Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan Vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Case Summary You Can Listen To on Caseon

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Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan Vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal No.7777/2023

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Case Background

As per case facts... Vishnu, a co-owner of acquired land, challenged a High Court order that declared Reddy, another co-owner, as the sole owner and enhanced compensation, alleging that Reddy ...

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2025 INSC 884

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7777 /2023

VISHNU VARDHAN @ VISHNU PRADHAN … APPELLANT

VS.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

With

W.P. (C) No. 673/2023

VISHNU VARDHAN @ VISHNU PRADHAN … PETITIONER

VS.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

With

MA No. 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022

With

CONMT. PET. (C) No. 23-24/2024 in W.P. (C) No. 673/2023

With

Diary No(s). 6013/2024

With

SMC (C) No. 3/2024

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

INDEX

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................... 3

FACTS .................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

IMPUGNED ORDER ............................................................................................................................................................ 20

BEFORE THIS COURT IN CIVIL APPEAL NO 3636-37 OF 2022 ................................................................................... 22

CONTENTIONS .................................................................................................................................................................. 24

ARGUMENTS BY VISHNU .............................................................................................................................................. 24

ARGUMENTS BY REDDY ................................................................................................................................................ 25

ARGUMENTS BY NOIDA ............................................................................................................................................. 28

REPLY BY VISHNU REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO MAINTAINABILITY ............................................................................ 29

ISSUES ................................................................................................................................................................................ 29

ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................................................................... 30

I. HAS REDDY PLAYED FRAUD ON THE COURTS? ..................................................................................................... 33

II. MAINTAINABILITY..................................................................................................................................................... 47

A. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITION ..................................................................................................... 47

B. MAINTAINABILITY OF CIVIL APPEAL/JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT ............................................ 56

INTRA-COURT APPEAL ........................................................................................................................................ 56

MERGER ............................................................................................................................................................... 59

PROCEDURE, IF AN IMPEDIMENT TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION ......................................................................... 76

C. VISHNU PURSUING THE CIVIL APPEAL AS WELL AS THE REVIEW PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR

MODIFICATION/RECALL, SIMULTANEOUSLY ............................................................................................................ 78

D. FORUM SHOPPING ...................................................................................................................................... 81

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................................... 82

INTRODUCTION

1. In Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh

, a three-Judge Bench of this

Court emphatically asserted “… stated simply, nothing … nothing … and

nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as fraud unravels everything.”

2. At the end of the last century, this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v.

Jagannath

noticed the growing trend of abuse of the process of law by

dishonest litigants playing fraud on courts. Fraud was held to be an act of

deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair

advantage of another: a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. The

opening paragraph of such decision reads as follows:

“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” observed Chief Justice

Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition

of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a

nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree — by the first

court or by the highest court — has to be treated as a nullity by every court,

whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral

proceedings.

This Court then warned that:

5. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such

an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest

litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties.

One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained

to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-

grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons

from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the

illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case

is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily

thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

3. “Fraud unravels everything” was famously said by Lord Denning in Lazarus

Estates Ltd. v. Beasley

, emphasising that fraud can invalidate judgments,

(2017) 4 SCC 1

(1994) 1 SCC 1

(1956) 1 Q.B. 702

contracts and all transactions. The principle highlights the importance of

honesty and transparency in legal proceedings and transactions. However, it

is a cardinal principle of law that fraud has to be pleaded and proved. Order

VI Rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

may be referred to ordaining

that particulars, inter alia, of fraud have to be stated in the pleadings.

4. From the multiple decisions of this Court on ‘fraud’, what follows is that fraud

and justice cannot dwell together, the legislature never intends to guard fraud,

the question of limitation to exercise power does not arise, if fraud is proved,

and even finality of litigation cannot be pressed into service to absurd limits

when a fraud is unravelled.

5. The issue of fraud unravelling everything is pertinent here due to the nature

of dispute we are tasked to adjudicate; hence, its reference at the beginning

of our judgment.

6. The primary parties involved in these proceedings are the appellant-writ

petitioner-applicant, Vishnu Vardhan

, and the respondent no.7, Reddy

Veeranna

. Vishnu has alleged that fraud has been played by Reddy on courts

to reap benefits behind Vishnu’s back. The tangled facts involved in these

proceedings, the complex web of activities of the primary parties and their

associates and the relief claimed in the civil appeal as well as the writ petition

by Vishnu would have to be examined in great depth to ascertain whether

fraud, as alleged by him, is established; and, if so, how it has affected the flow

of judicial proceedings and the manner in which the same has to be dealt with.

CPC

Vishnu

Reddy

In the process, other petitions/applications that are on record would also

require due consideration.

7. In the civil appeal, by special leave, Vishnu has assailed the judgment and

order

of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

dated 28

October, 2021,

whereby the High Court allowed a writ petition

filed by Reddy.

8. Concurrently with the civil appeal, Vishnu has presented a writ petition under

Article 32 of the Constitution. He has prayed for diverse relief therein, which

we propose to notice a little later.

9. The present lis concerns rival claims in respect of ownership of a land

situated in Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, which was acquired by the

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority

in 2005 and now forms a part

of Sector 18, NOIDA. The land was jointly purchased in 1997 by Reddy, one

T. Sudhakar

and Vishnu

. Relying on their joint ownership, the trio initiated

various legal proceedings seeking multiple relief from time to time, before and

after the acquisition of the land by NOIDA. Vishnu alleges that Reddy made

several attempts to assert his exclusive ownership in proceedings where

Vishnu and Sudhakar were not joined as parties. He further alleges that in one

such proceeding, Reddy succeeded and the High Court, by the impugned

order, declared him the sole owner. Aggrieved by the conduct of Reddy (which,

impugned order

High Court

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2272/2019

referred to as land, subject land or property, interchangeably, hereafter

NOIDA

Sudhakar

the trio, wherever referred to collectively

according to Vishnu, is fraudulent) and the impugned order, Vishnu has sought

relief from this Court by presenting the civil appeal.

10. While the relief claimed in the civil appeal is for setting aside of the impugned

order, what is prayed in the writ petition is (i) a declaration that Reddy is not

the sole owner of the subject land, (ii) an order setting aside NOIDA’s decision

(reflected in its letter dated 17

January, 2023) to sanction full compensation

for acquisition of the land to Reddy, (iii) a declaration that the trio, as co-

owners of the land, be jointly awarded compensation for acquisition thereof

and (iv) ordering an inquiry to unearth the fraud and to initiate appropriate

legal proceedings against the persons responsible.

11. Inter alia, there is a petition for review (defective) and an application for recall,

both at the instance of Vishnu. While the former seeks review of the judgment

and order dated 5

May, 2022 of this Court in C.A. No. 3636/2022, the latter

seeks recall of an order dated 30

January, 2023 in MA 255/2023 in Civil

Appeal 3636/2022.

FACTS

12. Since it is essential to delve deep into the facts for a proper determination of

the claims raised by Vishnu against Reddy and the officials of NOIDA, for the

sake of clarity and convenience, the full factual details are set out in the table

below.

April, 1976 Vide Notification No. 4157 dated 17

April, 1976 issued

under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area

Development Act, 1976, NOIDA was constituted by

declaring large tracts of land comprising of several

villages in Gautam Budh Nagar District, including lands

in the village of Chhalera Banger.

1985-1986 Between 1985 and 1986, NOIDA acquired a certain

portion of land from one Banwari and Bansha Singh and

compensation was received by them.

April, 1997 The trio jointly purchased a land measuring 5-13-10

Bighas at Khasra No. 422 and 427M of Village Challera

Banger, Gautam Budh Nagar, for a sum of Rs. 1 crore

from Bansa and Banwari Singh. Only 2-18-10 Bighas of

land

which was un-acquired by NOIDA is the subject

of the present proceeding. The names of the trio were

entered in the revenue records and the record of rights.

1998

First Suit

The trio instituted a suit

seeking a permanent

injunction against NOIDA from disturbing their

possession and title in the subject land.

February, 2000 The trial court by its decree restrained NOIDA from

interfering with the possession of the unacquired land

admeasuring 2-18-10 bighas.

June, 2000 Vide an agreement to sell, Sudhakar purportedly

relinquished his share in the subject land to Reddy for

Rs. 10 lakh.

subject land

Civil Suit No. 416/1998

2001 Aggrieved, NOIDA carried an appeal

from the trial

court’s decree dated 16

February, 2000 before the First

Appellate Court.

March, 2001 The First Appellate Court dismissed the civil appeal filed

by NOIDA and this decision not being challenged,

attained finality.

May, 2001

Second Suit

Sudhakar instituted a civil suit

against Reddy, seeking

a declaration of his 1/3

share in the subject land.

May, 2001 Reddy filed his written statement in the said suit. On the

same day, a compromise agreement was signed b y and

between Sudhakar and Reddy, conceding that Reddy

was the absolute owner of the land.

September,

2002

The trial court, declaring that the compromise

agreement was not bona fide, refused to act upon it.

December, 2002 The civil suit instituted by Sudhakar was dismissed for

default by the trial court.

2003-2004 NOIDA introduced a scheme for development of a

commercial hub at Sector 18, NOIDA.

November, 2003 Sudhakar requested the Deputy CEO to convert the

subject land for use from agricultural to commercial,

which was denied on 13

January, 2004.

Civil Appeal No. 61/2000

Civil Suit No. 283/2001

March, 2004 An office order set the rates for commercial land at Rs.

1,10,000 per sq. metre and for residential land at Rs.

4000 per sq. metre.

2003 – 2005 NOIDA allegedly made several attempts to dispossess

the trio from the subject land.

April, 2004 NOIDA issued an acceptance letter to DLF Universal for

allotment of the commercial hub.

2005 The trio filed Execution Petition No. 2/2005 for execution

of the decree of the trial court dated 16

February,

2000, restraining NOIDA from dispossessing them from

the land.

February, 2005

Agreement for Sale

Vishnu purportedly executed an Agreement for Sale for

his share of the land with Reddy for a sum of Rs. 25

lakh.

February, 2005

PoA

Vishnu executed a General Power of Attorney (PoA) in

favour of one Venkataramana.

February, 2005 NOIDA and DLF Universal entered into a lease deed for

Plot No. M-3, Sector 18, NOIDA for a total premium of

Rs. 173 crore for an area admeasuring 54,320.18 sq.

metre.

August, 2005 Execution Petition No. 2/2005 was rejected.

August, 2005 The trio, through their power of attorney holders, except

for Reddy who was himself present, agreed to sell land

measuring 5-13-10 Bighas in favour of M/s Prabhat

Home Pvt. Ltd. for 50% of the undivided share of the

entire land, for a consideration of Rs. 13.15 crore.

September, 2005

Land Acquisition

A Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act,

1894

in respect of the subject land was issued.

October, 2005 The trio had filed another execution application bearing

Execution Application No. 6/2005. This application was

rejected on 3

October, 2005.

November/December

2005

WP(C) 66797/2005 was filed before the High Court by

the trio, challenging the orders dated 2

August, 2005

and 3

October, 2005 whereby Execution Petition No.

2/2005 and Execution Application No. 6/2005,

respectively, were rejected.

November, 2005 A notification under Section 6 of the 1894 Act in respect

of the subject land was issued.

December, 2005

PoA - Cancellation

The General Power of Attorney dated 3

February, 2005

was purportedly cancelled by Vishnu.

December 2005 Vishnu filed WP(C) No. 75152/2005, challenging the

land acquisition proceedings initiated by NOIDA

authorities.

1894 Act

April, 2006 WP(C) 66797/2005 filed by the trio was allowed, and the

matter was remanded to the executing court to decide

whether the land in question stood acquired by NOIDA.

May, 2006

Third Suit

Reddy filed a civil suit

against Vishnu, praying for a

declaration that he was the sole owner of the land.

June, 2006 Vishnu executed a registered agreement for sale,

agreeing to sell his 1/3

share of the subject land to one

Ranbir Singh Narag for Rs. 3 crore.

October, 2006 Vishnu, through his Power of Attorney holder

(Venkataramana), filed a written statement in Civil Suit

No. 370/2006, admitting Reddy's claims.

October, 2006 A Joint Compromise Application was filed by Reddy and

the PoA holder of Vishnu.

Note: Vishnu argues that Venkataramana had no

authority to file the written statement or a compromise

application, as the PoA had already been cancelled on

December, 2005.

November, 2006 Civil Suit No. 370/2006, i.e., the third suit, was decreed

as per the compromise.

December, 2006 Execution Petitions, which had been remanded, were

rejected by the executing court on 1

August, 2008

because the lands were already acquired by NOIDA.

Civil Suit No. 370/2006

Challenging the rejections, the trio filed WP(C)

70088/2006 on 18

December, 2006. At paragraph 3

(three) of this WP, the trio pleaded that they are the co-

owners of the property.

December, 2009 While WP(C) No. 75152/2005, filed by Reddy,

challenging the land acquisition proceedings was

pending, Sudhakar and Vishnu filed impleadment

application claiming themselves to be the co-owners of

the property. The said application was allowed.

December, 2009 WP(C) No. 75152/2005 for compensation was allowed

by the High Court in light of the decision of the

Uttaranchal High Court in Bhoopendra Singh & Ors.

v. Awas Vikas Parishad

Note: This Court has upheld the decision of the

Uttaranchal High Court in Avas Evam Vikas Parishad

v. Bhoopendra Singh

2010 NOIDA challenged the order of the High Court dated 10

December, 2009 in SLP (C) No. 20196-97/2010.

September, 2010 Reddy had Vishnu's name deleted from the land records

qua the subject land using the compromise decree dated

November, 2006. In this regard, Khatauni Entry of

2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295

(2022) 14 SCC 277

Fasli Year 1407-1412 dated 26

September, 2010

shows Reddy as the sole owner.

January, 2011 Notice was issued by this Court in the SLP filed by

NOIDA, and operation of the impugned judgment dated

December, 2009 in WP(C) No. 75152/2005 was

stayed. On leave being granted, this SLP was numbered

as Civil Appeal No. 731/2013.

January, 2011 An award for compensation of the subject land was

made. This award has not been placed on record.

January, 2013 Vishnu was served by paper publication but did not enter

appearance before this Court.

November, 2015 Civil Appeal No. 731/2013 filed by NOIDA was dismissed

by this Court.

2015-17 Reddy made representations to NOIDA and the District

Magistrate seeking compensation in terms of the

judgment dated 4

November, 2015 passed by this

Court.

January, 2018 The District Magistrate rejected Reddy’s representation.

October, 2018 Reddy initiated action for contempt by filing Contempt

Petition No. 1841-42/2018 in Civil Appeal No. 731/2013

and alleged wilful and deliberate non-compliance with

the order dated 4

November, 2015. The petition was

withdrawn with liberty to avail appropriate remedies

before the High Court.

January, 2019 Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court, Reddy filed

WP(C) 2272/2019 before the High Court praying for:

1. quashing of the order dated 8

January, 2018.

2. quashing of the award dated 31

January, 2011.

