Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2466-2467 OF 2015

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.25568-25569 OF 2014)

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

DILEEP KUMAR SINGH …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

R.F.Nariman, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.These appeals raise an interesting question as to the

interpretation of a proviso contained in Section 47 of the

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of

Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (in short the “1995

Act”).

3.The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows:-

1

Page 2 On 1

st

January, 1998, the respondent was enlisted in the CRPF

as Assistant Commandant. While on duty, on 19

th

October,

2001, he sustained grievous injuries in his spinal cord and legs

while he was out on a visit checking night guards. Thereafter,

he was provided with specialized treatment in various hospitals,

but nothing worked and, ultimately, a medical board in its report

dated 22

nd

July, 2004 categorized the respondent as PEE-5,

i.e., a person who is permanently incapacitated and stated that

he has 100% disability and recommended that he be relieved

from service on medical grounds. On 27

th

October, 2004, a

show cause notice was served on the respondent along with a

copy of the report of the medical board with a direction to

submit his representation, if any, against the proposed

invalidation from service on medical grounds. Instead of

representing against the show cause notice, the respondent

filed writ petition No.30278/2004 challenging the said show

cause notice. By an interim order passed on 19

th

January, 2005,

the appellants were directed not to pass any order pursuant to

the report given by the medical board against the respondent.

2

Page 3 4.Pursuant to an order modifying the stay application, by an

order dated 1

st

July, 2011, the respondent was relieved from

service and given invalidation pension as admissible under

Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension) Rules of 1972. The respondent

filed a second writ petition No.42101 of 2011 challenging the

aforesaid order.

5.By the impugned judgment dated 8

th

January, 2014, the

Allahabad High Court held on a construction of Section 47 of

the said Act that a Notification dated 10

th

September, 2002

issued under Section 47 insofar as the CRPF is concerned,

(exempting the CRPF from the rigours of Section 47) would

have to be read with reference to the field occupied by Section

47(2) only. Thus, the High Court made it clear that the

exemption provision would apply only to promotion and not to

continuing the respondent in service. As a consequence, the

order dated 1

st

July, 2011, was set aside and the Union was

directed to treat the petitioner in service and to adjust him

against any suitable post or against a supernumerary post until

a suitable post is available or until he attains the age of

superannuation, whichever is earlier.

3

Page 4 6.Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Additional Solicitor General,

appearing on behalf of the Union of India has placed the 1995

Act before us. He referred to Section 33, Section 47 and

Section 73 and submitted that the penultimate proviso to

Section 47 would apply to the entire Section and not merely to

sub-section (2) thereof as is clear from the language of the

proviso which uses the words “this Section” and not “this sub-

section”. He further submitted that since there is no ambiguity

in the provision, no resort can be taken to Section 73(3) and

73(4) which refers to the proviso in Section 47 as “the proviso

to sub-section (2) of Section 47”. He further submitted that the

scheme of the Act would be disturbed by the impugned

judgment inasmuch as Section 33 and Section 47 cover the

same ground – Section 33 being applicable pre-appointment

and Section 47 being applicable after appointment. He cited

Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2010) 4 SCC

653 at paragraph 179, which judgment refers to the literal rule

of construction and S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3

SCC 1 at paragraphs 238 and 239, for the proposition that

courts cannot supply a cassus omissus.

4

Page 5 7.Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned senior counsel for the

respondent, has argued before us that the impugned judgment

is correct inasmuch as the 1995 Act is a beneficial legislation

meant to help disabled persons and an expansive construction

is, therefore, in order.

8.He argued that Sections 47 and 73 have to be

harmoniously construed and so construed, Section 73 throws

light on Section 47 and makes the proviso apply only to sub-

section (2) thereof. He argued that in no circumstance can a

disabled person, once he acquires a disability during his

service, be terminated as it would go against the purpose of the

Act. Further, he argued that the exemption notification dated

10

th

September, 2002 would not apply on facts as the disability

was incurred prior to the notification. He also argued that there

was discrimination against the respondent in that others with

disabilities did not get their service terminated.

