As per case facts, an employee was terminated for alleged misconduct, including refusal to perform duties, misbehavior with the Vice Chairman, and using vulgar and disparaging utterances towards women of ...
Renuka WP 5003 of 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 5003 OF 2021
Uttan Machimar and Vahatuk Sahakari
Society Ltd. and Anr. ...Petitioners
V/s.
Nitin Jaywant Mhatre ...Respondent
______________
Mr. Prashant Mohite with Mr. Kishor G. Pashte for the Petitioner.
Mr. Rajendra Jain with Mr. Pranil Lahigade i/b Mr. Prashant Goyal for
Respondent.
______________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
RESERVED ON: 11 JUNE 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON: 17 JUNE 2026
JUDGMENT:
1) The issue involved in the Petition is whether an act of the
employee in making vulgar and disparaging utterances towards women
of the community for whose benefit he is employed would constitute a
grave misconduct entailing punishment of dismissal from service. Also
involved is the issue as to whether finding of guilt recorded by the
Labour Court after assessing the evidence before it can be set aside in
revision by the Industrial Court by laying emphasis on a discrepancy in
the depositions and by considering the relationship of a witness with the
office bearer of the management.
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2) The issues arise in the light of challenge raised by the
Petitioner-employer to the judgment and order dated 7 January 2021
passed by the Member, Industrial Court, Thane, partly allowing Revision
Application (ULP) No. 75 of 2015 and setting aside the judgment and
order dated 3 August 2015 passed by Labour Court, Thane in Complaint
(ULP) No. 25 of 2007. The Labour Court had dismissed Complaint (ULP)
No. 25 of 2007, in which the Respondent had challenged the order of his
termination. Reversing the decision of Labour Court, the Industrial Court
has partly allowed Complaint (ULP) No. 25 of 2007 by declaring the order
of termination dated 11 January 2007 as illegal. However, instead of
directing reinstatement or backwages, the Industrial Court has awarded
compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the Respondent. Petitioner-employer is
aggrieved by award of compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs by the Industrial
Court to the Respondent and has accordingly filed the present Petition.
3) Petitioner is a cooperative society engaged in the activity
inter alia of providing transportation of fish and other services for the
benefit of fishermen. Respondent was engaged as Driver by the
Petitioner-society since January 2001. According to the Respondent, he
took part in organizing a union in the Petitioner-society and became
office bearer of the union. On 1 April 2003, memorandum of settlement
was executed with the Union by the Petitioner, under which it
recommended the name of Respondent for appointment as Staff Director
on managing committee of the Petitioner-society. According to the
Respondent, Petitioner-society was not willing to accept him on the
managing committee of the society and accordingly, he was embroiled in
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disciplinary inquiries. Memo dated 13 September 2006 was issued to the
Respondent alleging absence from duties on 13 September 2006 and
advising him not to report for duties. Another memo dated 16 October
2006 was issued in respect of incident of 14 October 2006 once again
directing him not to report for duties. It appears that on 16 October
2006, Vice Chairman of Petitioner-society Mr. Malcam Kasughar made a
complaint against the Petitioner for use of unparliamentary language.
Respondent was kept under suspension by letter dated 29 November
2006.
4) A chargesheet dated 29 November 2006 was issued to the
Respondent in respect of acts of refusal to perform duty on 13 September
2006 and 14 October 2006 as well as for misbehavior with Vice Chairman
on 16 October 2006. It is the case of the Petitioner-society that on
account of threats issued by Respondent to the Enquiry Officer, enquiry
could not be conducted. A police complaint was lodged against the
Respondent on 27 December 2006 regarding the act of threatening the
Enquiry Officer. Petitioner-society thereafter proceeded to terminate the
services of the Respondent on 11 January 2007.
5) Respondent approached Labour Court, Thane by filing
Complaint (ULP) No. 25 of 2007 challenging termination order dated 11
January 2007. The complaint was resisted by the Petitioner by filing
written statement. Since enquiry could not be conducted, Petitioner-
society led evidence to prove misconduct of the Respondent before the
Labour Court by examining Mr. Malcam Bhandari-Chairman, Mr. Anthoni
Juran Dinis, Mr. Bernardt David Hendricks, Mr. Malcam Edward Kasughar,
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Mr. Bernet Francis Bhandari and Ms. Ranjana Francis Bhandari.
Respondent examined himself before the Labour Court. After considering
the evidence on record, the Labour Court proceeded to dismiss the
Complaint of the Respondent by judgment and order dated 3 August
2015. Respondent filed Revision Application (ULP) No. 75 of 2015 before
the Industrial Court, Thane challenging the decision of the Labour Court
under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act).