3. a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings

have lapsed and to direct NOIDA to either initiate

fresh land acquisition proceedings or pass a fresh

award or hand over possession to Reddy.

August, 2020

Fourth Suit

Vishnu instituted Civil Suit No. 471/2020 before the trial

court claiming that the compromise decree dated 17

November, 2006, was null and void.

October, 2021 Served with summons, Reddy filed his written statement

in Civil Suit No. 471/2020. However, it has not been

placed on record.

October, 2021

Impugned order

in C.A. No.

7777/2023

The High Court allowed WP(C) 2272/2019 filed by Reddy

and accepted the plea that he was the sole owner of the

property. The compensation was enhanced from

Rs.181.87 per sq. yard (or Rs.152.04 per sq. metre) to

Rs.1,10,000 per sq. metre, with a deduction for

development charges at 50%, i.e., Rs. 55,000 per sq.

metre, along with a 30% solatium and interest @ 15%.

October, 2021

Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, Reddy

challenged the same in SLP (C) No. 19035/2021 which,

on leave being granted, was numbered as Civil Appeal

No. 3636/2022.

March, 2022 NOIDA filed a counter in Civil Appeal No. 3636/2022.

March, 2022 Aggrieved by enhancement of compensation by the

order dated 28

October, 2021 of the High Court,

NOIDA too challenged the same in SLP (C) No.

5500/2022. Upon leave being granted, the SLP was

numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3637/2022.

May, 2022

Challenge to the

impugned order

was dismissed by

this Court

This Court vide a common judgment and order,

dismissed the civil appeal filed by NOIDA (C.A. No.

3637/2022) and partly allowed the civil appeal filed by

Reddy (C.A. No. 3636/2022), setting aside deduction of

the development charges ordered by the High Court.

August, 2022 Review Petition (C) Nos. 874-875/2022 filed by NOIDA

were dismissed by this Court.

September,

2022

Due to the financial implications arising out of the order

dated 5

May, 2022, the then CEO, NOIDA issued a

letter to the Deputy Secretary, Govt. of Uttar Pradesh

seeking guidance from for filing a curative petition.

September,

2022

Vishnu filed IA No. 155895/2022 in C.A. No. 3636/2022

seeking modification of the order dated 5

May, 2022.

September,

2022

Pursuant to letter dated 15

September, 2022, the

matter was examined by the Law Department and letter

dated 30

September, 2022 was issued to NOIDA

requesting that instead of filing a curative petition, an

attempt be made to negotiate the compensation amount

with Reddy.

October, 2022 A meeting/negotiation took place between NOIDA and

Reddy, where they agreed to have the compensation

payable reduced from Rs.359 crore to Rs.295 crore,

which was paid to Reddy on 28

December, 2022.

January, 2023 IA No. 155895/2022 in C.A. No. 3636/2022 was

disposed of by a Bench of two-Judges [of which one of

us (Surya Kant, J.) was a member] , granting Vishnu

liberty to agitate his claim regarding co -ownership

before the Reference Court.

July, 2023 Vishnu approached this Court with the civil appeal and

the writ petition, which are under consideration.

July, 2023

Vishnu filed MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in Civil

Appeal 3636/2022 seeking recall of order dated 30

January, 2023.

August, 2023

MA Diary No.

6013/2024

Vishnu filed a defective Review Petition Diary no.

33040/2023 praying for review of the judgment dated

May, 2022. As the defects were not cured within

(tagged with the

present set of

matters)

time, registration thereof was declined

by the

Registrar (J-A) vide order dated 4

January, 2024.

Vishnu filed an appeal

against the Registrar’s order,

registered as MA Diary No. 6013/2024 in Review Petition

Diary No. 33040/ 2023. O n 24

October, 2024, the

Chamber Judge ordered that the said appeal be tagged

with Civil Appeal 7777/2023 and the other connected

matters.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

August, 2023

Notice and stay by

this Court

Notice on the special leave petition, writ petition,

miscellaneous application as well as on the application

seeking condonation of delay was issued by a bench of

this Court (cor. Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta , JJ.).

Reddy was directed to keep the compensation amount

received by him in an FDR and to file affidavits with

details of such FDR along with an undertaking not to

encash the FDR without prior permission of this Court.

November, 2023

Reference to a

larger bench

After noting his pleading that the compensation amount

had been invested in immovable properties, Reddy was

directed to furnish details of the immovable

properties/lands and investments in the business within

three weeks. The two-Judge Bench (cor. Surya Kant and

under Order VIII Rule 6(3) and 6(4) of Supreme Court Rules, 2013

under Order VIII Rule 6 (5) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013

Dipankar Datta, JJ.) condoned the delay in filing the SLP,

granted leave to appeal, issued Rule Nisi in the writ

petition and considering the issues likely to be raised in

the civil appeal directed that these matters be placed

before a larger Bench after obtaining necessary orders

from the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.

January, 2024 Vishnu filed Contempt Petition No. 23-24/2024 in WP

August, 2023 and 21

November, 2023.

May, 2024 This Court disposed of the IAs filed by Reddy seeking

recall/modification of orders dated 21

November, 2024

and 14

August, 2023 by directing him to file details of

the investments made by him (out of the compensation

amount) in a sealed cover, duly signed by him, along

with an affidavit/undertaking inter alia stating : (i) that

he shall not create any third-party rights in respect of

the said properties; (ii) that the compensation amount

has been invested only in the assets to be disclosed by

him in the sealed cover; (iii) that the said assets have

been disclosed in his Income Tax Returns; and (iv) that

there are no third-party interests or encumbrances on

the said assets, and if any exist, the same shall be

disclosed.

August 2024

SMC (C) No.

3/2024

(tagged with the

present set of

matters)

Suo Moto Contempt Petition (C) No. 3 of 2024 was

registered against NOIDA for not having filed the

counter affidavit within the time prescribed as per order

dated 8

May, 2024.

September 2024 The civil appeal, the writ petition and the connected

matters were heard on several dates.

October, 2024

This Bench, during the final hearing, opened the sealed

cover and, upon perusal of its contents, noted that

instead of making full disclosures, Reddy had submitted

a vague and misleading certificate from Pradeep Reddy

& Co., Chartered Accountants, omitting essential details

regarding the parties involved, the nature and manner

of the investments, the terms securing such

investments, and the particulars of the properties and

loans. Accordingly, the affidavit submitted by Reddy was

rejected and he was granted one final opportunity to

deposit a sum of Rs. 300 crore with the Registry. Reddy

was further restrained from entering into any agreement

to sell and/or creating any third-party rights in respect

of immovable assets owned by him, his family and the

companies created by him or his family members . He

was also directed to furnish details of all the movable/

immovable assets owned by him, his family and the said

companies.

November, 2024

Pursuant to the order dated 3

October, 2024, Reddy

filed IAs praying for deposit of title deeds of immovable

properties instead of cash deposit.

January, 2025

This Bench allowed Reddy to furnish securities through

his partnership firm Manyata-Pristine. Upon conclusion

of hearing, judgment was reserved.

IMPUGNED ORDER

13. The impugned order, as noted above, was passed on 28

October, 2021 partly

allowing Reddy’s writ petition.

14. Reddy, in paragraph 7 of his writ petition, asserted that as on the relevant

dates, he owned the subject land privately in light of the decree in Civil Suit

No. 416 of 1998 and that the respondents therein had no ‘right, title and

interest’ over the subject land.

15. A reply affidavit was filed by the State of U.P. and its officers; but as is usual

with official respondents, they did not go beyond averring that contents of

paragraph 7 of the writ petition are not admitted and that the entire land

acquisition proceedings, for planned development of NOIDA, were in

observance of the 1894 Act.

16. Before the High Court, the parties (namely Reddy as writ petitioner, the State

of Uttar Pradesh and seven others as respondents) advanced several

arguments and placed various documents on record. Preliminary objections on

the maintainability of the writ petition including, inter alia, suppression of facts

as well as the locus of Reddy to claim compensation for the subject land

without there being a decree in his favour were raised by the respondents

therein.

17. Regarding the preliminary objections to the maintainability of the writ petition:

a. the High Court rejected the same on the ground that Reddy had become the

sole owner of the subject land. This observation was premised on the order of

the trial court dated 17

June, 2010 under Section 34 of the “Land Revenue

Act, 1996” and Reddy’s name was, accordingly, entered in the Khatauni.

b. On the same premise, the allegation that Reddy had suppressed the order

dated 12

September, 2002 whereby the trial court denied to act on the

compromise decree was overruled by the High Court in view of the finding of

the trial court dated 17

June, 2010.

c. The objection of the respondents in the writ petition to the maintainability of

the writ petition asserting that a remedy is available under Section 18 of the

1894 Act was overruled by the High Court holding that the writ petition was

filed in view of the liberty given by this Court to approach the High Court vide

order dated 22

October, 2018.

18. Regarding the quantum of compensation :

a. The High Court repelled the submission of Reddy that compensation was not

determined as per the direction of the High Court and, therefore, the award is

to be treated as a nullity so as to apply Section 24 of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013

in view of the decision of this Court in Indore

Development Authority v. Manoharlal (LAPSE-5 J.)

b. Qua the challenge to the award and the prayer for determination of

compensation in accordance with law, the High Court held that the award

dated 31

January 2011 had been made subject to the final outcome of the

appeal filed by NOIDA. Since that appeal was dismissed by this Court on 4

November 2015, the State ought to have passed a fresh award in compliance

with the High Court’s judgment dated 10

December 2009.

c. The High Court then proceeded to determine the compensation by referring to

the circle rate of Sector 18, NOIDA, i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. metre. The

High Court also determined that development charges can be to the extent of

maximum 50% (fifty percent) and, therefore, held that the State should have

taken Rs. 55,000/- per sq. metre as the market value of the land. It was,

therefore, ordered accordingly.

BEFORE THIS COURT IN CIVIL APPEAL NO 3636-37 OF 2022

19. When the impugned order was challenged before this Court in separate

appeals, vide Reddy Veerana v. State of U.P.

, the civil appeal filed by

NOIDA was dismissed and the civil appeal filed by Reddy was allowed in part.

Learned senior counsel representing Reddy before us asserted that this

decision has therefore upheld the impugned order. However, on a closer

perusal of the case records, it is clear that the adjudication stands on a much

2013 Act

(2020) 8 SCC 129

(2022) 14 SCC 252

narrower footing. This Court in paragraph 39 of its decision in Reddy Veerana

(supra) noted that it is merely deciding on the quantum of compensation and

not the title of Reddy on the scheduled piece of land. For ease of reference,

paragraph 39 is quoted below:

39. In the instant case, since the title of the appellant on the scheduled piece

of land has not been contested by the respondents and the adjudication is

confined only to the quantum of compensation, we deem it appropriate not to

interfere with the findings of the High Court with respect to the ownership…

20. In view of the decision rendered in Bhoopendra Singh (supra), this Court

held that NOIDA must determine the compensation by taking into

consideration the circle rate which has been determined as per the market

value, i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/- per square metre. Further, dealing with the issue

of deduction of the development charges, this Court held that the High Court

failed to consider the contextual circumstances in its decision. Therefore,

applying the ratio of previous decisions, this Court concluded that NOIDA’s

actions, i.e., the passing of the award after a delay of five years from the date

of taking possession, was a violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution,

leading to a constitutional tort. Thus, taking note of the aforesaid and in the

peculiar facts of the case, it was directed that in addition to the statutorily paid

interest, the additional amount of penal interest must be paid in place of

shifting the date for determination of the amount of compensation or to

determine the compensation as per the 2013 Act, as demanded by Reddy.

CONTENTIONS

ARGUMENTS BY VISHNU

21. The principal submission advanced by learned senior counsel for Vishnu is that

the impugned order, along with all other orders obtained by Reddy through

misrepresentation and suppression of material facts, ought to be treated as

void ab initio, relying on the settled legal proposition that “fraud unravels

everything”.

a. Our attention was drawn to various documents on record indicating that Reddy

has taken inconsistent and mutually contradictory positions regarding the

extent of his ownership over the property. While he jointly prosecuted various

litigation from 2001 till 2019 along with Vishnu and Sudhakar, he asserted

sole ownership in other proceedings.

b. The written statement filed by Venkataramana, acting as Vishnu’s power of

attorney holder, admitting Reddy’s sole ownership of the property, was

without authority, as such power granted in Venkataramana’s favour had been

cancelled long before institution of Civil Suit No. 370/2006. It has also been

shown that Venkataramana is a partner of Reddy in the partnership firm that

offered securities before this Court.

c. Using this fraudulent decree dated 17

November 2006, Reddy managed to

have his name mutated in the revenue records.

d. Even after the decree, Reddy filed several pleadings claiming to be the joint

owner of the land.

e. The existence of the said decree was consistently suppressed by Reddy before

the courts.

22. As regards the quantum of compensation for the acquisition, it was submitted

on behalf of Vishnu that relegating the matter back to the Collector or the

Reference Court for computation after a lapse of two decades would be unjust.

It has been urged that the subject land should be treated as commercial in

nature, and compensation should be awarded accordingly.

23. On this basis, Vishnu has sought that the impugned order, insofar as it records

findings with respect to the ownership of the subject land, be set aside.

ARGUMENTS BY REDDY

24. At the outset, maintainability of this civil appeal and the connected writ

petition has been challenged by Reddy on various grounds including the fact

that:

a. Vishnu has sought apportionment of the subject land prior to getting the

registered Power of Attorney dated 3

February 2005, full settlement

agreement dated 3

February 2005 and decree of the Trial Court dated 17

November, 2006, nullified. Even though Vishnu instituted CS No. 471/2020

praying that the compromise decree dated 17

November, 2006 be declared

null and void, he has not sought any monetary compensation in the aforesaid

suit and has, therefore, bypassed the Trial Court in approaching the Supreme

Court only to save the payment of the court fee which smacks of mala fide;

b. Vishnu has engaged in ‘forum shopping’ as he has been pursuing various types

of proceedings before this Court as well as instituted a civil suit before the

Trial Court;

c. This Court does not have the original jurisdiction to adjudicate complicated

questions of fact under Article 131 of the Constitution;

d. Relying on the decision in Nidhi Kaim (supra), it is submitted that this Court

does not have the jurisdiction to decide an “intra-court appeal”;

e. The order dated 21

November, 2023 of this Court referring the matter to a

three-Judge Bench is against the established principle of stare decisis as the

reference order included not just questions of law but complicated questions

of fact;

f. The writ petition filed by Vishnu is not maintainable as against the order of

this Court dated 5

May, 2022 - much less when there is no violation of any

Fundamental Right alleged in the said writ petition - since judicial orders of

the Supreme Court cannot be challenged in the writ jurisdiction before this

Court itself;

g. The order of the High Court has now merged with the final order of this Court

and, therefore, the civil appeal filed by Vishnu is not maintainable, and that

the doctrine of merger would apply;

h. This Court does not have the jurisdiction to conduct a review of a judgment

through a miscellaneous application, much less in a second miscellaneous

application, by placing reliance on Order XLVII, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court

Rules, 2013

;

i. The listing of the review and chamber appeal is in clear violation of Order

XLVII, Rule 3 of the SC Rules, 2013; and

SC Rules, 2013

j. Vishnu is a chronic litigant coming with unclean hands as he has engaged in

supressing material documents before this Court and has played fraud upon

this Court.

