Page 1 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

With

I.A. No. 1897 of 2024 & I.A. No.1898 of 2024

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1. The State of Jharkhand.

2. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi,

having its office at Collectorate Officer, P.O. – G.P.O.,

P.S. Kotwali, Dist.-Ranchi.

3. The Additional Collector, Ranchi, having its office at

Collectorate Officer, P.O. – G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali,

Dist.-Ranchi.

4. The Circle Officer, Kanke Anchal, Ranchi, having its

office at Kanke, P.O. and P.S. Kanke, Dist.-Ranchi.

…. …. Appellants/Respondents

Versus

Poonam Pandey, aged about 54 years, w/o D.K.

Pandey, r/o 21, Police Housing Colony, Near

National Law University (N.U.S.R.L.), Kanke, P.O.

and P.S. Kanke, Dist.-Ranchi.

.... .... Petitioner/Respondent

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

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For the Appellants : Mr. Ranjan Kumar, AC to Sr. SC-I

For the Respondent : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Advocate

Mr. Nishanth Roy, Advocate

Mr. Rohan Mazumdar, Advocate

Ms. Neeharika Mazumdar, Advocate

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Order No.04/Dated 09

th

May, 2024

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:

I.A. No. 1898 of 2024:

1. The instant interlocutory application has been

filed for ignoring the defect no.10 reported vide

stamp reporting dated 22.11.2023 pertaining to filing

of typed copy page nos.85, 87, 98, 100-109, 114-

Page 2 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

136, 138, 139, 141, 157-252, 281-297, 298, 307-

326, 332, 333, 336-338.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant

has submitted by referring to the averment made in

the instant interlocutory application that after efforts

having been made the office of the

appellant/applicant is unable to trace out the

original copies of the same, therefore, prayer has

been made that the aforesaid defect may be ignored.

3. This Court, considering the nature of the

aforesaid defect, is hereby ignoring the same.

L.P.A. No. 645 of 2023:

4. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10

of the Letters Patent, is directed against the

order/judgment dated 05.04.2023 passed by learned

Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (C) No. 3691 of

2020 by which the writ petition has been allowed.

I.A. No. 1897 of 2024:

5. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by

limitation since as per the office note dated

22.11.2023, there is delay of 188 days in preferring

the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No.

1897 of 2024 has been filed for condoning such

delay.

6. This Court, after taking into consideration the

Page 3 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been field

after inordinate delay of 188 days, deems it fit and

proper, to first consider the delay condonation

application before going into the legality and

propriety of the impugned order on merit.

7. Learned counsel for the applicants-appellants

has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal

may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory

Application on the basis of grounds shown therein

treating the same to be sufficient.

8. The grounds for condoning the delay in

preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned in the

interlocutory application is that after pronouncement

of the impugned judgment dated 05.04.2023, the

concerned department sought for opinion from the

office of the learned Advocate General through Law

Department, Government of Jharkhand. Thereafter,

upon receipt of the file, the learned Advocate General

gave his opinion to file LPA which was communicated

to the concerned Department in terms of Letter

No.5905 dated 04.05.2023 which was communicated

by the office of the Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi

vide letter dated 04.05.2023 to the Additional

Collector, Ranchi.

In pursuance of the said letter, the file was

Page 4 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

placed before the office of Deputy Commissioner-

cum-Magistrate, Ranchi on 08.05.2023 and on the

same day, the Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi was

directed to file appeal. Thereafter, grounds of appeal

was prepared and the same was again placed before

the Additional Collector, Ranchi for approval and

thereafter, on 01.06.2023 the draft of the appeal was

prepared and placed before the Deputy Collector

Land Reforms, Ranchi for approval.

Thereafter, the file was again forwarded to the

Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi for necessary

corrections in the said draft and on 12.06.2023, file

was again placed before the Additional Collector,

Ranchi for perusal.

Thereafter, on 26.06.2023 the file was placed

before the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Magistrate,

Ranchi for approval and after getting approval, the

Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi was authorized to file

the memo of appeal and thereafter, the memo of

appeal was filed.

9. We have heard the learned counsel for the

appellants on delay condonation application and

before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit

and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has

been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with

Page 5 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

respect to the approach of the Court in condoning

the inordinate delay.

10. There is no dispute about the fact that generally

the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of

limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers

from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is

to consider the application to condone the delay

before entering into the merit of the lis.

11. It requires to refer herein that the Law of

limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest

reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general

welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of

limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the

parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy

must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of

time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by

the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors.

Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.

The Privy Council in General Accident Fire

and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed

Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416 , relied upon the

writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932,

wherein, it has been said that:

“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear

to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular

case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to

be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a

particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable

Page 6 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law,

postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not

recognized by law.”

