2023 INSC 948 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4296 OF 2023

Yashpal Jain …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

Sushila Devi & Others …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Aravind Kumar, J.

PREFACE

1. Even after 41 years, the parties to this lis are still groping in the

dark and litigating as to who should be brought on record as legal

representative of the sole plaintiff Mrs. Urmila Devi (hereinafter

referred to as ‘Urmila Devi’ for the sake of brevity). This is a classic

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case and a mirror to the fact that litigant public may become

disillusioned with judicial processes due to inordinate delay in the legal

proceedings, not reaching its logical end, and moving at a snail’s pace

due to dilatory tactics adopted by one or the other party. The said suit,

OS No.2 of 1982, was instituted for the relief to declare the sale deed,

executed by Shri Mangal Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘first

defendant’ for the sake of convenience) in favour of defendants No.4

to 32 in respect of the suit properties described in the plaints schedule

as item No.1 to 8, to be null and void by claiming to be the owner of

the said properties; and for a decree of possession of the suit properties

with costs.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

2. When the aforesaid suit was still at infancy stage the sole-

plaintiff expired on 18.05.2007. One Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an

application to substitute him as her legal heir, by placing reliance on

the Will dated 19.05.1999 and claiming to be a legatee under the said

registered Will. He also filed an affidavit stating thereunder that Mr.

Yashpal Jain (hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant’ for the sake of

convenience) was a witness to the said registered Will. The defendants

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objected to the said application contending inter alia that the appellant

herein was the adopted son of late Urmila Devi by relying upon the

adoption deed dated 06.01.1973 duly registered in the office of the

Sub-Registrar. In the said proceedings, the present appellant also filed

an affidavit stating thereunder that he was a witness to the Will dated

19.05.1999 executed by Urmila Devi in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain.

The application filed by Manoj Kumar Jain came to be allowed by

order dated 24.02.2010.

2.1 Being aggrieved by the said Order the legal heirs of the first

defendant namely, legal heirs of Mangal Singh, filed a Civil Revision

No.2 of 2010 before the District Judge which came to be allowed by

setting aside the Order of the Trial Court on the ground that applicant

had stated during the course of the revisional proceedings that he would

not press the said application and as such directed the Trial Court to

consider the application filed by Yashpal Jain-appellant herein and

permitted him to file an application seeking condonation of delay along

with the application to bring on record the legal representatives of the

sole plaintiff, since he had failed to do so earlier. Accordingly, revision

application came to be allowed by order dated 02.12.2011 and Mr.

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Yashpal Jain filed an application before the Trial Court for condoning

the delay in filing such application and also prayed for abatement of

suit to be set aside. The learned Trial Judge vide Order dated

09.05.2012 allowed the application by setting aside the abatement and

permitted Yashpal Jain to be substituted as legal representative of late

Urmila Devi.

3. At this juncture, we would like to point out that a careful

perusal of the application and the orders passed by the courts below

would indicate that the parties and the courts below seem to have

proceeded on the footing that they were to adjudicate the rights of a

legal heir which if seen in the light of expression used in the Code of

Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) is impermissible, as

it is not referable to ‘legal heir’ but ‘legal representative’ as defined

under Section 2 (11) which reads:

“Legal representative” means a person who in law

represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any

person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and

where a party sues or is sued in a representative character

the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the

party so suing or sued.

On the death of a party to the suit it is the legal representative who

is/are entitled to prosecute the proceedings and, in law, represent the

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estate of the deceased. The legal representative who is brought on

record not only includes a legatee under a Will but also an intermeddler

of the property who would be entitled to sue and to be sued and/or

continue to prosecute the proceedings. This vital aspect seems to have

been lost sight of by the courts below conveniently.

4. Be that as it may, the aforesaid Urmila Devi who claimed to be

Bhumidar and owner in possession of land situated in village

Sonargaon, Patti Katulsyun, District Garhwal, Uttarakhand has

contended in her suit that the suit schedule properties were looked

after by Mangal Singh- the first defendant and as he had fraudulently

obtained a Bhumidar Sanad of the land comprising No.77, 3/16 Nalis,

she had filed an application under Section 137-A of UP Act No.1 of

1951 before the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, Pauri Garhwal,

challenging the said Bhumidari Sanad obtained by the first defendant,

which was held in her favour by the Tehsildar, and confirmed by the

appellate authority. Not being satisfied with the said order, the first

defendant had filed a second appeal before the Revenue Board which

came to be allowed in favour of Mangal Singh, against which a review

petition was filed thereon by Urmila Devi which came to be allowed

on 30.08.1982. The said order was challenged before the High Court

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of Uttarakhand in Writ Petition (M/S) No.342 of 2005 (old No.14655

of 1983) by Mangal Singh. In the said proceedings a substitution

application came to be filed by the legal representative of Mangal

Singh stating thereunder that Yashpal Jain (appellant herein) is the

legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi and prayed for his name

to be substituted. The said application came to be allowed vide order

dated 24.02.2012 and appellant herein was substituted as the legal

representative of Urmila Devi in writ proceedings. There is no further

challenge to said order or in other words, it has attained finality.

