NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

1 WA. No.184 of 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT GWALIOR

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK

&

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT

ON THE 23

rd

OF JANUARY, 2026

WRIT APPEAL No. 184 of 2026

VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA

Versus

M P M K V V COM LTD AND OTHERS

Appearance:

Shri Ravi Bhargav - Advocate for Appellant.

Shri Ravi Jain – Advocate for respondent No.2 and 3.

ORDER

As per Justice Anand Singh Bahrawat:

By way of instant appeal, filed under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh

Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, challenge

is made to the order dated 15.12.2025 passed in W.P.No.2397/2025; whereby,

writ petition preferred by petitioner/appellant was dismissed claiming the benefit

of full salary for the period from 25.1.2018 to 30.4.2021 during which he

remained under suspension and praying for interest on the aforesaid amount.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

2 WA. No.184 of 2026

2.In nut shell the facts giving to the instant appeal are that initially appellant

was appointed on the post of Store Assistant in the Madhya Pradesh Vidhyut

Mandal now know as Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidhyut Vitaran

Company Ltd. (MPMKVV Com. Td) on 3.4.1982. At the relevant point of time

he was working as Junior Engineer at Gwalior Division of the

respondent/Company. During the service tenure, a criminal case was registered

at Special Police Establishment (SPE), Gwalior against present appellant along

with other co-accused persons namely Vikash Kesarwani, Ajay Nayak and

Shashikan Parashar on 18.1.2018 bearing crime No.257/2016 under Section 7,

13(1) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act)

and Section 120 of I.P.C. Thereafter, he was produced before the Court of First

Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge, Datia wherein a case was registered

bearing case No. SC LOK NO.01/2018. Thereafter, as per instructions issued by

the General Administration Department, Bhopal vide letter No. F-11/58/98/1-10

Bhopal appellant was placed under suspension with immediate effect vide order

dated 25.1.2018 and he was attached to the City Circle, Gwalior. After recording

the statement of prosecution, learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 29.7.2022

was acquitted all the accused persons along with appellant. During the pendency

of the case, appellant stood retired on 30.4.2021. Thereafter, appellant submitted

a representation before the respondent authority for regularation of period his

suspension. Accordingly, vide order 10.2.2023 the period of suspension from

25.1.2018 to 30.4.2021 has been treated to on duty for all purposes except for

pay and allowances for said period. The said order was challenged in writ

petition which was dismissed by impugned order dated 15.12.2025, hence the

present appeal.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

3 WA. No.184 of 2026

3.Learned counsel for appellant submits that the suspension of appellant is

totally unjustified because he was suspended on account of criminal case in

which he was subsequently acquitted and the reasons, account of which he was

placed under suspension, now does exist, therefore, he is entitled for full pay and

allowances for the period in which he was placed under suspension. It was

argued that by counsel for appellant that learned Single Judge has erred in law as

well as on facts in holding that appellant is not entitled to full salary for the

period of suspension, despite the fact that the appellant was acquitted in the

criminal proceedings. As the appellant was falsely implicated in the crime in

which he was acquitted, therefore, as per Fundametal Rule 54-B (3) he is entitled

to get full pay and allowances for the intervening period.

4. Learned counsel for respondents supported the impugned order passed by

learned writ Court and stated that appellant was involved in criminal case

because of his own acts and Department was not instrumental in his prosecution,

therefore, suspension on account of the same, cannot be said to be unjustified.

Under F.R.54-B, it is for the Competent Authority to form an opinion whether the

suspension of employee is justified or not and if the authority comes on

conclusion that suspension is totally unjustified, then only employee is held to be

entitled for pay and allowances for intervening period. In the present case, the

order of suspension cannot be said as unjustified, therefore, appellant is not

entitled for any pay and allowances for the period in which he was placed under

suspension.

5. Heard the counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

4 WA. No.184 of 2026

6.Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties it is necessary to

quote the following provisions of Rules:-

F.R.54-B. (1) When a Government servant who has been suspended

is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement

on superannuation while under suspension, the authority competent to

order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order-

(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to

the Government servant for the period of

suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of

his retirement on superannuation as the case may

be; and

(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated

as a period spent on duty.

