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PETITIONER:

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

K. K. DHAWAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/01/1993

BENCH:

MOHAN, S. (J)

BENCH:

MOHAN, S. (J)

SHARMA, L.M. (CJ)

BHARUCHA S.P. (J)

CITATION:

1993 AIR 1478 1993 SCR (1) 296

1993 SCC (2) 56 JT 1993 (1) 236

1993 SCALE (1)199

ACT:

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)

Rules, 1965-Rule 14-Disciplinary proceedings against Income

Tax Officer for violation of Rule 3(1)(i)(ii),(iii) of the

Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 while

conducting assessments in irregular manner, in undue haste,

conferring undue favour upon the assessees-Legality of.

HEADNOTE:

The respondent while working as Income Tax Officer completed

certain assessments during the year 1982-83.

A charge memorandum, was served on him, proposing to hold an

inquiry against him under Rule 14 of the Central Civil

Services (Classification, Central Appeal) Rules, 1965.

A statement of article of charge was framed against the

respondent. The substance of the charge was the completion

of nine assessments in an irregular manner, hastily with a

view to confer undue favour upon the assessees, and by such

act, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion

to duty and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of government

servant.

The details relating to misconduct or misbehaviour of the

respondent- were furnished and he was charged for violating

the provisions of Rules 3 (1) (i), 3 (1) (ii) and 3 (1)

(iii) of the Central Civil Services (,Conduct) Rules, 1964.

In support of the allegations, he was also supplied with the

necessary documents.

Against the memorandum, the respondent preferred an

application before the Central Administrative Tribunal,

praying for a stay of the disciplinary proceedings and to

consider his case for promotion on merits without resort to

the sealed cover procedure.

On 8.2.1991, the Tribunal directed the appellant-Union of

India to open the sealed cover and to implement the

recommendations of the

297

Departmental Promotion Committee to promote the respondent

to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, if he was

found fit for promotion within two weeks from the date of

order.

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Later on 223.1991, the Tribunal allowed the respondent's

application, holding that the action taken by the

respondent-officer was quasi judicial and should not have

formed the basis of disciplinary action. The Tribunal also

made its earlier order dated 8.2.1991 absolute.

The Union of India preferred the present appeals by special

leave against the orders of the Tribunal, contending that in

a case where disciplinary proceedings were pending against

the respondent, the procedure of opening the sealed cover

should not have been resorted to. Otherwise, it would

amount to putting a premium on misconduct ; that the

Tribunal failed to appreciate the ratio of the order in C.A.

Nos. 4986-87/90; that as the respondent was charged for

violation of Rules 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the

Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964; immunity from

the disciplinary action could not be claimed.

The respondent contended that the opening of the sealed

cover was correctly ordered because on the date when the

Departmental Promotion Committee met in March 1989, no

charge-sheet was served on the respondent; that as the

respondent was exercising quasi-judicial functions, orders

made by him if were wrong, the remedy by way of an appeal or

revision could be resorted to; that if in every case of

wrong order, disciplinary action was resorted to, it would

jeopardize the exercise of judicial functions; and the

immunity attached to the officer while exercising quasi-

judicial powers would be lost.

On the question, whether an authority enjoys immunity from

disciplinary proceedings with respect to matters decided by

him in exercise of quasi-judicial functions; allowing the

appeals, this Court,

HELD : 1.01. The disciplinary action can be taken in the

following cases :

(i) Where the Officer had acted in a manner as would

reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or

devotion to duty ;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness

or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of

a govern-

298

ment servant; [311E-F]

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the

prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise

of the statutory powers;

(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party,

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however,

small the bribe may be. [311G-H]

The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. For a

mere technical violation or merely because the order is

wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated

instances, disciplinary action is not warranted. Each case

will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be

postulated. [312A-B]

1.02. There is a great reason and justice for holding in

such cases that the' disciplinary action could be taken. It

is one of the cardinal principles of administration of

justice that it must be free from bias of any kind. [311B]

1.03. The officer who exercises judicial or quasi-

judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order

to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a judge.

