As per case facts, the Appellant, who was the original Plaintiff, filed a suit challenging a Judgment that had dismissed his claim. He alleged an oral agreement from 1982 with ...
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1085 OF 2010
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 14722 OF 2023
Vasant Gangaram Pedamkar .. Appellant
Versus
Harishchandra Gangaram Pedamkar (Now deceased)
through LRs. Asmita Anil Dalvi Nee
Asmita Harishchan and Ors. .. Respondents
Mr A A Siddiquie a/w Mr Suraj D Chauhan i/b M/s A A Siddiquie and
Associates, for the Appellant.
Mr Rajesh B Doshi a/w Ms Neha R Doshi, for Respondents No.1 and 2.
for the Defendant / Respondent.
CORAM : FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, J.
RESERVED ON :DECEMBER 15, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : JUNE 09, 2026
JUDGEMENT :
1. The present First Appeal is filed challenging the Judgement dated 23
rd
June 2010 passed by the Bombay City Civil Court at Dindoshi, Mumbai, in S.C.
Suit No.6680 of 1999 whereby the said Suit was dismissed.
Page 1 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
MAMTA
AMAR
KALE
Digitally
signed by
MAMTA
AMAR
KALE
Date:
2026.06.09
18:05:43
+0530
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
2. Interim Application No.14722 of 2023 is filed by the Appellant under
the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(CPC), seeking to produce additional evidence on record in the appeal. This
Interim Application is directed to be heard along with the present First Appeal.
FACTS
3. The case of the Appellant (original Plaintiff) is as under:
a. The original Respondent No.1 is the elder brother of the Appellant and
Respondent No.2 is the younger brother of the Appellant. The suit premises
being Room No.516, Azad Nagar, Building No.32, Alfa Co-Operative Housing
Society, Andheri (West), Mumbai, was originally allotted to original Respondent
No.1 on monthly rental basis by MHADA in 1966.
b. Sometime around 1982, MHADA agreed to convert the tenancy rights of
occupants into ownership rights. For that purpose, MHADA launched a hire
purchase scheme and the individual buildings were allowed to form their own
co-operative housing society and pay the purchase price. MHADA fixed the
purchase price of the suit premises as Rs.7,000/-
c. The Appellant and Respondent No.1 were staying in the suit premises
Page 2 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
with their respective families. It was agreed between the Appellant and original
Respondent No.1 that the Appellant will pay the purchase price of the suit
premises to MHADA and shall also help Respondent No.1 for the marriage of
his daughter because at the relevant time, the original Respondent No.1 had
resigned from his service. It was also agreed that, though the name of the
original Respondent No.1 is recorded as the member of the society and the share
certificate be obtained in the name of original Respondent No.1, for all
purposes, the Appellant alone and exclusively would be entitled to all the right,
title and interest in the suit premises.
d. With these mutual agreements, the name of the original Respondent
No.1 was allowed to be incorporated as a member of the society. The Appellant
continued to pay the monthly installments towards the price of the suit
premises. The Appellant also maintained original Respondent No.1 and his
family members out of his own income and the Appellant alone made all the
expenses of the marriage of the daughter of original Respondent No.1.
e. The Appellant’s father had acquired property at his native place. In 1984,
Respondent No.1 left Mumbai under the pretext of looking after the affairs of
the said property.
Page 3 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
f. In April 1998, at the behest of original Respondent No.1, the Appellant
made an Application to MHADA for transfer of the rights in the suit premises
in his favour. The original Respondent No.1 gave his No Objection without
any hesitation. On the basis of the said Application, the Estate Manager-II,
MHADA, by letter dated 20
th
June 1998, called upon the Appellant to submit
No Objection. Accordingly, the Appellant submitted No Objection dated 13
th
October 1998, signed by all the family members of original Respondent No.1
and by letter dated 29
th
November 1998, the Estate Manager-II, MHADA
transferred the suit premises in the name of the Appellant. The society has also
transferred the share certificate in the name of the Appellant.
g. The Appellant claims that he is the exclusive owner of the suit premises.
h. According to the Appellant, in October 1999, original Respondent No.1
and Respondent No.2 lodged a false complaint with Respondent No.3 alleging
that the transfer of premises in the name of the Appellant was not at the
instance of the original Respondent No.1. Respondent No.3, at the instance of
original Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2, threatened the Appellant with
Page 4 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
arrest. The Appellant therefore had an apprehension that the Respondents
would forcibly take possession of the suit premises.
i. In these circumstances, the Appellant filed the present suit for a
declaration that he is the sole and exclusive owner of the suit premises and for
an injunction restraining the Respondents from interfering with the exclusive
possession of the suit premises.
4. The case of the Respondents is as under :
a. The original Respondents No.1 and 2 have filed Written Statement and
have denied all the averments made in the Plaint. It was the objection of the
Respondents that the spouse and daughters of original Respondents No.1 and 2
were not made parties and, therefore, the suit has to be dismissed.
b. It is the case of the Respondents that, in 1966, MHADA allotted the suit
premises to original Respondent No.1 for his residence. The original
Respondent No.1, the Appellant and Respondent No.2, along with their sister,
were residing in the suit premises. After the marriage of the sister, original
Respondent No.1, the Appellant and Respondent No.2 continued to reside in
Page 5 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
the suit premises.
c. In 1993, Respondent No.2 shifted to Thane as his wife got employment
in Thane. The Appellant and the original Respondent No.1 continued to reside
in the suit premises.
d. In 1977, the Mill where Respondent No.1 was employed was closed.
