W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 1 of 22

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 3

rd

February, 2026

Date of Decision: 8

th

April, 2026

Uploaded on: 8

th

April, 2026

+ W.P.(C) 6999/2002

UMA SHANKAR SHARMA .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Anil Singhal, Mr. Abhimanyu

Sharma, Advs. along with Petitioner

in person

versus

STATE (GOVT. OF NCT) & ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Ms. Anju Bhattacharya, Ms. Nisha R.

Chauhan, Mr. Vinod Fulara and Ms.

Sakshi Ramola, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

JUDGMENT

SHAIL JAIN, J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the

Petitioner/workman, Shri Uma Shankar Sharma, under Articles 226 and

227 of the Constitution of India assailing the Award dated 5.07.2002

passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal No. I,

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, in I.D. No. 293/1990 (hereinafter referred

as ‘the Impugned Award’), whereby the claim of the Petitioner was

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 2 of 22

dismissed and the termination of his services was held to be legal and

justified.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. Brief facts emerging from the record, which are necessary for

adjudication of the present writ petition, are that the Petitioner/workman

was employed with Respondent No.2/Management, namely Delhi State

Co-operative Union Ltd., as a Sales Clerk with effect from 14.07.1971.

In the course of his duties at the Daryaganj Sales Counter, he was

entrusted with the maintenance of cash books, stock registers and

accounting of cash receipts, including collections received from the

Parliament Street counter managed by one Sh. D.K. Sharma.

3. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was served

with a charge-sheet dated 12.04.1989 alleging financial irregularities

and misappropriation of funds. It was alleged by the Management that

during internal checking of accounts for the years 1986-87, 1987-88 and

1988-89, discrepancies were detected in the accounts maintained by the

Petitioner and that certain cash receipts relating to sales, subscriptions

and publications had not been duly accounted for. It was further alleged

that upon verification of cash balance, amounts totalling ₹40,403.64 had

not been accounted for by the workman and that there was also a

shortage of ₹916.08 in the cash balance.

4. In his reply to the charge-sheet, the Petitioner did not dispute the

existence of discrepancies but sought to explain the same by alleging

that he had been falsely implicated to shield Sh. D.K. Sharma, who was

purportedly related to a Director of the Management.

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 3 of 22

5. A domestic enquiry was thereafter initiated by the Management

against the Petitioner. Upon completion of the enquiry, the Enquiry

Officer submitted a report holding the charges of misappropriation of

funds against the Petitioner to be proved. Consequently, the services of

the Petitioner were terminated vide order dated 30.06.1989.

6. Aggrieved by the termination of his services, the Petitioner raised

an industrial dispute. The appropriate Government referred the dispute

for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The reference was registered

as Industrial Dispute No. 293/1990, and the following question was

referred for adjudication:

“Whether the services of Shri Uma Shankar Sharma

have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by

the management and if so, to what relief is he entitled

and what directions are necessary in this respect.”

7. Before the Tribunal, the Petitioner/workman filed a statement of

claim challenging the termination as mala fide and in violation of

Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as

‘the Act’). It was contended before the Tribunal that the management

had exercised undue pressure upon him and threatened termination of

service in order to compel him to sign a pre-drafted reply to the charge-

sheet admitting the alleged discrepancies. The petitioner claimed that he

had been induced to deposit the amount on the assurance that his

services would be spared. It was further contended that the punishment

imposed was disproportionate, particularly in view of his long years of

service.

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 4 of 22

8. The Management filed its written statement opposing the claim

and contended that the Petitioner, being responsible for maintaining the

accounts of the sales counter, had failed to properly account for several

cash receipts. The management also asserted that the workman had

voluntarily deposited certain amounts and had also given written

undertakings admitting the discrepancies, and that adjustments had been

made against his security deposit, provident fund and salary bills. The

management therefore denied that any undue pressure had been

exercised upon the workman. They maintained that a fair inquiry was

conducted and that the Petitioner was afforded a full opportunity to

defend himself.

9. Upon consideration of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal

framed the following issues:

i. Whether the reference is illegal, invalid and improper

as alleged in the written statement?

ii. Whether the termination is based on proper and valid

enquiry?

iii. Relief in terms of reference.

