1

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

&

* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO

KUNCHEAM

+ COMCA Nos.29 & 30 OF 2025

% 22.01.2026

+COMCA No.29 OF 2025

# 1.The Visakhapatnam Port Authority, rep. by its Chairman

2. The Chief Engineer, Visakhapatnam Port

Authority…Appellants.

And:

$ M/s. Vishwanadh Avenues (India) Private Limited, rep. by its

Managing Director, Boddeti Narendra Kumar.

….Respondent.

+ COMCA No.30 OF 2025

# 1.The Visakhapatnam Port Authority, rep. by its Chairman

2. The Chief Engineer, Visakhapatnam Port Authority.

……Appellants.

And:

$ M/s. Vishwanadh Sports and Convention Private Limited, rep.

by its Managing Director, Boddeti Narendra Kumar.

….Respondent.

!Counsel for the appellants : Sri Ravi Teja Padiri

^Counsel for the respondent : Sri Dammalapati Srinivas,

Advocate General, assisted by Sri S.V.S.S.

Siva Ram

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1.2020 LawSuit (del) 837

2.(2025) 10 SCC 176

3.(1994) 2 SCC 266

5.(2006) 3 SCC 312

6.(2010) 4 SCC 785

7.(1978) 1 SCC 405

4.1990 SCR (3) 744

2

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

* * * *

COMCA Nos.29 & 30 OF 2025

DATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED : 06.01.2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 22.01.2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED : 22.01.2026

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

&

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the

fair copy of the Judgment?

Yes/No

____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

______________________________

MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM ,J

3

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

&

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

COMCA Nos.29 & 30 OF 2025

COMMON JUDGMENT: per the Hon‟ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari:

1. Heard Sri Ravi Teja Padiri, learned counsel for the

appellant and Sri Dammalapati Srinivas, learned Advocate

General along with Sri S.V.S.S.Siva Ram, learned counsel for the

respondent.

I. Facts:

2. The respondent, M/s.Vishwanadh Avenues India Private

Limited, represented by its Managing Director, filed C.AO.P.No.37

and C.AO.P.No.38 of 2025 before the learned Court of Special

Judge for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes at

Visakhaptnam (in short „the Special Judge‟), seeking interim

measure under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 (in short „the Act, 1996‟).

3. The 1

st

appellant, the Visakhapatnam Port Authority,

represented by its Chairman (respondent in CAOP) filed counter

and the 2

nd

appellant, the Chief Engineer, Visakhapatnam Port

4

Authority, filed the adoption memo adopting the same counter-

affidavit.

4. C.AO.P.Nos.37 and 38 of 2025 are pending before the

learned Special Judge and are fixed for 27.01.2026 „for orders‟.

5. The challenge made in the aforesaid two appeals is to the

orders dated 19.12.2025 passed separately but to the same

effect in both the C.A.O.P(s).

6. The order dated 19.12.2025 reads as under:

“ Rule 32 petition along with authorization filed by

respondent and the same is allowed.

Counter of R1 and adoption memo of R2 filed. Heard

leaned counsel for petitioner.

Heard learned counsel for respondents in part.

For further arguments on behalf of respondents call on

22.12.2025.

Parties shall maintain status quo ante as on the date of

filing of this petition till 22.12.2025.”

7. A lease was granted by the 1

st

appellant, the

Visakhapatnam Port Authority, to the respondent for a period of

ten years from 02.02.2024 vide document No.676/2024 dated

02.02.2024, for VPA‟s Kalvani A/c Auditorium with an extent of

14569 sq.m and 5212 sq.m built up area in Nehru Sports and

Cultural Complex at Salagrampuram on annual rent basis.

5

8. On the ground that there were violations of the terms and

conditions of the lease agreements, show cause notices were

issued, which were replied by the respondent. The

Visakhapatnam Port Authority, sought to invoke the bank

guarantee furnished by the respondent. This was challenged by

the respondent in W.P.No.20280 of 2025 and W.P.No.20282 of

2025. The learned Single Judge granted interim order dated

01.08.2025 restraining the appellants from encashing the bank

guarantee, if already not encashed, for a limited period. The

respondent was also permitted to operate regular activities as per

the lease agreement.

9. The interim order dated 01.08.2025 was challenged in

W.A.No.971 of 2025 and W.A.No.972 of 2025 by the appellants.