Original Respondent No.1 and the Appellant were jobless. Till 1993, original
Respondent No.1 and the Appellant were residing along with their families in
the suit premises. Thereafter, as per mutual agreement and for the sake of
convenience, it was decided that original Respondent No.1 would look after
their mother at the native place and would also look after the agricultural land
and the property situated at the native place being Village ‘Lep’. The original
Respondent No.1 used to visit the suit premises frequently and pay the
outgoings of it to MHADA.
e. In or around 1998, the Appellant requested the original Respondent No.1
and other family members to sign on some papers required for renovation of the
suit premises and extension of the building and for submitting the same to the
Page 6 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
local authority and MHADA. The original Respondent No.1 signed some
papers in good faith and having trust in the Appellant. The Appellant misused
the said trust and by misrepresentation and fraud and by forging the signatures
of the wife and daughters of original Respondent No.1, got the suit premises
transferred in his name.
f. The original Respondents No.1 and 2 have denied that it was mutually
agreed between the Appellant and original Respondent No.1 that the Appellant
would pay the purchase price of the suit premises to MHADA and would also
help original Respondent No.1 for the marriage of his daughter. It was also
denied that the Appellant is the sole and exclusive owner of the suit premises
and original Respondents No.1 and 2 are not having right in the same.
g. It was further denied that, as per arrangements, the name of original
Respondent No.1 was incorporated in the record of the society. It is the
contention of the Respondents that the Appellant had made an Application to
MHADA with intent to grab the suit premises. The Appellant had forged the
signatures of original Respondent No.1 and his family members and
fraudulently got this transfer in his name. A complaint was filed by the original
Page 7 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
Respondent No.1 in respect of the same.
h. It is the further contention of Respondents No.1 and 2 that the Appellant
had no right, title and interest in the suit premises, and, therefore, the suit is
required to be dismissed with costs.
5. The Trial Court framed the following issues.
ISSUES
1. Does plaintiff prove that, he become the exclusive owner of the
suit premises i.e. Room No.516, Azad Nagar, Building No.32, Alfa
Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Andheri (W), Mumbai
400058, as per family arrangement between him and defendants
No.1 and 2 ?
2. Does he further prove that, the defendants No.1 and 2 had
lodged false complaint to defendant No.3, with a view to deprive the
plaintiff from suit room ?
3. Does defendant No.1 prove that, the plaintiff got mutated the
suit premises in his name, as owner, through MHADA, on the basis
of false and forged documents practicing fraud on him and without
his consent ?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and anybody on their behalf from causing
obstruction and interference, in his possession with title over the suit
property ?
5. What order and relief ?
Page 8 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
6. The findings of the Trial Court on the aforesaid issues framed are as
follows:
ANSWERS
1. In the negative.
2. In the negative.
3. In the affirmative.
4. In the negative.
5. As per final order.
7. In the suit, the Appellant led his own evidence. The Respondents led the
evidence of Respondent No.2, Respondent No.1(b)(daughter of original
Respondent No.1), Indira Pedamkar (wife of original Respondent No.1),
Respondent No.1(a)(daughter of original Respondent No.1) and the original
Respondent No.1. All these witnesses were also cross examined.
8. By a Judgement dated 23
rd
June 2010, the Bombay City Civil Court at
Dindoshi, Mumbai, dismissed the Suit of the Appellant. It is in these
circumstances that the Appellant has filed the present Appeal. The Appellant
has also filed the aforesaid Interim Application for producing the additional
Page 9 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
evidence on record. This Interim Application has to be heard along with the
First Appeal.
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION IN THE FIRST APPEAL
9. The following points arise for determination in the present First Appeal.
(i) Whether the Trial Court was correct in dismissing the suit ?
(ii) Whether the Appellant is entitled to a declaration that he was the sole
and exclusive owner of the suit premises being Room No.516, Azad
Nagar, Building No.32, Alfa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited,
Andheri (West), Mumbai – 400 058 ?
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT IN THE FIRST APPEAL AND IN
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 14722 OF 2023.
10. Mr Siddiquie, the Learned Advocate for the Appellant, first made
submissions in respect of Interim Application No.14722 of 2023.
11. Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Appellate Court possessed wide
discretionary jurisdiction under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(aa) and 27(1)(b) of the
CPC to permit additional evidence at the appellate stage where the party
Page 10 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
demonstrates that, despite due diligence, the evidence was not within its
knowledge or could not be produced earlier when the decree was passed, or the
Court requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce Judgement or for any
other substantial cause. Mr Siddiquie submitted that this jurisdiction is
exercised to subserve the ends of justice provided the proposed evidence aligns
with the pleadings and is not intended to fill the lacunae arising from
negligence.
12. Mr Siddiquie submitted that, in the present case, the additional evidence
i.e. the letter dated 20
th
June 1998, was procured only in December 2021 via
the Right to Information Act, 2005 (‘RTI Act’), despite prior diligent efforts.
