IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.2396 of 2022

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Vijay Kumar Son of Late Ramnandan Das Resident of Village-Jalgovind

Chowk, P.S. Barh, District Patna, 803213.

... ... Petitioner/s

Versus

1.The Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Patna. through the Registrar

General

2.The District and Sessions Judge, Patna.

... ... Respondent/s

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Appearance :

For the Petitioner/s: Ms.Surya Nilambari, Advocate

For the Respondent/s: Mr. Piyush Lall, Advocate

======================================================

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DR. ANSHUMAN

C.A.V. JUDGMENT

Date : 15-10-2026

Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

and learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

petitioner has filed the present writ petition for the following

relief/s :-

“For quashing the order of the

Standing Committee as contained in the

communication dated 9.12.2021, issued under

the signature of the Registrar General, Patna

High Court, Patna addressed to the Petitioner

(Ex Employee, Class IV, Civil Court, Barh,

Patna), in compliance of the order of the

Hon'ble High Court, Patna dated 17.11.2021

passed in CW.J.C No. 12693/2019, whereby the

decision of the Standing Committee on the

memo of appeal dated 12.12.2016 submitted by

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the petitioner, against the order of dismissal

dated 12.5.2014 (passed by the District and

Sessions Judge, Patna), was made known to the

Petitioner; the decision being that the Standing

Committee had rejected such appeal, finding

that the decision of the Disciplinary Authority

cum District and Sessions Judge, Patna to

dismiss the Petitioner from service did not

require any interference.

For production of the main order

passed by the Standing Committee cum

Appellate Authority by which the Petitioner's

appeal against dismissal from service was

rejected, and upon its production the same be

quashed;

To quash the order dated 12.5.2014

passed by the District and Sessions Judge,

Patna whereby the Petitioner was dismissed

from service for proved misconduct.

It is further prayed that the

petitioner may be reinstated in service with

consequential benefits and that the petitioner

may be paid subsistence allowance for the

period between April 2009 till 12.5.2014 (date

of dismissal), during which he was not paid any

subsistence allowance even though he remained

under suspension till his dismissal in 2014,

having been suspended in 1993 itself.”

3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner

was appointed as a Peon (Class IV employee) in the Civil Court,

Patna, on compassionate grounds and joined on 02.07.1987. He

was subsequently transferred to the Civil Court, Barh. On

01.11.1993, while a sum of 1,82,729/- was kept in the Nazarat

₹

locker for disbursement of salary, a portion of the amount was

allegedly removed. On 02.11.1993, the Nazir found

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1,33,304.33/- missing, leading to registration of Barh P.S. Case

₹

No. 542 of 1993. The petitioner was suspended on 12.11.1993

and a charge-sheet was issued alleging dishonest removal of the

aforesaid amount by using duplicate keys, constituting theft,

misconduct and dereliction of duty. After enquiry, the charges

were held proved and, ultimately, the petitioner was dismissed

from service vide order dated 12.05.2014. Meanwhile, his

conviction under Sections 380/120-B, 457 and 411 of the Indian

Penal Code was affirmed in appeal; however, this Court, vide

order dated 29.07.2013 passed in Criminal Revision No. 11 of

2013, set aside the conviction and acquitted him. Despite his

acquittal, the petitioner was not permitted to resume duty.

Instead, a second show-cause notice was issued, to which he

replied pleading his acquittal and false implication. His appeal

against the dismissal was subsequently rejected by the Standing

Committee of this Court vide resolution dated 26.02.2019. Since

the appellate order was not initially communicated to him, he

filed CWJC No. 12693 of 2019, which was allowed on

17.11.2021 with a direction to communicate the appellate

decision and liberty to challenge the same as well as the order of

dismissal. Thereafter, the petitioner sought payment of

subsistence allowance for the period from April, 2009 to

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12.05.2014. The Standing Committee, however, reiterated its

earlier decision and rejected the appeal vide order dated

09.12.2021. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the

present writ petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

order of punishment cannot be sustained as the petitioner was

acquitted in the criminal proceeding arising out of Barh P.S.

Case No. 542 of 1993 on 29.07.2013 in Cr. Revision No. 11 of

2013, on the very same set of charges and evidence forming the

basis of the departmental proceeding. It is submitted that the

material witnesses in both proceedings were substantially the

same and the acquittal was not on account of any procedural

infirmity, hostile witnesses, or failure to adduce evidence.

Rather, upon consideration of the prosecution evidence, the

witnesses disowned the alleged seizure and the purported

confessional statement was found to have no nexus with any

discovery.

