REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7064 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9599 OF 2019)

Union of India & Anr. … Appellants

Versus

Tarsem Singh & Ors. … Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7068 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.10210 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7065 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9600 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7066 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9602 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7067 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.9604 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7084 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15478 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7086 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15482 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7081 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15472 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7079 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15470 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7070-7071 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS.15442-15443 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7104 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21689 OF 2019)

(D.NO.18425 OF 2019)

1

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7101 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21683 OF 2019)

(D.NO.18428 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7090 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15488 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7072-7073 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS.15444-15445 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7089 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15487 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7085 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15479 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7083 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15477OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7087 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15485 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7082 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15474 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7102 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21687 OF 2019)

(D.NO.18730 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7078 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15466 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7074 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15446 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7075 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15447 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7103 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21688 OF 2019)

(D.NO.19328 OF 2019)

2

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7080 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15471 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7076 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15448 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7077 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15450 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7105 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21690 OF 2019)

(D.NO.19353 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7088 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15486 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7069 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.14491 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7092 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21662 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20552 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7110 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 21696 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20561 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7091 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21657 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20565 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7094 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21664 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20573 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7095 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21666 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20612 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7097 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21671 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20617 OF 2019)

3

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7100 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21682 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20770 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7099 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21675 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20775 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7096 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21670 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20779 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7098 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21673 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20783 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7093 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21663 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20785 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7109 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21695 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20817 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7106 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21691 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20821 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7107 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21692 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20939 OF 2019)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7108 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.21693 OF 2019)

(D.NO.20941 OF 2019)

4

JUDGMENT

R.F. NARIMAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. A batch of appeals before us by the Union of India question

the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which is that the

non-grant of solatium and interest to lands acquired under the

National Highways Act, which is available if lands are acquired

under the Land Acquisition Act, is bad in law, and consequently that

Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956 be struck down as

being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India to this extent.

3. The facts of one of these appeals may be taken up as

illustrative of the points for consideration in all these appeals. In

Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsem Singh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7064

of 2019 @ SLP (C) No.9599 of 2019), a notification dated

24.12.2004 was issued under Section 3A of the National Highways

Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), intending to acquire

land belonging to the Respondents for the purpose of four-laning

National Highway No.1-A on certain stretches of the Jalandhar-

Pathankot section as well as the Pathankot-Jammu section falling

within the State of Punjab. On 11

th

July, 2005, the said lands were

declared to have vested in the State pursuant to Section 3D(2) of

5

the said Act. On 5

th

October 2006, the competent authority under

the Act passed an Award in which compensation was calculated at

Rs.4,219/- per marla or Rs.6.75 lakhs per acre. As this Award was

disputed by the Respondents, an Arbitrator was appointed under the

Act, who then arrived at a figure of Rs.1.5 lakhs per marla as

compensation. It is important to note that as no solatium or interest

is provided by the Act, such solatium and interest was not awarded

by the learned Arbitrator. Meanwhile, a Section 34 application filed

under the Arbitration Act by the Union of India was dismissed on the

ground that it was hopelessly time-barred. On appeal to the

Division Bench of the High Court, it was found on facts that as the

amount of compensation awarded was not challenged in certain

cases, the National Highways Authority of India being “State” under

Article 12 of the Constitution cannot be permitted to pick and

choose between persons similarly situate, as a result of which the

appeal against valuation at the rate of 1.5 lakhs per marla was

rejected. However, the Court deleted the grant of severance and

18% interest if the awarded amount is not paid within six months,

following an earlier Division Bench judgment of the same Court. The

Court then went on to state that despite the fact that no appeal has

been filed against the learned Single Judge’s judgment by the

owners, yet compensation for acquired land being in the nature of

6

beneficial legislation, they would be bound by an earlier Division

Bench judgment which requires the National Highway Authority to

pay solatium and, therefore, directed payment of solatium at the

rate of 30%, as laid down in the said judgment.

4. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the Union of India and NHAI, took us through the relevant

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as the National

Highways Act. According to him, the National Highways Act is a

complete Code which expressly excluded the application of the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and this being so, it is clear

that absent discrimination or manifest arbitrariness, the non-award

of solatium and interest that is awardable under the Land

Acquisition Act would not fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of

India. According to the learned Senior Advocate, it is not possible

to choose between one Acquisition Act and another, as the National

Highways Act alone would apply when land is acquired for the

purpose of National Highways. This being the case, all the

judgments that are cited by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs. Union of India 2011 (4) RCR

(Civil) 375, would, therefore, not apply. According to him, the

Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Banshilal Samariya

7

vs Union of India 2005-06 Supp RLW 559, correctly distinguished

this line of cases and equally correctly followed a line of judgments

under various state town planning Acts, the Requisitioning and

Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 and the Defence of

India Act, 1971 to arrive at the conclusion that solatium and interest

need not be paid in cases covered under the National Highways

Act. He further argued that given the fact that market value on the

date of publication of the Section 3A notification was to be given at

the full market rate, there could be no fundamental right violated as

solatium and interest that are granted are mere statutory rights

which can be awarded if the statute so enjoins, and equally need

not be awarded where a separate special statute expressly

excludes them. He also contended, somewhat feebly, that since

only strips of land adjoining the National Highways were required to

be acquired, in many cases, the landowners would have properties

which would not be subject to acquisition left with them, obviating

any need to pay solatium to them. Finally, he also referred to and

relied upon Article 31-C of the Constitution to argue that if at all

there was an infraction of Article 14, the Amendment Act of 1997 to

the National Highways Act, 1956, enacting Sections 3A to 3J, being

in furtherance of the Directive Principle contained in Article 39(b),

8

would be shielded from attack on the ground that Article 14 of the

Constitution has been violated.

5. Shri Amit Sibal, learned Senior Advocate, together with Shri

Neeraj Kumar Jain, defended the view of the Punjab and Haryana

High Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra) by

pointing out that the object sought to be achieved by the 1997

Amendment Act to the National Highways Act, 1956 was far

removed from the Directive Principle contained in Article 39(b) and,

therefore, did not receive the protection of Article 31-C of the

Constitution of India. They argued that the main object of the

Amendment Act was the speedy implementation of Highway

projects, which could only be achieved by expediting the process of

land acquisition. This being the case, excluding solatium and

interest that is awardable under the Land Acquisition Act results in a

discrimination between persons who are similarly situate so far as

lands are acquired by the Union of India from them for the purpose

of national highways as opposed to other public purposes, having

no rational relation to the object of the 1997 amendment. They were

at pains to point out that “solatium” is awarded because of the

compulsory nature of acquisition, which is present whether the land

is acquired for the National Highways or for any other public

9

purpose. They, therefore, argued that solatium and interest are

integral parts of compensation that is awardable to persons whose

lands have been compulsorily expropriated. They took us through

the provisions of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of the

Immovable Property Act, 1952 and the Defence of India Act, 1971,

and stated that the judgments that were delivered under those Acts,

which upheld the non-grant of solatium, was because requisition

was first made of private property for public purposes under those

Acts, for which compensation was granted. Possession having

been taken by the State, such properties could be handed back

under those Acts once the purpose of requisitioning such properties

was over. Also, it was only in very limited circumstances that such

requisitioned property was to be acquired, which, therefore,

obviated payment of any solatium. They, therefore, relied upon the

line of authorities which struck down provisions of statutes which did

not grant solatium where land was acquired without first being

requisitioned. They also took us through the judgment of the

Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court and pointed out that this

basic distinction between the two sets of applicable precedents was

not properly appreciated, leading the High Court to follow the wrong

line of authority. On merits, they argued that in some cases in the

Supreme Court itself, the then Solicitor General, Shri Ranjit Kumar,

10

expressly stated that solatium will be paid to some of the persons

who are covered by notifications under Section 3A of the National

Highways Act. This apart, as was correctly observed by the

Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the

impugned judgment, the National Highway Authority being “State”

under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, cannot file objections in

certain cases and accept arbitration awards in others. In any case,

no case has been made out under the limited jurisdiction to

challenge arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996.

6. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, it is

necessary to first mention that the National Highways Act, 1956, as

originally enacted, did not provide for acquisition of land. Thus, till

the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997, all

acquisitions for the purpose of National Highways were made under

the Land Acquisition Act, and the owners were given, in addition to

market value, solatium as well as interest under the provisions of

that Act.

7. Coming to the Amendment Act of 1997, it is important to set

out the Objects and Reasons that led to the aforesaid amendment.

They are:

11

“1. In order to create an environment to promote private

investment in national highways, to speed up

construction of highways and to remove bottlenecks in

their proper management, it was considered necessary

to amend the National Highways Act, 1956 and the

National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988.

2. One of the impediments in the speedy implementation

of highways projects has been inordinate delay in the

acquisition of land. In order to expedite the process of

land acquisition, it is proposed that once the Central

Government declares that the land is required for public

purposes for development of a highway, that land will

vest in the Government and only the amount by way of

compensation is to be paid and any dispute relating to

compensation will be subject to adjudication through the

process of arbitration.

3. It was also felt necessary to ensure continuity of the

status of bypasses built through private investment. To

achieve this, it is proposed to amend the National

Highways Act, 1956 so as to include the highway

stretches situated within any municipal area as a part of

National Highway. Further, as the National Highways

Act, 1956 permits participation of the private sector in

the development of the National Highways, it became

imperative to amend the National Highways Authority of

India Act, 1988 so as to provide that the National

Highway Authority of India may seek the participation of

the private sector in respect of the highways vested in

the Authority.

4. With a view to provide adequate capital and loans to

the National Highways Authority of India by the Central

Government, it is proposed to make amendment in the

National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988.

