1

2026:CGHC:27468

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 467 of 2023

Judgment Reserved on 23.06.2026

Judgment Delivered on 03.07.2026

•Vinod Kumar Tamboli, S/o Late Samelal @ Kishun Lal Tamboli,

aged about 65 Years, R/o Bhartiya Nagar, P.S. Civil Line, Bilaspur,

Tehsil and District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.

...Appellant

versus

•State of Chhattisgarh, Through A.C.B. Raipur / A.C.B. Unit

Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

... Respondent

For Appellant :Mr. Vaibhav P. Shukla, Advocate along

with Mr. Ashish Thawait, Advocate.

For Respondent/State :Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate

General.

(Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal)

CAV Judgment

1.This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure has been preferred against the judgment of conviction

and order of sentence dated 17.02.2023 passed by the learned

Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988), Bilaspur, C.G.

in Special Sessions Case No.06/2017 whereby the appellant has

been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(e)

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read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

(for short, ‘the Act, 1988’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for five years and to pay fine of Rs.4,00,000/-, in

default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous

imprisonment for 1½ year.

2.Case of the prosecution case, in brief, is that the appellant was

appointed as Patwari on 15.02.1981 and was serving under the

Revenue Department. On the basis of source information received

by the Anti-Corruption Bureau alleging that the appellant had

accumulated assets disproportionate to his known sources of

income, a preliminary enquiry was conducted. Thereafter, Crime

No.0/2014 was registered on 29.09.2014 and after obtaining a

search warrant, a search was conducted at the residential

premises of the appellant on 30.09.2014. During the search,

various documents, valuables and other articles were seized.

Subsequently, Crime No.42/2014 was registered and after

completion of investigation and obtaining sanction for prosecution,

charge-sheet was filed before the Special Court. According to the

prosecution, the check period was taken from 01.01.1990 to

30.09.2014. During the said period, the appellant and his family

members were found to have acquired movable and immovable

properties beyond their known sources of income. The

prosecution assessed the total income of the appellant and his

family members at Rs.67,14,930/- and the total expenditure and

assets at Rs.1,81,65,460/-, thereby calculating disproportionate

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assets of Rs.1,14,50,530/- which amounted to 170.52% of the

known income. On that basis, charge under Section 13(1)(e) read

with Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988 was framed and the

statements of the witnesses were recorded.

3.Appellant denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. In

defense, he examined 16 defence witnesses i.e. DW-1 to DW-16

and exhibited 72 documents i.e. Exs.D-1 to D-72. The prosecution

examined 33 witnesses i.e. PW-1 to PW-33 and exhibited 248

documents i.e. Exs.P-1 to P-248.

4.After appreciation of evidence, the learned Special Judge

recalculated the income and expenditure and held that the total

income of the appellant was Rs.67,75,545/- and total expenditure

and assets were Rs.1,65,65,680/-. The learned trial Court held

that the appellant possessed disproportionate assets worth

Rs.97,88,855/- (as corrected by the trial Court vide order dated

20.02.2023) which was approximately 144% more than his known

income and accordingly convicted and sentenced him.

5.Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Special

Judge has wrongly convicted and sentenced the appellant in

absence of cogent and reliable evidence. It is contended that the

impugned judgment suffers from serious errors in the appreciation

of both facts and law. It is further submitted that the trial Court

failed to properly consider the defence evidence relating to the

lawful sources of income of the appellant and his family. The

prosecution had issued a notice (Ex.D-45) seeking information for

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the period from 01.02.1995 to 30.09.2014. However, at the stage

of filing the charge-sheet, the check period was altered to

01.01.1990 to 30.09.2014, and assets relating to the earlier period

were included without giving the appellant an opportunity to

explain the same. It is also submitted that both daughters of the

appellant were employed prior to their marriage, and their income

was duly proved by oral and documentary evidence. However, the

trial Court failed to consider this material evidence. Similarly, the

appellant’s wife, Pushpa Tamboli, had an independent source of

income, which was duly established through defence evidence,

but the same was wrongly ignored. Learned counsel further

submits that the trial Court arbitrarily reduced the agricultural

income without any supporting evidence. It is also contended that

the appellant’s wife received Rs.40,00,000/- as advance sale

consideration for agricultural land, which was proved by the

purchaser and supported by a compromise decree passed by the

Lok Adalat (Ex.D-18), but the same was not considered by the trial

Court. It is further submitted that the rental income from the house

situated at Bhartiya Nagar was duly proved through tenants and

corroborated by the Investigating Officer, yet it was wrongly

discarded. According to learned counsel, if all these lawful

sources of income are properly taken into account, the

prosecution’s calculation of disproportionate assets becomes

unsustainable. It is also submitted that several expenditure heads

have been wrongly inflated by the prosecution and accepted by

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the trial Court, including household expenses assessed at 60% of

