No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 961
V. V. R. N. M. SUBBAYYA CHETTIAR
V.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME.TAX, MADRAS.
[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 4A (b)-Hindu undivided
family-Residence-Tests--Occasional visits
to India and attending
to family affairs there, effect
of-B,wden of proof-" Control and
management",'' situated", "wholly" and
11
affairs", meanings of.
The words used in s. 4A (b) show: (i) that, normally a Hindu
undivided family will be taken to be resident in the taxable terri
torieE1, but such a. presumption will not apply if the case can be
brought under the second part of the provision, (ii) the word
11
affairs " means affairs which are .relevant for the purpose of the
Income-tax Act and which have some relation to income, (iii) the
question whether the case falls within the exception depends on
whether the seat of the direction and control of the affairs of the
family is inside or outside British India, and (iv) the onus of
proving facts which would bring his case within the exception
which
is provided by the latter p.rt is on the assessee.
The expression "control and management" ins. 4A (b) ol the
Income-tax Act signifies the controlling and directive power, the
"head and brain" as it is sometimes called;
11
situated" implies
the functioning of such power at a particular place with some
degree of permanence; and ''wholly" seems to recognise the
possibility ol the seat of such power being divided between two
distinct a.ad separate places and thn.t a Hindu undivided family
may have more than one residence
in the same way as a
corpora
tion may have.
The karta of a Hindu undivided family lived with bis wife and
children and ca,rried on business in Ceylon, which bad become
their place of domicile. He owned some immoveable property
and bad a house. anil investments in British
India. In the year of
account be visited British India and stayed there for periods
amounting
in all to
101 days and during his stay started two firms
in British India, personally attended to a litigation relating to tbe
family lands, and appeared before the Income-tax 1rnthorities in
proceedings relating to assessment
of the. income of the family:
Held, that these facts were not necessarily conclusive to
establish tbe
existence of a centre of control and management of
the affairs of the family in British India, but they were by no
ineans irrelevant to the matter in issue, and inasmuch as the
assessee had not discharged the onus which lay upon him under
the law by producing all' the material evidence which be was
p&lled upon to produce to show that norms.11¥ and s.s a matter of
l l3
1960
Dec, 21.
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1950]
1950 course the affairs in India were also being controlled from
Colombo,
the normal presumption under the
firot part of s. 4 A (b)
V. V. R. N. M. must be given effect to and the assessee must be treateil as a
SubQayya resident in British India during the year in question. It was
Gh~ttiar however open to the assessee to prove in future years by proper
v. evidence that the seat of control and managerr1ent of the affairs
Oommissiontir of of the fau1ily wa.s wholly out.side British InUia.
Income·ta•, De.Beere V· Howe 15 Tax Oas. 198), Swedish Central Railway
Madra•. Co. Ltd. v. Thompson (9.Tax Oas. 373) l'eferred to.
APPELLATE jURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
XXXVIII of 1949.
Appeal from a
Judgmept of the High
Court of Judi
cature at Madras (Gentle C. J. and Patanjali Sastri J.)
dated August 22, 1947, in a reference under section
66
(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act made by the
Income.tax Appellate
Tribunal (Ref. No. 25 of 1946).
K. Rajah Aiyar (K. Srinivasan, with him) for the
appellant.
M. C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi, with him) for the res.
pondent.
1950: December 21. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Fa•! A!i J. FAZL ALI J. -This is an appeal from a judgment of
the
High
Court of Judicature at Madras on a reference
made to
it under section 66 (1) of the Indian
Income
tax Act by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in
connection
with the assessment of the appellant to
income-tax for the year 1942-43. The question of law
referred to
the High
Court was as follows:-
" Whether in the circumstances of the case, the
assessee
(a Hindu undivided family) is 'resident' in
British India under section 4A (b) of the Income-tax Act."
The circumstances of the case may be briefly stated
as follows. The appellant is the karta of a joint Hindu
family and has been living in Ceylon with his wife,
son
and three daughters, and they are stated to be
domiciled in
that country. He carries on business in
Colombo under the name ano style of the General
Trading Corporation, and he owns a house, some im
moveable property and investments in British India.
.-
2J
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 963
He has also shares in two firms situated at Vijaya-1950
puram and Nagapatnam in British India. In the year
of account, 1941-42, which is the basis of the present v.;;,::;Y:~ M.
assessment, the appellant is said to have visited Oh•ttiar
British India on seven occasions and the total period v.
of his stay in British India was 101 days. What he Commissioner of
did during this period is summarized in the judgment Incom•·tax,
of one of the ]earned Judges of the High Court in Madras.
these words : - Fazl Ali J.