5. With a view to achieve the above objectives and also

as both Houses of Parliament were not in session and

the President was satisfied that circumstances existed

which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate

12

action, the National Highways Laws (Amendment)

Ordinance, 1997 was promulgated by the President on

the 24th day of January, 1997.

6. The Bill seeks to replace the aforesaid Ordinance.”

8. Pursuant to this, the amendments that were made to the

National Highways Act, 1956 with which we are directly concerned,

are set out hereinbelow:

“3. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires,-

(a) "competent authority" means any person or authority

authorised by the Central Government, by notification in

the Official Gazette, to perform the functions of the

competent authority for such area as may be specified in

the notification;

(b) "land" includes benefits to arise out of land and

things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to

anything attached to the earth.

3A. Power to acquire land, etc. - (1) Where the Central

Government is satisfied that for a public purpose any

land is required for the building, maintenance,

management or operation of a national highway or part

thereof, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette,

declare its intention to acquire such land.

(2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall give a

brief description of the land.

(3) The competent authority shall cause the substance

of the notification to be published in two local

newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular

language.

3B. Power to enter for survey, etc.- On the issue of a

notification under sub-section (1) of section 3A, it shall

13

be lawful for any person, authorised by the Central

Government in this behalf, to—

(a) make any inspection, survey, measurement,

valuation or enquiry;

(b) take levels;

(c) dig or bore into sub-soil;

(d) set out boundaries and intended lines of work;

(e) mark such levels, boundaries and lines placing

marks and cutting trenches; or

(f) do such other acts or things as may be laid down

by rules made in this behalf by that Government.

3C. Hearing of objections - (1) Any person interested in

the land may, within twenty-one days from the date of

publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of

section 3A, object to the use of the land for the purpose

or purposes mentioned in that sub-section.

(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made

to the competent authority in writing and shall set out the

grounds thereof and the competent authority shall give

the objector an opportunity of being heard, either in

person or by a legal practitioner, and may, after hearing

all such objections and after making such further

enquiry, it any, as the competent authority thinks

necessary, by order, either allow or disallow the

objections.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "legal

practitioner" has the same meaning as in clause (i) of

sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Advocates Act, 1961

(25 of 1961).

(3) Any order made by the competent authority under

sub-section (2) shall be final.

3D. Declaration of acquisition- (1) Where no objection

under sub-section (1) of section 3C has been made to

the competent authority within the period specified

14

therein or where the competent authority has disallowed

the objection under subsection (2) of that section, the

competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a

report accordingly to the Central Government and on

receipt of such report, the Central Government shall

declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the

land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes

mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3A.

(2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-

section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central

Government free from all encumbrances.

(3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been

published under sub-section (1) of section 3A for its

acquisition but no declaration under sub-section (1) has

been published within a period of one year from the date

of publication of that notification, the said notification

shall cease to have any effect:

Provided that in computing the said period of one year,

the period or periods during which any action or

proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification

issued under sub-section (1) of section 3A is stayed by

an order of a court shall be excluded.

(4) A declaration made by the Central Government under

sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any

court or by any other authority.

3E. Power to take possession.- (1) Where any land has

vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2)

of section 3D, and the amount determined by the

competent authority under section 3G with respect to

such land has been deposited under sub-section (1) of

section 3H, with the competent authority by the Central

Government, the competent authority may by notice in

writing direct the owner as well as any other person who

may be in possession of such land to surrender or

deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or

any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within sixty

days of the service of the notice.

15

(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with any

direction made under sub-section (1), the competent

authority shall apply—

(a) in the case of any land situated in any area falling

within the metropolitan area, to the Commissioner of

Police;

(b) in case of any land situated in any area other than

the area referred to in clause (a), to the Collector of a

District,

and such Commissioner or Collector, as the case may

be, shall enforce the surrender of the land, to the

competent authority or to the person duly authorised by

it.

3F. Right to enter into the land where land has vested in

the Central Government. - Where the land has vested in

the Central Government under section 3D, it shall be

lawful for any person authorised by the Central

Government in this behalf, to enter and do other act

necessary upon the land for carrying out the building,

maintenance, management or operation of a national

highway or a part thereof, or any other work connected

therewith.

3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.-

(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall

be paid an amount which shall be determined by an

order of the competent authority.

(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of

an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act,

there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any

other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has

been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of

such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent, of

the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that

land.

(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under

sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent

16

authority shall give a public notice published in two local

newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular

language inviting claims from all persons interested in

the land to be acquired.

(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and

shall require all persons interested in such land to

appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner

referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3C, before the

competent authority, at a time and place and to state the

nature of their respective interest in such land.

(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority

under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not

acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on

an application by either of the parties, be determined by

the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central

Government.

(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996)

shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.

(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while

determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-

section (5), as the case may be, shall take into

consideration—

(a) the market value of the land on the date of

publication of the notification under section 3A;

(b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person

interested at the time of taking possession of the land,

by reason of the severing of such land from other

land;

(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person

interested at the time of taking possession of the land,

by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his

other immovable property in any manner, or his

earnings;

(d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land,

the person interested is compelled to change his

17

residence or place of business, the reasonable

expenses, if any, incidental to such change.

3H. Deposit and payment of amount. - (1) The amount

determined under section 3G shall be deposited by the

Central Government in such manner as may be laid

down by rules made in this behalf by that Government,

with the competent authority before taking possession of

the land.

(2) As soon as may be after the amount has been

deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority

shall on behalf of the Central Government pay the

amount to the person or persons entitled thereto.

(3) Where several persons claim to be interested in the

amount deposited under sub-section (1), the competent

authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion

are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of

them.

(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the

amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the

same or any part thereof is payable, the competent

authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the

principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the limits

of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.

(5) Where the amount determined under section 3G by

the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by

the competent authority, the arbitrator may award

interest at nine per cent, per annum on such excess

amount from the date of taking possession under section

3D till the date of the actual deposit thereof.

(6) Where the amount determined by the arbitrator is in

excess of the amount determined by the competent

authority, the excess amount together with interest, if

any, awarded under sub-section (5) shall be deposited

by the Central Government in such manner as may be

laid down by rules made in this behalf by that

Government, with the competent authority and the

18

provisions of sub-sections (2) to (4) shall apply to such

deposit.

3-I. Competent authority to have certain powers of civil

court.- The competent authority shall have, for the

purposes of this Act, all the powers of a civil court while

trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5

of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:—

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any

person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of any

document;

(c) reception of evidence on affidavits;

(d) requisitioning any public record from any court or

office;

(e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses.

3J. Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 not to apply.- Nothing

in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to an

acquisition under this Act.”

9. Keeping in view the object of reducing delay and speedy

implementation of highway projects, the amended National

Highways Act does away with any “award” by way of an offer to the

landowner. Post the notification under Section 3A, objections are

to be heard by the competent authority, whose order is then made

final. The moment the authority disallows the objections, a report is

submitted to the Central Government, and on receipt of such report,

the Central Government, by a declaration, states that the land

should be acquired for the purpose mentioned in Section 3A. The

19

important innovation made by the Amendment Act is that vesting is

not postponed to after an award is made by the Competent

Authority. Vesting takes place as soon as the Section 3D declaration

is made. One other important difference between the Amendment

Act and the Land Acquisition Act is that determination of

compensation is to be made by the competent authority under the

Amendment Act which, if not accepted by either party, is then to be

determined by an Arbitrator to be appointed by the Central

Government. Such arbitrator’s Award is then subject to challenge

under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Thus, delays in

references made to District Judges and appeals therefrom to the

High Court and Supreme Court have been obviated. Section 3G(7)

does not provide for grant of solatium, and Section 3H(5) awards

interest at the rate of 9% on the excess amount determined by the

arbitrator over what is determined by the competent authority

without the period of one year contained in the proviso to Section 28

of the Land Acquisition Act, after which interest is only awardable at

the rate of 15% per annum, if such payment is made beyond one

year.

10.Before embarking on a discussion as to the constitutional

validity of the Amendment Act, it is important to first understand

20

what is meant by the expression “solatium”. In Sunder vs Union of

India (2001) 7 SCC 211, a bench of 5 judges of this Court laid down

the nature of solatium as follows:

“21. It is apposite in this context to point out that during

the enquiry contemplated under Section 11 of the Act

the Collector has to consider the objections which any

person interested has stated pursuant to the notice

given to him. It may be possible that a person so

interested would advance objections for highlighting his

disinclination to part with the land acquired on account of

a variety of grounds, such as sentimental or religious or

psychological or traditional etc. Section 24 emphasises

that no amount on account of any disinclination of the

person interested to part with the land shall be granted

as compensation. That aspect is qualitatively different

from the solatium which the legislature wanted to

provide “in consideration of the compulsory nature of the

acquisition”.

22. Compulsory nature of acquisition is to be

distinguished from voluntary sale or transfer. In the latter,

the landowner has the widest advantage in finding out a

would-be buyer and in negotiating with him regarding the

sale price. Even in such negotiations or haggling,

normally no landowner would bargain for any amount in

consideration of his disinclination to part with the land.

The mere fact that he is negotiating for sale of the land

would show that he is willing to part with the land. The

owner is free to settle terms of transfer and choose the

buyer as also to appoint the point of time when he would

be receiving consideration and parting with his title and

possession over the land. But in the compulsory

acquisition the landowner is deprived of the right and

opportunity to negotiate and bargain for the sale price. It

depends on what the Collector or the court fixes as per

the provisions of the Act. The solatium envisaged in sub-

21

section (2) “in consideration of the compulsory nature of

the acquisition” is thus not the same as damages on

account of the disinclination to part with the land

acquired.”