5. Learned counsel submits that the principle laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal v. State of

Rajasthan, (2024) 1 SCC 175, particularly paragraphs 28 to 30,

squarely applies to the present case. Where the charges,

evidence, material witnesses and circumstances in the criminal

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and departmental proceedings are identical, and the criminal

court, upon a full evaluation of the evidence, finds that the

prosecution has failed to establish the charges, continuation of

the departmental punishment would be unjust, unfair and

oppressive. It is further submitted that the expressions “benefit

of doubt” and “honourable acquittal” are not decisive; the

substance and findings of the criminal judgment have to be

examined. In the present case, the acquittal was founded upon

the prosecution evidence itself, which failed to establish the

allegations.

6. Learned counsel further places reliance upon

Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr.

(1999) 3 SCC 679, particularly paragraphs 34 and 35, and G.M.

Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446, paragraphs 30 and

31, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the

criminal case and departmental proceeding are founded upon

identical facts and evidence and the delinquent is acquitted after

a regular trial, it would be unjust and oppressive to sustain the

departmental findings. It is, therefore, submitted that, in view of

the petitioner’s acquittal on the identical charges and evidence,

the impugned order of punishment deserves to be set aside.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

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departmental proceeding and the criminal case arose out of the

same charge, evidence and witnesses, and that the petitioner

never confessed or admitted the alleged theft in the departmental

proceeding. In his show-cause dated 19.11.1994, he specifically

denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. The finding

of guilt substantially rests upon the alleged confession before the

police and the recoveries purportedly made pursuant thereto.

8. It is further submitted that the respondents

themselves kept the departmental proceeding in abeyance

awaiting the outcome of the criminal case. Having adopted such

course for a considerable period, the respondents could not have

subsequently treated the acquittal as wholly irrelevant.

Moreover, this Court, while passing the order dated 29.07.2013

in Cr. Revision No. 11 of 2013, found material inconsistencies

in the alleged confession and recoveries, including the fact that

the seizure lists did not record recovery at the instance of the

petitioner and that the relevant seizure witnesses did not support

the alleged recoveries.

9. Learned counsel submits that the Disciplinary

Authority, while relying upon Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab,

A.I.R. 1997 SC 79, failed to undertake the very exercise

required by the said judgment, namely, to determine whether the

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alleged confession was voluntary. The authority merely accepted

the Enquiry Officer's conclusion regarding its credibility without

recording any independent finding on voluntariness.

10. It is further submitted that the Standing

Committee, which finally decided the petitioner's appeal, never

afforded him an opportunity of hearing. The earlier hearing

before the Sub Committee could not cure the defect, particularly

when the Sub Committee's order was subsequently withdrawn.

The appellate authority was required under Rule 27(2) of the

Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal)

Rules, 2005 to consider the procedural compliance, the

evidentiary basis of the findings and the proportionality of the

penalty, but did so without hearing the petitioner.

11. Learned counsel further submits that the orders

of the Disciplinary Authority and the Standing Committee are

non-speaking orders. The specific pleas raised by the petitioner

—namely, that he was not on duty at the relevant time, that he

had been falsely implicated, that he was denied cross-

examination, that the second show-cause notice did not disclose

the proposed penalty and that subsistence allowance had not

been paid—were not considered or dealt with by the authorities.

The appellate decision merely records a bare conclusion that

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there was no procedural irregularity or violation of natural

justice. Such an approach is contrary to the principles laid down

in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC

570, Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital, (2000) 7 SCC

668 and G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Education Society, (2010) 2

SCC 497.

12. It is submitted that the Enquiry Officer ignored

material evidence and, in certain respects, recorded findings

contrary to the evidence noted by him. The seizure witnesses

denied recovery of the keys and money in their presence, yet the

Enquiry Officer relied upon their evidence to hold the recovery

proved. The petitioner had also consistently pleaded that he was

not on duty on the relevant night, a plea supported by the

deposition of PW-9, but the Enquiry Officer neither called for

the duty roster nor recorded any finding on this material issue.

13. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was

denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined

against him, including the police witnesses and the Investigating

Officer. Since the finding of guilt rested substantially upon their

evidence and the alleged confession, denial of cross-

examination caused serious prejudice and violated the

petitioner's reasonable opportunity of defence.

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14. It is further submitted that the Enquiry Officer

relied upon material collected during the police investigation

without its proper proof in the departmental proceeding. In view

of the principles laid down in Roop Singh Negi, the Enquiry

Officer was required to base his findings upon evidence brought

on record in the departmental proceeding and could not treat the

police investigation material, by itself, as evidence.

15. Learned counsel also submits that the Enquiry

Officer travelled beyond the charge by holding the petitioner

guilty on the basis of an original key, whereas the charge alleged

removal of money by means of duplicate keys. The Enquiry

Officer further conducted an independent inspection of the

Nazarat Office and tested the locks and keys himself, thereby

supplementing the departmental evidence. Such conduct, it is

submitted, was inconsistent with his role as an impartial

adjudicator and vitiated the enquiry.

16. It is further submitted that the second show-

cause notice dated 11.12.2013 did not disclose the penalty

proposed to be imposed. Consequently, the petitioner was

denied an effective opportunity to make a representation against

the quantum of punishment, although ultimately the extreme

penalty of dismissal was imposed upon him.