Mr Siddiquie submitted that the documents sought to be produced directly
corroborate the pleaded case of consent, joint appearance, and compliance for
tenancy transfer, thus aligning squarely with the suit pleadings and warranting
admission under both limbs of Rule 27.
13. Further, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the official records and public
documents obtained from statutory bodies such as the Maharashtra Housing
and Area Development Authority under the RTI Act, which strike at the core of
Page 11 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
the ‘lis’ and unequivocally rebut the foundational premises of the impugned
decree (i.e. absence of prescribed format compliance or proof of consent/joint
appearance), are mandatorily admissible in appeal where their authenticity is
unimpeachable and no bonafide challenge to veracity is mounted.
14. Mr Siddiquie further submitted that the tendered documents irrefutably
establish the original Respondent No.1’s and the Appellant's physical joint
appearance before the officer on or about 20
th
June 1998, contemporaneous
signing of the signature variation explanation, and the Authority's inward
acceptance–thus fulfilling all requisite formalities for change of name and
transfer as pleaded, and destroying the Trial Court's erroneous findings.
Further, in the context of the Interim Application, Mr Siddiquie submitted that
the advance age of the litigant (79 years) coupled with the Trial Advocate's
contemporaneous ill-health/old age, along with the antiquity of the public
record constitutes "sufficient cause" and "other substantial cause" under Order
XLI Rule 27(1)(aa) and (b) of the CPC, justifying admission of the documents
to avert irremediable prejudice.
15. As far as the First Appeal is concerned, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the
Page 12 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
Trial Court's findings are vitiated by the failure to appreciate contradictions,
omissions, and admissions in the Respondents' evidence, particularly in the
context of the Written Statement which contains only general/non-specific
denials of the averments in the Plaint. The Written Statement vaguely denies
consent/transfer without particulars, contrary to Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of
the CPC which require specific denials.
16. In the context of non specific denials in the Written Statement, Mr
Siddiquie submitted that while paragraph 8 of the Written Statement admits
paragraph 1 of the Plaint (regarding allotment in 1966), paragraphs 9 and 10 of
the Written Statement do not dispute paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Plaint and
paragraphs 12 and 17 of the Written Statement make blanket denials of
arrangement/consent/transfer without addressing specific documents or events
pleaded. Mr Siddiquie submitted that such non specific denials amount to
admission on the part of the Respondents.
17. Further, Mr Siddiquie submitted that, in his Written Statement and
Affidavit-in-lieu of Examination-in-Chief, the original Respondent No.1 denies
giving consent to the transfer, but admits in cross-examination that he signed
Page 13 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
the No Objection Certificate and transfer letter. This contradicts the denials in
the Written Statement.
18. Further, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Written Statement does not
contain any particulars of the fraud pleaded by the Respondents. Mr Siddiquie
submitted that, in their Examination-in-Chief, the wife and daughters of
original Respondent No.1 denied their signatures and the No Objection
Certificate, but their cross-examination reveals tutoring by the original
Respondent No.1. Further, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the evidence of the
Respondents also does not contain any particulars or details of fraud.
19. Mr Siddiquie submitted that, for all the aforesaid reasons, the Judgement
of the Trial Court ought to be set aside.
20. Further, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the findings of the Trial Court in
respect of the issues framed by it are perverse. As far as Issue No.1 is concerned,
Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Trial Court erred in holding that the Appellant
had failed to prove ownership. Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Trial Court
failed to comply with Order VIII Rule 5 of the CPC as the Respondents’
Page 14 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
Written Statement contained only vague denials regarding the family
arrangements and the financial contributions pleaded by the Appellant.
Further, Mr Siddiquie submitted that it is undisputed that the Appellant has
been in exclusive possession of the suit premises since 1998-1999. Further, the
additional evidence sought to be adduced in terms of MHADA letter dated 20
th
June 1998 conclusively answers Issue No. 1 in the affirmative by proving the
"
Consensus-ad-idem" which the Trial Court found missing in paragraph 21 of
the Judgement.
21. As far as Issue No.2 is concerned, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Trial
Court held that the complaint filed by original Respondents No.1 and 2 to
Respondent No.3 was not false on the ground that the forgery "appeared
probable". Mr Siddiquie submitted that findings of forgery are perverse and the
complaint alleging such forgery was inherently false and malicious, intended
solely to harass the Appellant.
22. As far as Issue No.3 is concerned, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Trial
Court answered the same in the affirmative holding that the Respondents had
proved that the documents were forged. Mr Siddiquie submitted that this
Page 15 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
finding is legally unsustainable and contradictory to the record. In this context,
Mr Siddiquie submitted that the burden to prove Issue No. 3 lay strictly on
original Respondent No. 1. The original Respondent No.1 attempted to
discharge this burden by filing an Application Exhibit 44 to refer the disputed
documents to a Handwriting Expert. However, the Trial Court dismissed this
application by an Order dated 8
th
June 2010, holding that "
It is not necessary to
send the documents to the Handwriting Expert
". Mr Siddiquie submitted that
the Respondents accepted the said decision and did not file an appeal against
the same. In this context, Mr Siddiquie also submitted that having refused to
send the documents to the Handwriting Expert, the Trial Court could not
subsequently rule that forgery was "probable". A finding of forgery requires a
high standard of proof, not mere probability. Mr Siddiquie submitted that the
Trial Court effectively penalized the Appellant for a "forgery" that it explicitly
refused to investigate scientifically.
