As per case facts, the plaintiff sued to invalidate a sale deed of land purchased by his father in the plaintiff's minor name, claiming the father illegally sold it without ...
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2026:CGHC:11067
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Judgment reserved on 26-02-2026
Judgment delivered on 03-03-2026
SA No. 84 of 2015
Vimal Kumar Agrawal S/o Shri Shravan Kumar Agrawal Aged
About 27 Years R/o Arang, Tahsil Arang, Civil And Revenue Distt.
Raipur C.G. , Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - Shravan Kumar Agrawal S/o Shri Loknath Agrawal R/o Arang,
Tahsil Arang Civil And Revenue Distt. Raipur C.G.
2 - Shyam Kumar Arora S/o Shri Harikishan Arora R/o Main Road,
Arang, Tahsil-Arang Civil And Revenue Distt. Raipur C.G.
3 - Smt. Neelam Arora W/o Shri Shyam Arora R/o Main Road,
Arang, Tahsil-Arang Civil And Revenue Distt. Raipur C.G.
...Respondents
For Appellant :Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate
For Respondents No.2 & 3:Mr. Rishikant Mahobia, Advocate
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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , J
C A V Judgment
1.By the present appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (for brevity ‘the CPC’), the
appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and
decree dated 16/12/2014 passed by the learned 2
nd
Additional District Judge, Raipur, C.G. in Civil Appeal
No.15A/2013 (Vimal Kumar Agrawal Vs. Shravan Kumar
Agrawal & Ors), arising out of the judgment dated
05/01/2012 passed by the learned 12
th
Civil Judge Class-II,
Raipur, C.G. in Civil Suit No.20A/2008 (Vimal Kumar
Agrawal Vs. Shravan Kumar Agrawal & Ors) whereby the
learned appellate Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the judgment passed by the learned trial Court.
2.For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred
as per their status before the learned trial Court.
3.This appeal has been admitted on 27/07/2015 on the
following substantial question of law:
“1. Whether the findings of the 1
st
Appellate Court
regarding prayer for taking additional documents
on record under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC are
perverse?
3
2. Whether the findings and judgment and decree
passed by the trial Court and the First Appellate
Court regarding Section 4 of the Benami
transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and Section
8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act,
1956 are perverse?”
4.The plaintiffs preferred a suit seeking to declare the sale
deed executed on 3
rd
April 1999 in favor of defendants 2 and
3 as null and void, the possession of the disputed land to be
handed over to the plaintiff, and a permanent injunction to
prevent the defendants from transferring or altering the land
in any way. The plaintiff pleading inter alia that the land
situated at Village Rasani, Plot No. 61, R.I. Circle Arang,
Tehsil Arang, District Raipur, specifically part of Khasra
number 792, with an area of 1.30 hectares, was under the
ownership and possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
continued agricultural activities on this land both during his
minority and after becoming an adult. The defendant No. 1,
who is the father of the plaintiff, had purchased the land in
the name of plaintiff through a registered sale deed dated
25
th
November 1994. In 1999, defendant No.1 sold 1.31
hectares of this land to defendants 2 and 3. However, the
4
defendants neither informed the plaintiff nor obtained
permission from a competent Court as provided under
Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
(for short ‘the Act, 1956’). As a result, defendant No.1
illegally sold the plaintiff’s land to defendants 2 and 3,
contrary to the plaintiff’s interests. This sale was illegal and
void under Section 8(2) of the Act, 1956. The plaintiff also
pleaded that the Defendants 2 and 3 have no right to
transfer the land to any other person. During the plaintiff’s
minority, the plaintiff's elder brother of full blood, Vinay
Kumar Agarwal, filed a case on his behalf on 25
th
July 2003
before the 3
rd
Civil Judge, Class II, Raipur, seeking to
declare the sale as void. However, the same was dismissed
on 7
th
January 2008 on the grounds that it was not filed by
the natural guardian as required. Thus, this suit.
5.While admitting the plaint averments, the defendant No.1
contended that without obtaining permission from a
competent Court, the plaintiff's(minor) land was sold to
defendants No. 2 and 3.