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17. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the

petitioner remained under suspension from 12.11.1993 till his

dismissal on 12.05.2014, but was paid subsistence allowance

only up to April 2009. Despite his representation dated

27.11.2021, the subsistence allowance for the period from April

2009 to 12.05.2014 remains unpaid. It is submitted, relying

upon Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and

Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 679 and State of Bihar v. Arbind, (2013) 16

SCC 615, that subsistence allowance is a right and not a bounty,

and the petitioner is entitled to payment thereof with interest.

18. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that in view

of the aforesaid procedural and substantive infirmities, the

impugned orders are unsustainable and the writ petition deserves

to be allowed with the reliefs prayed for.

19. On the contrary, learned counsel for the

respondents submits that the departmental proceeding was

initiated against the petitioner, who was posted as Night Guard,

Civil Court, Barh, on the charge that during the night of

01.11.1993/02.11.1993 he had committed theft of

Rs.1,33,304.33 kept in the cash box of the locker room of the

Nazarth by opening the same with duplicate keys, thereby

committing misconduct and dereliction of duty. In connection

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with the same occurrence, Barh P.S. Case No. 542 of 1993 was

registered under Sections 380/120B, 457 and 411 of the Indian

Penal Code, and the petitioner was arrested on 03.11.1993 and

placed under suspension.

20. It is further submitted that the petitioner, in his

written statement of defence dated 19.11.1994, denied the

charge, including the alleged confession before the police and

the seizure. The departmental enquiry was thereafter conducted,

in which the petitioner was represented by an advocate, and the

Enquiry Officer, by report dated 15.07.1995, found the charge

proved on the basis of oral and documentary evidence. Although

the petitioner sought stay of the departmental proceeding on

account of the pending criminal case, the matter was

subsequently kept pending awaiting the outcome of the criminal

trial.

21. It is further submitted that the petitioner was

initially convicted by the trial court on 05.08.2002, and his

appeal was dismissed on 04.10.2012. However, in Criminal

Revision No. 11 of 2013, this Court, by judgment dated

29.07.2013, set aside the judgments of conviction and directed

his release. Thereafter, the petitioner sought reinstatement, but

upon reconsideration of the departmental proceeding, he was

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again issued a second show-cause notice and, despite his plea

that the criminal acquittal should result in dropping of the

departmental proceeding, the disciplinary authority found the

charge proved and imposed the punishment of dismissal from

service vide order dated 12.05.2014.

22. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner’s

earlier writ petition challenging the dismissal was disposed of

with liberty to avail the statutory appellate remedy. His appeal

was thereafter considered at the level of the Hon’ble Patna High

Court. Though a Sub-Committee of two Hon’ble Judges, by

order dated 06.02.2019, had allowed the appeal on the question

of quantum of punishment and remanded the matter, the Hon’ble

Standing Committee, upon reconsideration in the light of the

minutes dated 20.02.2019, resolved on 26.02.2019 to reject the

appeal. The reasons included that, under Rule 20 of the Bihar

Civil Court Staff (Class III & IV) Rules, 2009, the power to

decide an appeal against a major penalty vested in the Hon’ble

Standing Committee and had not been delegated; further,

hearing by one authority followed by decision by another raised

an issue of natural justice, and there was no provision for a

personal hearing at the appellate stage. The said decision was

subsequently communicated to the petitioner pursuant to the

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order dated 17.11.2021 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 12693 of 2019.

23. On the principal issue of acquittal, learned

counsel submits that acquittal in a criminal case, by itself, does

not entitle a delinquent employee to automatic exoneration from

departmental proceedings. The exception can arise only where

the criminal and departmental proceedings are found on

identical charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances, and

the criminal court has acquitted the delinquent on merits. In the

present case, according to the respondents, the petitioner has

failed to establish such identity. In particular, the Investigating

Officer, K.D. Kumar, was examined as Departmental Witness

No. 11 but was not examined in the criminal trial. The criminal

revision was allowed, inter alia, on account of the non-

examination of the Investigating Officer and the consequent

failure to explain discrepancies relating to recovery. In the

departmental proceeding, however, the said witness and other

police witnesses supported the alleged confession and recovery.

The respondents therefore submit that the standards applicable

to a criminal trial and a departmental proceeding are different,

the former requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt and the

latter proceeding on the preponderance of probabilities.

24. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s

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reliance upon the order dated 06.02.2019 of the Sub-Committee

is misplaced, as the Hon’ble Standing Committee subsequently

considered the matter and independently decided the appeal in

accordance with Rule 20 of the 2009 Rules. The earlier hearing

and decision of the Sub-Committee, therefore, could not govern

or bind the final decision of the competent appellate authority.

