Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. /2014

[Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 23631 of 2008]

Union of India and others … Appellant (s)

Versus

P. Gunasekaran … Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:

Leave granted.

2. Respondent, while working as Deputy Office

Superintendent, Central Excise Third Division, Coimbatore was

arrested by Police in a criminal case involving cheating and

extortion of money. The police registered a criminal case under

Sections 143, 319 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)

(hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) against the respondent.

Separate departmental proceedings were also initiated against

him under Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and

Appeal) Rules, 1965.

1

Page 2

3. Following are the three articles of charge:

“ARTICLE-I

That the said Shri P. Gunasekaran, Deputy Office

Superintendent (Level-II) (under suspension of

Central Excise, Headquarters Office, Coimbatore

while working in the Valuation Cell, Hqrs. Office,

Coimbatore came to the office on 23.11.1992, in

the morning and signed the attendance register, in

token of having come to the office and left office

without permission and came to the office the next

day, i.e., on the morning of 24.11.1992, and

affixed his initials in the departure column against

the dated 23.11.1992 and willfully falsified the

official register. He has thereby committed gross

misconduct and failed to maintain absolute

integrity and devotion to duty and has behaved in

a manner unbecoming of a Government servant,

in contravention of the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i),

3(1)(ii), 3(1)(iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct)

Rules, 1964.

ARTICLE-II

That the said Shri P. Gunasekaran, being a

ministerial Officer impersonated himself as a

Central Excise Executive Officer and on

23.11.1992 about 2.30 p.m. unauthorizedly

conducted passenger checks in a public transport

bus at Ukkadam Bus Stand, by usurping the

powers of Executive Officer and thereby

committed gross misconduct and failed to

maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty

and behaved in a manner unbecoming of a

Government servant in contravention of the

provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of

CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

ARTICLE-III

2

Page 3 That the said Shri P. Gunasekaran, on

23.11.1992 at about 2.30 P.M., abused his position

unauthorisedly conducted passenger check, by

usurping the powers of Executive Officer,

threatened a passenger bound for Kerala and

thereby committed gross misconduct and failed to

maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty

and behaved in a manner unbecoming of a

Government servant in contravention of the

provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of

CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”

4. In the disciplinary inquiry, all the charges were proved

and, on due procedure, the respondent was dismissed from

service by order dated 10.06.1997. The said order of dismissal

dated 10.06.1997 was challenged before the Central

Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench in O.A. No. 805 of 1997.

During the pendency of the original application before the

Central Administrative Tribunal, in criminal appeal, the First

Additional District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore acquitted the

respondent.

5. The Central Administrative Tribunal, vide order dated

27.10.1999, took the view that the respondent having been

acquitted on identical set of charges, he could not be proceeded

against in respect of second and third articles of charge in the

disciplinary proceedings. However, on the first Charge, the

Tribunal held as follows:

3

Page 4 “11.… There is one another charge on which, the

applicant has been punished by the disciplinary

authority, i.e., Article I which has been extracted above.

It cannot be said this charge is also part of the criminal

prosecution. On the evidence adduced, the inquiring

authority has come to the conclusion that Article I has

been proved taking note of the applicant’s letter dated

11.11.1992 addressed to the Collector of Central Excise

when he was kept under remand. This finding given by

the enquiry officer has been accepted by the

disciplinary authority. Considering all the three charges

as proved, the order of dismissal has been passed, but

since we have arrived at a conclusion that charges 2

and 3 cannot stand in view of the acquittal by the

criminal court, in our view, the quantum of punishment

has to be considered by the disciplinary authority. … …

… So the impugned order is set aside, the matter is

remitted back to the disciplinary authority to consider

the quantum punishment taking note of our conclusions

and observations made above. The disciplinary

authority shall consider the quantum of punishment

and pass orders within a period of 8 weeks from the

date of receipt of a copy of this order. …”

6. The appellants herein challenged the order of the

Administrative Tribunal in Writ Petition No. 355 of 2000 before

the Madras High Court. The said writ petition was disposed of by

judgment dated 12.01.2000. The High Court declined to interfere

with the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal. However,

in respect of Articles of Charge no.I which does not have any

relation to the criminal case, it was held at paragraph-6 as

follows:

4

Page 5 “6.… Charge No. 1 relates to the unauthorized

absence of the respondent from the office. The tribunal

was of the view that dismissal from service was not

warranted for the said charge. We do not think that the

view taken by the Tribunal either unreasonable or

irrational which could be interfered with by this court

under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

…”

7. The disciplinary authority, accordingly, passed order

dated 28.02.2000 which reads as follows:

“Whereas on consideration of the facts and

records of the case with regard to Article-I of the

disciplinary proceedings against Shri P. Gunasekaran

and the observation made in Hon’ble Tribunal’s order,

the undersigned is satisfied that good and sufficient

reason exists for imposing upon him the penalty herein

after specified, in modification of penalty of ‘dismissal

from service’ ordered vide C.No.II/10A/92-Vig. Dated

10.6.97.

Now, therefore, I order under clause (vii) of Rule

11 of Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965 that Shri

P. Gunasekaran, dismissed as Deputy Office

Superintendent, be compulsorily retired from the date

from which he was dismissed from service.”

8. Respondent challenged the order dated 28.02.2000

whereby he was compulsorily retired from service from the

original date of dismissal in O.A. No. 521 of 2001 before the

Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench. Dismissing the

O.A., it was held as follows:

5

Page 6 “10. … It is for the disciplinary authority to decide in

what way the punishment is to be imposed and this

Tribunal cannot act as an appellate court in such cases.

With this in mind, if we read the Article-I of the charge

extracted above, it is clear that the applicant does not

deserve any sympathy because he manipulated the

records. It is not a case of unauthorized absence. The

applicant after signing the attendance register left the

office and yet he made attempts to show that he was

present in the office for the whole day. It amounts to

falsification of the records and the conduct of the

applicant shows that he was dishonest or he has not

maintained the integrity as a government officer.

Falsification of records is a criminal offence. Taking into

consideration the gravity of charges, we hold that the

punishment imposed on the applicant is proper and the

same is not outrageous nor it shocks our conscience.

The O.A. is dismissed. …”

9. The said order dated 08.02.2001 was challenged by the

respondent before the High Court of Judicature at Madras which

has lead to the impugned judgment dated 18.09.2007 in Writ

Petition No. 29757 of 2002.

10. The High Court set aside the order of the Central

Administrative Tribunal, interfered with even the finding of the

enquiry officer, set aside the punishment and directed

reinstatement with backwages and all service benefits. To quote:

“2.We have gone through the materials placed on

record and also gone through the letter of the petitioner

dated 11.12.1992 on which the enquiry officer has

6

Page 7 given his findings whereby he brought to the notice of

the Collector what was transpired on 23.11.1992, and

there is no admission made by the petitioner.

Therefore, we hold that the enquiry officer has not

considered the letter in the proper perspective to arrive

at the right conclusion. Therefore, the letter dated

11.12.1992 cannot be taken as the basis, on which, the

punishment was imposed and therefore the impugned

order is liable to be set aside. Further, as rightly

contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the petitioner while modifying the order, the

respondents should have fixed the date of compulsory

retirement from the date of issue of the order, instead

of fixing the compulsory retirement from the date of

order of dismissal. Further, after going through the

contents of the letter, it seems the petitioner has not

admitted the charge. Therefore, as rightly contended by

the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner

except the letter of the petitioner, there is no other

evidence and whatever evidence is required with

regard to charges 2 and 3, which were framed on the

basis of the registration of the criminal case against the

petitioner, which ultimately ended in acquittal, the

punishment imposed on the basis of the above said

criminal case has to go. Therefore, the disciplinary

authority has not properly understood the order passed

by the tribunal to reconsider the punishment as per the

charge memo. The enquiry officer’s report is not based

on any evidence except based on the letter by the

petitioner, which the petitioner has not admitted of the

charges. The petitioner was acquitted from the charges

2 and 3. Therefore, the only charge, which we find is

not based on any material or evidence. Therefore, the

punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the

petitioner is unsustainable and the petitioner is to be

reinstated. It is brought to the notice of this court that

the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation.