5. As already noticed hereinabove, appellant herein filed an

application for substitution as legal representative of the original

plaintiff-Urmila Devi along with an application for condoning the

delay in filing said application and to set aside the abatement. The said

application came to be allowed vide Order dated 09.05.2012. Being

aggrieved by the said order, the Legal Representatives of Mangal Singh

filed Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 before the District Judge who

affirmed the Order of the Trial Court and dismissed the Revision

Petition by Order dated 13.12.2012. The legal representatives of

Mangal Singh filed WP No.144 of 2013 before the High Court

challenging the Orders dated 09.05.2012 and 13.12.2012 passed by the

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Trial Court and the Revisional Court, respectively. The High Court

allowed the writ petition by quashing the impugned orders and

rejecting the application of the appellant herein, thereby restoring the

original order dated 17.05.2008 wherein Manoj Jain had been ordered

for being substituted as legal representative of late Urmila Devi on the

strength of the registered Will dated 19.05.1999 propounded by him

with a direction to conclude the proceedings within a period of 9

months. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been

filed.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES

6. We have heard the arguments of Ms. Rachna Srivastava,

learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant and Mr.

Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel, appearing for the

respondents.

7. It is the contention of Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned Senior

Advocate appearing for the appellant, that the High Court committed

a serious error in upsetting the findings of the Trial Court and the

Revisional Court whereunder the discretionary power was exercised

by condoning the delay while setting aside the abatement and

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allowing the application of the appellant herein to be brought on

record as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi; the High

Court erred in not considering the fact that courts below had recorded

a clear finding that appellant herein was the sole surviving legal

representative of the deceased plaintiff and as such it ought not to

have interfered with the well-reasoned order passed by the Trial

Court as affirmed by the Revisional Court; She would also contend

that defendants in this suit who were the writ petitioners in WP(M/S)

342 of 2005 (old number 14655 of 1983) had substituted the

appellant herein as legal representative of Urmila Devi in dispute

related to the suit schedule property (involved in OS No.2 of 1982)

and as such defendants cannot be permitted to take stand contrary to

same. Hence, it is contended that impugned order is liable to be set

aside.

8. Per contra, Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel

appearing for the respondents, supports the impugned order and

contends that in the Writ Petition No.144 of 2013, appellant herein

who was a party therein had not filed a counter-affidavit and as such

High Court had recorded that non-traversing of petition averments

would amount to admission and had also taken note of the fact that

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appellant herein had filed an affidavit before the Trial Court on

25.10.2008 whereunder he has accepted the Will dated 19.05.1999

executed by deceased Urmila Devi and thereby supported the stand of

Manoj Kumar Jain being the legal heir of Urmila Devi. He would also

draw the attention of this Court to yet another affidavit dated

21.08.2009 filed by the appellant himself in OS No.2 of 1982

whereunder he has again supported the Will dated 19.05.1999 or in

other words, supported the substitution of Shri Manoj Kumar Jain as

legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi. Hence, he contends

there is no illegality committed by the High Court. It is further

contended that appellant was having knowledge of OS No.2 of 1982

and as such he cannot plead ignorance for the delay. Lastly,

challenging the adoption on the ground that same cannot be the basis

for the appellant herein to be brought on record, he has sought for

rejection of this appeal.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

9. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and

after bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival

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contentions raised at the Bar, we are of the considered view that

following points would arise for our consideration:

(i) Whether the impugned order dated 28.11.2019

passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 quashing the

orders dated 13.12.2012 rendered in Civil Revision No.4 of

2012 by the High Court whereby the order dated 09.05.2012

passed by trial court allowing the impleadment application

filed by the appellant herein had been rejected, is to be

sustained or set aside?

(ii) Whether any further direction or directions requires

to be issued for concluding the proceedings in a time bound

manner on account of Suit No.2 of 1985 pending for trial for

past 41 years?

(iii) What order?