[311C]

1.04. In the present case, this Court Is not concerned

with the correctness or legality of the decision of the

respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of

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his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with

reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in

appeal or revision under the Act. [311D]

1.05. In the case on hand, article of charge clearly

mentions that the nine assessments covered by the article of

charge were completed

(i) in an irregular manner,

(ii) in undue haste, and

(iii) apparently with a view to confer unduefavour upon

the assessees concerned. [310A-B]

Therefore, the allegation of conferring undue favour is very

much

299

there and certainly disciplinary action is warranted. [310C]

Govinda Menon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1274; Thayre v.

The London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, 22 TLR

240 and Thompson v. British Berna Motor Lorries Limited, 33

TLR 187 at page 188, referred to.

Union of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, [1992] 3 SCC 124,

explained.

SLP (C) Nos. 2635-36/89 in CA No. 4986-87/90, distinguished

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 266-267 of

1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.2.91 & 22.3.91-of the

Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi

in O.A. No. 2540/89 & M.P. No. 219 of 1991.

K.T.S. Tulsi, Additional Solicitor General B. Parthasarthy,

P. Parmeshwaran and C.V.S. Rao for the Appellants.

Indu Malhotra for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MOHAN, J. Leave granted.

The respondent, while working as Income Tax Officer, Muktsar

during the year 1982-83 completed certain assessments. A

charge memorandum dated 2.5.1989 was served on him to the

effect it was proposed to hold an inquiry against him under

Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification,

Central & Appeal) Rules, 1965. A statement of article of

charge framed against him was to the following effect :

STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE FRAMED

AGAINST, SHRI K.K. DHAWAN, A GROUP 'A'

NOW POSTED AS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER

OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY.

Article I

Shri K.K. Dhawan while functioning as I.T.O. "A"

300

Ward, Muktsar during 1982-1983 completed nine assessments in

the case of :

(1) M/s Chananna Automobiles,

(2) N/s Gupta Cotton Industries,

(3) M/s Ajay Cotton Industries,

(4) M/s National Rice Mills,

(5) M/s Tek Chand Buchram,

(6) M/s Tilak Cotton Industries,

(7) M/s Chandi Ram Behari Lal,

(8) M/s Phuman Mal Chandi Ram and

(9) M/s Modern Tractors

in an irregular manner, in undue haste and apparently with a

view to conferring undue favour upon the assessees concemed

By his above acts Shri Dhawan failed to maintain absolute

integrity and devotion to duty and exhibited a conduct

unbecoming of a Govt. servant, thereby violating provisions

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of Rules 3(1) (i), 3(1) (ii) and 3(1) (iii) of the CCS

(Conduct) Rules, 1964.

This was accompanied by a statement of imputation of his

misconduct or misbehaviour in support of the article of

charge framed against him.

In each of the nine cases of the assesses above referred to,

the details relating to misconduct or misbehaviour were

furnished. Therefore, it was charged that the respondent

had violated the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and

3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,

1964. The necessary documents in support of these

allegations were also enclosed.

Against the said memorandum dt. 2.5.1989, the respondent

preferred an application O.A. No. 2540/89 before the Central

Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi praying for a stay of the

disciplinary proceedings and to consider his case for

promotion on merits without resort to the sealed cover

procedure.

301

By its order dt. 8.2.1991, Central Administrative Tribunal,

Principal Bench, New Delhi directed the respondent Union of

India to open the sealed cover immediately and implement the

recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee in

so far as it pertained to the petitioner and to promote him

to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax if he was

found fit for promotion within two weeks from the date of

said order.

Thereafter, by a detailed judgment dated 22.3.1991, the

Tribunal relying on S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2635-36/89 in Civil

Appeal No. 4986-87/90, held that the action taken by the

officer was quasi-judicial and should not have formed the

basis of disciplinary action. Therefore, the application

was allowed and the impugned memorandum dated 2.5.1989 was

quashed. The earlier order dated 8.2.1991 to open the

sealed cover and implement the recommendations of

Departmental Promotion Committee was made absolute.

Aggrieved by these two orders, the present special leave

petitions have been preferred.

