A

B

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U.P. SALES TAX ASSN.

v.

TAXATION BAR ASSOCIATION AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1995

[K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948-Section 9-Appellate Authmity­

Exclusive Jwisdiction to deal with assessment, levy and Collection of Sales

Tax under the

Act-High Cowt cannot prohibit such an authority from dis­

charging his statutmy duties-Withdrawal and transfer of functions from the

authority

to another jurisdiction by the High Cowt not justified.

Constitution

of India, 1950: A1ticle 226 writ petition

prefen·ed by dis­

pleased members

of the Bar-High Cowt allowed petition prohibited the

appellate authority from discharging his

functions and transfe17'ed the same

D to another Jwisdiction-High Cowt cannot exercise this powe1~As se1ious

repurcussions would ensue to the functioning of the sub-Ordinate judicia1y

and statutmy ftmctionaries.

Legal profession-Ethics-Right

to go on

st1ike-Boycott of Cowts by

E lawyers-Deprecation of-Such act would deter judicial officers and

authmities from discharging their duties without fear, favour or ill-Will.

Under section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948. The

appellate authority, discharges quasi-judicial functions relating to assess­

ment, levy and collection of taxes. Such a statutory authority was con-

F fronted by lawyers belonging to the respondent Taxation Bar Association

and accused of graft. Subsequently the respondent Association threatened

to go on strike to pressurize removal

and transfer of this authority.

On

receipt of a resolution to this effect passed by the respondent Association,

the District Magistrate directed the authority to proceed on leave on the

G condition that the lawyers withdraw the strike. The strike continued even

after the authority resumed work under instructions from his superior

officers. When the Government did not accede to the demands of the

lawyers despite the strike, the

Bar Association filed a writ petition in the

High Court praying

Inter-alia for mandamus restraining the authority

from discharging his functions under section 9 of the Act of 1948

and for

H the transfer of pending cases to another authority.

228

U.P. SALE TAX ASSN. v. TAXATION BAR ASSN. 229

The High Court allowed the petition.

Aggrieved

by this order the

U.P: Sales Tax Service Association

preferred

an appeal to this Court.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD :

1.1. The

'High Court does not have the power to issue a writ

or order of prohibition, injuncting a statutory authority from discharging

its statutory functions

or transfering these functions to another

jurisdic·

tion. Exercise of such power by the High Court generates a rippling effect

on subordinate judiciary

and another statutory functionaries. [242-D-E]

S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India and Anr., AIR (1976) SC 1274

and Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, D. Ward Kanpur and·

Another, AIR (1966) SC 81, Distinguished.

A

B

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1.2 If the rule of law is to have any meaning and content, the D

authority of the court or statutory authority and the confidence of the

public in them should not

be allowed to be shaken, diluted or undermined.

Any scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious attack on the judicial

officer/authority beyond condonable limits, amounts to scandalising the

Courtffribunal amenable to conviction for its contempt

and liable to libel

or defamation and damages personally or group libel. [234-F; 235-B] E

Brahma

Prakash Shamia and Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR

(1954) SC 10; Tarini Mohan and Ors. v. Pleaders, AIR (1923) Calcutta 212

and In the matter of a Pleader, AIR (1924) Rangoon 320, referred to.

1.3.

It has been a frequent spectacle in the recent past to witness F

that advocates strike .work at the slightest provocation overlooking the

harm caused to the judicial system in general and the litigant public in

particular. [236-F]

Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Cowt T1ial Lawyers

Associa-·

tion, et al, 493 US 411; 107 L Ed 2d 851 (1989); Cowt of its own motion v. G

Mr. B.D. Kaushik & Ors., (1991) 4 Delhi Lawyer 316; Common cause v.

Union of India, (1995) 1 SCALE 6; Shri KK Venugopal, The legal prof es­

sionals at the tum of the Centu1y" (1989) 1 NLSJ 121; Shri P.P. Rao "strike

by professionals" Indian Advocate, Vol. XXIII, 1991 (Part-I); Shri H.N.

