Fcbntarz.1 4.

ll56 SUPRE;\'lE COURT REPORTS

WORKMEN OF DIMAKUC!-Jl TEA ESTATE

~ ..

THE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI

TEA ESTATE

[HJJSj

IS. R. DAs C. J.. S. K. DAS and A. K. SARKAR JJ.1

IndustriaL Dispute-Defi,-nition, Interpretation of-Test­

'tl1111 pe·rs07t.'. JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, lfl-17 (Act

XIV of 1947, s. 2(k). .

The question for decision in this appeal was whether a dis­

pute raised by the workmen relating to a person who was not a

workman could be an industrial dispute as defined i:y s. 2{kj

of .the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it stood before the am­

E:ndments of 1956. The appellants, v.

1ho were the workmen of

Dimakuchi Tea Estate, espoused the cause of one Dr. K. P.

Banerjee, Assistant Medical Officer. \Vho had been dismissed un­

heard with a month's salary in lieu of notice but v.rho had ac­

cepted such payment and left the garden and the dispute raised

was ultimately referred by the Government for adjudication

under s. 10 of the Act. Both the Tribunal and the Appellate In­

dustrial Tribunal took the vie\' that as Dr. Banerjee was not

a \Vorkman v.rithin the meaning of the Act, the dispute v:as

not an industrial dispute as defined by s. 2(k).

Held, (per Das, C.J., and S.K. Das, J., Sarkar J, dissenting)

that the expression 'any person' occurring in s. 2 {k) of the In­

dustrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be given its ordinary mean·

ing and must be rr:ad and 1Jnderstood in the context of the Act

and the object the Legislature had in viev.·. Nor can it be equat­

ed either with the \?Ord 'v,'orkn1an' or 'employee'.

The

two tests of an industrial dispute as defined by the

sec­

tion must, therefore, be-(1) the dispute n1ust be a real dispute,

capable of being settled by relief given by one party to the

other, and (2) the person in re~pect of whom the dispute is rais­

ed must be one in Vihose employment. non-employment, terms

uf employment, or conditions of labo.ur (as the case may be).

the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest,

and this must depend on the facts and circumstances of each

particular case.

Applying these tests, the dispute in the present case which

\Vas in respect of a person \Vho \Vas not a workman and belong­

ed to a different category altogether, could not be said to be a

dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Act and the appeal

must fail. ...

Narendra Kuniar Sen v. A.U India h1(lvstrial Disputes

(Labour Appellate) Tribunal, 11~53) 55 Born. L.R. 125 approved.

Western India Auto·mobile Association v. The Industrial

Tribunal, Bombay, [1949.J 'F.C.R. 321, distinguished.

S.C.R. SUPREME · COURT REPORTS 1157

Case-law discussed.

Per Sarkar, J.-There is no reason why the words 'any per­

son in s. 2(k) of the Act should not be given their natural mean­

ing so as to include an employee who is not a workman within

the meaning of the Act. Consequently, a dispute concerning a

person who is not a workman may be an industrial dispute

within that section.

The

primary object which the Act has in view is the pre­

servation of the industrial peace.

The Act does

not make the interest of the workmen in

the

dispute a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute.

Such interest is incapable of definition and ·to make it a condi­

tion of

an industrial dispute would d.efeat the object of the Act.

Western India Automobile Associ'<ition v. The Industrial

Tribunal of Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321; Narendra Kumar _Sen v.

The All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal,

(1953) 55 Bom. L.R. 125 and United CommerCial Bank Ltd. v.

Kedar Nath Gupta, (1952) 1 L.L.J., 782, referred to.

Even assuming that the workmen must be interested in

order that there can be an industrial dispute, the present case

satisfies

that test and falls within the purview of s. 2(k) of the

Act.

CIVIL APPELLATE JurusmcrION: Civil Appeal No. 297 of

1956. .

·Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order

dated August 30, 1955, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of

India, Calcutta in Appeal No. Cal. 220 of 1954.

C. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellants.

Purslzottam Tricumdas for N. C. Chatterjee, P. K.

Goswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respon­

dent.

1958. Fabruary 4. The Judgment of Das, C. J., and S. K.

Das, J., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a

·separate Judgment.

1958

·workmen vj

of Dimakuchi

Tea E8!ate

v.

T!te Manago,,•nt

·"f Dimaku.;hi

Tea E•fatt

S. K. DAs J.-This appeal by special leave raises a ques-s. K. Daa 1.

tion of some nicety and of considerable importance in the

matter of industrial relatioos in this country. The question is

the true scope and effect of the definition clause in s. 2(k) of

the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 (hereinafter

referred to as

the

Act). The question has arisen in the following circumstan-

ces.

1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]

1968 The appellants before us are the workmen of the Dima-

Wor-oJ kuchi tea estate represented by the Assam Chah Karmachari

Dima~

TUI

11

,,,,,. Sangha, Dibrugarh. The respondent is the management of

T• the Dimakuchi tea estate, district Darrang in Assam. One Dr.

TM :J,=:;:" of K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical Officer of the

2'11J B-Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November l, 1950. He

s. K.DaaJ. was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on

probation for three months. It was stated in his letter of ap­

pointment: "While you are on probation or trial, your suit­

ability for permanent employment will be considered. If dur­

ing the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for

employment, you will receive seven days' notice in writing

terminating your appointment.

If you are guilty of

miscon­

duct, You are liable to instant dismissal. At the end of the·

period of probation, if you are considered suitable, you will

be confirmed in the garden's service." In February 1951 Dr.

Banerjee

was given an increment of Rs. 5 per mensum, but

on April 21. Dr.

Banerjee received a letter from one Mr. Boroth.

manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated : "It has been

found necessary to terminate your services with effect from

the 22nd instant. You

will of course receive one month's salary

in lieu of

notice." As no reas()llS were given in the notice of

termination, Dr. Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out

why his services were being terminated. To this Dr. Banerjee

received a reply to this effect: "The reasons for your discharge

are on the medical side, which are outside my jurisdiction,

best kn~ to Dr. Cox but a main.reason is because of the

deceitful manner in which you added figures to the require

ments of the last medical indent· after it bad been signed by

Dr. Cox, evidence of which is in my hands."

The cause of Dr. Banerjee was then espoused by the

Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and

the secretary of that Sangha \vrote to the manager of the Dima­

kuchi tea estate, enquiring about the reasons for Dr. Baner­

jee's discharge. The manager wrote back to say that Dr. K. P.

Banerjee was discharged on the ground of incompetence in

S.C.R. SUPREME COUHT REPOR'rS 1159

his medical duties and the chief medical officer <Dr. Cox) had

19

&&

found that Dr. Baner1'ee was incompetent and did not have Wmkm<11 of

Dimakwt.4i

sufficient "knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and Tea Eetcl4

laboratory work which befalls the lot of every assistant medi- •·

. , The MGnagtn~nl of

cal offi.cer 111 tea garden practice." lt was further stated that Dimat..,oM •

Dr. Banerjee gave a faulty. inexpert and clumsy quinine in-Tea Eetot•

jection to one Mr. Peacock. an assistant in the Dimakuchi s. K. D114 J.

te<l estate, which produced an extremely acute and severe ill-

ness very nearly causing a paralysis of the patient's leg. The

reasons given by the manager for the termination of the servi-

ces of Dr. K. P. Banerjee did not satisfy the appellants herein

and certain conciliation proceedings, details whereof are not

necessary for our purpose. were unsuccessfully held over the

question of the termination of the service of Dr. Banerjee.

The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripar-

tite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner,

Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the

Indian

Tea Association and the Assam Chah Kannachari

Sangha respectively. This Board recommended that Dr. Baner-

jee should be reinstated with effect from the date of his dis-

charge. After the recommendation

of the Board, the respon-

dent he.rein appears to Ii.ave offered a sum equal to 28 month's

salary and° allowances in lieu of re-instatement; to this, how-

ever. the appellants did not agree.

In the meantime, Dr. K. P.

Banerjee received' a sum of Rs.

306-1-0 on May 22, 1951 and

left the tea garden

in question. Then, on December 23, 1953.

the

G•wernment of Assam published a notification in which

it was staled that whereas an industrial dispute had arisen bet-

ween the appellants and the respondent herein and whereas.

it

was expedient that the dispute should be referred for ad-'

judic:11ion to a Tribunal constituted under s. 7 of the Act, the

Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri

U.

K.

Gohain. Additional District and Sessions Judge. under

d. k) of sub-s. (I) of s. IO of the Act. The dispute which was

thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms:

?'1'c;rkr11t;'1~ of

Dim 1ik.~telii

Te" !:_Ns~te

v. -

TJ1e _,\la11r19.;mcnt

Di1m~/.,'11.chi

'J'ui FhtaW

1160 SUPREME COURT REPOHTS trn5s]

"(i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee. A. M. O.?

of

(ii) If not. is he entitled to re-instatement or any other

relief in lieu thereof?"

Both parties filed written statements before Mr. Gohain

and ihe respondent took the pica that Dr. K.P. Banerjee was

not a "workman·· within the meaning of the Act; therefore.

there was no industrial dispute in the sense in which that ex­

prc.<Sion was defined in the Act and the Tribunal had no juris­

diction to make an adjudication on merits. Mr. Gohain took

up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a

"workman" within the meaning of the Act and came to a

conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words:

"Dr. rlauerjee being not a 'workman', his case is not one

of an "industrial dispute" under the Industrial Disputes Act

and his case

is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this

Tribu­

nal and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any

relief

to

him."

There was then an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tri­

bunal of India, Calcutta. That Tribunal affirmed the finding

of Mr. Gohain to the effect that Dr. Banerjee was not a work­

man within the meaning of the Act, The Appellate Tribunal

then said:

"A dispute between the employers and employees to be

an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, must be between the employers

and

the workmen. There cannot be any industrial dispute

bet­

ween the employers and the employees who are not work­

men."

The appeal was accordingly dismissed by the Labour Appel­

late Tribunal. The appellants herein then moved this Court

for special leave and by an order dated March 14, 1956. special

leave was granted,

but was

"limited to the question whether

a dispute in relation to a person who

is not a workman falls

within the scope

of the definition of industrial dispute

contain­

ed ins. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."

It is clear from what has been stated above that the

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1161

question whether Dr.

K.

P. Banerjee is or is not a workman 1958

within the meaning of the Act is no longer open to the parties Workmen of

and we must proceed on the footing that Dr. K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii

was not a workman within the meaning o.f the Act and then Toa :itaU

decide the question if the dispute in relation to the termination Tlit Ma...;,gen~;11 of

of his service still fell within the scope of the definition of the D;maktl/e!,

expression "industrial dispute" in the Act. "" • •

We proceed now to read the definition clause the inter- s. K. Da•J.

pretation of which is the only question before us. That defi-

nition clause

is in these terms: "S. 2 (k): "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or

difference between employers and employers, or between em­

ployers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen.

which

is connected with the employment or non-employment

or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour.

of any

person;"

It must be stated here that the expression "workman" is also

defined in the Act, and the definition which is relevant fon

our purpose is the one previous to the amendments of t 956;

therefore,

in reading the

various sections or' the Act, we shall

read them as they stood prior to the amendments

of 1956 and

refer to the amendments only when they have a bearing

on

the question before us. The definition of 'workman' as it

stood at the relevant time stated:

"S. 2(s): "Workman" means any person employed (in­

cluding an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or

unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and

includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in

relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during

that dispute,

but does not include any person employed in

the naval, military

or air service of the Government."

Now, the question

is whether a dispute in relation to a

person who

is not a workman within the meaning of the Act

still falls within the

scope of the definition clause in s. 2(k).

If we analyse the definition clause it falls easily

and naturally into three parts: first, there must be a dispute

or difference; second, the dispute or difference must be bet­

ween employers and employers. or between employers and

J,·l'(D)3SCT--9

ll62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS Ll958

1968 workmen or between workmen and workmen; third, the dis-

w .,.hoeio af pute or difference must be connected with the employment or

m ... h<Ai

T"' •-non-employment or the terms of employment or with the

., "· of conditions l>f labour, of any person. The first part obviously

2'Ao m::::::" refers to the factum of a real or substantial dispute; the second

2'• •-part to the parties to the dispute; and the third to the subject

8. x. Dru J. matter of that dispute. That subject matter may relate to any

of two matters-(i) employment or non-employment, and (ii)

terms of empll>yment or conditions of labour, of any person.

On behalf of the appellants it is contended that the condi­

tions referred to in the first and second parts of the definition

clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there

is a dispute or difference over the termination of service of

Dr. K. P. Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between

the employer, namely, the management of the Dimakucbl

tea estate on one side. and its workmen on the other. even

taking the expression "workmen" in the restricted sense in

which that expression is defined in the Act. The real diffi.

culty arises when we come to the third part of the definition

clause. Leai:ned counsel for the appellants has submitted

that the expression "of any person" occurring in the third

part of the definition clause

is an expression of very wide impl)rt and there are no reasons why the words "any person"

should be equated with "any workman", as the Tribunals

below have done. The argument

is that inasmuch as the

dis­

pute or difference between the employer and the workmen

is connected with the non-employment of a person called

Dr.