The teamed counsel for the appellant Shri K.T.S. Tulsi

submits as under:

(i) That in a case where disciplinary

proceedings are pending against the

respondent, the procedure of opening the

sealed cover should not have been resorted to.

Otherwise, it would amount to putting a

premium on misconduct.

(ii)The Tribunal failed to appreciate the

ratio of the order in C.A. Nos. 4986-87/90.

In that case, the enquiry report showed that

the charge framed against the officer had not

been proved. That is entirely different from

holding that in a case of quasi-judicial

action taken by the Officer no disciplinary

action could be taken. The true purport of

that observation is only to buttress the

earlier finding that the charge had not been

proved. Therefore, reliance ought not to have

been placed on this ruling which turned on the

peculiar facts and circumstances of that case.

302

(iii)Though nine cases were cited in the

charge memorandum, only one of the cases had

been discussed.

(iv)Lastly, it is submitted that the

respondent is charged for violation of Rule

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3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of Central

Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

Therefore, if the conduct of the respondent

could be brought within the scope of the

Rules, immunity from the disciplinary action

cannot be claimed.

In support of these submissions, reliance is placed on Union

of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, [1992] 3 SCC 124.

In Civil Appeal No. 560 of 1991, the peculiar facts art

different; in disregard to the instructions of the Central

Board of Direct Taxes, refund of taxes was ordered.

Further, there was no allegation of corrupt motive or to

oblige any person on account of extraneous considerations.

Therefore, that ruling is distinguishable.

The respondent would try to support the impugned order

contending that the opening of the sealed cover was

correctly ordered because on the date when the Departmental

Promotion Committee met in March 1989, no charge-sheet had

been served on the respondent. The charge memorandum dated

2.5.1989 came up to be served only on 5.5.1989. Therefore,

following the earlier procedure such a direction was given.

This is a case in which the respondent was exercising quasi-

judicial functions. If the orders were wrong the remedy by

way of an appeal or revision could have been resorted to.

Otherwise, if in every case of wrong order, disciplinary

action is resorted to, it would jeopardize the exercise of

judicial functions. The immunity attached to the officer

while exercising quasi-judicial powers will be lost.

Rightly, therefore, the Tribunal relied on Civil Appeal Nos.

4986-87/90 where this Court took the view that no

disciplinary action can be taken in respect of exercising

quasi-judicial functions. To the same effect in Civil

Appeal No. 560/91 the decision relied on by the appellant

namely Union of India & Ors., [1992] 3 SCC 124 (supra) has

no application to the instant case.

The charge memorandum dated 2.5.1989 states as follows

303

MEMORANDUM

"The President proposes to hold an inquiry

against Shri K.K. Dhawan under Rule 14 of the

Central Civil Services (Classification,

Central and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The

substance of the imputations of misconduct or

misbehaviour in respect of which the inquiry

is proposed to be held is set out in the

enclosed statement of article of charge."

At this stage, we will refer to Rule 3(1)(i) , 3(1)(ii) and

3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,

1964 which are as under

Rule 3 (1) : Every government servant shall at all time-

(i) maintain absolute integrity;

(ii) maintain devotion to duty and

(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a government

servant.

The substance of the charge is the completion of nine

assessments in an irregular manner, hastily with a view to

confer undue favour upon the various assessees. By such

act, the respondent failed to maintain absolute integrity

and devotion to duty and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of

government servant. Certainly, it cannot be contended that

concerning the violation of these rules, no disciplinary

action could be taken. However, what is urged is that in so

far as the respondent was exercising quasi-judicial

functions, he could not be subject to disciplinary action.

The order may be wrong. In such a case, the remedy will be

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to take up the matter further in appeal or revision.

The question, therefore, arises whether an authority enjoys

immunity from disciplinary proceedings with respect to

matters decided by him in exercise of quasi-judicial

functions?