Thus, the solatium that is paid to a landowner is on account of

the fact that a landowner, who may not be willing to part with his

land, has now to do so, and that too at a value fixed legislatively and

not through negotiation, by which, arguably, such land owner would

get the best price for the property to be sold. Once this is

understood in its correct perspective, it is clear that “solatium” is part

and parcel of compensation that is payable for compulsory

acquisition of land.

11.As has been stated by us hereinabove, solatium and interest

were awarded to landowners for compulsory acquisition of their

lands for the purpose of National Highways until the 1997

Amendment Act. Interestingly, after the Land Acquisition Act has

been repealed and The Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement

Act, 2013 has come into force, Section 105 of the said Act provides

as under:

“105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases

or to apply with certain modifications.- (1) Subject to

sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply

22

to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in

the Fourth Schedule.

(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of section 106, the Central

Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of

the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.

(3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within

one year from the date of commencement of this Act,

direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the

determination of compensation in accordance with the

First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement

specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being

beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the

cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified

in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such

exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the

compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating

to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as

may be specified in the notification, as the case may be.

(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued

under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each

House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total

period of thirty days which may be comprised in one

session or in two or more successive sessions, and if,

before the expiry of the session immediately following

the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both

Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the

notification or both Houses agree in making any

modification in the notification, the notification shall not

be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in

such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the

Houses of Parliament.”

12.The First Schedule to the said Act provides that solatium

equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors,

23

depending on whether the land is situated in a rural or urban area,

constitutes minimum compensation package to be given to those

whose land is acquired. The Fourth Schedule to this Act, to be read

along with Section 105, expressly includes under Item 7, the

National Highways Act, 1956. In Item 9, this Schedule also includes

The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,

1952. By a notification dated 28

th

August, 2015 issued under

Section 105 read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided

that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to acquisitions

that take place under the National Highways Act. The result is that

both before the 1997 Amendment Act and after the coming into

force of the 2013 Act, solatium and interest is payable to

landowners whose property is compulsorily acquired for purposes of

National Highways. This is one other very important circumstance

to be borne in mind when judging the constitutional validity of the

1997 Amendment Act for the interregnum period from 1997 to 2015.

Article 31-C

13.Articles 31-C and 39(b) of the Constitution of India read as

under:

24

“31C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive

principles.- Notwithstanding anything contained in article

13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards

securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV

shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is

inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the

rights conferred by article 14 or article 19 and no law

containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such

policy shall be called in question in any court on the

ground that it does not give effect to such policy:

Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature

of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply

thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the

consideration of the President, has received his assent.”

“39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the

State.– The State shall, in particular, direct its policy

towards securing -

xxx xxx xxx

(b) that the ownership and control of the material

resources of the community are so distributed as best to

subserve the common good;

xxx xxx xxx”

An interesting discussion is contained in Sanjeev Coke

Manufacturing Company vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr (1983) 1

SCR 1000 at pages 1023 to 1025, on the scope of the expression

“material resources of the community” and the expression

“distribute” that are used in Article 39(b). Finally, the Court held:

25

“We hold that the expression ‘Material resources of the

community’ is not confined to natural resources; it is not

confined to resources owned by the public; it means and

includes all resources, natural and man-made, public

and private-owned.” (at page 1026)

However, we were referred to three judgments in Property Owners’

Association v. State of Maharashtra. In the first of these

judgments reported in (1996) 4 SCC 49, this Court has referred the

matter to five learned Judges on the vexed question as to whether

Article 31-C survived at all in view of the declaration contained in

Minerva Mills v. Union of India 1981 (1) SCR 206 to the effect that

the amended Article 31-C was constitutionally invalid. As the

aforesaid declaration would not revive the original Article 31-C, the

Article became a dead letter. When the same case travelled to five

learned Judges reported in (2001) 4 SCC 455, this Court was of the

opinion that the views expressed in Sanjeev Coke (supra) require

reconsideration in view of the fact that Sanjeev Coke (supra)

adopted the reasoning of Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Karnataka vs

Shri Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471 and not the reasoning of

the majority judgment of Untwalai, J. who stated that he must not be

understood to agree with all that has been said by Krishna Iyer, J.

in his judgment. The Court, therefore, referred the matter to seven

learned Judges. When the matter came up before the seven

26

learned Judges, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 522, this Court held that

the statement made in Sanjeev Coke (supra), followed by several

other judgments, that the “material resources of the community”

would include privately owned resources, would be prima facie

incorrect and hence the matter was referred to nine learned Judges

of this Court, which reference is still pending. We have not deemed

it necessary to refer this case to be tagged along with the reference

to nine learned Judges, as we will assume for the purpose of this

case that Article 31-C, as originally enacted, continues to exist and

that the “material resources of the community” would include private

property as well.

14.Shri Divan next referred us to State of Tamil Nadu vs L. Abu

Kavur Bai (1984) 1 SCC 515, which held that the Tamil Nadu Stage

Carriage and Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1973 was

protected by Article 31-C of the Constitution of India. This was held

on the footing that a nationalisation measure would fall within Article

39(b) as the word “distribution” is a word of extremely wide import,

which would include nationalisation of transport as a distributive

process for the good of the community. This situation is far

removed from the Amendment Act to the National Highways Act in

the present case, which is not a nationalisation measure at all, but is

a measure to speed up the acquisition process. Shri Divan then

27

relied upon this Court’s judgment in Maharashtra SEB vs Thana

Electric Supply Co. (1989) 3 SCC 616, in which the Indian Electricity

(Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1976 was engrafted on to the

Electricity Act, 1910, the effect of which was to substitute market

value of the undertaking that was compulsorily acquired, with the

concept of an “amount”, which was the book value of the

undertaking at the time of its delivery. Even as per this Act, by

virtue of the compulsory acquisition of the undertaking, the licensee

was given a solatium of 10% of such book value. Importantly, this

Court, after holding that nationalisation would come within the

expression “distribution” for the purposes of Article 39(b), engrafted

another test when legislation claims the protection of Article 31-C.

The Court held that the protection of Article 31-C is accorded only to

those provisions which are basically and essentially necessary for

giving effect to the objects of Article 39(b) – See paragraph 43. This

case is again distinguishable for the same reason as pointed out

qua State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu Kavur Bai (supra) as this is a

nationalisation measure far removed from the object of the 1997

Amendment Act to the National Highways Act. It is interesting to

note that despite the fact that a challenge under Articles 14 and 31

were bound to fail in view of the protective umbrella of Article 31-C,

yet the Amendment Act had still provided for 10% solatium as the

28

legislature had correctly appreciated that solatium is a part of

compensation given for the compulsory nature of acquisition of

property.

15.Shri Divan then referred us to Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.

Ltd. vs State of Assam (1989) 3 SCC 709, in which the Indian

Electricity (Assam Amendment) Act, 1973 and the Tinsukhia and

Dibrugarh Electric Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1973 were

challenged. These being nationalisation measures, this Court held

that these enactments were entitled to the protection of Article 31-C.

This nationalisation statute, again, is very far removed from the

Amendment Act, 1997 to the National Highways Act.

16.It is well-settled that in order that a law avail of the protection

of Article 31-C, it is not necessary that any declaration be made in

that behalf. (See State of Maharashtra vs Basantibai Mohanlal

Khetan (1986) 2 SCC 516 at 530). It is also important to remember

that in order that a law be shielded by Article 31-C, the said law

must have a direct and rational nexus with the principles contained

in Article 39(b). (See Assam Sillimanite Ltd. vs Union of India 1991

Supp 3 SCR 273 at 290)

29

17.An example of a law which claimed the benefit of Article 31-

C, but was denied such benefit is set out in Dr K. R. Lakshmanan vs

State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226 as follows:

“44. The main object for which the Club was established

is to carry on the business of race-club, in particular the

running of horse-races, steeplechases or races of any

other kind and for any kind of athletic sports and for

playing their own games of cricket, bowls, golf, lawn

tennis, polo or any other kind of games or amusement,

recreation, sport or entertainment etc. In the earlier part

of this judgment, we have noticed the working of the

Club which shows that apart from 5% commission from

the totalizator and the bookmakers no part of the betting-

money comes to the Club. The Club does not own or

control any material resources of the community which

are to be distributed in terms of Article 39(b) of the

Constitution of India. There are two aspects of the

functioning of the Club. One is the betting by the punters

at the totalizator and with the bookies. The Club does

not earn any income from the betting-money except 5%

commission. There is no question whatsoever of the

Club owning or controlling the material resources of the

community or in any manner contributing towards the

operation of the economic system resulting in the

concentration of wealth and means of production to the

common detriment. The second aspect is the conduct of

horse-races by the Club. Horse-racing is a game of skill,

the horse which wins the race is given a prize by the

Club. It is a simple game of horse-racing where the

winning horses are given prizes. Neither the “material

resources of the community” nor “to subserve the

common good” has any relevance to the twin functioning

of the Club. Similarly, the operation of the Club has no

relation or effect on the “operation of the economic

system”. There is no question whatsoever of attracting

the Directive Principles contained in Article 39(b) and (c)

of the Constitution. The declaration in Section 2 of the

Act and the recital containing aims and objectives totally

30

betray the scope and purpose of Article 39(b) and (c) of

the Constitution. While Article 39(b) refers to “material

resources of the community”, the aims and objects of the

Act refer to “the material resources of the Madras Race

Club”. It is difficult to understand what exactly are the

material resources of the race-club which are sought to

be distributed so as to subserve the common good

within the meaning of the Directive Principles. Equally,

the reference to Article 39(c) is wholly misplaced. While

Article 39(c) relates to “the operation of the economic

system … to the common detriment”, the aims and

objectives of the Act refer to “the economic system of

the Madras Race Club”. What is meant by the economic

system of the Madras Race Club is not known. Even if it

is assumed that betting by the punters at the totalizator

and with the bookmakers is part of the economic system

of the Madras Race Club, it has no relevance to the

objectives specified in Article 39(b) and (c). We are,

therefore, of the view that reference to Article 39(b) and

(c) in the aims and objects and in Section 2 of the Act is

nothing but a mechanical reproduction of constitutional

provisions in a totally inappropriate context. There is no

nexus so far as the provisions of the 1986 Act are

concerned with the objectives contained in Article 39(b)

and (c) of the Constitution. We, therefore, hold that the

protection under Article 31-C of the Constitution cannot

be extended to the 1986 Act.”