salary, valuation of jewellery, bank balances, household articles,

electronic items, luxury items, educational expenses, foreign

travel of the appellant’s son, cash seized during the search, and

valuation of immovable properties. It is contended that if the

evidence is appreciated in light of the settled principles laid down

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the appellant is able to

satisfactorily explain all the disputed items. On proper

recalculation, his lawful income exceeds the total expenditure and

assets. Therefore, it is prayed that the impugned judgment be set

aside and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. In support

of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has placed

reliance on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.

Krishna Reddy v. State Deputy Superintendent of Police,

Hyderabad, (1992) 4 SCC 45; Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of

Sikkim, (2011) 4 SCC 402; DSP, Chennai v. K. Inbasagaran,

(2006) 1 SCC 420; Krishnanand Agnihotri v. The State of Madhya

Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 816 and Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of

U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 5009 of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Crl.)

No. 10101 of 2024), decided on 04.12.2024 / 2025 Livelaw (SC)

90 & Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar & Anr., (1985) 2 SCC 370.

Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of this Court in

Krishna Kumar Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal

No. 490/2002, decided on 30.03.2010.

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6.Per contra, learned counsel for the State supports the impugned

judgment and submits that the prosecution has successfully

established each ingredient of the offence punishable under

Section 13(1)(e) of the Act of 1988. It is argued that the appellant

failed to furnish satisfactory explanations regarding several assets

discovered during investigation and that the learned Special

Judge has already granted due benefit to the appellant by

modifying the original calculations prepared by the investigating

agency. According to the learned State counsel, the findings

recorded by the trial Court are based upon a proper appreciation

of oral and documentary evidence and do not warrant interference

in an appeal against conviction.

7.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

entire record.

8.Appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under

Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988. Before

adverting to the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to

examine the legal principles governing a prosecution under

Section 13(1)(e) of the Act, which reads as under:-

“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.-(1) A public

servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,

-

xxx xxx xxx xxx

(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has,

at any time during the period of his office, been in possession

for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of

pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his

known sources of income.

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Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "known

sources of income" means income received from any lawful

source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance

with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time

being applicable to a public servant.”

9.The law relating to disproportionate assets cases is well settled. In

State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981)

3 SCC 199, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the initial burden

always lies upon the prosecution to establish the income, assets

and expenditure of the accused during the check period. Only

after the prosecution discharges this burden does the onus shift

upon the accused to satisfactorily explain the assets found in his

possession. Para 13 is relevant which is reproduced hereunder:-

“13. That takes us to the difficult question as to the nature

and extent of the burden of proof under Section 5(1)(e) of

the Act. The expression 'burden of proof' has two distinct

meanings (1) the legal burden. i.e. the burden of

establishing the guilt, and (2) the evidential burden, i.e.

the burden of leading evidence. In a criminal trial, the

burden of proving everything essential to establish the

charge against the accused lies upon the prosecution,

and that burden never shifts. Notwithstanding the general

rule that the burden of proof lies exclusively upon the

prosecution, in the case of certain offences, the burden of

proving a particular fact in issue may be laid by law upon

the accused. The burden resting on the accused in such

cases is, however, not so onerous as that which lies on

the prosecution and is discharged by proof of a balance of

probabilities. The ingredients of the offence of criminal

misconduct under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e)

are the possession of pecuniary resources or property

disproportionate to the known sources of income for

which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account. To

substantiate the charge, the prosecution must prove the

following facts before it can bring a case under 5(1)(e),

namely, (1) it must establish that the accused is a public

servant, (2) the nature and extent of the pecuniary

resources or property which were found in his possession,

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(3) it must be proved as to what were his known sources

of income i.e. known to the prosecution, and (4) it must

prove quite objectively, that such resources or property

found in possession of the accused were disproportionate

to his known sources of income. Once these four

ingredients are established, the offence of criminal

misconduct under s. 5(1)(e) is complete, unless the

accused is able to account for such resources or property.