In Govinda Menon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1274, it was

contended that no disciplinary proceedings could be taken

against appellant for acts or omissions with regard to his

work as Commissioner under Madras Hindu Religious and

Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. Since the

304

orders made by him were quasi-judicial in character, they

should be challenged only as provided for under the Act. It

was further contended that having regard to scope of Rule 4

of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955,

the act or omission of the Commissioner was such that

appellant was not subject to the administrative control of

the Government and therefore, the disciplinary proceedings

were void. Rejecting this contention, it was held as under

:

"It is not disputed that the appropriate

Government has power to take disciplinary

proceedings against the appellant and that he

could be removed from service by an order of

the Central Government, but it was contended

that I.A.S. Officers are governed by statutory

rules, that ,any act or omission' referred to

in Rule 4(1) relates only to an act or

omission of an officer when serving under the

Government, and that 'serving under the

Government' means subject to the

administrative control of the Government and

that disciplinary proceedings should be,

therefore, on the basis of the relationship of

master and servant. It was argued that in

exercising statutory powers the Commissioner

was not subject to the administrative control

of the Government and disciplinary proceedings

cannot, therefore, be instituted against the

appellant in respect of an act or omission

committed by him in the course of his

employment as Commissioner. We are unable to

accept the proposition contended for by the

appellant as correct. Rule 4(1) does not

impose any limitation or qualification as to

the nature of the act or omission in respect

of which disciplinary proceedings can be

instituted. Rule 4(1) (b) merely says that

the appropriate Government competent to

institute disciplinary proceedings against a

member of the Service would be the Government

under whom such member was serving at the time

of the commission of such act or omission. It

does not say-that the act or omission must

have been committed in the discharge of his

duty or in the course of his employment as a

Government servant. It is, therefore, open to

the Government to take disciplinary

proceedings against the appellant in respect

of his acts or omissions which cast

305

a reflection upon his reputation for integrity

or good faith or devotion to duty as a member

of the service. It is not disputed that the

appellant was, at the time of the alleged

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misconduct, employed as the First Member of

the Board of Revenue and he was at the same

time performing the duties of Commissioner

under the Act in addition to his duties as the

First Member of the Board of Revenue. In our

opinion, it is not necessary that a member of

the Service should have committed the alleged

act or omission in the course of discharge of

his duties as a servant of the Government in

order that it may form the subject-matter of

disciplinary proceedings. In other words, if

the act or omission is such as to reflect on

the reputation of the officer for his

integrity or good faith or devotion to duty,

there is no reason why disciplinary

proceedings should not be taken against him

for that act or omission even though the act

or omission relates to an activity in regard

to which there is no actual master and servant

relationship. To put it differently, the test

is not whether the act or omission was

committed by the appellant in the course of

the discharge of his duties as servant of the

Government. The test is whether the act or

omission has some reasonable connection with

nature and condition of his service or whether

the act or omission has cast any reflection

upon the reputation of the member of the

Service for integrity or devotion to duty as a

public servant. We are of the opinion that

even if the appellant was not subject to the

administrative control of the Government when

he was functioning as Commissioner under the

Act and was not the servant of the Government

subject to its orders at the relevant time,

his act or omission as Commissioner could form

the subject-matter of disciplinary proceedings

provided the act or omission would reflect

upon his reputation for integrity or devotion

to duty as a member of the service." In this

context reference may be made to the following

observations of Lopes, LJ. in Pearce v.

Foster, [1866] 17 OBD 536, p.542.

"If a servant conducts himself in a way

inconsistent with the

306

faithful discharge of his duty in the service,

it is misconduct which justifies immediate

dismissal. That misconduct, according to my

view, need not be misconduct in the carrying

on of the service of the business. It is

sufficient if it is conduct which is

prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to

the interests or to the reputation of the

master, and the master will be justified, not

only if he discovers it at the time, but also

if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing

that servant." (emphasis supplied)

Concerning, the exercise of quasi-judicial

powers the contention urged was to the

following effect :

"We next proceed to examine the contention of

the appellant that the Commissioner was

exercising a quasi-judicial function in

sanctioning the leases under the Act and his

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order, therefore, could not be questioned

except in accordance with the provisions of

the Act. The proposition put forward was that

quasi-judicial orders, unless vacated under

the provisions of the Act, are final and

binding and cannot be questioned by the

executive Government through disciplinary

proceedings. It was argued that an appeal is

provided under S.29(4) of the Act against the

order of the Commissioner granting sanction to

a lease and that it is open to any party

aggrieved to file such an appeal and question

the legality or correctness of the order of

the Commissioner and that the Government also

may in revision under S.99 of the Act examine

the correctness or legality of the order. it

was said that so long as these methods were

not adopted the Government could not institute

disciplinary proceedings and reexamining the

legality of the order of the Commissioner

granting sanction to the leases."