By judgment and order dated 7 January 2021, the Industrial Court has set
aside the order of the Labour Court and has declared the order of
termination of Respondent dated 11 January 2007 as illegal. However,
instead of ordering reinstatement or granting backwages, the Industrial
Court has awarded lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the
Respondent. Petitioner-society is aggrieved by the decision of the
Industrial Court and has accordingly filed the present Petition.
6) Mr. Mohite, the learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioner has submitted that the Industrial Court has erred in reversing
the well-considered decision of the Labour Court. That the Respondent
has committed serious misconduct of using unparliamentary and
derogatory language in front of Vice Chairman of society towards ladies
of fishermen community. That he also refused to perform duties on
several occasions. That he threatened the Enquiry Officer and prevented
him from conducting enquiry. That the Respondent had become an
incalcitrant employee who was repeatedly engaging in misbehavior and
misconduct. That the language used by the Respondent during the
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course of incident of 14 October 2006 is shocking. That despite
production of direct evidence of several witnesses, the Industrial Court
has erroneously held that the Respondent did not commit any
misconduct. That the finding of the Industrial Court that the punishment
is disproportionate is clearly erroneous. That awarding compensation to
the Respondent despite committing such grave misconduct would
tantamount to rewarding him. That the Industrial Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction by acting like an Appellate Court by reappreciating the
evidence. That revisional jurisdiction under Section 44 of the MRTU and
PULP Act is exercised by Industrial Court with material irregularity. He
would accordingly pray for setting aside the judgment and order passed
by the Industrial Court.
7) Per contra, Mr. Jain, the learned counsel appearing for
Respondent submits that the Industrial Court has correctly appreciated
the fact that Petitioner-society was unable to prove the charges levelled
against the Respondent. That the Respondent is deliberately embroiled
in false allegations since he was associated with the union activities.
That he was removed from service with a view to prevent him from being
appointed as Staff Director on the managing committee of the
Petitioner-society. That all the three incidents in the chargesheet relate
to a very short period of time, clearly indicating a deliberate design by
Petitioner-society to somehow throw the Respondent out of service. He
submits that witnesses produced by Petitioner-society sang different
songs during the course of their deposition. That there are serious
discrepancies in their depositions. Industrial Court has correctly held
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that there is absence of any corroborative material. He submits that in
exercise of limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, this Court cannot enter into the realm of reappreciation of
evidence, especially while the decision of the Industrial Court is well-
supported by the evidence on record. That Industrial Court has not
awarded reinstatement or backwages to the Respondent who is
victimized but has granted a meagre amount of compensation of Rs. 5
lakhs. He would therefore submit that no interference is warranted in the
judgment of the Industrial Court. He accordingly prays for dismissal of
the Petition.
8) Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for
my consideration.
9) While working as a Driver with the Petitioner-society,
Respondent was deputed to drive the vehicles/tempo owned by the
Petitioner-society for transportation of fish by members of the society. In
chargesheet dated 29 November 2006, three allegations were levelled
against the Respondent.
10) In the first charge, it was alleged that on 8 October 2006,
fish was being transported by two tempos, one of which was driven by
the Respondent. Since the Chairman Mr. Malcam Bhandari felt unwell
and fainted during the journey, the driver of the other tempo
Chandrakant Thakur drove his tempo to the market to ensure the quality
of the fish. He took Mr. Bhandari to the hospital, instructing the
Respondent to unload the fish from Mr. Thakur's tempo. However, after
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Mr. Thakur returned to the market, he found that Respondent had
disappeared from the scene by handing over the keys of Mr. Thakur's
tempo to a third person and failed to unload the fish. It was therefore
alleged that the Respondent endangered the safety of fish and put the
same at the risk of being wasted.
11) In the second charge, it was alleged that one of the
members Mr. Anthoni Dinis, who owns a fishing boat, had brought fish
on the Jetty on 13 September 2006 and had requested transportation of
fish to the office of society. Upon being instructed by the Manager Mr.
Bernardt Hendricks, Respondent failed to take tempo to the port for
transportation of fish and the fish remained in the boat. It was alleged
that the member Mr. Anthoni Dinis suffered loss of Rs. 51,622/- and
society suffered loss of commission of Rs. 1600/- on account of
degradation of quality of fish due to delay in transportation.