The burden then shifts to the accused to satisfactorily

account for his possession of disproportionate assets.

The extent and nature of burden of proof resting upon the

public servant to be found in possession of

disproportionate assets under s. 5(1)(e) cannot be higher

than the test laid by the Court in Jahgan's case (supra),

i.e. to establish his case by a preponderance of

probability. That test was laid down by the court following

the dictum of Viscount Sankey, L.C. in Woolmington v.

Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 AC 462. The High

Court has placed an impossible burden on the

prosecution to disprove all possible sources of income

which were within the special knowledge of the accused.

As laid down in Swamy's case (supra), the prosecution

cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know

the affairs of a public servant found in possession of

resources or property disproportionate to his known

sources of income i.e. his salary. Those will be matters

specially within the knowledge of the public servant within

the meaning of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

Section 106 reads:

When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any

person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

In this connection, the phrase the burden of proof is

clearly used in the secondary sense namely. the duty of

introducing evidence. The nature and extent of the burden

cast on the accused is well settled. The accused is not

bound to prove his innocence beyond all reasonable

doubt. All that he need do is to bring out a preponderance

of probability.

10.Similarly, in M. Krishna Reddy (supra), the Supreme Court held

that the burden cast upon the accused is not as heavy as that

resting upon the prosecution and the accused can discharge the

same on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.

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11.Thus, before drawing any adverse inference against the appellant,

this Court is required to examine whether the prosecution has

correctly determined the check period and whether it has fairly

assessed the income, expenditure and assets of the appellant.

12.The first aspect which requires consideration is the issue of the

check period. The record shows that during investigation, PW-31

S.P. Karosiya, Investigating Officer, issued notice Ex.D-45 to the

appellant seeking information regarding his income, expenditure,

movable and immovable properties for the period from 01.02.1995

to 30.09.2014. However, while filing the charge-sheet and

preparing the final calculation sheet, the prosecution adopted the

check period from 01.01.1990 to 30.09.2014. As a result, several

transactions and properties relating to the period prior to

01.02.1995 were included in the assessment. No witness

examined by the prosecution has explained as to why the check

period was altered. Even PW-31 S.P. Karosiya, Investigating

Officer, in his evidence has not assigned any reason for changing

the check period from 1995 to 1990. The prosecution has also

failed to establish that any opportunity was afforded to the

appellant to explain transactions falling within the additional period.

Since the entire prosecution case rests upon calculation of income

and expenditure during the check period, such inconsistency goes

to the root of the matter and creates serious doubt regarding the

correctness of the assessment made by the prosecution.

Therefore, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of this doubt.

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13.The next issue relates to the income earned by the daughters of

the appellant before their marriage. To prove this fact, the defence

examined DW-13 Achala Tamboli, elder daughter of appellant, who

categorically stated that before joining government service as a

Patwari, she was employed in NICT Computer Education Institute.

Her evidence is fully supported by DW-14 Saiyad Maqbool Ali, who

issued the salary certificates (Exs.D-39 and D-40). The salary

received by her after joining government service is also supported

by the pay slips (Exs.D-41 and D-42). So far as the younger

daughter, Abha Tamboli, is concerned, DW-11 Hemant Kumar

Soni, Head of ICE Computer Institute, has proved that she was

employed in the said institute and had received salary, which is

supported by salary certificate (Ex.D-38). Thus, the defence has

produced both oral and documentary evidence to establish that

both daughters had independent sources of income before their

marriage. The learned trial Court rejected the aforesaid income

mainly on the ground that the appellant had not disclosed the

same in the annual property returns submitted to his department.

In the opinion of this Court, such an approach cannot be accepted.