That was rejected as under:

'The charge is, therefore, one of misconduct

and recklessness disclosed by the utter

disregard of the relevant provisions of S.29

and the Rules thereunder in sanctioning the

leases. On behalf of the respondents it was

argued

307

both by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad and Mr. Bindra that

the Commissioner was not discharging quasi-

judicial functions in sanctioning leases under

S.29 of the Act, but we shall proceed on the

assumption that the Commissioner was

performing quasi-judicial functions in

granting leases under S.29 of the Act. Even

upon that assumption we are satisfied that the

Government was entitled to institute

disciplinary proceedings if there was prima

facie material for showing recklessness or

misconduct on the part of the appellant in the

discharge of his official duty. It is true if

the provisions of S.29 of the Act or the Rules

are disregarded the order of the Commissioner

is illegal and such an order could be

questioned in appeal under S.29 (4) or in

revision under S.99 of the Act. But in the

present proceedings what is sought to be

challenged is not the correctness or the

legality of the decision of the Commissioner

but the conduct of the appellant in the

discharge of his duties as Commissioner. The

appellant was proceeded against because in the

discharge of his functions, he acted in utter

disregard of the provisions of the Act and the

Rules. It is the manner in which he

discharged his functions that is brought up in

these proceedings. In other words, the charge

and the allegations are to the effect that in

exercising his powers as Commissioner the

appellant acted in abuse of his power and it

was in regard to such misconduct that he is

being proceeded against. It is manifest,

therefore, that though the propriety and

legality of the sanction to the leases may be

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questioned in appeal or revision under the

Act, the Government is not precluded from

taking disciplinary action if there is proof

that the Commissioner had acted in gross

recklessness in the discharge of his duties or

that he failed to act honestly or in good

faith or that he omitted to observe the

prescribed conditions which are essential for

the exercise of the statutory power. We see

no reason why the Government cannot do so for

the purpose of showing that the Commissioner

acted in utter disregard of the conditions

prescribed for the exercise of his power or

that he was

308

guilty of misconduct or gross negligence. We

are accordingly of the opinion that the

appellant has been unable to make good his

argument on this aspect of the case."

The above case, therefore, is an authority for the

proposition that disciplinary proceedings could be initiated

against the government servant even with regard to exercise

of quasi-judicial powers provided :

(i) The act or omission is such as to

reflect on the reputation of the government

servant for his integrity or good faith or

devotion to duty, or

(ii)there is prima facie material manifesting

recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of

the official duty, or

(iii)the officer had failed to act honestly or

in good faith or had omitted to observe the

prescribed conditions which are essential for

the exercise of statutory power.

We may also usefully refer to two English decisions. Thayre

v. The London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, 22

T.L.R. 240 states:

"Dishonesty' included dishonesty outside the

service of the company as well as dishonesty

towards the company."

In Thompson v. British Berna Motor Lorries Limited 33 T.L.R.

187 at page 188, it has been held as under :

"It was the duty of the servant to render

proper, full and clear accounts to his

principals, and it was the duty of a servant

to render prompt obedience to the lawful

orders of his master. in this case the

plaintiff had failed in both respects. There

was no question as to the plaintiff's honesty,

but he had been negligent."

The Tribunal has chosen to rely on Civil Appeal Nos. 4986-

87/90. The order in that case clearly shows the ultimate

conclusion was that the charge framed against the delinquent

officer had not been established. In support of that

conclusion, it was observed as under

309

"We are also of the view that the action taken

by the appellant was quasi-judicial and should

not have formed the basis of disciplinary

action."

We do not think where to buttress the ultimate conclusion,

this observation was made, that could ever be construed as

laying the law that in no case disciplinary action could be

taken if it pertains to exercise of quasi-judicial powers.