10. During the proceedings before the Tribunal, the validity of the

domestic enquiry was tried as a preliminary issue. Vide order dated

2.09.1996, the learned Tribunal held that the enquiry conducted by the

management was not proper or valid. The Tribunal observed that the

enquiry proceedings did not comply with the principles of natural justice

and accordingly held:

“...I am of the view that the enquiry conducted by MW1 was

neither proper nor valid because principles of natural

justice were not followed by the Enquiry Officer and I

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 5 of 22

therefore hold that termination of the workman is not based

on proper and valid enquiry.”

11. However, the Management was granted liberty to lead evidence

before the learned Tribunal to prove the charges against the workman.

12. Both the parties led their respective evidences to substantiate their

cases. The Petitioner stepped into the witness box as WW-1. On behalf

of the Respondents, Presenting Officer Sh. P.M. Sharma entered into the

witness box as MW-1.

13. Learned Tribunal vide the Impugned Award dated 5.07.2002,

answered the reference against the Workman and held that the

termination of the workman cannot be termed to be illegal or unjustified.

The Tribunal concluded that the Management had successfully

established the charges of misappropriation. Specifically, the Tribunal

noted the Petitioner's shifting stands and his admission that funds were

utilized for personal medical exigencies. The relevant portion of the

award reads as under:

“The management has been able to prove that certain

irregularities had been detected and when the workman was

confronted with the same he admitted his mistake and

sought time to deposit the same… the charges of

misappropriation stand duly proved against the workman

from the documents placed on record.”

14. On the aspect of relief, the Tribunal held that since the case

involved a loss of faith and misappropriation over a continuous period of

three years, the punishment of termination was proportionate to the

gravity of the offence.

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 6 of 22

15. Aggrieved by the said Award dated 05.07.2002, the

Petitioner/workman has approached this Court by way of the present

writ petition.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:

16. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner assails the

impugned Award primarily on the ground that the Tribunal failed to

properly appreciate the evidence on record and erroneously upheld the

termination of the Petitioner. It is submitted that the charge-sheet dated

12.04.1989 alleging misappropriation of funds was false and motivated.

Learned counsel submits that the Management exercised undue pressure

upon the Petitioner by threatening termination of his services in the

event of non-deposit of the alleged amounts and made him sign a pre-

drafted reply to the charge-sheet admitting the discrepancies on the

assurance that his services would be spared. Despite such assurance and

the Petitioner’s subsequent deposits, the Management proceeded with

the termination.

17. It is further contended that the Management failed to examine any

independent witness conversant with the alleged discrepancies or the

preparation of internal checking reports and that the sole witness

examined, namely Shri P.M. Sharma, had acted as the Presenting

Officer in the domestic enquiry and therefore could not have proved the

alleged acts of misconduct on merits.

18. Furthermore, the Petitioner contends that the entire case of the

Management rests on internal checking reports for the years 1986-1989,

yet the Management failed to produce or examine the authors of these

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 7 of 22

reports. Relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Hardwari Lal v. State of U.P. (1999) 8 SCC 582., learned counsel

argues that the non-examination of material witnesses, specifically those

who conducted the audit and those who could speak to the veracity of

the allegations has caused grave prejudice to the Petitioner’s case and

renders the findings of the Tribunal unsustainable.

19. Learned counsel also submits that the Tribunal erred in relying

upon the alleged admissions of the Petitioner without examining

whether such admissions were voluntary or were made under

inducement and coercion. Relying upon the decision of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court in J. Shiva Prasad v. Bank of India 1990(1) SLR

325 (A.P.), it is argued that an admission is not conclusive proof and

must be read in the totality of circumstances. Counsel contends that if an

admission is extracted through trickery, inducement, or is made in a

"dubious" context while the management simultaneously attempts to

rely on unproven documentary evidence, such an admission cannot form

the sole basis for punishment.

20. It is finally urged that the Petitioner had consistently maintained

that the shortfall was attributable to another employee, Shri D.K.

Sharma, and that the punishment of termination is shockingly

disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged offence, especially in light

of the Petitioner's long and otherwise unblemished service record since

1971.

21. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondents/Management supports the impugned Award and submits

that the present writ petition is nothing but an attempt to seek re-

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 8 of 22

appreciation of evidence which is impermissible in exercise of writ

jurisdiction. It is contended that the scope of interference under Article

226 of the Constitution is limited and that the High Court cannot sit in

appeal over the findings recorded by the Tribunal unless such findings

are shown to be perverse or based on no evidence.

22. Learned counsel submits that the Management had specifically

reserved its right to lead fresh evidence before the Tribunal under

Section 11-A of the Act in the event the domestic enquiry was held to be

defective. Pursuant to the liberty granted by the Tribunal on 02.09.1996,

detailed evidence was led before the Tribunal. It is submitted that the

Petitioner himself had made notings on the relevant documents

admitting that certain amounts had not been posted in the cash book due

to oversight and had undertaken to deposit the same. The Tribunal also

noted that the Petitioner had given a written communication requesting

adjustment of the outstanding amounts from his provident fund and

security deposits.

23. On the question of proportionality and the gravity of misconduct,

the Management relies upon several judicial precedents to contend that

acts of financial misappropriation constitute serious misconduct and

justify dismissal, regardless of the amount or past record. Reliance is

placed upon U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Basudeo

Chaudhary & Anr. (1997) 11 SCC 370, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme

Court held that even an attempt to cause a small loss is serious in nature

and warrants removal. Similarly, in Janatha Bazar (South Canara

Central Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd.) & Ors. Vs. Secretary,

Sahakari Noukarara Sangha & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 517, it was held that

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 9 of 22

in proven cases of misappropriation, a clean past record does not call for

sympathy. Further, in State Bank of India & Ors Vs. T.J. Paul (1999)

4 SCC 759, it was observed that any act prejudicial to the interest of the

employer constitutes misconduct even if actual loss is not proven.

24. It is thus contended that the Petitioner held a position of trust as a

Sales Clerk and his admission regarding the use of funds for medical

expenses further solidifies the charge of temporary misappropriation.

Therefore, the impugned Award does not suffer from any perversity or

illegality warranting interference by this Court.

ANALYSIS AND REASONING:

25. This court has heard the rival contentions of both the parties and

perused the documents placed on record.

26. Before examining the merits of the case, it is necessary to note the

well-settled position of law governing the scope of interference by the

High Court in matters arising from industrial adjudication. It is settled

that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India, the High Court does not act as an appellate

authority over the findings recorded by the Labour Court or Industrial

Tribunal. The High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its

own conclusions merely because another view is possible. Hon’ble

Supreme Court has consistently held that interference with findings of

fact recorded by the Labour Court is permissible only where such

findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from manifest

illegality.

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 10 of 22

27. The Apex Court in the judgement of Syed Yakoob v. K.S.

Radhakrishnan, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 24 categorically held that the

jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and

the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This

limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior

Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be

reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. The relevant portion of the

said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High

Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has

been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal

position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of

certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction

committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases

where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals

without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of

failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be

issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the

Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance,

it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard

to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure

adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles

of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the

jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory

jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act

as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that

findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as

result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or

questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is

apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a

writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear

to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal,

a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in

recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 11 of 22

refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had

erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has

influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of

fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an

error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.

In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must

always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the

Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of

certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material

evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or

inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy

or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of

fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points

cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these

limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts

under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be

legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed

Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora

v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam

[(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh

[AIR 1960 SC 1168]”

[Emphasis supplied ]

28. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of the

judgment in Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers'

Union & Anr. (2000) 4 SCC 245, has held as under:

“17. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an

exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction,

by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing

conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful,

though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate

jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided

over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact recorded by a

fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and

which ordinarily should be considered to have become final,

cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 12 of 22

on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the

opinion of the writ court to warrant those findings, at any

rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are

relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet

another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken…

The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was to find

out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid

down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen

workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding

authority and not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the

evidence and arriving at findings of one's own, altogether

giving a complete goby even to the facts specifically found by

the Tribunal below.”

