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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.349 OF 2019

The State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant

Versus

Laxmi Narayan and others ..Respondents

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 350 OF 2019

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Criminal Appeal No.349 of 2019

A two Judge bench of this Court vide its order dated 08.09.2017,

in view of the apparent conflict between the two decisions of this Court

in the cases of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466

and State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCC 149, has

referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and that is how the

matter is placed before a Bench of three Judges.

1.1Vide order dated 19.11.2018, since the same question of law is

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involved, this Court tagged the connected appeal with the main

appeal.

2.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order dated 7.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.

8000/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the said application,

preferred by the respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the

proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under

Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, relying upon the decision of this Court

in the case of Shiji @ Pappu & others vs. Radhika and another (2011) 10

SCC 705, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present

appeal.

2.1Office report dated 18.08.2017 indicates that service of show

cause notice on the respondents is complete, and respondent nos. 1 to

3 are represented by Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Advocate, but during

the course of hearing, nobody appeared for the respondents.

3.The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lodged

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against the respondents herein and two unknown persons at Police

Station Raun, District Bhind, for the offences punishable under

Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime

No.36/13. It was alleged that on 03.03.2013 at about 9:30 p.m., the

complainant – Charan Singh, who is an operator of LNT machine is

extracting sand of Sindh River at Indukhi Sand Mine and at that time

firing from other side of river started and the counter firing from this

side also started then he heard that take away your machine from

here. It is alleged that some people came there from which Sanjeev

(respondent no.2 herein), Lature (respondent no.1 herein), Sant Singh

(respondent no.3 herein) and two unknown persons came near to the

complainant and his machine and told him to run away, then

somebody told to Sanjeev (respondent no.2 herein) to fire and then

Sanjeev fired on the complainant and then they ran away. The

complainant fell from the machine. The bullet hit the complainant on

elbow of right hand. Somehow the complainant managed to reach the

village and a person called a car and admitted the complainant in

District Hospital.

3.1That on 04.03.2013, the duty doctor in the District Hospital

informed the police and on the basis of the statement of the

complainant, a Dehati Nalishi bearing No. 0/13 was registered under

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Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.

3.2That the medical examination of the injured complainant was

conducted at District Hospital and five injuries were found on his body

and injuries nos. 1 to 4 were opined to be caused by fire arm and

injury no.5 was advised for x-ray.

3.3That on 05.03.2013, the police reached on the spot and prepared

spot map; statement of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of

the Cr.P.C. and the police seized simple soil, blood stained soil and

other articles from the spot of the incident and prepared their seizure

memos.

3.4That the accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000 of

2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings

against the accused arising out of the FIR, on the sole ground of a

compromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant.

4.That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in

exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the

criminal proceedings against the accused solely on the ground that the

accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably.

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While quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the

High Court has considered and relied upon the decision of this Court

in the case of Shiji (supra).

5.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and

order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the

offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, the State of

Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.

6.Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya

Pradesh has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed

a grave error in quashing the FIR which was for the offences under

Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.

6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High

Court has quashed the FIR mechanically and solely on the basis of the

settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused,

without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences

alleged against the accused persons.

6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the FIR, the High Court has

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not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were against the

society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between the

two individuals.

6.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the

decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the

FIR. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the High

Court ought to have appreciated that in all the cases where the

complainant has compromised/entered into a settlement with the

accused, that need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of

recording conviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be

exercise of futility. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that in a given case despite

the complainant may not support in future and in the trial in view of

the settlement and compromise with the accused, still the prosecution

may prove the case against the accused persons by examining the

other witnesses, if any, and/or on the basis of the medical evidence

and/or other evidence/material. It is submitted that in the present

cases the investigation was in progress and even the statement of the

witnesses was recorded and the medical evidence was also collected. It

is submitted that therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case,

the High Court has clearly erred in considering and relying upon the

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decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra).

6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant-State that the accused were hard core

criminals and many criminal cases were registered against them and

they are a serious threat to the society. It is submitted that all these

aforesaid circumstances and the conduct on the part of the accused

were required to be considered by the High Court while quashing the

FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,

and more particularly when the offences alleged were against the

society at large, namely, attempt to murder, which is a

non-compoundable offence. In support of his submissions, learned

counsel for the appellant-State has placed reliance on the decisions of

this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC

303; State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149; State of

Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya

Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana

Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh

(2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC

641; and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan

Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019, State of

Madhya Pradesh vs. Dhruv Gurjar, decided on 22.02.2019 in Criminal

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Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013.

6.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the

aforesaid decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the appellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeal and

quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the

High Court quashing and setting aside the FIR, in exercise of its

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

7.As observed hereinabove, nobody appeared on behalf of the

respondents – accused.

8.We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at great

length.

9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present

appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307

and 34 of the IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the

complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and

the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this

Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court has observed that

there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons

and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High

Court has quashed the FIR.