14.In the matter of Ashok Tshering Bhutia (supra), the Supreme

Court held in para 40 which reads as under:-

“40.The contention of the respondents regarding non-

compliance with the 1981 Rules adversely affecting the

evidentiary value of Ext.D-4 must be rejected for at least

two reasons:

(i) The 1981 Rules are not rules of evidence. The

admissibility and probative value of evidence is

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determined under the provisions of the Evidence Act,

1872. These Rules are merely service rules by which

government servants in Sikkim are expected to abide.

Consequently, the respondent has not been able to

provide any cogent reason why the contents of Ext. D-

4 should be disregarded; and

(ii) Rule 19(i) of the 1981 Rules does undoubtedly

require government servants to, on first appointment to

any service or post and thereafter at the close of every

financial year, submit to the Government the return of

their assets and liabilities. However, it is to be noted

that the said Rule envisages that public servants will

submit such returns in a prescribed form. Despite

being repeatedly questioned by this Court, the

respondents were unable to produce such form. Thus,

it cannot be said that the appellant did not comply with

the said Rule as in the absence of such a form it was

impossible for him to have done so (through no fault of

his own). In any event, failing to submit such returns

even if there had been no such a form, would make

the appellant liable to face disciplinary proceedings

under the service rules applicable at the relevant time.

The provisions of the 1981 Rules cannot by any

stretch of imagination be said to have the effect of

rendering evidence inadmissible in criminal

proceedings under the PC Act, 1988.

Thus, in such a fact situation, the appellant could not be

fastened with criminal liability for want of compliance with

the said requirement of the Rules.”

15.Thus, the above principles clearly establish that rules requiring

submission of annual property returns are not rules of evidence.

Mere non-disclosure of any asset or income in departmental

returns may lead to disciplinary proceedings, but it cannot, by

itself, be a ground to discard otherwise reliable and admissible

evidence in criminal proceedings.

16.In view of the aforesaid legal position, and in the absence of any

material to show that the testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses

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are false or unreliable, this Court finds no justification for rejecting

the income of the appellant’s daughters. Accordingly, the income of

Rs.13,05,401/- earned by the daughters prior to their marriage

deserves to be accepted.

17.The next issue relates to the independent income of the

appellant’s wife, Pushpa Tamboli. The defence examined DW-12

Raj Kumar Bajaj, LIC Agent, who stated that DW-2 Pushpa

Tamboli, wife of appellant, was working as a collection agent under

him and was receiving remuneration for the work performed by her.

The defence also produced salary certificates and other

documents marked as Exs.D-19 to D-21 in support of the said

claim. The learned trial Court rejected the aforesaid evidence

mainly on the ground that the documents were prepared after

commencement of the investigation. Merely because the

documents were prepared after initiation of investigation, the same

cannot be discarded unless it is shown that they are false or

fabricated. During cross-examination of DW-12 Raj Kumar Bajaj,

nothing material has been elicited to discredit his testimony. The

prosecution has also failed to produce any evidence to establish

that the documents are fabricated or manipulated.

18.In view of the aforesaid evidence, this Court is satisfied that the

income of DW-2 Pushpa Tamboli, wife of appellant, amounting to

Rs.3,00,000/- during the check period stands duly established and

deserves to be included in the lawful income of the family.

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19.The next issue pertains to the agricultural income claimed by the

appellant. The record shows that the appellant and his family

owned agricultural lands during the check period. In support of the

agricultural income, reliance has been placed upon certificates

issued by the competent revenue authorities i.e. Exs.P-228, P-229

and P-230. The prosecution itself examined PW-20 Yugal Kishor

Urvasha, the then Tehsildar, and PW-28 Sandeep Thakur,

Additional Tehsildar, who proved the issuance of the aforesaid

certificates. According to the certificates, the agricultural income

earned by the appellant and his family members during the

relevant period was Rs.34,54,805/-. The learned trial Court,

however, accepted only Rs.11,57,339/-. It first deducted 33%

towards cultivation expenses and thereafter made a further

deduction of 50% by presuming that cultivation was carried out

under the Adhiya system. This Court finds no evidence on record

to support such a conclusion. Neither PW-20 Yugal Kishor

Urvasha, nor PW-28 Sandeep Thakur has stated that the lands

were cultivated on Adhiya basis. No document has been produced

by the prosecution to establish such an arrangement. The second

deduction, therefore, rests purely on assumption.