9.We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The

Preamble of the 1995 Act states as follows:-

5

Page 6 “An Act to give effect to the Proclamation on the

Full Participation and Equality of the People with

Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region

Whereas the Meeting to Launch the Asian and

Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons 1993—2002

convened by the Economic and Social Commission

for Asia and Pacific held at Beijing on 1st to 5th

December, 1992, adopted the Proclamation on the

Full Participation and Equality of People with

Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region;

And Whereas India is a signatory to the said

Proclamation;

And Whereas it is considered necessary to

implement the Proclamation aforesaid.”

10.Sections 33, 47 and 73(3) & (4) are set out hereinbelow:

“33. Reservation of posts.—Every appropriate

Government shall appoint in every establishment

such percentage of vacancies not less than three

per cent for persons or class of persons with

disability of which one per cent each shall be

reserved for persons suffering from—

(i) blindness or low vision;

(ii) hearing impairment;

(iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy,

in the posts identified for each disability:

Provided that the appropriate Government may,

having regard to the type of work carried on in any

department or establishment, by notification subject

to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in

such notification, exempt any establishment from

the provisions of this section.

6

Page 7 47. Non-discrimination in Government

employment.—(1) No establishment shall dispense

with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a

disability during his service:

Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring

disability is not suitable for the post he was holding,

could be shifted to some other post with the same

pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the

employee against any post, he may be kept on a

supernumerary post until a suitable post is available

or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever

is earlier.

(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely

on the ground of his disability:

Provided that the appropriate Government may,

having regard to the type of work carried on in any

establishment, by notification and subject to such

conditions, if any, as may be specified in such

notification, exempt any establishment from the

provisions of this section.

73. Power of appropriate Government to make

rules.—

(3) Every notification made by the Central

Government under the proviso to Section 33,

proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 47, every

scheme framed by it under Section 27, Section 30,

sub-section (1) of Section 38, Section 42, Section

43, Section 67, Section 68 and every rule made by

it under sub-section (1), shall be laid, as soon as

may be after it is made, before each House of

Parliament, while it is in session for a total period of

7

Page 8 thirty days which may be comprised in one session

or in two or more successive sessions, and if,

before the expiry of the session immediately

following the session or the successive sessions

aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any

modification in the rule, notification or scheme, both

Houses agree that the rule, notification or scheme

should not be made, the rule, notification or scheme

shall thereafter have effect only in such modified

form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so,

however, that any such modification or annulment

shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything

previously done under that rule, notification or

scheme, as the case may be.

(4) Every notification made by the State

Government under the proviso to Section 33,

proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 47, every

scheme made by it under Section 27, Section 30,

sub-section (1) of Section 38, Section 42, Section

43, Section 67, Section 68, and every rule made by

it under sub-section (1), shall be laid, as soon as

may be after it is made, before each House of State

Legislature, where it consists of two Houses or

where such legislature consists of one House

before that House.”

11.There is no doubt whatsoever that Mr. Mahabir Singh is

right in saying that this is a beneficial legislation passed

pursuant to a proclamation on the full participation and equality

of people with disabilities in the Asian and Pacific region to

which India is a signatory. However, we find that for the

8

Page 9 reasons given hereinafter the impugned judgment cannot be

sustained.

12.It will be noticed that Section 47 proviso speaks of “this

Section”. The literal rule applied to this proviso would make it

clear that it would apply to the entire Section, for otherwise the

words used would have been “this sub-section”. Quite apart

from this, the language of this proviso is similar to the language

of the proviso contained in Section 33. Both provisions speak of

an exemption being granted having regard to the “type of work”

carried on in any establishment. It is clear that given the “type

of work” carried on by the armed forces or the CRPF before us,

persons who have disabilities may not have any reservation for

them at all pre-appointment, if exempted, for the simple reason

that persons suffering with disabilities (which as defined under

Section 2(t) means a person suffering from not less than 40%

of any disability as certified by a medical authority) may be

persons wholly unfit for service required in the defence of the

country. It is obvious that, if at the appointment stage, persons

with disabilities need not have vacancies in posts reserved for

them, equally after suffering a disability during service, a person

9

Page 10 may for the self-same reason not be able to perform what is

required of him in the defence of the nation, thereby justifying

his discharge from service.

13.The context of the provision is “type of work”. It is clear

that given this context, there is no rationale for exemption so far

as “promotion” is concerned but no exemption so far as

“dispensation” is concerned.

14.One argument that weighed with the High Court was that

under the second proviso to sub-section (1), if it is not possible

to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a

supernumerary post. From this it was sought to be inferred that

under no circumstance can an employee who acquires

disability during his service have his service dispensed with.