Seerwa~ ''Lawyers strike and the Duty of the Supreme Court." Indian Advo- H

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A cate, Vol. XXIII 1991 (Part-I) and Shli F.S. Naliman, "Boycott a lawyers

weapon. "Indian Advocate,

Vol. XVIII, 1978 Vol. 1.& 2., referred to.

2. The High Court has the power to issue a writ of prohibition to

prevent a

Court or Tribunal from proceeding further when the inferior

Court or Tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction

B ; (b) proceeds to act in violation of the rules of natural justice; (c) proceeds

to

act under a law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional; or (d)

proceeds to

act in contravention of the fundamental rights. None of these

situations indisputably arises in this case.

Section 9 of the Act is a

complete code in itself for conferment of jurisdiction on the appellate

C authority, the procedure for dispensation and the power to pass orders

thereon. The appellate authority was acting in furtherance thereof. The

High

Court does not have the power to issue orders restraining the

authority from exercising these statutory powers

and further to deprive

that authority from exercising those powers by transfering the same to

another ,jurisdiction. (241-E-G]

D

E

F

[The Court observed that it was not benefitting the dignity of the

profession

that an advocate instead of arming himself with an armory of

precedents, got armed with a licensed revolver.] (242-G]

CIVIL

APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7872 of

1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.93 of the Allahabad High

Court in W.P. No. Nil of 1993.

Dipankar Gupta, Solicitor General, Uma Nath Singh for the Appel-

lant.

S.K. Bagga, D.V. Sehgal, Ms. S. Bagga,

Seeraj Bagga, Ms. Tanuj

Bagga and R.B. Misra, fot the Respondents.

G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

This Appeal

by special leave arises from the order dated 14th

October, 1993 of the Allahabad High Court made Writ Petition No. Nil of

H 1993 titled The Taxation Bar Association, Agra through its General Secretary

U.P. SALE TAX ASSN. v. TAXATION BAR ASSN. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.) 231

& Anr. v. Tiie State of U.P. through the Secretmy, Institutional Finance & A

Ors. Pursuant to our direction under Article 139A (1) of the Constitution

withdrawing the said writ petition

to this Court, we dispose of the same

ourselves.

The crucial question before

us is whether the High Court could issue

a writ or direction prohibiting a statutory authority,

viz., the Appellate

Authority under Section 9 of the

Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 (for

short, "the Act") from discharging the quasi judicial functions; direction

to

the State Government to withdraw all powers from it and transferring the

pending cases before the officer to any other authority? Whether advocates

would be justified to

go on strike as a pressure group in that behalf?

The impugned order

is the same, as prayed for in the main writ

petition, which reads

as under :

"Until further orders of this Court, the respondent no.3 Satti

B

c

Din is restrained from discharging his function as Deputy Com- D

missioner (Appeals) Sales Tax, Agra under Section 9 of the U.P.

Sales tax Act. However, it will be open to the Commissioner, Sales

Tax U.P. to transfer the cases pending before respondent no. 3 to

some other Court".

The facts not

in controversy are that on 2nd September, 1993,

pursuant to a resolution passed by the Taxation Bar Association, Agra, one

Ramesh Chander Gupta. Advocate and

President of that Association along

with two others met respondent

No. 3, Satti Din, the appellate authority in

E

F.

his chamber and accused him of "demanding illegal gratification in the

discharge of

his duties as appellate authority and that dissatisfaction was

widely prevelant among the advocates and litigants". Allegations and

counter-allegations of hurling abuses against each other have been made

resulting in wide spread violence. It would appear from the record that the

members of the appellant-Association, the staff of the

Office of the Deputy

Commissioner and other staff of the Government officers

in Agra and some G

general public on the one hand and advocates on the other hand alleged

to have been involved

in violence. Crimes have been registered against each

other, with which

we are not concerned and it would be inappropriate and

in expedient to mention them here

in detail. Law will take its own course.

Suffice

it to state that the 1st respondent appears to have made a repre­

sentation to the District Magistrate Agra,

who thereon asked Satti Din to H

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A go on leave on the condition that advocates would withdraw the strike.