23. As far as Issue No. 4 is concerned, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Trial
Court erred in answering the said Issue in the negative. Mr Siddiquie submitted
that, even assuming for the sake of argument, that the title was not proved, the
Appellant was admittedly in settled exclusive possession. Under the settled law,
Page 16 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
a person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed or interfered with except
by due process of law. Therefore, the injunction ought to have been granted to
protect the Appellant's possessory rights.
24. Next, Mr Siddiquie submitted that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the
suit. Mr Siddiquie submitted that, in view of the submissions on Issues No. 1 to
4 and the additional evidence produced, the suit is liable to be decreed.
25. In these circumstances, Mr Siddiquie submitted that Interim Application
No. 14722 of 2023 be allowed, the impugned Judgement be set aside and the
suit be decreed with costs.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS NO.1(a), 1(b) AND 2 IN THE FIRST
APPEAL AND INTERIM APPLICATION.
26. Mr Rajesh Doshi, the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
Respondents No.1(a), 1(b) and 2, supported the Judgement of the Trial Court.
Mr Doshi also pointed out that, in view of the redevelopment of the suit
building, the suit premises were demolished by the developer in 2024.
Page 17 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
27. Mr Doshi submitted that, in the suit, the Appellant had claimed that, in
1982, there had been a mutual agreement between the Appellant and the
original Respondent No.1, whereby the Appellant would pay the purchase price
of the suit premises regularly in installments to MHADA and also financially
help the Respondent No.1 for the marriage of his daughter. However, for the
first time in 1998, the Appellant made a claim in respect of the suit premises
and no claim in any form during the entire period of 17 years from 1982 to
1998 was made. Mr Doshi submitted that there has not been any single
instance or correspondence or pleadings in the Plaint, about any claim being
made in that regard, during the said period of 17 years, which fact strongly
proves that the Appellant, with dishonest intentions, made a claim in respect of
the suit premises in the year 1998.
28. Mr Doshi submitted that the case of the Appellant in the Plaint before
the Trial Court was that the original Respondent No.1 is the original
tenant/allottee/owner of the suit premises. In 1982, MHADA had agreed to
convert the tenancy rights into ownership rights for a price of Rs.7,000/-. As
per the mutual agreement entered into between the Appellant and the original
Respondent No.1, the Appellant would pay the purchase price of the suit
Page 18 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
premises regularly in installments to MHADA and also financially help
Respondent No.1 for the marriage of his daughter. Mr Doshi submitted that it
was further the case of the Appellant that though the name of original
Respondent No.1 would be recorded as a Member of the society, and the share
certificate would be obtained in the name of original Respondent No.1,
however, for all purposes and at all times the Appellant would be entitled to all
the right, title and interest in the suit premises as an owner and Respondents
No.1 and 2 and their family members shall not claim any interest therein.
29. Mr Doshi submitted that the facts which are admitted and undisputed by
the parties in the present proceedings are that the original Respondent No.1 was
working as a Mill worker, and in view of his service, in the year 1966, he was
allotted the suit premises. In 1982, the society was formed under the provisions
of Maharashtra Co-Operative Societies Act, 1960, wherein, the suit premises
was existing, and thereby, the original Respondent No.1 was allotted a share
certificate. Till 1998, the suit premises were standing in the name of the
original Respondent No.1 in all records.
30. Mr Doshi submitted that, from the pleadings of the Plaint and from the
Page 19 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
aforesaid admitted/undisputed facts, it emerges that it was the case of the
Appellant before the Trial Court that he has purchased the suit premises in the
year 1982 from the original Respondent No.1 by entering into an oral
agreement, for a monetary consideration. It was also the case of the Appellant
that, after a passage of more than 17 years, the Appellant, for the first time,
made a claim in respect of the suit premises and filed the present suit against the
Respondents. The only prayer sought in the present suit was a declaration that
he is the sole and exclusive owner of the suit premises.
31. Next, Mr Doshi submitted that the following aspects are required to be
considered, while deciding the present appeal.
(i) That the suit was filed after a passage of 19 years for seeking
declaration of ownership rights on the basis of an oral agreement
alleged to be entered in the year 1982.
(ii) That the Appellant had not filed any suit for specific performance
of the oral agreement, alleged to be entered in the year 1982.
(iii) Mere production of statements does not prove the payment of the
alleged consideration, as sought to be claimed by the Appellant.
(iv) As observed by the Trial Court in paragraph No.10 of the
Page 20 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
Judgement, the Appellant has failed to prove the payment of
consideration amount to the original Respondent No.1 as sought to be
claimed in the suit.
32. Mr Doshi submitted that it is required to be considered that transfer of
immovable property can only be done through duly stamped and registered sale
deed as per the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and not by
General Power of Attorney/Affidavits/Declarations as held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) Vs. State of Haryana
and Another (2012) 1 SCC 656 . Mr Doshi further submitted that transfer of
immovable property requires compulsory registration under the provisions of
the Registration Act, 1908 and particularly Section 17 thereof. In support of his
submission, Mr Doshi relied upon the Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Suresh Chand & Anr. AIR 2025 SC
4108 . Mr Doshi submitted that the suit before the Trial Court was hopelessly
barred by law of limitation as the declaration of ownership was sought for the
first time in the year 1999 on the basis of the oral agreement of the year 1982.