25. Learned counsel further submits that the

contention regarding non-issuance of a second show-cause

notice proposing the punishment is untenable. After the Forty-

Second Constitutional Amendment, there is no requirement of

giving a separate opportunity to the delinquent employee on the

proposed quantum of punishment. The notice dated 11.12.2013

enclosed the enquiry report and afforded the petitioner an

opportunity to submit his defence, which opportunity was duly

availed by him.

26. Learned counsel further submits that with regard

to the allegation of denial of opportunity to cross-examine

witnesses, it is submitted that the petitioner has neither

identified any particular departmental witness whom he was

prevented from cross-examining nor demonstrated any prejudice

caused to him. On the contrary, he was represented by an

advocate during the enquiry and was afforded adequate

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opportunity to defend himself, including filing his reply to the

charge-sheet and the second show-cause notice. The disciplinary

and appellate authorities also found no procedural violation in

the departmental proceeding.

27. It is further submitted that as regards the

petitioner’s challenge to the appreciation of evidence, learned

counsel submits that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article

226 is confined to examining the decision-making process and

does not extend to acting as an appellate authority for re-

appreciating the evidence or examining its adequacy, sufficiency

or reliability. In the present case, the finding of guilt was based

upon oral and documentary evidence, including evidence

regarding recovery of the stolen money and duplicate keys

pursuant to information allegedly furnished by the petitioner.

Accordingly, no interference with the findings of the Enquiry

Officer and disciplinary authority is warranted in exercise of

judicial review.

28. It is further submitted that the punishment of

dismissal cannot be said to be disproportionate. Once the charge

of theft of government money by the petitioner, while

functioning as Night Guard and by using duplicate keys, has

been found proved in the departmental proceeding, the

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punishment imposed cannot be said to shock the conscience of

the Court so as to warrant interference in exercise of judicial

review.

29. With regard to non-payment of subsistence

allowance, learned counsel for the contesting respondent

submits that the petitioner’s claim for the period from April,

2009 to 12.05.2014 was considered by the District and Sessions

Judge, Patna. Vide order dated 08.04.2022, subsistence

allowance was allowed for the period from 01.07.2009 to

16.11.2009, during which the petitioner had marked his

attendance, while payment for the subsequent period was

declined as he had failed to mark his attendance as required

under Rule 10 of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005. The said order has

not been challenged by the petitioner. It is therefore submitted

that he cannot subsequently raise a grievance regarding non-

payment for the period during which he failed to comply with

the statutory requirement. In any event, mere non-payment of

subsistence allowance does not, by itself, vitiate a departmental

proceeding unless actual prejudice is established. Here, the

departmental enquiry had already concluded with submission of

the enquiry report on 15.07.1995, and the petitioner has failed to

demonstrate any prejudice in his defence on account of non-

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payment of subsistence allowance for the later period.

30. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned

counsel for the respondents-State submits that the petitioner has

failed to establish any procedural illegality, violation of

principles of natural justice, prejudice, or ground warranting

interference with the departmental findings, the order of

dismissal, or the decision of the appellate authority.

In support of his argument, learned counsel for the

respondent relied upon the judgement/s below : -

1. (2009) 9 SCC 24 Southern Railway Officers

Association & ors. Versus Union of India and others - Para 37

2. (1999) 3 SCC 679-Capt. M. Paul Anthony Versus

Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr.. Para 34 and 35.

3. (2006) 5 SCC 446-G.M. Tank Versus State of

Gujarat & ors. - Para 30.

4. (2015) 2 SCC 610-Union of India & ors. Versus

P. Gunasekaran Para 12, 13, 20 and 21.

31. After hearing the respective parties and upon

perusal of the materials available on record, this Court, with a

view to adjudicate the issue involved in the present writ petition,

considers it appropriate to refer to and reproduce the relevant

judgments and statutory provisions relied upon by the learned

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counsel appearing for the respective parties.

32. Firstly, learned counsel for the petitioner has

relied upon the judgment in the case of Ram Lal Vs. State of

Rajasthan (supra). The relevant paragraphs 28 to 30 thereof are

reproduced hereinbelow:

“28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt”

and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are

not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of

law will not be carried away by the mere use of such

terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge

has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet

carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same

has also been proved by the witnesses examined on

behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the

acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full

consideration of the prosecution evidence and that

the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge

can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment

in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to

examine the substance of the judgment and not go by

the form of expression used.

29. We are satisfied that the findings of

the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly

indicate that the charge against the appellant was not

just, “not proved” — in fact the charge even stood

“disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held

by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when,

after considering the matters before it, the court either

believes that it does not exist or considers its non-

existence so probable that a prudent man ought,

under the circumstances of the particular case, to act

upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is

said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor

“disproved” (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. [Vijayee

Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190 : 1990 SCC (Cri)

378] ).

30. We are additionally satisfied that in

the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the

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disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed

thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were

not just similar but identical and the evidence,

witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is

a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash

the orders of the disciplinary authority and the

appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be

unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar

to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank [G.M.

Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC

(L&S) 1121] .

32.1 learned counsel for the petitioner has further

relied upon the judgment in the case of State of Bihar V. Arbind

reported in (2013) 16 SCC 615. The relevant paragraphs 10, 11

and 14 thereof are reproduced hereinbelow

“10. At this juncture, it is appropriate to

recapitulate the principles laid down by this Court

pertaining to payment of subsistence allowance and

the effect of such non-payment. It is settled in law that

an order of suspension never puts an end to the

service of an employee. He is only not entitled to the

salary but is eligible to get the subsistence allowance.

It has been held in Khem Chand v. Union of India [AIR

1963 SC 687] that the effect of an order of suspension

is that though the employee continues to be a

member of the service, he is not permitted to work

and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less

than his salary. The said principle has been reiterated

in State of M.P. v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 2 SCC

288 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 232] .

11. It is apt to note that the

subsistence allowance is governed by the

service rules. It is given to a suspended

employee for his sustenance. It is in a way

making a provision for maintenance and

survival. In O.P. Gupta v. Union of

India [(1987) 4 SCC 328 : 1987 SCC (L&S)

400 : (1987) 5 ATC 14] it has been stated

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that the very expression “subsistence

allowance” has an undeniable penal

significance. It basically means—a means of

supporting life, especially a minimum

livelihood. Thereafter, the learned Judges

proceeded to observe thus: (SCC p. 341,

para 15)

“15. … It is a clear principle of natural

justice that the delinquent officer when placed under

suspension is entitled to represent that the

departmental proceedings should be concluded with

reasonable diligence and within a reasonable period

of time. If such a principle were not to be recognised,

it would imply that the executive is being vested with a

totally arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its

officers under disability and distress for an indefinite

duration.”

14. In Jagdamba Prasad Shukla v. State

of U.P. [(2000) 7 SCC 90 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 825] it has

been ruled that the payment of subsistence allowance,

in accordance with the rules, to an employee under

suspension is not a bounty. It is a right and if a

suspended employee is unable to appear for want of

funds on account of non-payment of subsistence

allowance, it is a clear case of breach of principles of

natural justice on account of the denial of reasonable

opportunity to defend himself in the departmental

enquiry and that vitiates the departmental enquiry

and the consequent order of removal from service. It

is seemly to state here that in the said case the

employee had intimated the authorities about the

financial crunch.

32.2 Learned counsel has further relied upon the

judgement rendered in the case of Capt. M Paul Anthony

(supra) whose relevant paragraph 34 and 35 are reproduced as

under :-

“34. There is yet another reason for

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discarding the whole of the case of the respondents.

As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the

departmental proceedings were based on identical set

of facts, namely, “the raid conducted at the appellant's

residence and recovery of incriminating articles

therefrom”. The findings recorded by the enquiry

officer, a copy of which has been placed before us,

indicate that the charges framed against the appellant

were sought to be proved by police officers and panch

witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant

and had effected recovery. They were the only

witnesses examined by the enquiry officer and the

enquiry officer, relying upon their statements, came to

the conclusion that the charges were established

against the appellant. The same witnesses were

examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a

consideration of the entire evidence, came to the

conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any

recovery made from the residence of the appellant.

The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out

and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation,

therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a

judicial pronouncement with the finding that the “raid

and recovery” at the residence of the appellant were

not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather

oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex

parte departmental proceedings to stand.

35. Since the facts and the evidence in

both the proceedings, namely, the departmental

proceedings and the criminal case were the same

without there being any iota of difference, the

distinction, which is usually drawn as between the

departmental proceedings and the criminal case on

the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not

be applicable to the instant case.”

32.3 Learned counsel further relied upon the

judgement rendered in the case of G. M. Tank (supra) whose

relevant paragraph 30 and 31 reproduced as under :-

“30. The judgments relied on by

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the learned counsel appearing for the

respondents are distinguishable on facts and on

law. In this case, the departmental proceedings

and the criminal case are based on identical and

similar set of facts and the charge in a

departmental case against the appellant and the

charge before the criminal court are one and the

same. It is true that the nature of charge in the

departmental proceedings and in the criminal

case is grave. The nature of the case launched

against the appellant on the basis of evidence

and material collected against him during

enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the

charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the

same. In other words, charges, evidence,

witnesses and circumstances are one and the

same. In the present case, criminal and

departmental proceedings have already noticed

or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid

conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery

of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr

V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses

were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry

officer who by relying upon their statement came

to the conclusion that the charges were

established against the appellant. The same

witnesses were examined in the criminal case

and the criminal court on the examination came

to the conclusion that the prosecution has not

proved the guilt alleged against the appellant

beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the

appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the

finding that the charge has not been proved. It is

also to be noticed that the judicial

pronouncement was made after a regular trial

and on hot contest. Under these circumstances,

it would be unjust and unfair and rather

oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the

departmental proceedings to stand.

