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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 1341 of 2005

PETITIONER:

Trimukh Maroti Kirkan

RESPONDENT:

State of Maharashtra

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/10/2006

BENCH:

G.P. Mathur & R.V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

G. P. MATHUR, J.

1. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan has filed this appeal against the

judgment and order dated 27.7.2005 of Aurangabad Bench of Bombay

High Court by which the appeal filed by State of Maharashtra was

allowed and the order dated 21.4.1997 passed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded was set aside and the appellant

was convicted under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to

imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default to

undergo six months RI. By the same judgment and order, the appeal

filed by the appellant challenging his conviction under Section 498-A

IPC and the sentence of two years RI and a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in

default to undergo RI for three months was dismissed.

2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased Revata

@ Tai daughter of Dattarao resident of village Umatwadi was married

to the appellant Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (for short 'Trimukh') nearly

seven years before the incident which took place on 4.11.1996 in

village Kikki. Maroti Kamaji Kirkan (for short 'Maroti') is the father

and Nilawatibai Maroti Kirkan (for short 'Nilawati') is the mother of

the appellant Trimukh and they are residents of village Kikki. The

appellant who is the husband and Maroti and Nilawati used to ill-treat

the deceased Revata and used to harass her on account of non-

payment of Rs.25,000/- by her parents for the purpose of purchasing a

tempo for the appellant. Whenever, the deceased Revata came to her

parental home, she used to disclose to her family members the ill-

treatment and harassment meted out to her. She came to her parental

home at the time of Panchami festival in the year 1996 and stayed

there for about 15 days. During this period also she disclosed that on

account of non-fulfilment of demand of Rs.25,000/- by her father, the

appellant and her in-laws (Maroti and Nilawati) used to harass her.

She was often beaten and was not provided food. After the Panchami

festival, the father of Revata took her to the appellant's house in

village Kikki and requested the appellant and her in-laws not to ill-

treat her. He, however, told them that he is not in a position to fulfil

their demand of Rs.25,000/- on account of his weak financial

condition. A few months thereafter, Dattarao received information

from a person of village Kikki that Revata had died due to snake bite.

Information was also given by the Police Patil of the village to P.S.

Nanded (Rural) that Revata had died due to snake bite and on the

basis of this information, a case as A.D. No.42 of 1996 was registered

in accordance with Section 174 Cr.P.C. at the police station.

Devichand, ASI and some police personnel went to the village, held

inquest over the dead body and after preparing the spot panchnama

sent the same for post-mortem examination. The appellant Trimukh

himself showed the place of incident where the victim had been

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allegedly bitten by snake and had died. The post-mortem examination

conducted on the body of Revata disclosed that she had died due to

asphyxia as a result of compression of neck. Dattarao, father of the

deceased then lodged an FIR of the incident at 4.30 p.m. on 5.11.1990

at the police station and a case was then registered under Section 302

IPC. During the course of investigation, the police recorded

statements of some witnesses. The appellant was arrested and while

in custody he made a disclosure statement on the basis of which some

recoveries were made. After completion of investigation, chargesheet

was submitted against three persons, viz., the appellant Trimukh and

his parents, viz., Maroti and Nilawati.

3. The learned Sessions Judge, Nanded framed charges under

Section 498-A IPC against all the three accused and also under

Section 302 IPC against appellant Trimukh. The accused pleaded not

guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to establish its case the

prosecution examined 14 witnesses and filed some documentary

evidence. The accused in their statement denied the prosecution case

and stated that Revata had died on account of snake bite. The learned

Sessions Judge convicted all the three accused under Section 498-A

read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to two years RI and a

fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default to undergo RI for three months. The

appellant was, however, acquitted of the charge under Section 302

IPC. All the three accused preferred Criminal Appeal No.158 of

1997 before the High Court challenging their conviction and sentence

under Section 498-A IPC read with Section 34 IPC while the State of

Maharahstra preferred Criminal Appeal No.220 of 1997 challenging

the acquittal of Trimukh under Section 302 IPC. The High Court

allowed the appeal preferred by Maroti and Nilawati accused and their

conviction under Section 498-A IPC was set aside and the appeal

preferred by the appellant was dismissed. The appeal preferred by

the State of Maharashtra was allowed and the appellant was convicted

under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life

and a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default to further undergo six months