Further, Mr Doshi submitted that the signature of the original Respondent No.1
was obtained by false misrepresentation and he has categorically deposed before
Page 21 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
the Trial Court that he had never appeared before the Notary, as claimed by the
Appellant. Further, Respondents’ witnesses have categorically deposed before
the Trial Court that they had never appeared before the Notary and their
signatures on the alleged NOC are forged and bogus. The original Respondent
No.1’s witness Indira Pedamkar has also deposed before the Trial Court and also
in her cross-examination that she admitted that she is uneducated and cannot
sign and had not signed any NOC, as sought to be claimed by the Appellant.
Further, the Appellant had examined only himself and did not examine the
Notary Advocate and/or any other witness in support of his case, which fact
clarifies that the documents alleged to be executed by the original Respondent
No.1 and his family members are bogus and signatures were forged. Further,
Mr Doshi submitted that as per the ruling of this Court in Nawman Amin
Malik Vs Bhagat Housing Development (Pvt) Limited (in Civil Revision
Application No. 569 of 2011), it had been held that a notarized affidavit could
not be read and/or considered as a valid document, in the event of the same not
bearing the serial number of the notary register.
33. Further, Mr Doshi submitted that, in 1998, the Appellant, on the basis of
false representations, forged and bogus documents, got the suit premises
Page 22 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
transferred in his name, which case has been specifically denied by the original
Respondents No.1 and 2 in their Written Statement and particularly, in
paragraph No.4 therein.
34. Mr Doshi submitted that the Appellant has failed to prove the alleged
documents of transfer, which were strongly disputed by the Respondents. The
Appellant examined himself as the only witness and did not examine any other
witness in support of his case. The documents which the Appellant had relied
upon are subsequent to the alleged transfer of the suit premises by using false,
forged and fabricated documents and as such, those documents cannot be
looked into, under any circumstances.
35. Mr Doshi also submitted that the original Respondent No.1 had proved
the case of false representation, forged and bogus documents by examining
himself, Respondent No.2, his two daughters and his wife.
36. Further, Mr Doshi submitted that Respondent No.2, in his evidence, had
produced on record before the Trial Court a document, being a letter of the year
1999 to the Society, duly signed by original Respondent No.1, raising an
Page 23 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
objection to transfer of the suit premises in the name of the Appellant by the
Society in the suit building and the said document was marked Exhibit 33.
However, the Appellant has not annexed the said document along with the
present paper book.
37. Further, Mr. Doshi submitted that the original Respondent No.1 had filed
a suit in 2006, and, upon his death, the legal heirs proceeded with the said suit,
being suit No.2872 of 2006, which came to be disposed of by the Trial Court
vide its order dated 2
nd
September 2023, wherein, it has been observed by the
Trial Court that the original Respondent No.1 alone is the occupant/tenant of
the suit premises and the transfer of the suit premises in favour of the Appellant
by MHADA is illegal, null and void. Furthermore, in the said suit, the Trial
Court had held that the Appellant is not an authorized occupant/tenant of the
suit premises. As the issue of limitation was answered against the Respondents
herein, the Respondents herein had preferred First Appeal No.1022 of 2023,
which is admitted and is pending for final hearing on the limited issue of
limitation.
38. With regard to the Interim Application No. 14722 of 2023 filed by the
Page 24 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
Appellant, Mr Doshi submitted that the Appellant has sought to allow him to
produce on record the original letter of Respondent No.1’s alleged letter at
Exhibit C thereto, contending that the said document had been obtained under
the RTI Act. Mr Doshi submitted that the Respondents strongly oppose the
said application as the alleged letter at Exhibit C is a bogus document and not
executed by the original Respondent No.1, as sought to be claimed by the
Appellant.
39. Further, in the context of the Interim Application, Mr Doshi submitted
that in the letter of 20
th
June 1998, MHADA had stated that the signature of the
original Respondent No.1 on the alleged NOC/Affidavit differs and had called
upon the original Respondent No.1 to remain personally present. Therefore,
the Appellant contended that the original Respondent No.1 remained present
before the MHADA on 20
th
June 1998, which has never happened, and which
fact was also denied in paragraph no.17 of the Written Statement.
40. Further, Mr Doshi submitted that the alleged letter at Exh.C is in
response to the MHADA's letter dated 20
th
June 1998 i.e. of the very same day,
which raises serious doubt about the genuineness of the alleged letter of 20
th
Page 25 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
June 1998, as the original Respondent No.1 had not addressed any such letter in
his hand writing and has not even signed any such letter.
41. Further, Mr Doshi submitted that prior to the said Application, the
Appellant took out Interim Application No.4266 of 2021, for production of the
very same documents, which was withdrawn on 11
th
April 2023.
42. Mr Doshi submitted that, for all the aforesaid reasons, the First Appeal
and the Interim Application ought to be dismissed with costs.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 14722 OF 2023
43. In the Interim Application, the Appellant has sought permission to
produce in Appeal letter dated 20
th
June 1998 addressed to MHADA in
response to MHADA’s letter dated 20
th
June 1998, whereby due to variation in
the signature of original Respondent No.1, explanation was sought by MHADA,
and according to the Appellant, he and original Respondent No.1 appeared
before the MHADA Authorities, signed and submitted the said letter in the
presence of MHADA Authorities, which was duly acknowledged by MHADA
Page 26 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
by recording the inward number.