20.Once the revenue authorities themselves certified the agricultural

income and the certificates have been proved by prosecution

witnesses, there was no legal justification for making arbitrary

deductions unsupported by evidence. Accordingly, the agricultural

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income of Rs.34,54,805/- deserves to be accepted instead of

Rs.11,57,339/-.

21.The next issue relates to the rental income from the residential

house situated at Bhartiya Nagar, Bilaspur. To prove this, the

defence examined DW-3 Narendra Kumar Naidu, DW-5

Ramshankar Shriwas, DW-6 Indresh Naidu, DW-8 Ramswaroop

Yadav, DW-9 Santosh Kumar Naidu and DW-10 Mohd. Wasim

Javed. All these witnesses consistently stated that they were

tenants in different portions of the appellant’s house and were

paying rent to the appellant or his family members. The defence

also relied on affidavits of the tenants (Exs.D-23, D-25 and D-26)

and a departmental intimation regarding rental income (Ex.D-63).

Further, PW-31 S.P. Karosiya, the Investigating Officer, admitted in

his cross-examination that at the time of the search, some portions

of the house were occupied by tenants. Thus, the existence of

tenants is supported not only by defence evidence but also by the

prosecution evidence. The learned trial Court rejected the rental

income only on the ground that no rent agreements or rent receipts

were produced. However, in the present case, several tenants

have been examined, their evidence has remained largely

unchallenged, and even the Investigating Officer has admitted the

presence of tenants. Therefore, complete rejection of the rental

income is not justified. Accordingly, this Court holds that the rental

income of Rs.11,52,600/- deserves to be included in the income of

the appellant.

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22.The next issue relates to the receipt of advance sale consideration

of Rs.40,00,000/- by DW-2 Pushpa Tamboli, wife of the appellant.

To prove this, the defence examined DW-1 Krishna Kumar

Shrivastava, who stated that he had agreed to purchase

agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 86/1 situated at Dhaurabhata.

He further stated that he paid Rs.40,00,000/- to Pushpa Tamboli in

four instalments of Rs.10,00,000/- each. The defence also relied

on a compromise decree passed by the Lok Adalat (Ex.D-18),

which supports the said transaction. In addition, the bank account

statement of Pushpa Tamboli (Ex.P-90) was placed on record.

However, the learned trial Court rejected this transaction solely on

the ground that it was not disclosed in the appellant’s annual

property returns.

23.Applying the above principle to the present case, this Court finds

that the statement of DW-1 Krishna Kumar Shrivastava, along with

documents Ex.D-18 and Ex.P-90, satisfactorily establishes that the

amount of Rs.40,00,000/- was received by Pushpa Tamboli, wife of

the appellant. Accordingly, the said amount deserves to be treated

as a lawful source of income.

24.The next objection raised by the appellant relates to the

household expenditure assessed by the prosecution and accepted

by the learned trial Court.

25.The learned trial Court has calculated the household expenditure

by taking 60% of the salary income, thereby assessing the

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expenditure under this head at Rs.14,03,269/-. Counsel for the

appellant submits that in the matter of Krishna Kumar Shukla

(supra), this Court held that taking household expenditure at 60%

is on the higher side and, in the absence of any specific evidence

regarding actual expenditure, 50% of the salary income would be a

reasonable estimate. Paragraph 31 of the said judgment is

relevant and is reproduced hereunder:-

“31.So far as expenditure part of the appellant is

concerned, the first point is that 60 per cent of the house

hold expenditure prior to check period and also during the

check period is on the higher side, this Court finds force in

the argument of the appellant that Rs.35,939 is required to

be deducted towards the household expenditure prior the

check period and also during the check period. The total

household expenditure, in the opinion of this Court, should

be taken as 50 per cent of the total income of the appellant

and not 60 per cent as has been taken by prosecution.

From the record it appears that no challenge whatsoever

in respect of the aforesaid has been made at the time of

trial by the appellant and therefore, merely on the basis of

surrounding circumstances or standard of living of the

appellant and his family members, Rs. 35,939 can be

deducted from the expenditure of 60 per cent from the

household.”

26.In the present case also, the prosecution has not produced any

independent evidence to establish that the appellant and his family

were incurring household expenditure to the extent of 60% of their

salary income. Therefore, the household expenditure assessed by

the learned trial Court at Rs.14,03,269/- cannot be sustained.