This reasoning is fallacious for the reason that sub-section (1)

deals with dispensing with service as well as reduction in rank.

The argument that an employee’s services can never be

dispensed with under Section 47(1) having due regard to the

second proviso thereof fails to take into account that there is no

such requirement as far as reduction in rank is concerned. If an

exemption can be given so far as reduction in rank is

10

Page 11 concerned, then there is no reason why such exemption cannot

be given so far as dispensing with service is concerned, as both

are contained in Section 47(1) of the Act.

15.We now come to what appealed to the High Court and

was argued most vehemently before us. It was stated that

Section 73(3) & (4) made it clear that the proviso is only a

proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 47 and that therefore it

must be read only as such. To this again there are two

answers.

16.It is well settled that the provisions of a statute must be

read harmoniously together. However, if this is not possible

then it is settled law that where there is a conflict between two

Sections, and you cannot reconcile the two, you have to

determine which is the leading provision and which the

subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other.

This statement of the law is to be found in Institute of Patent

Agents & Ors. v. Joseph Lockwood, 1894 A.C. 347 at 360.

Lord Herschell, L.C., stated this, as follows:-

“Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two

sections to be found in the same Act. You have to

11

Page 12 try and reconcile them as best you may. If you

cannot, you have to determine which is the leading

provision and which the subordinate provision, and

which must give way to the other.”

17.This Judgment has been subsequently followed by the

High Court of Australia in Project Blue Sky Inc. v. Australian

Broadcasting Authority, 153 ALR 490, in the following terms:

“A legislative instrument must be construed on

the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended

to give effect to harmonious goals. Where conflict

appears to arise from the language of particular

provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as

possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing

provisions to achieve that result which will best give

effect to the purpose and language of those

provisions while maintaining the unity of all the

statutory provisions. Reconciling conflict provisions

will often require the court “to determine which is the

leading provision and which the subordinate

provision, and which must give way to the other”.

Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions

will it be possible in many cases to give each

provision the meaning which best gives effect to its

purpose and language while maintaining the unity of

the statutory scheme.” (at pages 509-510)

18.Under similar circumstances, in Smt. Laxmi Devi v.

Sethani Mukand Kanwar and Two Others, 1965 (1) SCR 726,

a question arose as to how one would harmonise Section 2(d)

with Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. The effect of

12

Page 13 Section 2(d), which is a saving clause, is that the provisions of

the Transfer of Property Act will apply to transfers by operation

of law. Whereas Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act

defines transfer of property as intended to take in transfers

effected by acts of parties. Auction sales, being transfers

effected by operation of law would, therefore, be within the

purview of Section 100 (latter part) read with Section 2(d).

(Section 100 provides that no charge shall be enforced against

any property in the hands of a person to whom such property

has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the

charge.) Section 2(d) was held to prevail over Section 5

because it is a “positive provision” which is “clear”. This Court

held:

“This position, however, has become somewhat

complicated by reason of the provisions contained

in s.5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section

5 provides, inter alia, that in the following sections

"transfer of property" means an act by which a living

person conveys property, in present or in future, to

one or more other living persons. In other words, in

terms, the definition of the expression "transfer of

property" as used in all the sections of the Transfer

of Property Act is intended to take in transfers

effected by acts of parties inter vivos, and an

auction-sale clearly is not such an act. Section

5 would, therefore, appear to exclude auction sales

13

Page 14 from the purview of s.100 altogether. This result

would appear to be consistent with the provision in

the preamble of the Act which says that the Transfer

of Property Act was enacted because it was thought

expedient to define and amend certain parts of the

law relating to the transfer of property by act of

parties. That is the position which emerges from the

reading of s.5 coupled with the preamble; and that

naturally raises the question as to how to reconcile

these two inconsistent positions.

In our opinion, the positive provision contained in s.

2(d) must prevail over the definition of "transfer of

property" prescribed by s.5. No doubt, the purpose

of the definition is to indicate the class of transfers

to which the provisions of the Transfer of Property

Act are intended to be applied; but a definition of

this kind cannot over-ride the clear and positive

direction contained in the specific words used by s.