RI. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

4. Since the present appeal has been filed under Section 2(a) of the

Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,

1970 and the High Court has reversed the order of acquittal and has

convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, it will be appropriate

to briefly consider the evidence on record. PW1. Dattarao is the

father and PW.2 Rukmabai is the mother of the deceased Revata and

they are residents of village Umatwadi. Both of them have deposed

that the marriage of the deceased with the appellant took place nearly

7 years back in which they had given Rs.20,000/- in cash besides

clothes and utensils. Whenever deceased came to her parental home,

she used to complain that she was being harassed and ill-treated on

account of demand of money. They have further deposed that last

time the deceased came to their house on the occasion of Panchami

festival when she told them that the appellant wanted to purchase a

tempo and, therefore, her in-laws and also the appellant were asking

her to get Rs.25,000/- from her parents. The deceased also informed

that occasionally she was not provided food and was beaten on

account of non-fulfillment of the demand of Rs.25,000/-. They have

further deposed that the deceased stayed with them for about 15 days

and thereafter PW.1 Dattarao escorted her to her matrimonial home

and informed her in-laws that he was not in a position to give

Rs.25,000/- and further requested them not to ill-treat her. A few days

before the Diwali festival a person came from village Kikki and

informed that Revata had died on account of snake bite. Thereafter,

PW.1, PW.2 and their sons and two daughters-in-law went to village

Kikki which is about 25 kilometers from their village Umatwadi. On

reaching there they saw that the body of Revata had been placed in a

sitting posture with her back resting on the wall and a strip of cloth

had been tied along her mouth. PW.1 has further deposed that

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subsequently he lodged an FIR on 5.11.1996 at the police station.

Though a suggestion was given to both the witnesses that the marriage

of the deceased had taken place about 10 years back, but both of them

specifically denied and stated that the marriage had taken place 5-6

years back. PW.1 has further deposed that he removed the cloth

which was tied along the mouth of the deceased and noticed marks of

injury around the neck and cheek and there were no bangles on her

hands. PW.3 Balasaheb, who is cousin of PW.1 and is resident of

village Umatwadi, has deposed that whenever Revata came to her

parental home, she always came to his house as well. She used to

narrate about the ill-treatment meted out to her by the appellant and

her in-laws as they were demanding an amount of Rs.25,000/- for

purchasing a tempo for the appellant. He has further deposed that in

the evening of 4.11.1996 two persons from village Kikki came to his

village and informed PW.1 and others that Revata had died on account

of snake bite. The witness has further deposed that next day in the

morning he went to village Kikki along with several other persons of

his village and saw the body of the deceased. There were injury

marks around the neck, cheek, hand and other parts of the body.

PW.4 Chander is another cousin of PW.1 and is resident of the same

village Umatwadi. His statement is almost similar to that of PW.3

Balasaheb. PW.5 Girjabai is a resident of village Kikki and her house

is very close to the house of the accused in the same village. She has

deposed that the deceased Revata used to visit her and she had often

told her that on account of non-fulfilment of demand of money by her

parents, she was being ill-treated by her in-laws and husband

(appellant). She has further deposed that she used to console the

deceased and tell her that the ill-treatment being meted out to her

would gradually stop. She has further stated that at about 3-3.15 p.m.

on the date of the incident she was informed that Maroti's daughter-

in-law had died due to snake bite. She immediately rushed to the

house of Maroti and saw the body of the deceased. There were marks

of injury on the neck and cheek and there were no bangles on her

hands. This witness is no doubt distantly related to the deceased as her

husband's mother is sister of PW.2 but nothing material has come out

in her cross-examination which may discredit her testimony regarding

the demand of Rs.25,000/- by the appellant and his parents and also

the ill-treatment being meted out to the deceased. It was suggested to

her in her cross-examination that the deceased was suffering from

T.B. and asthma and also that she used to have occasional chest pain

but it was emphatically denied by her.

5. PW.8 Madhvrao is the real brother of accused Maroti and the

appellant is his nephew. In his examination-in-chief he stated that he

did not know how Revata had died and he had not witnessed any

incident. The witness was declared as hostile and in his cross-

examination by State counsel he admitted that the appellant Trimukh

used to ply a tempo. PW.6 Maroti son of Ramrao Telange and PW.7

Venkat, both residents of village Kikki, have deposed that while in the

custody of the police the appellant said that he would show the spot

where the incident had taken place. Thereafter he had taken the police

party and the witnesses to the field of his father Maroti and on his

pointing out a pair of ladies chappal, broken pieces of bangles and a

sickle lying there were recovered and the appellant had further said

that the ladies chappal belonged to his wife. The aforesaid articles

were taken into possession by the Police Inspector and a panchnama

was prepared which was signed by them. PW.7 has further deposed

that on the pointing out of the appellant his shoe was recovered which

was taken in possession by the police and panchnama was drawn on

which he has put his signature. PW.9 Digamber who was a witness of

inquest turned hostile, but in his cross-examination he stated that he

went to the house of accused Maroti at about 9.00 a.m. and had seen

the body of the deceased with a piece of cloth tied around her mouth.

