2026:HHC:10813

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 25 of 2025

Reserved on: 3.3.2026

Date of Decision: 08.4.2026.

Vinod Sipahiya ...Petitioner

Versus

Anuj Kumar ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

For the Petitioner : Mr Bhupinder Pathania, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Mr Kunal Thakur, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present revision is directed against the

judgement dated 01.10.2024, passed by learned Additional

Sessions Judge-I, Kangra, at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P.

(learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 15.02.2024, passed by

learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kangra District Kangra

H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld (Parties shall hereinafter be

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the

learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the

learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act (NI Act), read with Section 420 of the Indian

Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the complainant and the

accused had a friendly relationship with each other. The accused

approached the complainant at the Nagrota Bagwan on

10.09.2011 and sought a loan of ₹1,50,000/- for his domestic

needs. The complainant paid ₹1,50,000/- to the accused on the

same day through Cheque No. 394621, drawn on State Bank of

Patiala, Nagrota Bagwan, Tehsil and District Kangra, H.P. The

accused issued a post-dated cheque No. 613701 dated 19.12.2011

for ₹1,50,000/- drawn on State Bank of India to discharge his

liability. He also executed an agreement acknowledging his

liability in the presence of marginal witnesses. This agreement

was attested by Mr Yashpal Kachhot, Notary Public at Kangra.

The complainant presented the cheque to his bank, State Bank

of India, branch office Ghorab (Nagrota Bagwan), District

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Kangra, H.P., from where it was sent to the bank of the accused

for collection. The bank of the accused dishonoured the cheque

with an endorsement of insufficient funds. The complainant

issued a notice to the accused asking him to pay the money

within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice

was duly received by the accused, but he failed to pay the

amount. Hence, the present complaint was filed before the

learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of

accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence

punishable under section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded

not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The complainant examined Anil Kumar (CW1) and

himself (CW2).

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section

313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he had taken a loan of ₹1,50,000/-

from the complainant, the complainant had presented the

cheque, and it was dishonoured with an endorsement of

insufficient funds. He stated that he had handed over three

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signed cheques as security to the complainant, which were

misused by the complainant. He had returned ₹ 1,20,000/- with

interest and was liable to pay only ₹ 30,000/-. His signatures

were obtained on blank paper. He denied the receipt of the

notice. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted

the taking of a loan in his statement recorded under Section 313

of Cr.P.C. He also admitted the issuance of the cheques as

security. Therefore, a presumption would arise that the cheque

was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The

accused claimed that he had returned ₹ 1,20,000/-; however,

this fact was not proved. The accused had failed to rebut the

presumption attached to the cheque. He admitted that the

cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement of insufficient

funds. The notice was duly served upon the accused. All the

ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the learned

Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an

offence punishable under section 138 of the NI Act and

sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for two months

and pay a compensation of ₹3,00,000/- to the complainant.

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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was

decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at

Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court).

The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings

recorded by the learned Trial Court that the receipt of the loan

was not disputed by the accused. The accused also admitted his

signature on the cheque and claimed that the cheque was issued

as security. Therefore, a presumption under Section 118 (a) and

139 of the NI Act arose that the cheque was issued for

consideration to discharge debt/liability. The accused failed to

rebut the presumption. The cheque was dishonoured with an

endorsement of funds insufficient. The accused failed to pay the

amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand.

Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the

accused of the commission of an offence punishable under

section 138 of the NI Act. The sentence imposed by the learned

Trial Court was not excessive, and no interference was required

with it. Hence, the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed

by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present

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revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in

appreciating the material on record. They had wrongly held that

the cheque was issued by the accused to discharge his legal

liability. The special Power of Attorney of the complainant

admitted in his cross-examination that more than five cases of

recovery of various amounts were pending in the Court, which

showed that the accused was a money lender. He has not

produced any registration of money lending, and the complaint

was not maintainable. The complainant had misused the cheque

by filling in an amount more than the value of the instrument.

The instrument clearly stated on its face that it was valid for

₹50,000/-. Therefore, the cheque was a void instrument and no

action could have been taken on it. Hence, it was prayed that the

present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed

by the learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Bhupinder Pathania, learned counsel

for the petitioner/accused and Mr Kunal Thakur, learned

counsel for the respondent/complainant.

10. Mr Bhupender Pathania, learned counsel for the

petitioner, submitted that the cheque, on the face of it,

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mentions that it was valid for ₹50,000. However, an amount of

₹1,50,000/- was filled. Therefore, the instrument was void. It

also corroborates the defence taken by the accused that he had

issued blank security cheques to the complainant, who had

misused them. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate this

important aspect. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be

allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned

Courts below be set aside.