Those Writ Appeals were disposed of by order dated 08.09.2025,

without interfering with the interim orders at that stage, but

clarifying that the appellants would be at liberty to pass

appropriate orders pursuant to the show cause notices and the

replies submitted by the respondent. The pendency of the writ

proceedings was held not to be a bar and in case of the decision

of the concerned authority being adverse to the respondent, it

6

was kept open for the respondent to resort to the remedies

available under law.

10. The bank guarantee is said to have been invoked and the

amount appropriated towards the outstanding dues.

11. The termination notice dated 10/11.09.2025 was also

issued demanding to vacate the subject property by 11.12.2025

exercising the right of re-entry.

12. The respondent then filed W.P.No.33535 of 2025, assailing

the termination notice but withdrew that writ petition with liberty to

pursue its remedy, as per the registered lease deed. The writ

petition was dismissed as withdrawn with the said liberty, vide

order dated 04.12.2025.

13. Thereafter, the C.A.O.P.Nos.37 and 38 of 2025 were filed

under Sections 9 of the Act, 1996 before the learned Special

Judge, Visakhapatnam.

Order in C.A.O.P(s) by Special Judge:

14. In C.A.O.P(s), the learned Special Judge passed the

following orders dated 10.12.2025, 17.12.2025, 19.12.2025,

22.12.2025 and 24.12.2025:

7

“10.12.2025:

Sri MKS, learned advocate for petitioner is present. Sri

S.Arun Dev, learned advocate filed vakalat on behalf of

respondent. Heard both sides. Parties shall act in

accordance with the terms of the lease deed dt.02.02.2024.

For counter and arguments call on 23.12.2025.

17.12.2025:

Both counsels present. IA 342/2025 is disposed of. For

counter and hearing call on 19.12.2025...IA 342/2025- Heard

both sides. Perused the record. In view of the grounds urged

by petitioner CAOP 37/2025 is advanced from 23.12.2025 to

19.12.2025.

19.12.2025:

“Rule 32 petition along with authorization filed by respondent

and the same is allowed. Couner of R1 and adoption memo of

R2 filed. Heard leaned counsel for petitioner. Heard learned

counsel for respondents in part. For further arguments on

behalf of respondents call on 22.12.2025. Parties shall

maintain status quo ante as on the date of filing of this petition

till 22.12.2025.”

22.12.2025:

“Learned counsels for both the parties are present. Sri SAD

filed memo along with documents. Heard Sri S.Arun Dev,

learned counsel for respondent. For reply call on

24.12.2025. Interim order passed on 19.12.2025 is

extended till 24.12.2025 as submissions made by both

parties should be considered properly and to protect

property in dispute. Call on 24.12.2025.”

24.12.2025:

“Written arguments filed on behalf of respondent. Exs.P1 to

P20 and Exs.R1 to R13 marked. Heard reply arguments on

behalf of petitioner. Interim order dated 19.12.2025 is

extended till 27.01.2026. Even though Sri S.Arun Dev,

learned counsel for respondent opposed extension of same,

interim order is extended till 27.01.2026 to preserve the

property pending disposal of this application keeping in view

the various contentions raised by both parties in law and on

facts. For orders call on 27.01.2026.”

8

Under Challenge is order dated 19.12.2025:

15. The main petitions CAOP Nos.37 & 38 of 2025 under

Section 9 of the Act, 1996 are pending before the learned Special

Judge, for decision/orders fixed for 27.01.2026. The order under

challenge in these appeals is dated 19.12.2025. The same has

been extended, which stands extended till 27.01.2026.

II. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellants:

16. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the

impugned order dated 19.12.2025 „to maintain status quo ante

as on the date of filing of the petition‟ could not be passed at the

ad-interim stage. He submitted that even no reasons have been

assigned for passing an order of the „status quo ante‟. The order

cannot be sustained.

17. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that

the possession had already been taken from the respondent and

the appellant is in possession.

9

18. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance in CRSC

Research and Design Institute Group Co. Ltd v. Dedicated

Freight Corridor Corporation of India Limited

1

.

Submission of the learned Advocate General for

respondent:

19. Learned Advocate General for the respondent submitted

that the learned Special Judge had passed an order on

10.12.2025 that the parties shall act in accordance with the terms

of the lease dated 02.02.2024. The appellants acting contrary to

the terms of the lease deed resorted to possession and so order

dated 19.12.2025 is justified.

20. Learned Advocate General submitted that after the order

dated 19.12.2025 of the „status quo ante‟, the respondent

obtained possession and presently is in possession, which he

submitted was evidenced by the documents annexed with the

memo dated 06.01.2026.