This is despite the fact that the impugned enactment, namely, the

Madras Race Club (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act,

1986 contained a declaration that it was enacted to give effect to the

policy of the State under Article 39(b) and (c).

18. When we examine the Objects and Reasons which led to the

1997 amendment of the National Highways Act, we do not find

mentioned therein any object relating to distribution of the material

31

resources of the community. The object of the Amendment Act has

no relationship whatsoever to the Directive Principle contained in

Article 39(b), inasmuch as its limited object is to expedite the

process of land acquisition by avoiding inordinate delays therein.

The object of the Amendment Act was not to acquire land for the

purpose of national highways as, pre-amendment, the Land

Acquisition Act provided for this. The object of the Amendment Act

was fulfilled by providing a scheme different from that contained in

the Land Acquisition Act, making it clear that the stage of offer of an

amount by way of compensation is removed altogether; vesting

takes place as soon as the Section 3D notification is issued; and

most importantly, the tardy Court process is replaced by arbitration.

Obviously, these objects have no direct and rational nexus with the

Directive Principle contained in Article 39(b). Article 31-C is,

therefore, out of harm’s way. Even otherwise, on the assumption

that Article 31-C is attracted to the facts of this case, yet, as was

held by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 1981

(1) SCR 206,

“…it is not every provision of a statute, which has been

enacted with the dominant object of giving effect to a

directive principle, that it entitled to protection, but only

those provisions of the statute which are basically and

essentially necessary for giving effect to the directive

32

principle are protected under the amended Article 31-C”

(at page 338-339)

This passage was specifically referred to in Tinsukhia Electric

Supply Co. Ltd. vs State of Assam (1989) 3 SCC 709 at 735. Also,

in Maharashtra State Electricity Board vs Thana Electric Supply Co.

(1989) 3 SCC 616, at para 43, this Court said:

“43. The idea of nationalisation of a material resource of

the community cannot be divorced from the idea of

distribution of that resource in the community in a

manner which advances common good. The cognate

and sequential question would be whether the provisions

of the Amending Act, 1976, had a reasonable and direct

nexus with the objects of Article 39(b). It is true, the

protection of Article 31-C is accorded only to those

provisions which are basically and essentially

necessary for giving effect to the objects of Article 39(b).

The High Court from the trend of its reasoning in the

judgment, appears to take the view that while the

provision for the takeover in the principal Act might

amount to a power to acquire, however, the objects of

the Amending Act of 1976, which merely sought to beat

down the price could not be said to be part of that power

and was, therefore, incapable of establishing any nexus

with Article 39(b). There is, we say so with respect, a

fallacy in this reasoning.”

The test of Article 31-C’s protection being accorded only to those

provisions which are basically and essentially necessary for giving

effect to the objects of Article 39(b) is lifted from Akadasi Padhan vs

State of Orissa 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 691, where this Court held, with

reference to Article 19(6), that qua laws passed creating a State

33

monopoly, it is only those essential and basic provisions which are

protected by the latter part of Article 19(6). This Court stated the

test thus:

“17. In dealing with the question about the precise

denotation of the clause “a law relating to”, it is

necessary to bear in mind that this clause occurs in

Article 19(6) which is, in a sense, an exception to the

main provision of Article 19(1)(g). Laws protected by

Article 19(6) are regarded as valid even though they

impinge upon the fundamental right guaranteed under

Article 19(1)(g). That is the effect of the scheme

contained in Article 19(1) read with Clauses (2) to (6) of

the said Article. That being so, it would be unreasonable

to place upon the relevant clause an unduly wide and

liberal construction. “A law relating to” a State monopoly

cannot, in the context, include all the provisions

contained in the said law whether they have direct

relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. In our

opinion, the said expression should be construed to

mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely

essential features. If a law is passed creating a State

monopoly, the Court should enquire what are the

provisions of the said law which are basically and

essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly. It

is only those essential and basic provisions which are

protected by the latter part of Article 19(6). If there are

other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary,

incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly,

they do not fall under the said part and their validity must

be judged under the first part of Article 19(6). In other

words, the effect of the amendment made in Article 19(6)

is to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly

and that means that it is only the provisions of the law

which are integrally and essentially connected with the

creation of the monopoly that are protected. The rest of

the provisions which may be incidental do not fall under

the latter part of Article 19(6) and would inevitably have

to satisfy the test of the first part of Article 19(6).” (at

page 707)

34

Even if the Amendment Act, 1997 be regarded as an Act to carry out

the purposes of Article 39(b), the object of the Amendment Act is not

served by removing solatium and interest from compensation to be

awarded. It is obvious, therefore, that the grant of compensation

without solatium and interest is not basically and essentially

necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, 1997, even

if it is to be considered as an acquisition Act pure and simple, for the

object of the said Amendment Act as we have seen is to obviate

delays in the acquisition process of acquiring land for National

Highways. On application of this test as well, it is clear that the

grant of compensation without solatium and interest, not being

basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the

Amendment Act, would not receive the protective umbrella of Article

31-C and, therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired into

by the Court.

Article 14 - Discrimination

19.The sheet anchor of the case of the Respondents is the

Constitution Bench judgment in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar vs Special

Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition (1965) 1 SCR 614 and

Nagpur Improvement Trust vs Vithal Rao (1973) 1 SCC 500. It is,

35

therefore, most important to advert to these two decisions in some

detail.

20.In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra), the Madras Legislature

amended the Land Acquisition Act providing for acquisition of land

for housing schemes by laying down principles for fixing

compensation different from those prescribed in the principal Act.

These differences are set out in the judgment as follows:

“The next question is whether the amending Act was

made in contravention of Article 31(2) of the

Constitution. The amending Act prescribes the principles

for ascertaining the value of the property acquired. It

was passed to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in

the State of Madras for the purpose of enabling the

State to acquire lands for housing schemes. “Housing

scheme” is defined to mean “any State Government

scheme the purpose of which is increasing house

accommodation” and under Section 3 of the amending

Act, Section 23 of the principal Act is made applicable to

such acquisition with certain modifications. In Section 23

of the principal Act, in sub-section (1) for clause first, the

following clause is substituted:

“first, the market value of the land at the date of

the publication of the notification under Section

4, sub-section (1) or an amount equal to the

average market value of the land during the five

years immediately preceding such date,

whichever is less.”

After clause sixthly, the following clause was added:

“seventhly, the use to which the land was put at

the date of the publication of the notification

under Section 4, sub-section (1).”

36

Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the principal Act was

amended by substituting the words, in respect of

solatium, “fifteen per centum” by the words “five per

centum”. In Section 24 of the principal Act after the

clause seventhly the following clause was added:

“eighthly, any increase to the value of the land

acquired by reason of its suitability or

adaptability for any use other than the use to

which the land was put at the date of the

publication of the notification under Section 4,

sub-section (1).”

Under Section 4 of the amending Act, the provisions of

Section 3 thereof shall apply to every case in which

proceedings have been started before the

commencement of the said Act and are pending. The

result of the amending Act is that if the State

Government acquires a land for a housing purpose, the

claimant gets only the value of the land at the date of the

publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the

principal Act or an amount equal to the average market

value of the land during the five years immediately

preceding such date, whichever is less. He will get a

solatium of only 5 per centum of such value instead of

15 per centum under the principal Act. He will not get

any compensation by reason of the suitability of the land

for any use other than the use for which it was put on the

date of publication of the notification.” (at page 629 &

630)

A challenge made to the said Amendment Act on the ground

that it is hit by Article 14 succeeded, the Court holding:

“Now what are the differences between persons owning

lands in the Madras city or between the lands acquired

which have a reasonable relation to the said object. It is

suggested that the differences between people owning

lands rested on the extent, quality and the suitability of

the lands acquired for the said object. The differences

37

based upon the said criteria have no relevance to the

object of the Amending Act. To illustrate: the extent of

the land depends upon the magnitude of the scheme

undertaken by the State. A large extent of land may be

acquired for a university or for a network of hospitals

under the provisions of the principal Act and also for a

housing scheme under the Amending Act. So too, if the

housing scheme is a limited one, the land acquired may

not be as big as that required for a big university. If

waste land is good for a housing scheme under the

amending Act, it will equally be suitable for a hospital or

a school for which the said land may be acquired under

the principal Act. Nor the financial position or the number

of persons owning the land has any relevance, for in

both the cases land can be acquired from rich or poor,

from one individual or from a number of persons. Out of

adjacent lands of the same quality and value, one may

be acquired for a housing scheme under the amending

Act and the other for a hospital under the principal Act;

out of two adjacent plots belonging to the same

individual and of the same quality and value, one may

be acquired under the principal Act and the other under

the Amending Act. From whatever aspect the matter is

looked at, the alleged differences have no reasonable

relation to the object sought to be achieved. It is said

that the object of the amending Act in itself may project

the differences in the lands sought to be acquired under

the two Acts. This argument puts the cart before the

horse. It is one thing to say that the existing differences

between persons and properties have a reasonable

relation to the object sought to be achieved and it is

totally a different thing to say that the object of the Act

itself created the differences. Assuming that the said

proposition is sound, we cannot discover any differences

in the people owning lands or in the lands on the basis

of the object. The object is to acquire lands for housing

schemes at a low price. For achieving that object, any

land falling in any of the said categories can be acquired

under the amending Act. So too, for a public purpose

any such land can be acquired under the principal Act.