11. Mr Kunal Thakur, learned counsel for the

respondent/accused, submitted that the cheque was

dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’ and not

with an endorsement that the cheque was invalid. The accused

had not taken this plea before the learned Courts below, and it is

impermissible to take this plea before this Court. Both the

learned Courts below had rightly held the accused guilty of

committing an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI

Act, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent

findings of fact. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be

dismissed.

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12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional

court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent

defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

207-

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at

the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a

detailed appreciation of the material and evidence

brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision

against conviction is not supposed to exercise the

jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of

interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397

of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests

jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence

or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of

any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the

provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of

jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error

that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases.

It is also well settled that while considering the same, the

Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts

and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

13. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under

Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to

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call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the

purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and

regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.

The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect

or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which

has crept in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this

Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.

Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:

(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has

been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC

p. 475, paras 12-13)

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the

power to call for and examine the records of an

inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as

to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or

order made in a case. The object of this provision is

to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction

or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it

may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise

the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token

of careful consideration and appear to be in

accordance with law. If one looks into the various

judgments of this Court, it emerges that the

revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the

decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous,

there is no compliance with the provisions of law,

the finding recorded is based on no evidence,

material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is

exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not

exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each

case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional

jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and

cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the

inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an

interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in

mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself

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should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is

dealing with the question as to whether the charge has

been framed properly and in accordance with law in a

given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise

of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially

falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing

of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the

proceedings under CrPC.”

14. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8

SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the

absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of

Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the

revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala

v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC

452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of

the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court

has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can

call for and examine the record of any proceedings

to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or

propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other

words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory

jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for

correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said

revisional power cannot be equated with the power

of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a

second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,

it would not be appropriate for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its

conclusion on the same when the evidence has

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already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well

as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring

feature is brought to the notice of the High Court

which would otherwise amount to a gross

miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the

impugned judgment of the High Court from the

aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in

concluding that the High Court exceeded its

jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the

respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred

to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment

of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v.

Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2

SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in

the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not

interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it

is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-

consideration of any relevant material, the order

cannot be set aside merely on the ground that

another view is possible. The following has been

laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

“14. … Unless the order passed by the

Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the

court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-

consideration of any relevant material or there

is palpable misreading of records, the

Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside

the order, merely because another view is

possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to

act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of

the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the

power in the court to do justice in accordance

with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.

The revisional power of the court under

Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated

with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the

court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is

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shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is

grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or

where the decision is based on no material or

where the material facts are wholly ignored or

where the judicial discretion is exercised

arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not

interfere with the decision in exercise of their

revisional jurisdiction.”

15. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.

Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it

is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional

Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by

a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a

jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,

therefore, in the negative.”

16. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.

Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir

Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales

& Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008)

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14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that

the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong

order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the

absence of a jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the

absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in

the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the

concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions

Court.

17. The present revision has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

18. The cheque (Ex.C6) bears an endorsement of Multi

City Cheque payable at par at all branches of SBI and valid for

₹50,000/- and under. The Reserve Bank of India has issued a

policy on Policy On Multi-City (Payable at Par) CTS-2010

Standard Cheques. Clause 4 of the policy reads as follows: -

There will be a cap on payment of MCC at non-home

branches with legend/ ceiling mentioned on the Cheques

as detailed hereunder:- “Valid up to Rs…….lacs at non-

Home branch”

19. A bare perusal of this clause shows that a cap has

been fixed for payment at non-home branches, which would be

mentioned on Multi City Cheques.

20. Clause 6 of the Policy provides for the payment of

multi-city cheques at a non-home branch and reads as under:-

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“The payment of MCCs at a non-home branch will be

restricted as per the limit of the Cheque (as per the legend

mentioned on the Cheque as narrated hereinabove).”

21. Thus, the multi-city cheque can be honoured for the

amount mentioned in the cheque as per the policy issued by the

Reserve Bank of India. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court of India in Pro Knits v. Canara Bank, (2024) 10 SCC 292:

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1864 that instructions issued by the Reserve

Bank of India are binding on the banking companies. It was

observed at page 296:

“8. At this juncture, it would also be apt to refer to the

relevant provisions contained in the Banking Regulation

Act, 1949. Section 21 of the said Act empowers the Reserve

Bank of India to control advances by banking companies.