21. Learned Advocate General placed reliance in Jindal Steel

and Power Limited v. Bansal Infra Projects Private Limited

2

.

1

2020 LawSuit (del) 837

2

(2025) 10 SCC 176

10

III. Point for determination:

22. The point for consideration in threes appeals is the legality

or otherwise of the impugned order dated 19.12.2025.

IV. Analysis/consideration:

23. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and

perused the material on record including the memo(s) dated

06.01.2026 filed by both the sides.

24. Before proceeding, we may mention that the

office/Registry raised objection with respect to the maintainability

of the appeal against the order dated 19.12.2025, pending the

petitions under Section 9 of the Act, 1996. The same was over-

ruled and the appeal was held maintainable vide order dated

23.12.2025.

25. The impugned order dated 19.12.2025 is an ad-interim

direction to maintain status quo ante on the date of the petition

under Section 9 of the Act, 1996.

26. We make it clear that as the main petitions are pending, we

would not enter into the merits of the case either way to hold

whether the case for grant of the interim measures under Section

9 of Act, 1996 is or is not made out. At present it lies within the

domain of the learned Special Judge to consider the same in

11

accordance with law. We shall confine our order only with respect

to the impugned order dated 19.12.2025 and that too to the

limited extent, whether an ad-interim mandatory injunction,

directing „to maintain status quo ante as on the date of the

petition under Section 9 of the Act, 1996‟ could be legally passed

and is sustainable.

Status quo:

27. The expression „status quo‟ in ordinary legal connotation

implies the existing state of things in a given point of time.

28. In Satyabrata Biswas and others vs. Kalyan Kumar

Kisku and others

3

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court considered the

expression „Status Quo‟ as following in paras 19 to 21:

“19.In Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn. at p. 95 1, status quo

has been defined as meaning:

"The existing state of things at any given date; e.g.,

Status quo ante bellum, the state of things before

the war."

20. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. the relevant

passage occurs:

"The existing state of things at any given date.

Status quo ante bellum, the state of things before

the war. 'Status quo' to be preserved by a

preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable,

uncontested status which preceded the pending

controversy."

21.This Court in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar

4

stated

thus: (SCC p.398, para 5) "According to the ordinary legal

3

(1994) 2 SCC 266

12

connotation, the term status quo' implies the existing state of

things at any given point of time."

‘Status Quo ante’:

29. „Status quo ante‟ would certainly mean the state of things

before the things existing at a given point of time. To maintain

„status quo ante‟ is to disturb the existing state of things and to

restore the previous state of things.

30. Such orders of „status quo ante‟ are not to be passed

lightly and certainly not for no reasons assigned in the order.

The order must contain justifiable reasons for an ad-interim order

in the nature of mandatory injunction.

31. In Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh

5

, the

Hon‟ble Apex Court held that an interim mandatory injunction is

not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed

only in the circumstances which are clear and the prima facie

materials clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been

altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of

justice demand that the „status quo ante‟ be restored by way of an

interim mandatory injunction. Para No.6 of Kishore Kumar

Khaitan (supra), is as follows:

4

1990 SCR (3) 744

5

(2006) 3 SCC 312

13

“6. An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is

easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in

circumstances which are clear and the prima facie materials

clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered

by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of

justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored by

way of an interim mandatory injunction.”

Reasons are life of law:

32. The order dated 19.12.2025 as reproduced above makes it

evident that any reason has not been assigned for the justification

to pass status quo ante order as an ad-interim mandatory

injunction.

33. The reasons are the back bone of every order. The very

life of law. When the reason of a law ceases, the law itself

generally ceases. Such is the significance of reason in any rule of

law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as also avoids

uncertainty. The reasons enable the aggrieved party approaching

the higher court to demonstrate that such reason was either no

reason in the eye of law or was not justified reason for reaching

the conclusion. The superior court may also know the actual

reason for passing of the order and to reach its conclusion,

whether a case for interference is made out or not. A non-

speaking order or an order without justifiable reasons cannot be

14

sustained, may it be a judicial, quasi judicial or even an

administrative order.

34. In Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax

Department, Works contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla

and brothers

6

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the order

passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any

conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation thereof

in the given facts and circumstances of the case vitiates the

order. Paras 14,23,24 and 30 of Shukla Brothers (supra) read

as under:

“14. The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the

person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the

authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted

an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the

authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing

proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the

given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such

rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires

that the judgment of the court should meet with this requirement with

higher degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority

may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be

supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between

passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has

practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned

orders.”