We, therefore, hold that discrimination is writ large on

the amending Act and it cannot be sustained on the

principle of reasonable classification. We, therefore, hold

38

that the amending Act clearly infringes Article 14 of the

Constitution and is void.” (at page 634 & 635)

(Emphasis supplied)

21.In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), this Court referred to

the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, under which lands were to be

acquired with reference to the Land Acquisition Act, as modified.

We are concerned in this case with the modification that has to do

with acquisition for the purposes of the Improvement Act, which did

not provide for solatium of 15% that would have been obtained

under the Land Acquisition Act. A Seven-Judge Bench of this Court

examined the matter in some detail, and followed P. Vajravelu

Mudaliar (supra) together with another judgment, Balammal vs

State of Madras (1969) 1 SCR 90. The Court held:

“27. What can be reasonable classification for the

purpose of determining compensation if the object of the

legislation is to compulsorily acquire land for public

purposes?

28. It would not be disputed that different principles of

compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquired

on the basis that the owner is old or young, healthy or ill,

tall or short, or whether the owner has inherited the

property or built it with his own efforts, or whether the

owner is politician or an advocate. Why is this sort of

classification not sustainable? Because the object being

to compulsorily acquire for a public purpose, the object

is equally achieved whether the land belongs to one type

of owner or another type.

39

29. Can classification be made on the basis of the public

purpose for the purpose of compensation for which land

is acquired? In other words can the Legislature lay down

different principles of compensation for lands acquired

say for a hospital or a school or a Government building?

Can the Legislature say that for a hospital land will be

acquired at 50% of the market value, for a school at 60%

of the value and for a Government building at 70% of the

market value? All three objects are public purposes and

as far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to

him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Article

14 confers an individual right and in order to justify a

classification there should be something which justifies a

different treatment to this individual right. It seems to us

that ordinarily a classification based on the public

purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the

purpose of determining compensation. The position is

different when the owner of the land himself is the

recipient of benefits from an improvement scheme, and

the benefit to him is taken into consideration in fixing

compensation. Can classification be made on the basis

of the authority acquiring the land? In other words can

different principles of compensation be laid if the land is

acquired for or by an Improvement Trust or Municipal

Corporation or the Government? It seems to us that the

answer is in the negative because as far as the owner is

concerned it does not matter to him whether the land is

acquired by one authority or the other.

30. It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition

Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is

acquired. If the existence of two Acts could enable the

State to give one owner different treatment from another

equally situated the owner who is discriminated against,

can claim the protection of Article 14.”

22.Both, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra) and Nagpur

Improvement Trust (supra) clinch the issue in favour of the

Respondents, as has been correctly held by the Punjab and

40

Haryana High Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra).

First and foremost, it is important to note that, as has been seen

hereinabove, the object of the 1997 Amendment was to speed up

the process of acquiring lands for National Highways. This object

has been achieved in the manner set out hereinabove. It will be

noticed that the awarding of solatium and interest has nothing to do

with achieving this object, as it is nobody’s case that land

acquisition for the purpose of national highways slows down as a

result of award of solatium and interest. Thus, a classification made

between different sets of landowners whose lands happen to be

acquired for the purpose of National Highways and landowners

whose lands are acquired for other public purposes has no rational

relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act,

i.e. speedy acquisition of lands for the purpose of National

Highways. On this ground alone, the Amendment Act falls foul of

Article 14.

23.Even otherwise, in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra), despite

the fact that the object of the Amendment Act was to acquire lands

for housing schemes at a low price, yet the Amendment Act was

struck down when it provided for solatium at the rate of 5% instead

of 15%, that was provided in the Land Acquisition Act, the Court

41

holding that whether adjacent lands of the same quality and value

are acquired for a housing scheme or some other public purpose

such as a hospital is a differentiation between two sets of

landowners having no reasonable relation to the object sought to be

achieved. More pertinently, another example is given – out of two

adjacent plots belonging to the same individual one may be

acquired under the principal Act for a particular public purpose and

one acquired under the Amending Act for a housing scheme, which,

when looked at from the point of view of the landowner, would be

discriminatory, having no rational relation to the object sought to be

achieved, which is compulsory acquisition of property for public

purposes.

24. Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) has clearly held that

ordinarily a classification based on public purpose is not permissible

under Article 14 for the purpose of determining compensation. Also,

in para 30, the Seven-Judge Bench unequivocally states that it is

immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition

Act under which the land is acquired, as, if the existence of these

two Acts would enable the State to give one owner different

treatment from another who is similarly situated, Article 14 would be

infracted. In the facts of these cases, it is clear that from the point

42

of view of the landowner it is immaterial that his land is acquired

under the National Highways Act and not the Land Acquisition Act,

as solatium cannot be denied on account of this fact alone.

25. A contention was taken by Shri Divan in that Article 31-A

second proviso would make it clear that compensation at a rate

which shall not be less than the market value would be payable only

in the circumstances mentioned therein and not otherwise. For this

reason, the Nagpur Improvement Trust case is distinguishable, as

one of the instances given therein is that it would not be possible to

discriminate between landowners who are similarly situate by giving

one landowner compensation at let us say 60% of the market value

and the other owner 100% of the market value.

26.The Nagpur Improvement Trust case has to be read as a

whole. Merely emphasising one example from the passages that

have been extracted above (supra) will not make the ratio of the

said judgment inapplicable. Besides, the second proviso to Article

31-A deals with persons whose lands are acquired when such

person is cultivating the same personally. The reason for awarding

compensation at a rate which is not less than market value is in

order that a farmer, who is cultivating the land personally, gets other

land of equivalent value, which he can then cultivate personally. As

such farmer is at the centre of agrarian reform legislation, such

43

legislation would be turned on its head if lands were to be acquired

without adequately compensating him instead of from absentee

landlords whose lands are then to be given to the landless and to

such persons if they personally cultivate lands less than the ceiling

area under State Agricultural Ceiling Acts. We think that any

reference to the second proviso of Article 31-A is wholly irrelevant to

the question before us and cannot under any circumstance be used

in order to distinguish a judgment which otherwise applies on all

fours.

27.However, it was argued that a line of judgments have

distinguished P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra) and Nagpur

Improvement Trust (supra) and that this line of judgments should

be followed in preference to the aforesaid two judgments.

28.In Union of India vs Hari Krishnan Khosla 1993 Supp (2)

SCC 149, this Court upheld the Requisitioning and Acquisition of

Immovable Property Act, 1952 and stated that non-grant of solatium

and interest which were otherwise grantable under the Land

Acquisition Act would not render the 1952 Act constitutionally infirm.

The Court undertook a minute distinction between the Land

Acquisition Act on the one hand and the 1952 Act on the other.

Thus, the Court stated:

44

“43. Coming to dissimilarities, in the case of requisition,

one of the important rights in the bundle of rights

emanating from ownership, namely, the right to

possession and enjoyment has been deprived of, when

the property was requisitioned. It is minus that right for

which, as stated above, the compensation is provided

under Section 8(2), the remaining rights come to be

acquired.

44. In contradistinction under the Land Acquisition Act,

as stated above, the sum total of the rights, namely, the

ownership itself comes to be acquired. We may usefully

quote from Salmond on Jurisprudence (1966) 12th Edn.,

Chapter 8 at pages 246-247:

“Ownership denotes the relation between a

person and an object forming the subject-matter of his

ownership. It consists in a complex of rights, all of

which are rights in rem, being good against all the

world and not merely against specific persons.

Though in certain situations some of these rights may

be absent, the normal case of ownership can be

expected to exhibit the following incidents.

First, the owner will have a right to possess the thing

which he owns….

Secondly, the owner normally has the right to use and

enjoy the thing owned: the right to manage it, i.e., the

right to decide how it shall be used; and the right to

the income from it ….

* * *

Fifthly, ownership has a residuary character. If, for

example, a landowner gives a lease of his property

to A, an easement to B and some other right such as

a profit to C, his ownership now consists of the

residual rights, i.e., the rights remaining when all

these lesser rights have been given away ….”

45. Then again, under the Act, the acquisition even

though it is for a public purpose is restricted to the two

clauses of Section 7(3) of the Act to which we have

45

already made a reference. Thus two clauses of Section

7(3) constitute statutory embargo.

46. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the power of

eminent domain could be exercised without any

embargo so long as there is an underlying public

purpose. In our considered view, these vital distinctions

will have to be kept in mind while dealing with the

question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. We

may, at once, state, when examined in this light, the

reasonings of the High Court to make out a case of

discrimination, seem to be incorrect.

xxx xxx xxx

58. We are of the firm view that cases of acquisition of

land stand on a different footing than those where such

property is subject to a prior requisition before

acquisition.

