Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2360_of 2016

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.6036 OF 2014]

UTTAM …APPELLANT

VERSUS

SAUBHAG SINGH & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

R.F. Nariman, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.The present appeal is by the plaintiff who filed a suit for

partition, being Suit No.5A of 1999 before the Second Civil

Judge, Class II Devas, Madhya Pradesh, dated 28.12.1998, in

which the first four defendants happened to be his father

(defendant No.3), and his father’s three brothers i.e. defendant

Nos. 1,2 and 4. He claimed a 1/8

th

share in the suit property on

the footing that the suit property was ancestral property, and

that, being a coparcener, he had a right by birth in the said

1

Page 2 property in accordance with the Mitakshara Law. A joint written

statement was filed by all four brothers, including the plaintiff’s

father, claiming that the suit property was not ancestral

property, and that an earlier partition had taken place by which

the plaintiff’s father had become separate. The trial court, by its

order dated 20.12.2000 decreed the plaintiff’s suit holding that it

was admitted by DW.1 Mangilal that the property was indeed

ancestral property, and that, on the evidence, there was no

earlier partition of the said property, as pleaded by the

defendants in their written statements.

3.The first Appellate Court, by its judgment dated

12.1.2005, confirmed the finding that the property was ancestral

and that no earlier partition between the brothers had in fact

taken place. However, it held that the plaintiff’s grandfather,

one Jagannath Singh having died in 1973, his widow Mainabai

being alive at the time of his death, the said Jagannath Singh’s

share would have to be distributed in accordance with Section 8

of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as if the said Jagannath

Singh had died intestate, and that being the case, once Section

8 steps in, the joint family property has to be divided in

2

Page 3 accordance with rules of intestacy and not survivorship. This

being so, no joint family property remained to be divided when

the suit for partition was filed by the plaintiff, and that since the

plaintiff had no right while his father was alive, the father alone

being a Class I heir (and consequently the plaintiff not being a

Class I heir), the plaintiff had no right to sue for partition, and

therefore the suit was dismissed and consequently the first

appeal was allowed.

4.Following the same line of reasoning and several

judgments of this Court, the High Court in second Appeal

dismissed the said appeal, holding:-

“15. Thus in view of the provisions contained in

Sections 4,6, 8 and Schedule of the Act as well as

the law settled by the aforesaid judgments, it is

clear that after coming into force of the Act

grand-son has no birth right in the properties of

grand-father and he cannot claim partition during

lifetime of his father.

16. In the present case, it is undisputed that

Jagannath had died in the year 1973, leaving

behind respondents No. 1 to 4 i.e. his four sons

covered by Class I heirs of the schedule therefore,

the properties had devolved upon them when

succession had opened on the death of Jagannath.

It has also been found proved that no partition had

taken place between respondents No. 1 to 4. The

appellant who is the grand son of Jagannath is not

3

Page 4 entitled to claim partition during the lifetime of his

father Mohan Singh in the properties left behind by

Jagannath since the appellant has no birth right in

the suit properties.

17. In view of the aforesaid, the substantial

questions of law are answered against the appellant

by holding that the first appellate court has

committed no error in dismissing the suit for

partition filed by the appellant referring to Section 8

of the Act and holding that during the lifetime of

Mohan Singh, the appellant has no right to get the

suit property partitioned.”

5.It is this judgment that has been challenged before us in

appeal.

6.Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior advocate

appearing on behalf of the appellant, took us through various

provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, and through several

judgments of this Court, and contended that Section 6, prior to

its amendment in 2005, would govern the facts of this case. He

conceded that as Jagannath Singh’s widow was alive in 1973 at

the time of his death, the case would be governed by the

proviso to Section 6, and that therefore the interest of the

deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property would

devolve by intestate succession under Section 8 of the said Act.

However, he argued that it is only the interest of the deceased

4

Page 5 in such coparcenary property that would devolve by intestate

succession, leaving the joint family property otherwise intact.

This being the case, the plaintiff had every right to sue for

partition while his father was still alive, inasmuch as, being a

coparcener and having a right of partition in the joint family

property, which continued to subsist as such after the death of

Jagannath Singh, the plaintiff’s right to sue had not been taken

away. He went on to argue that Section 8 of the Act would not

bar such a suit as it would apply only at the time of the death of

Jagannath Singh i.e. the grandfather of the plaintiff in 1973 and

not thereafter to non suit the plaintiff, who as a living

coparcener of joint family property, was entitled to a partition

before any other death in the joint family occurred. He also

argued that the Hindu Succession Act only abrogated the Hindu

Law to the extent indicated, and that Sections 6 and 8 have to

be read harmoniously, as a result of which the status of joint

family property which is recognized under Section 6 cannot be

said to be taken away upon the application of Section 8 on the

death of the plaintiff’s grandfather in 1973.