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

6

(2010) 4 SCC 785

15

“23. We are not venturing to comment upon the correctness or

otherwise of the contentions of law raised before the High Court in the

present petition, but it was certainly expected of the High Court to

record some kind of reasons for rejecting the revision petition filed by

the Department at the very threshold. A litigant has a legitimate

expectation of knowing reasons for rejection of his claim/prayer. It is

then alone, that a party would be in a position to challenge the order

on appropriate grounds. Besides, this would be for the benefit of the

higher or the appellate court. As arguments bring things hidden and

obscure to the light of reasons, reasoned judgment where the law and

factual matrix of the case is discussed, provides lucidity and

foundation for conclusions or exercise of judicial discretion by the

courts.

24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once

ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such

is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons

furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter

of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of

reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of

uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to

the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our

view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for

rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at

admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise they may

be.”

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

“30. In the light of the judgments referred to and relied upon by the

parties including the judgment of this Court, it is true that requirement

of stating reasons for judicial orders necessarily does not mean a very

detailed or lengthy order, but there should be some reasoning

recorded by the court for declining or granting relief to the petitioner.

The purpose, as already noticed, is to make the litigant aware of the

reasons for which the relief is declined as well as to help the higher

court in assessing the correctness of the view taken by the High Court

while disposing of a matter. May be, while dealing with the matter at

the admission stage even recording of short reasoning dealing with

16

the merit of the contentions raised before the High Court may suffice,

in contrast, a detailed judgment while matter is being disposed of after

final hearing, but in both events, in our view, it is imperative for the

High Court to record its own reasoning however short it might be.”

35. The aforesaid principle applies even to quasi judicial and

administrative orders. Here, it is a case of a judicial order.

Whether taking of possession was as per terms of the lease

deed or not:

36. The learned counsel for the appellants‟ submitted that after

termination of the lease, the possession was taken in terms of

Clauses 1 and 7 of the lease. The panchanama report dated

15.12.2025 was prepared which has been annexed with the

appeal. The learned Advocate General submitted that the

possession was not taken over in accordance with law in terms of

the lease deed. As per para 7(i) of the lease deed, the eviction

would be governed by the Public Premises (Eviction of

Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 or any other law for the time

being in force, which procedure was not followed. Learned

counsel for the appellants submitted that as per para 1 of the

lease deed there was the right of re-entry to the lessor without

prejudice to any other rights or remedies the lessor may have

against the lessee. The right of re-entry was exercised in terms

17

of the lease deed. The lessor was at liberty to chose any method

of redressal. He referred to Section 68 (1) of the Major Port

Authorities Act, 2021 (for short, „the Act, 2021‟). In response, the

learned Advocate General submitted that even in the case of right

of re-entry the procedure under Section 68(3) of the Act, 2021

was required to be followed, but any application was not made to

any Magistrate of the First Class.

37. Learned Advocate General thus supported the order dated

19.12.2025 on the submission that the possession was not taken

as per the terms of the lease deed. So, the appellants violated the

Order dated 10.12.2025 of the learned Special Judge, which

provided that the parties shall act in accordance with the terms of

the lease deed dated 01.02.2024 and therefore, the learned

Special Judge was right in passing the order dated 19.12.2025 to

maintain „status quo ante‟ as on the date of the petition, whereas

learned counsel for the appellants‟ submission is that the

possession was taken in terms of the lease deed.

38. It is not the reason assigned in the impugned order that it

was passed because taking of possession was not in terms of

the lease deed or that the appellants violated the order dated

10.07.2025.

18

39. It is well settled in law that an order can be justified on the

reasons assigned in the order. The reasons cannot be supplied

later on, by way of affidavit. In Mohinder Singh Gill and

another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi

and others

7

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as follows:

“8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory

functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity

must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be

supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or

otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the

time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by

additional grounds later brought ,out. We may here draw attention to

the observations of Bose J. in Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs.

Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16) "Public orders, publicly made,

in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of

explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of

what he meant, or of what was in Ms mind, or what he intended to,

do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have

public effect and are intended to effect the actings and conduct of

those to whom they are addressed and must be const rued

objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself."