25. On merits, it has been argued before us that:

a. Reddy has perfected his title through the decree of the Trial Court dated 17

November, 2006 in CS No. 370 of 2006. Moreover, Vishnu sold off his entire

property to a third party, Ranbir Singh, vide a registered agreement to sell

dated 7

June, 2006 while supressing the earlier sale made to Reddy;

b. The principle that fraud vitiates every proceeding is subservient to the principle

of interest rei publicae, ut sit finis litium. It was specifically contended that

Reddy has not played any fraud by not making Vishnu a party to the previous

litigation;

c. On the contrary, fraud has been played upon Reddy as Vishnu has not

disclosed material documents;

d. Vide decree dated 17

November, 2006, the interest in the subject land

passed from Vishnu to Reddy which to this day stands as a valid instrument;

e. The three deeds, namely, the full settlement sale agreement,

Affidavit/declaration and the Registered Power of Attorney must be read

together as part of the same transaction;

f. A registered document can only be cancelled/modified by another registered

document; in the instant case, the registered irrevocable Power of Attorney

dated 3

February, 2005 could not have been cancelled without registering

the document of cancellation;

g. Moreover, no notice of cancellation was provided to Venkataramana and,

therefore, it is not a valid cancellation as per Section 208 of the Indian Contract

Act, 1872 and Section 3 of the Power of Attorney Act, 1882;

h. Furthermore, a registered Power of Attorney cannot be revoked unilaterally;

i. Vishnu is estopped from re-agitating the issue on title as he has relinquished

his entire share of the property; and

j. Lastly, NOIDA has no right to re-agitate the dispute on merits collaterally.

ARGUMENTS BY NOIDA

26. NOIDA has argued before us that:

a. The doctrine of merger is not applicable when the order of the Court is vitiated

by fraud and that fraud is an exception to the rule of stare decisis;

b. This Court exercises plenary powers to prevent the abuse of process and to

meet the ends of justice under Article 129 of the Constitution;

c. The landowners must be relegated to the reference court under Section 18 of

the 1894 Act for determining compensation; and

d. The High Court and this Court committed a grave legal and factual error by

ignoring vital evidence in the form of exemplar sale deeds of the subject land

for determining the true and actual market value for assessment of quantum

of compensation.

27. In consequence thereof, NOIDA has prayed for recalling the orders of the High

Court dated 28

October, 2021 and of this Court dated 5

May, 2022 in

exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and to revisit the

enhanced compensation of Rs.1,10,000 /- per sq. metre or to direct the

landowners to approach the appropriate court under the 1894 Act.

REPLY BY VISHNU REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO MAINTAINABILITY

28. In response to the objections raised regarding the maintainability of the

present set of petitions, Vishnu submitted that:

a. Through the present proceedings, he is not seeking to appeal the judgment

dated 5

May 2022 and is, therefore, not invoking the appellate jurisdiction of

this Court but rather its inherent jurisdiction to prevent a gross miscarriage of

justice;

b. The provisions of the SC Rules—particularly Order LV Rule 6—preserve the

inherent powers of this Court to prevent the abuse of the court’s process;

c. Fraud constitutes an exception to the doctrine of merger;

d. The doctrine of merger is also inapplicable in the present case, as Vishnu was

not a party before the High Court; and

e. The writ petition is maintainable not only on the basis of infringement of the

right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, 1950

, but also because

Vishnu’s rights of access to justice and to a fair, equal, and transparent judicial

process are at stake.

ISSUES

29. On maintainability,

a. whether the impugned order having merged with this Court’s order dated 5

May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), as claimed by Reddy, renders the

present appeal – which, so to say, lays a collateral challenge to an order of

this Court itself – not maintainable?

Constitution

b. whether the present writ petition is not maintainable, as it seeks to challenge

a judicial order which, by its very nature, can never be said to violate

Fundamental Rights?

c. whether Vishnu can pursue a civil appeal against the impugned order as well

as a petition for review of the decision of this Court in which the impugned

order has merged, as claimed, simultaneously?

d. Whether Vishnu has engaged in forum shopping?

30. Whether Reddy obtained the impugned order, as well as this Court’s order

dated 5

May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), by practising fraud and

deception upon the courts and , therefore, the same deserve to be set

aside/recalled?

31. Should the answer to the above issues be in favour of Vishnu and against

Reddy, what would be the appropriate order to be passed in these proceedings

having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances?

ANALYSIS

32. We begin with recording the realisation that undoubtedly, there seems to be

much more than what have met our eyes. However, like all courts, we are

bound to decide cases based on the evidence on record, judicially noticeable

facts, and the applicable law. Despite Reddy and Vishnu – and to certain extent

Sudhakar – having used the judicial process obviously to secure their personal

interests, we cannot be a bystander. If things have happened with a telling

effect on public interest, resulting in public funds from the public exchequer

being drained, the same has to be dealt with with in the bounds of our

jurisdiction. In our pursuit for the truth and to uphold the rule of law, we must

adhere to established principles unless a valid reason warrants deviation.

33. Vishnu, as can be gathered from the narrative of events, has not left any stone

unturned to have the benefits accruing in favour of Reddy undone. The sheer

number of proceedings instituted by Vishnu bear testimony to his struggle to

set at naught all such orders that operate to his detriment. Apart from the civil

appeal against the impugned order and a writ petition under Article 32 seeking

enforcement of what, Vishnu calls infringement of his Fundamental Rights, he

has inter alia pursued the alternate channel of filing a petition (which is

defective) for review of the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra), an application

for modification/recall of the order of this Court relegating him to the remedy

under the 1894 Act and a petition for contempt of this Court’s order. The

multiplicity of proceedings in this particular case raises a reasonable

apprehension that the legal process, including this Court’s, is being potentially

abused by Vishnu. While, in no uncertain terms has Reddy assert ed that

Vishnu has indulged in abuse, we need to carefully assess whether it is Vishnu

or Reddy, or both, who is/are the real abuser(s).

34. While judicial consuetude ordinarily mandates that we begin with a threshold

examination of the issue of maintainability, the sui generis features of the

present case impel us to first address the core allegation levelled by Vishnu of

fraud having been committed by Reddy. We find that the question of

maintainability, in the present case, is a mixed question of fact and law which,

ideally, ought to be determined after adjudicating the question of alleged fraud

played by Reddy on the courts. We draw support for this approach from the

decision of this Court in Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta

where,

dealing with Order XIV, CPC, it was observed as under:

13. Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that where issues both of

law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of the opinion that the

case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try

that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a

bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The provisions of

this Rule came up for consideration before this Court in Major S.S.

Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon [(1964) 4 SCR 409 : AIR 1964 SC 497] and it was

held as under: (SCR p. 421)

“Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where issues both of law

and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or

any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try

those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the

settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been

determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact

may be exercised only where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may

be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction

upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary

issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the court; not to

do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the

decision of issues of fact, would result in a lopsided trial of the suit.”

Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order 14 Rule 2

CPC by the amending Act, 1976 but the principle enunciated in the above quoted

decision still holds good and there can be no departure from the principle that

the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of

law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law

depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue.

(emphasis ours)

35. Recently in Sathyanath v. Sarojamani

, this Court after analysing

judgments rendered by various High Courts and also Ramesh (supra) made

the following observations:

21. The provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 are part of the procedural law, but the

fact remains that such procedural law had been enacted to ensure expeditious

disposal of the lis and in the event of setting aside of findings on preliminary

issue, the possibility of remand can be avoided, as was the language prior to

the unamended Order 14 Rule 2. If the issue is a mixed issue of law and fact,

or issue of law depends upon the decision of fact, such issue cannot be tried as

a preliminary issue. In other words, preliminary issues can be those where no

evidence is required and on the basis of reading of the plaint or the applicable

(2006) 5 SCC 638

(2022) 7 SCC 644

law, if the jurisdiction of the court or the bar to the suit is made out, the court

may decide such issues with the sole objective for the expeditious decision.

Thus, if the court lacks jurisdiction or there is a statutory bar, such issue is

required to be decided in the first instance so that the process of civil court is

not abused by the litigants, who may approach the civil court to delay the

proceedings on false pretext.

* * *

23. The different judgments of the High Court referred to above are in

consonance with the principles laid down by this Court in Ramesh B.

Desai [Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638] that not all

issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those issues of law can

be decided as preliminary issues which fell within the ambit of clause (a) relating

to the “jurisdiction of the Court” and (b) which deal with the “bar to the suit

created by any law for the time being in force”. The reason to substitute Rule 2

is to avoid piecemeal trial, protracted litigation and possibility of remand of the

case, where the appellate court differs with the decision of the trial court on the

preliminary issues upon which the trial court had decided.

(emphasis ours)

36. We shall therefore decide the issue of maintainability after examining the

allegation of fraud.

I. HAS REDDY PLAYED FRAUD ON THE COURTS?

37. Upon due consideration of the entire factual matrix, some notable facts stand

out which, we believe, are appropriate to highlight.

38. At the inception, the trio – Vishnu, Reddy and Sudhakar – stood as a united

front. They consistently projected themselves as co-owners of the property in

question in multiple judicial proceedings:

a. in 1998, claiming to be the owners of the property, the trio jointly instituted

a suit

seeking a permanent injunction against NOIDA.

b. upon securing a decree, they together filed an execution application

c. they jointly pursued a writ petition

challenging rejection of their

execution application.

Civil Suit No. 416/1998

Execution Application No. 6/2005

WP (Civil) 66797/2005

d. even when Vishnu singly assailed the land acquisition proceedings in a writ

petition

, Reddy and Sudhakar filed an impleadment application

reaffirming the narrative of joint ownership.

e. NOIDA, in its appeal

before this Court, arrayed the trio as respondents

and not once did Reddy assert exclusive ownership during these

proceedings.

39. Contrary to the consistent earlier stance, Reddy, in a complete volte-face,

asserted his sole ownership of the property in not one but multiple judicial

proceedings:

a. in 2001, Sudhakar sued

Reddy, seeking his 1/3

share in the land. Curiously,

the written statement was filed the very next day, and even more curiously, a

compromise agreement was filed a day later. The Trial Court, sceptical of this

sudden turn of events, rejected the compromise finding its bona fides

questionable. Ultimately, the suit was dismissed for default as Sudhakar did

not pursue it further.

b. in 2006, Reddy sued

Vishnu, claiming to be the sole owner. This suit took a

particularly curious turn when one Venkatarama na, claiming to be Vishnu’s

Attorney, filed a written statement admitting the claim. However, records

reveal that the Power of Attorney had already been cancelled on 21

December, 2005, a full six months prior to the suit being instituted. Worse

still, pursuant to the documents having been filed in the Court by Reddy, it

WP (Civil) 75152/2005

Civil Appeal No. 731/2013

Civil Suit No. 283/2001

Civil Suit No. 370/2006

has surfaced that Venkataramana is also a partner of Reddy in the firm

Manyata-Pristine.

c. Finally, in January 2019, Reddy once again laid exclusive claim to the subject

land asserting himself as the sole owner in a writ petition

before the High

Court, challenging the District Magistrate’s decision to deny him

compensation. Vide the impugned order, his claim was allowed by the High

Court.

40. In a judicial landscape that values consistency and candour, this case strikes

a discordant note. This trajectory of the contradictory claims made by Reddy

can hardly be ignored by this Court.

41. The impugned order was passed on a writ petition presented by Reddy,

wherein he challenged the District Magistrate’s refusal to grant compensation

for the acquired land and simultaneously sought a declaration of his exclusive

ownership. The High Court accepted his claim albeit based on material which

was scant, information that was incomplete and knowledge appearing to be

fragmentary.

42. Considering Reddy’s consistent stance in earlier proceedings that the property

was jointly owned with Vishnu and Sudhakar, his failure to implead them in

the writ petition is appalling, if not more. This, in our view, was a calculated

attempt by Reddy to wrongfully appropriate the entire property keeping the

other two – Vishnu and Sudhakar – in the dark.

WP (Civil) 2272/2019

43. Although the provisions of the CPC do not apply to writ proceedings ex proprio

vigore, the principles flowing therefrom, as far as practicable, can be made

applicable. Order I Rule 9, CPC, as originally enacted, ordained that a suit shall

not be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties; however,

after its amendment in 1976 introducing the proviso, the implication is that

non-joinder of a party could, in a given case, prove fatal for the right to relief

claimed by the plaintiff, more so when a necessary party is not impleaded ,

and defeat the suit. Although Order I Rule 10 does empower a court to implead

at any stage of the proceedings a party who should have been joined as a

defendant, either upon or without the application of either party, a decree

passed by the court in the absence of a necessary or proper party to the suit

and affecting his interest could be avoided by such party; however, if the

decree is such that it acknowledges and declares the right of the decree-holder

to the subject matter of the suit and entitles him to its benefits, such a decree

has to be carried either in appeal or review by the affected non-party to divest

the decree-holder of whatever the decree entitles him to.

44. Insofar as writ proceedings are concerned, it is no longer res integra that any

order made on a writ petition affecting the interest of a party who has not

been arrayed as a respondent could be invalidated on the ground of breach of

natural justice.

45. We may profitably refer to the decision in Poonam v. State of U.P.

Although the decision was rendered in connection with a selection process for

(2016) 2 SCC 779

allotment of a fair price shop, this Court after analysing various previous

decisions emphasised:

21. We have referred to the aforesaid passages as they state the basic principle

behind the doctrine of natural justice, that is, no order should be passed behind

the back of a person who is to be adversely affected by the order. The principle

behind the proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 that the Code of Civil Procedure enjoins it

and the said principle is also applicable to the writs. An unsuccessful candidate

challenging the selection as far as the service jurisprudence is concerned is

bound to make the selected candidates parties.

46. A reference may further be made to the decision in Ajay Ishwar Ghute and

Ors. v. Meher K. Patel and Ors.

wherein a Bench of two-Judges [of which

one of us (Ujjal Bhuyan, J.) was a member] in an appeal against an order

made under Article 226 of the Constitution, held thus:

21. In the facts of the case, the senior district-level officials of the State had

stated on oath that the construction of the compound wall, in respect of which

relief was sought in the Writ Petition, would affect the rights of several third

parties. However, the Court completely ignored the same. Even in clause 6(iii)

of the “Minutes of Order”, there was enough indication that the compound wall,

if not appropriately constructed, would affect the rights of owners of the other

lands. Therefore, it was the duty of the Court to have called upon the 1st and

2nd respondents to implead the persons who were likely to be affected. The 1st

and 2nd respondents could not have pleaded ignorance about the names of the

concerned parties as they have referred to the owners of the other lands in the

“Minutes of Order”. However, the Division Bench of the High Court has failed to

make even an elementary enquiry whether third parties will be affected by the

construction of the compound wall under police protection. Hence, the order

dated 16th March 2022 passed in the Writ Petition in terms of the “Minutes of

Order” is entirely illegal and must be set aside. The Writ Petition will have to be

remanded to the High Court to decide the same in accordance with the law.