31. In our opinion, such facts and

evidence in the departmental as well as criminal

proceedings were the same without there being

any iota of difference, the appellant should

succeed. The distinction which is usually proved

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between the departmental and criminal

proceedings on the basis of the approach and

burden of proof would not be applicable in the

instant case. Though the finding recorded in the

domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the

courts below, when there was an honourable

acquittal of the employee during the pendency of

the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the

same requires to be taken note of and the

decision in Paul Anthony case [(1999) 3 SCC 679 :

1999 SCC (L&S) 810] will apply. We, therefore,

hold that the appeal filed by the appellant

deserves to be allowed.

32.4 Learned counsel has further relied upon the

judgment rendered in the case of Kuldip Singh (supra) whose

relevant paragraph 11 reproduced as under :-

“11. In this sense, if the

appellant's confession is relevant, the fact

that it was made to the police or while in the

custody of the police may not be of much

consequence for the reason that strict rules

of Evidence Act do not apply to

departmental/disciplinary enquiries. In a

departmental enquiry, it would perhaps be

permissible for the authorities to prove that

the appellant did make such a

confession/admission during the course of

interrogation and it would be for the

disciplinary authority to decide whether it is

a voluntary confession/admission or not. If

the disciplinary authority comes to the

conclusion that the statement was indeed

voluntary and true, he may well be entitled

to act upon the said statement. Here, the

authorities say that they were satisfied about

the truth of the appellant's confession. There

is undoubtedly no other material. There is

also the fact that the appellant has been

acquitted by the Designated Court. We must

say that the facts of this case did present us

with a difficult choice. The fact, however,

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remains that the High Court has opined that

there was enough material before the

appropriate authority upon which it could

come to a reasonable conclusion that it was

not reasonably practicable to hold an

enquiry as contemplated by clause (2) of

Article 311. Nothing has been brought to our

notice to persuade us not to accept the said

finding of the High Court. Even a copy of the

counter filed by the respondents in the High

Court is not placed before us. Once proviso

(b) is held to have been validly invoked, the

government servant concerned is left with no

legitimate ground to impugn the action

except perhaps to say that the facts said to

have been found against him do not warrant

the punishment actually awarded. So far as

the present case is concerned, if one believes

that the confession made by the appellant

was voluntary and true, the punishment

awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The

appellant along with some others caused the

death of the Superintendent of Police and a

few other police officials. It must be

remembered that we are dealing with a

situation obtaining in Punjab during the

years 1990-91. Moreover, the appellate

authority has also agreed with the

disciplinary authority that there were good

grounds for coming to the conclusion that it

was not reasonably practicable to hold a

disciplinary enquiry against the appellant

and that the appellant was guilty of the crime

confessed by him. There is no allegation of

mala fides levelled against the appellate

authority. The disciplinary and the appellate

authorities are the men on the spot and we

have no reason to believe that their decision

has not been arrived at fairly. The High Court

is also satisfied with the reasons for which

the disciplinary enquiry was dispensed with.

In the face of all these circumstances, it is not

possible for us to take a different view at this

stage. It is not permissible for us to go into

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the question whether the confession made

by the appellant is voluntary or not, once it

has been accepted as voluntary by the

disciplinary authority and the appellate

authority.”

32.5 Learned counsel has further relied upon the

judgement rendered in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra)

whose relevant paragraph 23 is reproduced as under :-

“14. Indisputably, a

departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial

proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a

quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled

against the delinquent officer must be found

to have been proved. The enquiry officer has

a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into

consideration the materials brought on

record by the parties. The purported

evidence collected during investigation by

the investigating officer against all the

accused by itself could not be treated to be

evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No

witness was examined to prove the said

documents. The management witnesses

merely tendered the documents and did not

prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter

alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the

FIR which could not have been treated as

evidence.

23. Furthermore, the order of

the disciplinary authority as also the

appellate authority are not supported by any

reason. As the orders passed by them have

severe civil consequences, appropriate

reasons should have been assigned. If the

enquiry officer had relied upon the

confession made by the appellant, there was

no reason as to why the order of discharge

passed by the criminal court on the basis of

selfsame evidence should not have been

taken into consideration. The materials

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brought on record pointing out the guilt are

required to be proved. A decision must be

arrived at on some evidence, which is legally

admissible. The provisions of the Evidence

Act may not be applicable in a departmental

proceeding but the principles of natural

justice are. As the report of the enquiry

officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also

surmises and conjectures, the same could

not have been sustained. The inferences

drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were

not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as

is well known, however high may be, can

under no circumstances be held to be a

substitute for legal proof.