6.Defendants No.2 and 3 in their written statement, denied the
plaint averments and submitted that when the plaintiff was 8
years old, defendant No. 1 had purchased the land (Khasra
5
No. 792, area 1.489 hectares) from Vishwanath, son of
Loknath, through a registered sale deed on 25
th
November
1994 in the name of his minor son, Vimal Kumar Agarwal
(plaintiff) as a benamidar (nominee). The land in question
originally belonged to defendant No. 1 and later, during the
settlement process, the area of Khasra No. 792 was
recorded as 1.31 hectares. Since defendant No. 1 was the
actual owner of the land and the land was merely registered
in the name of his son, the need to seek permission from the
Court for its sale was not required. Therefore, the sale was
not subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, 1956.
7.The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and duly
appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by
both parties, as well as the material available on record,
dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. The Court held that,
in respect of the suit property, the plaintiff’s natural guardian
(his father) was not required to obtain prior permission from
the competent Court for transferring the property. The Court
further held that the suit instituted by the plaintiff was barred
by limitation, had not been properly valued for the purposes
of jurisdiction and court fees, and that appropriate court fees
had not been affixed. Against the said judgment and decree,
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the plaintiff filed the Civil Appeal before the learned appellate
Court who by order impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by
maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned
trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellant/plaintiff.
8.(a)Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both
the Courts erred in considering and appreciating the
provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act,
1956. The findings recorded by the Courts are based on the
age of the plaintiff as mentioned in certain documents on
record, which are apparently unreliable. Both the Courts
failed to appreciate that the Plaintiff himself had not declared
his age in those documents and, therefore, he cannot be
bound by such entries. Learned counsel further submits that
both the Courts further erred in observing that the plaintiff
ought to have mentioned his running age as 21 years in the
plaint. The plaintiff had specifically pleaded that he filed the
suit within the prescribed period of limitation after attaining
majority. It is also pertinent to note that the age mentioned in
the pleadings were never specifically challenged by the
defendants.
(b)Learned counsel further submits that the learned First
Appellate Court committed a serious error in rejecting the
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application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Appellate Court ought to have considered
the necessity and relevance of the additional evidence
sought to be adduced and should have decided the
application along with the merits of the appeal. To buttress
his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision
rendered by the High Court of Karnataka in the matter of
Sangawwa v Shankarappa reported in 1991 LawSuit (Kar)
287 and this Court in the matter of Ganga Singh & Ors. v
Jamuna Prasad reported in SA No.340 of 2009
(31.1.2024).
9.On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No.2
and 3 would submit that the impugned judgment and decree
passed by both the Courts are wholly legal and justified.
Defendant No. 1 is the father of the plaintiff. Both father and
son, in collusion with each other, have filed the present
appeal with an ulterior motive to harass Defendant Nos. 2
and 3. Hence, they have prayed for dismissal of the present
appeal. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon
the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of
Pushpalata Vs. Vijay Kumar (dead) Thr. LRs & Or s
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1152 and Sri Narayan
8
Bal And Ors Vs. Sridhar Sutar And Others reported in
(1996) 8 SCC 54.
10.I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
material available on record.
11.So far as the first substantial question of law whether the
findings of the 1
st
Appellate Court regarding prayer for taking
additional documents on record under Order 41 Rule 27 of
the CPC are perverse is concerned, the documents
submitted by the plaintiff are his own educational certificates,
namely: (1) the District Pre-Matriculation (Class VIII)
Certificate for the year 2002, and (2) the Chhattisgarh Board
of Secondary Education, Raipur, High School Certificate
Examination (Class 10+2) 2004 Certificate along with mark
sheet. These certificates were not only available to the
plaintiff from the beginning but were also fully known to him.
The plaintiff claims to have pursued engineering studies;
therefore, it is evident that he cannot claim ignorance of his
own examination certificates or his date of birth. Accepting
such a claim in any way would be unreasonable.