47. More generally, there are umpteen number of decisions of this Court wherein

the rights of a third party have been protected in civil litigation. This principle

was specifically noted in respect of claims arising out of land acquisition in the

2024 SCC OnLine SC 681

case of Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land

Acquisition) Neyvely

as follows:

12. It is true that Section 50(2) of the Act gives to the local authority or the

company right to adduce evidence before the Collector or in the reference under

Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any proceedings held before the

Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company may appear and

adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

However, it has no right to seek reference. Based thereon, the contention is

that the limited right of adduction of evidence for the purpose of determining

the compensation does not carry with it the right to participate in the

proceedings or right to be heard or to file an appeal under Section 54. We

cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with sub-section (2) of

Section 50 of the Act within a narrow compass. The right given under sub -

section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in

derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from

the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural

justice. The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this Court

starting from Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] is

that the beneficiary, i.e., local authority or company, a cooperative society

registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person

interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and

is an aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary has the right to be

heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is

entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of

the Collector. If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the court

and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court

under Section 26 or of the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled

to file writ petition under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness. When

the award made under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion

or corruption, the beneficiary is entitled to challenge it in the writ petition apart

from the settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge is amenable

to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action. These are very valuable and

salutary rights. Moreover in the language of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in the absence

of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no

complete and effectual determination of binding just and proper compensation

to the acquired land would be made. So it is concomitantly a proper party if not

a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The denial of

the right to a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure

offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious that though the stakes

involved are heavy, the Government plead or the instructing officer do not

generally adduce, much less proper and relevant, evidence to rebut the claims

for higher compensation. Even the cross-examination will be formal, halting and

ineffective. Generally, if not invariably the governmental agencies involved in

the process take their own time and many a time in collusion, file the appeals

after abnormal or inordinate delay. They remain insensitive even if the States

(1995) 1 SCC 221

(sic Stakes)involved run into several crores of public money. The courts insist

upon proper explanation of every day's delay. In this attitudinal situation it

would be difficult to meet strict standards to fill the unbridgeable gaps of the

delay in filing the appeals and generally entails dismissal of the appeals at the

threshold without adverting to the merits of the hike in the compensation. On

other hand if the notice is issued to the local authority etc. it/they would

participate in the award proceedings un der Sections 11 and 18, adduce

necessary and relevant evidence and be heard before the Collector and the

court before determining compensation. For instance that without considering

the evidence in the proper perspective, the court determined the compensation.

14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to the beneficiary and if the

State does not file the appeal or if filed with delay and it was dismissed, is it

not the beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of the compensation,

who would be the affected person? Is it not interested to see that the appellate

court would reassess the evidence and fix the proper and just compensation as

per law? For instance the reference court determined market value at Rs

1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of the land is only Rs 10,000. Who

is to bear the burden? Suppose State appeal was dismissed due to refusal to

condone the delay, is it not an unjust and illegal award? Many an instance can

be multiplied. But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary for whose benefit

the land is acquired is served with the notice and brought on record at the stage

of enquiry by the Collector and reference court under Section 18 or in an appeal

under Section 54, it/they would be interested to defend the award under Section

11 or Section 26 or would file an appeal independently under Section 54 etc.

against the enhanced compensation. As a necessary or proper party affected

by the determination of higher compensation, the beneficiary must have a right

to challenge the correctness of the award made by the reference court under

Section 18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc. Considered from this perspective

we are of the considered view that the appellant-Company is an interested

person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party,

if not a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. The High Court had

committed manifest error of law in holding that the appellant is not a person

interested. The orders of the High Court are accordingly set aside.

48. However, it is clarified that we do not seek to make any opprobrious remarks

against the High Court as it was incumbent upon Reddy to implead Vishnu and

Sudhakar as respondents in his writ petition and the High Court could not have

been expected to know the long-standing disputes or the fact that Reddy had

procured change in the revenue records on the basis of the compromise decree

whereupon further proceedings between Vishnu and Reddy in the shape of a

suit were pending unless the same was brought to its notice.

49. In any event, having regard to the events preceding presentation of the writ

petition by Reddy, out of which the present proceedings have arisen, we have

no hesitation to hold that Reddy tailored a situation to suit his convenience by

not impleading Vishnu as a party with the sole intention of obtaining an order

in respect of not only the quantum of compensation payable for acquisition of

the subject land but also a declaration as to his entitlement thereto – all,

behind Vishnu’s back. An attempt by Reddy to steal a march over Vishnu is

clearly discernible which, without reference to anything more, does border on

fraud.

50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single

material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully

refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v.

State of Bihar

where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:

13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies

such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the

need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by

deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that

had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the

case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court,

whatever view the court may have taken …

(emphasis ours)

51. In the present case, Reddy's failure before the High Court to disclose the

earlier series of litigation - where he consistently asserted joint ownership with

Vishnu and Sudhakar - being a fact having a bearing on the merits of the case,

is alone sufficient to vitiate the impugned order.

(2004) 7 SCC 166

52. However, the concealment runs deeper. It stems from the suit

that Vishnu

had instituted on 7

August, 2020, referred to hereafter.

53. During the pendency of the writ petition (in which the impugned order was

passed), Vishnu instituted the suit praying to declare the compromise decree

dated 17

November, 2006 as null and void on the ground that the written

statement (admitting Reddy’s sole ownership over the property) filed by

Venkataramana on his behalf was without any authority as the P ower of

Attorney in his favour already stood cancelled. Reddy filed his written

statement in that suit on 11

October 2021 – which is 17 (seventeen) days

before the High Court disposed of the writ petition. Despite being a party to

the suit, Reddy chose not to inform the writ court of pendency of the suit.

Notably, the decree dated 16

February, 2000 in the suit

instituted by the

trio and the change in the land records based on the compromise decree dated

November, 2006 in the suit

instituted by Reddy were relied on by Reddy

to have a ruling in his favour. As per the records available from the website of

the High Court, it is noted that judgment was reserved on 6

October, 2021.

Therefore, between 7

August, 2020 (date of institution of the fourth suit) and

October, 2021 (date of the impugned order), ample opportunity was

available for Reddy to disclose the factum of a suit having been instituted by

Vishnu. This deliberate suppression, of a material fact, further highlights the

fraudulent intent behind Reddy’s claim.

Civil Suit No. 471/2020

Civil Suit No. 416/1998

Civil Suit No. 370/2006

54. As discerned above, suppression of material facts before the High Court by

Reddy is writ large; however, his fraudulent conduct is not confined to that

forum alone.

55. It has not been shown to us by Reddy that during the course of the proceedings

before this Court leading to the decision in Reddy Veeranna (supra), this

Court was informed of institution of the suit by Vishnu. In fact, this Bench

discovered the pendency of such suit solely through examination of the related

documents and proceedings.

56. Another instance – though ultimately unsuccessful – that underscores Reddy’s

fraudulent conduct is the suit

instituted on 30

May, 2001, i.e., the first suit.

In this suit, which was filed just two days before the summer vacation of the

court, Sudhakar sought a declaration of his 1/3

ownership in the land.

Curiously, despite acknowledging in paragraph 3 of the plaint that the property

was jointly owned by three individuals, Vishnu, the third co-owner, was not

made a party to the suit. What followed reveals the dubious conduct of Reddy.

The very next day, Reddy filed his written statement, outright denying

Sudhakar’s claims and asserting exclusive ownership. He contended that he

alone paid the full sale consideration, and that Sudhakar’s name was included

in the sale deed merely due to his status as a practicing advocate, whose help

was needed in official dealings.

57. Interestingly, on the very same day, Reddy and Sudhakar filed a compromise

agreement in which Sudhakar unconditionally admitted Reddy’s sole

Civil Suit No. 283/2001

ownership. However, the trial court, rightly suspicious of the extraordinary

speed at which the pleadings and the compromise agreement were filed,

questioned the bona fides of the agreement and refused to act upon it.

Subsequently, neither party pursued the matter, and the suit was dismissed

for default on 5

December 2002.

58. It is almost unprecedented for a written statement and a compromise to be

filed the day after a suit is instituted. Even more astonishing is Sudhakar’s

complete and unopposed surrender of his claim without any explanation, and

notably, without impleading the third co-owner, Vishnu. The moment the trial

court declined to endorse the compromise, both of them lost interest in the

case and the suit was ultimately dismissed for default. This sequence: rapid

pleadings, exclusion of a necessary party, and abandonment of the suit clearly

reflects a collusive effort by Reddy to manufacture support for his claim of sole

ownership (emphasis ours). While Reddy's conduct before the High Court

reveals fraud, this episode confirms that his deceptive practices date back over

two decades.

59. Another instance of somewhat shady dealings stem from the fact of filing of a

written statement before the trial court by Venkataramana, acting as Vishnu’s

Attorney, whereas it is Vishnu’s claim that the Power of Attorney was cancelled

by the time the written statement was filed. Having regard to the ultimate

order proposed to be passed, we do not wish to make any factual

determination as to whether the Power of Attorney stood cancelled or not as

on the relevant date or even if cancelled, whether the due procedure was

followed; however, suffice it to note that Venkataramana, in course of the

proceedings before this Court, has been discovered to be a partner with Reddy

in their firm Manyata – Pristine and it is this firm which offered securities

before this Court as recorded in the order dated 21

January, 2025.

60. Be that as it may, obtaining of the impugned order by Reddy in his favour by

playing fraud on the High Court is conspicuous by its presence. Thus, we find

Vishnu's core argument to be creditworthy and compelling for us to hold that

judicial orders procured by Reddy by subverting the judicial process through

fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand.

61. In decisions abound, the Courts have consistently nullified orders obtained

through fraudulent means. Key excerpts from some of these decisions read

thus:

a. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh

, this Court

reiterated that fraud unravels everything:

3. “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant)

is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries.

Lord Denning observed in a language without equivocation that “no judgment

of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained

by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything” (Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley

[(1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] ).

b. In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros.

, it was held:

20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any

civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.

Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his

ability to, ‘wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares’. It has

been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New

International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission

to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against

conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being

prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined as an

intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance

upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal

(2000) 3 SCC 581

(1992) 1 SCC 534

right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct,

by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have

been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he

shall act upon it to his legal injury……..

c. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.

, this Court held:

21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is

obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before

three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:

“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”

22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order

obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non

est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court

or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or

inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ

or even in collateral proceedings.

23. ***

24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases , 13th Edn., p. 644,

explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment

would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable

from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court

was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential

distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction

is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that

it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one

which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was

imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.

25. It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus

nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus

nemini patrocinari debent).

d. The judgment by Denning, L.J. in Lazarus Estates Ltd. (supra), which has

since been quoted with approval by this Court in a catena of decisions including

Nidhi Kaim (supra), asserted intolerance for fraud in legal proceedings in the

following words:

No court … will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by

fraud. […] Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud

unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates

judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever….

(2007) 4 SCC 221

62. We are also mindful of the legal principle that if a fact could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence, its non-disclosure does not

constitute suppressio veri or suggestio falsi. Profitable reference may be made

to the decision in Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University

where this

Court observed that “where a person on whom fraud is committed is in a

position to discover the truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved”. It would

neither be a case of suggestio falsi nor suppressio veri.

63. However, the circumstances of the present case clearly indicate that the fact

of Vishnu being a co-owner of the property could not have been discovered by

either the High Court or this Court unless the same were placed before such

courts. Reddy having conducted himself throughout in a fraudulent manner

and with intent to deceive not only Vishnu but also the High Court could not

be expected to lay bare all previous transactions and proceedings. As is usual

with statutory authorities, not much was also expected of NOIDA. Corruption

of a large scale in payment of compensation has not gone unnoticed by this

Court for which a suo motu contempt action has been initiated. Since

proceedings are pending, we wish to leave it at that. However, what is

important for the present purpose is the overarching element of fraud in which

Reddy indulged with impunity.

64. In light of the above discussion, we feel no hesitation to hold that given the

deception involved, the impugned order and the decision of this Court dated

(1976) 1 SCC 311

May, 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra) procured by Reddy are tainted by

fraud and, thus, lack legal sanctity and validity.

II. MAINTAINABILI TY

65. We now propose to deal with the arguments raised by learned senior counsel

for Reddy relatable to maintainability of this writ petition and civil appeal as

well as the other applications filed by Vishnu. We propose to deal with them

in detail considering the labyrinthine and peculiar facts presented before us.

A. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITION

66. Learned senior counsel for Reddy has vociferously contended that the writ

petition under Article 32 presented by Vishnu is not maintainable on the twin

grounds that (i) the writ petition makes no mention of violation of any

Fundamental Right and (ii) no writ petition can lie against a judicial order.

67. Writ jurisdiction in India, as is well known, emanates from two articles of the

Constitution – Articles 32 and 226. The latter pertains to writ jurisdiction

exercisable by the various High Courts in the country while the former confers

jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs/orders/directions for

enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, guaranteed by the Constitution. Since

the High Courts are empowered under the Constitution to enforce legal rights,

apart from Fundamental Rights, the power conferred under Article 226 is

considered to be more expansive compared to the power under Article 32.

68. It is axiomatic that merely because a litigant barely pleads in his writ petition

before this Court that any of his Fundamental Rights has been breached would

not entitle him to maintain a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. What

is additionally necessary for him to plead is the nature of breach of

Fundamental Right, actual or apprehended, and the (likely) consequence

thereof.

69. The importance of pleadings in a writ petition under Article 32 was highlighted

by this Court in Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala

as follows:

14. Reverting to the preliminary objections raised by the respondent State, as

already mentioned above, there is no reference to the G.O. in the entire writ

petition. This document is not even part of the writ petition. Therefore, there

are no foundational facts and/or pleadings in the writ petition challenging this

G.O. as unconstitutional. More importantly, there is no prayer in the writ petition

seeking quashing of this G.O. Even when the learned counsel for the State had

pointed out fundamental infirmity in the writ petition, no attempt was made by

the petitioners to amend the writ petition so as to incorporate challenge to the

said G.O. as well. In the absence of any pleadings and the prayer seeking

quashing of the said G.O., it is not permissible for the petitioners to seek a relief

by making oral submissions in this behalf.

(emphasis ours)

70. For a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to be entertained, the

petitioner has to run a case establishing prima facie violation or imminent

threat of violation of any Fundamental Right. In this context, some relevant

judicial pronouncements are discussed below.

a. In D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab

, this Court held:

44. We have already found that none of the provisions of the Act offend any

fundamental rights of the petitioners. But it is contended on behalf of the

petitioners that in a petition under Article 32 once it is alleged and a prima facie

case is made out that the fundamental rights of a citizen are threatened or

violated this Court is not only bound to entertain it for determining to what

extent the allegation is valid but is also bound to go into the question, if raised,

that the law under which it is alleged that his fundamental right is infringed is

invalid on the ground of want of legislative competence. There are two facets

to this submission. Firstly, whether ultimately any fundamental right in fact is

threatened or violated, so long as a prima facie case of such a threat or violation

is made out a petition under Article 32 must be entertained. Secondly, once it

is entertained irrespective of whether it is found ultimately that in fact no

fundamental rights of the petitioners are invaded the vires of the legislation or

the competence of the legislature to enact the impugned legislation must be

gone into and determined. While the first proposition is valid, the second is not.