32.6 Further the judgement rendered in the case of

Charan Singh (supra) whose relevant paragraph 10 reproduced

as under :-

“11. The Consumer Protection

Act is one of the benevolent pieces of

legislation intended to protect a large body of

consumers from exploitation. The Act provides

for an alternative system of consumer justice

by summary trial. The authorities under the

Act exercise quasi-judicial powers for redressal

of consumer disputes and it is one of the

postulates of such a body that it should arrive

at a conclusion based on reason. The necessity

to provide reasons, howsoever, brief in

support of its conclusion by such a forum, is

too obvious to be reiterated and needs no

emphasising. Obligation to give reasons not

only introduces clarity but it also excludes, or

at any rate minimises, the chances of

arbitrariness and the higher forum can test the

correctness of those reasons. Unfortunately

we have not been able to find from the

impugned order any reasons in support of the

conclusion that the claim of the appellant is

“unrealistic” or “exaggerated” or “excessive”.

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Loss of salary is not the sole factor which was

required to be taken into consideration.

32.7 Learned counsel has further relied upon the

judgement rendered in the case of G. Vallikumari (supra) whose

relevant paragraph 19 reproduced as under :-

“19. In his order, the Chairman of the

Managing Committee did refer to the allegations

levelled against the appellant and representation

submitted by her in the light of the findings

recorded by the enquiry officer, but without even

adverting to the contents of her representation and

giving a semblance of indication of application of

mind in the context of Rule 120(1)(d)(iv) of the Rules,

he directed her removal from service. Therefore,

there is no escape from the conclusion that the

order of punishment was passed by the Chairman

without complying with the mandate of the relevant

statutory rule and the principles of natural justice.

The requirement of recording reasons by every

quasi-judicial or even an administrative authority

entrusted with the task of passing an order

adversely affecting an individual and

communication thereof to the affected person is

one of the recognised facets of the rules of natural

justice and violation thereof has the effect of

vitiating the order passed by the authority

concerned.

33. This Court also feels it necessary to quote the

relevant judgement relied upon by learned counsel for the

respondent in the case of Southern Railway Officers

Association and Ors. (supra) whose relevant paragraph 37 is

reproduced as under :-

“37. Acquittal in a criminal case by

itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an

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order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary

authority. The High Court did not say that the said

fact had not been taken into consideration. The

revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled

principle of law that the order of dismissal can be

passed even if the delinquent official had been

acquitted of the criminal charge.”

33.1 Learned counsel for the State has further relied

upon the judgement in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs.

P. Gunasekaran (supra) whose relevant paragraph 12, 13, 20

and 21 are reproduced as under :-

“12. Despite the well-settled position,

it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court

has acted as an appellate authority in the

disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the

evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on

Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority

and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative

Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court

is not and cannot act as a second court of first

appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers

under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,

shall not venture into reappreciation of the

evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent

authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the

procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles

of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled

themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some

considerations extraneous to the evidence and

merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed

themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or

extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of

Patna High Court CWJC No.2396 of 2022 dt.15-10.-2026

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it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no

reasonable person could ever have arrived at such

conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had

erroneously failed to admit the admissible and

material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had

erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which

influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no

evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in

the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in

accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the

evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the

evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal

evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however

grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of

punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

20. Equally, it was not open to the

High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go

into the proportionality of punishment so long as

the punishment does not shock the conscience of the

court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority

has come to the conclusion that the respondent

lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable

standards as to what is integrity in service

jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for

such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford

Dictionary is “moral uprightness; honesty”. It takes

in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness,

openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy,

rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness,

goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation,

nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability,

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genuineness, moral excellence, etc. In short, it

depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a

code of moral values.

21. The impugned conduct of the

respondent working as Deputy Office Superintendent

in a sensitive department of Central Excise,

according to the disciplinary authority, reflected lack

of integrity warranting discontinuance in service.

That view has been endorsed by the Central

Administrative Tribunal also. Thereafter, it is not

open to the High Court to go into the proportionality

of punishment or substitute the same with a lesser

or different punishment. These aspects have been

discussed at quite length by this Court in several

decisions including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of

India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996)

32 ATC 44] , Union of India v. G.

Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S)

1806] , Om Kumar v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC

386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] , Coimbatore District

Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. [(2007) 4 SCC

669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68] , Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul

Kumar Choudhuri [(2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC

(L&S) 499] and the recent one in Chennai

Metropolitan Water Supply [Chennai Metropolitan

Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali

Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] .”

34. This Court also feels it necessary to quote Rule

20 of the Bihar Staff and Selection Rule, 2009 as under :-

“20. Appeal.

(1)Any employee aggrieved by

imposition of any minor/major punishment upon

him by the disciplinary authority may prefer an

appeal to the High Court within a period of 30

days from the date of receipt of copy of the said

order and/or from the date of communication of

the said order upon the concerned employee.

