

conditions of the judiciary have to be incorporated in and declared by the

legislative enactments. But the mere fact that Article 309 gives power to

the executive and the legislature to prescribe the service conditions of

the judiciary, does not mean that the judiciary should have no say in the

matter. It would be against the spirit of the Constitution to deny any role

to the judiciary in that behalf, for theoretically it would not be

impossible for the executive or the legislature to turn and twist the tail

of the judiciary by using the said power. Such a consequence would be

against one of the seminal mandates of the Constitution, namely, to

maintain the independence of the judiciary."

By way. of a note of caution we may add that the control vested in the High

Court over the subordinate judiciary though absolute and exclusive, it has

to be exercised without usurping the power vested in the Executive under

the Constitution. This necessarily brings us to the consideration of

Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. Those Articles read

thus :

"Article 233. Appointments of district judges.-(1) Appointments of persons

to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State shall

be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court

exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.

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(2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall

only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not

less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the

High Court for appointment.

Article 234. Recruitment of persons other than district judges to the

judicial service.-Appointments of persons other than district judges to the

judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in

accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with

the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising

jurisdiction in relation to such State.

Article 235. Control over subordinate courts.-The control over district

courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion

of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of

a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall

be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed

as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may under

the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High

Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of

his service prescribed under such law."

The backdrop in which the interpretation of the above Articles comes into

focus is given below.

The first respondent in Civil Appeal No. 4751/92 at the relevant time was

officiating as Chief Judicial Magistrate in the Orissa Superior Judicial

Service (Junior Branch). The first respondent in Civil Appeal Nos. 4752 and

4753 were officiating in Class-I of the Orissa Judicial Service. The Review

Committee constituted by the Full Court of the Orissa High Court met on

30.1.87 and decided to recommend to the Full Court that the first

respondent in each of the appeals be retired prematurely in public

interest. The recommendation of the Review Committee was accepted by the

Full Court, which met on 4.2.87. Pursuant to that, the first respondent in

each of the appeals were retired prematurely as per the Notification issued

by the High Court on 5.2.87. That Notification was challenged in the High

Court mainly on the ground that the High Court was not vested with the

power of making an order of compulsory retirement. It was also challenged

on the ground that there were no materials against them to make the

impugned order.

That the High Court could not itself have passed an order of compulsorily

retirement as above, which amounts to termination of service is borne out

from the plain language cf the above Articles and in particular of Article

235 read with Article 311. This question has been debated and answered by

this Court in a number of cases.

In The State of Wert Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, [1966] 1 SCR 771, a

Constitution Bench of this Court while setting aside an order of dismissal

of an officiating District and Sessions Judge passed after consulting the

State Public Service Commission but without consulting the High Court,

elaborately considered the scope of Article 235. Hidayatullah, J., (as His

Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench observed that there is nothing in

Article 311 which compels the conclusion that the High Court is ousted of

the jurisdiction to hold the inquiry if Article 235 vested some power in

it. The control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control

subject only to the power of the Governor into the matter of appointment

(including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District

Judges. Within the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the

High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or

removal subject however to the conditions of service, to a right of appeal

if granted by the conditions of service, and to the giving of an

opportunity of showing cause as required by clause (2) of Article 311,

unless such an opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under

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the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause.

In State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand H.C.S. & Ors., [1976] 2 SCC 977,

a four-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope and

width of Article 235 of the Constitution. That was a case in which the

State Government compulsorily retired a senior Subordinate Judge though the

High Court recommended only for his reversion. This Court held :

Para 15-This Court in Bagchi's case said that control vested in the High

Court is over the conduct and discipline of the members 'of the Judicial

Service. Orders passed in disciplinary jurisdiction by the High Court are

subject to an appeal as provided in the conditions of service. The High

Court further deals with members of the Judicial Service in accordance with

the rules and conditions of service. This Court in Bagchi's case said that

the word "deal" points to disciplinary and not merely administrative

jurisdiction. The order terminating the appointment of a member of the

service otherwise than upon his reaching the age fixed for superannuation

will be passed by the State Government on the recommendation of the High

Court. This is because the High Court is not the authority for appointing,

removing, reducing the rank or terminating the service.