K.

P. Banerjee (even though he was not a workman). the

dispute

is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the

de­

finition clause. At first sight, it does appear that there is Cl>n­

siderable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the

appellants.

It is rightly pointed out

that the definition clause

does not contain any words of qualification or restriction in

respect of the expression "any person" occurring in the third

part, and

if any limitations as to its scope are to be imposed.

they must be such

as can be reasonably inferred from the

definition clause itself or other provision of the Act.

::>CR SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1163

A little careful consideration will show, however, that 1968

the expression "any person" occurring in the third part of the Wore.en of

Dimafcuclt i

definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this 'l'fa Eatau

wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must T'

11

"· ,

1

. l ("") f 11e ma....,....U o1

relate to (1) employment or non-emp oyment or n terms o Di1na"1<CM .

employment or conditions of labour of any person~ these ne-Tea Ealalt

cessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in :;. K. Du• J.

respect of whom the employer-employee relation never

existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject mat·

ter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly,

the definition clause must

be read in the contex of the

sub-

ject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the

objects and other provisions of the

Act. It is well settled

that

" the words of a statute. when there is a doubt about

their meaning are

to be understood in the sense in

which they best harmonise with the subject

of the enact-

ment and the object which the Legislature has in

view. Their

meaning

is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or

etymological propriety of language, nor even

in its popular

use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are

used,

and the object to be attained." (Maxwell, Interpreta-

tion of Statutes, 9th Edition,

p. 55).

It is necessary, therefore, to take the Act as a whole

and examine its salient provisions. The long title shows that

the

obje.ct of the Act is

"to make provision ·for the investi­

gation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain

other purposes." The preamble states the same object and

s. 2 of the Act which contains definitions states that unkm

there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, cer­

tain expressions will have certain meanings. Chapter 11 re­

fers to the authorities set up under the Act, such as, Works

Comm;ttees, Conciliation Officers. Boards of Conciliation.

Courts of Enquiry, and Industrial Tribunals. The primary

duty of a

Works Committee is to promote measures for

securing and preserving amity and

good relations between

the employer and his

workmen and. to that end, to comment

L,'P(D)it''WT-H( a)

1164 SUPREME COURT REPOUTS [1958]

1968 upon matters of their common interest or concern and en·

w.,...,_ of deavour to compose any material difference of opinion in

Di...kuMi

Tea E..,,. respect of such matters, Conciliation Officers are charged

v. with the duty of mediating in and promoting the settlement

'1'111 MBMgem••• of . . · C ·1· · 1 be

Di""'kuc/>i of mdustnal disputes. A Board of onc1 iat10n may a so

Tto E.,,,.. constituted for the same purpose, namely, for promoting the

s. K. IJa• J. settlement of an industrial dispute. A Court of Enquiry may

be appointed for enquiring into any matter which appears

to be connected with or relevant to an industrial

dispute.

Section 7 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government

to constitute one or more Tribunals for the adjudication of

industrial disputes

in accordance with the provisions of the

Act. Chapter

III ~ontains provisions relating to the reference

of industrial disputes

to Boards of Conciliation. Courts of

Enquiry or Industrial Tribunals, and the reference in the

present case was made under

s.

10 of that Chapter. Under

s. IO(c) of the Act where an appropriate Government is of

opinion that any industrial disputes exist or are apprehend·

ed, it may. at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute

or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant 1tl

the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication. Chapter IV of

the Act deals with procedure. powers and duties of the au·

thorities set up under the Act. Where an industrial dispute

has heen referred to a Tribunal for adjudication,

s. 15

re·

quires that the Tribunal shall bold its proceedings expedi­

tiously and shall as soon as practicable on the conclusion

thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government. Sec­

tion 17 lays down inter alia that the award of a Tribunal shall

within a period of one month from the date

of its receipt by

the appropriate Government be published in such manner

as it thinks

fit. Section

17-A lays down that the award of a

Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry

of thirty

days from the date of its publication

under s. 17; it also

contains certain other provisions which empower the appro·

priate Government to modify or reject the award. Section 18

is important for our purpose, and in so far as it relates

ta awards it states that an award which has become enforce·

able shall be binding on-

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPCRTS 1165

(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

J9S3

. -

Wo•hlM of

(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the pro-Di111aheAO

1

T«i B~

ceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribuna re- .,.

cords the opinion that they were so summoned withoitt pro· The~ el

per cause; T111 Biia#

(c) where a party referred to under clause (a) or Clause

8

· K Dtu J.

(b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect

of the establishment to which the dispute relates; and

(d) where a party referred

to in clause (a) or clause (b)

is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in

the establishment or part of establishment

as the case may

be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the

dispute

and all persons who subsequently beoome employed in that

establishment or part.

Section

19 lays down the period of operation of settlements

and awards and states

inter alia that

aiI1 award shall, subject

_to the provisions of the section, remain in operation for a

period of one year. Chapter V of the Act deals with strikes

and lock-outs, Chapter

V-A with lay-off and retrenchment,

Chapter VI with penalties and Chapter VII with miscella­

neous ma.tters. It is important to note that tpough in the defi­

nition of "lock-out", s. 2 (1) of the Act, and "strike", s. 2(q).

of the Act, the expression 'any person' has been used, in

ss. 22(2) and 23 of the Act which deal with 'look-out" and

"strike", only the word 'workmen' has been used. Section 33

provides that during the pendency of any conciliation proceed­

ings or any proceedings before a tribunal of any industrial

dispute, no employer shall

(a) alter to the prejudice of the

workmen concerned, the conditions of their service etc. or

(b) discharge or punish by dismissal or otherwise any

work­

man concerned in the dispute. Section 33 A, however, uses

the word 'employee', but read with s. 33, the word employee

must mean there a

w,orkman. Section 36 which deals with

representation of parties

ha:s some bearing on the question

beft>re us. It lays down that a workman who is a party to a

dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceed­

ing under the Act by-

1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]

1968 (a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is

w..-•! a member;

~ (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which

fl< Ma;;,_

01

the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and

D;...ahM.

Tw E..;. (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade

union, by an officer of any trade union connected with, or

&.K.Da•J. th . . hi

by any o er workman employed m the industry m w ch

the worker

is employed and authorised in such manner as

may

be prescribed.

An employer who is a party to a dispute shall

be entitled

to

be represented in any proceedings under the Act by-

(a) an officer of an association of employers

of which

he

is a member;

(b) an officer of a federation of associations of

em­

ployers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is

affiliated; and

(c) where the employer is not a member of any associa­

tion of employers, by an officer of any association of em­

ployers connected with, or by any other employer engaged

in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and au­

thorised in sudh manner as may be prescribed.

Sub-section

(3) of s. 36 states that no party to a dispute

shall

be entitled to be represented by a

legal practitioner in

any conciliation proceedings under the Act or

in any

pro­

ceedings before a court. Sub-section (4) states thirt in any pro­

ceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be repre­

sented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other

parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Tribunal

The point to note

is that there is no particular

provision for

the representation of a party other than a workman or an

employer, presumably because under the second part of the

definition clause the parties to an industrial dispute can only

be employers and employers, employers and workmen or

workmen and workmen.

Thus, an examination of the salient provisions ·of the Act

shows that the principal objects of the Act are-

s.c.R. SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS U67

(1) the promotil:>n of measures for securing and preserv- 196&

ing amity and good relations between the employer and Worhaca o/

workmen; ~-=-

(2) an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, The .If~ of

between employers and employers, employers and workmen, Di~

or workmen and wl:>rkmen, with a right of representation by Tea "'*

a registered trade union or federation of trade unions or as-s. K. Dae J.

sociation of employers or a federation of ass1:>ciatio!l8 of em-

loyers;

(3) prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs;

(4) relief to workmen in the matter of

lay-off and re­

trenchment; and

(5) collective bargaining.

The Act is primarily meant for regulating the relations of em­

ployers and workmen-past, present and future. It draws a

distinction between 'workmen'

as such and the managerial

or

supervisory staff, and confers benefit on. the former only.

It is in the context of all these provisions of the Act that

the definition clause in

s. 2(k)

has to be interpreted. It seems

fairly obvious

to us that if the expression

"any person" is

given its ordinary mea!ning, then the definition clause will

be so wide as to become inconsistent not merely with the ob­

jects and other provisions 1:>f the Aot, but also with the other

parts of that very clause. Let us see how the definition clause

works

if the expression

"any person" occurring therein is

given its ordinary meaning. The workmen may then raise a

dispute about a person with whom they have no possible

Cl:>mmunity of interest; they may raise a dispute about the

employment of a person in another industry or a different es­

tablishment..;....a dispute in which their own employer is not

in a position to give any relief, in the matter of employment

or non-employment or the terms 1:>f employment or condi­

tions of labour of such a person. In order to make our mean­

ing clear we may take a more obvious example. Let WI as­

sume that for s1:>me reason or other the workmen of a parti­

cular industry raise a dispute with their employer about the

employment or

terms of employment of the

District Map

trate or District Judge of the district in which the industry

1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]

1958 is situate. It seems clear to us that though the District Mugis-·

Work...,. of trate br District Judge undoubtedly comes within the ex-

~;:;.z: pression "any persbn" occurring in the definition clause, a

v. dispute a!bout his employment or tenns of employment is not

Ta. :i::z:;.f of an industrial dispute; firstly, because such a dispute does not

Tea EJ...,, come within the scope of the Act, having regard to the defi-

s. K. Da• J. nition of the words "emplllyer", "industry", and ·'workman"

and also to other p~ovisions of the Act; secondly, there is no

possible community of interest between the District Magis­

trate or District Judge on the bne hand and the disputants,

employer and workmen, on the other. The absurd results

that will follow such

an interpretation have been forcefully

expressed by Chagla

C. J., in his decision in Narendra Kumar

Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tri­

bunal('):

"If "any person" were to be read as an expression with­

out any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we

must not put even. any territorial restriction on that expres­

sion. In other words, it would be open to the workmen not

only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment

of persons employed in the same industry as themselves,

not

only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of

employ­

ment in corresponding or similar industries, not only a dis­

pute with regard to the tenns of employment of people em­

ployed in our country, but the terms of employment of any

workman or any labourer anywhere in the world. The propo­

sition has only to be stated in order to make one realise how

entirely untenable

it

is."

Take, for example, anbther case where the workmen raise

an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Mana­

ger or Chief Medical Officer by the employer but without

claiming any benefit fur themselves, and let us assume that a

dispute or difference arises between the workmen on one side

and the employer on the other over such

an objection. If

such a dispute comes within the definition clause and is

re­

ferred to an industria 1 tribunal for adjudication, the parties

(r) [1953] 55 Born. L.R. 125, 129, 130.

S.C.-R SUPR.EMB COURT REPORTc 116!1

to the dispute will be the employer on one side and his work- 1958

men ·on the other. The Manager or the Chief Medical Officer ll'<wlomen of

b h

· Vimakuchi

cannot obviously be a party tb the dispute, ecause e is not Tea Elllat•

a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act and there is no Th

111

"· ,,

•

1

• e: · anagement o;

dispute between him and his employer. That bemg tlie pos1-Dimak.ichi

tion, the award, if any, given by the Tribunal will be bind-Tea Eatatt

ing, under cl. (a) of s. 18, on the parties to the dispute and ,9, K. Das J.

not on the Manager or the Chief Medidal Officer. It is ex-

tremely doubtful if in the circumstances stated. the Tribunal

can summon the Manager or the Chief Medical Officer as a

party to the dispute, because there

is no dispute between the

Manager or Chief Medical

Officer on one side and his em-

loyer on the other. Furthermore, s. 36 of the Act does not pro-

vide for representation of a person who is ·not a party to the

dispute.

If, therefore, an award is made by the Tribunal in

the case which

we have taken by way of illustration,

that

award, though binding on the employer, will not be bind-

ing on the Manager or Chief Medicat

Officer. It should be

obvious that the Act could not have contemplated an

even-

tuality of this kind, which does not promote any of the ob-

jects of the Act, but rather goes against them.

When these difficulties were pointed out to learned

coun­

sel for the appellants, he conceded that some limitations

must be put on the width

of the expression

"any person" oc•

curring in the definition clause. He formulated four such

limitations :

(1) The dispute must be a real and substantial one in

respect of which one of the parties to the dispute can give re­

lief to the other; e.g., when the dispute is between workmen

and employer, the employer must be in a position to give

relief to the workmen. This, according to learned counsel for

the appellants,

will exclude those cases in which the

work­

men ask for something which their employer is not in a posi­

tion to give. It would also exclude mere ideological differ­

ences or controversies.

(2) The industrial dispute if raised by workmen must

relate to the particular establishment or part of establishment

1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19118]

19SB in which the workmen are employed so that the definition

w.,.,,,,,. .. •/ clause may be consistent with s·. 18 of the Act.