B

c

Though Satti Din had initially gone on leave, the advocates continued

strike. On his superior officer's instructions, Satti Din had rejoined duty as

appellate authority. On registration of the crime case against the advocates,

it would appear that

on September 6, 1993, an emergency meeting of

Associations of Agra and Firozabad

was held and it was resolved to

boycot~

all the courts and observe total strike on September 7, 1993; and in a joint

meeting of all the Associations a resolution

was passed resolving immedi­

ate enquiry into the charges of corruption against, and for the transfer

of,

respondent No. 3. They further resolved to continue to boycott courts and

go on indefinite strike called by Taxation Bar Associations. The advocates

made representation to the Governor on 4th September,

1993 and further

representations to all concerned.

It

would appear that they had also

approached the Advocate General to initiate contempt proceedings against

the 3rd respondent and the Advocate General also appears to have issued

show cause notice to the 3rd respondent under Section

15 of the Contempt

D of Courts Act. We are not concerned with the legality or appropriateness

of any of the said proceedings. Suffice it to state that when the indefinite

strike evoked

no response, the 1st respondent filed the writ petition for a

mandamus for the aforestated reliefs.

To satisfy whether there

is some substance in the allegations of

E corruption imputed to the officer, we issued notice to the Government to

produce his confidential service records and also directed the Secretary to

the Government to

file an affidavit, pursuant to which the Secretary has

filed an affidavit and has also produced confidential service records of the

3rd respondent. We find no adverse remarks, much less

any allegation of

F corruption made against the 3rd respondent at any time. The Secretary has

certified that the officer

is competent and honest, but an average officer.

It would appear from the record that the allegation of demand of illegal

gratification

was mentioned for the first time by Ramesh Chander Gupta

on 2nd September,

1993. To support the imputations, he filed a copy of

the decision dated 28th July,

1993 rendered by the 3rd respondent in the

G matter of Mis.

As/wk Auto Sales, Nunihai, Agra v. Asstt. Commissioner

(Assessment).

The allegation of Ramesh Chander Gupta is that the

3rd° respondent

was demanding in every case 25 per cent of the assessable tax as illegal

H gratification and he was dismissing the appeals in which illegal gratification

...

U.P.SALETAXASSN.v. TAXATIONBARASSN.[K. RAMASWAMY,J.] 233

was not paid. It is not his case that he paid the alleged demanded amount.

In the above said appeals, the assessee filed

his return for the year 1989-90

and the admitted liability

was of Rs. 16,38,121,38. The turnover was about

10 crores. The disputed tax amount was Rs. 93,07,457.02. The 3rd respon­

dent allowed the appeal and reduced the tax liability from Rs. 93,07,457.02

and assessed the tax for Rs. 70,21,943.70. Except the allegation on this

occasion, and repetition thereafter

by the other advocates, no allegation of

corruption

was imputed to the 3rd respondent at any point of time earlier

to 2nd September,

1993. It appears from the affidavit filed by one of the

advocates before the

Sales Tax Commissioner that the 3rd respondent

dismissed his appeals for default.

We searched for the reasons for the trouble. In the face of the

Government's undisputed record of integrity of the officer and in the

A

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absence of any allegation of corruption prior to 2nd September, 1993 and

.

1

in the face of dismissal of the appeals for default, it would appear that the /

3rd respondent

was not easily conceding to the prayer for adjournment but D

was disposing of the matters on merits. Thus, he appears to have irked or

incurred the displeasure of the advocates, who, it may be, invented the

imputation to avoid inconvenient officer. The consequential strike was

carried out by the advocates but to no success. When it

was proved to be

ineffective, they tapped judicial process under Article 226 of the Constitu-

tion on

October 13, 1993 and the High Court at the admission stage issued E

the interim direction practically allowing the Writ Petition on October 14,

1993.

From these facts the question that emerges is whether the High

Court, at the instance of the advocates and the Bar, could prohibit the p

quasi-judicial statutory authority from discharging the statutory duties and

whether

was justified in directing the Government to withdraw the func­

tions from him and transfer the same to some other jurisdiction

?