Para 16 - It is true that the fixation of the age of superannuation is the

right of the State Government. The curtailment of that period under rule

governing the conditions of service is a matter pertaining' to disciplinary

control as well as administrative control. Disciplinary control means not

merely jurisdiction to award punishment for misconduct. It also embraces

the power to determine whether the record of a member of the service is

satisfactory or not so as to entitle him to continue in service for the

full term till he attains the age of superannuation. Administrative,

judicial and disciplinary control over members of the judicial Service is

vested solely in the High Court. Premature retirement is made in the

exercise of administrative and disciplinary jurisdiction. It is

administrative because it is decided in public interest to retire him

prematurely. It is disciplinary because the decision was taken that he does

not deserve to continue in service up to the normal age of superannuation

and that it is in the public interest to do so.

Para 18 - The control vested in the High Court is that if the High Court is

of opinion that particular judicial officer is not fit to be retained in

service the High Court will communicate that to the Governor because the

Governor is the authority to dismiss, remove, reduce in rank or terminate

the appointment. In such cases it is the contemplation in the Constitution

that the Governor as the Head of the State will act in harmony with the

recommendation of the High Court. If the recommendation of the High Court

is not held to be binding on the State consequences will be unfortunate. It

is in public interest that the State will accept the recommendation of the

High Court. The vesting of complete control over the subordinate judiciary

in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in

matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State. "The Government will

act on the recommendation of the High Court. That is the broad basis of

Article 235".

In State of UP. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & Anr., [1978] 2 SCC 102, a

Constitution Bench of this Court again had an occasion to consider the

validity of an order of compulsory retirement passed by the State Governor

on the recommendation of the Administrative Committee of the High Court.

The High Court set aside the order compulsorily retiring the District

Munsiff on the ground that the recommendation by the Administrative

Committee cannot be construed as the recommendation of the High Court (Full

Court). Reversing the judgment of the High Court and approving the

procedure of the recommendation through the Administrative Committee, this

Court observed:

"Here, the decision to compulsory retire the respondent was taken by the

Judges of :he High Court itself, though not by all. If some but not all

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Judges of the High Court participate in a decision relating to a matter

which falls within the High Court's controlling jurisdiction over

subordinate courts, the High Court does not efface itself by surrendering

its poet to an extraneous authority. The procedure adopted by the High

Court under its Rules is not subversive of the independence of the

subordinate judiciary, which is what Article 235 recognises and seeks to

achieve.

The learned Judges further held that the recommendation made by the

Administrative Committee cannot be said to suffer from any legal or

constitutional infirmity.

In Chief Justice of A.P. & Ors. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu & Ors. etc., [1979] 2

SCC 34, a Constitution Bench of this Court again considered the validity of

an order of compulsory retirement passed by the State Governor on the

recommendation of the High Court. That order was challenged before the

State Administrative Tribunal and this Court while holding that the State

Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal,

observed as follows :

"Respondent 1, Shri V.V.S. Krishnamurthy, in that appeal was, at the

material time, a member of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service. He

attained the age of 50 years on November 24, 1974. He was prematurely

retired, in public interest, by an order dated September 29, 1975 of the

State Government on the recommendation of the High Court. Before the

Government passed this order, a Committee of Judges appointed by the High

Court, considered the entire service record of respondent 1 and records of

other Judicial Officers and decided to prematurely retire the first

respondent in public interest.

The interpretation and scope of Article 235 has been the subject of several

decisions of this Court, The position crystalised by these decisions is

that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court

under Article 235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and

effective in operation. It comprehends a wide variety of matters. Among

others, it includes :

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

(g) Premature or compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Courts

and of Subordinate Courts.

In the last-mentioned case (Inder Prakash Anand) the Government servant was

officiating in the cadre of District Judges. The High Court recommended

that he should be reverted to his substantive post of senior Subordinate

Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrate and, as such, allowed to continue in

service till the age of 58 years. Contrary to the recommendation of the

High Court, the State Government passed an order under Rule 5.32(c) of the

Punjab Civil Service Rules, compulsorily retiring him from service at the

age of 55 years. Holding that the order of compulsory retirement was

invalid, this Court stressed that the power of deciding whether a judicial

officer should be retained in service after attaining the age of 55 years

upto the age of 58 years, vests in the High Court, and to hold otherwise

"will seriously affect the independence of the judiciary and take away the

control vested in the High Court". The formal order of retirement, however,

is passed by the Governor acting on the recommendation of the High Court,

that being "the broad basis of Article 235". It was explained that "in such

cases it is the contemplation in the Constitution, that the Governor as the

Head of the State will act in harmony with the recommendation of the High

Court". It was concluded that "the vesting of complete control over the

Subordinate Judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of

the High Court in matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State". In

other words, while in form, the High Court's decision to compulsorily

retire a subordinate judicial officer in the exercise of its administrative

or disciplinary jurisdiction under Article 235 is advisory, in substance

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and effect, it is well-nigh peremptory. "