RE: POINT No.(i)

10. It is not in dispute that Smt. Urmila Devi had instituted a suit

O.S. No.2 of 1982 against Mangal Singh and others in respect of suit

schedule properties as described in the plaint schedule for declaring the

sale deeds executed by Mangal Singh in favour of defendant Nos.4 to

32, as mentioned in Plaint Schedule 1 to 18, as null and void; and

during the pendency of the said suit the plaintiff- Smt. Urmila Devi

expired on 18.05.2007. On her demise Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an

application on 17.05.2008 for substitution as her legal heir and

claiming right legatee under the Will dated 19.05.1999. This

application was followed by an affidavit of the appellant (Yashpal Jain)

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dated 25.10.2008 stating thereunder that his mother Urmila Devi had

executed a Will dated 19.05.1999 in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain and

also stating thereunder that Will was duly registered. The legal heirs of

the defendant objected the said substitution contending, inter alia, that

the present appellant is the adopted son of Urmila Devi and said

adoption deed was duly registered on 06.01.1973 in the office of the

Sub-Registrar. It was also contended that Shri Rajendra Prasad Jain

was the holder of power of attorney of Urmila Devi and on his

(Rajendra Prasad) death on 18.02.2001, she had executed another

power of attorney on 21.04.2001 appointing Virender Kumar Jain and

on the basis of the same the name of his wife came to be mutated in

respect of the lands indicated thereunder. Hence, it was contended that

Will propounded by Manoj Kumar Jain was fabricated and forged.

Hence, it was prayed that claim of Manoj Kumar Jain for being

substituted as legal representative of Urmila Devi is liable to be

rejected. Yet another affidavit was also filed by the appellant on

21.08.2009 reiterating the contents of the earlier affidavit dated

25.10.2008. In other words, it was contended that Manoj Kumar Jain

was not the legal representative of Urmila Devi.

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11. The learned trial judge allowed the application by order dated

24.02.2010 for substitution by condoning the delay with costs and

directed substitution of Manoj Kumar to be the legal representative of

deceased plaintiff Urmila Devi.

12. The aforestated order dated 24.02.2010 came to be challenged

by legal representatives of Mangal Singh in Civil Revision No.2 of

2010 which resulted in same being allowed vide order dated

02.12.2011 and the order of the trial court dated 24.02.2010 was set

aside by taking note of the fact that Manoj Kumar Jain had stated in

his application 27/C along with affidavit that he would not press the

substitution application. The appellant was granted liberty to file an

application for impleadment as a party before the lower court. In this

background appellant herein filed an application for substitution as

legal representative of Urmila Devi and this application came to be

filed on 05.12.2011 along with application for condonation of delay

and to set aside abatement, which was opposed by the legal

representatives of the first defendants by filing objections and

contending that application filed by Yashpal Jain is not maintainable.

After hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the parties learned

trial judge by a detailed order dated 09.05.2012 condoned the delay

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and allowed the application of the appellant to be brought on record as

legal representative of the deceased-plaintiff Urmila Devi. This order

came to be affirmed by order dated 13.12.2012 in Civil Revision No.4

of 2012 filed by the legal representatives of Mangal Singh.

13. It is pertinent to mention at this juncture that during the life

time of Urmila Devi an application came to be filed under Section 137-

A of U.P. Act No.1 of 1951 before Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, Pauri

Garhwal contending that the Bhumidari Sanad had been obtained by

Mangal Singh, with reference to land comprising Nos.77, 3/16 Nalis,

by adopting forgery, which came to be accepted. The appeal filed by

Mangal Singh before the Assistant Collector against the order of

Tehsildar did not yield any result, which gave rise to filing of a Second

Appeal before the Revenue Board culminating in said appeal being

allowed in favour of Mangal Singh. The Review Petition filed against

the order of the Second Appellate Authority came to be allowed and

this was challenged by Mangal Singh in WP (M/S) No.342 of 2005

(Old No.14655 of 1983). During the pendency of the said writ

petition, as noticed earlier, Urmila Devi expired and an application for

substitution came to be filed by the very same legal representatives of

Mangal Singh (who are Respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein) vide Annexure

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P-10, specially pleading thereunder to delete the name of Respondent

No.4 (therein) Smt. Urmila Devi and substitute Yashpal Jain

(appellant herein) in her place. This application came to be allowed by

order dated 24.02.2012 as reflected in Annexure RA/2 annexed to the

rejoinder affidavit of the appellant. In this view of the matter, it cannot

be gain said by the respondents herein that the appellant is not to be

substituted as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi. It is for

this cogent reason, the learned trial judge vide order dated 09.05.2012

allowed the substitution and permitted the appellant herein to be

substituted as legal representative of deceased plaintiff-Urmila Devi.