" During such stays, he personally attended to a
litigation relating to the family lands both in the trial
Court and in the Court of appeal. He was also attending
the income tax proceedings relating to the assessment
of the family income, appearing before the income.
tax
authorities at Karaikudi and Madras.
On one of these
occasions, he obtained
an extension of time for
pay
ment of the tax after interviewing the authority
concerned ....... "
The other facts relied upon by the income-tax
authorities
were that he did not produce the file of
correspondence with the business in
Colombo so as to
help them
in determining whether the management
and control of the business was situated in
Colombo
and he had started two partnership businesses in India
on 25th February, 1942,
and remained in India for some
time after the commencement
of those businesses.
Upon the facts so stated, the Income-tax Officer and
the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax held that
the appellant was a resident within the meaning of
section
4A (b) of the Income-tax Act, and was therefore
liable to
be assessed in respect of his foreign income.
The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal however came to a
different conclusion
and held that in the circumstances
·
of the case it could not be held that any act of manage
ment or control was exercised by the appellant during
his stay in British
India and therefore he was not
liable to assessment in respect
of his income outside
British India. This view was not accepted
by a Bench
of the Madras High
Court consisting of the learned
Chief Justice and Patanjali Sastri]. They held that
the Tribunal had misdirected itself in determining the
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
1950 question of the " residence" of the appellant's family
and that on the facts proved the control and manage-
v. ;~b~~Y~~ M. ment of the affairs of the family cannot be held to have
Ghettiar been wholly situated outside British India, with the
v. result that the family must be deemed to be resident
Commissioner of in British India within the meaning of section 4A (b)
Income-ta•, of the Income-tax Act. In this appeal, the appellant
Ma.dra" has questioned the correctness of the High Court's
Fa•I Ali J. decision :-
Section 4A (b) runs thus:
"For the purposes of this Act-
A Hindu undivided family, firm or other association
of persons is resident in British India unless the control
and management of its affairs is situated wholly without
British India."
It will be noticed that section 4A deals with
" residence ", in the taxable territories, of (a) indi
viduals, (b) a Hindu undivided family, firm or other
association
of persons, and (c) a company. In each of
these cases, certain tests have been laid down,
and the
test with which we are concerned is that laid down in
section 4A (b
). This provision appears to be based
very largely on the rule which
has been applied in
England to cases of corporations, in regard to which
the law was stated thus by Lord Loreburn in De Beers
v.
Howe(').
"A company cannot eat or sleep, but it can keep
house
and do business. We ought, therefore, to see
where
it really keeps house and does business ...... The
decision
of
Chief Baron Kelly and Baron Huddleston
in The Calcutta jute Mills v. Nicholson and The Cesena
Sulphur Company v. Nicholson('), now thirty years •
ago, involved the principle that a company resides for
purposes
of income-tax where its real business is carried· on. Those decisions have been acted upon ever
since. I regard
that as the true rule, and the real
business is carried on where the
central management
and control actually
abideS"."
It is clear that what is said in section 4A (b) of the
Income-tax Act is what Lord Loreburn intended to
(1) 5 Tax C••· 198. (2; (18761 1 Ex. D. 428,
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 965
convey by the words " where the central management !950
and control actually abides."
. h" ~~&~•
The principles w ich are now well-established in subbayya
England and which will be found to have been very Ohettiar
clearly enunciated in Swedish Central Railway Com- v.
pany Limited v. Thompson(
1
), which is one of the Commissioner of
1 d
· th b · t Income-tax
ea mg cases on e su 1ec , are:-Madra•.'
(1) that the conception of residence in the case of a
fictitious "person ", such as a company, is as artificial Farl Ali J.
as the company itself, and the locality of the residence
can only be determined by analogy,
by asking where
is
the head and seat and directing power of the affairs
of. the company. What these words mean have been
explained
by Patanjali
Sastri J. with very great clarity
in the following passage where he deals with the
meaning of section
4A (b) of the Income-tax Act:-
"Control and management " signifies, in the present
context, the controlling
and directive power,
"the head
and brain" as it is sometimes called, and "situated"
implies the functioning of such power at a particular
place with some degree of permanence, while "wholly"
would seem to recognize the possibility of the seat of
such power being divided between two distinct and
separated places."
As a general rule, the control and management of a
business remains in the hand
of a person or a group of
persons, and the question to be asked is wherefrom
the person or group
of persons controls or directs the
business.