59. Therefore, the cases relating to acquisition

like Vajravelu Mudaliar case [(1965) 1 SCR 614 : AIR

1965 SC 1017], Balammal case [(1969) 1 SCR 90 : AIR

1968 SC 1425], Nagpur Improvement Trust case [(1973)

1 SCC 500] and Peter case [(1980) 3 SCC 554] are not

helpful in deciding the point in issue

here. Goverdhan v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 3058

of 1983, allowed by this Court on January 31, 1983) no

doubt was a case of acquisition under the Defence of

India Act, 1962 but it contains no discussion. It has

already been noticed that the award of solatium is not a

must in every case as laid down in Prakash Amichand

Shah case [(1986) 1 SCC 581]”

29.Similarly, in Union of India vs Chajju Ram (2003) 5 SCC 568,

a case which arose under the Defence of India Act, 1971, this Court

followed Hari Krishnan Khosla (supra), finding that the provisions

of the Defence of India Act were in pari materia to those of the 1952

Act. The Court, therefore, held:

46

“25. Here it is not a case where existence of the

Acquisition Act enables the State to give one owner

different treatment from another equally situated owner

on which ground Article 14 was sought to be invoked

in First Nagpur Improvement Trust case [(1973) 1 SCC

500]. The purposes for which the provisions of the said

Act can be invoked are absolutely different and distinct

from which the provision of the Land Acquisition Act can

be invoked for acquisition of land. In terms of the

provisions of the said Act, the requisition of the land was

made. During the period of requisition the owner of the

land is to be compensated therefor. Section 30 of the

said Act, as referred to hereinbefore, clearly postulates

the circumstances which would be attracted for

acquisitioning of the requisitioned land.

26. The purposes for which the requisitioning and

consequent acquisition of land under the said Act can be

made, are limited. Such acquisitions, inter alia, can be

made only when works have been constructed during

the period of requisition or where the costs to any

Government of restoring the property to its condition at

the time of its requisition would be excessive having

regard to the value of the property at the relevant time.

27. One of the principles for determination of the amount

of compensation for acquisition of land would be the

willingness of an informed buyer to offer the price

therefor. In terms of the provisions of the said Act

acquisition of the property would be in relation to the

property which has been under requisition during which

period the owner of the land would remain out of

possession. The Government during the period of

requisition would be in possession and full enjoyment of

the property.

28. It is beyond any cavil that the price of the land which

a willing and informed buyer would offer would be

different in the cases where the owner is in possession

and enjoyment of the property and in the cases where

he is not. The formulation of the criteria for payment of

compensation in terms of Section 31 of the Act was

clearly made having regard to the said factor, which

cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable.

47

Parliament while making the provisions for payment of

compensation must have also taken into consideration

the fact that the owner of the property would have

received compensation for remaining out of possession

during the period when the property was under

acquisition.

29. The learned Attorney-General appears to be correct

in his submission that the provision for grant of solatium

was inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by Parliament

having regard to the fact that the amount of

compensation awarded to the owner of the land is to be

determined on the basis of the value thereof as on the

date of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of

the Act. It has been noticed that the process takes a long

time. Taking into consideration the deficiencies in the

Act, the Land Acquisition Act was further amended in the

year 1984. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of

the Land Acquisition Act, therefore, solatium is paid in

addition to the amount of market value of the land.

30. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the

classification sought to be made for determination of the

amount of compensation for acquisition of the land

under the said Act vis-à-vis the Land Acquisition Act is a

reasonable and valid one. The said classification is

founded on intelligible differentia and has a rational

relation with the object sought to be achieved by the

legislation in question.”

30.We may hasten to add that a Division Bench of this Court in

H. V. Low and Company Private Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal

(2016) 12 SCC 699 has found on a prima facie examination that the

case of Chajju Ram (supra) requires reconsideration.

31.For our purposes, it is enough to state that the line of

judgments under the 1952 Act and the Defence of India Act, 1971,

48

which contained a two-step process, namely, requisition which may

be followed by acquisition, are wholly distinguishable for the

reasons stated in those judgments. As was stated in Chajju Ram

(supra), the object of a Requisition Act is completely different from

an Acquisition Act. In a Requisition Act, private property is taken for

public purposes only temporarily – when the reason for requisition

ends, ordinarily the property is handed back to the owner. This

being the case, in requisition statutes handing back of the property

is the rule and acquisition of the property the exception, as property

can only be acquired for the two reasons set out in Section 7 of the

1952 Act and Section 30 of the Defence of India Act, 1971. Also, as

has been pointed out in Hari Krishnan Khosla (supra), what gets

acquired is only rights as to ownership, possession having been

taken over by requisition. In addition, the owner has already

received compensation for remaining out of possession during the

period when the property is under requisition. For all these reasons,

the aforesaid judgments are wholly distinguishable from the

acquisition measure in this case.

32.The next judgment relied upon by the learned counsel on

behalf of the Appellants is Prakash Amichand Shah vs State of

Gujarat (1986) 1 SCC 581. This judgment contained a challenge to

49

the Bombay Town Planning Act. The Nagpur Improvement Trust

(supra) judgment was distinguished in this judgment by stating that

the scheme of the Bombay Town Planning Act is wholly different

from the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act. In particular, the Court

held:

“34. … Under Section 53 of the Act all rights of the

private owners in the original plots would determine and

certain consequential rights in favour of the owners

would arise therefrom. If in the scheme, reconstituted or

final plots are allotted to them they become owners of

such final plots subject to the rights settled by the Town

Planning Officer in the final scheme. In some cases the

original plot of an owner might completely be allotted to

the local authority for a public purpose. Such private

owner may be paid compensation or a reconstituted plot

in some other place. It may be a smaller or a bigger plot.

It may be that in some cases it may not be possible to

allot a final plot at all. Sections 67 to 71 of the Act

provide for certain financial adjustments regarding

payment of money to the local authority or to the owners

of the original plots. The development and planning

carried out under the Act is primarily for the benefit of

public. The local authority is under an obligation to

function according to the Act. The local authority has to

bear a part of the expenses of development. It is in one

sense a package deal. The proceedings relating to the

scheme are not like acquisition proceedings under the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor are the provisions of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 made applicable either

without or with modifications as in the case of the

Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936. We do not

understand the decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust

case [(1973) 1 SCC 500 : AIR 1973 SC 689 : (1973) 3

SCR 39] as laying down generally that wherever land is

taken away by the government under a separate statute

compensation should be paid under the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 only and if there is any difference between the

50

compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 and the compensation payable under the statute

concerned the acquisition under the statute would be

discriminatory. That case is distinguishable from the

present case. In State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter [(1980) 3

SCC 554 : AIR 1980 SC 1438 : (1980) 3 SCR 290] also

Section 34 of the Cochin Town Planning Act which came

up for consideration was of the same pattern as the

provision in the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936

and for that reason the court followed the decision in

the Nagpur Improvement Trust case [(1973) 1 SCC 500 :

AIR 1973 SC 689 : (1973) 3 SCR 39] . But in that

decision itself the court observed at pp. 302 and 303

thus: (SCC p. 564, para 21)

“We are not to be understood to mean that the rate of

compensation may not vary or must be uniform in all

cases. We need not investigate this question further

as it does not arise here although we are clear in our

mind that under given circumstances differentiation

even in the scale of compensation may comfortably

comport with Article 14. No such circumstances are

present here nor pressed.”

33.This judgment is again distinguishable in that it was found,

having regard to the Bombay Town Planning Act, that the person

from whom the land was expropriated gets a package deal in that

he may be allotted other lands in the final Town Planning Scheme,

apart from compensation that is payable. However, it is worthy of

comment that State of Kerala vs T. M. Peter (1980) 3 SCC 554,

which was relied upon in this case, expressly followed Nagpur

Improvement Trust (supra), holding:

51

“20. Is it rational to pay different scales of compensation,

as pointed out by Sikri, C.J., in Nagpur Improvement

Trust case [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao,

(1973) 1 SCC 500 : AIR 1973 SC 689 : (1973) 3 SCR

39], depending on whether you acquire for housing or

hospital, irrigation scheme or town improvement, school

building or police station? The amount of compensation

payable has no bearing on this distinction, although it is

conceivable that classification for purposes of

compensation may exist and in such cases the statute

may be good. We are unable to discern any valid

discrimen in the Town Planning Act vis-a-vis the Land

Acquisition Act warranting a classification in the matter

of denial of solatium.

21. We uphold the Act in other respects but not when it

deals invidiously between two owners based on an

irrelevant criterion viz. the acquisition being for an

improvement scheme. We are not to be understood to

mean that the rate of compensation may not vary or

must be uniform in all cases. We need not investigate

this question further as it does not arise here although

we are clear in our minds that under given

circumstances differentiation even in the scale of

compensation may comfortably comport with Article 14.

No such circumstances are present here nor pressed.

Indeed, the State, realising the force of this facet of

discrimination, offered, expiratory fashion, both before

the High Court and before us, to pay 15%, solatium to

obliterate the hostile distinction.

22. The core question now arises. What is the effect

even if we read a discrimination design in Section 34? Is

plastic surgery permissible or demolition of the section

inevitable? Assuming that there is an untenable

discrimination in the matter of compensation does the

whole of Section 34 have to be liquidated or several

portions voided? In our opinion, scuttling the section, the

course the High Court has chosen, should be the last

step. The court uses its writ power with a constructive

design, an affirmative slant and a sustaining bent. Even

when by compulsions of inseverability, a destructive

stroke becomes necessary the court minimises the injury

52

by an intelligent containment. Law keeps alive and

“operation pull down” is de mode. Viewed from this

perspective, so far as we are able to see, the only

discriminatory factor as between Section 34 of the Act

and Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act vis-à-vis

quantification of compensation is the nonpayment of

solatium in the former case because of the provision in

Section 34(1) that Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act

shall have no application. Thus, to achieve the virtue of

equality and to eliminate the vice of inequality what is

needed is the obliteration of Section 25 of the Land

Acquisition Act from Section 34(1) of the Town Planning

Act. The whole of Section 34(1) does not have to be

struck down. Once we exclude the discriminatory and,

therefore, void part in Section 34(1) of the Act, equality is

restored. The owner will then be entitled to the same

compensation, including solatium, that he may be

eligible for under the Land Acquisition Act. What is

rendered void by Article 13 is only “to the extent of the

contravention” of Article 14. The lancet of the court may

remove the offending words and restore to constitutional

health the rest of the provision.