Dimaku<lu •

Tea E1tate (3) The dISpute must relate to the employment, non-em-

'l'he Man;g.,..nt of ployment or the terms of employment or with the conditions

Dimal:troAi of labour of any person, but such person must be an em-

Tea E8tate ployee discharged or in service or a candidate for employ-

s. K. D .. J. ment. Aocording to learned counsel for the appellants, the

person about whom the dispute has arisen need not

be a

workman within the

meaning of the Act, but he must answer

to the description of

an employee, discharged or in service,

or a candidate for employment.

(4) The workmen raising the dispute must have a nexus

with the dispute, either because they are personally

interest­

ed or because they have taken up the cause of another per­

,;on in the general interest of labour welfare. The further argu­

ment of learned counsel for the appellants is

that even

im­

posing the aforesaid four limitations on the width of the

expression "any person" occurring in the definition clause, the

dispute in the present case is an industrial dispute within

the

meaning of s. 2

(le) of the Aot, because (1) the employer

could give relief in the matter of the termination bf service

of, Dr. K.P. Banerjee, (2) Dr. K.P. Banerjee belonged to the

same establishment, namely, the same tea garden,

(3) the

dispute related to a discharged employee (though not a work­

man) and

(4) the workmen raising the dispute were vitally

interested in

it by reason of the fact that Dr. Banerjee (it

is

stated) belonged to their trade union and the dismissal of an

employee without the formulation of a charge and without

giving

him an opportunity to meet any charge was a

matter

of general interest to all workmen in the same establishment.

We now propose

to examine the question whether

the

limitations formulated by learned counsel for the appellants

are the only true limitations to be imposed with regard

to

the definition clause. In doing so we shall also consider what

is the true scope and

effect bf the definition clause and what

are the correct tests to be applied with regard to it. We

think that there is no real difficulty with regard to the first

S.C.R.. SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS 1171

two Jimitations. They are, we think, implicit in the definition 1958

clause itself. It is obvious that a dispute between employers Workmen of

JJimak'UCki

and employers, employers and workmen, or between work-Tea Eslale

men and workmen must be a real dispute capable of set-The ;~nagement of

tlement or adjudication by directing one of the parties to the ~!~i

dispute to give necessary relief to th'e other. It is also obvi-

. b dir tl L. 8. K. Das J.

ous that the parties to the dispute must e ec y or suu-

stantially interested therein, so that if workmen raise a dis-

pute, it must relate to the establishment or pa:rt of establish-

.men in which they are employed. With regard to limitation

(3), while we agree that the expression 'any person' cannot

be completely equated with 'any workman' as defined in the

·Act, we think that the limitation formulated by learned coun-

sel for the appellants is much too widely stated and is not

quite correct.

We recognise that if the expression 'any person'

means 'any workman'

·within the meaning of the Act, then it

is difficult to understa11d why the Legislature instead of using

the expression 'any workman'

used the much wider expres-sion 'any person' in the third part of the definition clause.

The very circumstance that in the second part of the defini·

tion clause the expression used is "between emyloyers and

workmen or between workmen and workmen" while in the

third part the expression

used is

"any person" indicates that

the expression "any person" cannot be completely equated

with 'any workman'. The reason for the

use of the expres-

sion

"any person" in the definition clause is, however, not far

to seek. The word 'workman'

as defined in the Act (before

the amendments of

1956) included, for the purposes of any

proceedings under the Act in relation to an industrial

dis-

pute, a workman discharged during the dispute. This defini-

tion corresponded to s. 2 (j) of the old Trade Disputes Act,

1929 except that the words

"including an apprentice" were

inserted and the words "industrial dispute" were substituted

for the words "trade dispute". It is worthy of note that in the

Trade Disputes Act,

1929, the word 'workman' meant any person employed in any trade or industry to do any skilled

117:! SUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1948)

1958 or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. It is

iv orkm•~ of clear enough that prior to I 956 when the definition of 'work·

Dimakuchi

Tea E•tate man' in the Act was further widened to include a person dis.

The .Ma~·,,,..nt •! missed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a

Dimai11chi consequence of the dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or

Tt.aEWite • •

retrenchment led to the dispute, a workman who had been du;.

8

• K. Das J. charged earlier and not during the dispute was not a work­

man within the meaning of the Act. If the expression. "any

person" in the third part of the definition ctause were to be

strictly equated with 'any workman'. then there could be

no industrial dispute, prior to 1956, with regard to a work­

man who had been discharged earlier than the dispute, even

though the discharge itself had led to the dispute. That

seems to be the

reason why the Legislature used the expres­

sion 'any person' in the third part of the definition clause

so

as to put it beyond any doubt that the non-employment

of such a dismissed workman

was also within the ambit of

an industrial dispute. There

Wll'S a wide gap between a 'work­

man' and an 'employee' under the definition of the word

'workman' in

s. 2(s) as it stood prior to 1956; all existins

workmen were no doubt employees; but

all

employees were

not workmen. The supervisory staff did not come within the

definition. The gap has been reduced to some extent by the

amendments of

1956; part of the supervisory

staff (who draw

wages not exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem) and

those who were otherwise workmen but were discharged or

dismissed earlier have also

come within the definition. If and

when the gap

is completely bridged. 'workmen' will be

syno­

nymous with 'employees', whether engaged in any skilled or

unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, etc.

But till the gap

is completely obliterated, there is a

distino­

tion between workmen and non-workmen and that distino­

tion has an important bearing on the question before us.

Limitation no.

(3) as formulated by learned counsel for

the

appellants ignores the distinction altogether and equates 'any

person' with 'any employee'-past, present or future: this

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1173

we

do not think is quite correct or consistent with the other 1958

provisions of the Act. The Act avowedly gives a restricted

work""" of

meaning to the word 'workman' and almost all the provi-f.~':'1.":};;

sions of the Act are intended to confer benefits on that class v.

l d

. .

f · k

7' It;; llfonagenumt of

of persons who genera ly answer to the escr1pt1on o wor -n;,,,,,/,1tclii ·

men. The expression 'any person' in the definition clause · 'fea 8-'

10

''

means, in our opinion, a person in whose employment, or 8. K. .Tia.~ .1.

non-employment, or terms of employment, or conditions of

labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial

interest-with whom they have, under the scheme of the

Act, a community of interest. Our reason for so holding is

not merely that the Act makes a distinction between work-

men

and non-workmen, but

because a dispute to be a real

dispute must be one in which the parties to the dispute have

a direct

or substantial interest. Can it be said that workmen

as a class are directly

or

substanti~lly interested in the em-

ployment, non-employment, terms of employment or condi-

tions

of labour of persons who belong to the supervisory

staff

and are, under the provisions of the Act, non-workmen on

whom the

Act has

conferred no benefit, who cannot by them-

selves

be parties to an industrial dispute

and for whose repre-

sentation the Act makes no particular provision? We ven-

ture

to

think that the answer must be in the negative. Limi-

tation

(4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants

is also

too generally stated. We recognise that solidarity of

labour or general interest of labour welfare may furnish, in

some cases, the necessary nexus

of direct or substantial in-

terest

in a dispute between employers and workmen, but the

principle· of solidarity of the labour movement or general

welfare of labour must be based on or correlated to the prin-

ciple

of community of interest; the workmen can raise a dis-

pute

in respect of those persons

only in the employment or

non-employment or the tenns of employment or the condi-

tions

of

labour of whom they have a direct or substantial in-

terest. We think

that Chagla CJ .. correctly put the crucial

test when

he said in Narendra Kumar

Sen v. All India Indus-

trial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal(').

( ')

[195~] 55 Born. "L.R. 125. 129, 130.

1174 SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1958]

1968 "Therefore, when s. 2 (kJ speaks of the employment or

Wor'lom.n of non-employment or the terms of employment or the condi-

Dimaku~Tii ·fib f · nJ h I

Tea E""'" hons o a our o any person, It can o y mean t e emp oy-

v. ment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the

Tiu! .Management of . . •

Dimal .. chi cond1hons of labour of only those persons m the employment

Tea E&ate or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the

s. K. n .. J. conditions of Jabour of whom the workmen themselves are

directly and substantially interested. If the workmen have no

direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-em­

ployment of a person or in his terms of ·emplt>yrnent or his

conditions of labollr, then an industrial dispute cannot arise

with regard to such person."

We reach the same conclusion by approaching the ques­

tion from a somewhat different standpoint. Ordinarily, it is

only the aggrieved party who can raise a dispute; but an

'industrial dispute' is put on a collective basis, because it is

now settled that

an individual dispute, not espoused by

others of the class to which the aggrieved party may belong,

is not

an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2

(k),

As Isaacs J. observed in the Australian case of George Hud­

son Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union('):

"The very nature of an 'industrial dispute' as distinguish­

ed from an individual dispute, is to obtain new industrW

conditions, not merely for the specific individuals then work­

ing from the specific individuals then employing them, and

not for the moment only,

but for the class of employees from

the

class of employers ........................ It is a battle by the

claimants,

not for themselves

alone."

Section 18 of the Act supports the aforesaid observations, in

so far as it makes the award binding not merely on the par­

ties to the dispute, but where the party is an employer, on

his heirs, successors or assigns and where the party is com­

posed of workmen, on all persons employed in the establish­

ment and all persons who subsequently become employed

therein.

If, therefore, the dispute is a collective dispute, the

party raising the dispute must have either a direct interest in

the subject matter of dispute or a

substantial interest therein

in the sense that the class to which the aggrieved party be-

(') 32. C.L.R. 413, 441.

S.C.R. SUPRElVIE COURT REPORTS 1175

longs is substantially affected thereby. It is the community of

interest of the class as a whole-class of employers or class

of workmen-which furnishes the real nexus between the

dis-

Jr°'"'""" of

Dimak1tclli

TeaEstaie

pute and the parties to the dispute. We see no insuperable v.

diffi ul

, b . , . f h' The M11nage111t11t -Of

c ty m t e practica I application o t 1s test. In a case r1im.a.kwlii

where the party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved work- l'ea Estak

men themselves and the subject matter of dispute relates to S.K. Da$ J.

them or any of them, they clearly· have a direct interest in

the dispute. Where,

h'owever, the party to the dispute also

composed of workmen, espouse the cause of another person whose employment, or non-employment, etc., may prejudi-

cially affect their interest, the workmen have a substantial in·

terest in the subject matter of dispute. In both such cases, the

dispute is

an industrial dispute.

Learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn our

attention to the definition of a 'trade dispute' in the Indian

Trade

Unions Act, 1926. That definition is also in the same

terms,

but with this vital difference that the word 'workmen'

means there

"all persons-employed in trade or industry whe­

ther or not in the employment of the employer with whom

the trade dispute arises." It is obvious that the very wide

definition of the word 'workmen' determines the ambit of the

definition of a 'trade dispute' in the Trade Unions Act, 1926.

The provisions of that Act have different objects in view, one

of which

is the expenditure of the funds of a registered Trade Union 'on the conduct of trade disputes on behalf of the

Trade Union or any member thereof. We do not think that

that definition for the purposes of an Act like the Trade

Unions Act is of any assistance in construing the definition in

the Act with which

we are now concerned, even though the

words employed are the same;

for, one thing, the meaning of

the word 'workman' completely changes the ambit of the

definition clause, and for another, the objects, scheme and

purpose of the

two Acts are not the same. For the same

rea­

sons, we do not think that with regard to the precise prob·

Iem before us much m;sistance can be obtained by a detailed

1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f19118]

19ii8 examination of English, American or Australian decisions

Workm1m of given with regard to the terms of the statutes in force in

Din•rtJ•uchi h · E h A be • ed ·

r,,, Estate t ose countries. ac . ct must mterpret on its own

,._ tenns-p~cularly when the definition of a 'workman' varies

T!1s: J.fa11ngcmrnt (lf f · h • d' · fr

Dimahchi rom statute to statute and, wit changmg ct>n ttJons, om

Th< ~sta.te time to time. and country to country.

S. K. Da~ J.

The interpretation of s. 2(k) of the Act has been the

subject of consideration

in various Indian

decisions frt>m

different points of view. Two recent decisions of this Court

considered the question if an individual dispute of a work­

man was within the definition of an industrial dispute. The

decisitm

in C.

P. Transport Services Ltd. v. Raghunathl'), re­

lated to the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement

Act

(No.

XXIII of 1947) and the decision in Newspapers Ltd.

v. State Jndu,-trial Tribunal, U. P.('). to the U. P. In­

dustrial Disputes Act (No. XXVIH of 1947). Both these de­

cisions considered s. 2(k) of the Act. but with reference to a

different problem. The definition clause

in s. 2(kl was

consi­

dered at some length by the Federal Court in Western India

Automobile Association

v. The Industrial Tribunal,

Bom·

bayC). and learned counsel for the appellants has placed

great reliance on some of the cbservations made therein. The

question which

fell for dec.ision in that case was whether

"in­

dustrial dispute" included within its ambit a dispute with re­

gard to re-instatement of certain dismissed workmen. It was

held that re-instatement

was connected with

non-employment

and, therefore, fell within the words of the definition. It ap­

pears that the finding of the Court from which the appeal was

preferred to

the Federal Court was that the workmen whose

re-instatement

was in question were discharged

during the

dispute and were. therefore, workmen within the meaning of

the Act. Therefore. the problem of interpretation with which

we are faced in this oase was not the problem before their

Lordships of the Federa:I Court. The observations on which

learned counsel for the appellants has relied are these:

"The question for determination is whether the defini-

( ') [1956] S.C.R. 956. (') A.LR. (1957) S.C. 532.