Then, we come to Civil Appeal No. 560/91 to which one of us

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(Mohan, J.) was a party. The ruling in this case turned on

the peculiar facts. Nevertheless, what we have to carefully

notice is the observation as under :

"On a reading of the charges and the

allegations in detail learned Additional

Solicitor General has fairly stated that they

do not disclose any culpability nor is there

any allegation of taking any bribe or to

trying to favour any party in making the

orders granting relief in respect of which

misconduct is alleged against the respondent."

The above extract will clearly indicate that if there was

any culpability or any allegation of taking bribe or trying

to favour any party in exercise of quasi-judicial functions,

then disciplinary action could be taken. We find our

conclusion is supported by a following observations found in

the said order at page 3:

"In our view, the allegations are merely to

the effect that the refunds were granted to

unauthorized instructions of the Central Board

of Direct Taxes. There is no allegation,

however, either express or implied that these

actions were taken by the respondent actuated

by any corrupt motive or to oblige any person

on account of extraneous considerations. In

these circumstances, merely because such

orders of refunds were made, even assuming

that they were erroneous or wrong, no

disciplinary action could be taken as the

respondent was discharging quasi-judicial

function. If any erroneous order had been

passed by him correct remedy is by way of an

appeal or revision to have such orders set

aside."

310

In the case on hand, article of charge clearly mentions that

the nine assessments covered by the article of charge were

completed

(i) in an irregular manner,

(ii) in undue haste, and

(iii) apparently with a view to confer undue favour upon

the assessees concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the allegation of conferring undue favour is very

much there unlike Civil Appeal No. 560/91. If that be so,

certainly disciplinary action is warranted. This Court had

occasion to examine the position. In Union of India & Ors.

v. A.N. Saxena, [1992] 3 SCC 124 to which one of us (Mohan,

J.) was a party, it was held as under :

"It was urged before us by learned counsel for

the respondent that as the respondents was

performing judicial or quasi-judicial

functions in making the assessment orders in

question even if his actions were wrong they

could be corrected in an appeal or in revision

and no disciplinary proceedings could be taken

regarding such actions.

In our view, an argument that no disciplinary

action can be taken in regard to actions taken

or purported to be done in the course of

judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not

correct. It is true that when an officer is

performing judicial or quasi-judicial

functions disciplinary proceedings regarding

any of his actions in the course of such

proceedings should be taken only after great

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caution and a close scrutiny of his actions

and only if the circumstances so warrant. The

initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is

likely to shake the confidence of the public

in the officer concerned and also if lightly

taken likely to undermine his independence.

Hence, the need for extreme care and caution

before initiation of disciplinary proceedings

against an officer performing judicial or

quasi-judicial functions in respect of his

actions in the discharge or purported to

discharge his functions. But it is not as if

such action cannot be taken at all. Where the

311

actions of such an officer indicate

culpability, namely a desire to oblige himself

or unduly favour one of the parties or an

improper motive there is no reason why

disciplinary action should not be taken."

This dictum fully supports the stand of the appellant.

There is a great reason and justice for holding in such

cases that the disciplinary action could be taken. It is

one of the cardinal principles of administration of justice

that it must be free from bias of any kind.

Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or

quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in

order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a

Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to

be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the

present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or

legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct

of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer.

The legality of the orders with reference to the nine

assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under

the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the

Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary

action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we

conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the

following cases

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner

as would reflect on his reputation for

integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;

(ii)if there is prima facie material to show

recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of

his duty;

(iii)if he has acted in a manner which is

unbecoming of a government servant;

(iv)if he had acted negligently or that he

omitted the prescribed conditions which are

essential for the exercise of the statutory

powers;

(v) if he had acted in order to unduly

favour a party-,

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt

motive however, small the bribe may be because

Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may

be small, yet the fault is great."

312

The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However,

we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely

because the order is wrong and the action not falling under

the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not

warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution. Each case

will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be

postulated.

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In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals will stand

allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

We make it clear that it is open to the respondent to put

forth all defenses open to him in the departmental inquiry

which will be considered on its merit.

V.P.R. Appeals allowed.

313