2025 INSC 663 Page 1 of 10

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. ________ / 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 2657/2025)

Tushar Himatlal Jani … Appellant

versus

Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors. … Respondents

JUDGMENT

SURYA KANT, J.

Leave granted.

2. The instant appeal is directed against the order dated 30.07.2024

passed by the High Court of Bombay (High Court) restraining

the Appellant from dispossessing Respondent No. 1 or creating any

third-party interest in the disputed premises.

3. The facts leading to the instant appeal are that the Appellant’s

father was the owner of a plot admeasuring 22,000 square feet bearing

C.T.S. Nos.443(part), 451(part), 452A(part) at Vittalwadi, Ghatala

Village, Chembur, Mumbai. Out of the said area, the Appellant’s father

leased out 11,250 square feet i.e. the subject land, to a partnership

firm, namely M/s Silver Chem (India)/Respondent No.2, which was

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owned by the Vijan family members in 1972. It seems that upon the

death of his father, the entire property devolved upon the Appellant.

The Appellant terminated the above-mentioned lease agreement

vide notice dated 11.02.2008 and, in furtherance thereof, filed Eviction

Suit No. 119/148 of 2008 before the Small Causes Court at Bombay

(Small Causes Court).

4. Notably, Respondent No.1, who claims to be the legal heir of one

of the partners of Respondent No. 2, allegedly runs a business from the

suit structure in the name and style of M/s Asset Motors. He, thus, filed

an Impleadment Application in the Eviction Suit, contending that he is

a necessary and proper party whose rights would be directly affected by

the outcome of the proceedings. Respondent No.1 postulated his

undivided share in the business of Respondent No. 2 by virtue of a

Memorandum of Understanding executed amongst the Vijan family

members and further relied on his institution of a separate suit (bearing

No.441/2014) before the High Court seeking partition of his 1/6

th

undivided share in all the properties owned and held by the Vijan

family. The Small Causes Court allowed the impleadment application

vide order dated 06.10.2016. The Appellant, being aggrieved by the

aforesaid order, preferred a revision petition before the Appellate Small

Causes Court, which was allowed vide order dated 03.05.2019, setting

aside the order of impleadment.

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5. Members of the Vijan family, i.e. the partners of Respondent

No. 2 and Respondent No. 1, purportedly entered into a Family

Settlement Agreement on 09.06.2021 to resolve their inter se

differences, which referred to Respondent No. 1’s entitlement to 550

square feet area within the subject land. This Family Settlement was

the outcome of mediation efforts facilitated by a learned Mediator

appointed by this Court in several petitions between members of the

Vijan family. According to Respondent No.1, the Agreement ostensibly

provided him with an undivided share in the premises, wherein he

claims to have been allocated 550 square feet out of the total area of

22,000 square feet with entitlement to ‘receive right, title, interest, free

of any encumbrances’ therein.

6. In the aftermath of this settlement, several consequential events

unfolded. Evidently, the partners of Respondent No. 2, along with

Respondent No.1, entered into a Lease and License Agreement dated

15.10.2021, with M/s KMG Global as the licensee, for a period of 12

months in respect of the subject land. The Appellant has categorically

asserted that this Agreement was executed without his consent and

knowledge. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 firm and its partners

claimed to have surrendered their tenancy rights on 19.10.2022 qua

the subject land. Pursuant to these developments, Respondent No. 1

once again filed an impleadment application in the Eviction suit relying

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on the Family Settlement Agreement. He simultaneously lodged an

application before the Registrar of Firms seeking recognition as a

partner in Respondent No. 2 firm. Whilst these applications remained

pending, Respondent No. 1 instituted a separate suit, which, according

to the Appellant, was merely an attempt to create a paper trail of

Respondent No. 1’s alleged physical possession of the disputed area in

the subject land.

7. It appears that following the surrender of tenancy rights by

Respondent No. 2 and its partners, the Appellant unconditionally

withdrew the Eviction Suit vide order dated 13.01.2023, wherein the

Small Causes Court also rejected Respondent No. 1’s second

application for impleadment. Consequently, the Appellant effectuated a

leave and license agreement dated 11.04.2023 with M/s KMG Global

over a built-up area of 2,200 square feet.

8. Thereafter, Respondent No.1, asserting his status as one of the

partners of Respondent No.2, on the basis of the Family Settlement

Agreement, filed a suit bearing R.A.D. Suit No. 519/2023 before the

Small Causes Court seeking declaration of his tenancy rights with

respect to an undivided area of 550 square feet purportedly forming

part of the premises leased to Respondent No. 2. Respondent No.1

averred in this fresh suit that by virtue of his partnership status in

Respondent No.2 as per the Family Settlement Agreement, any

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surrender of tenancy rights by Respondent No.2 firm qua the subject

land without his signature or consent would be illegal and non-binding.

Respondent No.1 also filed an application bearing No. Exhibit 10

praying for interim protection in the form of his possession over the

area measuring 550 square feet and restraining the Appellant from

dispossessing him therefrom. The Small Causes Court, vide order dated

27.04.2023 granted interim protection to Respondent No.1 and

subsequently confirmed the same vide order dated 10.05.2023. The

aggrieved Appellant preferred an appeal which was allowed by the

Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court vide order

dated 20.12.2023.

9. Respondent No.1 consequently filed Writ Petition (C)

No.763/2024, which stands allowed and by way of impugned order, the

High Court has restored the order dated 27.04.2023 of the Small

Causes Court and granted injunction in favour of Respondent No. 1.