In Tej Pal Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 604, a Division

Bench of this Court had occasion to consider a question whether the

impugned order of premature retirement passed by the Governor without

having before him the recommendation of the Administrative Committee or of

the Full Court was void and ineffective. The learned Judges, after

referring to earlier judgments of this Court, held as follows:

"Para 4 - Article 235 of the Constitution provides that the control over

district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and

promotion of and the grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial

service of the State and holding any post inferior to the post of District

Judge shall be vested in the High Court. It has been held in State of U.P

v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi that premature retirement of subordinate courts

is a matter which falls squarely within the power of control vested in the

High Courts by Article 235 of the Constitution. Without (he recommendation

of the High Court it is not open to the Governor to issue an order retiring

prematurely Judges of District Courts and of subordinate courts.

Para 13 -................In the instant case the Government had sought the

opinion of the High Court regarding the question whether the appellant

could be prematurely retired and that question was certainly a very

important matter from the point of view of the subordinate judicial

service. The Administrative Judge before giving his opinion in support of

the view expressed by the government should have either circulated the

letter received from the government amongst the members of the

Administrative Committee or placed it before them at a meeting. He did not

adopt either of the two courses. But he on his own forwarded his opinion to

the government stating that the appellant could be prematurely retired.

That he could not do. Ordinarily, it is for the High Court, on the basis of

assessment of performance and all other aspects germane to the matter to

come to the conclusion whether any particular judicial officer under its

control is to be prematurely retired and once the High Court comes to the

conclusion that there should be such retirement, the Court recommends to

the Governor to do so. The conclusion is to be of the High Court since the

control vests therein. Under the Rules obtaining in the Allahabad High

Court, the Administrative Committee could act for and on behalf of the

government proposal was of no consequence and did not amount to

satisfaction of the requirement of Article 235 of the Constitution. It was

only after the Governor passed the order on the basis of such

recommendation, the matter was placed before the Administrative Committee

before the order of retirement was actually served on the appellant. The

Administrative Committee not have dissented from the order of Governor or

the opinion expressed by the Administrative Judge earlier. But it is not

known what the Administrative Committee would have done if the matter had

come up before it before the Governor had passed the order of premature

retirement. In any event the deviation in this case is not a mere

irregularity which can be cured by the ex post facto approval given by the

Administrative Committee to the action of the Governor after the order of

premature retirement had been passed. The error committed in this case

amounts to an incurable defect amounting to an illegality. We may add that

while it may be open to the government to bring to the notice of the High

Court all materials having a bearing on the conduct of a District Judge or

a subordinate judicial officer, which may be in its possession, the

government cannot take the initiative to retire prematurely a District

Judge or a subordinate judicial officer. Such initiative should rest with

the High Court." In Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rqjiah, etc.,

[1988] 3 SCC 211, this Court had an occasion to consider the validity of an

order of compulsory retirement passed by the High Court. The learned Judges

held that the proper procedure for the High Court was to recommend the case

for compulsory retirement and it was for the Governor on whom the

recommendation of the High Court was binding, to pass the formal order.

This Court in the said case observed as follow :

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"The test of control is not the passing of an order against a member of the

subordinate judicial service, but the decision to take such action. It may

be that so far as the members of the subordinate judicial service are

concerned, it is the Governor, who being the appointing authority, has to

pass an order of compulsory retirement or any order of punishment against

such a member. But passing or signing of such orders by the Governor will

not necessarily take away the control of the High Court vested in it under

Article 235 of the Constitution. An action against any government servant

consists of two parts. Under the first part, a decision will have to be

made whether an action will be taken against the government servant. Under

the second part, the decision will be carried out by a formal order. The

power of control envisaged under Article 235 of the Constitution relates to

the power making a decision by the High Court against a member of the

subordinate judicial service. Such a decision is arrived at by holding an

enquiry by the High Court against the member concerned. After the High

Court comes to the conclusion that some action either in the nature of

compulsory retirement or by the imposition of a punishment, as the case may

be, has to be taken against the member concerned, the High Court will make

a recommendation in that regard to the Governor and the Governor will act

in accordance with such recommendation of the High Court by passing an

order in accordance with the decision of the High Court. The Governor

cannot take any action against any member of a subordinate judicial service

without, and contrary to, the recommendation of the High Court.