5

Page 6 7.Shri Niraj Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the respondents, countered these submissions, and also

referred to various provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and

various judgments of this Court to buttress his submission that

once Section 8 gets applied by reason of the application of the

proviso to Section 6, the joint family property ceases to be joint

family property thereafter, and can only be succeeded to by

application of either Section 30 or Section 8, Section 30

applying in case a will had been made and Section 8 applying

in case a member of the joint family dies intestate. He,

therefore, supported the judgment of the High Court and

strongly relied upon two judgments in particular, namely

Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others v.

Chander Sen and Others, (1986) 3 SCC 567, and Bhanwar

Singh v. Puran, (2008) 3 SCC 87, to buttress his submission

that once Section 8 is applied to the facts of a given case, the

property thereafter ceases to be joint family property, and this

being the case, no right to partition a property which is no

longer joint family property continues to subsist in any member

of the coparcenary.

6

Page 7 8.Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is

necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956. The Act, as its long title states, is an Act

to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession

among Hindus. Section 4 overrides the Hindu Law in force

immediately before the commencement of this Act insofar as it

refers to any matter for which provision is made by the Act.

Section 4 reads as follows:

“4. Overriding effect of Act.—Save as otherwise

expressly provided in this Act,—

(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or

any custom or usage as part of that law in force

immediately before the commencement of this Act,

shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter

for which provision is made in this Act;

(b) any other law in force immediately before the

commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to

Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the

provisions contained in this Act.”

Section 6 prior to its amendment in 2005 reads as follows:

“6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary

property.—When a male Hindu dies after the

commencement of this Act, having at the time of his

death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary

property, his interest in the property shall devolve by

7

Page 8 survivorship upon the surviving members of the

coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act :

Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving

a female relative specified in Class I of the

Schedule or a male relative specified in that class

who claims through such female relative, the

interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara

coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary

or intestate succession, as the case may be, under

this Act and not by survivorship.

Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section,

the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall

be deemed to be the share in the property that

would have been allotted to him if a partition of the

property had taken place immediately before his

death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to

claim partition or not.

Explanation 2.—Nothing contained in the proviso to

this section shall be construed as enabling a person

who had separated himself from the coparcenary

before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs

to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred

to therein.”

It is common ground between the parties that since the present

suit was filed only in 1998 and the decree in the said suit was

passed on 20.12.2000, that the amendment to Section 6, made

in 2005, would not govern the rights of the parties in the present

case. This becomes clear from a reading of the proviso (i) to

Section 6 of the amended provision which states as follows:-

8

Page 9 “Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section

shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation

including any partition or testamentary disposition of

property which had taken place before the 20th day

of December, 2004.”

The explanation to this Section also states thus:

“Explanation.—For the purposes of this section

“partition” means any partition made by execution of

a deed of partition duly registered under the

Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition

effected by a decree of a court.”

From a reading of the aforesaid provision it becomes clear that

a partition having been effected by a court decree of

20.12.2000, which is prior to 9

th

September, 2005, (which is the

date of commencement of the Amending Act), would not be

affected.

9.The next important Section from our point of view is

Section 8, which reads as follows:-

“8. General rules of succession in the case of

males.—The property of a male Hindu dying

intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of

this Chapter —

(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives

specified in Class I of the Schedule;

(b) secondly, if there is no heir of Class I, then upon

the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class II of

the Schedule;

9

Page 10 (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two

classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased;

and

(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the

cognates of the deceased.”

THE SCHEDULE

Class I

Son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a

pre-deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son;

son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a

pre-deceased daughter; widow of a pre-deceased

son; son of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased

son; daughter of a pre-deceased son of a

pre-deceased son; widow of a pre-deceased son of

a pre-deceased son, son of a pre-deceased

daughter of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a

pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased

daughter; daughter of a pre-deceased son of a

pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a

pre-deceased daughter of a pre-deceased son.”

10.Also of some importance are Sections 19 and 30 of the

said Act which read as follows:-

“19. Mode of succession of two or more heirs.—

If two or more heirs succeed together to the

property of an intestate, they shall take the property,

—

(a) save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,

per capita and not per stirpes; and

(b) as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants.

10

Page 11 30. Testamentary succession.— Any Hindu may

dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition

any property, which is capable of being so disposed

of by him or by her, in accordance with the

provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of

1925), or any other law for the time being in force

and applicable to Hindus.