10. The aggrieved Appellant is thus before this Court.

11. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant,

contended that the impugned injunction order has effectively paralyzed

the Appellant’s legitimate redevelopment plans, causing substantial

financial detriment. He underscored that despite the disputed area of

550 square feet being merely a small fragment of the entire property,

the restraint qua this portion has brought the entire project to a

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grinding halt. He further propounded that the High Court gravely erred

in issuing an injunction in the absence of any eviction proceedings

initiated by the Appellant against Respondent No. 1. Mr. Divan posited

that Respondent No. 1 lacks the locus standi to obstruct the Appellant’s

development rights as he is neither in lawful nor actual possession of

the subject land. It was advanced that the original tenants had

unequivocally surrendered their tenancy rights, thereby conferring

complete and unencumbered rights upon the Appellant to deal with

his property.

12. Per Contra, Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1, vigorously urged that the

impugned order is in the nature of a simpliciter injunction not to

dispossess Respondent No.1 from the subject property without due

process of law and has been in force for more than 20 months with only

a brief hiatus in the interregnum. He staunchly maintained that the

Appellant has not filed any suit to evict Respondent No. 1, rather he

withdrew the Eviction Suit filed against Respondent No. 2

unconditionally vide order dated 13.01.2023. He further expounded

that rights in the disputed property emanate from a Family Settlement

Agreement mediated through a Mediator appointed by this Court, and

allowing the instant petition would overturn the Consent Order passed

by this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 5587 of 2020. Mr. Chowdhury adduced

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that the putative Surrender Letter relied upon by the Appellant is ex

facie forged and illegal, inasmuch as it is bereft of any reference to any

area being surrendered; it is not signed by all partners; and it

inexplicably purports to surrender valuable property rights without

any consideration.

13. Having heard learned Senior Counsels on behalf of both the

parties and after perusing the record, we deem it approprite to clarify

at the outset that the issue regarding the tenancy rights of Respondent

No. 1 or of the partners of Respondent No. 2, who happen to be his

family members, is sub-judice before the Small Causes Court in R.A.D.

Suit No. 519/2023. The short question that falls for our consideration

thus is whether the High Court was justified in restoring the interim

injunction in favour of Respondent No. 1 in a modified term during the

pendency of the Suit.

14. The High Court has , in the impugned order, noted that

Respondent No.1 is a tenant/joint tenant of the subject land based on

the Appellant’s alleged admission acknowledging his possession. Mr.

Shyam Divan, however, strongly refuted this finding, contending that

the Appellant’s counsel had characterized Respondent No. 1 as a rank

trespasser during the course of inter-party negotiations and such

references, made in the context of settlement discussions, cannot be

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construed as conclusive admissions for the purpose of granting

injunction by the High Court.

15. The law governing the grant of interim injunction is well-settled.

This Court, through a catena of decisions, has consistently held that

before granting an interim injunction, the Court must satisfy itself of

three essential prerequisites: firstly, the existence of a prima facie case

in favour of the applicant evincing a reasonable probability of success

at trial; secondly, that the balance of convenience lies in favour of

granting the injunctive relief; and thirdly, that the applicant would

suffer irreparable injury or harm not adequately compensable in

damages if the injunction is refused. It is only when these three

conditions are cumulatively fulfilled that an interim injunction ought

to be granted.

16. Applying the principles delineated above to the facts at hand, we

are of the considered view that the High Court erred in granting the

injunction in favour of Respondent No.1. We say so for the reason that

the Appellant is incontrovertibly the absolute owner of the property,

with the disputed area constituting merely a fraction of the entire

premises. The Appellant has already entered into an agreement to

redevelop the property. In these circumstances, the restraint imposed

by the impugned injunction significantly circumscribes the Appellant’s

legal right to derive commercial benefit from his property.

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17. It further seems to us that Respondent No.1 has failed to establish

a prima facie case in his favour as the question of tenancy rights

claimed by him is pending adjudication before the Small Causes Court,

and at this stage, material ambiguities persist regarding the validity of

his claim. Even though Respondent No. 1 claims rights and partnership

in the Respondent No. 2 firm through a Family Settlement Agreement,

such contention requires deeper scrutiny, which can only be

undertaken during the course of trial of his civil suit. Concerning the

balance of convenience, it decidedly tilts in favour of the Appellant,

considering that the disputed area is merely 550 square feet out of the

total area of 22,000 square feet, and the Appellant has already entered

into a leave and license agreement dated 11.04.2023 with M/s KMG

Global covering a built-up area of 2,200 square feet. The injunction has

thus inordinately impeded the entire redevelopment project for a

relatively small disputed portion. Moreover, the Appellant would suffer

irreparable injury if the injunction is allowed to operate, given that the

protracted delay is not only causing substantial financial losses but

also affecting the Appellant’s contractual obligations, which cannot be

adequately compensated at a belated stage.

18. Conversely, Respondent No. 1 would not suffer any irremediable

loss as his alleged tenancy rights over an area measuring 550 square

feet can be adequately safeguarded.

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19. For the reasons aforestated, we allow the instant appeal and set

aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 30.07.2024. However,

with a view to balance equities, the Appellant is hereby directed to keep

one unit measuring about 550 square feet reserved in the developed

property as a security to protect the alleged rights of Respondent No.1,

in the event that the Suit pending before the Small Causes Court is

decided in his favour.

20. We clarify that this order does not express any opinion on the

merits of the tenancy dispute pending before the Small Causes Court.

The said Court shall proceed to adjudicate the matter in R.A.D. Suit

No.519/2023 in accordance with law , uninfluenced by any

observations made herein and expeditiously.

..........................J.

(SURYA KANT)

……….………………… ..........................J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

May 13, 2025