Judicial review is the basic structure of our Constitution which

entrusts that power to the Judiciary. Judiciary

is the sentinel on the qui vive

to protect the liberty and rights of the citizens, apart from keeping the

other organs of the

State exercising that process within the confines of the

Constitution and the

laws. Articles 323A and 323B empower the

Parlia­

ment and the appropriate legislature to make law to constitute Tribunals

G

to adjudicate the disputes, complaints or offences with respect to all or any H

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234

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

of the matters specified therein. Sub-clause 2(a) of Article 323B provides

for constitution of the Tribunal "for

levy, assessment, collection and enfor­

cement of any

tax". A glance at the provisions in Section 9 of the Act shows

that any dealer or other person aggrieved by an order of the assessing

authority, other than those passed under excluded sections,

is provided

with a right of appeal to the appellate authority. It also regulates the

procedure for disposal

of the appeal and in some cases the orders attain

finality and in ·some cases the orders are appealable to the Sales Tax­

Tribunal. The appellate authority has power, after giving opportunity of

hearing, to confirm or annual

or modify the order of the assessing officer,

and to reduce or enhance the amount of assessment or penalty arising from

the orders of the assessing authority. It is also empowered to set aside the

order and to direct re-assessment or to pass fresh order after specified

enquiry or to direct fresh enquiry and to submit a report within the

specified time. Section 9 of

CPC envisages to exclude taking cognizance of

civil dispute by express provisions or by necessary implication. It would

D thus be clear that as regards assessment, levy and collection of sales tax or

penalty under the Act, though the dispute in relation thereto is a cognizable

civil dispute by a civil court

of competent jurisdiction, the statute by

necessary implication takes out the disputes covered by the Act from the

jurisdiction

of the civil court and gives exclusive jurisdiction to the appel-

E

late authority and a further revision to the Tribunal with ultimate power of

judicial review by the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution.

It

is fundamental that if rule of law is to have any meaning and

content, the authority of the court or a statutory authority and the con­

fidence of the public in them should not be allowed to

be shaken, diluted

F or undermined. The courts of justice and all tribunals exercising judicial

functions

from the highest to the lowest are by their constitution entrusted

with ·functions directly connected with the administration

of justice. It is

that expectation and confidence of all those, who have or likely to have

business in that court or tribunal, which should be maintained so that the

court/tribunal perform all their functions on a higher level of rectitude

G without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Casting defamatory expressions

upon the character, ability or integrity of the judge/judicial officer/authority

undermines the dignity of the court/authority and it would tend to create

distrust in the popular mind and impedes confidence of the people in the

courts/tribunals which

is of prime importance to the litigants in the protec-

H tion of their rights and liberties. The protection to the judges/judicial

U.P. SALE TAX ASSN. v. TAXATION BAR ASSN. [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 235

officer/authority is not personal but accorded to protect the institution of A

the judiciary from undermining the public confidence in the efficacy of

judicial process. The protection, therefore,

is for fearless curial process.

Any scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious attack on the judicial

officer/authority beyond condonable limits, amounts to scandalising the

court/tribunal amenable to not only conviction for its contempt but also

liable to libel for defamation and damages personally or group libel.

Maintenance

of dignity of the court/judicial officer or quasi-judicial

authority

is, therefore, one of the cardinal principles of rule of law em­

bedded in judicial review. Any uncalled for statement or allegation against

the judicial officer/statutory authorities, casting aspersions of court's in­

tegrity or corruption would justify initiation of appropriate action for

scandalising the court or tribunal

or vindiction of authority or majesty of

the court/tribunal. The accusation of the judicial officer or authority or

arbitrary and corrupt conduct undermines their authority and rudely

shakes them and public confidence

in proper dispensation of justice. It is

B

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of necessity to protect dignity or authority of the judicial officer to maintain D

the stream of justice pure and unobstructed. The Judicial Officer/authority

needs protection personally. There fore, making wild allegations of corrup­

tion against the presiding officer amounts to scandalising the

court/statutory authority. Imputation of motives of corruption to the judi-

cial officer/authority by any person or group

of persons is a serious inroad

into the efficacy of judicial process and a threat to judicial independence

and needs to

be dealt with strong arm of the law.