(2018) 14 SCC 193

(1971) 2 SCC 269

46. It is apparent therefore that the validity or the invalidity of the impugned

law, on the ground of legislative competence should purport to infringe the

fundamental rights of the petitioner as a necessary condition of its being

adjudicated. But if in fact the law does not, even on the assumption that it is

valid, infringe any fundamental rights, this Court will not decide that question

in a petition under Article 32. The reason for it is obvious, namely, that no

petition under Article 32, will be entertained if fundamental rights are not

affected and if the impugned law does not affect the fundamental rights it would

be contrary to this principle to determine whether that law, in fact, has

legislative competence or not.

(emphasis ours)

b. In Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE

, a coordinate Bench of this Court had the

occasion to rule that:

11. […] But, we may point out here that a mere failure to apply a rule which

ought to have been applied may not, by itself, justify an invocation of the

powers of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. In order to succeed in

a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioner has to disclose how

his fundamental right has been infringed by a particular rule or decision or its

application. The impact of the Rule or decision upon the facts of each petitioner

case has to be clearly brought out.

12. In the cases before us, the fundamental rights alleged to be violated could

only be the general ones embraced by Article 16(1) of the Constitution which

reads:

“There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to

employment or appointment to any office under the State.”

Where a petitioner alleges that he has been denied equality of opportunity for

service, during the course of his employment as a government servant, it is

incumbent upon him to disclose not only the Rule said to be infringed but also

how this opportunity was unjustifiably denied on each particular occasion. The

equality of opportunity in a matter relating to employment implies equal

treatment to persons similarly situated or in the same category as the

petitioner. It postulates equality of conditions under which a number of persons

belonging to the same category compete for the same opportunities and a just

and impartial application of uniform and legally valid standards in deciding upon

competing claims. It does not exclude justifiable discrimination.

(emphasis ours)

c. In Ramdas Athawale (5) v. Union of India

, it was observed by this Court

that:

46. It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the

right to a constitutional remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the right

conferred by Part III of the Constitution and unless a question of enforcement

(1975) 4 SCC 714

(2010) 4 SCC 1

of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not apply. It is well settled that

no petition under Article 32 is maintainable, unless it is shown that the petitioner

has some fundamental right. In Northern Corpn. v. Union of India [Northern

Corpn. v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 239] this Court has made a pertinent

observation that when a person complains and claims that there is a violation

of law, it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the

enforcement of which alone Article 32 is attracted.

(emphasis ours)

d. In Harbhajan Singh v. State of Haryana

, this Court referring to the

decisions in D.A.V. College (supra) and Ramdas Athawale (supra) observed

as follows:

11. But the above decisions do not wholly support the stand of the respondents.

This Court in D.A.V. College [D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC

269] has held that there are two aspects. The first is whether ultimately any

fundamental right in fact is threatened or violated. So long as a prima facie case

of such a threat or violation is made out, a petition under Article 32 must be

entertained. Second, once it is entertained, irrespective of whether it is found

ultimately that in fact no fundamental rights of the petitioners are invaded, the

vires of the legislation or the competence of the legislature to enact the

impugned legislation must be gone into and determined. [The Constitution

Bench in D.A.V. College [D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 269],

further held that while the first proposition is valid, the second is not. Thus, the

entertainment of the writ petition does not mean that this Court has to examine

the impugned legislation or legislative competence if the same is not found to

be infringing fundamental rights.

71. Furthermore, the right to seek an effective legal remedy for an infringed right

is part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. One

may make a profitable reference to the decisions in Anita Kushwaha v.

Pushap Sadan

and Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India

for the same.

72. Since the 1970s, interpretation of the Constitution, particularly Fundamental

Rights, has undergone a significant transformation. Through dynamic and

evolving interpretations, various aspects of equality, life and freedom have

been recognised and expanded to reflect the changing needs of society.

(2023) 11 SCC 693

(2016) 8 SCC 509

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1334

73. We are, at this stage, reminded of what this Court held in Express

Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India

while negating a challenge to the

interpretation placed on Article 14 in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.

International Airport Authority of India Ltd.

that all governmental

actions, which are not supportable by law, would be per se violative of Article

14 of the Constitution. Excerpts from paragraph 70 read as follows:

70. […] it is urged that the content of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution would

not include the right which is guaranteed by other clauses of Article 19.

According to the learned counsel, it must therefore logically follow that what

facilitated the exercise of a fundamental right did not for that reason become a

part of the fundamental right itself. He read out different passages from the

judgments of Bhagwati. J. in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., Maneka Gandhi v.

Union of India and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority

of India Ltd. and endeavoured to show, to use his own language, that “in spite

of some literal flourish in the language here and there, they did not and could

not depart from the ambit of Article 14 which deals with the principle of equality

embodied in the Article”. He was particularly critical of the dictum of Bhagwati,

J. in International Airport Authority case

that “arbitrariness was the antithesis

of Article 14” and commented that this would mean that all governmental

actions which are not supportable by law were per se violative of Article 14. I

am afraid, it is rather late in the day to question the correctness of the landmark

decision in Maneka Gandhi case and the innovative construction placed by

Bhagwati, J. on Article 14 in the three cases of Royappa, Maneka Gandhi and

International Airport Authority which have evolved new dimensions in judicial

process.

74. As we read the above passage acknowledging the declaration of law that

arbitrariness in State action is an antithesis of Article 14, we are also reminded

of decisions of high authority of this Court that a violation of a principle of

natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14 [see Union of India

(1986) 1 SCC 133

(1974) 4 SCC 3

(1978) 1 SCC 248

(1979) 3 SCC 489

v. Tulsiram Patel

] and that natural justice is an antithesis of arbitrariness

[see Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanho University

75. Article 14’s guarantee against arbitrariness is fundamental to all State actions.

Since equality and natural justice are antithesis of arbitrariness, nowadays it

has become customary to style a petition as one filed under Article 32 and

vaguely allege either arbitrariness or violation of the traditional principles of

natural justice [the rules that none should be condemned unheard and no one

should be a judge of his own cause] as well as a third principle developed in

India, which also includes the right to be afforded a fair hearing and a reasoned

order should the outcome of the proceedings be adverse to the person

proceeded against. Question is, should the Supreme Court entertain writ

petitions under Article 32 without clear and specific pleadings as to how the

right of equality or any other Fundamental Right has been infringed and what

is the impact thereof on the suitor without clear, specific, and definite

pleadings? The answer must be an emphatic ‘NO’. If the principles deducible

from the authorities referred to above are of any guidance and help, a loosely

drafted writ petition under Article 32 ought not to be entertained in the

absence of the requisite pleadings. Even where violation of a statutory right is

sought to be camouflaged as violation of a Fundamental Right , or where a

statutory right is found to have been predominantly violated with only an

incidental infringement of a Fundamental Right , this Court may, in the

judicious exercise of its discretion, refuse to entertain the writ petition while

(1985) 3 SCC 398

(1998) 8 SCC 194

safeguarding the liberty of the suitor to pursue his writ remedy before the High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

76. Having said that, we now proceed to decide the contentions raised by Reddy.

77. The first contention is that the writ petition does not disclose violation of any

Fundamental Right. In this regard, reference may be made to the first

paragraph of the writ petition which reads:

This Writ Petition under Article 32 seeks to enforce Petitioner’s fundamental

Rights under Article 14, 19(1)(g) & Article 21 together with 300 -A of the

Constitution of India. This Writ Petition is necessitated on account of an

extraordinary and brazen fraud upon this Hon’ble Court…

This appears to be a general statement regarding the particular Fundamental

Rights which, according to Vishnu, stand breached. It is of no help to him.

Furthermore, a perusal of paragraph 6(h) of the writ petition reveals

averments to the effect that the rights of Vishnu under Articles 19(1)(g) and

21 have been severely impaired insofar as it relates to access to appropriate

legal remedies, as the remedy available under Section 30 of the 1894 Act is

only illusory in nature, considering that the question of title has already been

declared in favour of Reddy.

78. A plain reading of the writ petition together with the prayer clauses, noted in

paragraph 6 (supra), makes it evident that none of Vishnu’s Fundamental

Rights were invaded to enable him maintain a writ petition under Article 32 of

the Constitution. To recapitulate, Vishnu prayed in his writ petition that (i)

Reddy be declared as not the sole owner of the subject land, (ii) NOIDA’s

decision (reflected in its letter dated 17

January, 2023) to sanction full

compensation for acquisition of the land to Reddy be set aside, (iii) the trio be

declared as co-owners of the land and jointly awarded compensation for

acquisition thereof and (iv) an inquiry be ordered to unearth the fraud and to

initiate appropriate legal proceedings against the persons responsible. The

case set up in the writ petition by Vishnu does not, in our opinion, constitute

breach of any of his Fundamental Rights; although, it cannot be gainsaid that

his property rights are definitely in jeopardy leading to violation of Article 300A

of the Constitution for which a petition under Article 226 could have been

entertained regard being had to the law laid down by a five-Judge Constitution

Bench of this Court in Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab

. However, Vishnu

sought to project that the writ petition had to be filed due to concerns that

even if a sound case on merits were presented, other courts would feel

hesitant to entertain the grievance given this Court’s decision in Reddy

Veerana (supra). It was as if apart from the remedy of a writ petition before

this Court, no other remedy was available to Vishnu.

79. That is, however, not the case before us. Vishnu has sought to avail the

appellate remedy against the impugned order as well as a review of the

decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) which, if undisturbed by us, would

incidentally seal his fate. In any event, if Vishnu were to succeed in the civil

appeal and the petition for review considered bearing in mind the decision on

this civil appeal, the resulting relief would likely address his grievance arising

from the fraud, of which he has claimed to be a victim.

80. In our view, there is no prima facie infringement of Vishnu’s Fundamental

Rights including, inter alia, the right to have access to an effective legal

AIR 1963 SC 1909

remedy, since all the available options for relief are being sought to be

explored by him. Accordingly, we uphold the first argument advanced by

Reddy that the writ petition did not disclose violation of any of the

Fundamental Rights and, hence, is not maintainable.

81. Having regard to the aforesaid finding, we are not required to deal with the

second ground; however, for completeness of decision, we are ad idem with

the contention that a writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order. In this

context, reference may be made to the nine-Judge Constitution Bench decision

of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra

where

it was pertinently observed as follows:

18. On these facts, the question which arises for our decision is whether a

judicial order passed by the High Court prohibiting the publication in

newspapers of evidence given by a witness pending the hearing of the suit, is

amenable to be corrected by a writ of certiorari issued by this Court under Article

32(2). This question has two broad facets; does the impugned order violate the

fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(a), (d) and (g); and if

it does, is it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32(2)?

Thus, in the present proceedings, we will limit our discussion and decision to

the points which have a material bearing on the broad problem posed by the

petitions before us.

* * *

37. The next question which calls for our decision is : does the impugned order

contravene the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)? In

dealing with this question, it is essential to bear in mind the object with which

the impugned order has been passed. As we have already indicated, the

impugned order has been passed, because the learned Judge was satisfied that

the interests of justice required that Mr Goda should not be exposed to the risk

of excessive publicity of the evidence that he would give in court. This order

was passed by the learned Judge after hearing arguments from both the parties

to the suit. Thus, there is no doubt that the learned Judge was satisfied that in

order to be able to do justice between the parties before him, it was essential

to grant Mr Goda's request for prohibiting the publication of his testimony in the

newspapers from day to day. The question is : can it be said that an order which

has been passed directly and solely for the purpose of assisting the discovery

of truth and for doing justice between the parties, infringes the fundamental

rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)?

AIR 1967 SC 1

38. The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental rights of

the petitioners under Article 19(1), is based on a complete misconception about

the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial decisions. When

a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first

decides questions of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the

relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge

are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers

from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the

decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate court. But it is

singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a

Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him

for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article

19(1). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy

between the parties brought before the court and nothing more. If this basic

and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain

that the judicial verdict pronounced by court in or in relation to a matter brought

before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of

citizens under Article 19(1).

(emphasis ours)

82. Interestingly, a perusal of the prayer clauses of the writ petition presented by

Vishnu does not show that a challenge has been laid to any judicial order. He

has prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari, to quash and set aside the

decision of NOIDA dated 17

January, 2023 and a writ of declaration to declare

Reddy to not have an exclusive right to claim compensation. There being

evidently no challenge to any judicial order, this ground of challenge is liable

to be rejected.

B. MAINTAINABILITY OF CIVIL APPEAL/JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

83. A variety of objections regarding the jurisdiction of this Court in determining

the questions arising for decision have been raised.

INTRA-COURT APPEAL

84. Firstly, we wish to clarify that we do not possess and are not exercising any

“intra-court appeal” jurisdiction, as contended by learned senior counsel

representing Reddy. The Constitution does not confer any such jurisdiction on

us and we are conscious of the legal position. However, having so clarified, it

is important to note that the principle of “fraud unravels everything” is not

confined only to examining judgments rendered by the courts below but could

include the unravelling of judgments of this Court as well, if at all the justice

of the case before us so demands. In the former moiety of this judgment, we

have discussed that Reddy has with impunity indulged in playing fraud on the

courts and, therefore, his challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court must fail.

85. In Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab

, this Court held that:

17. It is a settled legal proposition that where a person gets an order/office by

making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority, such

order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law as fraud unravels everything.

“Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new

subtleties invented to evade law.” It is trite that “fraud and justice never dwell

together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). Fraud is an act of deliberate

deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. Fraud

and deception are synonymous. “Fraud is anathema to all equitable principles

and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the

application of any equitable doctrine.” An act of fraud on court is always viewed

seriously. [Vide Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy [(2010) 8 SCC 383, para

34.]

18. However, the question does arise as to whether it is permissible for a party

to treat the judgment and order as null and void without getting it set aside

from the competent court. The issue is no more res integra and stands settled

by a catena of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such an order, even if

void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. [Vide State of

Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [(1996) 1 SCC 435]

and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [(1997) 3

SCC 443].

86. Moreover, as noted hereinabove, the decision in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra)

delineated that every Court, either superior or inferior – first or final – has

jurisdiction in cases where a judgment of the court has been obtained by fraud

to treat it as nullity.

87. Acceptance of the contention of Reddy would lead to a situation akin to a

juridical cul-de-sac, where no option is available to Vishnu to assert his legal

(2011) 12 SCC 588

rights. Adopting a hands-off approach weighed down by the fact of existence

of a judicial order of this Court of competent jurisdiction and thereby keeping

it untouched (despite proof of such judicial order having been procured by

fraud), would be a travesty of justice. Much of what has been said by this

Court on the aspect of fraud vitiating even the most solemn of proceedings, in

that case, would seem to be dead letter. On the contrary, ends of justice

demand that such order(s), as might have been procured based on established

fraud, must not be retained on the record of Courts of Record.