In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala,

(1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering

a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein

no explanation much less a reasonable or

satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had

been given, held at paragraph-6 as under:

“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a

particular party but it has to be applied with all

its rigour when the statute so prescribes and

the courts have no power to extend the period

of limitation on equitable grounds.”

While considering the similar issue, this Court

in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar

Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, it has been

held as under:

“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a

party seeking condonation of delay is a

significant and relevant fact.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to

encapsulate the conception of reasonableness

and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered

free play.

21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of

a party relating to its inaction or negligence are

relevant factors to be taken into consideration.

It is so as the fundamental principle is that the

courts are required to weigh the scale of

balance of justice in respect of both parties and

the said principle cannot be given a total go-by

in the name of liberal approach.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive

delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,

lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a

nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of

course, within legal parameters.”

12. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant

Page 7 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

does not act with bona fide motive and at the same

time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the

period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such

lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence

are the vital factors which should be taken into

consideration while considering the question of

condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may

be made to the judgment rendered by the Division

Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat

through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai

Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202 ,

wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that “Law

having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30

days for preferring the appeal, the Government

cannot ignore the provisions of the period of

limitation as it was never the intention of the

legislature that there should be a different period of

limitation when the Government is the appellant.”

In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs.

Living Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC

563], it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at

paragraphs 27 to 29 as under:

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)

concerned were well aware or conversant with

the issues involved including the prescribed

period of limitation for taking up the matter by

way of filing a special leave petition in this

Court. They cannot claim that they have a

separate period of limitation when the

Page 8 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

Department was possessed with competent

persons familiar with court proceedings. In the

absence of plausible and acceptable

explanation, we are posing a question why the

delay is to be condoned mechanically merely

because the Government or a wing of the

Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in

a matter of condonation of delay when there

was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction

or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has

to be adopted to advance substantial justice,

we are of the view that in the facts and

circumstances, the Department cannot take

advantage of various earlier decisions. The

claim on account of impersonal machinery and

inherited bureaucratic methodology of making

several notes cannot be accepted in view of the

modern technologies being used and available.

The law of limitation undoubtedly binds

everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all

the government bodies, their agencies and

instrumentalities that unless they have

reasonable and acceptable explanation for the

delay and there was bona fide effort, there is

no need to accept the usual explanation that

the file was kept pending for several

months/years due to considerable degree of

procedural red tape in the process. The

government departments are under a special

obligation to ensure that they perform their

duties with diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception and

should not be used as an anticipated benefit

for the government departments. The law

shelters everyone under the same light and

should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”

Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of

Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade,

[(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to the judgment

rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Post Master

General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited

& Anr. (supra,) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as

hereunder:

“1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do

Page 9 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

the same thing again and again and the conduct

seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition

has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had

an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed

filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh

in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of

M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our

order dated 15-10-2020.

2. We have penned down a detailed order in that

case and we see no purpose in repeating the same

reasoning again except to record what are stated to

be the facts on which the delay is sought to be

condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the

Government Advocate was approached in respect

of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram

Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP

1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of

the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020.

Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17

months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be

filed or not. What greater certificate of

incompetence would there be for the Legal

Department.

3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief

Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look

into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department

as it appears that the Department is unable to file

appeals within any reasonable period of time much

less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as

already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no

more admissible in view of the judgment

in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)

Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)

Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :

(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]

4. We have also expressed our concern that these

kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to

obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme

Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to

save the skin of officers who may be in default. We

have also recorded the irony of the situation where

no action is taken against the officers who sit on

these files and do nothing.

5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual

manner in which the application has been worded,

the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose

costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be

deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation

Project Committee. The amount be deposited within

four weeks. The amount be recovered from the

officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and

sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the

said amount be also filed in this Court within the

said period of time. We have put to Deputy

Advocate General to caution that for any successive

Page 10 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

matters of this kind the costs will keep on going

up.”