Explanation.—The interest of a male Hindu in a

Mitakshara coparcenary property or the interest of a

member of a tarwad, tavazhi, illom,

kutumba or kavaru in the property of the tarwad,

tavazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru shall,

notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or in

any other law for the time being in force, be deemed

to be property capable of being disposed of by him

or by her within the meaning of this section.”

11.Before analysing the provisions of the Act, it is necessary

to refer to some of the judgments of this Court which have

dealt, in particular, with Section 6 before its amendment in

2005, and with Section 8. In G.K. Magdum v. H.K. Magdum,

(1978) 3 S.C.R. 761, the effect of the old Section 6 was gone

into in some detail by this Court. A Hindu widow claimed

partition and separate possession of a 7/24

th

share in joint

family property which consisted of her husband, herself and

their two sons. If a partition were to take place during her

husband’s lifetime between himself and his two sons, the widow

would have got a 1/4

th

share in such joint family property. The

11

Page 12 deceased husband’s 1/4

th

share would then devolve, upon his

death, on six sharers, the plaintiff and her five children, each

having a 1/24

th

share therein. Adding 1/4

th

and 1/24th, the

plaintiff claimed a 7/24

th

share in the joint family property. This

Court held:-

“The Hindu Succession Act came into force on June

17, 1956. Khandappa having died after the

commencement of that Act, to wit in 1960, and since

he had at the time of his death an interest in

Mitakshara coparcenary property, the pre-conditions

of Section 6 are satisfied and that section is

squarely attracted. By the application of the normal

rule prescribed by that section, Khandappa's

interest in the coparcenary property would devolve

by survivorship upon the surviving members of the

coparcenary and not in accordance with the

provisions of the Act. But, since the widow and

daughter are amongst the female relatives specified

in class I of the Schedule to the Act and Khandappa

died leaving behind a widow and daughters, the

proviso to Section 6 comes into play and the normal

rule is excluded. Khandappa's interest in the

coparcenary property would therefore devolve,

according to the proviso, by intestate succession

under the Act and not by survivorship. Testamentary

succession is out of question as the deceased had

not made a testamentary disposition though, under

the explanation to Section 30 of the Act, the interest

of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary property

is capable of being disposed of by a will or other

testamentary disposition.

There is thus no dispute that the normal rule

provided for by Section 6 does not apply, that the

12

Page 13 proviso to that section is attracted and that the

decision of the appeal must turn on the meaning to

be given to Explanation 1 of Section 6. The

interpretation of that Explanation is the

subject-matter of acute controversy between the

parties.”

12.This Court, in dealing with the proviso and explanation 1

of Section 6, held that the fiction created by explanation 1 has

to be given its full effect. That being the case, it was held:-

“13. In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the

property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary

in the very nature of things, and as the very first

step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the

coparcenary property. For, by doing that alone can

one determine the extent of the claimant's share.

Explanation 1 to Section 6 resorts to the simple

expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of

a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener “shall be deemed to

be” the share in the property that would have been

allotted to him if a partition of that property had

taken place immediately before his death. What is

therefore required to be assumed is that a partition

had in fact taken place between the deceased and

his coparceners immediately before his death. That

assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other

words, the assumption having been made once for

the purpose of ascertaining the share of the

deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot

go back on that assumption and ascertain the share

of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption

which the statute requires to be made that a

partition had in fact taken place must permeate the

entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate

share of the heirs, through all its stages. To make

the assumption at the initial stage for the limited

13

Page 14 purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased

and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of

the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's

imagination to boggle. All the consequences which

flow from a real partition have to be logically worked

out, which means that the share of the heirs must

be ascertained on the basis that they had separated

from one another and had received a share in the

partition which had taken place during the lifetime of

the deceased. The allotment of this share is not a

processual step devised merely for the purpose of

working out some other conclusion. It has to be

treated and accepted as a concrete reality,

something that cannot be recalled just as a share

allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot

generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of this

position is that the heir will get his or her share in

the interest which the deceased had in the

coparcenary property at the time of his death, in

addition to the share which he or she received or

must be deemed to have received in the notional

partition.”

13.In State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao

Deshmukh and Ors. , (1985) 3 S.C.R. 358, this Court

distinguished the judgment in Magdum’s case in answering a

completely different question that was raised before it. The

question raised before the Court in that case was as to whether

a female Hindu, who inherits a share of the joint family property

on the death of her husband, ceases to be a member of the

family thereafter. This Court held that as there was a partition

by operation of law on application of explanation 1 of Section

14

Page 15 6, and as such partition was not a voluntary act by the female

Hindu, the female Hindu does not cease to be a member of the

joint family upon such partition being effected.