He further admitted that when the police was recording the

panchnama, he had said that there was no mark of snake bite on the

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body of the deceased and that he had put his signature on the inquest

panchnama. PW.11 Vilas and PW.12 Nilawati whose agricultural

land is situate near the agricultural land of Maroti accused turned

hostile. PW.13 Digamber son of Madhavrao who is also a resident of

village Kikki, also turned hostile. However, he admitted that he had

heard that Revata had died due to snake bite and further that a tempo

is owned by Maroti which is plied by the appellant Trimukh.

6. PW.14 Devichand, Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, P.S.

Nanded (Rural) has deposed that on the basis of the information given

by the Police Patil, an Accidental Death Case was registered at 12.30

p.m. on 5.11.1996 at the police station and he was entrusted with the

inquiry of the same. He came to the village Kikki, held inquest on the

body of the deceased and sent the same for post-mortem examination.

He had prepared the panchnama which was signed by the witnesses.

After the report of the post-mortem examination had been received

and the FIR had been lodged by PW.1 Dattarao at 4.30 p.m. on

5.1.1996, a case was registered under Section 302 IPC. He had

arrested the appellant and while he was in custody some recoveries

were made regarding which a panchnama was prepared and was

signed by the witnesses. He has further deposed that he asked the

appellant Trimukh as to how the incident took place and then he had

shown the scene of offence in a field and on his pointing out he had

recovered a pair of ladies chappal, pieces of bangles and a sickle from

the spot. In his cross-examination PW.14 has stated that when he had

reached the hose of accused Maroti in village Kikki after registration

of an Accidental Death Case, he had found the body of the deceased

inside a room in a sitting posture with her back taking support from

the wall.

7. PW.10 Dr. Hanumant Vasantrao Godbole conducted post-

mortem examination on the body of the deceased Revata between

2.00 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. on 5.11.1996 and found the following ante

mortem injuries on her person :-

1. Swelling of left cheek seen (contusion). Abrasion of

about 1.5 c.m. diameter seen over left cheek, lower

aspect near angle of mandible, reddish.

2. Abrasion of 1.5 x 1 c.m. over right zygomatic region of

face reddish.

3. Five abrasions over left shoulder over superior and

middle aspect, size ranging from 0.5 x 1.5 x .5-1 c.m.

reddish.

4. Contusion over chin, inferior aspect, 4 x 3 c.m. reddish-

bluish.

5. Abrasion over right shoulder, medial most aspect, 2 x 1

c.m. reddish.

6. Contusion over cheek (left) lateral to chin, 2 x 2 c.m.,

reddish bluish.

7. Abrasion over left side of neck, upper most aspect, 3 c.m.

medial and just above in relation with injury no.1 in this

column, reddish, 1 x 0.5 c.m.

8. Abrasion over right shoulder, 1.5 c.m. posterior to injury

no.5, 3 x 2 c.m. reddish.

9. Irregular large abrasion over neck, anteriorly involving

upper and lower aspect, and extending to right side,

reddish graze-type, on lower aspect involving

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sternoclavicular joints, upper aspect anteriorly (in the

middle) from above thyrid cartilage. Dimension 7 c.m.

near thyrid cartilage, about 4.5 c.m. below thyrid

cartilage, maximum width over lower most aspect of

neck, near sternoclavicular joints. At few places

abrasion, dark brown colour, intermingled with reddish

areas. (Suggestive of multiple irregular abrasion

intermingling with each other).

The internal examination revealed the following injuries :-

(1) Contusion under scalp left temporal area, 4 x 4 c.m.

reddish, swollen, (2) mid occipital areas 7 x 5 c.m.,

reddish swollen. On dissection of neck, about whole of

the anterior and lateral aspect of neck (structures i.e.

subcutaneous tissue muscles) showed infiltration of

blood (ecchymosed). Ecchymoses also seen at

sternoclavicular joint, upper part of sternum. No

evidence of fracture of hyoid bone/thyrid cartilage or

ribs. Lymps nodes in neck region-congested. Thyroid

cartilage and trachea showed reddish patches of

haemorrhage externally and on opening.

The witness has opined that the death was caused due to

asphyxia as a result of compression of neck. He deposed that the

general and specific chemical testing did not reveal any poison and

had there been a snake bite then poison would have appeared in the

blood. He further deposed that the injuries present on the neck of the

deceased could be caused if the throat is pressed with a shoe with

force and the victim is pulled at the opposite direction by holding her

hands.

8. The accused did not examine any witness in their defence.

Maroti accused admitted in reply to question no.14 that the dead body

was kept resting in sitting position and a strip of cloth was tied to the

mouth.