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal

and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2

SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient

cause has been made out in the facts of the given

case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay

condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as

hereunder:-

“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that

even after sufficient cause has been shown a party

is not entitled to the condonation of delay in

question as a matter of right. The proof of a

sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the

exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in

the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not

proved nothing further has to be done; the

application for condoning delay has to be

dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause

is shown then the court has to enquire whether in

its discretion it should condone the delay. This

aspect of the matter naturally introduces the

consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this

stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides

may fall for consideration; but the scope of the

enquiry while exercising the discretionary power

after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be

limited only to such facts as the court may regard

as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why

the party was sitting idle during all the time

available to it. In this connection we may point out

that considerations of bona fides or due diligence

are always material and relevant when the court is

dealing with applications made under Section 14 of

the Limitation Act. In dealing with such

applications the court is called upon to consider the

effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and

14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which

have been expressly made material and relevant

by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same

extent and in the same manner be invoked in

dealing with applications which fall to be decided

only under Section 5 without reference to Section

14. In the present case there is no difficulty in

holding that the discretion should be exercised in

favour of the appellant because apart from the

general criticism made against the appellant's lack

of diligence during the period of limitation no other

Page 11 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we

have already pointed out, the learned Judicial

Commissioner rejected the appellant's application

for condonation of delay only on the ground that it

was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as

possible within the period prescribed, and that, in

our opinion, is not a valid ground.

Thus, it is evident that while considering the

delay condonation application, the Court of Law is

required to consider the sufficient cause for

condonation of delay as also the approach of the

litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as

because after expiry of the period of limitation, a

right is accrued in favour of the other side and as

such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive

of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction

and laches on its part.

It also requires to refer herein that what is the

meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of

meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in

Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition

Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been

held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to

15 hereunder:-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the

defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The

meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or

“enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to

answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word

“sufficient” embraces no more than that which

provides a platitude, which when the act done

suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the

facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly

examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable

standard of a cautious man. In this context,

Page 12 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

“sufficient cause” means that the party should not

have acted in a negligent manner or there was a

want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts

and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged

that the party has “not acted diligently” or

“remained inactive”. However, the facts and

circumstances of each case must afford sufficient

ground to enable the court concerned to exercise

discretion for the reason that whenever the court

exercises discretion, it has to be exercised

judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court

that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”

from prosecuting his case, and unless a

satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court

should not allow the application for condonation of

delay. The court has to examine whether the

mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to

cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and

Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR

1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969)

2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]

, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2

SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben

Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan

Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 :

AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964

SC 993] this Court explained the difference

between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause”

and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a

good cause and vice versa. However, if any

difference exists it can only be that the requirement

of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree

of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be

given a liberal interpretation to ensure that

substantial justice is done, but only so long as

negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be

imputed to the party concerned, whether or not

sufficient cause has been furnished, can be

decided on the facts of a particular case and no

straitjacket formula is possible.

(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 :

AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath

Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR

2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of

limitation may harshly affect a particular party but

it has to be applied with all its rigour when the

statute so prescribes. The court has no power to

extend the period of limitation on equitable

grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory

provision is never an evil. A court has no power to

ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a

distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory

provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a

Page 13 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

particular party but the court has no choice but to

enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal

maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is

hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a

situation. It has consistently been held that,

“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be

considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public

policy, its aim being to secure peace in the

community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to

quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It

seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not

been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse

of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws

of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts

have expressed at least three differing reasons

supporting the existence of statutes of limitations

namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of

cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant

might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale

claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of

actions should pursue them with reasonable

diligence.”

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense

of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,

limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of

what may have been acquired in equity and justice

by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a

party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff

Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa

Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]

and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium

Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of

Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that

judicially engrafting principles of limitation

amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of

law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul

Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the

effect that where a case has been presented in the

court beyond limitation, the applicant has to

explain the court as to what was the “sufficient

cause” which means an adequate and enough

reason which prevented him to approach the court

within limitation. In case a party is found to be

negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the

facts and circumstances of the case, or found to

have not acted diligently or remained inactive,

there cannot be a justified ground to condone the

delay. No court could be justified in condoning such

an inordinate delay by imposing any condition

Page 14 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

whatsoever. The application is to be decided only

within the parameters laid down by this Court in

regard to the condonation of delay. In case there

was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to

approach the court on time condoning the delay

without any justification, putting any condition

whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in

violation of the statutory provisions and it

tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the

legislature.”

Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause

means that the party should not have acted in a

negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on

its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a

case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not

acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However,

the facts and circumstances of each case must afford

sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to

exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the

Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised

judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court

that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from

prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory

explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow

the application for condonation of delay. The Court

has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or

was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as

has been held in Manindra Land and Building

Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors.,

AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A.

Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs.

Page 15 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben

Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of

Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.

It has further been held in the aforesaid

judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’

should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure

that substantial justice is done, but only so long as

negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be

imputed to the party concerned, whether or not

sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided

on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket

formula is possible, reference in this regard may be

made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors.

Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195 ,

wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as

hereunder:-

“12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression

“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5

of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any

other similar provision should receive a liberal

construction so as to advance substantial justice

when no negligence or inaction or want of bona

fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case

whether explanation furnished would constitute

“sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon

facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket

formula for accepting or rejecting explanation

furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But

one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed

with the tendency of finding fault with the cause

shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in

over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of

explanation furnished should be the rule and

refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence

or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to

Page 16 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

the defaulting party. On the other hand, while

considering the matter the courts should not lose

sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the

time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the

other party which should not be lightly defeated by

condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However,

by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of

the matter the explanation furnished should not be

rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable

points of facts and law are involved in the case,

causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the

party against whom the lis terminates, either by

default or inaction and defeating valuable right of

such a party to have the decision on merit. While

considering the matter, courts have to strike a

balance between resultant effect of the order it is

going to pass upon the parties either way.”

13. It is evident from the judgments referred

hereinabove, wherein, expression ‘sufficient cause’

has been dealt with which means that the party

should not have acted in a negligent manner or there

was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the

facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be

alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or

“remained inactive”.

14. This Court, after considering the aforesaid

proposition and the explanation furnished in the

delay condonation application to condone the

inordinate delay of 188 days, is proceeding to

examine as to whether the explanation furnished can

be said to be sufficient explanation for condoning the

delay.

15. As would appear from the explanation

furnished, wherein, it has been stated that after

pronouncement of the impugned judgment dated

Page 17 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

05.04.2023, the concerned department sought for

opinion from the office of the learned Advocate

General through Law Department, Government of

Jharkhand. Thereafter, upon receipt of the file, the

learned Advocate General gave his opinion to file LPA

which was communicated to the concerned

Department in terms of Letter No.5905 dated

04.05.2023 which was communicated by the office of

the Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi vide letter dated

04.05.2023 to the Additional Collector, Ranchi.

In pursuance of the said letter, the file was

placed before the office of Deputy Commissioner-

cum-Magistrate, Ranchi on 08.05.2023 and on the

same day, the Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi was

directed to file appeal. Thereafter, grounds of appeal

was prepared and the same was again placed before

the Additional Collector, Ranchi for approval and

thereafter, on 01.06.2023 the draft of the appeal was

prepared and placed before the Deputy Collector

Land Reforms, Ranchi for approval.

Thereafter, the file was again forwarded to the

Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi for necessary

corrections in the said draft and on 12.06.2023, file

was again placed before the Additional Collector,

Ranchi for perusal.

Page 18 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

Thereafter, on 26.06.2023 the file was placed

before the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Magistrate,

Ranchi for approval and after getting approval, the

Kanke Anchal, Kanke, Ranchi was authorized to file

the memo of appeal and thereafter, the memo of

appeal was filed.

16. It appears from the stated grounds in the delay

condonation application that the cause has been

tried to be shown of movement of file from one

department to another.

17. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such

circumstances as per the reference made

hereinabove about the conduct of the State-

appellant, the same cannot be said to be sufficient

cause to condone the delay of 188 days.

18. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed

an order in L.P.A. No.430 of 2022 on 11.09.2023

rejecting the delay condonation application as filed

by the State Government since the appeal was filed

after delay of about 128 days without any sufficient

cause to condone the delay.

19. The reference of another case is required to be

made herein of an order passed by the coordinate

Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019,

wherein, the issue of condoning the delay of 568

Page 19 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

days was under consideration.

The coordinate Bench of this Court has not

found the reason furnished by the State appellants

therein to be sufficient cause on the ground of

movement of file from one table to another by putting

reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble

Apex as referred hereinabove.

20. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon’ble

Apex Court by filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of

2022 and has challenged the order passed in L.P.A.

No.835 of 2019 but the said SLP No.7755 of 2022

has been dismissed as would appear from the order

dated 13.05.2022.

The Hon’ble Apex Court has also dismissed one

Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on

28th April, 2023 filed by the State of Jharkhand

which was filed against the order passed by this

Court in L.P.A. No.99 of 2021, wherein the

coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said

appeal on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of

the appeal.

21. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also

dismissed S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on

02.02.2024 filed by the State of Jharkhand against

the order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in

Page 20 of 20 L.P.A. No.645 of 2023

L.P.A. No.401 of 2022, wherein, the delay of 259

days was not condoned.

22. This Court, after taking into consideration the

ratio laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the

judgments referred hereinabove as also the

explanation furnished in the delay condonation

application, is of the view that no sufficient cause

has been shown to condone inordinate delay of 188

days in filing the appeal.

23. Accordingly, the delay condonation application

being I.A. No.1897 of 2024 is hereby dismissed.

24. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also

stands dismissed.

25. In consequence of dismissal of appeal, pending

interlocutory applications also stand dismissed.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)

Saurabh/A.F.R.