14.In Shyama Devi (Smt) and Ors.

v. Manju Shukla (Mrs) and Anr., (1994) 6 SCC 342, this Court

again considered the effect of the proviso and explanation 1 to

Section 6, and followed the judgment of this Court in

Magdum’s case (supra). This Court went on to state that

explanation 1 contains a formula for determining the share of

the deceased on the date of his death by the law effecting a

partition immediately before a male Hindu’s death took place.

15.On application of the principles contained in the aforesaid

decisions, it becomes clear that, on the death of Jagannath

Singh in 1973, the proviso to Section 6 would apply inasmuch

as Jagannath Singh had left behind his widow, who was a

Class I female heir. Equally, upon the application of explanation

1 to the said Section, a partition must be said to have been

effected by operation of law immediately before his death. This

being the case, it is clear that the plaintiff would be entitled to a

share on this partition taking place in 1973. We were informed,

15

Page 16 however, that the plaintiff was born only in 1977, and that, for

this reason, (his birth being after his grandfather’s death)

obviously no such share could be allotted to him. Also, his case

in the suit filed by him is not that he is entitled to this share but

that he is entitled to a 1/8

th

share on dividing the joint family

property between 8 co-sharers in 1998. What has therefore to

be seen is whether the application of Section 8, in 1973, on the

death of Jagannath Singh would make the joint family property

in the hands of the father, uncles and the plaintiff no longer joint

family property after the devolution of Jagannath Singh’s share,

by application of Section 8, among his Class I heirs. This

question would have to be answered with reference to some of

the judgments of this Court.

16.In Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others v.

Chander Sen and Others, (1986) 3 SCC 567, a partial partition

having taken place in 1961 between a father and his son, their

business was divided and thereafter carried on by a partnership

firm consisting of the two of them. The father died in 1965,

leaving behind him his son and two grandsons, and a credit

balance in the account of the firm. This Court had to answer as

16

Page 17 to whether credit balance left in the account of the firm could be

said to be joint family property after the father’s share had been

distributed among his Class I heirs in accordance with Section

8 of the Act.

17.This Court examined the legal position and ultimately

approved of the view of 4 High Courts, namely, Allahabad,

Madras, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, while stating

that the Gujarat High Court’s view contrary to these High

Courts, would not be correct in law. After setting out the various

views of the five High Courts mentioned, this Court held:

“It is necessary to bear in mind the preamble to the

Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The preamble states

that it was an Act to amend and codify the law

relating to intestate succession among Hindus.

In view of the preamble to the Act i.e. that to modify

where necessary and to codify the law, in our

opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates

heirs in Class I and only includes son and does not

include son's son but does include son of a

predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the

property in the situation contemplated by Section 8

he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. The

Gujarat High Court's view noted above, if accepted,

would mean that though the son of a predeceased

son and not the son of a son who is intended to he

excluded under Section 8 to inherit, the latter would

by applying the old Hindu law get a right by birth of

the said property contrary to the scheme outlined in

17

Page 18 Section 8. Furthermore as noted by the Andhra

Pradesh High Court that the Act makes it clear by

Section 4 that one should look to the Act in case of

doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would

be difficult to hold today the property which

devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu

Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-à-vis

his own son; that would amount to creating two

classes among the heirs mentioned in Class I, the

male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu

family property and vis-à-vis son and female heirs

with respect to whom no such concept could be

applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that

heirs in Class I of Schedule under Section 8 of the

Act included widow, mother, daughter of

predeceased son etc.

Before we conclude we may state that we have

noted the observations of Mulla's Commentary on

Hindu Law, 15th Edn. dealing with Section 6 of the

Hindu Succession Act at pp. 924-26 as well as

Mayne's on Hindu Law, 12th Edn., pp. 918-19.

The express words of Section 8 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956 cannot be ignored and must

prevail. The preamble to the Act reiterates that the

Act is, inter alia, to “amend” the law, with that

background the express language which excludes

son's son but includes son of a predeceased son

cannot be ignored.

In the aforesaid light the views expressed by the

Allahabad High Court, the Madras High Court, the

Madhya Pradesh High Court, and the Andhra

Pradesh High Court, appear to us to be correct.

With respect we are unable to agree with the views

of the Gujarat High Court noted hereinbefore.” [at

paras 21-25]

18

Page 19 18.In Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204 at

page 210, this Court followed the law laid down in Chander

Sen’s case.