[Emphasis supplied ]

29. Therefore, the limited question before this Court is whether the

findings returned by the Tribunal in the impugned Award suffer from

perversity, illegality, or are based on no evidence, warranting

interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

30. The record reveals that the Tribunal, by order dated 02.09.1996,

held that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management was not

proper or valid on account of non-compliance with the principles of

natural justice. However, since the Management had taken a plea

seeking liberty to prove the misconduct independently before the

Tribunal, the Tribunal granted an opportunity to the management to lead

evidence on merits.

31. Pursuant to such liberty, the Tribunal has undertaken a detailed

examination of the Management witness namely Sh. PM Sharma and

Workmen himself as well as the documentary material placed on record

by the Management. The Tribunal has recorded the following finding:

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 13 of 22

“The averments made by MW1 are in consonance with the

charge-sheet served upon the workman…which gives details of

the amounts which were not accounted for on various heads

including subscription amount, contribution amount,

delegation fee, building fund, stationery items, difference of

stock register with actual sales etc. for the years 1986-87,

1987-88 and July 1988 to December 1988.”

32. The Tribunal further took note of the fact that on several

documents forming part of the internal checking record, there were

handwritten notings of the Petitioner himself acknowledging that the

amounts had not been entered in the cash book and undertaking to

deposit the same. The relevant observation of the learned Tribunal reads

as under:

“...There is a noting in the handwriting of the workman

himself which the workman has admitted during his cross-

examination that the amount reflected was not posted in the

cash book due to mistake and he undertook to deposit the same

immediately. Similar is the report which is with regard to July

1988 to December 1988… admitted by him that he received

the said amount from Shri D.K Sharma but had not entered the

same due to clerical mistake and undertook to deposit the

amount immediately...”

33. The Tribunal further noted that the workman had addressed a

written communication dated 23.03.1989 requesting that certain

amounts be adjusted from his provident fund and security deposits,

which conduct was treated by the Tribunal as corroborative of the

existence of deficiencies and the acknowledgment thereof.

34. While analysing the stand taken by the Petitioner, the Tribunal

recorded that in the reply submitted to the charge-sheet, the Petitioner

did not dispute the existence of deficiencies but sought to explain the

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 14 of 22

same. The relevant finding returned by the learned Tribunal reads as

under:

“So, in the reply to the charge-sheet, the workman had

admitted his guilt and his only explanation is that though he

has put to his own use only Rs.25,000/- yet he had deposited

the entire amount to save Shri D.K. Sharma.”

35. The Tribunal further examined the plea raised by the Petitioner

that the alleged admissions were obtained under threat or inducement. In

this regard, the Tribunal recorded a categorical finding that no

particulars of such alleged coercion had been furnished. The relevant

portion of the Award reads thus:

“...The particulars of threat or inducements are absolutely

lacking in the statement of claim. There were no particulars as

to who gave the inducements or who exercised undue influence

on him and when they were exercised and in what manner they

were exercised and needless to say that the allegations of

undue influence or inducement which are without particulars

are meaningless and cannot be looked into.”

36. The Tribunal therefore rejected the plea of coercion and held that

the stand taken by the Petitioner was shifting and contradictory.

37. On the basis of the evidence discussed above, the Tribunal

ultimately concluded that the charges of financial irregularities and

misappropriation stood established.

38. At this stage, it would be apposite to deal with the principal

contentions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner. The challenge to the

impugned Award is essentially two-fold. Firstly, it is contended that the

Management has examined only one witness, namely the Presenting

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 15 of 22

Officer, and no independent witness has been examined to prove the

alleged discrepancies or the internal checking reports. Secondly, it is

contended that the alleged admissions of the Petitioner were not

voluntary and were obtained under inducement, coercion and threat of

termination.

39. Insofar as the first contention is concerned, this Court is unable to

accept the same. It is a settled position of law that strict rules of

evidence as applicable under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are not

required to be applied in industrial adjudication. What is required is that

there must be some material on record on the basis of which the

Tribunal can reasonably arrive at a conclusion. In the present case, the

Tribunal has not based its findings solely on the oral testimony of MW-

1, but has extensively relied upon documentary evidence placed on

record, including internal checking reports, receipt records and, most

importantly, the handwritten notings and undertakings of the Petitioner

himself, which have been duly admitted by him during cross-

examination.