12) Lastly in charge No. 3, it was alleged that on 14 October
2006, Vice Chairman of the society Mr. Malcam Kasughar and other
members were present in the society office at 11.30 pm for procurement
of ice. At that time, Mr. Malcam Kasughar instructed the Driver Iqbal
Shaikh to transport ice meant for three boats and Mr. Shaikh expressed
that he would carry the ice after taking some rest. At that time,
Respondent suddenly intervened and used unparliamentary language.
When Mr. Kasughar inquired with the Respondent as to how he was
present in the society office if he was not an employee of the society,
Respondent again used extremely derogatory language about the women
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and daughters of the Koli community in presence of the other members,
including ladies.
13) This is how the three charges were levelled against the
Respondent by chargesheet dated 29 November 2006.
14) It is the case of the Petitioner-society that Respondent
prevented the enquiry from being conducted by threatening the Enquiry
Officer on 27 December 2006. A police complaint was lodged against the
Respondent on 27 December 2006. The society therefore issued
termination letter dated 11 January 2007 without holding enquiry.
15) Since enquiry was not held, the Petitioner-society led
evidence before the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 25 of 2007 by
examining several witnesses. The Labour Court appreciated the evidence
of the witnesses and held charge No.1 relating to incidence of 8 October
2006 to be disproved. Part of charge No. 2 relating to disobedience was
held to be proved but cause of loss to the member was not held to be
proved. Charge No. 3 was held to be proved by the Labour Court. The
Labour Court held that though the conduct of the Respondent in respect
of charge Nos. 1 and 2 may not be serious, the misconduct committed by
him on 14 October 2006 of using indecent language against Vice
Chairman in presence of several men and women members was sufficient
to dismiss him. Accordingly, the Complaint of Respondent was dismissed
by the Labour Court by order dated 03 August 2015. The Industrial Court
has, however, reversed the finding of the Labour Court.
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16) As observed above, the charge relating to incident dated 8
October 2006 was disproved by the Labour Court itself. So far as charge
No. 2 is concerned, the Labour Court had held that cause of loss was not
proved by evidence but the allegation of disobedience of order was
proved. So far as the third charge relating to the incident of 14 October
2006 is concerned, the same was the main allegation against the
Respondent. In relation to the said incident, the The Labour Court in its
judgment and order dated 3 August 2015 made the following
observations:
“As per the chargesheet Exh.U-25, the main allegation against the complainant
is in respect of incident dtd. 14.10.2006. To prove the charge the respondents
have examined Malkam Kasughar at Exh.C-6 and Burnat Bhandari at Exh.C-7A
and Ranjana Bhandari at Exh.C-9A. Malkam Kasughar has deposed that he was
present on 14.10.2006 in the office of the society at 11.30 p.m. He instructed
Iqqbal Shaikh to bring ice for the fishing boat to which Iqbal Shaikh replied
that he will go there after taking rest. At that time complainant immediately
came to him and in loud voice told to him ‘
मी सोसायटीचा नोकर नाही
,
मी सोसायटीच्या
पगारावरही नाही
, ’
मी सोसायटीच्या पगाराला लंडावर मारतो
. Then he enquired to the
complainant that whether he is not servant of the society and if not how he
was there in the society premises. To which he replied that ‘
मी गाडी चालवायला
’
आलो नाही तर कोळ्यांच्या बायांना व मुलींना झवायला आलो आहे
. The peoples were present
there got annoyed...”
17) Thus, it was alleged that on 14 October 2006, Respondent
used abusive language towards the Vice Chairman Mr. Malcam Kasughar
and also made vulgar and disparaging utterances towards wives and
daughters of Kolis (fishermen). The charge was held to be established by
the Labour Court after assessing the evidence on record. However, the
Industrial Court has reversed the finding of the Labour Court by
recording following findings:
18. According to the Ld. Labour Court, the main allegation against the revision
applicant is with respect of incident dated 14.10.2006. This allegation is with
respect to a misconduct of using abusive and indecent language by the revision
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applicant before Vice Chairman of the society Mr. Malcam Kasughar. It is
alleged that Mr. Kasughar directed another driver Mr. Iqbal Sheikh to bring all
the ice from three boats in one trip, that time, the revision applicant interfered
and used abusive and filthy language. It is further alleged therein that at that
time many ladies and gents were present. The Ld. Labour Court has considered
evidence before it from witness Malcalm Bhandari and Smt. Ranjana Bhandari
as well as the revision applicant and held that the said charge has been proved
by the respondents. For the purpose to see as to whether the said findings of
the Ld. Labour Court do not suffer from any apparent error, I have perused the
evidence on record before the Ld. Labour Court because without scrutinizing
the evidence legality of judgement of the Ld. Labour Court cannot be assessed.