44. The Appellant has submitted that the said document i.e. letter dated 20
th
June 1998 addressed to MHADA could not be produced earlier as the Advocate
M. S. Menon, who was conducting the trial at that time on behalf of the
Appellant, was of old age and was suffering from various old age ailments.
Similarly, the Appellant, at the relevant time, was also aged 65 years, and,
therefore, the said document could not be produced.
45. Further, the Appellant has submitted that the official records and public
documents obtained from statutory bodies such as MHADA under the RTI Act
are admissible in Appeal where their antiquity is unimpeachable and no
bonafide challenge to the authenticity is mounted. Further, the Appellant has
submitted that the advanced age of the Appellant (79 years), coupled with the
Trial Court Advocate’s ill health and old age, along with the antiquity of the said
letter, constitutes ‘Sufficient cause’ and ‘Other substantial cause’ under Order
XLI Rule 27 (1)(aa) and (e) of the CPC.
46. On the other hand, the Respondents have opposed taking on record of
Page 27 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
the said letter dated 20
th
June 1998 on the ground that it is a bogus document
and not executed by the original Respondent No.1. Further, the Respondents
have contended that the said letter ought not to be taken on record as original
Respondent No.1 has contended in his Written Statement that he never
remained present before the MHADA Authorities.
47. Further, the Respondents have also submitted that the fact that MHADA
wrote a letter dated 20
th
June 1998, and the response was on the same day i.e.
20
th
June 1998, also creates serious doubt about the genuineness of the said
letter dated 20
th
June 1998.
48. Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC reads as under:
27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court -
(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce
additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate
Court. But if-
(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused
to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or
[(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes
that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was
not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due
diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed
against was passed, or]
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or
any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or
for any other substantial cause,
Page 28 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be
produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an
Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.
49. The Appellant has shown that the letter dated 20
th
June 1998 could not,
after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the
decree appealed against him was passed. Further, in my view, if the document
was available with the Appellant, there was no reason why the Appellant would
not have produced the same. Further, the Appellant has stated that he applied
for the document by an Application dated 22
nd
December 2021 under the RTI
Act to MHADA and received the document thereafter. This itself shows that
the document was not earlier available.
50. The said document has been obtained by the Appellant from MHADA
under the RTI Act. The same is very clear from the stamp on the document
which states that it has been obtained under the RTI Act. Therefore, the
authenticity of the said document cannot be doubted. Further, the said
document is also relevant to the present Appeal. As submitted by the Appellant,
it could not be produced earlier due to the advanced age and ill health of the
Appellant’s Advocate and also the advanced age of the Appellant himself.
Page 29 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
51. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am inclined to take the said document on
record under the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC. Accordingly,
the said letter dated 20
th
June 1998 is taken on record and marked as an Exhibit
(subject to correctness of the contents thereof and subject to proof of execution
by original Respondent No.1).
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1085 OF 2010
52. The Appellant has sought a declaration that he is the sole and exclusive
owner of the suit premises.
53. In these circumstances, the onus of proof is on the Appellant to prove that
he is the sole and exclusive owner of the suit premises.
54. It is the case of the Appellant that he has purchased the suit premises in
1982 from the original Respondent No.1 by entering into an oral agreement for
a monetary consideration.
55. In order to succeed, the Appellant has to prove the same. The Appellant
Page 30 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
has not proved as to why, despite admittedly having available property at the
native village, original Respondent No.1 did not have Rs.7,000/- to purchase
the suit premises from MHADA and did not have the money to get his
daughter married. Therefore, in my view, the very basis of the oral agreement
pleaded by the Appellant is not proved.
56. Further, the Appellant has also not proved as to why, if in 1982, it was
agreed that the Appellant would be the sole and exclusive owner of the suit
premises, the suit premises were not transferred in his name at that time and
share certificate was not issued in his name.
57. The Appellant has further not proved as to why he waited for 16 to 17
years to get the suit premises transferred in his favour if the oral agreement was
of the year 1982.
58. Further, the Appellant has not proved payment of consideration to
Respondent No.1. The Appellant has merely produced the statement. The said
statement cannot prove the payment of consideration to original Respondent
No.1.
Page 31 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
59. In my view, all the aforesaid, by itself, makes the case of the Appellant
improbable.
60. Further, the original Respondent No.1 has contended that his signature
had been obtained on the document of transfer by misrepresentation. He has
deposed to that effect in paragraph No.4 of his Affidavit-in-lieu of
Examination-in-Chief dated 12
th
October 2009. Paragraph 4 reads as under:
4. In 1998 I was in search of groom for my daughter Sharmila and
hence in April 1998 I came to Mumbai and stayed with Baban for
few days at Kalwa Thane. At that time Plaintiff had brought some
papers in written in English and stated that my signatures are
required forth coming out renovation in the suit premises and
extension to the building. He further stated put everyone in the
Building had already submitted papers and because my signature
everyone is delayed. As the papers are in English. I informed him to
keep the papers because Baban and his wife were not in the house at
that time. Plaintiff then stated that, whether I had no trust on him.