40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B.

Staff Canteen Workers' Union & Anr, (supra) has clearly held that

findings of fact recorded by a duly constituted fact-finding authority

cannot be interfered with so long as they are based on some material

evidence, even if another view is possible. Similarly, in State of

Haryana v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC 491, it has been held that in

domestic and industrial proceedings, sufficiency of evidence is not to be

scrutinized as in a criminal trial and even hearsay evidence can be relied

upon so long as it has a reasonable nexus with the facts in issue.

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 16 of 22

41. In the present case, the documentary material, coupled with the

admitted writings of the Petitioner acknowledging non-accounting of

amounts and undertaking to deposit the same, constitutes sufficient

evidence for the Tribunal to arrive at its findings. The mere fact that the

Presenting Officer was examined as a witness would not, in the facts of

the present case, render the entire proceedings or findings invalid,

particularly when the documentary evidence stands independently

corroborated.

42. The reliance placed by the Petitioner on Hardwari Lal v. State of

U.P (supra) is misplaced. The said judgment was rendered in a context

where material witnesses directly connected with the alleged misconduct

were not examined, thereby causing prejudice to the delinquent

employee. In the present case, however, the findings of the Tribunal are

not based solely on oral testimony but are primarily founded on

documentary evidence and, significantly, on the admitted writings and

conduct of the Petitioner himself. The Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate any specific prejudice caused to him on account of non-

examination of the authors of the internal checking reports, particularly

when the contents thereof stand corroborated by his own admissions and

subsequent conduct. Thus, the ratio of the said judgment is clearly

distinguishable and does not advance the case of the Petitioner.

43. Insofar as the second contention regarding alleged inducement

and coercion is concerned, the same has been specifically considered

and rejected by the Tribunal. As noted hereinabove, the Tribunal has

categorically recorded that no particulars of the alleged threat or

inducement were furnished by the Petitioner. The absence of material

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 17 of 22

particulars, such as the nature of threat, the person exercising such

influence and the circumstances in which such alleged admissions were

made, renders the plea wholly vague and unsubstantiated. It is also

evident from the findings recorded in the Award that the Petitioner has

taken mutually contradictory stands. While on the one hand he sought to

dispute the allegations and attribute the discrepancies to another

employee, on the other hand he has admitted that amounts aggregating

to ₹40,403.64 had not been accounted for, that he had utilised

approximately ₹25,000/- on account of illness in his family, and that

there was a shortage of ₹916.08 in cash, which he accepted and

subsequently deposited. The Tribunal has also noted that the plea of

inducement was not taken in the reply to the charge-sheet and was raised

for the first time in the statement of claim without any particulars, and

that even in cross-examination, no material details of such alleged

coercion were furnished.

44. It is a settled principle that a mere bald allegation of coercion or

inducement, without any supporting material, cannot be accepted to

discredit otherwise admitted documentary evidence. The Tribunal has

also taken note of the shifting and inconsistent stands of the Petitioner,

and has rightly disbelieved the same. In such circumstances, the plea of

inducement or coercion is clearly untenable.

45. In these circumstances, the reliance placed by the Petitioner on

judgments dealing with involuntary admissions, including J. Shiva

Prasad (supra), is misplaced, as the Tribunal has not relied upon the

alleged admissions in isolation but has considered the same in

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 18 of 22

conjunction with documentary evidence on record as well as the

contradictory stands taken by the Petitioner.

46. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered

view that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are based on

appreciation of evidence and cannot be said to be perverse, arbitrary or

based on no evidence. The conclusions drawn by the Tribunal are

plausible and are supported by material on record. The Tribunal has

relied upon:

● Documentary records relating to internal checking of

accounts,

● Handwritten notings and undertakings given by the Petitioner,

● Adjustments of outstanding amounts from the Petitioner’s

dues, and

● The explanation furnished by the Petitioner in his reply to the

charge-sheet.