88. Another challenge to the maintainability of the civil appeal is on the ground

that the reference of the case, by this Court using its “intra-court appeal”

jurisdiction to the present bench of three judges violate the established

principle of stare decisis as it refers not only a question of law but also

questions of fact. While the High Court and any subsequent Bench of this Court

would no doubt continue to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the dicta in

A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra), in reality, for the purposes of judicial propriety

and abundant caution, this Court in a coordinate configuration deemed it

inappropriate to examine whether the decision of this Court in Reddy

Veerana (supra), in which it is contended that the impugned order has

merged into, ought to be examined in greater depth for ascertaining whether

it was obtained by fraud. Therefore, the only plausible option open to the

Bench of coordinate strength was to refer the matter to a larger bench to

decide whether fraud has been played on this Court and this is precisely what

has been done in the present case by the order dated 21

November, 2023.

The said order was open-ended in the sense that who should constitute the

larger bench was not specified. It was left open for the master of the roster to

decide on constitution of the larger bench; and it could have included the

available member(s) of the two-Judge Bench, which decided Reddy Veerana

(supra). However, this Bench having been constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief

Justice and Reddy having participated in the proceedings before us without

raising any demur regarding coram, we see the contention as one raised in

desperation. Even otherwise, to put it straight, we do not wish to spill much

ink regarding this misconceived contention since by way of this judgment, we

have kept our focus limited to the point of “fraud” and have exercised caution

and circumspection in not making any determination regarding the merits

pertaining to the dispute at hand. We, therefore, see no merit in the contention

urged on behalf of Reddy that placement of the civil appeal and the writ

petition before us is in violation of any law.

89. Lastly, ex abundanti cautela, as pointed out above, this Court in Reddy

Veerana (supra) made no determination on the title of Reddy and only made

the decision with respect to the compensation on the basis of the circle rate.

Therefore, this larger bench is not strictly sitting in “appeal” on any point of

law/fact but is concerned only with whether this Court’s judgment was

procured through fraud.

MERGER

90. Learned senior counsel for Reddy has also assiduously argued that the present

civil appeal is not maintainable, as it effectively challenges an order of the

Supreme Court, into which the impugned order has merged. It is contended

that no appeal lies before the Supreme Court against its own order.

91. Since arguments in extenso were advanced on the aspect of non -

applicability/applicability of the doctrine of merger, we need to notice what it

means, how this Court has applied it or declined to apply it to the cases before

it, and finally how relevant it is to the present exercise.

92. As per Black’s Law Dictionary (10

Edition), ‘merger’ means “the act or an

instance of combining or uniting; Civil Procedure. the effect of a judgment for

the plaintiff, which absorbs any claim that was the subject of the lawsuit into

the judgment, so that the plaintiff’s rights are confined to enforcing the

judgment”.

93. A brief overview of English law on the doctrine of merger by judgment reveals

that when an action prevails, the cause of action, along with all attendant

rights emanating from it, merge into the judgment and thereby stand

extinguished.

94. To trace the origin of the doctrine of merger in English law, we must journey

back to the nineteenth century. Almost two centuries ago, the Court of

Exchequer Chamber, in the case of King v. Hoare

, articulated the following

principles:

If there be a breach of contract, or wrong done, or any other cause of action

by one against another, and judgment be recovered in a court of record, the

judgment is a bar to the original cause of action, because it is thereby

reduced to a certainty, and the object of the suit attained, so far as it can be

at that stage; and it would be useless and vexatious to subject the defendant

to another suit for the purpose of obtaining the same result. Hence the legal

maxim, ‘transit in rem judicatam’—the cause of action is changed into matter

of record, which is of a higher nature, and the inferior remedy is merged in

the higher.

(1844) 13 Meeson and Welsby 494

95. Similarly, in Kendall v. Hamilton

, the House of Lords, endorsing the

decision in Hoare (supra), stated thus:

The doctrine of merger is quite intelligible. Where a security of one kind or

nature has been superseded by another of a higher kind or nature, it is

reasonable to insist that the party seeking redress should rest only upon the

latter. So when what was once a mere right of action has become a judgment

of a court of record, the judgment is a bar to the original cause of action.

96. In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v . Zodiac Seats UK Ltd

, the Supreme

Court of the United Kingdom, summarised the doctrine of merger as follows:

17. […] [Merger] treats a cause of action as extinguished once judgment has

been given upon it, and the claimant’s sole right as being a right upon the

judgment. Although this produces the same effect as the second principle, it is

in reality a substantive rule about the legal effect of an English judgment, which

is regarded as ‘of a higher nature’ and therefore as superseding the underlying

cause of action: see King v Hoare […].

97. Perhaps one of the earliest Indian decisions exploring the doctrine of merger

is that of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of Income -Tax v.

Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla

wherein a Division Bench held thus:

It is a well-established principle of law that when an appeal is provided from a

decision of a Tribunal and the appeal Court after hearing the appeal passes an

order, the order of the original Court ceases to exist and is merged in the order

of the appeal Court and although the appeal Court may merely confirm the order

of the trial Court, the order that stands and is operative is not the order of the

trial Court but the order of the appeal Court.

98. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai

Manubhai

, laid down that the English doctrine of merger, while it might have

(1879) 4 App. Cas. 504

[2013] UKSC 46

(1953) SCC OnLine Bom 28

(1953) 2 SCC 489

influenced certain judicial pronouncements in our country, it essentially has no

relevance to a Hindu widow's estate.

99. In State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd.

, another three-Judge Bench

observed that the application of the doctrine of merger depends on the nature

of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory

provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. It was observed

thus:

5. […] But the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal

application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders, one by the

inferior Tribunal and the other by a superior Tribunal, passed in an appeal on

revision, there is a fusion of merger of two orders irrespective of the subject-

matter of the appellate or revisional order and scope of the appeal or revision

contemplated by the particular statute.

100. The question arising for decision before a Constitution Bench of five-Judges of

this Court in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co.

Ltd. and others

was whether the order of the original authority merged in

the order of the Appellate Authority even where the Appellate Authority merely

dismissed the appeal without any modification of the order of the original

authority. Answering the question posed before it, the Bench observed thus:

4. [..] It is obvious that when an appeal is made, the Appellate Authority can do

one of three things, namely, (i) it may reverse the order under appeal, (ii) it

may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and thus

confirm the order without any modification. It is not disputed that in the first

two cases where the order of the original authority is either reversed or modified

it is the order of the Appellate Authority which is the operative order and if the

High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ to the Appellate Authority it cannot

issue a writ to the original authority. The question therefore is whether there is

any difference between these two cases and the third case where the Appellate

Authority dismisses the appeal and thus confirms the order of the original

(1967) 1 SCR 732

(1963) 2 SCR 563

authority. It seems to us that on principle it is difficult to draw a distinction

between the first two kinds of orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the

third kind of order passed by it. In all these three cases after the Appellate

Authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the

Appellate Authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or

confirmed it. In law, the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious

as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification.

(emphasis ours)

101. At the turn of this century, the decision in Kunhayammed v. State of

Kerala

was rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. Since this

decision stands out as a guiding light wherein this Court summarized the law

on the doctrine of merger and appears to be the sheet anchor of the claim of

Reddy, it would be apt to examine the decision closely.

102. The question that arose for decision in Kunhayammed (supra) was whether

upon dismissal of a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution

of India carried from an order of the High Court, a review petition would still

be maintainable before such Court. The decision begins with the following

words:

1. A question of frequent recurrence and of some significance involving

the legal implications and the impact of an order rejecting a petition

seeking grant of special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India has arisen for decision in this appeal.

The coordinate Bench had the occasion to examine the doctrine of merger in

great depth. Briefly, what was held is this. If special leave were not granted

(either by an unreasoned or a reasoned order) and the petition dismissed, the

order under challenge would not merge in the order of dismissal. However, if

upon grant of leave the Court dismissed an appeal in exercise of its appellate

(2000) 6 SCC 359

jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the order is unreasoned, the doctrine would

apply resulting in merger of the order under challenge in the order dismissing

the appeal. In paragraph 7 the Court noted that the doctrine of merger is

neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognized

and that it is a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the

hierarchy of the justice delivery system. Paragraph 12 of the decision has aptly

captured the logic underlying the doctrine of merger. It was observed thus:

12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more

than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject -matter at a

given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal

or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior

forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be

effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the

superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way — whether the decree

or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the

decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final,

binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order

passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is

not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by

the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which

could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.”

(emphasis ours)

The Bench then proceeded to sum up its conclusions thus:

42. ‘To merge’ means to sink or disappear in something else; to become

absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is

defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby

the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or

swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus

Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68.)

* * *

44. To sum up, our conclusions are:

(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a

court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such

superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before

it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the

superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is

capable of enforcement in the eye of law.

(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible

into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special

leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave

to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an

appeal.

(iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited

application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the

superior forum and the content or subject -matter of challenge laid or

capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger.

The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or

affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the

Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the

judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate

jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing

of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore

be applied to the former and not to the latter.

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order

or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger.

An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place

of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not

inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives

reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications.

Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law

by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution.

Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order

are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the

parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings

subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being

the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the

order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order

of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order

of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent

proceedings between the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of

Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract

the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely

affirmation.

(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to

appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the

jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as

provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 CPC.

(emphasis ours)

103. A subsequent three-Judge Bench in Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Sri

Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal

succinctly summarized what was held in Kunhayammed (supra) in the

following words:

20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where orders of different

nature were passed and dealt with these judgments by classifying them in the

following categories:

(i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition—without reasons—no res

judicata, no merger.

(ii) Dismissal of the special leave petition by speaking or reasoned order—no

merger, but rule of discipline and Article 141 attracted.

(iii) Leave granted—dismissal without reasons—merger results.

104. It is discernible from the aforesaid decisions that although the doctrine of

merger has its roots in common law principles, it has firmly been integrated

within the contours of Indian jurisprudence.

105. Having discussed the law on the doctrine of merger, we must acknowledge

that with rules come with exceptions. The doctrine of merger does not apply

universally or without limit. There are certain decisions of this Court which, in

the exceptional situations before it, declined to apply the doctrine of merger.

It would be appropriate to notice the same now.

106. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Vijai

International Udyog

emphasized that the doctrine of merger finds no

application where the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” is applicable. It

was observed thus:

(2019) 4 SCC 376

(1984) 4 SCC 543

4. On the facts of the case, we do not accept the view of the High Court that

the doctrine of merger applied. Both the assessee and the Commissioner had a

statutory right of appeal to the Tribunal against the decision of the Assistant

Commissioner and in exercise of that right two separate appeals had been filed.

On account of the mistake of the Tribunal in not clubbing the two appeals the

statutory right of appeal of one party could not be negatived. It is a well-settled

proposition of law that no party should suffer on account of the mistake of the

Court or the Tribunal. That apart in a situation like this, the doctrine of merger

has no application and the High Court was in error in throwing out the

Commissioner's appeal by applying the doctrine of merger.

107. Yet again, the two-Judge Bench in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra) laid down

fraud as an exception to the doctrine of merger while observing thus:

38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case

is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is

passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts

including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not

dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally

by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which

Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also

gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore,

merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to

any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall

or reconsider the order.

39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is

established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or

playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in

consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to

stand.

(emphasis ours)

108. In MRF Ltd. v. Manohar Parrikar

, a two-Judge Bench held that the doctrine

of merger does not apply when the higher court has not adjudicated the issues

on merits, and the controversy between the parties has not been looked into.

(2010) 11 SCC 374

In applying this doctrine to the specifics of the case, the Court had the occasion

to observe:

39. The issue of merger has no bearing in the facts and circumstances of the

present petitions, since, the issue that was decided by the High Court in the

earlier batch of writ petitions and the issue that was raised and considered in

the subsequent public interest litigation is entirely different. Secondly, in our

view, the principles of res judicata are also not attracted since the issue raised

and considered in the subsequent public interest litigation had not been raised

and considered in the earlier round of litigation.

109. The decision rendered by another Bench of two Judges of this Court in

Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks Ltd.

is also worth

consideration because it deals with a situation different from those considered

by this Court in the aforementioned decisions. It was held thus:

21. The Tribunal obviously failed to notice this distinction and proceeded to

apply the doctrine of merger rather mechanically. It failed to take into

consideration a situation where an order may be partly in favour and partly

against a party in which event the part that goes in favour of the party can be

separately assailed by them in appeal filed before the appellate court or

authority but dismissal on merits or otherwise of any such appeal against a part

only of the order will not foreclose the right of the party who is aggrieved by the

other part of this order. If the doctrine of merger were to be applied in a pedantic

or wooden manner it would lead to anomalous results inasmuch as a party who

has lost in part can by getting his appeal dismissed claim that the opposite party

who may be aggrieved by another part of the very same order cannot assail its

correctness no matter the appeal earlier disposed of by the court or authority

had not examined the correctness of that part of the order.

110. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that when an appeal is limited to a

specific part of the judgment and order of the first-instance court, the merger

occurs only to that extent, leaving the rest intact and available for future

consideration. The extent of merger is determined by the subject matter of the

(2010) 11 SCC 153

appeal. The merger can only operate on issues which were the subject-matter

of the appellate court’s judgment and order and cannot have any application

to issues which are not being taken on appeal by either party or which had not

been touched upon by the appellate court.

111. What happens in situations where an appeal is limited to a specific portion of

the judgment of the first-instance court or where the issues decided by the

court therein remain unaddressed in the appellate court's judgment: can it still

be asserted that the entire original judgment of the first-instance court ceases

to exist upon merging with the appellate court's judgment?

112. In S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N.

, a Bench of two Judges laid

down that it is only the operative part of an original judgment that merges in

the judgment of the appellate forum and not the whole of the judgment. The

relevant paragraph of the decision is extracted hereunder:

10. Firstly, the doctrine of merger. Though loosely an expression merger of

judgment, order or decision of a court or forum into the judgment, order or

decision of a superior forum is often employed, as a general rule the judgment

or order having been dealt with by a superior forum and having resulted in

confirmation, reversal or modification, what merges is the operative part i.e.

the mandate or decree issued by the court which may have been expressed in

a positive or negative form. For example, take a case where the subordinate

forum passes an order and the same, having been dealt with by a superior

forum, is confirmed for reasons different from the one assigned by the

subordinate forum, what would merge in the order of the superior forum is the

operative part of the order and not the reasoning of the subordinate forum;

otherwise there would be an apparent contradiction. However, in certain cases,

the reasons for decision can also be said to have merged in the order of the

superior court if the superior court has, while formulating its own judgment or

order, either adopted or reiterated the reasoning, or recorded an express

approval of the reasoning, incorporated in the judgment or order of the

subordinate forum.