E

In

Brahma Prakash Shanna & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR

(1954) SC 10) a Constitution Bench of this Court held that a resolution

passed

by the Bar Association expressing want of confidence in the judicial F

officers amounts to scandalising the court to undermine its authority and

thereby committed contempt of the court.

In

Taiini Mohan & Ors. v. Pleaders, AIR 1923 Calcutta 212, the facts

were that pursuant to the resolution passed by the Bar Association to

boycott thP. subordinate court as a protest against courts for alleged ill-G

treatment of pleaders, the petitioner-pleaders refused to appear in the

court. Action was drawn up under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners

Act against several pleaders for their failure to appear

in the court in

matters which were entrusted to them by their clients. The Full Bench of

the High Court held that pleaders deliberately abstained from attending

H

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the court and took part in a concerted movement to boycott the court - a

course of conduct held not justified. The pleaders has duties and obliga­

tions to their clients

in respect of suits and matters entrusted to them which

·

were pending in the that court. They had duty and obligation to co-operate

with the court in the orderly administration of justice.

By the

cours'e which

B

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they had adopted, the pleaders violated and neglected those duties and

obligations

in both those respects. If the pleaders thought they had a just

cause of complaint, they had

two courses open to them-to make a repre­

sentation to the District Judge or to the High Court. Thus boycotting the

court

was

held to be highhanded and unjustified and further action was

dropped with the hope that those observations would be sufficient to

prevent any further recurrence of conduct of a similar nature with the

warning that if the conduct was repeated the consequences might be of

serious nature.

This ratio was followed In the matter of a pleader AIR (1924) Ran-

D goon 320 wherein also in pursuance of the resolution of the local Bar

Association to boycott the court, a pleader refrained from appearing in the

court without obtaining his client's consent and left his client undefended

as a result of which his client was detained in jail for about a month mor.e.

The Division Bench

held that the pleader was guilty of unprofessional

conduct and the subsequent consent given

by the client did not affect his

E liability.

It has been a frequent spectacle in the recent past to witness that

advocates strike work and boycott the courts at the slightest provocation

overlooking the harm caused to the judicial system

in general and the

F litigant public in particular and to themselves in the estimate of the general

public. An advocate

is an officer of the court and enjoys a special status

in the society. The workers

in furtherance of collective bargaining organise

strike as

per the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as a last resort

to compel the management to concede their legitimate demands.

G

It is not necessary to go into the question whether the advocates, like

workmen, have any right at all

to go on strike or boycott court. In Federal

Trade Commission

v.

Supe1ior Cowt Tlial Lawyen Association et al. 493 US

411 : 107 L Ed 2d 851 (1989) the Attorneys who regularly accepted court

appointments to represent indigent defendants in minor felony and mis-

H demeanor case before the District of Columbia Superior Court sought an

U.P.SALETAXASSN. v. TAXATIONBARASSN. [K. RAMASWAMYJ.) 237

increase in the statutorily fixed fees they were paid for the work they had A

done. When their lobbying efforts to get increase in the fees failed, all the

attorneys,

as a group, agreed among themselves that they would not

accept

any new cases after a certain date, if the District of Columbia had not

passed legislation providing for an increase

in their fees. The trial lawyers'

association to which the attorneys belonged supported and publicised their

agreement. When they were not accepting the briefs which affected the

District's criminal justice systems, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

filed a complaint against the trial lawyer's association complaining that they

had entered into a conspiracy to

fix prices and go in for a boycott which

was an unfair method of competition violating

Section 5 of the Federal

Trade Commission Act

(15

USCS 45). The administrative law judge

rejected various defences of the Association and recommended that the

complaint to browbeat the boycott be dismissed. The Court ~f Appeals for

B

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the District of Columbia reversed the FTC Order holding that the Attor­

neys are protected by Federal constitution's First Amendment etc. On

certiorari, majority of U.S.A. Supreme Court speaking through Stevens, J. D

held that the lawyers had no protection of the First Amendment (free

speech) and the action of the group of attorneys to boycott the courts

constituted restraint of trade within the meaning of Section! of Sheman

Act against unfair method of competition. Though the object

was

enact­

ment of a favourable legislation, the boycott was the means by which the

attorneys sought to obtain favourable legislation. The Federal

Constitution's First Amendment does not protect them.