12.Further, the plaintiff had filed the claim before the trial Court
on 22.01.2008. Even if it is assumed that the documents
were submitted along with the engineering examination
9
application, considering the duration of the engineering
course, he could have submitted the certificates of 2002 and
2004 before the trial Court, since the case was presented
before the trial Court in 2008 and was disposed of on
05.01.2012. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff did not
exercise due diligence that would demonstrate he was
unable to present these certificates earlier. These
documents were not only in his possession but were fully
known to him from the outset.
13.In view of these circumstances, the appellate Court has
rightly observed that it was not appropriate to admit the
additional evidence submitted by the plaintiff. Consequently,
the said documents are rejected in light of the principles
enunciated under Order 41, Rule 27, sub-rule (1)(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
14.As far as second substantial question of law is concerned,
Plaintiff-Vimal Kumar Agrawal (P.W.1) stated that when he
was minor his father, defendant No.1-Shravan Kumar
Agrawal, had purchased the suit land in his name on 25-11-
1994 and got the sale deed registered accordingly. At that
time, he was approximately 7–8 years old. His father sold
the said land in the year 1999 to defendant Nos. 2 and 3
10
without obtaining permission from the competent Court as
required under Section 8 of the Act, 1956. During cross-
examination, he admitted that the suit land had been
purchased by his father in his name. The negotiations,
documentation, and transaction relating to the purchase and
sale of the land were conducted by his father, and the sale
consideration was also received by his father. The witness
further stated that the payment was made by withdrawing
money from his bank account by his father. He further stated
that the money deposited in his account had been deposited
by his parents; however, he also stated that he does not
know when or how much money he received as a gift.
15.Defendant No.1-Shravan Kumar Agrawal (D.W.1), also
supported the plaintiff’s statement and stated that he had
purchased the suit land in the name of his minor son Vimal
Kumar Agrawal on 25-11-1994 and had issued a cheque of
Rs. 36,000/- from Vimal Kumar’s savings bank account to
the seller. He further stated that he had sold the suit land for
his personal needs and that he did not give the sale
proceeds to plaintiff. He categorically stated in his cross-
examination at para 8 that at the relevant they are joint
11
family and he maintains the joint family in the capacity of
Karta.
16.Defendant No.2, Shyam Kumar Arora (D.W.2), stated that
defendant No.1 had informed him regarding the suit property
that he had purchased the property from his own income in
the name of his minor son, who is the real owner, and that
he (Defendant No. 1) is the head (karta) of his family. Only
thereafter he purchased the suit property. The real owner of
the suit property was defendant No.1, while the plaintiff was
merely a benamidar.
17.At the time of execution of the sale deed dated 03-04-1999,
the plaintiff was a minor. During his minority, the sale deed
(Exhibit D-1) was executed by his father/defendant.
However, prior permission from the competent Court, as
required under law, was not obtained for such execution.
Since this is in contravention of the provisions of Section
8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the
said sale deed is void and not binding upon the plaintiff.
18.Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
reads as under:
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8. Powers of natural guardian.
(1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power,
subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts
which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the
benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or
benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian can in no
case bind the minor by a personal covenant.
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous
permission of the court,—
(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift,
exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable
property of the minor; or
(b) lease any part of such property for a term
exceeding five years or for a term extending more
than one year beyond the date on which the minor
will attain majority.
(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural
guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any
person claiming under him.
19.The disputed property was purchased by the plaintiff’s father,
Shravan Kumar Agrawal, when the plaintiff was minor and the
consideration amount was also paid by him. This fact has
been admitted by the plaintiff as well. Therefore, the plaintiff is
merely a nominal owner of the suit property, while the real
owner is his father, Shravan Kumar Agrawal. The plaintiff
13
holds the status of a benamidar, and consequently, no
permission from the competent Court was required for transfer
of the suit property.
20.From the evidence on record, it is clear that through the sale
deed (Exhibit D-1), the suit property was sold on behalf of the
minor Vimal Kumar by his father, Shravan Kumar, to
Defendants No. 2 and 3.The suit property had originally been
purchased by the plaintiff’s father, Shravan Kumar, through a
registered sale deed (Exhibit D-2) dated 25 November 1994
from Vishwanath Agrawal for a consideration of ₹44,000/-.