(') (1949] F.C.R 321. 329-330. 346~147.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1177

tion of the expression "industrial dispute" given in the Act 1968

includes within its ambit, a dispute in regard to re-instate-Wor.l:tmn of

d f th d fin

. Di'1114lc!Wii

.ment of dismissed employees ......... The wor s o e e 1-. Te.a Estate

tion may be paraphrazed thus: "any dispute which has con-, _ M v _ ,,

_ • . p,.., anagemtnl o

1

nection with the workmen bemg m, or out of service or emp-Dimalcucki

loyment". "Non-employment" is the negative of "employ· Tea ~state

ment" and would mean that disputes of workmen out of ser· s.K. Das J.

vice with their employers are within the ambit of the defini·

tion. It is the positive or the negative act of an employer that

leads to employment or to non-employment. It may relate to

an existing employment or to a contemplated employment, or

it may relate to an existing fact of non-employment or a con-

templated non-employment. The following four illustrations

elucidate this point: (l) An employer has already employed

a person and a trade union says "Please do not employ him".

Such a dispute is a dispute as to employment or in connection

with employment.

(2) An employer gives notice to

a union

saying tha:t he wishes to employ two particular persons. The

union says "no". This is a dispute as to employment. It

arises out of the desire of the employer to employ certain per-

sons.

(3) An employer may dismiss a man, or decline to

em·

loy him. This matter raises a dispute as to non-employment.

(4) An employer contemplates turning out a number of peo-

ple who a!I'e already in his employment. It is a dispute as t~

contemplated non-employment. "Employment or non-em-

. ployment" constitutes the subject matter of one class of in·

dustrial disputes, the other two classes of disputes being those

connected with the terms

of employment and the conditions

of labour. The failure

to employ or the refusal to employ are

actions

on the part of the employer which would be covered

by the terms

"employment or non-employment". Re-instate­

ment is connected with non-employment and is therefore

within the words of the definition."

................................................... •-........ ' ............... .

"It was contended that the re-instatement of the discharg­

ed workmen was not an industrial dispute because · if the

LJP(D)3SCl-10

fr o-rktrteu uj

ll78 Slil'RE:ME COUilT REl'ORT::; [J 958]

union represented Lhe discharged employees, they were not

workmen within the definition of that word in the Industrial

1;;'.;"';~~~; Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no difficulty

v. in the respondents (unionl taking up the cause of the dis-

Tf,,· Jbuwocu•wl of l km d th d' b · till · d "al

fh"mahudii c 1arged Wbr en an e 1spute emg s an m ustrt

2"•a Eetak dispute between the employer and the workmen. The non-

s.K. D"' J. employment "of any persott" can amount to an industrial

dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling im­

der the definition of thM word in the Industrial Disputes Act.

It was argued that if the respondents represented the undis­

charged employees, there was no dispute between them and

the employer.

That again is fallacious, because under the

definition of industrial dispute. it is not necessary that the

parties to the proceedings can be the disoharged workmen

only. The

last words in the definition of industrial dispute,

viz., "any person" are a complete answer to this argument

of the appellants." It is true that two of the illustrations~

Nos. (2) and (3)-given in the aforesaid observations seem

to indicate that there can be an industrial dispute relating to

persons who are not strictly speaking "workmen"; but whe­

ther those persons would answer to such description or what

community of interest the workmen had with them

is not

stated and in any view

we do not think that illustrations given

to elucidate a different problem can be

taken as determina­

tive of a problem which was not before the court

in that case.

A reference was also made to the decision of this Court

in

D. N. Banerjee v.

P. R. Mukherjee('). The question there

was whether the expression "industrial dispute" included dis­

putes between municipalities and their employees in branches

of work analogous to the ca'Trying on of a tarde or business .

. More in point is the decision of the Full Bench of the

Labour Appellate Tribunal

in a number of appeals reported

in

1952 Labour Appeal Cases. p. 198. where the question

now before

us arose directly for decision. The same question

arose for decision before the

All India Industrial Tribunal

<Bank Disputes) and the majPrity of members (Messrs. K. C.

(') [1953] S.C.R. 302.

8.C.R. SUPREME COURT R.EPOHT8 1179

Sen and J. N. Majumdar) expressed the view that a dispute w;s

between employers and workmen might relate to employ-WMkmw of

ment or non-employment or the terms of emplt>yment or con- ¥';:E":f:.{~i

ditions of labour of 'persons who were not workmen, and the , v.

. . . . · I . 'I he Man<J{feme11I of

words 'any person·· used m the defi111t1on clause were e, ast1c Dimal:uchi

enough to include an officer, that is, a member of the super-Pea E•talc

visory staff. The majority view will be found in Chap. X of s.K. Das J.

the Report. The minority view was expressed by Mr~ N.

Chandrasekhara Aiyar, who said:

"It is fairly clear to my mind that "any person" in the

• Act means· any-one who belongs to the employer class or the

workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against

whom can be said to be adequately presented by the group

ot category of persons to which he belongs.

As stated already it should be remembered that the

cases relied upon for the

view that 'any person' may mean

others also besides the workmen were

all cases relating to

workmen. They were discharged or dismissed workmen and

when their cases were taken up by the Tribunal the

point

was raised that they had ceased to be workmen and were

therefore outside the sebpe of tbe Act. This argument was

repelled.

In my opinion, there is no justification for treating such

cases as authorities for the wider proposition that a valid

industrial dispute can be raised by workmen about the

em­

ployment or non-employment of somC4:)ne else who does not

belong and never belonged to their class or category.

My view therefore is that the Act does not apply to

cases of non-workmen, or officers, if they may be

so ca>Iled."

Both these views as also other decisions of High Courts and

awards of Industrial Tribunals, were considered by the Full

Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Chainnan

of the Tribunal (Mr. J. N. Majumdar) itcknowledged that his

earlier view was not correct and expressed bis opinion, con·

curred in by all the other members of the Tribunal, at p.

210-

1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]

1968 "l am, therefore, of opinion that the expression 'any

Workmen of person' has to be interpreted in terms of 'workmen'. The

Dimakm:hi words 'any person' cannot have, in my opinion, their widest

Tea E8'au amplitude, as that would create incongruity and repl!gnancy

Th• .Jlan:;,,.., .. of in the provisions of the Act. They are to be interpreted in a

~~ima~i manner that persons, who would come within that expression,

JwE8'ae can at some stage or other, answer the description of work·

s.K. v .. J. man as defined in the Act."

It is necessary to state here that earlier a rnntrary view

had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Bir/a Brothrrs,

Ltd. v. Modak('), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co.

Ltd. v. S. N. Modak('), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Mad­

ras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Work·

men('). It is necessary to emphasise here two considerations

which have generally weighed with some of the learned

Judges

in support of the view expressed by them; these two -considerations are that (!) normally workmen will not raise

a dispute in which they are not directly or substantially in·

terested and (2) Government will not make a reference unless

the dispute is a real or substantial one. We think that these

two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammati­

cal or etymological interpretation of the expression "any

pers1>n" occurril)g in the definition clause should lead, on

the contrary,

to an interpretation which, to use the words

of

Maxwell, is to be found in the subject or in the occasion on

which the words aJre used lllld the object to be attained by

the statute.

We are aware that anybody may

·be a potential wt>rkman

and the concept of "a. potential workman" introduces an

element of indefiniteness and uncertainty.

We also agree that

the expression

"any person" is co-existensive with any

workman, potential or otherwise.

We think,

however, that

the crucial test is one of community of interest and

the

per­

son regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in

whose employment, non-anployment, terms of employment

or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the

(1) I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. (") [19111) 1 IL.J. 145.

(') [1952] L.L . .J. 122.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1181

dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Whether such

direct or substantial interest has been established in a parti­

cular case will depend on its facts and circumstances.

195S

Workmonof

DiMku.eM

'l'da J!Jstak

Two other later decisions have also been brought to our The M~~gemen~ of

notice: Prahlad Rai Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') in lj,imaEkuchi

• ~ea #al•

which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the expression

'any person' in the definition clause did not mean a work-B.K. Da•?J

man and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India

Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunai(2), rt'ing the

.decision of Chagla

C. J. and

Shah J: from which we have

already quoted some extracts.

An examination of the decision referred to above

un­

doubtedly discloses a divergence of opinion: two views have

been expressed, one based on the ordinary meaning of the

expression 'any person' and the other based on the context,

with reference to the subject of the enactment and the objects

which the legislature has in

view. For the reasons which we

have already given, we think that the latter view is correct.

To summarise. Having regard to the scheme and objects of

the Act, and

its other provisions, the

expression 'any person'

in

s. 2(k) of the Act must be read subject to such limitations

and qualifications

as· arise from the context; the two crucial

limitations are

(1) the dispute must be a real dispute

bet­

ween the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two

parts Of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settle­

ment or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving ne­

cessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom

the dispute is raised must

be one in whose employment,

non­

employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour

(as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct

or substantial interest.

In the absence of such interest the

dis­

pute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties.

Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer,

the person regarding whose employment, non-employment,

terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is

raised need not be, strictly speaking, a 'workman' "thin the

(') A.I.R. (1955) N.U.C.

Allahabad

664.

(

2

) (1953) 55 Born. 1 R. 125.

J!lJS

JY orl'fneti of

DitMk1l-chi

T e-1i. Elt<lte

v.

Tlie .Marutg 1~1r~nt of

JJim,alatcl1i

Tv.i. E~late

S.K. /Jo,J.

1182 SU.PHE.ME COURT H.EPORTS [1958]

meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment,

non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of la­

bour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial in­

terest.

Jn the case before us, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a

'workman'. He belonged to the medical or t_echnical staff­

a different category altogether from workmen. The appellants

had no direct, nor substantial interest

in his employment or

non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member

of the

same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid

down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination

of

ser­

vice was an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k)

of the Act.

The result. therefore,

is that the appeal fails and is

dis­

missed. In the circumstances of this case there will be no

order for costs.

SARKAR J.--On November 1, 1950, Dr. K. P. Banerjee

was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dima­

kudhi Tea Estate, whose management is the respondent in

this appeal. On April 21, 1951, the respondeni .terminated

Dr. Banerjee's service with effect from the next day and he

was offered one month's salary in lieu of notice. He accepted

this salary and later left the Tea Estate. The workmen of

the Tea Estate raised a dispute concerning the dismissal

of

Dr. Banerjee.

On December 23, 1953, the Government of

Assam made an order of reference for adjudication of the

dispute by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of

s.

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The order of refer­

ence was in the following terms

Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen

in the matters

·specified in the schedule below between:

(!) The workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate. P.O. Dima­

kuchi, District Darrang, Assam represented by the Secretary,

Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, I.N.T.U.C. Office, P.O.

Dibrugarh, Assam and,

(2) The management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, P.O.

Dimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam whose agents are Messrs.

Williamson Magor and Company Limited, Calcutta.

RC.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1183

And whereas it is considered expedient by the Govt. of 1958

Assam to refer the said dispute for adjudication to a Tri.bunal Worktnµi of

IXmalDuchi

-constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Tea Estate

1947 (Act XIV of 1947) Th6Ma~emenlof

Now. therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by ~':;;

-clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10, as amended, of _the

Industrial Disputes Act <XIV of 1947), the Governor of

Assam

is pleased to refer the said dispute to

Sri Uma Kanta

Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge (retired) who

has been appointed to constitute a Tribunal under the pro-

visions

of the said Act. SCHEDULE

(i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

was justified

in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M.

O.?

·(ii) If not, is he entitled to re-instatement or any other

relief in lieu thereof?

The Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman

:as defined in the

Act and, therefore, the dispute referred was ·

not an industrial dispute and consequently it had

no

jurisdic­

tion to adjudicate upon such a dispute. Tb'e workmen pre·

ferred an appeal. to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. · That

Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that Dr. Banerjee was

not a workman within the definition

of that term in the Act

and as the dispute was connected with his employment or

non-employment, it was not

an industrial dispute, and was

therefore beyond the jurisdiCtion of the Industrial Tribunal.

From that decision

·the present appeal by the workmen of

the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by this -Court under

Art. 136 of. the Constitution~ In granting the leave this Court

limited it to the question whether a dispute in relation to a

person who is not a workman, falls within the scope of the

definition of "Industrial Dispute" contained in s. 2(k) of the

Act. That, therefore,

is the only question before us.

Section 2(k) is in these terms:

"Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference bet­

ween employers and employers or between employers and

Sarkar J.