E

Shri K.K. Venugopal, a leading senior member of this Bar and ex­

President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, in his article "The Legal

Profession at the Turn of the Century" (1989) 1 NLSJ 121, opined that F

boycott amounts to contempt of court and the advocates participating in

the strike keep their clients

as hostages and their interests in jeopardy.

Shri

P.P. Rao, another senior member of this Bar and former President of the

Supreme Court Bar Association in his article "Strike by Professionals"

published in Indian Advocate -journal of the Bar Association of India

(Vol. XXIII

1991

(Part I) -opined that it amounts to professional miscon- G

duct. Shri H.M. Seervai, a noted distinguished jurist in his article ''Lawyers

Strike and the Duty of the Supreme Court" republished in the Indian

Advocate

Vol. XXIII (1991)

(Part I), opined that lawyers ought to know

that at least

as long as lawful redress is available to aggrieved lawyers, there

is no justification for lawyers to join in an illegal conspiracy to commit a H

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A gross, criminal contempt of court, thereby striking at the heart of the liberty

conferred on every person

by our Constitution. Strike is an attempt to

interfere with the administration of justice. The principle

is that those who

have duties to discharge

in a court of justice are protected by the law and

are shielded

by the law'to discharge those duties, the advocates in return

B

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D

E

F

G

have duty to protect the courts. F9r once conceded that lawyers are above

the law and the law courts, there can be no limit to lawyers taking the law

into their hands to paralyse the working of the courts.

"In my

submission",

he said that "it is high time that the Supreme Court and the High Court

make

it clear beyond doubt that they will not tolerate any interference from

anybody or authority in the daily administration of justice. For in no other

way can the Supreme Court and the High Court maintain the high position

and exercise the great powers conferred

by the Constitution and the law

to do justice without fear or favour, affection or

ill-will."

Shri Nariman, yet another learned senior members of this Court and

President of the Bar Association of India and Editor of the Indian Advo­

cate-in his article "Boycott

-a lawyer's weapon" published in the Journal

'Indian Advocate' (Vol. XVIII

1978 Nos. 1 & 2), opined that when the

lawyers boycott the courts, confidence in the administration of justice

is

shaken. The longer the boycott the greater the jeopardy to the system. The

boycotting of a court

by members privileged to practise, there is virtually

holding justice to ransom.

It certainly contributes to the law's delays. An

absention from the courts by those who have held themselves out as

practising, there

is a threat to the administration of law and undermines

the rule of law which

is the bedrock of our Constitution. He ended with a

quotation by Sir Norman Macleod AIR

(1920) Bombay 168 that "those who

live by the law would keep the law".

In a recent article by R.D. Sharma, published in Pioneer dated 9th

August,

1994, it is stated that law courts do not belong to the lawyers alone.

They belong to the people. Lawyers must realise the untold hardships and

miseries to which the litigants are subjected to and the extent to which the

cause of justice suffers on each day they boycott the courts on one pretext

or another.

It is this realisation which needs to be asserted vigorously than

ever before.

It is, therefore, stated that the public image of the lawyers

admittedly

is at its nadir and if remedial steps are not initiated from within,

a day

will come when society finds it convenient to dispense with them

H altogether. If it happens, it will be bad not only for the profession but also

U.P.SALETAXASSN. v. TAXATION BAR ASSN. [K. RAMASWAMY,J.) 239

for freedom, democracy

and rule of law in the country. A

In Cowt of its own motion v. Mr. B.D. Kaushik &

01:1·., [ 1991 I 4 Delhi

Lawyer 316, a Full

Court of the Delhi High Court was constrained to

consider the outrageous conduct on the part of M/s. B.D. Kaushik,

Rajinder Kumar, Rajiv Khosla, Jugal Wadhwa, R.N. Vats, Jatin

Singh and

P.S. Rathee, contemners in that case. The contemners, aided and abetted

by others in large number stormed various court rooms on September 26,

1991 at about 10.30 a.m., when Judges were transacting their judicial

functions; they individually

and collectively stood on the chairs, tables and

dais of the Court masters and acted in a menacing manner, shouted abuses.

and slogans such as

"Chief Justice and Judges Hai Hai, Murdabad". They

B

c

also prevented various lawyers from discharging their judicial functions as

officers

of the Court and also stopped the litigants from conducting their

cases in the Court.

