Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 739 OF 2012

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7944 OF 2010

Union of India .... Petitioner(s)

Versus

Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores

Ltd. & Ors. ....

Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.

1)This review petition has been filed by the Union of India,

Ministry of Mines, seeking review of the judgment and order

dated 13.09.2010 passed in Sandur Manganese & Iron

Ores Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Others, 2010 (13)

SCC 1 (Civil Appeal No. 7944 of 2010 and Civil Appeal Nos.

7945-54 and 7955-61 of 2010).

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Page 2 2)In Sandur (supra), this Court had interpreted various

provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and

Regulation) Act, 1957 (in short “the MMDR Act”) and the

Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (in short “the MC Rules”)

framed thereunder. It is the grievance of the petitioner

herein that this review is instituted since the Ministry of

Mines, Government of India, could not put forth its view on

the interpretation of the provisions of the MMDR Act in

Sandur (supra) for the reason that the copy of the special

leave petition was not served upon the review petitioner

which is a necessary and relevant party to the subject-matter

in issue/dispute and the review petitioner did not get an

opportunity of being heard.

3)It is also brought to our notice that vide notification

dated 30.01.2003, the Ministry of Coal and Mines was

bifurcated into separate Ministries since the petitioners in

various SLPs furnished the name of the Ministry as “Ministry

of Coal and Mines” in all the matters and according to them,

it was not noticed by the Department concerned, namely, the

Department of Mines.

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Page 3 4)We are conscious of the fact that the principles of

natural justice guarantee every person the right to represent

his/her case in the court of law, wherein the final verdict of

the court would adversely affect his/her interest. Considering

the above principle, this Court, vide order dated 04.10.2012,

granted the opportunity to the Union of India to represent its

case.

5)Before considering the claim of the Union of India about

acceptability or otherwise of various conclusions in the

impugned judgment, we have to consider whether the

petitioner has shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay

of 320 days.

6)The details furnished in I.A. No. 1 of 2011 filed for

condoning the delay in filing the above review petition

sufficiently prove that steps were taken at various levels in

the Ministry of Mines, accordingly, we accept the reasons

furnished therein. In view of the same, the delay is

condoned.

7)Taking note of the reasons stated for the delay and the

stand of the Department that the Ministry concerned,

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Page 4 namely, Department of Mines was not duly projected and

represented before this Court, we heard Mr. Goolam E.

Vahanvati, learned Attorney General for the review

petitioner, on merits, particularly, with reference to the

points formulated for consideration and ultimate conclusion

arrived therein and Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,

Mr. A.M. Singhvi, Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, Mr. L.N. Rao,

learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents and

Ms. Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for the State of Karnataka.

8)Now, let us consider whether the review petitioner has

made out a case for reviewing the judgment and order dated

13.09.2010 and satisfies the criteria for entertaining the

matter in review jurisdiction.

Review Jurisdiction

9)Article 137 of the Constitution of India provides for

review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court which

reads as under:

“Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or

any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall

have power to review any judgment pronounced or order

made by it.”

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Page 5 10) Further, Part VIII Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules,

1966 deals with the review and consists of four rules. Rule 1

is important for our purpose which reads as under:

“The Court may review its judgment or order, but no

application for review will be entertained in a civil

proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order

XLVII Rule 1 of the Code and in a criminal proceeding

except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of

the record.”

11) Order XLVII, Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 provides for an application for review which reads as

under:

“Any person considering himself aggrieved-

a)by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but

from which no appeal has been preferred,

b)by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

c)by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or

evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not

within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the

time when the decree was passed or order made, or on

account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a

review of the decree passed or order made against him, may

apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the

decree or made the order.”

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Page 6 12) Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of

review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

i)Discovery of new and important matter or evidence

which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not

within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be

produced by him;

ii)Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

iii)Any other sufficient reason

13)The words “any other sufficient reason” has been

interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and

approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios

Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius &

Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520, to mean “a reason sufficient on

grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”.

With the above statutory provisions, let us discuss the claim

of the petitioner-Union of India.