The entire sale consideration was paid by Shravan Kumar
Agrawal himself, which has also been admitted by the plaintiff.
21.The plaintiff has further admitted that the suit property was
purchased by his father and that all negotiations and
documentation relating to the transaction were carried out by
his father. He stated that the money was withdrawn from his
account by his father; however, he also admitted that the
amount deposited in his account had been deposited by his
father and mother themselves.
22.Thus, at the time when the suit property was purchased by
the plaintiff’s father, Shravan Kumar, the plaintiff was only 8
14
years old. There is neither any pleading nor any evidence to
show that the plaintiff had any independent source of income
at that time. On the contrary, the plaintiff himself has stated
that the suit property was purchased by his father in his name
and that the consideration amount was also paid by his father.
23.There is also no pleading that the amount used for
purchasing the suit property was received by the plaintiff by
way of any gift or donation. Rather, in cross-examination, he
stated that he does not know when and how much money he
had received as gifts. At the time of purchase of the suit
property, the plaintiff and his father were members of a joint
family, and the entire sale consideration was paid by the
plaintiff’s father. Therefore, it is clear that the disputed
property was in fact purchased by the plaintiff’s father. The
plaintiff’s name was recorded merely as a nominal owner,
whereas the real owner was his father, Shravan Kumar
Agrawal.
24.The Supreme Court in the matter of Pushpalata (supra)
spelt out the circumstances, which can be taken as a guide
to determine the nature of transactions at para 22, which
reads as under :
15
“The court’s approach in cases, where the claim is
that a property or set of properties, are benami,
was outlined, after considering previous
precedents, in Binapani Paul Vs. Pratima Ghosh
reported in (2007) 6 SCC 100, where this Court
cited with approval extracts from Valliammal Vs.
Subramaniam reported in (2004) 7 SCC 233: 2004
Supp (1) SCR 966:”
47. Burden of proof as regards the benami
nature of transaction was also on the
respondent. This aspect of the matter has
been considered by this Court in Valliammal
(D) By LRS. v. Subramaniam and Others
[(2004) 7 SCC 233] wherein a Division Bench
of this Court held:
13. This Court in a number of judgments has
held that it is well established that burden of
proving that a particular sale is benami lies on
the person who alleges the transaction to be a
benami. The essence of a benami transaction
is the intention of the party or parties
concerned and often, such intention is
shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily
pierced through. But such difficulties do not
relieve the person asserting the transaction to
be benami of any part of the serious onus that
rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of
mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute
for proof. Ref to Refer to Jaydayal Poddar v.
16
Bibi Hazra [(1974) 1 SCC 3), Krishnanand
Agnihotri v. State of M.P. ((1977) 1 SCC 816
1977 SCC (Cri) 190], Thakur Bhim Singh v.
Thakur Kan Singh [(1980) 3 SCC 72], Pratap
Singh v. Sarojini Devi [1994 Supp (1) SCC
734) and Heirs of Vrajlal J. Ganatra v. Heirs of
Parshottam S. Shah ((1996) 4 SCC 490]. It
has been held in the judgments referred to
above that the question whether a particular
sale is a benami or not, is largely one of fact,
and for determining the question no absolute
formulas or acid test, uniformly applicable in
all situations can be laid. After saying so, this
Court spelt out the following six circumstances
which can be taken as a guide to determine
the nature of the transaction:
(1) the source from which the purchase
money came;
(2) the nature and possession of the property,
after the purchase;
(3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a
benami colour;
(4) the position of the parties and the
relationship, if any, between the claimant and
the alleged benamidar;
(5) the custody of the title deeds after the
sale; and
17
(6) the conduct of the parties concerned in
dealing with the property after the sale.