In a threatening tone they also shouted at the Judges

saying

"Stop the work, we will not allow the courts to function and you

should retire

to your

chambers". They insisted upon the Chief Justice in D

his Court to listen to their Memorandum to be read by Rajiv Khosla which

was

read by B.D. Kaushik, the President of the Association. The contents

of the Memorandum scandalised or tended to lower the authority of the

High Court. This outrageous and unbecoming episode continued to linger

on and hover in the High Court till almost

12.30 P.M. The conscience of

the Court was shocked due to the contumacious conduct of the contemners

for initiation

of the Court's suo mottu action under Article 215 of the

Constitution.

The Full Bench,

Per majority, held that the contempt com­

mittea by the contemners is gravest and that it could not be imagined that

any contempt worse

than that was possible, as the contempt was committed

E

not by laymen but by those who are officers of the courts. F

In Common Cause v.

Union of India, (1995] 1 SCALE 6, this Court

is directly grappling with the problem of strike by Advocates. Noticing that

it was

not necessary to go into the wider question whether members of the

profession could at all go

on strike or boycott courts, it was felt that a

committee

be constituted in that behalf to suggest steps to be taken to G

prevent such boycott or strike. The committee suggested that, instead of

the Court going into the wider question, interim arrangements be made to

see whether it would

be workable. The suggestions made on November 13,

1994 were incorporated in the order passed by this Court as an interim

measure that the Advocates should not resort to the strike

or boycott the H

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A court or abstain from court except in serious, rarest of rare cases; instead,

they should resort to peaceful demonstration so

as to avoid causing

hardship to the litigant public.

B

c

D

E

F

The Court indicated as under :

"(1) In the rare instance where any association of lawyers (includ­

ing statutory Bar Councils) considers it imperative to call upon

and/or advise. members of the legal profession to abstain from

appearing

in courts on any occasion, it must be left open to any

individual member/members of that association to be free to ap­

pear without let, fear or hindrance or

any other coercive step.

.

(2)No such member who appears in court or otherwise practices

his legal profession, shall be visited with

any adverse or penal

consequences whatever

by any association of lawyers, and shall not

suffer

any expulsion or threat of expulsion therefrom.

(3) The above will not preclude other forms of protest by practicing

lawyers

in courts such as, for instance, wearing of arm bands and

other forms of protest which in no

way interrupt or disrupt the

court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant.

Any such forms of protest shall not 'however be derogatory

to the

court or to the profession.

(

4)

Office bearers of a Bar Association (including Bar Council)

responsible for taking decisions mentioned in clause (1) above shall

ensure that such decisions are implemented in the spirit of what

is stated in clause (1), (2) and (3) above."

Accordingly, the ·court directed the members of the Bar to adopt

further course of action

in terms thereof. Instead of working that order in

its letter and spirit and given a trial, strikes or boycotts of courts/tribunals

are being continued abegging. When in writ petition

No. 553/94 titled

G

Supreme Cowt Bar Association v. State of U.P. & Ors., concerning contempt

of the High Court

by some of the members of the Bar Association of

Allahabad High Court and the Police officials had come up for orders,

pursuant to a suggestion made

by the Bar by order dated February 21,

1995, this Court directed the Attorney General

.to convene a meeting of

H some of the leading senior members of the Bar of the Supreme Court to

(

(

J

U.P.SALETAXASSN.v.TAXATIONBARASSN.[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 241

suggest ways and means to tackle the problem of strike or boycott by the A

Advocates. Pursuant thereto, the Attorney General for India held two

meetings, whereat they reached consensus that a Standing Committee be

constituted at different

levels of courts to consider complaints and to

manage the crisis.