19. I am aware of the fact that this Court cannot re-assess or re-examine the
evidence led before the Ld. Labour Court, but it can be definitely seen as to
whether any material witness has left by the Labour Court which amounts to
error. In this context, witness of the respondent Mr. Malcolm Kasughar stated
in the cross examination that on 14.10.2006 he was present in the office of the
society from 7.00 to 1.00 a.m in the night. He has further stated that on that
day, no members of the committee were present with him at 11:30 pm. He
admits that he himself or the society has not lodged any police complaint
about the incidence took place on 14.10.2006. Another witness Mr. Burnat
Bhandari who has been examined at Exh.C-7A has stated that on 14.10.2006 at
about 11.30 in the night, Chairman Mr. Malcam Bhandari and Deputy
Chairman Mr. Malcam Kasughar were present in the office of the society and
no police complaint was made. Third witness Smt. Ranjana Bhandari has
admitted that she is sister of Ex-Chairman Mr. Malcam Bhandari, but she
denied that her brother was present at the time of so called incidences taken
place on 14.10.2006. If all this evidence is considered, it will clear that there is
no corroboration of witnesses with each other.
20. Now coming to the most important aspect with respect to the allegation
dated 14.10.2006 that the society has issued a memo after two days i.e. on
16.10.2006, in which it is only mentioned that due to the misconduct
committed by the revision applicant with Vice Chairman Mr. Malcam Kasughar,
he is restrained from joining duty since 16.10.2006 on the instructions of the
Chairman. It is also material to note that in the said memo, nothing has been
mentioned about using offensive or filthy language by the revision applicant in
the presence of Chairman or the ladies. It is also required to be noted that in
the said memo, earlier it is mentioned as “संस्थेचे चेयरमन श्री माल्कम भंडारी यांचे
बरोबर के लेल्या गैरव
र्तणुकीमुळे”
. However, the words “vice” has been added before the
word Chairman and the word Malcalm Bhandari has been struck down and the
word Kasughar has been inserted. Therefore, it is surprising that such serious
misconduct using language has taken place, but the same has not been
mentioned in the memo which was issued after two days after so called
incidence. Secondly, the witness admitted that there is no police complaint
made in respect of the said incidence, nor any other independent lady has
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complained against the revision applicant or came forward to give evidence.
The lady who has been examined is admittedly sister of director Mr. Malcolm
Bhandari. This memo dated 16.10.2006 has not at all been considered by the
Ld. Labour Court which according to me a clear error apparent on the face of
the record and therefore the Ld. Labour Court committed error in holding that
charge with respect to incident dated 14.10.2006 has been proved against the
revision applicant. The Ld. Labour Court has only held that the complainant
has admitted his presence and presence of women at that time and therefore
the charge has been proved. However, the Learned Labour Court failed to
appreciate chronology of events i.e. issues of a letter by Maharashtra Rajaya
Rashtriya Kamghar Sangh to appoint the revision applicant on Director body of
the society as workers’ director as he is taking care interest of the workers on
01.09.2006. Thereafter, only the memo dated 13.09.2006 was issued restraining
the revision applicant from joining duties as he did not remain present in the
office. Second memo is dated 16.10.2006 regarding so called misconduct with
Malcam Kasughar. It is pertinent to note that prior to September 2006, the
record of the revision applicant appears to be clean and only after insurance of
letter by the union for appointing him as workers’ director, allegations against
him where started.
21. The Ld. Labour Court in the judgement has stated that a vague statement
about taking part in the union activities has been made by the revision
applicant without there being any cogent evidence. At the same time, the Ld.
Labour Court appears to have ignored the letter dated 01.06.2009 issued by the
union for joining him on director body as earlier director. The said letter is self
speaking, in which the union has stated that the revision applicant is taking
care of workers’ right and interest. This itself shows that the revision applicant
was active member of the union. Thereafter by issuing memo, the society tried
to keep him away from the duty and when he challenged the same action by
filing complaint in the Industrial Court, the society started enquiry against
him. Other charges does not appear to be serious, but the only serious charge is
about the incident dated 14.10.2006. However, for the first charge it is alleged
in the chargesheet that the revision applicant committed misconduct of using
indecent and abusive language before gents and ladies and lastly by making
farce of enquiry he appears to have been terminated on the ground of loss of
confidence. With respect to incident dated 14.10.2006, there was no memo
issued through the revision applicant and no explanation was called from him
by mentioning that he had used indecent language and hence, I hold that the
evidence of the respondent ought to have been careful examined by the Ld.