I did keep trust upon the Plaintiff and I signed. I was not knowing
that I was signing no objection certificate to transfer. I was
represented by Plaintiff that signature was required on the papers,
required for extension of building. I never went to Notary nor any
Advocate Krishna Malaw. I never seen then nor did they see me
while signing I never gave consent to transfer the tenancy of suit
premises in the name of Vasant.
61. Therefore, as far as the signature of original Respondent No.1 is
concerned, it is the word of the Appellant against the word of original
Page 32 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
Respondent No.1 as to whether there was any misrepresentation or not.
However, the Appellant has deposed that the Affidavit was notarised by
Advocate Shri L G Waingarkar and the signatures of the Appellant and
Respondent No.1 were identified by Shri Krishna Malandkar, who signed the
same. In his deposition, the original Respondent No.1 has denied the same. In
these circumstances, the Appellant should have examined the Notary and Shri
Krishna Malandkar and should have produced the notarial register. The
Appellant’s failure to do so creates doubt about the probability of his case and
makes the case of original Respondent No.1 of misrepresentation more
probable.
62. Further, as far as the signatures of other family members of original
Respondent No.1 are concerned, each one of them has stepped into the box and
deposed that they have not signed the documents. This deposition has not been
shaken in cross-examination. The only answer of the Appellant is that the wife
and two daughters of original Respondent No.1 are tutored witnesses and they
have been tutored by the original Respondent No.1 to deny their signatures. In
my view, simply because the said witnesses have deposed that Respondent No.1
requested them to give evidence, the same cannot mean that they were tutored
Page 33 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
witnesses. In my view, simply by submitting that they are tutored witnesses,
cannot take the case of the Appellant any further. The Appellant should have
examined some person who had seen the wife and daughters sign the
documents and/or should have led the evidence of a Handwriting Expert, which
the Appellant failed to do. In the light of the aforesaid, it cannot be accepted
that original Respondent No.1’s wife and two daughters had signed the
documents of transfer. This creates further doubt about the probability of the
case of the Appellant.
63. It is important to note that not only did the Appellant not examine a
Handwriting Expert but when the Respondents made an Application for
appointment of a Handwriting Expert, the Appellant objected to the said
Application on the ground that there is no foundation in the evidence of the
Respondents’ witnesses for such a request being made. The Appellant sought
the rejection of the said Application. This is one of the reasons as to why, by an
Order dated 8
th
June 2010, the City Civil Court at Dindoshi, Mumbai dismissed
the said Application.
64. This leaves me to deal with the letter dated 20
th
June 1998 which has
Page 34 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
been produced by the Appellant on record in this Appeal and marked as an
Exhibit (subject to correctness of the contents thereof). It is the case of the
Appellant that the said document shows that the original Respondent No.1 had
appeared before the MHADA Authorities to verify his signature and, therefore,
the case of the Respondents, that original Respondent No.1 had signed under
misrepresentation, is false. In my view, the said document, by itself, does not
prove that it was signed by original Respondent No.1 and further that it was
signed in the presence of the MHADA Authorities. In paragraph 17 of his
Written Statement, the original Respondent No.1 has denied that original
Respondent No.1 remained present before the MHADA Authorities and signed
the transfer papers. In the light of the said denial of the original Respondent
No.1, the correctness of the contents of the said letter and its execution by
original Respondent No.1 ought to have been proved. The Appellant has not
sought to lead any additional evidence to prove the correctness of the contents
of the said letter or its execution by the original Respondent No.1. In these
circumstances, and in light of the other evidence against the Appellant, the case
of the Appellant in respect of the said letter dated 20
th
June 1998 cannot be
believed.
Page 35 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
65. In light of aforesaid findings, I have not dealt with the Judgements
referred to by the Respondents.
66. In light of the aforesaid findings and for all the aforesaid reasons, in my
view, the Judgement dated 23
rd
June 2010 of the Trial Court does not call for
any interference. The Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit. In these
circumstances, the present Appeal is required to be dismissed.
67. The Point for Determination No.(i) is answered in the affirmative and the
Point for Determination No.(ii) is answered in the negative.
ORDER
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 14722 OF 2023
1. The Interim Application is allowed and the letter dated 20
th
June 1998 is
taken on record and marked as an Exhibit (subject to the correctness of the
contents thereof and subject to proof of execution by the original Respondent
No.1).
Page 36 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
1-fa-1085-2010.doc
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1085 OF 2010
In light of the aforesaid discussion and for all the aforesaid reasons:
a. First Appeal No.1085 of 2010 is hereby dismissed.
b. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to
costs.
c. In light of the dismissal of the First Appeal, all other Interim Applications
/ Civil Applications are also rendered infructuous and are disposed of as such.
[FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, J.]
Page 37 of 37
9
th
June 2026
Mamta Kale
In a significant ruling, the Bombay High Court First Appeal, specifically First Appeal No. 1085 of 2010, involving a complex property ownership dispute, has affirmed the decision of the Trial Court, dismissing the appellant's claim of exclusive ownership over suit premises. This intricate case, delving into family arrangements, alleged fraud, and the admissibility of additional evidence, is now thoroughly analyzed and available on CaseOn, alongside the related Interim Application No. 14722 of 2023.