47. This Court is therefore of the considered view that the Petitioner

is essentially inviting this Court to undertake a re-appreciation of

evidence and substitute its own conclusions for those arrived at by the

fact-finding authority, which is impermissible in exercise of writ

jurisdiction.

48. Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to hold that the findings

returned by the Tribunal suffer from perversity, illegality or are based on

no evidence so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

49. Having held that the findings of misconduct recorded by the

Tribunal do not suffer from perversity, the only question that survives

for consideration is whether the punishment of termination imposed

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 19 of 22

upon the Petitioner is so disproportionate to the proved misconduct as to

warrant interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India.

50. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the

punishment imposed is harsh and disproportionate, particularly having

regard to the long years of service rendered by the Petitioner. It is

further urged that the alleged discrepancies were attributable to another

employee and that the Petitioner had ultimately deposited the amounts.

51. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted

that the misconduct proved against the Petitioner relates to financial

irregularities and misappropriation of funds handled by him in the

course of his duties and that such misconduct strikes at the root of the

relationship of trust between employer and employee.

52. A perusal of the impugned Award reveals that the Tribunal has

specifically considered the plea of proportionality raised by the

Petitioner. While dealing with this aspect, the Tribunal has recorded as

follows:

“The last limb of the argument put forward by the AR for the

workman is that the punishment or termination is not justified

and is disproportionate to the charges proved against the

workman. However, I do not find any merit in the said plea as

it is a case where the workman has been involved in

misappropriation of the amounts for continuous three years

and had deposited the same only when the same was detected

by the management and even thereafter the workman has been

taking frivolous stands to justify his own wrongs. It is a case of

loss of faith and causing loss to the management, as such the

punishment imposed upon the workman is absolutely in

consonance with the gravity of the offences proved against the

workman.”

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 20 of 22

53. The law regarding judicial interference with the quantum of

punishment is well-settled. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v.

Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held

that the High Court, while exercising powers of judicial review, cannot

normally substitute its own conclusion on the penalty and impose some

other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or

the Tribunal shocks the conscience of the court, only then can it be

remitted or interfered with.

54. In the present case, the misconduct was not an isolated or

technical lapse. It involved repeated financial irregularities continuing

over a period of three years (1986-1989). The Petitioner held a position

of trust as a Sales Clerk, specifically receiving a cash handling

allowance. As held in State Bank of India v. T.J. Paul (supra), any act

prejudicial to the interest of the employer especially in a financial

capacity constitutes grave misconduct.

55. The fact that the Petitioner deposited the misappropriated amounts

after detection does not wash away the initial misconduct. In Divisional

Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254, it

was held that when an employee is found guilty of misappropriating the

employer's money, there is nothing wrong in the employer losing

confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding the punishment of

dismissal. The Apex Court in Janatha Bazar (South Canara Central

Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd.) v. Secretary, Sahakari Noukarara

Sangha (supra) has categorically held that in cases involving proved

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 21 of 22

misappropriation, there is no question of showing misplaced sympathy

on the ground of long service or smallness of amount involved.

56. The doctrine of loss of confidence assumes particular significance

in cases where the employee is entrusted with financial duties. Once

such confidence is shaken by proved misconduct involving financial

irregularities, the employer cannot be compelled to continue the

relationship.

57. Consequently, this Court finds that the punishment of termination

is not ‘shockingly disproportionate’ to the gravity of the proven charges

of continuous financial misappropriation. The findings of the learned

Tribunal on the loss of confidence are based on a sound appreciation of

the nature of the Petitioner’s duties and his conduct. Therefore, no

interference is warranted on this ground.

CONCLUSION:

58. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no infirmity,

illegality, or perversity in the impugned Award dated 05.07.2002 passed

by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal No. I, Karkardooma

Courts, Delhi in I.D. No. 293/1990. The findings recorded by the

learned Tribunal are based on a reasoned appreciation of the oral as well

as documentary evidence on record and do not warrant interference in

exercise of writ jurisdiction.

59. Accordingly, the impugned Award dated 05.07.2002 is upheld.

W.P.(C) 6999/2002 Page 22 of 22

60. For the reasons stated above, the present writ petition, being

devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall

also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

SHAIL JAIN, J

APRIL 8, 2026

DG