Labour Court. After taking into consideration material peace of evidence and
chronology of events, I find that the Ld. Labour Court has committed error
which is apparent on the fact of the record. Hence, I hold that the respondent
society has failed to prove the misconduct alleged against the revision
applicant with respect to so called incident dated 14.10.2006.
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18) The Industrial Court has considered the evidence of Mr.
Malcam Kasughar, Mr. Bernet Bhandari and Smt. Ranjana Bhandari for
arriving at a conclusion that there is no corroboration of witnesses with
each other. However, evidence of Mr. Malcam Kasughar clearly indicates
use of indecent and unparliamentary language by the Respondent. The
Industrial Court has misread the admission given by Mr. Malcam
Kasughar that “दि. 14/10/2006 रोजी रात्री 11.30 वाजता माझ्यासोबत का
र्यकारिणीतील कोणीच
स
दस्य हजर नव्हता
...”. This statement is read by the Industrial Court to mean
deposition by Mr. Malcam Kasughar that no managing committee
member was present when the incident occurred. This does not mean
that the persons named in his examination in chief were not present
when the incident occurred. May be that the witness Mr. Bernet Francis
Bhandari deposed that society Chairman Mr. Malcam Bhandari was also
present when incident occurred, which appears to be inconsistent with
deposition of Mr. Malcam Kasughar. However, this discrepancy is not
sufficient to completely disregard the depositions of both the witnesses.
More importantly, the occurrence of incident is also deposed by one
more witness, Smt. Ranjana Francis Bhandari. The Industrial Court
however disregarded her evidence merely because she is sister of Ex-
Chairman of the society.
19) It must be borne in mind that this is a domestic enquiry and
the test to prove the charges in a domestic enquiry is preponderance of
probability. Charges need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Small
discrepancies in depositions of witnesses cannot be a ground for
disbelieving in deposition of witnesses. Such discrepancies do not make
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out a case of perversity. It is not necessary in a domestic enquiry that
there must be corroboration in evidence led by all the witness. The
Industrial Court has committed a grave error in giving important to one
small inconsistency between depositions of the two witnesses (about
presence of managing committee member) What ought to have been
appreciated by the Industrial Court is the fact that both the witnesses Mr.
Malcom Kasughar and Mr. Bernet Francis Bhandari have deposed about
use of abusive and derogatory language by the Respondent and that
there is no inconsistency in the same. In such circumstances, the
discrepancy about presence of Society’s Chairman ought to have been
ignored by the Industrial Court.
20) The industrial Court has also erred in completely
disregarding the deposition of Smt. Ranjana Bhandari merely because
she happens to be the sister of ex-chairman. There is no dispute that
Smt. Ranjana Bhandari herself is engaged in fishing activities and was in
the Society’s Office for collection of ice on 14 October 2006. Thus the
case does not involve setting up a related witness, who had no occasion
to be present at the time of the incident. Therefore mere relationship of
the witness with the ex-office bearer of the Society cannot be a reason
for completely discarding her evidence. What needs to be emphasized is
the capacity of the witness as a fisherwoman and not her relationship as
sister of the ex-office bearer. She was present at the spot in her capacity
as a fisherwoman and not in capacity as sister of ex-chairman.
21) Yet another factor considered by the Industrial Court for
disbelieving the incident of 14 October 2006 is the manner in which
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Memo dated 16 October 2006 was couched. The Industrial Court has held
that the Memo did not include the allegation of using filthy language by
the Respondent. The Memo dated 16 October 2006 was issued to the
Respondent essentially to ensure that the Respondent did not attend
duties. It was not for conducting disciplinary inquiry against him.
Therefore, it was not necessary for the Society to give all the details of
the Respondent’s misconduct in the said Memo. Therefore, mere absence
of allegation of use of indecent or unparliamentary language in the
Memo dated 16 October 2006 cannot be a ground for concluding that the
incident may not have occurred. Referring to the conduct of misbehavior
of the Respondent with Mr. Malcam Kasughar in the Memo dated 16
October 2006 was sufficient and it was not necessary to reproduce the
entire details of misconduct.
22) The third factor considered by the Industrial Court for
disciplinary incident of 14 October 2006 is non-lodging of police
complaint in respect of that incident. The Industrial Court has however
failed to appreciate that lodging of police compliant is not a sine qua non
for holding of disciplinary inquiry. The employer in a given case may
think it appropriate not to lodge criminal prosecution and give
importance to enforcing discipline amongst the staff members by
conducting domestic inquiry. In my view therefore, non-lodging of police
complaint is an altogether irrelevant factor for deciding the issue of
commission of service-related misconduct by the Respondent.