(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 53, where a

Government servant under suspension dies before the disciplinary or

court proceedings instituted against him are concluded, the period

between the date of suspension and the date of death shall be treated

as duty for all purposes and his family shall be paid the full pay and

allowances for that period to which he would have been entitled had

he not been suspended, subject to adjustment in respect of subsistence

allowance already paid.

(3)Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the

opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified , the Government

servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8), to be paid the

full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he

not been suspended:

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

5 WA. No.184 of 2026

Rule 9 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,

1966 (hereinafter referred as 'Rules 1966')

9. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is

subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority

empowered in that behalf by the Governor by general or special

order, may place a Government servant under suspension-

(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is

contemplated or is pending, or

(b) where a case against him in respect of any

criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry of

trial :

[Provided that a Government servant shall invariably be placed under

suspension when a challan for a criminal offence involving

corruption or other moral turpitude is filed against him :]

Provided further that where the order of suspension is made by an

authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall

forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in

which the order was made.

(2)A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed

under suspension by an order of appointing authority-

(a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is

detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or

otherwise for a period exceeding forty-eight hours;

(b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in

the event of conviction for an offence, he is

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

6 WA. No.184 of 2026

sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding

forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or

removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such

conviction.

7. As per F.R.54-B, on reinstatement of employee on revocation of

suspension if competent authority formed an opinion that the suspension was

wholly unjustified, then only the employee become entitled for full pay and

allowances for the period in which he was placed under suspension. For full pay

and allowances for intervening period, suspension order has to be wholly

unjustified in the opinion of the Competent Authority.

8.Rule 9 (1) of Rules 1966, confers discretion to the Appointing /

Disciplinary/ Competent Authority to place any employee under suspension on

condition stipulated in Rule 9 (1) (a) and (b) of Rules 1966. Suspension under

Rule 9 (1) (a) and (b) is dependent upon discretion of the authority on the

condition prescribed therein except the proviso of Rule 9(1) (b) of Rules 1966

which is mandatory in nature. The relevant proviso is reproduced as under for

ready reference and convenience:

Provided that a Government servant shall invariably

be placed under suspension when a challan for a

criminal offence involving corruption or other moral

turpitude is filed against him.

9. The appellant was placed under suspension. The said suspension on

account of when a challan for a criminal case involving corruption or moral

turpitude is filed against him, the authority had no other option but to place

employee under suspension under the deeming clause of Rule 9 of Rules

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

7 WA. No.184 of 2026

1966. Therefore, the said suspension cannot be treated as unjustified even in

case of acquittal also, because at the time of suspension it was justified under

priviso of Rule 9 (1) (b) of Rules 1966.

10.Once it is held that suspension of employee was not wholly unjustified, he

cannot be held entitled to pay allowances for the period of suspension. As at the

time of suspension, there was no other option but to suspend the appellant

on account of his custody in a criminal case. Merely because he was acquitted,

the said suspension of petitioner which was under the statutory rules cannot be

treated as wholly unjustified.

11.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain v. Union of India,

(2019) 5 SCC 809 where it has clearly been held that an employee against whom

criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in

comparison to an employee facing a departmental inquiry and further that an

employee involved in a crime disables himself from rendering his services on

account of his incarceration in jail and subsequent acquittal by an Appellate

Court would not entitle him to claim back wages.

12.Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Greater Hyderabad Municipal

Corpn. v. M. Prabhakar Rao, (2011) 8 SCC 155 has held, in the light of Rules

governing the conditions of service of the employee therein, that the relevant rule

vests power on the competent authority to order reinstatement and to form an

opinion whether suspension of the government servant was wholly unjustified

and if in his opinion suspension is found to be wholly unjustified, such

government servant would be paid full pay and allowances to which he would

have been entitled had he not been suspended.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

8 WA. No.184 of 2026

13.Referring to the judgment of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman (1991) 4

SCC 109, Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Prabhakar Rao (supra) has also

observed that in cases where criminal conviction results in acquittal with benefit

of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence, the authority concerned

must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee deserves any

salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves

such benefit.

14. It has also been observed in Jankiraman (supra) that to lay down a rule

that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary proceedings he

shall be entitled to all salary for the intervening period, is to undermine discipline

in the administration that shall jeopardise public interest.

15. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed in M. Prabhakar Rao

(supra), relying on Jankiraman (supra) that even in cases where acquittal in

criminal proceedings is on account of non-availability of evidence, the authority

concerned must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all

deserves any salary for the intervening period and further that such a power is

vested in the competent authority with the view to ensure that discipline in

administration is not undermined and public interest is not jeopardised.

16. It has also been observed by the Apex Court in M. Prabhakar Rao (supra)

that in every such case where an employee is exonerated in disciplinary or

criminal proceedings, whether or not he shall be entitled to all salary during the

period of suspension, such a decision has to be taken by the competent authority

on the facts and circumstances of each case. Paragraphs 8 to 10 of M. Prabhakar

Rao (supra) are extracted herein below:

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

9 WA. No.184 of 2026

“8. Sub-rule (3) of FR 54-B extracted above, thus, vests power on the

competent authority to order reinstatement to form an opinion whether

suspension of a government servant was wholly unjustified and if, in

its opinion, the suspension of such government servant is wholly

unjustified, such government servant will be paid the full pay and

allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been

suspended. The proviso to sub-rule (3) of FR 54-B, however, states

that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the

proceedings instituted against the government servant had been

delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the government servant

then the government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay

only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as

it may determine. In other words, even where the competent authority

is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the

government servant may still not be entitled to be paid the whole pay

and allowances, but may be paid such pay and allowances as may be

determined by the competent authority.

9. The rationale, on which sub-rule (3) of FR 54-B is based, is that

during the period of suspension an employee does not work and,

therefore, he is not entitled to any pay unless after the termination of

the disciplinary proceedings or the criminal proceedings the

competent authority is of the opinion that the suspension of the

employee was wholly unjustified. This rationale has been explained in

clear and lucid language by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in

Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman [(1991) 4 SCC 109 : 1991 SCC

(L&S) 387 : (1993) 23 ATC 322] . At SCC p. 121 in para 26 P.B.

Sawant, J., writing the judgment for the Court in the aforesaid case

further observed:

“26. … However, there may be cases where the

proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for

example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the

clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in

the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on

account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts

attributable to the employee, etc. In such circumstances,

the authorities concerned must be vested with the power

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

10 WA. No.184 of 2026

to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary

for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to

which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not

possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the

circumstances under which such consideration may

become necessary. To ignore, however, such

circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible

rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in

disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to

all salary for the intervening period is to undermine

discipline in the administration and jeopardise public

interests.”

10. It will be clear from what this Court has held in Union of India v.

K.V. Jankiraman [(1991) 4 SCC 109 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 387 : (1993)

23 ATC 322] that even in cases where acquittal in the criminal

proceedings is on account of non-availability of evidence, the

authorities concerned must be vested with the power to decide

whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening

period, and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. In the

aforesaid case, this Court has also held that this power is vested in the

competent authority with a view to ensure that discipline in

administration is not undermined and public interest is not jeopardised

and it is not possible to lay down an inflexible rule that in every case

where an employee is exonerated in the disciplinary/criminal

proceedings he should be entitled to all salary during the period of

suspension and the decision has to be taken by the competent

authority on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

17.Hon’ble Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh

Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541 has clearly held that as per the regulation applicable

in the said case, the employer has to have exclusive power to decide whether to

treat the period of suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise and that the

power, thus, vested cannot be validly challenged. The Court further observed that

in such a situation the employee is absent for reasons of his own involvement in

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

11 WA. No.184 of 2026

the misconduct and the employer is in no way responsible for keeping him

away from his duties and therefore, the employer cannot be saddled with the

liability to pay the employee his salary and allowances for that period as the

same would be against the principle of ‘no work no pay’ and positively

inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. The Court further held

that the employer’s power in that behalf is unassailable. Paragraph 15 of the

judgment in Bhopal Singh Panchal (supra) is apposite to be quoted here which

reads as under:

“15. We have already pointed out the effect of the relevant provisions

of Regulations 39, 46 and 47. The said regulations read together,

leave no manner of doubt that in case of an employee who is arrested

for an offence, as in the present case, his period of absence from duty

is to be treated as not being beyond circumstances under his control.

In such circumstances, when he is treated as being under suspension

during the said period, he is entitled to subsistence allowance.