Similar views appears to have also been expressed by

the Bar Council of India and also the Bar Council of State of U.P. The

problem

was relegated to be considered in the Common Cause Case

(supra). However, it would be imperative to remind ourselves that self­

regulation alone would retrieve the profession from lost social respect and

enable the members of the profession

to keep the law as useful instrument

of social order.

In this case, the respondent-Association and the advocates resorted

to boycott the courts on the specious plea of non-transfer of

Satti Din, the

appellate authority,

who seems to be honest and willing to discharge his

duties diligently. When the Government stuck to its stand and did not yield

B

c

to the pressure despite the strike, the Bar Association filed writ petition in D

the High Court. Question is whether the High Court was justified in

entertaining the writ petition and issuing the directions quoted above. The

High Court has power

to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent a court or

tribunal from proceeding further when the inferior court or tribunal (a)

proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in

violation of the rules of natural justice, (

c) proceeds to act under law which E

is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or ( d) proceeds to act in contraven-

tion of the fundamental rights. None of these situations indisputably arises

in this case. As noted

above,

Section 9 of the Act is a complete code in

itself for conferment of jurisdiction on the appellate authority, the proce­

dure for dispensation and the power

to pass orders thereon. The appellate F

authority was acting in furtherance thereof. It is, therefore, to be seen

whether the High Court

was justified in issuing orders restraining the

authority from exercising those statutory powers and further to deprive that

authority to exercise those powers

by transfering the same to any other

jurisdiction.

S. Govinda Menon v.

Union of India & Anr., AIR 1976) SC 1274,

relied on by the 1st respondent is of no avail. In that case the acts and

omissions were imputed

to the officer, doubting his integrity, good faith

G

and devotion to duty expected of a civil servant, though integral to the

discharge

of statutory functions under the Madras Hindu Religious and H

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. The question was whether the officer

is amenable to· disciplinary jurisdiction when his conduct or integrity was

subject of disciplinary enquiry under all India Services (Discipline and

Appeal) Rules,

1955. It was held therein that he was amenable to discipli­

nary jurisdiction and action for misconduct. This case has no relevance to

B

the facts of the present case.

The decision

in Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D

Ward, Kanpur & Anr., AIR (1966)

SC 81 also is of no assistance to the 1st

respondent. Though this court

was considering the scope and nature of the

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article

226, there is no doubt now as

C regards the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Courts. However wide its

power be, the question

is whether a writ or order of prohibition could be

issued prohibiting a statutory authority from discharging its statutory func­

tions or transferring those functions to another jurisdiction.

Having given our anxious and careful consideration,

we are of the

D considered view that the High Court does not have the aforesaid power.

Exercise of such power generates its rippling effect on

the subordinate

judiciary and statutory functionaries. On slightest pretext by the aggrieved

parties or displeased members of the Bar,

by their concerted action they

would browbeat the judicial officers or authorities,

who would always be

E deterred from discharging their duties according to law without fear dis­

charging their duties according to law without fear or favour or ill-will.

Therefore,

we hold that writ petition is not maintainable. The impugned

orders are clearly and palpably illegal and are accordingly quashed.

Before parting with the case,

we are distressed to notice, as rightly

F pointed out by the learned Solicitor General, that

an: advocate instead of

arming himself with armoury of precedents,

was armed with licenced

revolver and

was attending the courts with licenced fire-arm. He pretended

to provide himself with the revolver to shoot

in self-defence. It is regret­

table that advocates attend court with fire arms; it

is not befitting to the

G dignity of the legal profession and is a distressing feature.

Such conduct

being not consistent with the dignity of the legal profession, to maintain

and enhance which the 1st respondent

is formed, the same needs to be

deprecated.

Before drawing the curtain on this unsavoury episode,

we express our

H deep appreciation for valuable assistance rendered by

Shri Dipankar

,_

-

U.P. SALE TAX ASSN. v. TAXATION BAR ASSN. [K RAMASWAMY, J.) 243

Gupta, learned Solicitor General as amicus curiae and learned counsel A

appearing for the parties.

The appeal

is accordingly allowed and the writ petition stands dis­

missed but, in the circumstances, without costs. The interim order passed

becomes non-functional automatically. D.P. Appeal allowed.

B