Discussion

14)The respondent – Company (Sandur Manganese & Iron

Ores Ltd.) by filing S.L.P.(C) No. 22077 of 2009 (converted

into Civil Appeal No. 7944 of 2010) challenged before this

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Page 7 Court the final judgment and order dated 05.06.2009 passed

by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal

No. 5084 of 2008 and allied matters wherein the High Court

dismissed the appeals and held that the decision of the State

Government in not recommending mining lease to the

Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. and instead preferring

two other Companies for grant of mining lease does not

suffer from any irregularity, illegality, discrimination,

arbitrariness, unreasonableness or violative of principles of

natural justice.

15)This Court, in Sandur (supra), allowed the appeal filed

by Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. and quashed the

impugned order dated 05.06.2009 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Appeal No. 5084

of 2008 etc. etc. as well as the decision of the State

Government dated 26/27.02.2002 and the subsequent

decision of the Central Government dated 29.07.2003 and

directed the State Government to consider all applications

afresh in light of this Court’s interpretation of Section 11 of

the MMDR Act and Rules 35, 59 and 60 of the MC Rules in

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Page 8 particular, and make recommendation to the Central

Government within a period of four months.

16)Consequently, the UOI has raised mainly two issues on

merits of the case, thereby challenging the impugned

judgment. They are:-

(1) Firstly, that the impugned judgment has incorrectly

reported the ‘Report of the Committee to Review the

Existing Laws and Procedures for Regulation and

Development of Minerals’. As a consequence, the ratio of

impugned judgment, which relies on this Expert

Committee Report, shall stand erroneous in the eyes of

law.

(2) Secondly, Section 11(2) and Section 11(4) should be

applicable to both virgin and previously held areas.

Now we shall discuss the above mentioned issues

respectively.

First Contention:

17) The first contention of learned Attorney General is two

fold viz., that the Expert Committee’s Report was misquoted

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Page 9 and as a result the impugned judgment which relies on the

same, shall stand erroneous on the face of law. We accede to

the above contention partially. It is true that the Expert

Committee’s Report has been misquoted to the extent of

adding four lines, which was originally not a part of the

report. Thus, this Court has the power to modify the

impugned judgment to the extent of deletion of the

misquoted statement under review jurisdiction.

18) The Report of the Committee to Review the Existing Laws

and Procedures for Regulation and Development of Minerals,

referred in the impugned judgment reads as under:

Para 2.1.21 of the Report:

“49…… The concept of first-come, first-serve has

become necessary in view of the fact that the Act does

not provide for inviting applications through

advertisement for grant of PL/ML in respect of virgin

areas. No doubt, there is provision in Rule 59 of the MC

Rules for advertisement of an area earlier held under

PL/ML with provision for relaxation. In this

background, the Committee recommended the

introduction of the proviso to S. 11(2) permitting

calling for applications by way of a notification.

There is a distinction between virgin areas and

areas covered under Rule 59 and S. 11(2) ought

to be interpreted to cover virgin areas alone.”

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Page 10 19) Hence, the above underlined portion of the report which

is misquoted in the impugned judgment owing to clerical

mistake requires to be deleted, accordingly, we do so.

20) However, we are not in agreement with learned Attorney

General that the impugned judgment is erroneous on the

face of law merely because the Expert Committee Report

was misquoted. In our considered view, the impugned

judgment stands good of reason even without these

misquoted lines as well. Hence, mere deletion of these lines

along with removal of certain portion of para 51 of the

impugned judgment will clarify the mistake.

Portion of Para 51 of Sandur (supra) to be deleted:

“51…..The analysis of the Report makes it clear that

the main provision in Section 11(2) applies to

“virgin areas”. It further makes it clear that to the

extent that an area that is previously held or

reserved would require a notification for it to

become available.”

Thus the first contention is considered as per the above

terms.

Second Contention:

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Page 11 21) With regard to the second contention that both Section

11(2) and Section 11(4) should be applicable to both virgin

and previously held areas, the same has been well reasoned

in the impugned judgment and the mere fact that different

views on the same subject are possible is no ground to

review the earlier judgment passed by this Bench.