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23) Thus, the parameters applied by the Industrial Court while
deciding the Revision of the Respondent are entirely incorrect leading to
erroneous conclusion.
24) In a domestic inquiry, the findings can be treated as
perverse only if there is total absence of evidence. The present case does
not involve perversity in the light of availability of some evidence on
record for proving the charge relating to incident of 14 October 2006. It
is well-settled position that courts and tribunals cannot go into the issue
of adequacy of evidence for a domestic enquiry. It is only in a case where
there is absolutely no evidence that courts or tribunal are justified in
interfering in the finding of the guilt. Reference in this regard can be
made to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and Anr.
Vs Rattan Singh
1
in which it is held as under:
4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated
rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All
materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities
and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material
and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant
under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite
decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and
other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach
is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and
observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if
perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment
vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic
tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected
themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone
out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding
could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent
referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not
1
(1977) 2 SCC 491
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go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid
requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there
no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular
court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of
understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way,
sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is
beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is
certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an
error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence
of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has
relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are
unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.
(emphasis added)
25) Again, in Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and
Ors.
2
, the Apex Court has held as under:
6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under
Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental
enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of
course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role
of the appellate authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can
the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as
also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic
enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if
there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were
such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the
findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority.
7. In Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar [(1978) 3 SCC 366] it was held that
the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of quasi-judicial
character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its
conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which
and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the
delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere
suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If,
therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the
delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings
recorded by the enquiry officer would be perverse.
2
(1992) 2 SCC 10
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8. The findings recorded in a domestic enquiry can be characterised as perverse
if it is shown that such findings are not supported by any evidence on record or
are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person
could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. This principle
was laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rama Rao [(1964) 2 LLJ 150] in
which the question was whether the High Court under Article 226 could
interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision
was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [(1969) 2 LLJ
377] and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel [(1976) 1 SCC 518] . In
Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC 635] it was laid down that
where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the
conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be
rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal
records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are its mere ipse
dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the
additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.
9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings
of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is based on
no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial
scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions
which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no
evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person
would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence
on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever
compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse
and the findings would not be interfered with.
(emphasis added)
26) In my view therefore, the Industrial Court has exercised
revisional jurisdiction under Section 44 of the MRTU and PULP Act with
material irregularity. It has virtually reappreciated the evidence and has
gone into the issue of quality and quantity of evidence, which was
beyond its jurisdiction. Findings are recorded by the Industrial Court that
punishment imposed on the Respondent is shockingly disproportionate
and that the Respondent is victimized. I am unable to agree with those
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findings. Looking at the utterances made by the Respondent on 14
October 2006 towards women of Koli community, it cannot be concluded
that the misconduct is not serious.
27) So far as finding of the Industrial Court about victimization
is concerned, in every case, presumption of victimization cannot be
drawn merely because action is taken against an office-bearer of the
Union. Courts and Tribunals need to first assess the conduct of the
delinquent employee independent of his/her status as office-bearer and
find out whether the conduct amounts to misconduct. If the conduct of
even an office-bearer of the union constitutes misconduct, no special
protection can be extended to such office-bearer and inference of
victimization cannot be readily drawn.
28) This Court is aware of the position that the Industrial Court
has not awarded the relief of reinstatement or backwages to the
Respondent. It has, however, awarded lumpsum amount of Rs. 5 lakhs.
Ordinarily, this Court would not have interfered in award of
compensation in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution of India. However, the misconduct committed by the
Respondent is grave. Petitioner-society is justified in terminating his
service with a view to ensure discipline in its organization. An employee
who had become incalcitrant and who has indulged in misbehaving with
the Vice Chairman by use of unparliamentary and indecent language
cannot be rewarded with compensation. It has come on record that, the
Respondent has used derogatory language towards Koli women in the
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Renuka WP 5003 of 2021
incident of 14 October 2006. There was no provocation for Petitioner to
utter the words which he has uttered towards the Vice Chairman and
women. On 14 October 2006, Mr. Malcam Kasughar had instructed the
other Driver Iqbal Shaikh and there was no occasion to intervene in such
conversation by the Respondent. Thus, the utterances made by
Respondent were not a reaction to any action taken against him. This
indicates the mindset of the Respondent who has indulged in the act of
hurling abuses and making utterances in unparliamentary language
which are derogatory to women in presence of other women. Such
tendency on behalf of employees needs to be dealt with iron hands so as
to maintain discipline in the organization. Respondent had apparently
become an element of terror and even prevented the enquiry officer from
conducting enquiry by threatening him. While the Industrial Court laid
emphasize on non-filing of police complaint with regard to incident of
14 October 2006, it conveniently ignored the complaint lodged in respect
of threats given to the Enquiry Officer on 27 December 2006.