The said section inter alia provides that where the

Reserve Bank is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient

in the public interest or in the interest of the depositors or

banking policy so to do, it may determine the policy in

relation to advances to be followed by banking companies

generally or by any company in particular and when the

policy has been so determined, all banking companies or

the banking company concerned, as the case may be,

shall be bound to follow the policy as so determined. Sub-

section (3) of Section 21 states that every banking company

shall be bound to comply with any directions given to it under

the said section. Further, Section 35-A of the said Banking

Regulation Act reads as under:

“35-A. Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions.—

(1) Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that—

(a) in the public interest; or

(aa) in the interest of banking policy; or

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(b) to prevent the affairs of any banking company

being conducted in a manner detrimental to the

interests of the depositors or in a manner

prejudicial to the interests of the banking company;

or

(c) to secure the proper management of any

banking company generally,

It is necessary to issue directions to banking

companies generally or to any banking company in

particular. It may, from time to time, issue such

directions as it deems fit, and the banking companies or

the banking company, as the case may be, shall be bound

to comply with such directions.

(2) Reserve Bank may, on representation made to it or

on its own motion, modify or cancel any direction

issued under sub-section (1), and in so modifying or

cancelling any direction may impose such conditions

as it thinks fit, subject to which the modification or

cancellation shall have effect.” (emphasis supplied)

9. Thus, Section 21 read with Section 35-A makes it clear

that the directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India to

the banking companies are binding on them and they are

bound to comply with such directions.”

22. Delhi High Court dealt with the multi-city cheques

and the policy of Reserve Bank of India in Boston Beverages Pvt.

Ltd. v. Kingston Beverages, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 7233 held that, as

per the policy, a multicity cheque of more than ₹ 10 lakh cannot

be accepted by a non-home branch of the Royal Bank and has to

be presented at the home branch. It was observed:-

“15….In order to regulate the same, the Reserve Bank of

India also issued a policy which is known as Policy on

Multi-city/payable at par CTS 2010 Standard Cheques.

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The perusal of the said policy would reveal that a certain

limit has been prescribed on payment of multi-city

cheques at non-home branches, as mentioned therein.

16. According to the said policy, in case cheque account of

multicity cheque to be presented at non-home branch in

case of saving bank account, is more than Rs.10,00,000/-

(Rupees Ten lakhs) then same would not be accepted by

non-home branch of the drawee bank and thus, it has to

be presented at the home branch of the drawee bank for

its encashment. The same is the position with regard to

other types of bank accounts, like current accounts, cash

credits, etc.”

23. In the present case, the cheque mentions the cap of

₹50,000/-, and it could have been presented for such an amount

before the non-home branch. The complainant had presented

the cheque before the State Bank of India, Ghorab, whereas the

cheque was drawn at the State Bank of India, Palampur.

Therefore, the cheque was presented before the non-home

branch and should have been within the specified amount of

₹50,000/- mentioned on the cheque, and the submission that

the cheque was void has to be accepted as correct. Neither of the

learned Courts below did advert to this important aspect of the

case.

24. It was submitted that this plea was not taken before

the learned Courts below and cannot be taken before this Court.

This submission cannot be accepted. It was specifically

suggested to the complainant, Anuj Kumar (CW2), in his cross-

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examination that the accused had handed over three cheques of

₹50,000/- as security, and he had filled an invalid amount in the

cheque. The accused had taken a loan of ₹1,50,000/-. He had

issued a cheque, which was valid at the non-home branch of

₹50,000 and would have been required to issue three cheques for

the payment of ₹1,50,000/-. Therefore, the plea taken by him

that the cheque was invalid as more than the permissible

amount was filled in it was specifically suggested to the

complainant. Both the learned Courts below failed to appreciate

the significance of this fact and thereby committed a

jurisdictional error while entertaining and deciding the

complaint.

25. Therefore, the present revision is allowed and

judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 15.2.2024,

passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kangra,

District Kangra, H.P., in Criminal Case No. 158-III/2015, titled

Anuj Kumar Vs. Vinod Saphiya, affirmed by learned Additional

Sessions Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra,

H.P., in Criminal Appeal No.7-D/X/2024, titled Vinod Saphiya Vs.

Anuj Kumar is ordered to be set aside, and the accused is

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acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under

section one 38 of the NI Act.

26. The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any,

also stand disposed of.

27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish bail

bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like

amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of

this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six

months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave

Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the

leave, the petitioner/accused on receipt of notice thereof shall

appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

28. A copy of this judgment, along with records of the

learned Courts below, be transmitted forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

8

th

April, 2026

(Chander)