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9.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact

that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per

Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it

appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant

facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness

of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment

and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court

has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the

distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong

and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State

of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the

Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the

entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the

settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes

to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution,

circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the

High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire

conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the

criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by

the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307

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and 34 of the IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court

in a catena of decisions.

9.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this

Court has observed and held as under:

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion

can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in

quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in

exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and

different from the power given to a criminal court for

compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.

Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory

limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the

guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the

ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of

any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal

proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where

the offender and the victim have settled their dispute

would depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case and no category can be prescribed. However, before

exercise of such power, the High Court must have due

regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous

and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed

even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender

have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in

nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,

any compromise between the victim and the offender in

relation to the offences under special statutes like the

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by

public servants while working in that capacity, etc.;

cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal

proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal

cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil

flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of

quashing, particularly the offences arising from

commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or

such like transactions or the offences arising out of

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matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes

where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature

and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this

category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal

proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise

between the offender and the victim, the possibility of

conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the

criminal case would put the accused to great oppression

and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to

him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and

complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In

other words, the High Court must consider whether it

would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to

continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of

the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of

process of law despite settlement and compromise

between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to

secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the

criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the

above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court

shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal

proceeding.”

9.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6

SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh

(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and

lay down the following principles by which the High Court

would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the

settlement between the parties and exercising its power

under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the

settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to

accept the settlement with direction to continue with the

criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to

be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to

compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No

doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court

has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings

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even in those cases which are not compoundable, where

the parties have settled the matter between themselves.

However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with

caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and

on that basis petition for quashing the criminal

proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases

would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an

opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those

prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences

of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,

etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a

serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences

alleged to have been committed under special statute like

the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that

capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of

compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having

overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,

particularly those arising out of commercial transactions

or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family

disputes should be quashed when the parties have

resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to

examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is

remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases

would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice

and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not

quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the

category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are

to be generally treated as crime against the society and

not against the individual alone. However, the High Court

would not rest its decision merely because there is a

mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is

framed under this provision. It would be open to the High

Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section

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307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has

collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead

to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this

purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the

nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is

inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of

weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries

suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.

On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court

can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of

conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and

bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the

settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas

in the latter case it would be permissible for the High

Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based

on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,

the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the

settlement between the parties is going to result in

harmony between them which may improve their future

relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under

Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play

a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is

arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of

offence and the matter is still under investigation, the

High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to

quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is

because of the reason that at this stage the investigation

is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed.

Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the

evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy

stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising

its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of

the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the

other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost

complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the

matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High

Court should refrain from exercising its power under

Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court

would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits

and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence

under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in

those cases where the conviction is already recorded by

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the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage

before the High Court, mere compromise between the

parties would not be a ground to accept the same

resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already

been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved

under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded

of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of

sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

9.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this Court has

had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the

FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of

decisions of this Court on the point, this Court summarised the

following propositions:

“(1)Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the

High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or

to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer

new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which

inhere in the High Court.

(2)The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to

quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on

the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the

offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of

jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.

While compounding an offence, the power of the court is

governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to

quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is

non-compoundable.

(3)In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or

complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the

ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent

power.

(4)While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide

ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the

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ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any

court.

(5)the decision as to whether a complaint or first

information report should be quashed on the ground that the

offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves

ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no

exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate.

(6)In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and

while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,

the High Court must have due regard to the nature and

gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving

mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and

dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or

the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such

offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a

serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with

the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of

public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

(7)As distinguished from serious offences, there may be

criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant

element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing

insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is

concerned.

(8)Criminal cases involving offences which arise from

commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar

transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in

appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have

settled the dispute.

(9)In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal

proceeding if in view of the compromise between the

disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the

continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression

and prejudice; and

(10)There is yet an exception to the principle set out in

Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving

the financial and economic well-being of the State have

implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute

between private disputants. The High Court would be

justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved

in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or

misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of

upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the

balance.”

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9.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specifically

observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding

an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of

imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private

parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a

serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that

where the accused are facing trial under Sections 307 read with

Section 34 IPC, as the offences are definitely against the society,

accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by

demonstrating their innocence.

9.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specifically

observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable

and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between

the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the

proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar

is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the

case of Kalyan Singh (supra) and Dhruv Gurjar (supra).

10. Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of

Narinder Singh (supra) is concerned, this Court in paragraph 29.6

admitted that the offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the

category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be

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generally treated as crime against the society and not against the

individual alone. However, this Court further observed that the High

Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of

Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed. Its further

corroboration with the medical evidence or other evidence is to be

seen, which will be possible during the trial only. Hence, the decision

of this case in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) shall be of no

assistance to the accused in the present case.

11. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this

Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR by observing

that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is

no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would

be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the

High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid

ground. It appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the

said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought

to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant

has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any

conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too

early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still

can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the

other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly

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when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil

nature and/or is not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this

Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between

the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this

Court observed that, ‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution

where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations…will be

a futile exercise that will serve no purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it

was also further observed ‘that even the alleged two eyewitnesses,

however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the

prosecution version’, and to that this Court observed and held ‘that

the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality

and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in such circumstances, be justifiably

invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and

thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in

the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:

“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the

plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself,

makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the

same with utmost care and caution. The width and the

nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is

sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for

reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance

of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the

process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to

enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power

under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to

say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the

ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise

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that power may result in the abuse of the process of law.

The High Court may be justified in declining interference

if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot

assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a

petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to

consider the facts and circumstances of each case to

determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent

powers may be invoked.”

11.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case

which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the

parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the

society at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the

dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision

may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very

serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under

Section 307 IPC. Therefore, without proper application of mind to the

relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court has

materially erred in mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that

in view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording

conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility.

The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of

this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant

facts and circumstances of the case.

12. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this

Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat

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(supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court

has noted the difference between the power of compounding of

offences conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the

powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal

proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court

further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a

criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section

320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while,

on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for

quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section

482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of

justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate

consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in

the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very

Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and

lay down the following principles by which the High Court

would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the

settlement between the parties and exercising its power

under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the

settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to

accept the settlement with direction to continue with the

criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to

be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to

compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No

doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court

has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings

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even in those cases which are not compoundable, where

the parties have settled the matter between themselves.

However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with

caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and

on that basis petition for quashing the criminal

proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases

would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an

opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those

prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences

of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,

etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a

serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences

alleged to have been committed under special statute like

the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in that

capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of

compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having

overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,

particularly those arising out of commercial transactions

or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family

disputes should be quashed when the parties have

resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to

examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is

remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases

would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice

and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not

quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the

category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are

to be generally treated as crime against the society and

not against the individual alone. However, the High Court

would not rest its decision merely because there is a

mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is

framed under this provision. It would be open to the High

Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section

22

307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has

collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead

to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this

purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the

nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is

inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of

weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries

suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor.

On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court

can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of

conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and

bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the

settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas

in the latter case it would be permissible for the High

Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based

on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage,

the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the

settlement between the parties is going to result in

harmony between them which may improve their future

relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under

Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play

a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is

arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of

offence and the matter is still under investigation, the

High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to

quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is

because of the reason that at this stage the investigation

is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed.

Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the

evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy

stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising

its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of

the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the

other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost

complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the

matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High

Court should refrain from exercising its power under

Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court

would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits

and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence

under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in

those cases where the conviction is already recorded by

23

the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage

before the High Court, mere compromise between the

parties would not be a ground to accept the same

resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already

been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved

under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded

of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of

sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of

this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and

held as under:

i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to

quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable

offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having

overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly

those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of

matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties

have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

ii)such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions

which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity

or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not

private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

iii)similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences

under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the

offences committed by public servants while working in that

24

capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise

between the victim and the offender;

iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.

would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and

therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not

against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal

proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the

Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot

be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,

on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute

amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its

decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in

the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be

open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of

Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has

collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to

framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it

would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury

sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate

parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an

exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the

evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is

25

filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is

not permissible when the matter is still under investigation.

Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of

the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)

should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the

circumstances stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the

Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of

non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do

not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a

settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the

High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;

the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was

absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed

with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.

14. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High

Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences

under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the

investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused

managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and

sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The

allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in

26

commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence

and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the

High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the

accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically

quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the

Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court

has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.

15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, the present

appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated

07.10.2013 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case

No. 8000 of 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside, and the

FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the

accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.

Criminal Appeal No.350 of 2019

16. So far as Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP 10324/2018 is

concerned, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has

quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under

Sections 323, 294, 308 & 34 of the IPC, solely on the ground that the

accused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of

27

the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), there may not be

any possibility of recording a conviction against the accused. Offence

under Section 308 IPC is a non-compoundable offence. While

committing the offence, the accused has used the fire arm. They are

also absconding, and in the meantime, they have managed to enter

into a compromise with the complainant. Therefore, for the reasons

stated above, this appeal is also allowed, the impugned judgment and

order dated 28.05.2018 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous

Criminal Case No. 19309/2018 is hereby quashed and set aside, and

the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the

accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.

……………………………….J.

[A.K. SIKRI]

……………………………….J.

[S. ABDUL NAZEER]

NEW DELHI; ……………………………….J.

MARCH 05, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]