29) Respondent made derogatory utterances against women
belonging to mainly Koli community. Many fisherwomen were present
when the utterances were made. Thus, derogatory statements were not
confined only in relation to Respondent’s employment and the same
were made towards someone for whose benefit the Respondent was
employed. He was employed to drive inter alia the fisherwomen on daily
basis. The utterances made by him on 14 October 2006 indicated his
mindset towards the persons for whose benefit he was employed with the
organization. Such a person cannot be rewarded with compensation. The
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Industrial Court has not appreciated this position and has erroneously
proceeded to set aside the order of the Labour Court by rewarding the
Respondent for his unpardonable conduct.
30) In my view therefore, the order of the Industrial Court is
indefensible and liable to be set aside. The Petition accordingly succeeds,
and I proceed to pass the following order:
(i)Judgment and order dated 7 January 2021 passed by Member,
Industrial Court, Thane in Revision Application (ULP) No. 75 of
2015 is set aside.
(ii)Judgment and order of Labour Court dated 3 August 2015
dismissing Complaint (ULP) No. 25 of 2007 is upheld.
31) Writ Petition is allowed in above terms. Rule is made
absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
Page No. 20 of 20
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The recent judgment in Uttan Machimar and Vahatuk Sahakari Society Ltd. and Anr. v. Nitin Jaywant Mhatre (WP 5003 of 2021) from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay delivers a critical ruling on what constitutes grave misconduct in employment and the boundaries of revisional jurisdiction for Industrial Courts. This significant decision, which overturns a compensation award and upholds the original dismissal of an employee, is now readily accessible on CaseOn, highlighting key principles for employers and legal practitioners navigating disciplinary actions and appellate processes.
This case revolves around the termination of service of an employee (Respondent) by a cooperative society (Petitioner) following allegations of misconduct, including the use of abusive and derogatory language. The journey of this dispute through the Labour Court, Industrial Court, and finally the High Court, provides valuable insights into the standards of proof in domestic inquiries and the appropriate exercise of revisional powers.
The Petitioner, Uttan Machimar and Vahatuk Sahakari Society Ltd., is a cooperative society primarily involved in transporting fish and providing services for the benefit of fishermen. The Respondent, Nitin Jaywant Mhatre, was employed as a Driver since January 2001. The dispute began after the Respondent became involved in union activities and sought a position as Staff Director on the society's managing committee. This led to a series of disciplinary actions and memos, culminating in his suspension in November 2006.
The High Court was tasked with addressing two fundamental questions:
Following a chargesheet detailing three allegations (refusal to perform duty, causing loss, and using derogatory language), and the inability to conduct a formal inquiry due to alleged threats from the Respondent, the Petitioner-society terminated his services. The Respondent challenged this termination before the Labour Court. The Labour Court, after examining evidence presented by both sides, found two of the three charges proved: disobedience of orders (though not the resultant loss) and, critically, the third charge relating to the use of indecent and derogatory language on October 14, 2006. The Labour Court concluded that this misconduct alone was sufficient to justify dismissal, thus upholding the termination.
The Respondent then filed a Revision Application with the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court reversed the Labour Court's decision, declaring the termination illegal. Instead of ordering reinstatement or backwages, it awarded the Respondent a lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs. The Industrial Court based its reversal on several grounds: perceived discrepancies in witness testimonies, the lack of corroboration, the disregard of a witness's testimony due to her relationship with an ex-Chairman, the absence of specific details in an initial memo, and the fact that no police complaint was lodged for the incident. It also opined that the Respondent might have been victimized due to his union activities and that the punishment was disproportionate.
Aggrieved by the compensation award and the Industrial Court's findings, the Petitioner-society approached the High Court. The High Court's primary focus was to determine if the Industrial Court had correctly applied its revisional jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act).
The High Court's decision heavily relies on established legal principles governing domestic inquiries and the scope of revisional jurisdiction. It emphasized that courts and tribunals should not act as appellate authorities in such matters, particularly regarding the re-appreciation of evidence.