40. So, in the absence of the reasons assigned in the order, it

cannot be upheld on the arguments of the learned Advocate

General, trying to supply the reason i.e., the alleged violations in

taking possession. It would not be proper on our part to

speculate the reasons to uphold the impugned Order.

7

(1978) 1 SCC 405

19

41. Additionally, to accept the arguments of either side,

investigation into the facts and the terms and conditions of the

lease deed would be required. A finding of violation or no-

violation of the terms and conditions of the lease and so the

violation of the order dated 10.07.2025, would also be required.

42. In our view, we should not enter into such questions at this

stage of the appeal, when the main petitions are pending before

the learned Special Judge. It was for the Special Judge to have

considered that aspect of the matter particularly when the pleas

to that effect were raised by the appellants before the Special

Judge in the counter affidavit. It ought to have considered that

aspect, may be prima facie, and on arriving at a finding, prima

facie, in favour of the respondent herein that, change in

possession was contrary to the terms of the lease deed violating

the order dated 10.12.2025, then appropriate ad interim order

could have been passed, if the interest of justice so demanded.

43. Further, as per Section 68 (3) of the Major Port Authorities

Act, 2021, if the allottee or employee or other person refuses or

fails to comply with an Order under Section 68 (1), then the lessor

has to approach the Magistrate. Whether, there was such a

failure or refusal, so as to necessitate the appellants to invoke

20

Section 68 (3) of the Act, 2021 would also involve consideration

of various factors, which we need not enter into for the first time,

in the appeals, at this stage.

44. We are on the legality of the impugned order dated

19.12.2025 as passed by the learned Special Judge and as it

stands.

45. The factual aspects on which there is no dispute, are that,

i) the Port Trust Authorities took the possession on 15.12.2025, ii)

on the date the order dated 19.12.2025 was passed the

respondent was not in possession and iii) the order dated

19.12.2025 does not evidence reasons much less justifiable

reasons.

46. On the point of present possession, as per the memo(s)

dated 06.11.2026 from both the sides annexing the documents in

their respective support there is factual dispute between the

parties.

47. We are satisfied that the learned Special Judge is not

justified in passing the order „to maintain status quo ante‟ as on

the date of the petition under Section 9 of the Act, 1996, as an

ad-interim mandatory injunction, for the reasons:

(i) an interim mandatory injunction is not to be easily granted

21

(ii) no reason has been assigned justifying the circumstances nor

any finding has been recorded, prima facie, to restore status quo

ante and

(iii) the order does not stand the test of the law laid down in

Kishore Kumar Khaitan (supra), Shukla Brothers (supra) and

M.S. Gill (supra).

48. Learned Advocate General submitted that this Court should

not interfere with the order dated 19.12.2025 pending the main

petition under Section 9 of the Act, 1996. He relied upon Jindal

Steel and Power Limited (supra). In the said case, the interim

relief granted was staying the invocation of the bank guarantee

pending the proceedings under Section 9 of the Act, 1996. The

Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that the Court should refrain from

interfering with the invocation of a bank guarantee, except in

cases of fraud of an egregious nature or in cases where allowing

encashment would result in irretrievable injustice, however but it

did not interfere with the order since Section 9 proceeding therein

was ripe for arguments before the Commercial Court, and

directed that the parties shall advance their contentions along

with the necessary documents, and the Commercial Court shall

pass appropriate orders within the specified time and until such

22

time, the bank guarantee shall be kept alive and subject to the

outcome Section 9 arbitration proceedings.

49. In the present case, impugned order is of a different

nature. It is an ad-interim mandatory injunction pending the main

petition. So, no benefit can be derived by the respondent from

Jindal Steel and Power Limited (supra).

50. CRSC Research and Design Institute Group Co. Ltd

(supra), cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is not on

the point.

Result:

51. For the above consideration made, the order dated

17.12.2025 is set aside in both the appeals.

52. The Special Judge, Visakhapatnam shall decide the CAOP

No.37 of 2025 and CAOP No.38 of 2025 under Section 9 of the

Act, 1996, pending before it, positively on the date fixed, in

accordance with law.

53. Both the appeals are allowed with the aforesaid

observations and directions.

No order as to costs.

23

Consequently, miscellaneous application if any pending

shall also stand closed.

________________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI,J

______________________________

MAHESWARA RAO KUNCH EAM,J

Date:22.01.2026.

Note:

L.R copy to be marked.

B/o.PAB/Gk.

24

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

&

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

COMCA Nos.29 & 30 OF 2025

Date:22.01.2026.

PAB/Gk.