Therefore, applying the principle laid down by this Court in Krishna

Kumar Shukla (supra), the household expenditure is liable to be

calculated at 50% of the salary income, which comes to

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Rs.11,69,390/-. Consequently, the expenditure under this head is

reduced from Rs.14,03,269/- to Rs.11,69,390/-, and the appellant

is entitled to the benefit of the corresponding reduction.

27.The next objection raised by the appellant relates to the amount of

Rs.26,95,995/- taken by the learned trial Court under the head of

“bank deposits” as expenditure. The appellant submits that the

amount lying in bank accounts represents savings and cannot, by

itself, be treated as expenditure. This submission deserves to be

accepted. A bank deposit is only a way of keeping money and does

not mean that the amount has been spent. Unless the prosecution

proves that the money deposited in the bank was actually used for

acquiring assets or represents unexplained expenditure, it cannot

be treated as expenditure. In the present case, no such evidence

has been brought on record. Therefore, the amount of

Rs.26,95,995/- taken by the trial Court under this head cannot be

sustained and is liable to be excluded. Accordingly, the expenditure

under the head “Bank Deposits” is taken as Nil.

28.The prosecution treated the cash of Rs.20,01,930/- recovered

during the search as unexplained expenditure of the appellant.

However, the defence examined DW-2 Pushpa Tamboli, DW-4

Manish Kumar Tamboli, DW-7 Abhishek Tamboli, DW-13 Achala

Tamboli and DW-16 Vinod Kumar Tamboli, all of whom consistently

stated that the cash belonged to different family members. The

evidence shows that Rs.9,00,000/- belonged to the appellant’s

son, Abhishek Tamboli, and was kept for his marriage, while the

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remaining amount belonged to the appellant’s wife and other family

members from their independent income. The prosecution has not

produced any evidence to disprove this explanation. The cash was

recovered from a house jointly occupied by several family

members, and there is no material to show that the entire amount

belonged only to the appellant. In these circumstances, the

explanation given by the defence appears reasonable and

deserves to be accepted. Accordingly, the amount of

Rs.20,01,930/- included by the learned trial Court under this head

is liable to be excluded, and the expenditure under the head “Cash

Found During Search” is taken as Nil.

29.The learned trial Court has separately included Rs.91,750/-

towards electronic items and Rs.3,20,000/- towards luxury items as

expenditure. In the opinion of this Court, these items are part of

normal household articles, and their cost is already included in the

household expenditure assessed separately. Therefore, making

separate additions under these heads would result in duplication.

Accordingly, the amounts of Rs.91,750/- and Rs.3,20,000/- are

excluded, and the expenditure under the heads “Electronic Items”

and “Luxury Items” is taken as Nil.

30.The prosecution treated jewellery and silver ornaments valued at

Rs.15,42,286/- as assets acquired by the appellant during the

check period. The defence contended that most of the jewellery

was Stridhan belonging to the wife and daughters, received by

them on occasions such as marriage and family ceremonies. The

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evidence also shows that details of the jewellery possessed by the

daughters were furnished to the department through the relevant

documents relied upon by the defence. However, the learned trial

Court valued the jewellery at the market rate prevailing on the date

of search and treated the entire amount as expenditure incurred by

the appellant. Such an approach is not acceptable.

31.In Pratibha Rani (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly

recognised that Stridhan is the exclusive property of a married

woman, over which neither the husband nor his family members

have any ownership rights. Such property remains under her

absolute control, and its mere presence in the shared household

cannot lead to an inference that it belongs to the husband.

32.Similarly, in M. Krishna Reddy (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that jewellery found in the possession of the wife cannot

automatically be treated as assets of the public servant. The

prosecution must establish, by cogent evidence, that such

jewellery was in fact purchased by the public servant from his own

undisclosed income. In the absence of such proof, the benefit must

go to the accused.

33.Further, in Nirankar Nath Pandey (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court observed that the valuation of assets such as gold and

jewellery cannot be treated as static over a long check period. It

was held that the natural appreciation in value over time must be

taken into account while assessing alleged disproportionate

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assets. Therefore, valuing jewellery at the rate prevailing on the

date of search, without considering the time and source of

acquisition, may lead to an incorrect and inflated assessment.