(2)Such memorandum of appeal

shall be forwarded by the District Judge

concerned to the Registrar of the High Court

Patna High Court CWJC No.2396 of 2022 dt.15-10.-2026

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together with his comments thereon, if any,

within two weeks from the date of receipt of such

memorandum of appeal.

(3)The Standing Committee of the

High Court shall, dispose of such appeal as

expeditiously as possible and preferably within a

period of three months from the date of receipt of

the memorandum of appeal, if the same has been

preferred against an order imposing a major

penalty and by the Judge Administrative

Department No. 1 in case of minor penalty.

(4)All procedures for holding

Departmental proceeding, imposition of penalty,

disposal of appeal etc, shall be governed by such

statutory Rules as are applicable for the

employees concerned.”

34.1 Further Rule 10 of the CCA Rules 2005 states

as under :-

“10. Subsistence allowance

during suspension (1) A Government Servant

under suspension or deemed to have been placed

under suspension shall be entitled to receive a

subsistence allowance an amount equal to the half

average pay and in addition, dearness allowance

admissible on such half pay :

Provided that where the period of

suspension has exceeded twelve months, the

authority, who has made such order of suspension,

shall be competent to vary the amount of

subsistence allowance for any period subsequent to

the period of first twelve months as follows:-

(i) the amount of subsistence

allowance may be increased by such a suitable

amount, which shall not be exceeding fifty per cent

of the subsistence allowance admissible during the

period of the first twelve months, if in the opinion of

the said authority, the period of suspension has been

prolonged for which, for reasons to be recorded in

writing, the Government Servant is not responsible.

(ii) the amount of subsistence

allowance may be reduced by such a suitable

amount which shall not be exceeding fifty per cent of

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the subsistence allowance admissible during the

period of first twelve months, if, in the opinion of the

said authority, the period of suspension has been

prolonged, for which, for reasons to be recorded in

the writing, the Government Servant is responsible.

(iii) the rate of dearness allowance

will be based on the rates increased or, the reduced

amount, as the case may be, of subsistence

allowance admissible under sub-clause (i) or sub-

clause (ii) of this Rule:

Provided further that the Government

Servant shall be entitled to receive subsistence

allowance only for such period when he is actually

present at the headquarters during the suspension

period. He shall be required to mark his attendance

in the attendance register meant for such

Government Servant:

Provided further that since the

headquarters cannot be fixed for the period of

custody, therefore marking of such attendance shall

not be required for the period of custody.

(2) No Government Servant shall be

entitled to receive payment under sub-rule (1) unless

he furnishes a certificate that he is not engaged in

any other employment, business, profession or

vocation.

(3) Where suspension is under sub-

rule (2) of Rule 9, in that case also the subsistence

allowance shall be admissible in accordance with

sub-rule (1) above. As a result of deemed suspension

due to detention in custody the payment of

subsistence allowance may be made to the

dependent nominated by the Government Servant

on the basis of his authority. Such subsistence

allowance shall be paid by the same establishment

where the Government Servant was posted at the

time of detention.

4) The disciplinary authority shall be

the competent authority to grant subsistence

allowance and to increase or decrease the same.”

35. Upon consideration of the entire material on

record, including the pleadings, the documents, and the

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judgments discussed hereinabove, this Court has reached the

conclusion that it is an admitted position that the petitioner was

dismissed from service pursuant to a departmental proceeding.

36. It is, however, also an admitted position that the

petitioner was convicted by the trial court and that his appeal

against the judgment of conviction was dismissed. Subsequently,

in criminal revision, the judgment of conviction passed by the

trial court was set aside, and the petitioner was directed to be

released.

37. It is a well-settled principle of law that the

standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is proof beyond a

reasonable doubt, whereas, in a departmental proceeding, the

standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities.

38. In the present case, this Court finds that the

punishment imposed upon the petitioner in the departmental

proceeding was based on the evidence of the witnesses

examined before the inquiry officer. Upon perusal of the

materials on record, including the evidence considered by the

inquiry officer, this Court finds that the disciplinary authority

imposed the punishment on the basis of the findings recorded in

the departmental inquiry.

39. This Court has also considered the various

Patna High Court CWJC No.2396 of 2022 dt.15-10.-2026

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judgments discussed hereinabove and has reached the

conclusion that the law laid down therein categorically

establishes that acquittal in a criminal case, by itself, cannot be a

ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by

the disciplinary authority. It is a well-settled principle of law that

an order of dismissal from service may be passed against a

delinquent employee even if he has been acquitted of the

criminal charges, provided that the findings recorded in the

departmental proceeding are otherwise sustainable in law.

40. In view of the foregoing discussion and the

principles of law laid down in the judgments referred to

hereinabove, this Court finds no ground warranting interference

with the impugned order of dismissal from service.

41. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.

Ashwini/-

(Dr. Anshuman, J)

AFR/NAFR

CAV DATE 20.07.2026

Uploading Date 15/10/2026

Transmission Date NA