(2) Mere activity by the company in a place does
not create residence, with the result that a company
may be
"residing" in one place and doing a great deal
of business in another.
(3) The central management and control of a com
pany may be divided, and
it may keep house and do
business in more than one place, and, if so, it
may
have more than one residence.
(4) In case of dual residence, it is necessary to show
that the company performs some of the vital organic
Ill 9 T•x Oas. R73.
•
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1950]
1950 functions incidental to its existence as such in both
the places, so
that in fact there are two centres of
V.~R.N M. t
Subbayya managemen .
Ghettiar It appears to us that these principles have to be
v. kept in view in properly construing section 4A(b) of
Gommi,,fon.r afthe Act. The words used in this provision clearly
Income.ta~. show firstly, that, normally, a Hindu undivided family
Madras. will be taken to be resident in the taxable territories,
Fa•t Ali J. but such a presumption will not apply if the case can
be
brought under the second part cf the provision.
Secondly,
we take
it that the word " affairs " must
mean affairs which are relevant for the purpose
of the
Income-tax Act
and which have some relation to
income. Thirdly, in order to bring
the case under the
exception, we have to ask whether
the seat of the
direction
and control of the affairs of the family is
inside or outside British
India. Lastly, the word
" wholly " suggests that a Hindu undivided family
may have more than one "residence" in the same
way as a corporation may have.
The question which now arises is what is
the result
of the application of these principles to this case, and
whether it can be held that the central control and
management of the affairs.of the assessee's family has
been shown to be divided in
this case.
It seems to us that the mere fact that the assessee
has a house
at Kanadukathan, where his mother lives,
cannot constitute
that place the seat of control and
management of the affairs of the family. Nor are we
inclined in the circumstances of the present case to
attach much importance to the fact that the assessee
had to stay in British India for
101 days in a parti
cular year. He was undoubtedly interested in
the
litigation with regard to his family property as well as
in
the income-tax proceedings, and by merely coming
out to
India to take part in them, he cannot be said to
have shifted the seat of management and control of the
affairs of his family, or to have
started a second centre
for
such control
arid management. The same remark
must apply to the starting of two partnership busines
ses, as mere" activity " cannot be the test of residence.
-
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 967
It seems to us that the learned Judges of the High 1950
Court have taken rather a narrow view of the meaning
of section 4A(b). because they seem to have proceeded v. v. R. N. M.
. Subbavya
on the assumption that merely because the assessee Chsttiar
attended to some of the affairs of his family during his v.
visit to British India in the part!cular year, he brought Oommissw•er of
himself within the ambit of the rule. On the other · focoms-tax,
hand, it seems to us that the more correct approach to Madras.
the case was made by the Appellate Assistant Com- Faz! Ali J.
missioner of Income-tax in the following passage which
occurs in his order dated the 24th February, 1944
:-" During a major portion of the accounting period
(year ending 12th April, 1942) the appellant was con
trolling the businesses in Burma and Saigon and there
is no evidence that such control was exercised only from
Colombo. No correspondence or other evidence was
produced which would show
that any instructions were
issued from
Colombo as regards the management of the
affairs in British
India especially as it was an
un
authorized clerk who was looking after such affairs.
The presumption therefore
is that whenever he came to
British India the appellant was looking after these
affairs himself and exercising control by issuing instruc-
tions
............... It has been admitted that there are
affairs of the family in British India. Has
it been
definitely established in this
case that the control and
management of such affairs has been only in Colombo?
I have to hold it has not been established for the
reasons already ~tated by me."
There can be no doubt that the onus of proving facts
which would bring his case within the exception, which
is provided by the latter part of section 4A (b), was on
the assessee. The appellant was called upon to adduce
evidence to show
that the control and management of the affairs of the family was situated wholly outside
the taxable territories,
but the correspondence to which
the Assistant
Commissioner of Income-tax refers and
other material evidence which might have shown
that
normally and as a matter of course the affairs in India
were also being controlled from
Colombo were not pro
duced. The position therefore is this. On the one
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
1950 hand, we have the fact that the head and karta of the
assessee's family who controls
and manages its affairs
v. v. R. N. M. permanently lives in
Colombo and the family is domi-.
Subbayya .
Oh•ttiar ciled in Cey Ion. On the other hand, we have cert am
v. acts done by the karta himself in British India, which,
Oommisaioner o[though not conclusive by themselves to establish the ·
In"me-ta>, existence of more than one centre of control for the
Madras. affairs of the family~ are by no means irrelevant to the
Faz! Ali J. matter in issue and therefore cannot be completely
ruled out of consideration in determining it.