34.These principles make it clear that jewellery belonging to the wife

or family members cannot be automatically attributed to the

appellant, and its valuation must be made in a fair and reasonable

manner keeping in view the time of acquisition and natural

appreciation in value.

35.In the present case, the prosecution has not produced convincing

evidence to establish that the jewellery in question had been

purchased by the appellant himself from unexplained income

during the check period. In the absence of such evidence, the

entire value of the ornaments could not have been treated as

expenditure of the appellant. Accordingly, the amount of

Rs.15,42,286/- is excluded and the expenditure under the head

Gold and Silver Ornaments is taken as Nil.

36.The learned trial Court has included Rs.50,000/- towards the

foreign trip of the appellant’s son and Rs.1,29,200/- towards his

educational expenses as expenditure of the appellant. The

defence has explained that the appellant’s son was independently

employed and had borne the expenses of his foreign trip from his

own income. As regards the educational expenses, they form part

of normal household expenditure, which has already been

considered separately. The prosecution has not produced any

21

evidence to show that these amounts were incurred by the

appellant from his undisclosed income. Accordingly, the amounts

of Rs.50,000/- and Rs.1,29,200/- are excluded, and the

expenditure under the heads “Foreign Trip of Son” and “Education

of Son” is taken as Nil.

37.The learned trial Court assessed the expenditure under the head

“Immovable Properties” at Rs.53,51,518/-. On examining the

record, this Court finds that the said calculation is not fully

supported by the evidence. An amount of Rs.7,47,246/- spent on

construction over land purchased by the appellant’s mother has

been included, even though the transaction falls outside the check

period. The prosecution itself had sought information only for the

relevant check period; therefore, inclusion of such amount is not

justified. Similarly, properties purchased by the appellant’s brother

and brother-in-law in the name of his son have also been included

without any clear evidence to show that the investment was made

by the appellant. The defence has placed on record departmental

intimations (Exs.D-55 and D-56), which show that these

transactions were duly disclosed.

38.At this stage, reference may be made to the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnanand Agnihotri (supra), wherein

it has been held in paragraph 26 as under:—

“26……….It is well settled that the burden of showing

that a particular transaction is benami and the

appellant owner is not the real owner always rests on

the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to

22

be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a

definite character which would either directly prove the

fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly

and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The

essence of benami is the intention of the parties and

not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil

which cannot be easily pierced through. But such

difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the

transaction to be benami of the serious onus that rests

on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures

or surmises as a substitute for proof. (Vide Jayadayal

Poddar v. Mst. Sibi Hazra, (1974) 2 SCR 90). It is not

enough merely to show circumstances which might

create suspicion, because the court cannot decide on

the basis of suspicion…….”

39.In view of the above legal position, and in the absence of any

reliable evidence to link the said properties with the appellant, the

calculation made by the prosecution under this head appears

arbitrary and excessive. Accordingly, the expenditure under the

head “Immovable Properties” is reduced from Rs.53,51,518/- to

Rs.42,09,241/-.

40.From the above discussion, it is clear that the learned trial Court

has either ignored or wrongly reduced several lawful sources of

income of the appellant and his family members, despite there

being reliable oral and documentary evidence on record. At the

same time, certain expenditure heads have been increased on the

basis of assumptions without any cogent evidence. This has

materially affected the final calculation of the alleged

disproportionate assets. Therefore, the computation made by the

learned trial Court requires modification.