However, the subsistence allowance paid to him is liable to be

adjusted against his pay and allowances if at all he is held to be

entitled to them by the competent authority. The competent authority

while deciding whether an employee who is suspended in such

circumstances is entitled to his pay and allowances or not and to what

extent, if any, and whether the period is to be treated as on duty or on

leave, has to take into consideration the circumstances of each case. It

is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the

competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension

that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said

period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in

the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or

otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged.

During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for

reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in

no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank,

therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary

and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

12 WA. No.184 of 2026

„no work, no pay‟ and positively inequitable to those who have to

work and earn their pay. As it is, even during such period, the

employee earns subsistence allowance by virtue of the Regulations. In

the circumstances, the Bank‟s power in that behalf is unassailable.”

18. In Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held that if an employee or public servant got involved in a criminal

case and his prosecution which ultimately resulted in his acquittal was not at the

behest of or by the department itself, the department, in any manner, cannot

be faulted with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a

person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in

service. The relevant observations can be found in paragraph no.4 in Jaipal Singh

(supra), which is extracted here in below:

“4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on

record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we

are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special

leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefore does

not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a

binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by the

appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded

therefore it operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through

the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in

Ranchhodji [(1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 491] . If

prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person

concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps

different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen

the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if

after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal

subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault

with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person

convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in

service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon,

for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

13 WA. No.184 of 2026

reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the

order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent

has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge

was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the

appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the

respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot

be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of

the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view,

committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without

adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations.

Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed

payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside.”

19. Regard may be had in this respect to yet another judgment of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Sukhdarshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2024) 14 SCC 531

where Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in terms of the rules applicable

therein, where there is an order of dismissal and thereafter, the employee

concerned is reinstated, the authority concerned is to pass an order as to whether

the period from the date of suspension or from the date of dismissal till

reinstatement of the employee, is to be treated as the period spent on duty for any

purpose. Hon’ble Supreme Court further holds that in a situation where Appellate

Authority finds termination of services of an employee to be illegal, it would not

ipso facto inevitably follow that employee will become entitled to claim the

salary for the entire period, consequent upon his being found to be entitled to be

reinstatement and that this is a matter for the authority to decide. Paragraph 24 of

Sukhdarshan Singh (supra) is extracted herein below:

“24. Rule 15(v)(f) indeed contemplates that when there is a dismissal,

removal, compulsory retirement or reduction to a lower service inter

alia and there is an order of reinstatement, the authority is to pass an

order as to whether the period from the date of suspension or from the

date of his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement till the date of

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

14 WA. No.184 of 2026

his reinstatement, is to be treated as a period spent on duty for any

purpose. This gives a clear indication that upon an order being passed

by the appellate authority finding the termination of employee to be

illegal and leaves it there, it would not ipso facto inevitably follow

that the employee will become entitled to claim the salary for the

entire period consequent upon his being found to be entitled to

reinstatement. This is a matter for the authority to decide.”

20. On a careful reading of the judgments referred to herein above, the

principle of law which can be deduced is that in case order of reinstatement of an

employee is passed on his acquittal in the criminal case by the Appellate Court,

such an employee will not ipso facto be entitled for salary or any other benefit for

the period he was placed under suspension or for the period he was out of

employment on account of his dismissal for the reason of his conviction by the

Trial Court.

21. Accordingly, the reasons of the respondent having been kept out of

employment are not attributable to the appellant and therefore, in terms of the

law, as discussed above, he was not entitled to the salary for the period in

question.

22. In the judgments which have already been quoted above, Hon’ble

Supreme Court has discussed the rationale for vesting such a power with the

competent authority of the employer. In the instant case, the competent authority

of the respondent has exercised such discretion, which in our opinion, is based on

the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. In such a situation, in our

opinion, once the competent authority of the appellant exercised its discretion

denying the benefit of the period in question any interference by the Court in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:3951

15 WA. No.184 of 2026

uncalled for. The discretion exercised by the competent authority of the

appellant, in this case, is based on relevant facts, and therefore, for this reason as

well, interference in such a discretionary decision of the appellant is

unwarranted.

23. In view of discussion made above, this Court is of the considered opinion

that impugned order passed by writ Court is justified and does not warrant any

interference. Accordingly, order passed by learned writ Court is hereby affirmed

and Writ Appeal is hereby dismissed.

(Anand Pathak) (Anand Singh Bahrawat)

Judge Judge

Ahmad