Jf orkmtn of

IJimakueki

Pee EMle

v.

Tl" Jf•·••u-of

J}r'm.nkuehi

1-·ea Edak

So-rkar J.

1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1958

workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is

connected with the employment

or.

non-employment or the

terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of

any person."

The. dispute that was raised was between an employer,

the respondent in this appeal and its workmen, the appellants

before us and concerned the employment or non·employment

of Dr. Banerjee, a person employed by the same employer

but who was not

a workman. The question that we have to

decide

has arisen because of the use of the words "any per­

son" in the definition. These words are quite general and

very wide and according to their ordinary meaning include

a person who is not a workman. If this meaning is given to

these words, then the dispute that arose concerning

Dr.

Banerjee's dismissal would be an industrial dispute because

the dispute would then be clearly within

s. 2(k). This indeed

is not

disputed. Unless there are reasons to the contrary these

words have to be given their ordinary meaning. In Bir/a

Brothers Ltd. v. Modak(') and in Western India Automobile

Association

v. Industrial

Trilnmal of Bombay(') it was held

that the \vords Hany person" Y.'ere not meant to refer only

to workmen as defined in the Act but were wide and general

and would include others who were not such workmen. In

The Dalhousie lute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak('), Banerjee J.

said, "Any person means whatever individual is chosen. I

see no reason to restrict the meaning of the word 'person'."

The same view was expressed in East India Industries

(Madras) Ltd. v. Their Workmen('), which was the decision

of an Industrial Tribunal. There is then some support for

the view that the words 'any person' should have no restric­

tion put upon them.

It is pointed out on behalf of the respondent that it is

not its contention that the words 'any person' should be

understood as referring only to a

"workman" as defined in

the Act but that those words should include all persons of

(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. (') [1949] F.C.R. 321.

(') [1951] 1 L.L.J. 154. (') [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1185

the workman class and so they would include discharged 1956

workmen. It is then stated that the first two of the cases men• w orlmim of

tioned above were concerned with a dispute regarding dis· f.':E=i

charged workmen and did not therefore decide that the Y.

• • 'l'hs M anagemuit of

words 'any person' included all. It is no doubt true that IXmak<uchi

these cases were concerned with a dispute regarding discharg· Te" E•lal<

cd workmen but I do not understand the decision to have Sarkar .1.

proceeded on that basis. Sen 1. said in Birla Brothers case(')

(p 213) that, "It cannot be argued that workmen dismissed

prior to the Act are not 'persons' ". Anfi in the Western

India Automoble Association case('), it was said (p. 346-7).

"It was contended that the reinstatement of the dis·

charged workmen was not an industrial dispute because if

the union represented the discharged employees, they were

not workmen within the definition of that word in the Indus·

trial Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no

difficulty in the respondents {union) taking up the cause of .

. the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an indus­

trial dispute between the employer and the workmen. The

non-employment "of any person" can amount to an indus·

trial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling

under the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes

Act.

It was argued that if the respondents represented the

undischarged employees, there

was no dispute between them

and the employer. That again

is fallacious, because under the

definition of industrial dispute, it

is not necessary that the

parties to the proceedings can be the discharged workmen

only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute,

viz.,

"any person", are a complete answer to this argument

of the appellants."

The last two of the cases mentioned earlier were not how·

ever concerned with any dispute regarding discharged work·

men. In The Dalhousie Jute Co. case(') the dispute was with

regard to the employment of persons who sought employment

as workmen and in the East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. case('} the dispute concerned the dismissal of a member of

(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. ("). [1949] F.C.R. 321,

(') [1951] 1 L.L.J. 145. (4) [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.

1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)

1~68 the supervisory staff, that is, another employee of the same

wori,..,. of employer who was not a workman. It is however said that

Di~i in none of these cases the arguments that are now advanced

Tea E.,,,,. appear to have been advanced and they were not consider-ed

Tlle .Ma,.:g.,..,., of in the judgments. This comment is justified. I shall there­

n;....-; fore lay these cases aside in deciding the question that has

Tt11 E"°" arisen .

8irkar J. •

Are there then good reasons for not giving to the words

"any persons" their plain meaning? Several have been ad­

vanced and I shall examine them a little later. I wish now

. to discuss how it is· proposed to restrict the meaning of these

words,. I have already stated that the contention is that the

words are not confined to a workman but refer only to a

person of the workman

class. This, I confess, I do not fol-

· low. The word "workman" is a term defined in the Act.

Outside the definition it

is impossible to say who is a

work­

man and who is not. That being so, the words "workman

dass" would be meaningless unless they meant all persons

who were workmen 'as defined in ·the Act. So read the

words "any ·person" would niean only a workman. But it is

.conceded that this is not so. And, of course, it cannot be so,

for,

if that was intended, there was no reason for the

legisla­

ture not to have used the words "any workman" instead of

the words "any person". Again if this was the intention,

then a dispute concerning the dismissal of a workman would

not be an industrial dispute for a dismissed workman was

not a workman within the definition of . that word in the Act

as it stood

in 1953, that being the Act with which we

life

concerned. Such a result is against all conceptions of indus­

trial disputes laws. It is indeed not contended that a dis­

pute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an

industrial dispute.

It therefore seems to me that the words "any person" cannot be said to refer only to persons of the

workman cl.ass. If they cannot be restricted as being under­

stood to refer only to a person of the workman class, it is not

suggested that they can be restricted in any other manner.

It is then said that the words refer to

"workmen". dis-

S.O.R SUPRE~IK COURT H.EPOl-nS 1187

missed as well as in employment as also those, who in future, 1958

become "workmen"'. Again I am in difficulty. So under-ll'orl,mon of

l

· l d h ks JJimalmcl1i

stood the words wou d not me u e a person w o see em-. 7.'ea l!Jatat•

ployment as a workman because he has not become a work- v.

• . • . 'Plw .illam.aae11ient <U

man tdl he is employed. That bemg so, it would have to be Dimakucki

said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when 1'rnEstatc

new workmen are to be appointed, that only those of the Sirkar J.

candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed

and others should not

be, would not be an industrial dispute.

That

again seems to me to be against all conceptions of in-

dustrial dispute laws. Furthermore, I am wholly unable to

appreciate what

is meant by a dispute concerning a person,

who is not at the time the dispute arises, a workman but in

future

becomes one. When is. such a person to become a

workman? I

find no answer. Again, is it to be said that

whether a dispute

is an industrial dispute or not may have

to depend on future circumstances for there is no knowing

whether the person concerning

whom the dispute arises will

later become a workman or not?

.If he becomes one, there

can

be no dispute concerning him referable to a point of time

before he became one, and,

if he does not, he cannot be one

who in future becomes a workman.

It is said that the words

"any person" were used instead

of the word workffian because it was intended to include

within them persons

who had been dismissed before the dis­

pute arose and who were not within the definition of work­

men in the Act as it stood in 1953. If that was the reason,

why could not the legislature use the words

"workmen and

dismissed workmen?" There was nothing to prevent that

being done.

In fact the definition of

"workman" has been

amended in

1956 to include workmen discharged in conse­

quence of an industrial dispute or whose discharge has led to

that dispute.

So, as the definition now stands, it includes

persons dismissed before the dispute arose. Yet the words

"any person" have been !aft untouched in s. 2 (k) .and not

been replaced by the word workman. This, to

my mind,

1968

IVM/cmeno/

Dimak"""i

1188 SUPREME COURT REPORT [1958]

shows that it was not the intention to confine the words "any

person" to workmen in employment or discharged.

Tea E<taJ• But it is said that the words "any person" were left in

p/,. Ma~,.,...,.1 of the Act because it was intended to include not only workmen

Dimakuchi in employment and dismissed workmen but also persons

Tea E•tate who in future become workmen. It is said that, that this is

BirkarJ. so appears from s. 18 of the Act. I shali presently consider

this section but I desire to observe now that this argument

much weakens the argument noticed in the preceding para­

graph, for if the words "any person" were used so that persons

who in future become workmen might be included in them,

they could not have been used to avoid such dismissed work­

men as were not workmen as defined in the Act being ex­

cluded from them. It seems to me that if it is argued that

the words "any person" were used so that persons who in

future become workmen may be included in them, it cannot

be argued that those words were used instead

of the word

"workman" because it was intended to include within them

certain dismissed workmen who were not workmen within

the definition

of that term in the Act as it stood in 1953.

Coming now to

s. 18 it is in these terms:

A settlemem arrived

at in the course of conciliation

pro­

ceedings under this Act or an a ward which has become en­

forceable sha II be binding on-

( a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the pro­

ceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board or Tribu­

nal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were

so summoned without proper cause;

(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b)

is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of

the establishment to which the dispute relates;

(d) where a party

roferred to in clause (a) or clause (b)

is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in

the establishment

or part of the establishment, as the case

may be, to which the dispute relates

on the date of the

dis­

pute and all persons who subsequently become employed in

that establishment or part.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1189

I entirely fail to see how that section assists at all in finding 1958

out who were meant to be included in the words "any per-Workmen of

son". Is it to be said that s. l8(d) by making the award -';;:.::;:

binding on those who become in future employed in the · v,

l

. h

km

· d' h h The Management of

estab is ment as wor en, 1n icates t at sue persons are Dimakuchi

treated in the same. way as workmen in actual employment Tea Estate

and therefore it must have been iq.tended to include them Sirkar J_

within the words "any person" along with present and dis-

missed workmen. I am wholly unable to agree. The object

of s. 18(d) is quite clear. The Act is intended to compose

a dispute between an employer and his workmen by a settle-

ment or an award brought about by the machinery provided

in it and the period during which an award or a settlement

is to remain in. force is also provided. The idea behind s. 18

is that whoever takes up appointment as a workman in the

establishment to which the dispute relates

· during the time

when the award or settlement is in force, would be bound

by it.

If it were not so, the

award or settlement would have

little effect in settling a dispute, for any newly recruited work·

men could again raise the dispute. Any one -having any

experience of industries knows that workmen are largely a

shifting population and that the need for replacement of the

workmen leaving and for addition to the strength of the

workmen employed,

is not infrequent. To meet the exigen-

cy arising

from this need and to make the award or settle-

ment effective it was necessary to enact

s. 18(d). Its object

was not to place workmen

in

em]11.oyment and, workmen

recruited in future

in the same position for all purposes of

the Act. On

the. same reasoning, in view of s. 18(a), it has

to be said that it

was the intention of the Act to give the

heirs, successors or assignees of an employer the same posi-

tion for all purposes of the Act as that

of the employer. But

that would be absurd. Section

18(d) deals with a person

who in future becomes employed. The section

does

not say employed as a workman but I will assume

that that

is what is meant. I do not understand

what

is meant by saying that such a person is within the

words

"any person" in s. 2(k). What is the point of time that

1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]

1968 has to be considered? If it is after he has become employed,

Workma" of then he is a workman and admittedly within the words "any

DiflllJh<hi person". Is it to be said that before such employment also

TCJJvEBlate he is within the meaning of those words. But it is difficult to

Th• Ma':fi:• of follow this. It is conceivable that any person whatsoever

~ima i may in future be employed as a workman for there is noth-

<• EBla•• ing in the quality of a human being that marks him out as a

Birkar J. workman. In this way the words "any person" would include

all. That, however,

is not meant, for it will defeat the very

argument based on

s. 18(d). Is it to be said then, only such

future workmen are meant

as apply for jobs as such? But

the section makes

no reference to such people at all and

can­

not therafore be of any assistance in showing that it was

intended that such applicants would be included within the

words "any person". I am therefore wholly unable to accept

the argument that

s. 18(d) shows that future workmen were

intended to

be included within the words

"any person". I

wish also to say this. Assume that s. 18(d) shows that it was

intended to include within the words "any person" one who

in future becomes a workman. But where

is the reason for

saying that the words

do not also include others?

Section

18 provides none.

I proceed now to discuss the reasons advanced for res­

tricting the generality of the words "any person". They were·

put as follows :

l. In certain sections of the Act the words "any person"

have been used but there the rwerence is to worknien, and

therefore iri s. 2(k) the words "any person" should mean per­

sons of the workman class.

2. The scheme anlt the purpose of the Act generally

and the object of

.the Act specially being to benefit

work­

men, the words "any person" should be confined to people

of the workman

class.

3. The word

"dispute" in s. 2(k) itself indicates that the

person raising the dispute must be interested in the dispute

and therefore since the dispute must concern the employ­

ment, non-employment, terms of employment or the condi­

tions of labour of a person, that person must be of the work­

man class.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1191

The first reason, then, is that in certain sections, the 19.;t

Workmen of

Dimakuch>

Pea Eslate

v.

7'1•e Management of

Di11111kuc1'i

Act uses the words "any person". I will assume that by the

use of these words only workmen are intended to be referred

to in these sections. But the question arises

why is such

intention to be inferred? Clearly, because the context

re­

quires it. I will refer to some of these sections to make my

point clear. Section 2(1) defines a lock-out as "the closing

of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the

refusal by the employer to continue to employ any number

of persons employed by him". Section 2(q) defines a strike

as "a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in

any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal,

or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number ·

of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to

work

or to accept

employment." Lock-outs and strikes are

dealt with in

ss. 22. 23 and 24 of the Act.