9. From the evidence adduced by the prosecution the following

circumstances are clearly established.

I. The marriage of Revata with the appellant Trimukh had taken

place about 5-6 years back.

II. The appellant Trimukh used to ply a tempo.

III. There was a demand of Rs.25,000/- by the appellant and his

parents from the parents of the deceased. The deceased was

being ill-treated and was occasionally not given food on

account of the fact that the demand of money had not been met.

IV. The deceased had told her parents about the fact that she was

being ill-treated and occasionally she was not given food,

whenever she visited her parental home and last time on the

occasion of Panchami festival. She had also told about the said

fact to her neighbour PW.5 Girjabai of village Kikki.

V. After the death of Revata the appellant and his parents informed

some persons in the village as also the family members of the

deceased that she had died on account of snake bite.

VI. When PW.1, PW.2, PW.3 and PW.4 reached the house of the

accused in village Kikki, they found the body of the deceased in

a sitting posture with her back taking support from the wall.

PW.14 Devichand, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police also found

the body in the same position.

VII. The post-mortem examination revealed that Revata had died

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due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account

of snake bite.

VIII. Certain recoveries like chappal of the deceased, broken pieces

of bangles were made at the pointing out of the appellant. A

shoe was also recovered at his pointing out.

10. In the case in hand there is no eye-witness of the occurrence

and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The

normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the

circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn

must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances

should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt

of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form

a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that

within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused

and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other

than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his

innocence.

11. The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride

has shown a phenomenal increase in last few years. Cases are

frequently coming before the Courts, where the husband or in-laws

have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met.

These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the

house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead

evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the

crime, would come forward to depose against another family member.

The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are

generally reluctant to depose in Court as they want to keep aloof and

do not want to antagonize a neighbourhood family. The parents or

other family members of the bride being away from the scene of

commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence

which may inculpate the real accused except regarding the demand of

money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not

mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should go

unpunished.

12. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in

such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to

plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their

choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead

evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of

circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the

Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see

that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a

guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v.

Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 \026 quoted with approval

by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh (2003) 11

SCC 271). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead

evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at

any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to

lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the

facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in

mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact

is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of

proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section

throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it

reads:

(b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without

ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on

him."

Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a

house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be

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upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led

by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is

required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would

be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the

Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of

the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was

committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply

keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise

that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution

and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.

13. A somewhat similar question was examined by this Court in

connection with Section 167 and 178-A of the Sea Customs Act in

Collector of Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormull AIR 1974 SC

859 and it will be apt to reproduce paras 30 to 32 of the reports which

are as under :

30. It cannot be disputed that in proceedings for imposing

penalties under Clause (8) of Section 167 to which

Section 178-A does not apply, the burden of proving that

the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Department.

This is a fundamental rule relating to proof in all criminal

or quasi-criminal proceedings, where there is no statutory

provision to the contrary. But in appreciating its scope

and the nature of the onus cast by it, we must pay due

regard to other kindred principles, no less fundamental,

of universal application. One of them is that the

prosecution or the Department is not required to prove its

case with mathematical precision to a demonstrable

degree; for, in all human affairs absolute certainty is a

myth, and as Prof. Brett felicitously puts it - ''all

exactness is a fake". El Dorado of absolute proof being

unattainable, the law, accepts for it, probability as a

working substitute in this work-a-day world. The law

does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible.

All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree

of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis,

believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal

proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing

more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities

of the case.

31. The other cardinal principle having an important

bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that

sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be

considered - to use the words of Lord Mansfield in

Blatch v. Archer (1774) 1 Cowp. 63 at p.65 "according to

the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove,

and in the power of the other to have contradicted". Since

it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for

the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within

the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not

obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden.

32. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to

avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering

guards, it is impossible for the Preventive Department to

unravel every link of the process. Many facts relating to

this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar

knowledge of the person concerned in it. On the principle

underlying Section 106, Evidence Act, the burden to

establish those facts is cast on the person concerned; and

if he falls to establish or explain those facts, an adverse

inference of facts may arise against him, which coupled

with the presumptive evidence adduced by the

prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial

presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in

the result prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best in

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'Law of Evidence', (12th Edn. Article 320, page 291), the

"presumption of innocence is, no doubt, presumptio juris;

but every day's practice shows that it may be successfully

encountered by the presumption of guilt arising from the

recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property",

though the latter is only a presumption of fact. Thus the

burden on the prosecution or the Department may be

considerably lightened even by such presumption of fact

arising in their favour. However, this does not mean that

the special or peculiar knowledge of the person

proceeded against will relieve the prosecution or the

Department altogether of the burden of producing some

evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It will only

alleviate that burden to discharge which very slight

evidence may suffice.