23

41.The comparative statement of income, as accepted by the learned

trial Court and as held by this Court, is reproduced below:-

Comparative Statement of Income

S. No.Income Head As observed by

the Trial Court

As per Appellant

and held by this

Court

1. Salary of AppellantRs.23,38,781/-Rs. 23,38,781/-

2. Salary of Son Rs.14,50,817/-Rs.14,50,817/-

3. Salary of

Daughters

Nil Rs.13,05,401/-

4. Salary of Wife Nil Rs.3,00,000/-

5. General Provident

Fund

Rs.1,92,000/-Rs.1,92,000/-

6. Deposit in Bank

Accounts

Rs.2,42,882/-Rs.2,42,882/-

7. Fixed Deposits Rs.5,66,795/-Rs.5,66,795/-

8. Agricultural IncomeRs.11,57,339/-Rs.34,54,805/-

9. House RenovationRs.50,000/- Rs.50,000/-

10.Vehicle Sale Rs.4,55,000/-Rs.4,55,000/-

11.Life Insurance Rs.3,72,620/-Rs.3,72,620/-

12.Income from

Immovable

Property

Rs.2,40,000/-Rs.2,40,000/-

13.Rental Income Nil Rs.11,52,600/-

14.Advance income

from Agreement to

Sell of property

Nil Rs.40,00,000/-

15.Other heads Rs.27,22,621/-Rs.27,22,621/-

Total Rs.97,88,855/- Rs.1,88,44,322/-

42. Similarly, the expenditure determined by the learned trial

Court and the expenditure as reassessed by this Court is as

follows:

24

Comparative Statement of Expenditure

S.No.Expenditure HeadAs accepted by

the trial Court

As per Appellant

and held by this

Court

1. From Salary of

Appellant

Rs.14,03,269/-

(60%)

Rs.11,69,390/-

(50%)

2. Bank Deposits Rs.26,95,995/- Nil

3. Cash Found

During Search

Rs.20,01,930/- Nil

4. Electronic ItemsRs.91,750/- Nil

5. Luxury Items Rs.3,20,000/- Nil

6. Gold & Silver

Ornaments

Rs.15,42,286/- Nil

7. Foreign Trip of

Son

Rs.50,000/- Nil

8. Education of SonRs.1,29,200/- Nil

9. Immovable

Properties

Rs.53,51,518/-Rs.42,09,241/-

10.Other heads Rs.29,79,732/-Rs.29,79,732/-

Total Rs.1,65,65,680/-Rs.83,58,363/-

Final Comparative Position

Particulars As held by the

trial Court

As held by this

Court

Total Lawful Income Rs.97,88,855/- Rs.1,88,44,322/-

Total Expenditure/AssetsRs.1,65,65,680/-Rs.83,58,363/-

Balance Position Expenditure

exceeded income

by Rs.67,76,825/-

Income exceeded

expenditure by

Rs.1,04,85,959/-

43.From the foregoing discussion and the comparative statements of

income and expenditure, it is evident that the total lawful income of

the appellant during the check period comes to Rs.1,88,44,322/-,

whereas the total expenditure and assets come to Rs.83,58,363/-.

25

Thus, the lawful income of the appellant is substantially higher than

the expenditure and assets attributed to him. The appellant has

satisfactorily explained the disputed sources of income as well as

the expenditure by leading reliable oral and documentary

evidence, which finds due corroboration from the record. On the

other hand, the prosecution has failed to establish beyond

reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of assets

disproportionate to his known sources of income. The findings

recorded by the learned trial Court are based on an erroneous

appreciation of the evidence and arbitrary calculations and,

therefore, cannot be sustained.

44.It is well settled that in a prosecution under Section 13(1)(e) of the

Act, 1988, the initial burden lies upon the prosecution to establish

beyond reasonable doubt that the assets possessed by the public

servant are disproportionate to his known sources of income. In

the present case, the prosecution has failed to discharge the said

burden. The appellant, on the other hand, has successfully

explained the income and expenditure questioned by the

prosecution. Consequently, the essential ingredients of the offence

punishable under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the

Act, 1988 are not made out.

45.Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 17.02.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge

(Prevention of Corruption Act), Bilaspur in Special Sessions Case

No.06/2017 convicting the appellant for the offence punishable

26

under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988

deserves to be and is hereby set aside. Appellant- Vinod Kumar

Tamboli is acquitted of the charge under Section 13(1)(e) read with

Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988.

46.Appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall remain in force for a

further period of six months from today in terms of Section 481 of

the BNSS, 2023.

47.The fine amount, if deposited by the appellant, shall be refunded

to him in accordance with law.

48.The documents, title deeds, valuables and other articles seized

during the course of investigation, if not required in connection with

any other proceeding, shall be returned to the appellant after due

verification.

49.Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned trial Court

forthwith for information and necessary compliance.

Sd/-

(Radhakishan Agrawal)

Judge

Akhilesh