Section 22(2)

says that no employer carrying on any public utility service

shall lock-out any of his workmen except on certain condi~

tions mentioned in the section. Section 23 says that no em­

ployer of any workman employed in any industrial establish­

ment shall declare a lock-out during the periods mentioned

in the section. Section 24 states that a strike or a lock-out

shall be illegal if commenced

or declared in contravention of

s. 22 or s. 23. The definitions of lock-outs and strikes are

for the purposes of

ss. 22, 23 and 24. There are other sections

in

which lock-outs and strikes are mentioned but they make

no difference for our present purpose. The lock-outs and

strikes dealt with in ss. 22(2), 23 and 24 are lock-outs of and

strikes by. workmen. It may hence be said that in s. 2(1)

and (q1 by the word person a workman is meant. Therefore

it

is these sections, viz., 22(2), 23 and 24, which show what the

meaning of the word 'person' in the definitions

is. I would

like

lo point out in passing that s. 22(1) says that no person

employed in a public utility service shall

go on strike except on

certain conditions and there

is nothing in the Act

to show

that the word "person" in s. 22(1) means only a workman.

Proceedin~ however with the· point we are concerned with,

Pea Eslate

Sirlcar j,

1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]

1958 the question is, is there any provision in the Act which

wo,kman of would show that the words "any person" in s. 2(k) were

1;.':::'l:!'~ meant only to refer to persons of the workman class. I have

v. not been able to find any and none has been pointed out.

Tli.e Management of , .

Dimakuchi Therefore the fact that m s. 2, sub-ss. (]) and (q) the word

Tw Estak ''persons" means workmen is no reason for concluding that

Sarkar J. the same word must be given the same restricted meaing in s.

2(k). The position with regard to s. 33A, in which the word

ernploye~ has to be read as meaning a workman because of

s. 33, is the same and does not require to be dealt with spe­

cially. I may add that if it has tq be said that because in

certain other sections the word "person" has to be under­

stood as referring to a workman only, in s. 2(k) also the same

word must have the same meaning, then

we have to read the

words

"any person" in s. 2(k) as meaning only a workman

as defined in the Act. This however

is not the contention

of the learned counsel for the respondent. I may further say

that

it was not contended that the word

"person" in s. 2,

sub-ss. (1) and (q) and the word employee in s. 33A has to

be read as including not only a workman in employment but

also a discharged workman and a person who in future be­

comes a workman, and it seems to me that such a contention

would not have been possible.

I proceed now

to deal with the second group of reasons

based on the object and scheme of the Act. It is said that the

Act makes a distinction between employees who are work­

men and all other employees, and that the focus of the Act

is on workmen and it was intended mainly for them. This

was the view taken in

United Commercial Bank Ltd. v.

Kedar Nath Gupta('). I will assume all this. It may also be

true that the Act is not much concerned with employees

other than workmen. But I am unable to see that all

this

is any reason for holding that the words "any person" must

mean a person of the workman class.

The

d(lfinition in s.

2(k) would be fully concerned with workmen however the

(') [1952] 1 L.L.J. 782.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1193

words "any person" in it may be understood because the dis- 1968

pute will be one to which a workman is a party. Is it to be Workmen of

· d d f km Dimakuchi

said that the Act would cease to be mten e or wor en Tea E/JlaU

or the focus of it displaced from workmen or that the distinc- v.

. . The Management of

t10n between workmen and other· employees would vamsh Dimakuehi

if a dispute relating to the dismissal of one who is not a ea Estate

workman is held to be an industrial dispute, even though Sarkar J.

the dispute is one to which workmen are parties? I am un-

able to subscribe to such art argument. But it is said that in

such a case the workmen would not be interested in the dis-

pute, the dispute would not really be with them and they would

not be in any real sense of the word parties to it. So put

the argument comes under the last of the three reasons ear-

lier stated, namely, that in order that there may be an indus-

trial· dispute the workmen must be interested in that dispute.

This contention I will consider later.

It is also said in the United Commercial Bank Case(') that the main purpose of

the Act

is to adjust the relations between employers and

workmen by securing for the latter the benefit provided by

the Act.

It is really another way of saying that the work-

men must be interested

in the dispute, for if they are not

interested no benefit

.can accrue to them from an adjustment

o1 it. This, as I have said, I will discuss. later.

It is also said that the Act is for the benefit of workmen

and therefore if a dispute concerning a person who is not a

workman,

is an industrial dispute capable of being resolved by

adjudication under the Act, then, if the award

goes in favour

of the workmen raising it, a benefit would result to a person

whom the Act did not intend to .benefit.

So it is said, an in­

dustrial dispute cannot be a dispute concerning one who is

not a workman. But the benefit resulting to the person in

such a case would only be incidental. The workmen them­

selves would also be benefited by it at the same time. To

adopt this argument would be to deprive the workmen of

this benefit and there

is no justification for doing so. How

the workmen would be benefited would appear later when I

discuss the question of the workmen's interest in the dispute.

(

1)[1952] 1 L.L.J.

782.·

L/P(fl)3SCI-ll

ll94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958J

1968 I will show later that if the workmen were not interested in

ll'Mkmeno/ the dispute so that they could get no benefit under it, there

Di....w.hi

would be no. reference by the Government and there would

'1'et(E81Dl<

... be no benefit to a person who was not a workman. Further.

'1'1"' AfJt::::s::::M' of I am unable to agree that the Act is intended to confer

'1'"' Estate benefit on workmen. Its object is admitted by all to pre-

Barkor J. serve industrial peace. It may confer some benefit on work­

men but at the same time it takes away their power and

right to strike and puts them under a disadvantage.

We were

referred' to the note of dissent to the award of

the majority of tbe All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Dis­

putes), dated July 31, 1950. This note was by Mr. Chandra

Sekhar Aiyer who later became a Judge of this Court. In

that note he expressed the view that "any person" in s. 2(k)

means any one who belongs to 'the employer class or the

workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against

whom, can be said to be adequately represented by the

group or category of persons to which he belongs. I have

already stated

my difficulties in agreeing that the words

"any

person" mean only persons of the workman class. I will

presently deal with the reasoning on which

Mr. Aiyer bases

his view but I wish

to say now that it seems to me that the

words

"any person" cannot refer to anyone belonging to the

employer class becl'use the dispute must be in connection

with the employment, non-employment, or terms of employ­

ment

or the conditions of labour of any person and it is not

possible

to conceive of any such thing in connection with a

person in his capacity as an employer.

Mr. Aiyar first stated that a necessary limitation to be

put on the words

"any person" is that the person should have

something to do with the particular establishment where the

dispute has cropped up. He said that it could not be

that

the workmen in Bank A could raise a valid and legitimate

industrial dispute with their employer because some one

in

Bank B had not been treated well by his employer. Assume

this is

so. But it does not follow that an industrial dispute

must be one concerning a person of the workman class alone,

for a person having something to do with an establishment

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT 1195

need not necessarily belong to the workman class. An officer 1968

in an establishment where the dispute crops up would be as Wor'lerMnoJ

much a person having something to do with that establish· ~!='11:'::

ment as a workman there and, therefore, even assuming that v.

the limitation suggested by Mr. Aiyar applies, there would The ff.':::fueri;:.m of

be nothing in it to prevent an industrial dispute concerning Pea Ealale

him arising. The question is not whether the person con-SarkarJ.

cerning whom an industrial dispute may arise. has to be

employed in the establishment where the dispute arises, but

whether

he must belong to what has been called the work-

man class. The

decis~on of the former question which has not

arisen in ttis case, is of no help in deciding the question that

has arisen and I do not therefore

feel called upon to express

any opinion with regard to it.

Mr. Aiyar next referred to a case where workmen of a

Bank raise a dispute with that Bank about an employee of

the Bank

who was not

ai workman, for example an officer

who had been dismissed. He assumed that the Bank and

the

officer had no dispute as between themselves. In his

view, if in such a case the dispute was an industrial dispute

and could be made the subject matter of an award by an

Industrial Tribunal, the award would not be binding on the

officer because he had no concern with the dispute.

Accord­

ing to him, it would be absurd to suggest that the Bank was

under an obligation to give effect to the award. Therefore,

in his

view, such a dispute would not be an industrial

dis­

pute. Now, whether the award would be binding on the

officer or not, would depend on whether he could be made

a party to the dispute under

s. 18(b). It is not necessary to

discuss that question

now. But assume that the award was

not binding on the officer. Why should not the Bank be

under an obligation

to give effect to the award in so far as

it lay in its power

to do so? If the dispute was an industrial

dispute; the award would

be binding on the Bank and it

must

give effect to it. Then the argument comes to this that

the dispute

is not an industrial dispute because the award

1196 SUPREl\iE COURT REPORTS [1958]

1968 would not, as assumed, be binding on the officer concerning

W""k""'••f whom the dispute arose. I cannot accept this view. Take

Dimaltui/ti h" A 1 · ·

TG<t Esia"' t is case. n emp oyer d1sm1sses five of his workmen. The

v. workmen dismissed make no grievance. Three months later

T/1e .1.,!ana(fement of . . . .

1Jimakuc1'i the employer d1sm1sses twenty five more and again neither

Tea Esia"' the dismissed workmen nor the workmen in employment

Sarkar J. raise any dispute. Two months after the second dismissal the

employer dismisses fifty workmen. These workmen make no

complaint and leave. The workmen in employment now

begin to take notice of the dismissals and think that the em­

ployer is acting on a set policy and raise a dispute about all

the dismissals. The dispute

is then referred for adjudication

and an award is made in favour of the workmen. Assume

that all the dismissed workmen could be made parties

to the

adjudication proceedings

but for one reason or another, were

not made parties. This award would· not be binding on the

dismissed workmen and certainly not on those who

had been

dismissed

on the two earlier occasions. They would not be

covered by any of the provisions

of s. 18. Is it to be said

that for

that reason the dispute is not an industrial dispute?

I am wholly unable to agree.

Such a dispute would be en­

tirely within the definition even on the assumption that the

words "any person" mean only persons of the workman class.

It follows, therefore, that in order to decide whether a dis­

pute is or is not an industrial dispute, the question whether

the award would be binding on tbe person concerning whose

employment the dispute was raised,

is no test. I therefore

find nothing in the minute of dissent of Mr. Aiyar to justify

the putting of any restriction on the plain meaning

of the

words

"any person" in s. 2(k). As I shall show later, if cer­

tain disputes concerning foremen who are not workmen and

who I will assnme would not be bound by the award, are not

to be industrial disputes, the object of the Act would clearly

be defeated. I cannot therefore agree

that the fact that an

award is not binding on one affords a reason for holding that

there cannot be an industrial dispute concerning him.

The matter was put from another point of view. It is

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1197

~aid that if workmen could raise an industrial dispute with 1958

their employer concerning the salary of a manager, who wa~ Wurk"ie" of

d d d d

. · h Dimakucki

not a workman, an an awar was ma e 1rectmg t e em-Tea Bstaie

ployer to pay a smaller salary to the manager, the employer v. ,,

Tlie Manageme1tt o

1

would be bound by the award but not the manager. Then Dimakuchi

it is said, suppose the employer had made a contract with Tea E•tat•

the manager to employ him at the higher salary for a number SarkarJ.

of years. It is pointed out that in such a case the awarr·

being binding on the employer, he would be compelled to

commit a breach of his contract and be liable to the manager

in damages.

It is said that it could not have been the inten-

tion of the Act to produce a result whereby

an employer

would become liable in damages and therefore such a dis-

pute

cannot be an industrial dispute. But I do not agree

that the employer would be liable in damages.

The award

being binding on him under the Act, the performance of his

contract with the manager would become unlawful after the

award

and therefore void under s. 56 of the Contract Act.

The employer would not, by carrying out the award, be com-

mitting any breach of contract nor would he be liable

in

damages. To hold that the dispute contemplated is an in-

dustrial dispute, would not

produc.:: the absurd result sug-

gestecl. The reason suggested for not holding that dispute to

be

an industrial dispute, therefore, fails.

Take another case.

Suppose there was a dispute bet­

ween two employers A and B concerning the wage to be

paid by B to his workmen, A complaining that B was paying

too high wages, and the dispute was referred for adjudica­

tion by a Tribunal and

an award was

made that B should

reduce the wages of his workmen. Assume the workmen

were not parties to the dispute

and were not made parties

even if it was possible to do so. The award would not be

binding on the workmen concerned under

s. 18. None the

less it cannot be said that the dispute was not an industrial

dispute.