19.In Bhanwar Singh v. Puran, (2008) 3 SCC 87, this Court

followed Chander Sen’s case and the various judgments

following Chander Sen’s case. This Court held:-

“The Act brought about a sea change in the matter

of inheritance and succession amongst Hindus.

Section 4 of the Act contains a non obstante

provision in terms whereof any text, rule or

interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage

as part of that law in force immediately before the

commencement of the Act, ceased to have effect

with respect to any matter for which provision is

made therein save as otherwise expressly provided.

Section 6 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time,

provided for devolution of interest in the

coparcenary property. Section 8 lays down the

general rules of succession that the property of a

male dying intestate devolves according to the

provisions of the Chapter as specified in Clause (1)

of the Schedule. In the Schedule appended to the

Act, natural sons and daughters are placed as

Class I heirs but a grandson, so long as father is

alive, has not been included. Section 19 of the Act

provides that in the event of succession by two or

more heirs, they will take the property per capita

and not per stirpes, as also tenants-in-common and

not as joint tenants.

Indisputably, Bhima left behind Sant Ram and three

daughters. In terms of Section 8 of the Act,

19

Page 20 therefore, the properties of Bhima devolved upon

Sant Ram and his three sisters. Each had 1/4th

share in the property. Apart from the legal position,

factually the same was also reflected in the

record-of-rights. A partition had taken place

amongst the heirs of Bhima.

Although the learned first appellate court proceeded

to consider the effect of Section 6 of the Act, in our

opinion, the same was not applicable in the facts

and circumstances of the case. In any event, it had

rightly been held that even in such a case, having

regard to Section 8 as also Section 19 of the Act,

the properties ceased to be joint family property and

all the heirs and legal representatives of Bhima

would succeed to his interest as tenants-in-common

and not as joint tenants. In a case of this nature, the

joint coparcenary did not continue.” (at paras 12-15)

20.Some other judgments were cited before us for the

proposition that joint family property continues as such even

with a sole surviving coparcener, and if a son is born to such

coparcener thereafter, the joint family property continues as

such, there being no hiatus merely by virtue of the fact there is

a sole surviving coparcener. Dharma Shamrao Agalawe v.

Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (1988) 2 SCC 126, Sheela Devi

v. Lal Chand, (2006) 8 SCC 581, and Rohit Chauhan v.

Surinder Singh (2013) 9 SCC 419, were cited for this purpose.

None of these judgments would take the appellant any further

in view of the fact that in none of them is there any consideration

20

Page 21 of the effect of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act.

The law, therefore, insofar as it applies to joint family property

governed by the Mitakshara School, prior to the amendment of

2005, could therefore be summarized as follows:-

(i)When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the

Hindu Succession Act, 1956, having at the time of his death an

interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the

property will devolve by survivorship upon the surviving

members of the coparcenary (vide Section 6).

(ii)To proposition (i), an exception is contained in Section 30

Explanation of the Act, making it clear that notwithstanding

anything contained in the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in

Mitakshara coparcenary property is property that can be

disposed of by him by will or other testamentary disposition.

(iii)A second exception engrafted on proposition (i) is

contained in the proviso to Section 6, which states that if such a

male Hindu had died leaving behind a female relative specified

in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that

Class who claims through such female relative surviving him,

then the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property

would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, and not

by survivorship.

21

Page 22 (iv)In order to determine the share of the Hindu male

coparcener who is governed by Section 6 proviso, a partition is

effected by operation of law immediately before his death. In

this partition, all the coparceners and the male Hindu’s widow

get a share in the joint family property.

(v)On the application of Section 8 of the Act, either by

reason of the death of a male Hindu leaving self-acquired

property or by the application of Section 6 proviso, such

property would devolve only by intestacy and not survivorship.

(vi) On a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act,

after joint family property has been distributed in accordance

with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family property

ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various

persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property as

tenants in common and not as joint tenants.

21.Applying the law to the facts of this case, it is clear that on

the death of Jagannath Singh in 1973, the joint family property

which was ancestral property in the hands of Jagannath Singh

and the other coparceners, devolved by succession under

Section 8 of the Act. This being the case, the ancestral

property ceased to be joint family property on the date of death

22

Page 23 of Jagannath Singh, and the other coparceners and his widow

held the property as tenants in common and not as joint

tenants. This being the case, on the date of the birth of the

appellant in 1977 the said ancestral property, not being joint

family property, the suit for partition of such property would not

be maintainable. The appeal is consequently dismissed with no

order as to costs.

……………………………J.

(Kurian Joseph)

……………………………J.

(R.F. Nariman)

New Delhi;

March 2, 2016.

23