It is apparent from the observation extracted above that this Court also

understood the power of control of the High Court as the power of taking a

decision against a member of the subordinate judicial service. The High

Court is the only authority that can take such a decision. The High Court

will hold an enquiry and decide on the result of such enquiry whether any

action will be taken against a member of the subordinate judicial service.

If it comes to the conclusion that such an action is required to be taken,

it will make a recommendation in that regard to the State Governor who will

make an order in accordance with the recommendation of the High Court.

The control of the High Court, as understood, will also be applicable in

the case of compulsory retirement in that the High Court will, upon an

enquiry, come to a conclusion whether a member of the subordinate judicial

service should be retired prematurely or not. If the High Court comes to

the conclusion that such a member should be prematurely retired, it will

make a recommendation in that regard to the Governor inasmuch as the

Governor is the appointing authority. The Governor will make a formal order

of compulsory retirement in accordance with the recommendation of the High

Court."

No doubt, the learned Judges also found that there was no sufficient

material warranting an order of compulsory retirement in that case.

In High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal & Anr.,

[1998] 3 SCC 72, a two-Judge Bench of the Court while construing the scope

and extent of Articles 233 to 235 of the Constitution, held as follows:

"This article shows that the High Court has to exercise its administrative,

judicial and disciplinary control over the members of the Judicial Service

of the State. The word "control", referred to in this article, is used in a

comprehensive sense to include general superintendence of the working of

the subordinate courts, disciplinary control over the Presiding Officers of

the subordinate courts and to recommend the imposition of punishment of

dismissal, removal and reduction in rank or compulsory retirement.

"Control" would also include suspension of a member of the Judicial Service

for purposes of holding a disciplinary enquiry, transfer, confirmation and

promotion. (See State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand and State of U.P.

v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi). In State of Gujarat v. Ramesh Chandra

Mashruwala it was held that "control" in Article 235 means exclusive and

not dual control. (See also Chief Justice of A.P. v. L. V.A. Dixitulu;

State of W.B. v. Nriendra Nath Bagchi)."

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On going through the judgments of this Court right from Shyam Lai v. State

of U.P., [1955] 1 SCR 26 down to High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v.

Ramesh Chand Paliwal & Anr, [1998] 3 SCC 72, one cannot but reach one

conclusion regarding the power of the High Court in the matter of ordering

compulsory retirement. That conclusion is that the High Courts are vested

with the disciplinary control as well as administrative control over the

Members of the Judicial Service exclusively, but that does not mean that

they can also pass orders of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or

termination from service while exercising administrative and disciplinary

control over the Members of Judicial Service. Undoubtedly, the High Courts

alone are entitled to initiate, to hold enquiry and to take a decision in

respect of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from

service, but the formal order to give effect to such a decision has to be

passed only by the State Governor on the recommendation of the High Court.

It is well settled again by a catena of decisions of this Court that the

recommendation of the High Court is binding on the State

Government/Governor [vide para 18 in Inder Prakash Anand's case (supra)].

We are clearly of the view that while the High Court retains the power of

disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary, including the power to

initiate disciplinary proceed ngs, suspend them pending enquiries and

impose punishment on them but when it comes to the question of dismissal,

removal, reduction in rank or termination of the services of the judicial

officer, on any count whatsoever, the High Court becomes only the

recommending authority and cannot itself pass such an order [vide Inder

Prakash Anand's case and Rajiah's case (supra)].

In the instant case, the decision of the Orissa High Court dated 4.2.87 (on

the Administrative Side) was required to be forwarded to the Governor for

passing an order of cornpulsorily retirement. That was not done. It was

wrong for the High Court to have passed the order of compulsory retirement

itself. The judicial side of the High Court rightly decided the Writ

Petition in favour of the judicial officers and held the order dated 5.2.87

to be bad. In the words of the Division Bench of the High Court :

"There is a stronger constitutional objection to accept the submission of

Shri Nayak for regarding the High Court as the appointing authority of the

Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of what has been provided in rule 10

of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963, inasmuch as it has

been laid down in Article 234 of the Constitution that appointments of

persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State shall

be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the rules made by

him in that behalf. The aforesaid rules are one set of such rules. So, no

provision in the rules could have altered the constitutional position that

the Governor of the State is the appointing authority of persons other than

District Judges also. Conferment of this power on the High Court by virtue

of what is stated in rule 10 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules

would have clashed with the constitutional mandate. We would therefore, not

accept because of what is stated in rule 10 that the High Court is the

appointing authority of a Chief Judicial Magistrate."