It completely satisfies the definition of an indus­

trial dispute even on the basis

that the words 'any

persons"

mean only workmen. So again it would appear that the

1968

1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]

words may include one on whom the award would not be

binding. Workmen.of

Dim.akuchi

Tea Es'416

v. I may add here, though I do not propose to decide the

Th< .M~nagem•'!' o/ question it being wholly unnecessary for the case before us

D•makucln . '

Tea EBlaJ• that 1t seems to me that when a dispute concerns a person whe-

80,,,,,, J. ther a workman or not, who is not a party to the dispute, he

can, under s. 18(b), be properly made a party to appear in the

proceedings arising out of that dispute. I

find nothing in

that section to prevent such a course being adopted.

If he

is made a party, there is no doubt that the decision,

which­

ever way it went, would be most satisfactory to all concern­

ed. If this is the right view, then all arguments based on the

fact that the words "any person" can only include one on

whom the award would be binding would disappear, for on

being made a party the award would be binding on that

person.

It would on the contrary show that it was intended

that the words

"any person" should include one who is not

a party to the dispute, and therefore not in the workman

class.

An argument based on

s. 33 was also advanced. That

is this. The section provides that during the pendency of

conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal

in

respect of an industrial dispute the conditions of service of

workmen concerned in the dispute cannot be changed by the

employer, nor such workmen dismissed or otherwise punished

by him except with the permission of the Board or Tribunal.

It is said that this section shows that it was intended to

pro­

tect only workmen and therefore the words "any person" in

s. 2(k) should be understood as meaning workmen only. I do

not follow this argument at all. Section 33 gives protection

to workmen concerned in the dispute which can only mean

workmen who are parties to the dispute. A workman con­

cerning whom a dispute arises may or may n:ot be a party

to the dispute. The object of the section is clear.

If

work­

men could be punished during the pendency of the proceed­

ings, then no workman would raise a dispute or want to take

part in the proceedings under the Act concerned with its

adjudication. Further, such punishment would surely give

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1199

rise

to another dispute. AU this would defeat the entire

object

of the Act which is to compose disputes by settlement

or adjudication. Section 33 gives protection to workmen who

are parties

· to the dispute and does not purport to concern

itself with the person concerning whom the dispute arises.

Such being the position, the section can throw no light on

the meaning of the words "any person" in s. 2(k). Suppose a

workman was dismissed and thereupon a dispute arose bet­

ween the employer and the other workmen in employment

concerning such dismissal. Such a dispute would be un­

doubtedly an industrial dispute. And it is none the less so,

though no protection can be given to the dismissed workman

under

s. 33 for he is already dismissed.

· Reference was also made to s. 36 which provides for the

representation of the parties to a dispute in a proceeding

arising under the Act out of such dispute. Sub-section

(1) of

s. 36 provides how a workman, who is a party, shall be

repre­

sented and sub-section (2) provides bow an employer who is

likewise a party, shall be represented. The section does not

provide for representation of any other person.

It is said

that this shows that the words

"any person" must mean only.

a workman, because they must mean an employee, past,

present or future and only such employees as are workmen

can be parties to the dispute under the definitibn. I am

unable to agree. Section 36 provides for the representation of workmen besides employers and of no one else, because

no one

but a party need be represented in the proceedings

and under the definition, a party to an industrial dispute

must either be

an employer or a workman. This section has

nothing to do with the person concerning whom the dispute

arises.

If, however, he is also a party to the dispute, then

the section makes a provision for his representation in the

proceedings arising out of that dispute as such a party and

not as one concerning whom the dispute has arisen. I have

. earlier said that there may be a case in which though the

person concerning whom the dispute arises is a workman,

still he may not be a party to it. The fact that besides an

1968

Workmen of

.Dima!tucM

TtaEetau

v.

The Managemind tf

Dima!tucM

P.aEatala

Sarkar J.

1200 SUPRElE COURT REPORTS (1968}

1958 employer, the Act makes provision for the representation in

Workmeno/ the proceedings arising out of an industrial dispute of work-

1i-~-;a;::;:;; men alone does not show that an industrial dispute can only

v. arise concerning a workman. In my view, therefore s. 36

Ph<Managemtnto/ . f . . fi d" h . f h d

Dim•l:uchi 1s o no asst.stance m n mg out t e meamng o t e wor s

PeaE#alt "any person".

Sarkar J,

I come now to the last of the reasons advanced for res­

tricting the natural meaning of the words "any person". It

is said that the word dispute in the definition shows that the

person raising it must have an interest in it and therefore

since the dispute must concern the employment, non-employ­

ment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of a

person that person must be a workman. I confess I do

not

follow the reasoning. It is said that this is the view

ex­

pressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of

Chagla

C. J. and

Shah J. in Narendra Kumar Sen v. The

All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal(').

I have some difficulty in seeing that this is the view expressed

in that case. What happened there was that certain work­

men raised a dispute against their employer which includ·ed

a demand for fixing scales of pay and for bonus not only

for themselves

but also for the foremen and divisional heads

under the same employers who

·were not workmen and this

dispute had been referred by the Government for adjudica­

tion by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal refused to ad­

judicate the dispute in so far as it concerned the pay and

bonus of persons who were not workmen as, according to it,

to this extent it was not an industrial dispute. The work­

men then applied to the High Court for a writ directing the

Tribunal to decide the dispute relating to the claims made

for the pay and bonus of the persons who were not workmen.

The-High Court held that the dispute was not an industrial

dispute and refused the writ. Chagla C. J. expressed himself

in these words

(p.

130):

"A controversy which is connected with the employ­

ment or non-employment or the terms of employment or

with the conditions of labour is an industrial controversy.

But it

is not enough that it should be an industrial contro-

(') (1953) 55 Born. L.R. 125.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1201

versy; it must be a dispute; and in my opinion it is not every 1958

controversy or every difference of opinion between work- Workmen of

· d' d' ff Dima1'uchi

men and employers which is constituted a ispute or 1 er-Tea E8tate

ence within the meaning of s. 2(k). A workman may have v.

'd l · l d'ff · h h' l k The Managcmenl ot

t eo og1ca 1 erences wit is emp oyer; a wor man may Dimal-uchi

feel sympathetic consideration for an employee in his own in-Tea Estate

dustry gr in other industry; a workman may feel seriously Sarkar J.

agitated about the conditions of labour outside our own

country; but it is absurd to suggest that any of these factors

would entitle a workman to raise an industrial dispute within

the meaning of

s. 2(k). The dispute contemplated by s.

2(k)

is a controversy in which the workman is directly and

substantially interested.

It must also be a grievance felt by

the workman which the employer

is in a position to remedy.

Both the conditions must be present;

it. must be a grievance

of the

workman himself; it must be a grievance which the

employer

as an employer is in a position to remedy or set right."

Then he said \p. 131):

"It is only primarily in their own employment, in their

own terms of employment, in their own conditions of labour

that wcrkmen are interested and it is with regard these that

they are entitled to agitate by means of raising an industrial

dispute and getting it referred to a Tribunal by the Govern­

ment under s. 10."

I find some difficulty in accepting all that the learned

Chief Justice said. But assume he

is right. How does it

follow that because an industrial dispute

is one in which

workmen must be interested it must be concerning

them­

selves? I do not see that it does. Neither do I find Chagla

C. J. saying so. In the case before him the dispute con­

cerned persons who were not workmen and he found on the

facts before him that the workmen were not interested in

that dispute and thereupon held that the dispute

was

not an

industrial dispute. But that

is not saying that an industrial

dispute can only be a dispute concerning workmen. Even

the observations that I have read

.from p. 131 of the report

would not support this

view. It is not difficult to conceive

1958

Workmen oJ

1202 SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1958]

of a dispute concerning the employment of a person who is

not a workman which at the same time is one which affects

n;~:~~~ the conditions of labour or terms of employment of the

v. workmen themselves. I shall give examples of such disputes

1'Ae Manag.,..nt of 1 Wh I · h · · h "f · d

DimaL.,,.,.i ater. at WIS now to pomt out IS t at even 1 an m us-

Ten Estai. trial dispute has to be one in which workmen are interested,

Sarkar J. that would be no reason for saying that it can only be a dis­

pute concerning workmen and that therefore the words "any

person" in s. 2(k) must mean only workmen. I also think

it right to say now that this argument is not really open to

the respondent, for the contention of the learned counsel for

the respondent is,

as I have earlier stated, that the words

"any person" do not mean a workman only but mean all

persons of the workman class, or past, present and future

workmen.

Now I find nothing in the judgment of Chagla

C. J. to show that workmen can be interested in the work­

man class or in past or future workmen. On the contrary

he says that workmen are interested

primarily-and by the

word

"primarily" I think he means, directly and substantially

-only in their own employment, terms of employment or

conditions of labour. Reliance on the judgment of the

Bombay High Court will therefore land the respondent in

contradiction.

I

find great difficulty in saying that it is a condition of

the existence of an industrial dispute that workmen must be

interested· in it. The Act does not say so. But it is .said

that the word dispute in the definition implies it. No doubt.

one does not raise a dispute unless he

is interested in it, and

as the Act must be taken to have in contemplation normal

men it must

have assumed that workmen will not raise a dis­

·pute unless they are interested in it. But that is not to my

mind saying that it i~ a condition of an industrial dispute as

contemplated by the Act that workmen must be interested

in

it.

So to hold would, in my opinion, lead to grave difficul­

ties and might even result in defeating the object of the Act.

This I

will endeavour to show presently. What I have to say

will also show that even assuming that an industrial dispute

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1203

is one in which workmen have to be interested, the dispute 1968

that we have in this case concerning Dr. Banerjee's dismissal Workmenof

is an industrial dispute for the appellant worlanen are ~~r;;:;;:;;

directly and substantially interested in it. v.

The Managemenl of

The question that first strikes me, is what is the interest Dimakuehi

h

. h km h

? I fi d . . 'bl d fi

TeaEstate

w 1c wor en must ave. n 1t 1mposs1 e to e ne

that interest. If it cannot be defined, it cannot of course be Sarkar J.

made a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute,

for

we would then never know what an industrial dispute is.

Now,

"interest", as we understand that word in courts of law,

means the well-known concepts

of proprietary interest or

interest in other recognised civil rights.

Outside these the

matter becomes completely

at large and well nigh impossible ·Of definition. To say that the interest that the -workmen

must have is one of the well-known kinds of interest men-

tioned above is, to

my mind, to make the Act largely infruc-

tuous. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act

is not

dealing with interest as ordinarily understood.

It cannot

be kept in mind too

wel! that the Act is dealing with a new

concept, namely, that of the relation between employer and

·employed or to put it more significantly, between capital

.and labour, a concept which is undergoing a fast and elemen-

tal change from day to day. The numerous and radical

amendments made in tne Act since it came on the Statute

book not so long ago, testify to the fast changing nature of

the concept. Bearing all these things in inind, I find

it al-

most impossible to define adequately or with any usefulness

.an interest which will serve the purposes of the Act. I feel

that

an attempt to do so will introduce a rigidity which will

work harm and no good. Nor does it, to my mind, in any

manner help to define such interest by calling it direct and

:Substantial.

I

will illustrate the difficulty that I feel by an example

or two. Suppose a workman was dismissed by the employer

and the other workmen raised a dispute about it. Such a

dispute comes completely within the definition even assum­

ing that the words "any person" only refer to persons of the

1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]

1958 workman class, as the respondent contends. There is there-

Workmen of fore no doubt that such a dispute is an industrial dispute.

1?~':";:;! The question then is what interest have the disputing work-

v. men in the reinstatement of the dismissed workman if they

'l'he Management of h . ? . .

Dimakuchi must ave an interest. The reinstatement would not in any

Tea Esiate way improve their financial condition or otherwise enhance

Sarl:ar J. any interest of theirs in any sense of the term, in common

use. The only interest that I can think of the workmen

having for themselves in such a dispute

is the solidarity. of

labour. It is only this that if the same thing happens to any

one of them, the others would rally round and

by taking up

his cause prevent the dismissal. Apart from the Act how

would the workmen have prevented the dismissal from taking

effect? They would have,

if they wanted to prevent the

dismissal, gone on strike and thereby tried to force the

em­

ployer's hands not to give effect to 'the dismissal. That

would have destroyed the industrial peace which the object

of

the Act is to preserve. It is in order to achieve this

ob­

ject that the Act recognises this dispute as an industrial dis­

pute and provides for its settlement by the methods of

conciliation or adjudication contained in it and preserves the

industrial peace by preventing the parties being left to their

own devices.

If what I have described as solidarity

of

labour is to be considered as direct and substantial interest

for the purposes of an industrial dispute,

as I conceive is not

disputed by any one, then it

wilt appear that we have em­

barked on a new concept of interest. I will now take an­

other case which in regard to interest is the same as the pre­

vious one. Suppose the employer engages some workmen

at a low rate of wages and the other workmen raise a dis­

pute demanding that the wages of these low paid workmen

be increased. This case would be completely within the

definition of an industrial dispute even according to the most

restricted meaning that may be put upon the words "any

person", namely that they refer only to workmen as defined

in the Act, because the dispute concerns the terms of em­

ployment of such a workman. So this has admittedly to be

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1205

held to be an industrial dispute. What then is the interest 1958

of the workmen in this dispute? The increase in the wages Workmen of

· l DimakucM

claimed would not in any manner improve the financia con- Tea Estale

dition of the disputing workmen, nor serve any of their T' M v. ,,

. tie anagemenl o

1

interest as ordinarily understood. It would however help Dimakucl!i

h k

· · h h · d Tea Estate

t e wor men m seemg t at t elf own wages were not re ne-

ed by preventing the employer from being able to engage Barkar J.

any low paid workman at all. .Apart from this I can think

of no other interest that the disputing workmen may have

in the dispute.