(Emphasis supplied)

The aforesaid principle has been approved and followed in

Balram Prasad Agrawal v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1830

where a married woman had committed suicide on account of ill-

treatment meted out to her by her husband and in-laws on account of

demand of dowry and being issueless.

14. The question of burden of proof where some facts are within

the personal knowledge of the accused was examined in State of West

Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 382. In this

case the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased Mahesh from the

house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the

accused and took him away at about 2.30 in the night. Next day in the

morning his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial

Court convicted the accused under Section 364 read with Section 34

IPC and sentenced them to 10 years RI. The accused preferred an

appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State

also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for

murder charge. The accused had not given any explanation as to what

happened to Mahesh after he was abducted by them. The learned

Sessions Judge after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence

had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence

after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons and

the discovery of the dead body in the hospital and had concluded that

the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against

the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court took

note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and laid

down the following principle in paras 31 to 34 of the reports :

"31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not

be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no

process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of

presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it

impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the

traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the

prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic

coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the

major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty.

32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in

establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court

has to presume the existence of certain facts.

Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the

court to rely on in conditions such as this.

33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the

existence of one fact from the existence of some other

facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved.

Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact

otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other

proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from

other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of

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reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most

probable position. The above principle has gained

legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is

incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court

to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely

to have happened. In that process the court shall have

regard to the common course of natural events, human

conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.

34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that

Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him

out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened

to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered

within a short time after the abduction the permitted

reasoning process would enable the court to draw the

presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such

inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the

court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was

in their custody."

Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court while maintaining

the conviction under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC reversed

the order of acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and

convicted the accused under the said provision and sentenced them to

imprisonment for life.

15. In Ram Gulam Chaudhary & Ors. v. Sate of Bihar (2001) 8

SCC 311, the accused after brutally assaulting a boy carried him away

and thereafter the boy was not seen alive nor his body was found. The

accused, however, offered no explanation as to what they did after

they took away the boy. It was held that for the absence of any

explanation from the side of the accused about the boy, there was

every justification for drawing an inference that they have murdered

the boy. It was further observed that even though Section 106 of the

Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its

burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but

the section would apply to cases like the present, where the

prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable

inference can be drawn regarding death. The accused by virtue of

their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead

the Court to draw a different inference.

16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-

witness account is available, there is another principle of law which

must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating

circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers

no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue,

then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of

circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a

catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v.

Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra

Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v.

Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan

(2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995)

3 SCC 574 (para 4)].

17. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of

his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that

shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the

offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also

normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does

not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an

explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance

which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In

Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 2077 it was

observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the

house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact that

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the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the

absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In

Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant

was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his

house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his

custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible

explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section

313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with

absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the

innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the

appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife.

In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the

medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during

late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after

sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that wife had

committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at

that time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that

the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further

the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night.

It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was

the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation

and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court

acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In

State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 the wife was

found dead in a hut which had caught fire. The evidence showed that

the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00

p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when

the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of

accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter.

The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a

result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held

that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it

was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime.

18. In the earlier part of the judgment we have given a resume of

the evidence which is available on record. The appellant was plying a

tempo in order to earn his livelihood. It is fully established that the

deceased Revata was being ill-treated and harassed on account of non-

fulfilment of demand of Rs.25,000/- which the appellant wanted for

purchasing a tempo. The deceased Revata was often beaten and was

sometimes not given food. After Revata had been murdered,

information was sent to her parents that she had died on account of

snake bite, which was reiterated when they reached the house of the

appellant in village Kikki. In fact, everyone in the village had been

told that Revata had died on account of snake bite and the Police Patil,

believing the said information to be true, had lodged an Accidental

Death Report at the police station. The medical evidence, however,

showed that she had died on account of asphyxia due to strangulation.

The body of the deceased was purposely placed in a sitting posture

with her back taking support of the wall so that no one may suspect

that she had actually been killed as a result of strangulation and may

believe the version of snake bite given by the appellant and his

parents. The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did

not offer any explanation as to how she received the injuries which

were found on her body. Recovery of some articles of the deceased

was made at the pointing out of the appellant. The circumstances

enumerated above unerringly point to the guilt of the accused and they

are inconsistent with his innocence.

19. The High Court was, therefore, perfectly right in allowing the

appeal filed by the State and in convicting the appellant under Section

302 IPC and sentencing him thereunder. We, therefore, do not find

any merit in the appeal, which is hereby dismissed.