In view of all that is stated above, we would hold that the High Court is

not the appointing authority of Chief Judicial Magistrates to clothe it

with the power of compulsory retirement conferred by the First proviso to

rule 71 (a) of the Orissa Service Code. In this connection, may we also

point out that it would be really incongruous where, though the High Court

cannot retire a Munsif, or for that matter a District Judge, as fairly

conceded by Shri Nayak it would be in a position to retire a Chief Judicial

Magistrate. We do not think if the concerned provisions permit us to take

this view.

Before closing this aspect of the discussion, we may say that we are

conscious of the legal position that passing of an order of compulsory

retirement by the Governor is a formal matter as stated in Rajiah 's case

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(supra) because, according to this decision, the Governor in such cases

merely acts on the recommendation of the High Court by signing an order in

that regard; but the procedure of the Governor formally passing an order of

retirement has to be complied with. So long as there is no formal order of

the Governor, the compulsory retirement as directed by the High Court

cannot take effect, as opined in Rajiah's case itself.

Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, it is not necessary to deal with

the second submission of Shri Ray that there were no materials in the

present case to order for the compulsory retirement of the

petitioner........

The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is strictly in accord

with the catena of judgments referred to above and in particular with the

judgment in Rajiah 's case (supra). We, therefore, see no error in the

orders under appeal.

Had the matters rested here, there would have been no problem but the

subsequent developments have given a new turn and twist to the case.

After the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, the

Full Court on the Administrative Side on 7.11.91 decided to make a

recommendation to the Government for compulsory retirement of the concerned

Judicial Officers. That recommendation was forwarded to the Government on

26.11.91. In the meanwhile, the High Court had also put in issue the

judgment of the Division Bench through the Special Leave Petitions out of

which the present appeals have arisen and an interim order dated 19.12.91

made at the notice stage was as follows:-

"Issue notice on the S.L.P. and LA. No. 1/91 and tag on to S.L.P. (C) No.

18266/91. In the meantime, the operation of the impugned judgment shall

remain stayed.

It is stated by the Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that he was

permitted to join. In view of our present order he will not now work in the

post he has joined.

Once month's time is allowed to the respondent No. 1 for filing his Counter

Affidavit and two weeks thereafter to the petitioner for rejoinder."

After the recommendation of the Full Court was received, the Government on

2.12.91 chose not to proceed further on the plea that the matter was

pending in the Supreme Court. They declined to act further on the

recommendation. This, the Government could not have done. The course open

to the Government was to forward the recommendation of the High Court to

the Governor who would have passed an order in accordance with the

recommendation made by the High Court as has been held in Inder Prakash

Anand's case (supra) because the recommendation of the High Court was

binding on the Government.

By not making an order of compulsory retirement on the recommendation of

the High Court, a peculiar situation was created in the sense that the

Judicial Officers were neither in service nor were they technically out of

service. They, however, did not perform any work. The question, therefore,

now arises as to what is the manner in which relief can be moulded to

balance equities between the parties by this Court, so that the litigation

itself is given a quietous.

The first respondent in Civil Appeal No. 4751/92 has died pending appeal.

His legal representatives had been brought on record. The first respondent

in other two appeals have since retired.

Mr. Jayant Das, learned Advocate General, appearing for the State

Government, as well as learned counsel appearing for the High Court rightly

agreed with the suggestion made on behalf of the Judicial Officers that on

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the basis of the recommendation made by the Full Court of the High Court on

7.11.91, the Governor of State be requested to pass a formal order of

compulsory retirement of Judicial Officers with effect from the date when

the recommendation was received by the Government, i.e. 2.12.91. The

Judicial Officers (which would include legal representatives in the case of

deceased 1st respondent in C.A. No. 4751/92) would, thus, be entitled to

their salary, allowances and all other consequential benefits till 2.12.91.

This suggestion appeals to us also as it will balance the equities between

the parties and set at naught a controversy which has unnecessarily

remained pending for so long. The arrears as per the above terms shall be

paid to the Judicial Officers within three months from the date of receipt

of this judgment.

The appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to

costs.

RP.

Appeals disposed of.