Therefore, the salary payable to the petitioner from the

date of his compulsory retirement till the date of his

superannuation has to be treated the reinstatement

with all backwages and monetary benefits which shall

be calculated and paid to him. The terminal benefits

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Page 8 and pension as applicable under the Rules shall be

calculated and paid to the petitioner.”

11. Thus aggrieved, the Union of India and others are before

this Court.

12. Heard Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General

appearing for the appellants and Shri Sumeer Kumar

Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing

to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in

the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence

before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was

accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by

the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings,

the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first

appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article

226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-

appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see

whether:

a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

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Page 9 b.the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in

that behalf;

c.there is violation of the principles of natural justice in

conducting the proceedings;

d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a

fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the

evidence and merits of the case;

e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by

irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

f.the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary

and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have

arrived at such conclusion;

g.the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit

the admissible and material evidence;

h.the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted

inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

i.the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

9

Page 10 Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High

Court shall not:

(i).re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii).interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the

same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii).go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv).go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v).interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings

can be based.

(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii).go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks

its conscience.

14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra

Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao

1

, many of the

above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded

thus:

1

AIR 1963 SC 1723

10

Page 11 “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a

proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court

of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is

concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by

an authority competent in that behalf, and according to

the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether

the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where

there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted

with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and

which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion

that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is

not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ

under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive

at an independent finding on the evidence. The High

Court may undoubtedly interfere where the

departmental authorities have held the proceedings

against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with

the rules of natural justice or in violation of the

statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or

where the authorities have disabled themselves from

reaching a fair decision by some considerations

extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case

or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant

considerations or where the conclusion on the very face

of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no

reasonable person could ever have arrived at that

conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental

authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly

held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal

evidence on which their findings can be based, the

adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter

which can be permitted to be canvassed before the

High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226

of the Constitution.”

11

Page 12 15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra

Venkata Rao

2

, the principles have been further discussed at

paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows:

“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with

departmental inquiries has come up before this Court.

Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of

A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the

view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty

of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in

criminal trials thatan offence is not established unless

proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the

satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be

not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High

Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is

not competent to declare the order of the authorities

holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is

not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision

of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against

a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine

whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in

that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in

that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are

not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which

the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry

has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support

the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the

charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review

the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on

the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the

departmental authorities have held the proceedings

against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the

rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules

prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities

have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by

some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the

merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be

influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the

conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and

2

(1975) 2 SCC 557

12

Page 13 capricious that no reasonable person could ever have

arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities

are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole

judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on

which their findings can be based, the adequacy or

reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be

permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a

proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the

Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the

High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the

disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported

by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable

person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan

Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded

its powers in interfering with the findings of the

disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent

was instrumental in compelling the shut-down of an air

compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This

Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the

evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group

of strikers and compelled them to close down their

compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The

General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry

Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted

the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the

General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the

conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority

should prevail and the High Court should not have

interfered with the conclusion.

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under

Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court

exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact

reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the

appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned

in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on

the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not

an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In

regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ

can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said

13

Page 14 finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit

admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously

admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the

impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no

evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which

can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact

recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the

ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced

before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain

a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a

point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said

finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the

entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High

Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect

that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on

the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate,

the evidence in the present case which was considered by

the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to

justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which

would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the

respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave

reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High

Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived

at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the

evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the

evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High

Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari

should not do.”

These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the

living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State

of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh

3

. To quote the

unparalled and inimitable expressions:

3

(1977) 2 SCC 491

14

Page 15 “4. …. in a domestic enquiry the strict and

sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian

Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are

logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible.

There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has

reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that

departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals

must be careful in evaluating such material and should

not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant

under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is

not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although

we have been taken through case-law and other

authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a

judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous

materials or considerations and observance of rules of

natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if

perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of

independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions

reached, such finding, even though of a domestic

tribunal, cannot be held good. …”

16. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court upto the

latest in Chennai Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. T.

T. Murali Babu

4

, these principles have been consistently

followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything.

17. On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the

punishment of compulsory retirement in the impugned order

dated 28.02.2000, had arrived at the following findings:

“Article-I was held as proved by the Inquiry authority

after evaluating the evidence adduced in the case.