23. We hold that the exclusion of Section 25 of the Land

Acquisition Act from Section 34 of the Act is

unconstitutional but it is severable and we sever it. The

necessary consequence is that Section 34(1) will be

read omitting the words “and Section 25”. What follows

then? Section 32 obligates the State to act under the

Land Acquisition Act but we have struck down that part

which excludes Section 25, of the Land Acquisition Act

and so, the “modification” no longer covers Section 25. It

continues to apply to the acquisition of property under

the Town Planning Act. Section 34(2) provides for

compensation exactly like Section 25(1) of the Land

Acquisition Act and in the light of what we have just

decided Section 25(2) will also apply and “in addition to

the market value of the land as above provided, the

court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per

centum on such market value in consideration of the

compulsory nature of the acquisition”.

53

34.One more judgment needs to be referred to, namely, Girnar

Traders (3) vs State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, which was

relied upon by Shri Divan to argue that, like Chapter VII of the

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, the amendment to

the National Highways Act is a complete self-contained code and

must, therefore, be followed on its own terms. This judgment dealt

with whether Section 11-A introduced by the 1984 amendment to

the Land Acquisition Act could be said to apply to acquisitions made

under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act. The answer to

this question was that Section 11-A could not be so applied as the

Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act referred to the Land

Acquisition Act as legislation by way of incorporation and not

legislation by way of reference. In the present case, the Land

Acquisition Act, by virtue of Section 3J of the National Highways Act,

does not apply at all. The controversy in the present case does not,

in any manner, involve whether the Land Acquisition Act applies by

way of incorporation or reference. This case is also, therefore,

wholly distinguishable. Further, the ‘self-contained code’ argument

based on this judgment cannot be used as a discriminatory tool to

deny benefits available to landowners merely because land has to

be acquired under a different Act, as has been held in Nagpur

Improvement Trust (supra).

54

35. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the Union of India and NHAI, has stated that under Section

3G(2) of the National Highways Act, where the right of user or any

right in the nature of an easement on land is acquired under the Act,

there shall be paid to the owner and any other person whose right is

so affected, an amount calculated at 10% of the amount that is

determined as payable by the order of the competent authority.

According to the learned Senior Advocate, this amount is not

payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and that this being

the case, it is clear that what is given by way of compensation under

the National Highways Act being more than what is given under the

Land Acquisition Act in certain respects, the Scheme of the Acts,

therefore, being different, the non-giving of solatium and interest

under the National Highways Act is justified. Even otherwise,

persons should not be given compensation under Section 3G(2) as

a matter of course, but would have to submit proof that a right of

easement or a right of user has been acquired for which

compensation ought to be paid. Shri Amit Sibal, learned Senior

Advocate, on the other hand, has argued, referring to Sections 3(b),

9 and 31(1) of the Land Acquisition Act that easementary rights are

compensated even under the Land Acquisition Act and in point of

fact the sum of 10% payable under Section 3G(2) of the National

55

Highways Act is really in the nature of a cap beyond which no

further compensation can be granted. Even otherwise, according

to the learned Senior Advocate, granting of compensation under

Section 3G(2) would have no bearing on interest and solatium that

is payable under the Land Acquisition Act and not under the

National Highways Act.

36. Section 3G(2) makes it clear that rights of user and rights in

the nature of easement being valuable property rights,

compensation must be payable therefor. It is obvious that there is

no double payment to the owner on this score as the owner and/or

any other person has to prove that a right in the nature of an

easement has also been taken away. Obviously, the right of user

being subsumed in acquisition of ownership, the owner cannot get a

double benefit on this score. The right of user is, therefore,

referable only to persons other than the owner, who may have

tenancy rights, and other rights of license on land which is acquired

under the National Highways Act.

37.Insofar as easementary rights under the Land Acquisition Act

are concerned, three Sections are relevant and need to be quoted:

“3. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is something

repugnant in the subject or context,—

56

xxx xxx

(b) the expression “person interested” includes all

persons claiming an interest in compensation to be

made on account of the acquisition of land under this

Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in

land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land;

xxx xxx

9. Notice to persons interested.— (1) The Collector shall

then cause public notice to be given at convenient

places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the

Government intends to take possession of the land, and

that claims to compensation for all interests in such land

may be made to him.

(2) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land so

needed, and shall require all persons interested in the

land to appear personally or by agent before the

Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such

time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of

publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their

respective interests in the land and the amount and

particulars of their claims to compensation for such

interests, and their objections (if any) to the

measurements made under section 8. The Collector

may in any case require such statement to be made in

writing and signed by the party or his agent.

(3) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same

effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all

such persons known or believed to be interested therein,

or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, as

reside or have agents authorised to receive service on

their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land

is situate.

(4) In case any person so interested resides elsewhere,

and has no such agent the notice shall be sent to him by

post in a letter addressed to him at his last known

residence, address or place of business and registered

under sections 28 and 29 of the Indian Post Office Act,

1898 (6 of 1898).

57

xxx xxx

31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in

Court.— (1) On making an award under section 11, the

Collector shall tender payment of the compensation

awarded by him to the persons interested entitled

thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them

unless prevented by some one or more of the

contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.

xxx xxx”

A reading of these Sections shows that a person who is interested

in an easement affecting land can claim compensation therefor

under the aforesaid provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Under

both the Land Acquisition Act and the National Highways Act, such

claims have to be proved in accordance with law, the difference

being that under the Land Acquisition Act actuals are payable,

whereas under the National Highways Act, a fixed amount of 10% of

the amount determined by the competent authority is payable. It is,

therefore, wholly incorrect to state that extra amounts are payable to

the owner under the National Highways Act, which are not so

payable under the Land Acquisition Act. Also, both Acts

contemplate payment of compensation to persons whose

easementary rights have been affected by the acquisition. In any

event, this contention cannot possibly answer non-payment of

solatium and interest under the National Highways Act, which has

been dealt with in extenso in this judgment.

58

38.It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place

under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the notification

of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and

interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. In fact, with effect

from 1

st

January, 2015, an Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 2014 was

promulgated amending the 2013 Act. Section 10 of the said

amendment Ordinance states as follows:

“10. In the principal Act, in section 105,-

(i)for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be

substituted, namely:-

“(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the

determination of compensation in accordance

with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and

resettlement in accordance with the Second

Schedule and infrastructure amenities in

accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply

to the enactments relating to land acquisition

specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from

1st January, 2015.”;

(ii)sub-section (4) shall be omitted.”

It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the notification dated 28

th

August, 2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act.

This notification is important and states as follows:

“MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT

ORDER

59

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2015

S.O. 2368(E).— Whereas, the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013)

(hereinafter referred to as the RFCTLARR Act) came

into effect from 1st January, 2014;

And whereas, sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the

RFCLTARR Act provided for issuing of notification to

make the provisions of the Act relating to the

determination of the compensation, rehabilitation and

resettlement applicable to cases of land acquisition

under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule

to the RFCTLARR Act;

And whereas, the notification envisaged under sub-

section (3) of Section 105 of RFCTLARR Act was not

issued, and the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance,

2014 (9 of 2014) was promulgated on 31st December,

2014, thereby, inter-alia, amending Section 105 of the

RFCTLARR Act to extend the provisions of the Act

relating to the determination of the compensation and

rehabilitation and resettlement to cases of land

acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth

Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act;

And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment)

Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was promulgated on 3rd

April, 2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the

RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014;

And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second

Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30th

May, 2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the

RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015);

And whereas, the replacement Bill relating to the

RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015)

was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for

examination and report and the same is pending with the

Joint Committee;

As whereas, as per the provisions of article 123 of the

Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second

60

Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day

of August, 2015 and thereby placing the land owners at

the disadvantageous position, resulting in denial of

benefits of enhanced compensation and rehabilitation

and resettlement to the cases of land acquisition under

the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule to the

RFCTLARR Act as extended to the land owners under

the said Ordinance;

And whereas, the Central Government considers it

necessary to extend the benefits available to the land

owners under the RFCTLARR Act to similarly placed

land owners whose lands are acquired under the 13

enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule; and

accordingly the Central Government keeping in view the

aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficial

advantage to the land owners and uniformly apply the

beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to

the determination of compensation and rehabilitation

and resettlement as were made applicable to cases of

land acquisition under the said enactments in the

interest of the land owners;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by

sub-section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013),

the Central Government hereby makes the following

Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties, namely;-

1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of Difficulties)

Order, 2015.

(2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day

of September, 2015.

2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation

and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation

and Resettlement Act, 2013, relating to the

determination of compensation in accordance with the

First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in

accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure

61

amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall

apply to all cases of land acquisition under the

enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said

Act.

[F.No. 13011/01/2014-LRD]

K. P. KRISHNAN, Addl. Secy.”

It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification have

applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement Trust

(supra), as the Central Government has considered it necessary to

extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the

2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired

under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the

National Highways Act being one of the aforesaid enactments.

This being the case, it is clear that the Government has itself

accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra)

would apply to acquisitions which take place under the National

Highways Act, and that solatium and interest would be payable

under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the

purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those

landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public

purposes under the 2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that

even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to

discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and

62

landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes

to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the

enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well

as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look

in the light of this development.

1

In any case, as has been pointed

out hereinabove, the case of Chajju Ram (supra), has been

referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the matter, we are of the

view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is correct,

whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court is not correct.