The dispute arose concerning Room No. 516, Azad Nagar, Mumbai. Originally allotted to the elder brother (original Respondent No. 1) by MHADA in 1966 on a rental basis, the property became central to a legal battle when MHADA introduced a hire-purchase scheme in 1982 to convert tenancy into ownership. The Appellant (younger brother and original Plaintiff) claimed an oral agreement from 1982, stating he would pay the purchase price (Rs. 7,000/-) and assist Respondent No. 1 financially, including for his daughter's marriage. In return, the Appellant would be the sole owner, despite the share certificate remaining in Respondent No. 1's name.
The Appellant further contended that Respondent No. 1 left Mumbai in 1984 to manage native property. In April 1998, with Respondent No. 1's alleged consent, the Appellant applied to MHADA for transfer, ultimately acquiring the share certificate in his name by November 1998. However, Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 (another younger brother) later lodged a complaint alleging forgery and misrepresentation, leading the Appellant to file a suit seeking a declaration of exclusive ownership and an injunction against interference.
The Respondents vehemently denied the Appellant's claims. They asserted that Respondent No. 1 had signed papers under the false pretext of renovation and building extension, not for property transfer. They alleged that the Appellant misused trust, misrepresented facts, and forged signatures of Respondent No. 1's wife and daughters. They also pointed out the 17-year delay (1982-1999) in the Appellant claiming ownership, arguing that no claim was made during this period.
Crucially, the Respondents highlighted that immovable property transfer requires a duly stamped and registered sale deed, not just affidavits or declarations. They also mentioned a separate suit (Suit No. 2872 of 2006) where the Trial Court declared the transfer to the Appellant illegal, null, and void, deeming Respondent No. 1 the rightful occupant.
The Trial Court framed several issues, including whether the Appellant proved exclusive ownership through a family arrangement, whether the Respondents' complaint was false, and whether the Appellant mutated the property through false and forged documents. The Trial Court found:
The suit was thus dismissed on June 23, 2010.
The Appellant sought to admit a letter dated June 20, 1998, obtained via the Right to Information (RTI) Act in December 2021. This letter allegedly showed Respondent No. 1's joint appearance before MHADA authorities to explain a signature variation, thus corroborating consent for transfer.
This rule allows appellate courts to admit additional evidence if, despite due diligence, it could not be produced earlier, or if the court requires it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause.
The High Court acknowledged that the Appellant demonstrated due diligence, citing his advanced age (79 years) and his trial advocate's ill health/old age as reasons for the delay. The document's procurement via RTI in 2021 suggested it wasn't readily available earlier. The Court found the document relevant and its authenticity, being from a statutory body under RTI, hard to doubt. Therefore, the Interim Application was allowed, and the letter was taken on record as an Exhibit, "subject to correctness of the contents thereof and subject to proof of execution by the original Respondent No.1."
At this point, it's worth noting how valuable resources like CaseOn.in are for legal professionals. Their 2-minute audio briefs can quickly distill the essence of complex rulings, providing a concise yet comprehensive understanding of how specific judgments, like this one, navigate procedural aspects such as the admissibility of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27.
The core issue was whether the Appellant proved he was the sole and exclusive owner of the suit premises based on the 1982 oral agreement and the subsequent transfer.
The burden of proof rested squarely on the Appellant to prove his ownership claim. Legal principles regarding transfer of immovable property (requiring registered deeds as per Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and Registration Act, 1908) were central. Additionally, the standard of proof for fraud and forgery is high, requiring more than mere probability.
Based on the thorough analysis of facts and evidence, the High Court concluded that the Appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish exclusive ownership of the suit premises. The various inconsistencies, lack of concrete evidence for the oral agreement and consideration, and the Appellant's failure to adequately counter the forgery claims, all contributed to the affirmation of the Trial Court's decision. Consequently, First Appeal No. 1085 of 2010 was dismissed, with all other related Interim/Civil Applications rendered infructuous.
This judgment serves as a critical lesson in civil litigation, particularly concerning:
It starkly highlights the rigorous standard of proof required when claiming ownership, especially on the basis of oral agreements and when forgery is alleged. Lawyers must ensure all elements, including consideration and valid execution of documents, are irrefutably proven.
The case demonstrates the application of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, emphasizing that while courts may admit new evidence under certain conditions (like due diligence and relevance), its mere admission does not equate to proof of its contents or execution. Parties still bear the responsibility to prove the authenticity and veracity of such documents.
The judgment implicitly reinforces the mandatory requirement for registered instruments for the transfer of immovable property, a cornerstone of property law in India, as cited with reference to Supreme Court precedents like Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. and Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. Lrs.
The failure to examine a Notary Public or an identifying witness, especially when signatures on affidavits are disputed, can be detrimental to a party's case. It underscores the evidentiary value (or lack thereof, if not properly substantiated) of notarized documents.
The Appellant's objection to a handwriting expert's appointment was noted by the Court, implying that such actions can be viewed unfavorably when subsequent claims of forgery are made. This highlights the strategic considerations in litigation regarding expert evidence.
All information provided in this analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances. CaseOn bears no responsibility for any actions taken based on the information provided herein.
Legal Notes
Add a Note....