(2002) 8 SCC 361

113. It is clear that what gets merged is the operative part of the original judgment

and order, not its entirety, unless the appellate court adopts, reiterates the

reasoning, or expressly approves the reasoning contained in the first-instance

court's judgment and order. Put differently, a 'declaration of law' by the

appellate court regarding the issues before the first -instance court is

necessary, which can only be inferred from a detailed, analytical order rather

than a mere dismissal seeking closure of the case without clear discussion or

analysis. Therefore, it becomes imperative to discern whether the appellate

court's judgment and order indeed 'declares' the law on the issues presented

before the first-instance court.

114. At the cost of repetition, we may note that placing heavy reliance on

Kunhayammed (supra) learned senior counsel for Reddy argued that the

impugned order of the High Court having merged with the decision in Reddy

Veerana (supra), the former ceases to exist, and it is the latter which subsists,

remains operative, and is capable of enforcement in the eye of the law.

115. Reverting to Kunhayammed (supra), we bear in mind what the coordinate

Bench expressed in paragraphs 12 and 44(iii) extracted supra. While

wholeheartedly concurring with the law laid down in Kunhayammed (supra),

we also notice that Kunhayammed (supra), on its own terms, has recognized

that the doctrine of merger has limited application; hence, the same decision

does carve out an exception requiring every matter coming before the courts,

where the point of merger is raised, to be decided on case-to-case basis.

116. There can be no doubt that a review petition before the court which passed

the decree/order would be barred by reason of application of the doctrine of

merger if despite dismissal of a civil appeal by this Court, be it by a reasoned

or an unreasoned order, the appellant chooses to approach the court (whose

decree/order was impugned) once again wi th a review petition. Notably, the

issue that has engaged our attention in this appeal did not arise for decision in

Kunhayammed (supra).

117. We preface our discussion on the next point by reiterating that a party to the

proceedings affected by a judgment/order may appeal as of right within the

prescribed period of limitation, if such a right is created by a statute. However,

insofar as a stranger, i.e., a non-party to the proceedings is concerned, if an

appeal from the judgment/order is allowed, he too can appeal provided a

leave/permission is granted by the appellate court. Law is well-settled that

much is not required to obtain leave/permission. If a stranger, dissatisfied with

a judgment/order, can make out even a prima facie case that he, being bound

by such judgment/order, is aggrieved by it or prejudicially affected by it, there

could arise little reason for declining leave/permission. We may usefully refer

to the decisions in Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd.

and State of Punjab v. Amar Singh

in this behalf. Precisely for this reason,

the two-Judge Bench (cor. Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta, JJ.) granted

permission to Vishnu to appeal against the impugned order.

(1970) 3 SCC 573

(1974) 2 SCC 70

118. Without reading and understanding the ratio laid down in Kunhayammed

(supra) in light of the issue that was decided by it and blindly placing reliance

on such ratio, as if it were a one-size-fits-all situations, could produce a result

which may not be what the interest of justice of a given case would demand.

A couple of situations can be conceived of where the principle of merger, as

enunciated and in the manner understood as well as applied, could bring about

undesirable and pernicious results.

119. One of the situations, akin to the present case, could be where the judgment

and order of a high court upon a challenge being laid before this Court is upheld

in the course of disposal of a civil appeal by way of its dismissal. As a result of

merger of the operative directions contained in the order of the high court in

the appellate order of this Court, it is such appellate order which would partake

the character of the only operative order. Now, if the order of the high court

prejudicially affects a third party or even has the effect of binding such party

but such party was deliberately not included in the array of respondents and,

in fact, it is proved that he was unaware of the proceedings before the high

court or this Court, the remedy of such affected party to appeal against the

order of the high court with the permission of this Court as and when he derives

knowledge of the same would not be available if the contention sought to be

raised on behalf of Reddy, based on the merger doctrine, is accepted. The

affected party would, thus, be disabled from applying for a review before the

High Court per Kunhayammed (supra), its order having merged in this

Court’s order. No doubt, remedy by way of review followed by a curative

petition is made available before this Court by the SC Rules, 2013 but the

same are not as wide as the remedy of appeal. Even in cases of such remedies,

the party approaching this Court cannot urge, as a matter of right, that he be

heard before an order is passed. The contention that Reddy has urged based

on the merger doctrine, if accepted, might lead to highly unjust and inequitable

consequences which, in cases, could be irreversible.

120. Let us consider another situation. This Court by enactments made by the

Parliament exercises appellate jurisdiction over orders passed by several

Tribunals. Suppose, one respondent in an original proceeding before a Tribunal

considers itself aggrieved by an order passed by it and carries it in an appeal

before this Court, which is dismissed by a Bench of two Judges in exercise of

appellate jurisdiction vide a reasoned order without notice to the respondents

on the first day it is listed. However, while such appeal was pending before this

Court, another respondent in the original proceeding before the Tribunal is also

desirous of carrying the same order in appeal but, for sufficient cause, is unable

to appeal readily. By the time such respondent upon completion of all

formalities presents its appeal and the same comes up for consideration before

a Bench of this Court, whatever be the strength of the Bench, the respondent

in the appeal being the successful applicant before the Tribunal and before this

Court too brings to its notice that the appeal presented first in point of time

has been listed and dismissed by a Bench of two Judges of this Court. Should

the appellant (in the appeal, which was filed later) be told off at the gates on

the sole ground that the order under appeal has ceased to be the operative

order, having merged with the appellate order of this Court? If the situation

unfolds to be such where the Bench of greater strength is inclined to admit the

appeal disagreeing with the view of the Bench of two Judges, can it be said

that the said Bench would be disabled from exercising their appellate

jurisdiction since, per the doctrine of merger, the order under appeal does not

exist? The answers to the aforesaid questions, in our considered opinion,

cannot but be in the negative. A right of hearing that accompanies every

proceeding decided publicly, unless such hearing is barred, cannot be cast

aside for no better reason than that of a merger having occurred.

121. There is one other exception to the doctrine of merger. Nowadays, it is not a

rarity to find that petitions involving similar, though not identical, issues are

clubbed together and disposed of by a common judgment and order. If such a

judgment and order is unsuccessfully challenged before a superior court by

one of the petitioners to the proceedings, and such a challenge fails, the

doctrine of merger may not apply when another set of petitioners challenges

the same (common) judgement and order; if the second set of petitioners are

able to demonstrate that the case run by them is not identical (though bearing

resemblance) with the proceedings already decided, it would still be open for

the superior court to entertain the challenge and rule in a manner different

from the earlier proceedings.

122. Thus, the application of the doctrine of merger, in every case, should be

accompanied by an awareness of its limitations and should not be wielded to

close avenues for addressing genuine concerns. Prioritizing justice and fairness

should supersede an absolute insi stence on finality. While the latter is

commendable, the former is superior. These doctrines, even though are

grounded in sound and justifiable public policy arguments, yet, do not limit the

powers of the courts in cases where larger public interest is at stake. They

have been adapted to accommodate exceptions and qualifications, leaving

room for acknowledging special circumstances, particularly in matters of public

significance.

123. On a conspectus of the authorities, we are inclined to the view that the doctrine

of merger may not have any application in all cases of cognate civil appeals

being carried from the same order (obviously at the instance of a party

different from the appellant who approached this Court first in point of time),

if it is convincingly demonstrated that (i) his right of appeal should not be

foreclosed because of the very rare or special circumstance(s) that is/are

projected before the court; or (ii) his appeal raises an issue of seminal public

importance, which was not available to be raised by the appellant who

approached this Court in its appellate jurisdiction in the earlier round of

litigation, and also that such issue in the greater public interest requires a

resolution by this Court; or (iii) since an act of court ought to prejudice none,

refusal to interfere by this Court would invariably result in offending the

principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit ; or (iv) the earlier appellate

decision is vitiated because of fraud having been practiced on this Court by a

party in whose favour the ruling had been made, as in this case; or (v) that

public interest would be put to extreme jeopardy by reason of irretrievable

consequences ensuing, if interference which is otherwise found to be

warranted in law were declined solely based on the doctrine of merger.

124. Having noted that fraud is an exception to the doctrine of merger and

considering that the impugned order of the High Court and the decision of this

Court in Reddy Veerana (supra) have been found by us to be vitiated by

fraud, the argument by learned senior counsel for Reddy as regards the non-

maintainability of the present proceedings based on the merger doctrine is of

no significance.

PROCEDURE, IF AN IMPEDIMENT TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION

125. Procedural law is a sentinel of non-arbitrariness; it not only provides a

safeguard against the individual vagaries of a judge but also establishes a

structured framework for litigants to approach the legal system for redressal

of their issues. However, procedural law cannot foresee all situations that may

arise. Procedure must facilitate justice, not detract from it. In special cases,

the letter of procedural law must yield to the ends of justice. Courts are, of

course, duty-bound to apply procedural law in its entirety, save where such

application would result in manifest absurdity.

126. The contention advanced by learned senior counsel for Reddy is that the

procedure undertaken by the Registry and the Division Bench of this Court

violates the SC Rules, 2013. We are in complete disagreement with such a

proposition since the provisions of the SC Rules, 2013, highlighted by learned

senior counsel for Reddy, are applicable in the course of normal action. Once

fraud, on the face of the record, is proved, the procedural law laid down by

the SC Rules, 2013 must support the actualisation of justice, not the continued

perpetuation of wrongs. We quite agree with the contention of learned senior

counsel for Vishnu that Order LV, Rule 6 of the SC Rules, 2013 specifically

recognises the inherent powers of this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction to

secure justice. When the Court has been the victim of fraud, it’s hands cannot

be tied down by procedural laws in a manner to defeat the interests and rights

of other parties.

127. In the case of State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari

, this Court with reference

to Rule 3 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules and Orders, Vol. 5,

Chap. 1-A held:

8. …This omission or default is only a breach which can be characterised as an

irregularity to be corrected by condonation on application by the party fulfilling

the condition within a time allowed by the court. We must always remember

that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but

an aid to justice. It has been wisely observed that procedural prescriptions are

the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the

administration of justice. Where the non-compliance, tho' procedural, will

thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing of justice to parties, the rule is mandatory.

But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just

disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a

dominant desideratum. After all, courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end

product on technicalities. Viewed in this perspective, even what is regarded as

mandatory traditionally may, perhaps, have to be moderated into wholesome

directions to be complied with in time or in extended time… .

128. In M.V. “Vali Pero” v. Fernandeo Lopez

, this Court in a case regarding

Rule 4 of Chapter XXII of the Calcutta High Court Rules, 1914, as applicable

to the Original Side, held that:

18. Rules of procedure are not by themselves an end but the means to achieve

the ends of justice. Rules of procedure are tools forged to achieve justice and

are not hurdles to obstruct the pathway to justice. Construction of a rule of

procedure which promotes justice and prevents its miscarriage by enabling the

court to do justice in myriad situations, all of which cannot be envisaged, acting

within the limits of the permissible construction, must be preferred to that which

is rigid and negatives the cause of justice. The reason is obvious. Procedure is

meant to subserve and not rule the cause of justice. Where the outcome and

fairness of the procedure adopted is not doubted and the essentials of the

prescribed procedure have been followed, there is no reason t o discard the

result simply because certain details which have not prejudicially affected the

result have been inadvertently omitted in a particular case. In our view, this

appears to be the pragmatic approach which needs to be adopted while

construing a purely procedural provision. Otherwise, rules of procedure will

become the mistress instead of remaining the handmaid of justice, contrary to

the role attributed to it in our legal system.

(1976) 1 SCC 719

(1989) 4 SCC 671

129. We have no hesitation to hold that a similar interpretation can be applied to

the SC Rules, 2013.

130. The contention of Reddy under consideration can also be dealt with by applying

the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. No act of Court should harm a

party being the foremost principle in the mind of any Court, it would be a

travesty of justice if such court, feeling bound by the shackles of technicalities,

were to decline interference to set things right despite arriving at a definitive

conclusion of being tricked by fraud; and, it is a fallacy to urge such a

contention before the Supreme Court, which has vast and pervasive powers

to remedy any wrong that might have occasioned to a litigant owing to sharp

and fraudulent practices of another litigant, more particularly in a case of

proven fraud.

131. This contention of Reddy, therefore, must fail owing to our satisfaction of the

impugned order and the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) having been

vitiated by fraud.

C. VISHNU PURSUING THE CIVIL APPEAL AS WELL AS THE REVIEW PETITION AND

APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION /RECALL, SIMULTANEOUSLY

132. That Vishnu has spared no effort to explore every option has been noticed by

us above.

133. An appeal against a decree or order, passed or made by an inferior court,

before a superior court and a review of the same decree/order before the court

which passed/made it cannot simultaneously be pursued by the same party.

The logic behind it is that there cannot be a parallel challenge to the same

decree or order by the same party before two different fora – that is, in the

courts of appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction. On the very terms of

Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC, such a course of action is not

permissible.

134. However, there is an absence of a two-pronged assail in two different

proceedings by Vishnu to the same decree or order: whereas the civil appeal

is directed against the impugned order, a petition has subsequently been filed

by Vishnu for review of the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) [which had

the occasion to modify the impugned order]. Therefore, neither Section 114

nor Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC would create a legal bar for entertaining the two

proceedings [appeal and review] that have been initiated by Vishnu.

135. Nevertheless, it does seem to us to be a well thought out endeavour on the

part of Vishnu to file the petition for review even after he had carried the

impugned order in an independent appeal before this Court. Uncertainty was

looming large and Vishnu, not content to rest on his oars by simply appealing

to the conscience of this Court, also sought a review to remedy the wrong

caused to him by Reddy. If indeed the appeal against the impugned order were

to fail on the ground that the same had merged in the decision in Reddy

Veerana (supra), as argued by Reddy, or even if the same appeal were to

succeed and the impugned order set aside, Vishnu would have very little to

salvage since the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) would still hold the field.

Filing of the review by Vishnu, thus, appears to have been intended to ensure

that he is either not non-suited or that even after achieving success in appeal,

he is not left in the lurch. However, we are of the considered opinion that even

if Vishnu had not applied for a review - as a logical corollary of the aforesaid

discussions - the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) too having been

obtained by Reddy by playing fraud, has to be erased from the records being

a nullity.

136. Turning to the order under appeal declining registration of the petition for

review, which has been directed to be tagged with these proceedings and also

requires simultaneous disposal, we find that the petition was marked as

defective. The grounds based whereon the Registrar declined registration have

been perused.

137. The occasion has now arisen for considering the grounds urged in support of

the appeal against the Registrar’s order . Apart from an objection that

appropriate quantum of court fees has not been deposited, which Vishnu has

disputed, the Registrar noted certain technical defects concerning array of

parties and the like. The same are certainly curable defects. We, therefore,

find it necessary to allow the appeal by requiring the Registry to notify the

additional quantum of court fees payable by Vishnu, which has not been

notified to him, as well as grant liberty to Vishnu to cure the other technical

defects within a fortnight from this date. It is only upon curing of such defects

that the petition for review shall be treated to be in order.

138. As already discussed above, due to fraud having been played by Reddy, the

doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned order is open to

interference notwithstanding the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana

(supra). For reasons already discussed, the civil appeal has to be allowed and

the impugned order set aside.