39. We were also referred to the judgment of a learned Single

Judge of the Karnataka High Court reported as Lalita vs Union of

India AIR 2003 Karnataka 165, as well as a judgment of the Division

Bench of the Madras High Court in T. Chakrapani vs Union of India,

both of which distinguished the Requisition Act cases and relied

upon Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) in order to reach the

same conclusion as the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Both

these judgments are also correct.

1 The Defence of India Act, 1971, was a temporary statute which remained in

force only during the period of operation of a proclamation of emergency and

for a period of six months thereafter – vide Section 1(3) of the Act. As this Act

has since expired, it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act.

63

40.One more argument was raised by learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the Respondents, which is that nothing

survives in these mattes in view of orders passed by this Court in

Union of India v. T. Chakrapani – the Division Bench judgment of

the Madras High Court having come before this Court. This order

is quoted by us in full :

“In view of the statement made by Shri Ranjit Kumar,

learned Solicitor General of India on an earlier date of

the hearing that solatium in terms of the impugned order

of the High Court would be granted for the instant

acquisitions made under the provisions of the National

Highways Act, 1956, no subsisting issue remains in the

present appeals as also in the special leave petition. The

appeals as also the special leave petition are

accordingly closed. The respondents – writ petitioners

be paid solatium as due in terms of the impugned

order(s) along with interest thereon.”

We were also referred to an order in Sunita Mehra v. Union of

India (2016) SCC OnLine 1128, in which this Court held :

“6. The only point agitated before us by the learned

Solicitor General is that in paragraph 23 of the impugned

judgment of the High Court, it has been held that land-

owners would “henceforth” be entitled to solatium and

interest as envisaged by the provisions of Sections 23

and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the ultimate

paragraph of the impugned judgment it has, however,

been mentioned that in respect of all acquisitions made

under the National Highways Act, 1956, solatium and

interest in terms similar to those contained in Sections

23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will have

to be paid.

64

7. Learned Solicitor General has pointed out that there is

an apparent inconsistency in the judgment, which needs

to be clarified. It has also been submitted by the learned

Solicitor General that the order of the High Court should

be clarified to mean that the issue of grant of interest

and solatium should not be allowed to be reopened

without any restriction or reference to time. Learned

Solicitor General has particularly submitted that to

understand the order of the High Court in any other

manner would not only seriously burden the public

exchequer but would also amount to overlooking the

delay that may have occurred on the part of the land-

owner(s) in approaching the Court and may open

floodgates for en masse litigation on the issue.

8. We have considered the submissions advanced.

In Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457,

this Court, though in a different context, had restricted

the operation of the judgment of this Court

in Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 and had

granted the benefit of interest on solatium only in respect

of pending proceedings. We are of the view that a

similar course should be adopted in the present case

also. Accordingly, it is directed that the award of solatium

and interest on solatium should be made effective only

to proceedings pending on the date of the High Court

order in Golden Iron & Steel Forgins v. Union of India i.e.

28.03.2008. Concluded cases should not be opened. As

for future proceedings, the position would be covered by

the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 01.01.2014),

which Act has been made applicable to acquisitions

under the National Highways Act, 1956 by virtue of

notification/order issued under the provisions of the Act

of 2013.”

41.There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the

aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases.

65

This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the

impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when

the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no

Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this

score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us

ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we

would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the

Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be

granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the

interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our

discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land

Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Section

23(1A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of section 28 proviso

will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act.

Consequently, the provision of Section 3J is, to this extent, violative

of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to

be unconstitutional. Accordingly, Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 9599/2019

is dismissed.

42. Coming to the individual appeals in the case, Shri Mukul

Rohatgi has raised essentially 11 grounds, which, according to him,

66

require the Court’s attention. We will deal with each of these

grounds seriatim hereinbelow:

Ground 1: That the acquired land was treated as commercial land,

ignoring Section 143 of The Punjab Regional and Town Planning

and Development Act, 1995, due to which construction is restricted

upto 50m on either side of the National Highway.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15442-

15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-

15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No.15479/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No.

15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No.

21664/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019; SLP (C) No.

21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No.

9600/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689/2019;

SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

67

In these matters, this ground has been raised and argued

sometimes at the Section 34 stage, sometimes at the Section 37

stage, and sometimes at both stages. The burden to prove that the

land in question is within 50m of the National Highway, and that it

does not have commercial potentiality, is on the NHAI but, on facts,

has never been discharged. This being the case in all these

appeals, they stand dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019; SLP (C) No.

15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken or argued in the

Section 34 petition. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 2: That the arbitrator conducted the spot visit five years

after the Section 3A notification was issued, based on which

compensation was determined.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15442-

15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-

15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No.

15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019;

68

SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No.

15471/2019; SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No.

14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No.

21666/2019; SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No.

21673/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21691/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019; SLP (C) No.

21693/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in the

Section 34 petitions filed in these cases. Further, assessment, in

any case, of the land in question, relates to the date of the original

notification. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 3: That exemplars of faraway villages in other districts were

relied upon to enhance compensation.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15472/2019; SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15442-

15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-

15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C)

69

No.15474/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No.

15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No.15471/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 14491/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No.

21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No.

21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21663/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No.

21691/2019; SLP (C) No. 21692/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019;

SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019; SLP (C) No.

21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689 /2019;

SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

Ground 4: That the Arbitrator relied upon the Collector Rate of the

year 2011-13/ 2012-13.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15472/2019; SLP (C) No.

15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15488/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-

15445/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019;

70

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.

15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No.

15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No.

21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21695/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21693/ 2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No.

15485/2019;

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15471/2019

In this matter, this ground has been taken up in the Section 34

petition, however, the High Court has rightly dismissed this appeal

in terms of the Punjab & Haryana High Court order dated 15.02.17,

in FAO No. 6522 of 2016, titled ‘Mangal Dass vs. Govt. of India’,

wherein compensation of Rs. 7,00,000 per marla, which was

calculated based on the collector rate of 2011, was held to be not

justified, and was reduced to Rs. 4,50,000 per marla. Therefore, this

appeal also stands dismissed.

71

Ground 5: That compensation on account of loss of structure was

awarded.

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C)

No. 15485/2019;

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15472/2019

In this matter, this ground has not been taken in the Section 37

appeal. Therefore, this appeal also stands dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019

In this matter, this ground has been taken up in the Section 34

petition, and the High Court, noting that the landowner gave up his

claim on loss of structure awarded at the rate of Rs. 50,000 by the

Arbitrator, held that no further adjudication is necessary on this

point. Therefore, no interference is required, and this appeal also

stands dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No.

15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019;

72

SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No.

15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21691/2019

In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section

34 petition, as this ground is factual, no patent illegality arises.

Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 6: That compensation for shifting expenses was granted

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15477/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C)

No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019

In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section

34 petition, as this ground is factual, no patent illegality arises.

Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 7: That arbitration costs were awarded

73

SLP (C) No. 15442-15443/2019; SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C)

No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.

14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21657/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019;

SLP (C) No. 10210/2019; SLP (C) No. 15466/2019; SLP (C) No.

21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 21662/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of in the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No. 21682/2019; SLP (C) No.

9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No. 21683/2019;

SLP (C) No. 9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No.

15448/2019; SLP (C) No. 15450/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 37 appeals. Therefore, these appeals also stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15478/2019; SLP (C) No. 15482/2019; SLP (C) No.

15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019; SLP (C) No. 21673/2019;

SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019; SLP (C) No.

21692/2019

74

In these matters, this ground has not been taken up in any of the

Special Leave Petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand dismissed.

Ground 8: That compensation was awarded based on post-

notification sale deed

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15444-15445/2019; SLP (C)

No. 14491/2019; SLP (C) No. 21664/2019; SLP (C) No.

21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21695/2019; SLP (C) No. 21693/2019; SLP (C) No.

9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 9600/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP

(C) No. 21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689 /2019; SLP (C) No.

9604/2019; SLP (C) No. 21696/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

Ground 9: That compensation was awarded based on sale deeds

of smaller plots of land

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 21666/2019; SLP (C) No.

21671/2019; SLP (C) No. 21670/2019; SLP (C) No. 21663/2019;

SLP (C) No. 9602/2019; SLP (C) No. 21687/2019; SLP (C) No.

75

21683/2019; SLP (C) No. 21689 /2019; SLP (C) No. 9604/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21696/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

Ground 10: That compensation on account of severance of land

was awarded

SLP (C) No. 15470/2019; SLP (C) No. 15479/2019; SLP (C) No.

15471/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 10210/2019

In this matter, this ground has not been taken in the Special Leave

Petitions. Therefore, this appeal stands dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15485/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.

15447/2019; SLP (C) No. 15486/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019

76

In these matters, though this ground has been taken in the Section

34 petition, no patent illegality arises. Therefore, these appeals

stand dismissed.

Ground 11: That compensation on account of loss of business was

awarded

SLP (C) No. 15487/2019; SLP (C) No. 21675/2019

In these matters, this ground has not been taken and argued in any

of the Section 34 petitions. Therefore, these appeals stand

dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 15477/2019; SLP (C) No. 15474/2019; SLP (C) No.

15466/2019; SLP (C) No. 15446/2019; SLP (C) No. 15447/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21688/2019; SLP (C) No. 15471/2019; SLP (C) No.

15450/2019; SLP (C) No. 21690/2019; SLP (C) No. 21691/2019;

SLP (C) No. 21692/2019

In these matters, though this ground has been argued in the Section

34 petition, no patent illegality arises. Therefore, these appeals

stand dismissed.

…………………………J.

(R.F. Nariman)

…………………………J.

New Delhi (Surya Kant)

September 19, 2019.

77