The High Court reiterated that findings in a domestic inquiry can only be deemed 'perverse' if there is a total absence of evidence. It cited landmark Supreme Court judgments, State of Haryana and Anr. Vs Rattan Singh and Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and Ors., to underscore that the strict rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials do not apply to domestic inquiries. The test is whether there was 'some evidence' that a 'reasonable person' could act upon, not whether it was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The sufficiency of evidence is generally beyond scrutiny.
The High Court highlighted that minor inconsistencies or discrepancies in witness depositions are common and do not automatically negate the credibility of evidence, especially in a domestic inquiry where the standard is preponderance of probability. It also clarified that corroboration from every witness is not a prerequisite for proving charges.
A crucial aspect of the High Court's ruling was its clarification on the limits of revisional jurisdiction. It asserted that the Industrial Court, under Section 44 of the MRTU and PULP Act, cannot re-evaluate the quality and quantity of evidence as an appellate court would. Its role is limited to correcting material irregularities or perverse findings, not re-appreciating evidence.
For legal professionals and students looking to quickly grasp the nuances of such complex rulings, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that succinctly summarize the critical points and implications of judgments like Uttan Machimar and Vahatuk Sahakari Society Ltd. and Anr. v. Nitin Jaywant Mhatre, making legal analysis more efficient and accessible.
The High Court systematically dismantled the Industrial Court's reasoning for reversing the Labour Court's findings.
The High Court found that the Industrial Court misread certain admissions and placed undue emphasis on minor discrepancies. For instance, a witness's statement about the absence of managing committee members at a specific time did not contradict the core testimony regarding the Respondent's use of abusive language. The High Court stressed that both key witnesses (Mr. Malcam Kasughar and Mr. Bernet Francis Bhandari) consistently deposed about the abusive language, and this core aspect remained uncontradicted.
The Industrial Court's decision to disregard the testimony of Smt. Ranjana Bhandari merely because she was the sister of an ex-Chairman was deemed erroneous. The High Court pointed out that she was present at the incident in her capacity as a fisherwoman, a member of the community, and not merely as a related party. Her presence at the society's office for collecting ice on the day of the incident was undisputed.
The High Court clarified that the memo issued two days after the incident was primarily to restrain the Respondent from duty, not a detailed chargesheet for a disciplinary inquiry. Therefore, its lack of specific verbatim details of the abusive language was not a valid ground to doubt the incident's occurrence. Furthermore, the High Court held that lodging a police complaint is not a mandatory prerequisite for conducting a domestic inquiry. Employers have the discretion to focus on internal discipline.
The High Court concluded that the Industrial Court had exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by delving into the re-appreciation of evidence, essentially acting as an appellate court. This approach, according to the High Court, constituted a material irregularity and led to an erroneous conclusion.
The High Court strongly condemned the Respondent's utterances towards women of the Koli community. It deemed such conduct as 'shocking' and 'grave misconduct,' especially given that the Respondent was employed to serve this very community. The court emphasized that such behavior cannot be considered minor and warrants stern action to maintain organizational discipline. It noted that the Respondent's intervention in another driver's conversation and subsequent abuse indicated a clear mindset, not a reaction to any provocation.
Regarding the Industrial Court's finding of victimization, the High Court clarified that victimization cannot be presumed merely because an action is taken against a union office-bearer. The employee's conduct must be assessed independently, and if it constitutes misconduct, no special protection can be extended. The High Court also highlighted that the Industrial Court overlooked the police complaint lodged regarding the Respondent's threats to the Enquiry Officer, which hindered the inquiry process.
In light of its detailed analysis, the High Court concluded that the Industrial Court's order was indefensible and liable to be set aside. The High Court:
The Writ Petition was allowed, and rule was made absolute, with no order as to costs.
This High Court judgment serves as a crucial guide for understanding the fine line between valid legal scrutiny and overreach in revisional jurisdiction. For lawyers, it clarifies the standards for challenging or defending findings in domestic inquiries, particularly on grounds of perversity or adequacy of evidence. It underscores that minor inconsistencies or relationships of witnesses, if not fundamentally undermining the core evidence, should not be grounds for overturning well-reasoned findings.
For students, the case offers a practical illustration of the IRAC method in action, demonstrating how judicial bodies apply legal principles (like those from MRTU and PULP Act and precedents on domestic inquiries) to complex factual scenarios. It highlights the importance of distinguishing between appellate and revisional powers and the serious implications of workplace misconduct, especially involving derogatory language towards beneficiaries of service.
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.
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