139. As a logical corollary of the impugned order being set aside, it would follow

that the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra), upholding the same,

which too was obtained by playing fraud, will also be a nullity, and thus stand

recalled in exercise of our inherent powers.

140. Furthermore, based on the aforesaid discussion, we are also inclined to allow

the application (MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022 ) for

recall of the order dated 30

January, 2023 whereby this Court directed Vishnu

to approach the court under Section 30 of the 1894 Act for appropriate relief.

D. FORUM SHOPPING

141. The contention that Vishnu has engaged in forum shopping is premised on the

fact that he instituted Civil Suit No. 471/2020 on 7

August, 2020 before the

trial court claiming that the compromise decree dated 17

November, 2006

was null and void and, therefore, it is contended that the present proceedings

are instituted to bypass the jurisdiction of the trial court.

142. This contention has been urged to be rejected. When the High Court has

already ruled in a proceeding that directly affects Vishnu’s right and when such

decision, on appeal, is replaced by the decision of the higher court in Reddy

Veerana (supra), Vishnu invariably was left with no other option but to

approach this Court by way of these proceedings. After the decision in Reddy

Veerana (supra), it is obvious that no court, far less the trial court, would

venture to make any order having the effect of upsetting what this Court had

directed rendering Vishnu’s endeavour to approach any other court useless

before first attempting to have the order operating against him in Reddy

Veerana (supra) vacated/recalled.

143. Pertinently, we wish to point out that considering the long-standing set of

disputes between the trio, it would have been appropriate if the High Court

were urged to implead those third parties whose rights could specifically be

affected. However, the High Court proceeded unaware of the fact that there

was one other party (read Vishnu) who was claiming joint ownership and had

even instituted a suit to have the decree obtained by Reddy declared void.

Now, in view of the order that we propose to pass, we hope and trust that all

the necessary parties would be brought on record and extended the

opportunity to place their respective versions to facilitate an appropriate

decision to be rendered to terminate the present lis by a just and proper

redetermination of the compensation payable to the rightful claimant(s).

CONCLUSION

144. In the wake of the unbecoming conduct of the trio, we do not feel bound by

the nature of relief claimed by Vishnu. We, therefore, consider it appropriate

to order/direct as under:

i. the impugned order of the High Court dated 28

October, 2021 passed in

WP (Civil) 2272/2019 [Reddy Veeranna v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors.]

stands set aside, since fraud has vitiated the entire proceedings;

ii. as a corollary to the above, the judgment and order dated 5

May, 2022

in Reddy Veerana (supra) (which too was obtained by playing fraud) is

declared to be a nullity and stands recalled in exercise of our inherent

powers;

iii. the order dated 30

January, 2023 passed by this Court in MA 255/2023

in C.A. No. 3636/2022 is recalled, also in exercise of our inherent powers;

iv. WP (Civil) 2272/2019 [Reddy Veeranna v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors.] is

remanded in its entirety to the High Court;

v. as a consequence of (iv) supra, WP (Civil) 2272/2019 will stand revived

and restored on the file of the High Court with direction to implead Vishnu

Vardhan and T. Sudhakar as additional respondents;

vi. WP (Civil) 2272/2019 will be decided afresh by the High Court in

accordance with law, upon hearing all interested parties;

vii. should any disputed question of fact arise for decision disabling it to decide

the same based on affidavit evidence, the High Court may in its discretion

permit the parties to lead oral and documentary evidence regarding the

claim for compensation as well as re-determination and apportionment

thereof amongst the rightful claimants, as if it were exercising powers

under Section 54 of the 1894 Act.

viii. till such time a decision is given by the High Court, the interim order dated

January 2025, whereby we allowed Reddy to furnish securities through

his partnership firm Manyata-Pristine instead of cash deposit, shall

continue meaning thereby that the securities furnished by him in the form

of title deeds of immovable properties shall remain deposited with this

Court and shall be subject to and abide by further orders of the High Court;

ix. however, the interim order dated 3

October, 2024 restraining Reddy from

entering into any agreement to sell and/or to create third party rights in

respect of the immovable assets owned by him (except those for which

security has been furnished), his family and the companies created by him

or his family members shall remain in abeyance subject to his cooperating

with the High Court for early disposal of the writ petition;

x. in the event of non-cooperation from the side of Reddy, the High Court

may pass such restraining order as it may deem fit and proper.

xi. having regard to the magnitude of fraud which we have detected in course

of consideration of these proceedings, we find it just and proper to request

the Chief Justice of the High Court to preside over the Division Bench for

finally deciding the writ petition as early as possible, and subject to the

convenience of the Bench, preferably by the year end;

xii. all questions on merits, other than those decided vide this judgment,

including re-determination of fair and just compensation for the acquired

land and apportionment thereof, are kept open for being urged before the

High Court;

xiii. having regard to the track record of the trio, the possibility of a compromise

cannot be totally ruled out and if they file terms of settlement, we hope

and trust that the High Court will carefully examine such terms to ensure

that public interest is not hindered in its acceptance; and

xiv. pending suits/proceedings, if any before any judicial fora / administrative

authority, shall be taken to its logical conclusion in accordance with law.

145. The civil appeal (CA 7777 of 2023), the appeal against the order of the

Registrar (MA Diary No. 6013/2024 in Review Petition Diary No. 33040/ 2023),

and the application for recall of the order dated 30

January, 2023 (MA

1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/ 2022) are allowed and shall

stand disposed of on the above terms together with all other connected

applications. The writ petition [WP (C) 673 of 2023] is, however, dismissed.

146. As indicated in paragraph 137, Vishnu shall be at liberty to cure the defects

upon due communication of the additional court fees to be put in by him for

making the petition for review in order. Thereafter, the petition for review (Dy.

No. 33040/2023) shall be registered, appropriately numbered, and shown to

have been disposed of by this order. Should Vishnu fail to cure the defects,

the petition shall stand dismissed as infructuous.

147. SMC (C) No. 3/2024 will be heard separately.

148. In view of the remand ordered by us, we observe that the parties shall bear

their own costs.

………………………………J

(SURYA KANT )

………………………………J

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

………………………………J

(UJJAL BHUYAN )

NEW DELHI;

JULY 23, 2025.

Reference cases

Description

Unraveling Deception: Supreme Court’s Stern Stance on Fraud in Vishnu Vardhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

In a landmark judgment that reiterates the age-old legal maxim “fraud unravels everything,” the Supreme Court of India has delivered a pivotal decision in the case of *Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.* This ruling underscores the judiciary's unwavering commitment to upholding justice, particularly in complex judicial fraud cases that directly impact property dispute resolution. As highlighted on CaseOn, this case serves as a critical precedent for legal professionals, demonstrating the Supreme Court’s proactive approach in rectifying judicial orders obtained through deceit and misrepresentation.

Issue: Can Fraudulent Orders Be Undone, and How?

The core of this intricate legal battle revolved around several critical questions:

Could orders obtained through fraud and deception by one party, Reddy, be set aside or recalled, including a High Court order and an earlier Supreme Court decision that had seemingly validated Reddy's sole ownership of a disputed land?
Was the writ petition filed by Vishnu maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution, given the nature of his claims?
Did the doctrine of merger apply to the High Court's order (which was affirmed by the Supreme Court), thereby rendering Vishnu's civil appeal non-maintainable?
Was Vishnu engaging in “forum shopping” by pursuing multiple legal avenues simultaneously?

Rule: The Enduring Principles of Justice Against Fraud

The Supreme Court invoked several fundamental legal principles to address these issues:

“Fraud unravels everything” (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant): This maxim asserts that any judgment, decree, or order obtained by fraud is a nullity and non-existent in the eyes of the law. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, even in collateral proceedings.
Suppression of Material Facts: Deliberate concealment of crucial information by a litigant, especially before writ courts, can vitiate the entire proceeding and any order obtained.
Doctrine of Merger: While a superior court’s decision usually absorbs and replaces the lower court's order, this doctrine has exceptions. Fraud is a significant exception, meaning a judgment tainted by fraud does not merge and can be revisited.
Maintainability of Article 32 Writ Petitions: For a writ petition under Article 32 to be entertained, it must establish a prima facie violation or imminent threat of a Fundamental Right. Mere allegations of legal rights infringement are insufficient.
Procedural Law as an Aid to Justice: Procedural rules are meant to facilitate justice, not obstruct it. In cases of proven fraud, procedural technicalities must yield to the overarching goal of achieving substantive justice. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of court shall prejudice no one) reinforces this.

Analysis: The Court's Scrutiny of a Deceptive Property Saga

The Tangled Web of Deception: Has Reddy Played Fraud on the Courts?

The Court meticulously examined the factual matrix, which revealed a consistent pattern of fraudulent conduct by Reddy. Initially, Vishnu, Reddy, and Sudhakar – referred to as ‘the trio’ – jointly purchased land in Gautam Budh Nagar and presented a united front in legal proceedings, asserting co-ownership against NOIDA. However, Reddy subsequently engaged in a series of deceptive acts to claim sole ownership.

Key instances of Reddy's fraudulent conduct included:

Dubious Second Suit: In 2001, Sudhakar sued Reddy for his 1/3rd share. Reddy filed a written statement and a compromise agreement the very next day, asserting sole ownership. The trial court, suspicious of the unusual speed, rejected the compromise, noting its questionable bona fides. Vishnu, a co-owner, was not even made a party.
Fraudulent Third Suit and Canceled PoA: In 2006, Reddy sued Vishnu to declare himself the sole owner. Crucially, Vishnu’s Power of Attorney (PoA) holder, Venkataramana, filed a written statement admitting Reddy's claim. Records later revealed that Vishnu had canceled this PoA in December 2005, a full six months before the suit was instituted. Furthermore, Venkataramana was discovered to be Reddy's partner in the firm Manyata-Pristine, which later offered securities to the Supreme Court.
Suppression of Material Facts: Reddy used the fraudulent compromise decree from the Third Suit to have Vishnu's name deleted from land records. More significantly, when Reddy filed a writ petition in the High Court in 2019 (leading to the impugned order), he asserted sole ownership and failed to implead Vishnu and Sudhakar. He also deliberately suppressed the pendency of a suit filed by Vishnu in 2020 (Civil Suit No. 471/2020) which challenged the very compromise decree Reddy was relying upon. This suppression continued even during proceedings before the Supreme Court in *Reddy Veerana* (2022).

The Court found Reddy's actions to be a “calculated attempt to wrongfully appropriate the entire property keeping the other two – Vishnu and Sudhakar – in the dark,” concluding that “judicial orders procured by Reddy by subverting the judicial process through fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand.”

Navigating Legal Pathways: Maintainability of Petitions

This case, steeped in complex legal maneuvers, truly puts into perspective the multi-faceted roles legal professionals play. Understanding such rulings requires not just reading but deep analysis. For those in law, getting a quick yet comprehensive understanding of these detailed legal battles is vital. CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs provide an invaluable resource, allowing legal professionals to swiftly grasp the core facts, legal arguments, and the nuanced reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decisions in cases like *Vishnu Vardhan*, making it easier to analyze specific rulings and stay informed.

The Writ Petition (Article 32): Lack of Fundamental Rights Violation

The Supreme Court dismissed Vishnu’s writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. It clarified that while Vishnu's property rights were in jeopardy (potentially violating Article 300-A), his pleadings did not adequately demonstrate a direct infringement of his fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), or 21. The Court emphasized that for an Article 32 petition to be maintainable, a “prima facie violation or imminent threat of violation of any Fundamental Right” must be established, which Vishnu failed to do, especially since other remedies were available and being pursued.

The Civil Appeal and the Doctrine of Merger: Fraud as an Exception

Reddy contended that Vishnu’s civil appeal against the High Court's impugned order was non-maintainable because that order had “merged” with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in *Reddy Veerana* (5th May 2022). The Court thoroughly analyzed the doctrine of merger, noting that it is not of “universal or unlimited application.”

Crucially, the Court held that fraud constitutes an exception to the doctrine of merger. Since Reddy had procured both the High Court’s impugned order and the Supreme Court’s *Reddy Veerana* decision by playing fraud, these orders were found to be “tainted by fraud and, thus, lack legal sanctity and validity.” Therefore, the doctrine of merger did not apply, leaving the impugned order open to interference.

The Court also rejected Reddy’s “intra-court appeal” argument, explaining that the reference to a larger bench was necessary to determine if fraud had been played on the Supreme Court itself, without “sitting in ‘appeal’ on any point of law/fact.”

Simultaneous Proceedings and Forum Shopping: Justice Over Technicalities

Reddy accused Vishnu of “forum shopping” for pursuing a civil appeal, a review petition, and an application for modification/recall simultaneously. The Court acknowledged that normally, an appeal and a review for the same order cannot be pursued by the same party. However, considering the unique circumstances – particularly the looming uncertainty and the need to remedy the wrong caused by Reddy's fraud – Vishnu’s multiple filings were deemed a necessary endeavor to ensure justice, not an attempt to bypass jurisdiction. The Court affirmed its inherent powers under Order LV, Rule 6 of the SC Rules, 2013, to prevent abuse of process and secure justice, especially when the Court itself has been a victim of fraud.

Conclusion: A Resounding Victory Against Deception

The Supreme Court concluded that the pervasive fraud committed by Reddy vitiated the entire proceedings. Consequently, it passed the following orders and directions:

The High Court’s impugned order dated 28th October, 2021, in WP (Civil) 2272/2019, is set aside.
As a corollary, the Supreme Court’s judgment and order dated 5th May, 2022, in *Reddy Veerana* (which was also obtained by fraud), is declared a nullity and recalled.
The order dated 30th January, 2023, by the Supreme Court in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022, is recalled.
WP (Civil) 2272/2019 is remanded to the High Court for fresh decision, with directions to implead Vishnu Vardhan and T. Sudhakar as additional respondents.
The High Court may permit parties to lead oral and documentary evidence for re-determination and apportionment of compensation.
The interim orders regarding Reddy’s securities (furnished through Manyata-Pristine) and the restraint on creating third-party rights on his immovable assets will continue, subject to further orders from the High Court.
The Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to preside over the Division Bench for an early decision on the remanded writ petition.
Vishnu is granted liberty to cure the defects in his review petition (Diary No. 33040/2023).
All other questions on merits, and pending suits/proceedings, are kept open.

Why This Judgment is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

This judgment serves as a profound reminder of the judiciary's role as a guardian of justice. For lawyers, it highlights the critical importance of client due diligence, ethical representation, and full disclosure. It also demonstrates the expansive and inherent powers of the Supreme Court to correct egregious errors or injustices caused by fraud, even when it means revisiting its own previous decisions. For law students, it is an excellent case study on the application of fundamental legal principles like “fraud unravels everything,” the nuanced exceptions to the doctrine of merger, and the balance between procedural strictness and substantive justice in complex litigation. It underscores that justice cannot be thwarted by cunning deception or procedural technicalities, especially when public interest and judicial integrity are at stake.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for specific legal guidance based on their individual circumstances. The content should not be used as a substitute for professional legal advice.

Legal Notes

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