Under the circumstances of the case, the evidence

relied on viz., letter dated 11.12.92 written by Shri P.

4

(2014) 4 SCC 108

15

Page 16 Gunasekaran, provides a reasonable nexus to the

charge framed against him and he did not controvert

the contents of the said letter dated 11.12.92 during

the time of inquiry. Nor did he produce any defence

witness during the inquiry to support his claims

including that on 23.11.92 he left the office on

permission. There is nothing to indicate that he was

handicapped in producing his defence witness. …”

18. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report

and having accepted it, after discussing the available and

admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central

Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the

disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to

re-appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

19. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of

its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,

to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the

punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the

instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the

conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there

are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service

jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such

assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is “moral

16

Page 17 uprightness; honesty”. It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence,

trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy,

rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness,

cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility,

irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral

excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm

adherence to a code of moral values.

20. The impugned conduct of the respondent working as

Deputy Office Superintendent in a sensitive department of

Central Excise, according to the disciplinary authority, reflected

lack of integrity warranting discontinuance in service. That view

has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also.

Thereafter, it is not open to the High Court to go into the

proportionality of punishment or substitute the same with a

lesser or different punishment. These aspects have been

discussed at quite length by this Court in several decisions

including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others

5

,

Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham

6

, Om Kumar

and others v. Union of India

7

, Coimbatore District Central

Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central

5

(1995) 6 SCC 749

6

(1997) 7 SCC 463

7

(2001) 2 SCC 386

17

Page 18 Cooperative Bank Employees Association and another

8

,

Chairman-cum-Managing Director , Coal India Limited and

another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others

9

and the

recent one in Chennai Metropolitan Water

Supply (supra).

21. All that apart, on the facts of the present case, it has to

be seen that in the first round of litigation before the Central

Administrative Tribunal in order dated 27.10.1999 in O.A. No.

805 of 1997, the Tribunal had entered a finding that “on the

evidence adduced, the inquiring authority has come to the

conclusion that Article I has been proved taking note of the

appellant’s letter dated 11.11.92 addressed to the Collector of

Central Excise when he was kept under remand. This finding

given by the inquiry officer has been accepted by the disciplinary

authority”.

22. That order of the Central Administrative Tribunal was

challenged by the respondent in Writ Petition No. 226 of 2000

which was disposed of by judgment dated 12.01.2000 wherein

the High Court had also endorsed the said finding which we have

already referred to herein before.

8

(2007) 4 SCC 669

9

(2009) 15 SCC 620

18

Page 19 23. Thus, the finding on Charge no. I has attained finality. It

is the punishment of dismissal on Charge no. I which was

directed to be reconsidered by the Central Administrative

Tribunal and which view was endorsed by the High Court. On

that basis only, the dismissal was converted to compulsory

retirement. Such findings cannot be reopened in the subsequent

round of litigation at the instance of the respondent. It was only

the punishment aspect that was opened to challenge.

24. The Central Administrative Tribunal, in the order dated

01.02.2001 in O.A. No. 521 of 2000, after elaborately discussing

the factual as well as the legal position, has come to the

conclusion that the punishment of compulsory retirement is not

outrageous or shocking to its conscience, it was not open to the

High Court to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings from

stage one and direct reinstatement of the respondent with

backwages.

25. The last contention is with regard to date of effect of the

punishment. According to the respondent, even assuming that

compulsory retirement is to be imposed, it could be only with

effect from the date of order, viz., 28.02.2000. We are unable to

appreciate the contention. The respondent stood dismissed from

19

Page 20 service as per order dated 10.06.1997. It was that punishment

which was directed to be reconsidered. Consequent thereon

only, the punishment was altered/substituted to compulsory

retirement. Necessarily, it has to be from the date of dismissal

from service, viz., 10.06.1997.

26. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

The order dated 28.02.2000 passed by the disciplinary authority

and confirmed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai

Bench vide order dated 01.02.2001 in O.A. No. 521 of 2000 is

restored.

27. The appeal is allowed as above. No costs.

.....…..…..………… J.

(ANIL R.

DAVE)

..………..……………J.

(KURIAN

JOSEPH)

New Delhi;

November 19, 2014.

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