2(d). As we have already seen, the result of the

saving clause enacted by s. 2(d) is to emphasise

the fact that the provisions of s.57 and those

contained in Chapter IV must apply to transfer by

operation of law. Such a positive provision cannot

be made to yield to what may appear to be the

effect of the definition prescribed by s.5, and so, we

are inclined to hold that notwithstanding the

definition prescribed by s.5, the latter part of

s.100 must be deemed to include auction sales.” (at

page 733)

19.A reference to these two judgments makes it clear that

Section 47 is the “leading provision” and Section 73 is the

“subordinate provision”. Further, Section 47 is a positive and

clear provision. This is because, Section 47 is the substantive

14

Page 15 provision exempting the subject matter of Section 47 as a

whole as opposed to Section 73 which is only a machinery

provision by which notifications made under Section 47 are to

be laid before each House of Parliament.

20.Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel

beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. Therefore, the

golden rule is to read the whole Section, inclusive of the

proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each

other and result in a harmonious construction. This is laid down

in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1 SCC 128, as

follows:-

“18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the

following, among other decisions, were cited at the

Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in

statutes: CIT v.Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd, [AIR 1959

SC 713 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256, 266 : (1959) 36

ITR 1] ; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. CST [AIR

1955 SC 765 : (1955) 2 SCR 483, 493 : (1955) 6

STC 627] ; Thompson v. Dibdin [(1912) AC 533,

541 : 81 LJKB 918 : 28 TLR

490] ; Rex v. Dibdin [1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125]

and Tahsildar Singh v.State of U.P. [AIR 1959 SC

1012 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875, 893 : 1959 Cri LJ

1231] . The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to

the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a

settled rule of construction that a proviso must

prima facie be read and considered in relation to the

principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a

15

Page 16 separate or independent enactment. “Words are

dependent on the principal enacting words to which

they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read

as divorced from their context”

(Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912 AC 533). If the rule of

construction is that prima facie a proviso should be

limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the

enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound.

To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the

proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of

construction that a proviso must be considered in

relation to the principal matter to which it stands as

a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso,

although the golden rule is to read the whole

section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner

that they mutually throw light on each other and

result in a harmonious construction.”

21.Viewed at in this light also, one is to read Section 47 as a

whole and being read as a whole it is clear from the proviso that

it would apply to “type of work” carried on in any establishment

and would, therefore, apply to both dispensing with service

including reduction in rank as well as promotion.

22.Another interesting facet is brought out by the marginal

note of Section 47 and Chapter VIII in which Section 47 falls.

Chapter VIII has as its heading “non-discrimination”. Equally,

the marginal note of Section 47 is “non-discrimination in

government employments”. It is clear that the idea of Section

16

Page 17 47 is not to discriminate against employees who acquire

disability during service. It is settled law that discrimination

cannot be viewed in the abstract – the doctrine of classification

is an important adjunct to the doctrine of discrimination. It is

clear, therefore, that if there is an intelligible differentia having a

rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, a provision

will not be held to be discriminatory. It is clear that an

exemption provision is based on such a classification and

exempting any establishment from not dispensing with service

or reduction in rank or not granting promotions has a rational

relation to the object sought to be achieved, namely, that the

“type of work” carried on in an establishment may be such that

a disabled employee’s services may have to be dispensed with

and/or promotion denied.

23.Shri Mahabir Singh cited United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 at page 345 for the

proposition that in a beneficial legislation what the legislature

gives for the benefit of those covered by it, the court cannot

take away. We are of the view that this authority will not apply

for the basic reason that we are construing an exemption

17

Page 18 provision in a beneficial legislation. We have already held that

the exemption provision will cover the entirety of the field of

Section 47. In what facts and circumstances the Government

exercises its discretion taking into account the type of work in

an establishment is obviously to be guided by the object for

which the beneficial legislation is enacted together with

balancing the need for exempting some establishments from a

part or the whole of the provisions of the Act. On a true

construction, it is clear that the legislation has “given” the

Government the power to exempt any establishment from the

rigours of the Act not only qua promotion but also qua

termination from service and reduction of rank as has been held

above.

24.Learned counsel also cited before us Kunal Singh v.

Union of India & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 524. This judgment

decided that the benefit of Section 47 would be available to a

person as an additional benefit even though he may get certain

other benefits under the service Rules applicable to him. No

question as to the proviso to Section 47 arose before the court

18

Page 19 in that case and for the purposes of the present controversy,

the ratio of that decision will have little or no bearing.