If therefore it is essential that the disputing

workmen must have an interest in the dispute, this must be

that interest, for,

as already stated, the dispute is undoubted-

ly an 'industrial dispute.

If this is sufficient interest to constitute an industrial

dispute I fail to

see why the workmen have no sufficient

interest in a dispute in which they claim that a foreman who

is particularly rude and brutal in his behaviour should be

removed and they should have a more human foreman. This

is surely a matter in which the workmen raising the dispute

have a personal and immediate interest and not, as in the

last case, an interest in the prevention of something happen­

ing in future, which conceivably may never happen

at all.

Such an interest

is plainly nearer to

the ordinary kinds of

interest than the interest in solidarity of labour or in the

prevention of future harm which in the preceding paragraphs

have been found to be sufficient to sustain an industrial

dis­

pute. The dispute last imagined would undoubtedly be an

industrial dispute if the foreman

was a workman for then

it would be entirely within the definition of an industrial

dispute.

· Now suppose the foreman was not a workman.

Can it be said that then the dispute would not be an indus­

trial dispute? Would the interest of the workmen in the dis­

pute be any the less

or in any way different because the

foreman whose dismissal

was demanded was not a workman?

I conceive it impossible to say

so. Therefore if interest is

the test, the dispute that I have imagined would have to be

1958

Workmen. of

1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958J

held to

be an industrial dispute whether or not the foreman

concerned was a workman.

~;:"i Now assume that the dispute did not arise out of a

Th< Ma,.;;;..,,

111

of demand for the dismissal of a foreman but against his dis-

Dimakuchi missal on the ground that he was a particularly kind and

TeaEatate h . d h km

sympat et1c man an t e wor en were happy to work

Sarkar J.

under him. In such a case the interest of the workmen in

the dispute would be the same

as their interest in the dispute

demanding the foreman's dismissal. They would be

demand­

ing his reinstatement in their own interest; they would be

demanding it to make sure that their work would be easy

and smooth and that they would be happy in the discharge

of

it

Such a dispute therefore also has to be held to be an

industrial dispute, and as in the last case, it would make no

difference for this purpose· that the foreman concerned was

not a workman.

If this is right, as I think it is, then similarly the dispute

concerning the dismissal

of Dr. Banerjee would be an

indus­

trial dispute for the workmen have sufficient personal and

immediate interest in seeing that they have a doctor of their

liking

to look after them. It is indeed the case of the

work­

men that by his devotion to duty and good behaviour Or.

Banerjee became very popular with the workmen. Whether

the contention of the workmen

is justified or not and whether

it would

be upheld by the Tribunal or not, are who!Jy

diffe­

rent matters and do not affect the question whether in an

industrial dispute the workmen must l)e interested. It is

enough

to say that I find no reason to think that the

appel·

lant had no interest in the dispute concerning the dismissal

of Dr. Banerjee. Therefore, I would hold that even if it is

necessary

to constitute an industrial dispute that workmen

must have

an interest in it, the dispute before us is one in

which the appellants' have a direct and substantial interest

and it is an industrial dispute.

For myself however I would not make the interest of

the workmen in the dispute a condition of the existence of

an industrial dispute. The Act does not do so. I repeat that

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1207

it would be impossible to define such interest. In my view,

such a condition would defeat the object of the Act. It is

said that otherwise the workmen would be able to raise dis­

putes in which they were not interested. Supposing they did,

the Government is not bound ·to refer such disputes for ad­

)~dication. Take a concrete case. Suppose the workmen

raise a dispute that the manager of the concern should have

a higher pay.

It would be for the Government to decide

whether the dispute should be referred for adjudication or

not. The Government

is not bound to refer. Now, how is

the Government to decide? That must depend on the

Government's evaluation of the situation. That this

is the

intention

is clear from the object that the Act has in view.

I will here read from the judgment of the Federal Court in

Western India Automobile Association case(') what the ob­

ject of the Act is. It was said at pp. 331-332.

"We shall next examine the Act to determine its scope.

The Act

is stated in the preamble to be one providing for the

investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Any

industrial dispute

as defined by the Act may be reported to

Government who may take such· steps

as seem to it

ex­

pedient for promoting conciliation or settlement. It may refer

it to

an Industrial Court for advice

or it may refer it to an

Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The legislation substi­

tutes for free bargaining between the parties a binding

award by an impartial tribunal. Now,

in many cases an

industrial dispute starts with the

making of number of de.

mands by workmen. If the demands are not acceptable to

the

employer-and that is what often happens-it results in

a dismissal of the leaders and eventually in a strike. No

machinery for reconciliation and settlement of such disputes

can be considered effective unless

it provides within its scope

a solution for cases of employees who are dismissed in such

conditions and who are usually the first victims in an

indus­

trial dispute. If reinstatement of such persons cannot be

(

1

) [1949] F.C.R. 321.

1968

Workmen of

DimaL'UChi

Tea Estate

v.

Tke Managem•11t of

Dimal,ucki

TeaEalale

SarkarJ.

1958

Workmen oj

Di11lllkuchi

Tea Estate

1208 SUPREiE COURT REPORTS [1958]

brought about by conciliation

or adjudication, it is difficult,

if not impossible, in many cases to restore industrial peace

which

is the object of the

legislation" ..

Tl1' Man!;'""'"' of This is the view of the object of the Act that is accepted

!j:,_'"'!;~'(.~;• by all including the decisions in Narendra Kumar Sen's

Sarkar J,

case(') and United Commercial Bank case('). In Narendra

Kumar Sen's case(') Chagla C. J. said· at p. 130:

"The Industrial Disputes Act was enacted, as Mr. Desai

rightly says, to bring about industrial peace in the country,

to avoid conflicts between employers and labourers, to pre­

vent strikes and lock-outs, to

see that the production in our

country does not suffer by reason

of constant and continuous

labour

troubles".

Therefore in deciding whether to refer or not, the Govern­

ment

is to be guided by the question whether the dispute is

such as to disturb the industrial peace and hamper produc­

tion. I

find· no difficulty in thinking that the Government

would realise that there was no risk

of the peace being dis­

turbed or production being hampered by the dispute raised

by the workmen demanding a higher salary for the manager,

for being normal men the workmen were not likely to suffer

the privations of a strike to enforce their demand for a cause

of this nature. The Government must be left to decide this

primary question for itself, and therefore the Government

must be left to decide in each case whether the workmen

had sufficient interest in the dispute.

If Government thought

that the workmen

had no such interest as would lead them

to disturb industrial peace by strike

or otherwise if the dis­

pute was not ended, the Government might not in its discre­

tion refer the dispute for adjudication by a tribunal.

It

must be left free to decide as it thinks best in the interest of

the country.

It is not for the Court to lay down rigid princi­

ples of interest which interfere with the Government's discre­

tion, for that might defeat the object

of the Act. If the

Government feels that the dispute is such that

it might lead

to the disruption

of industrial peace, it is the policy of the

Act that it should exercise its powers under it to prevent

(') (1953) 55 Born. L.R. 125. (') [1962] 1 L.L.J. 782.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1209

that. Assume a case in which the workmen raised a dispute 1958

without having what the court considers sufficient interest to Workmen of

k · · d · 1 d' d h f h lJimal:uchi

ma e it an m ustna 1spute an t ere ore, on t e matter Tea Estate

c~min~ to the court the dispute was held not. to be an indus-Tlie Jlla~~Y'T'•'"''

trial dispute. Upon that the Governments hands would JJim"''"c1,;

be tied and it would not be able to have that dispute resolv-~!.'ea E•tate

ed by the processes contemplated in the Act. Suppose now Sarkar J.

that, the workmen then go on strike and industrial peace is

disturbed aad production hampered. The object of the Act

would then

have been defeated. And why? Because it was

said that it was not a dispute in which the workmen were

interested and therefore not a dispute

which was capable of

being adjusted under the provisions of the Act.

It would be

no answer to say that the workmen would not go on strike

in such a case. If they would not, neither would the Govern-

ment refer the dispute for adjudication under the Act and it

would not be

necessary for the court to decide whether the

workmen

were interested in the dispute or not or whether

the dispute

was an industrial dispute or not. Therefore, I

think that it is not necessary to say that a dispute is an indus-

trial dispute within the meaning of the Act only when

work-

men are interested in it.

Such a test of an industrial dispute

would niake it justiciable by courts and also introduce a

rigidity in the application of the Act

which is incompatible

With the fast changing concepts it has in view and so defeat

the object of the Act.

It is enough to assume that as normal

men, workmen would not raise a dispute or threaten indus-

trial peace on account of it

unless they are interested in it.

I wish however to make it.clear, should any doubt exist

as to this, that I do not intend to be understood as

saying·

that the question whether a dispute is an industrial dispute

or not

is never justiciable by courts of law and that a dispute

is an industrial dispute only if the Government says so.

Such

a larger question does not arise in this case. All that I say

is that it is not a condition of an industrial dispute that

workmen must be interested in it and 110 question of interest

1210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]

JDss falls for decision by a court if it can be called upon to decide

Workm'" of whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not. The ques-

I>i1n,tkuchi · f · J f · J ·

r,,,,. E,

101

, t10n o mterest can on y be o pract1ca value m that it helps

7

,"·' >l•n:g,wnt of the Governmen_t '? ~ecide whether a dispute should be

ni

0nuk«chi referred for ad1ud1cahon or not.

1',·t: J~'J;lrtle

Then it is said that if workmen were allowed to raise

a dispute concerning a person who was not a workman, then

it would be possible" for such a person to have his dispute

with the employer adjudicated through the workmen. This

case was put. Suppose the. manager wanted his salary to be

increased

but could not make the employer agree to

hi~ de­

mand, he could then instigate the workmen and make them

raise a dispute that his salary should be increased and if such

a dispute

is an industrial dispute and the award goes in

favour of the workmen then the result would be that the Act

could be used for settling disputes between the manager and

his employer, a dispute which the Act did not intend to con­

cern itself with. So it is said that the words "any person"

in s. 2(k) cannot include an employee who is not a workman.

I am unable to agree. First, in interpreting

an Act, the Court is not entitled to assume that persons would use its

provisions dishonestly.

The words in the Act cannot have

a different meaning than their natural meaning because

otherwise there would be a possibility of the

Act being used

for a purpose for which it was not meant. The remedy

against this possibility

is

provided· in the Act, in that it has·

given complete freedom to the Government not to refer such

a dispute.

It is .not

necessary to meet a somewhat remote

apprehension that the Act may be used for purposes other

than those for which it was meant,

to construe its language

in a manner different from

that which it plainly bears. Lastly,

in doing this many cases like those earlier mentioned

includ­

ing the present, which are dearly cases of industrial disputes

would have to be excluded in the attempt to prevent

by

in­

terpretation a remote app1ehension of a misuse of the Act.

This would do more harm than good.

S.C.R. SUPRKl\m COUHT H.EPOR'l'S 1211

I have therefore come to the conclusion that a dispute con­

cerning a person who is not 1l workman may be an industrial

dispute within

s. 2(k). As it has not been said that the dispute

with which we are concerned is for any other reason not

an

industrial dispute, I hold that the Industrial Tribunal had full

jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done

so.

I would therefore

allow the appeal and send the case

back

to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance

with

Jaw.

ORDER

OF THE COURT

In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal is

dismissed-: But there will be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

SANTOSH KUMAR

v.

BHAI MOOL SINGH

(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and

VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)

Negotiable Instruments-Summary Suit on dishonoured

cheque-Application

for leave to defend-Triable

issue-Failui-e

to produce documentary evidence-If 11enders defence va.gue

and not bona fide-Grant of conditional leave-Discretion of

Court, Interference

with-Code of

Civil Procedure, 0. XXXVII,

rr. 2 and 3.

The respondent filed a suit against the appellant under

0. XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedur·e on the basis of a

cheque for Rs. 60,000 drawn by the appellant in favour of the

respondent which, on presentation to the Bank, had been disho­

noured. The appellant applied under r. 3 of 0. XXXVII for

leave· to appear and defend the suit on the ground that the

cheque had been given only as a collateral security for the

price of goods supplied, that the goods had been paid for by

cash payments and by other cheques 11nd that therefore the

cheque in question had served its end and was without consi­

L/S4SCI-2(a)

1958

JYorkmen of

Dimakuelfi

Tea. Estate

v.

Tl1e .lla1wgem•.nt uf

JJimakuchi

2'ea EstaJe

Sutkar ./.

1958

Fr-bruury 5.