In these
circumstances,
and in the absence of the material evi
dence to which reference has been made, the finding of
the Assistant Commissioner,
that the onus of proving
such facts as would bring his case within
the exception
had not been discharged by the assessee and tlie nor
mal presumption
must be given effect to, appears to
us to be a legitimate conclusion.
In this view, the
appeal must be dismissed with costs, but we should
like to observe
that as this
case has to be decided mainly
with reference
to the question of onus of proof, the
decision in this appeal must be confined to the year of
assessment to which this case relates,
and it would be
open to the appellant to show in future years
by
proper evidence that the seat of control and
manage
ment of the affairs of. the family is wholly outside
British India.
Mukherjea J. MuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my learned brother,
:f:azl Ali J., both in his reasoning and in his conclu
s10n.
d kh
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-I concur in the 1'udg-
Chan rase ara f I .
Ai.yar
1
. ment o my earned brother, Faz! Ah J.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri.
Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.
-
The landmark 1950 Supreme Court ruling in V. V. R. N. M. Subbayya Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras remains a cornerstone for understanding the principles governing the residence of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) for taxation purposes. This analysis, available on CaseOn, delves into the interpretation of Section 4A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, clarifying the critical concept of "control and management" and the burden of proof placed upon the assessee.
The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was to determine the conditions under which a Hindu Undivided Family could be considered "resident" in British India as per Section 4A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Specifically, the Court had to decide if an HUF, whose Karta (manager) was domiciled and primarily resided in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), could be deemed resident in India based on the Karta's activities during his temporary visits.
The case hinged on the precise wording of Section 4A(b), which states:
"A Hindu undivided family, firm or other association of persons is resident in British India unless the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly without British India."
This provision establishes a crucial legal standard:
The Court noted that this principle is analogous to the English common law test for determining corporate residency, which focuses on where the "central management and control actually abides."
The Court's analysis meticulously examined both the Karta's actions and the assessee's failure to provide key evidence.
The facts presented showed that during the relevant accounting year, the Karta of the HUF stayed in British India for 101 days. During this period, he was not merely a passive visitor. He actively engaged in managing the family's affairs by:
The Supreme Court clarified that while these actions were not necessarily conclusive proof of a center of control in India, they were by no means irrelevant. They were substantive acts related to the management and direction of the family's financial and legal affairs.
The turning point of the case was the assessee's inability to discharge the burden of proof. The law required the appellant to demonstrate that control was exercised *wholly* from Ceylon. The income tax authorities had called upon the assessee to produce correspondence and other material evidence that would show that the family's affairs in India were being directed and controlled from Colombo.
The appellant failed to produce this evidence. This absence of proof was critical. The Court reasoned that in the face of the Karta's active management in India, and without any evidence to the contrary, the legal presumption of residence could not be overturned.
For legal professionals pressed for time, understanding the nuances of such landmark rulings is vital. This is where CaseOn.in proves invaluable, offering 2-minute audio briefs that distill the core arguments and outcomes of cases like this, enabling quick and effective legal analysis.
The judgment provided a clear interpretation of the key terms in the statute. "Control and management" was defined as the central directing authority—the "head and brain" of the operation. The word "situated" implied a degree of permanence, not a fleeting presence. Furthermore, the term "wholly" acknowledged the possibility that control could be divided, potentially leading to an HUF having dual residency, much like a corporation.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. It held that the HUF was resident in British India for the assessment year in question. The verdict was not based on the 101-day stay alone, but on the assessee's failure to discharge the legal onus of proving that the control and management of its affairs were situated *wholly* outside British India.
Crucially, the Court noted that its decision was confined to the facts and lack of evidence for that specific year. It remained open for the appellant to prove in subsequent years, with proper evidence, that the seat of control was indeed entirely outside India.
The Supreme Court held that under Section 4A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, a Hindu Undivided Family is presumed to be resident in India unless it can prove that the control and management of its affairs are wholly outside India. The Karta of an HUF, domiciled in Ceylon, visited India for 101 days and managed litigation, attended tax proceedings, and started businesses. As the assessee failed to produce evidence proving that control was exercised exclusively from Ceylon, he did not discharge the burden of proof. Therefore, the HUF was correctly assessed as a "resident."
This case is foundational for tax law and jurisprudence for several reasons:
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