Jaydayal Poddar Vs. Bibi Hazra [(1974) 1
SCC 3] , SCC p. 7, para
14. The above indicia are not exhaustive and
their efficacy varies according to the facts of
each case. Nevertheless, the source from
where the purchase money came and the
motive why the property was purchased
benami are by far the most important tests for
determining whether the sale standing in the
name of one person, is in reality for the
benefit of another. We would examine the
present transaction on the touchstone of the
above two indicia.
*** *** ***
18. It is well settled that intention of the parties
is the essence of the benami transaction and
the money must have been provided by the
party invoking the doctrine of benami. The
evidence shows clearly that the original
plaintiff did not have any justification for
purchasing the property in the name of
Ramayee Ammal. The reason given by him is
not at all acceptable. The source of money is
not at all traceable to the plaintiff. No person
named in the plaint or anyone else was
examined as a witness. The failure of the
18
plaintiff to examine the relevant witnesses
completely demolishes his case.”
25.By applying the aforesaid guidelines, after examination of
the fact & evidence available on record in the case at hand, it
is very clear that, though the property purchased in the name
of plaintiff by his father i.e. defendant No.1, but the motive,
source of income, relation of plaintiff & defendant No.1 shows
that the original owner of the property is the defendant No.1
only. Hence, being the Karta of joint family, the defendant
No.1 has purchased & sold the land, which is stood in the
name of plaintiff, who is the minor son of the defendant No.1
and as such, the provision of Section 8 of the Act, 1956 is not
attracted.
26.In respect of obtaining permission under Section 8 of the Act,
1956 for disposing of the undivided interest of the minor in the
joint family is concerned, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Sri Narayan Bal (supra) held thus at para 5 :
“5. With regard to the undivided interest of the
Hindu minor in joint family property, the provisions
afore-culled are beads of the same string and need
to be viewed in a single glimpse, simultaneously in
conjunction with each other. Each provision, and in
particular Section 8, cannot be viewed in isolation.
19
If read together the intent of the legislature in this
beneficial legislation becomes manifest. Ordinarily
the law does not envisage a natural guardian of the
undivided interest of a Hindu minor in joint family
property. The natural guardian of the property of a
Hindu minor, other than the undivided interest in
joint family property, is alone contemplated under
Section 8, whereunder his powers and duties are
defined. Section 12 carves out an exception to the
rule that should there be no adult member of the
joint family in management of the joint family
property, in which the minor has an undivided
interest, a guardian may be appointed; but
ordinarily no guardian shall be appointed for such
undivided interest of the minor. The adult member
of the family in the management of the joint Hindu
family property may be a male or a female, not
necessarily the Karta. The power of the High Court
otherwise to appoint a guardian, in situations
justifying, has been preserved. This is the
legislative scheme on the subject. Under Section 8
a natural guardian of the property of the Hindu
minor, before he disposes of any immovable
property of the minor, must seek permission of the
court. But since there need be no natural guardian
for the minor's undivided interest in the joint family
property, as provided under Sections 6 and 12 of
the Act, the previous permission of the court under
Section 8 for disposing of the undivided interest of
20
the minor in the joint family property is not required.
The joint Hindu Family by itself is a legal entity
capable of acting through its Karta and other adult
members of the family in management of the joint
Hindu Family property. Thus Section 8 in view of
the express terms of Sections 6 and 12, would not
be applicable where a joint Hindu Family property
is sold/disposed of by the Karta invilving an
undivided interest of the minor in the said joint
Hindu Family property. The question posed at the
outset therefore is so answered.”
27.Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second
Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the
appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent
findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be
interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse,
based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.
28.In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the
basis of evidence available on record, that the
appellant/plaintiff failed to establish its case by placing cogent
and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to
21
demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law
in the findings so recorded.
29.The questions sought to be raised in the present Second
Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and
challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not
give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning
of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
30.It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding
of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not
ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
31.In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv
Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating
the settled proposition, it has been held that when any
concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the
appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it
was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading
of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against
any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no
Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.
32.Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned
counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law
22
cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial
question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC.
These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts.
The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law
which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event,
the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of
law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case
is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned
passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned
First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no
illegality and infirmity at all.
33.Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby
dismissed. SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Gowri/
Amardeep
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