22) It has been time and again held that the power of review

jurisdiction can be exercised for the correction of a mistake

and not to substitute a view. In Parsion Devi & Ors. vs.

Sumitri Devi & Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 715, this Court held as

under:-

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to

review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent

on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident

and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can

hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the

record justifying the court to exercise its power of review

under Order 47 Rule I CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction

under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an

erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review

petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and

cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".

23) This Court, on numerous occasions, had deliberated upon

the very same issue, arriving at the conclusion that review

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Page 12 proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be

strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of

CPC.

24) In the present case, the error contemplated in the

impugned judgment is not one which is apparent on the face

of the record rather the dispute is wholly founded on the

point of interpretation and applicability of Section 11(2) and

11(4) of the MMDR Act. In review jurisdiction, mere

disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the

ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already

dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to

challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an

alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.

Hence, in review jurisdiction, the court shall interfere only

when there is a glaring omission or patent mistake or when a

grave error has crept in the impugned judgment, which we

fail to notice in the present case.

25) For the above reasons, the second ground for review

petition is liable to be rejected.

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Page 13 26)Further, the contention regarding MoU entered into by

the State Government and investments made thereunder is

concerned, this Court has noticed this fact and rejected the

contention made by the respondents in Sandur (supra). It

is relevant to point out that the State of Karnataka is stated

to have committed to JSW Steels Limited on 11.10.1994 for

grant of mining leases but the same has been invoked by

JSW Steels after a lapse of 8 years and more precisely, after

5 years of commencing commercial operations in its steel

plant by making an application on 24.10.2002. Once an area

is notified for re-grant and applications are invited from the

mining public for grant of mining lease, the applications must

be disposed of in terms of the provisions of the MMDR Act

and the MC Rules and not de hors. In para 80 of Sandur

Manganese (supra), this Court has held as follows:

“80. It is clear that the State Government is purely a

delegate of Parliament and a statutory functionary, for the

purposes of Section 11(3) of the Act, hence it cannot act in

a manner that is inconsistent with the provisions of

Section 11(1) of the MMDR Act in the grant of mining

leases. Furthermore, Section 2 of the Act clearly states

that the regulation of mines and mineral development

comes within the purview of the Union Government and

not the State Government. As a matter of fact, the

respondents have not been able to point out any other

provision in the MMDR Act or the MC Rules permitting

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Page 14 grant of mining lease based on past commitments. As

rightly pointed out, the State Government has no authority

under the MMDR Act to make commitments to any person

that it will, in future, grant a mining lease in the event that

the person makes investment in any project. Assuming

that the State Government had made any such

commitment, it could not be possible for it to take an

inconsistent position and proceed to notify a particular

area. Further, having notified the area, the State

Government certainly could not thereafter honour an

alleged commitment by ousting other applicants even if

they are more deserving on the merit criteria as provided

in Section 11(3).

Hence, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-argue the

very same point.

27)Regarding the issue of Mineral Policies, this Court has

already held in Sandur (supra) that in view of the specific

parliamentary declaration as discussed and explained by this

Court in various decisions, there is no question of the State

having any power to frame a policy de hors the MMDR Act

and the MC Rules.

28)In view of the above, the petitioner-Union of India has

not invoked any valid ground for exercising the power under

review jurisdiction. In addition to the same, after the

judgment in Sandur (supra), another coordinate Bench of

this Court followed the ratio decidendi in Monnet Ispat and

Energy Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., 2012 (11) SCC 1.

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Page 15 29)For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept any

of the contentions raised by Learned Attorney General,

therefore, the review petition is disposed of by deleting the

misquoted lines in the Expert Committee Report.

30)In view of the above order and the directions issued by

us in para 98 of Sandur (supra), we grant a further period

of 4 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order to

comply with the same.

31)In view of the dismissal of the review petition filed by

the Union of India, the impleadment applications stand

dismissed.

...…………………………………J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

...…………………………………J.

(H.L. DATTU)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 23, 2013

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