25.We now come to two other contentions raised by Mr.

Mahabir Singh. According to him, the exemption notification

dated 10

th

September, 2002 will not apply for the reason that

the accident took place prior to 2002. It is clear that the

exemption notification will apply to all cases in which an

employee’s services are dispensed with. The relevant date,

therefore, is the date of dispensing with service and not the

date on which the disability is incurred, for Section 47 prohibits

an establishment from dispensing with the service of an

employee who acquires disability during his service. Since

service was dispensed with on 1

st

July, 2011 (that is long after

the date of the exemption notification), the notification will,

obviously, apply.

26.The plea of discrimination sought to be made by Mr.

Mahabir Singh is based on an averment made in the reply

affidavit on behalf of the petitioner (respondent herein) in the

Supreme Court. The averment is as follows:

19

Page 20 “Further the contention of the petitioners that the

disabled persons are not being retained in service is

absolutely wrong because the persons disabled due

to militant action etc. are retained and not being

invalidated from service in accordance to Para 9(a)

(i) of Standing Order No.7/99 of CRPF. Many

disabled persons has been retained or re-instated in

CRPF and other armed forces after enactment of

the Act of 1995 and amendment of rule 20(2) of the

C.C.S. (Leave) Rules 1972 as well as the judgment

passed by this Honorable Court reported in 2003(2)

ESC (SC) Kunal Singh Vs. U.O.I.. Even the CRPF

itself has retained such disabled officer Shri Pratap

Singh, Deputy Commandant till superannuation and

retained Shri Y.N. Ray and Sameer Shrivastava

who became disabled in the rank of Assistant

Commandant and granted regular promotion and at

present they are Commandant. Two other officers

Sh. R.K. Singh and Sh. P.R. Mishra have also been

retained in service despite their disability. Similarly

the B.S.F. also has not only retained Shri Surinder

Singh but had promoted him up to his present rank

of Second in Command. The Indian Army has

retained similarly wheel chair bound physically

disabled (paraplegic) Officer S.K. Rajdan and

promoted him to the rank of Major General and

Indian Air Force also retained its wheel chair bound

disabled (paraplegic) trainee cadet Harjot Singh.”

27.In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants this

averment is denied in the following terms:-

“The contents of para 5 (G-H) of reply are wrong,

misconceived and hence denied. It is submitted

that Central Para Military forces perform a critical

role in maintaining internal security and guarding of

national borders. By very nature, the job

20

Page 21 requirements are “technical’ in nature requiring a

high level of physical fitness and abilities. CRPF is

exempted from the provisions of Section 47 of the

Act. The Respondent does not come within the

purview of Standing Order 7/99 and has been

declared 100% permanently incapacitated for

further service, he was dealt as per procedure laid

down in Section VIII of CRPF medical manual.

There is difference between NOT FIT FOR

NORMAL ACTIVE DUTY AND 100% PERMANENT

INCAPACITATION FOR FURTHER SERVICE.

Since the Respondent comes under second

category, he was dealt with as per procedure laid

down in section VIII of CRPF Medical Manual.

However, it is respectfully submitted that full Bench

decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of

Union of India Vs. Mohd. Yasin Ansari [(2006) 3

UPBEBC 2508] has held that a person in the armed

forces even with lower degree of disability cannot

be retained in services.”

28.Apart from the plea of the disabled officers mentioned

being vague, for no particulars are given as to the extent of

their disability, the Union has made it clear that Standing Order

No.7/99 will not apply and that since the job requirements

demand a high level of fitness and ability CRPF is exempted

from the provisions of Section 47 of the Act. Not only has this

plea not been raised before the High Court, but the plea raised

before us is lacking in particulars and has to be dismissed for

this reason also.

21

Page 22 29.We make it clear that the respondent, who has been

occupying official accommodation, will vacate such

accommodation by 30

th

June, 2015. Mr. Patwalia has assured

us that, given the facts of this case, no penal charges will be

collected from him till the date on which he vacates the said

accommodation.

30.The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the

Allahabad High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to

costs.

….…..…..………………………...J.

(T.S. Thakur)

….…..…..………………………...J.

(R.F. Nariman)

New Delhi,

February 26, 2015.

22