Rightly so, this order of the trial court came to be affirmed by the

Revisional Court vide order dated 13.12.2012. It would be apt and

appropriate to note at this juncture and at the cost of repetition that

Manoj Kumar Jain, who had initially filed an application for

substitution which came to be allowed by the trial court by order dated

24.02.2010, which order was carried in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010

and in the said proceedings an application came to be filed by said

Manoj Kumar Jain stating thereunder that he does not intend to press

the application filed by him for being substituted as legal

representative of Urmila Devi. This fact also persuaded the Revisional

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Court to remand the matter back to the trial court vide order dated

02.12.2011.

14. In this factual scenario, the defendants cannot be heard to

contend that appellant herein had filed two affidavits (Annexure P-5

and Annexure P-7) whereunder he had admitted Manoj Kumar Jain as

the legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi and as such he cannot

turn around to assert himself to be the legal representative of Urmila

Devi, for the simple reason that affidavits filed by the appellant

Yashpal Jain does not even remotely suggest or indicate that he have

admitted Manoj Kumar Jain being the legal representative of Urmila

Devi. On the other hand, said affidavits which has been perused by

us, would clearly indicate that he has only affirmed and reiterated the

fact that he is a signatory to the said Will and nothing more or nothing

less.

15. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel appearing for

the respondents herein, have also contended that on account of non-

traversing of the writ petition averments the contents thereof are to be

presumed true and correct, though seems to be an attractive

proposition at first brush, it cannot be accepted for the simple reason

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that consent does not confer jurisdiction. Even otherwise, the records

would clearly indicate that Manoj Kumar Jain himself had filed an

application, accompanied by affidavit before the Revisional Court in

Civil Revision No.2 of 2010, stating thereunder that he would not

press the application filed by him for substitution and this was

sufficient for the High Court to have accepted the plea of the appellant

or in other words, it should have sustained the order of trial court and

ordered for appellant being brought on record as legal representative

of deceased Urmila Devi.

16. At the cost of repetition, it requires to be noticed that

respondents herein themselves having filed an application in WP

(M/S) No.342 of 2005 for bringing the present appellant (Yashpal

Jain) as her legal representative in the writ petition (M/S) 342/2005

and prosecuted the same, would reflect that they were in the

acquaintance of the fact that present appellant being the legal

representative of deceased Urmila Devi but yet are attempting to

contend that Manoj Kumar Jain is to be brought on record as legal

representative of Urmila Devi. In this background the impugned order

which has resulted in rejection of the application filed by the appellant

to be brought on record as legal representative of Urmila Devi if

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sustained would result in the estate of deceased plaintiff not being

represented, as a consequence of which suit would abate or would be

put to a silent death by the defendants without claim made in the suit

being adjudicated on merits. Hence, point No.(i) is answered in favour

of the appellant and against respondents and therefore, the impugned

order is set aside.

17. As far as the question of right of the appellant over the suit

schedule properties, we are of the view, by virtue of adoption

propounded, it is an issue which would be at large before the learned

trial court and the veracity of the Will dated 19.05.1999 alleged to

have been executed by Urmila Devi in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain,

is to be decided in appropriate proceedings and as such we desist from

expressing any opinion in that regard and contentions of both parties

are kept open.

RE: POINT No.(ii)

18. Case papers on hand would disclose that dispute between the

parties relates back to 02.02.1982 the date of institution of the suit

No.2/1982 by the original plaintiff Smt. Urmila Devi. As to the stage

of the suit namely, as to whether trial has commenced or otherwise,

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the material available before this court are silent but the fact remains

that proceedings have got protracted from 1982 till demise of Urmila

Devi on 18.05.2007 and thereafter it has moved at a snail’s pace or in

other words, the litigation seems to have not been taken to its logical

end for reasons best known. The death of the original plaintiff opened

up a flood of litigation and as a result of it, several orders came to be

passed by the courts below, both in original jurisdiction and revisional

jurisdiction, which also reached the High Cout and ultimately before

this Court by the present proceedings. The cause for delay has been

myriad. It is for this reason we have expressed our anguish at the

beginning of this judgment as to likelihood of litigant public getting

disillusioned of justice delivery system due to delays. It would be apt

to note that certain litigations initiated more than 50 years back are still

pending. As per the data extracted from National Judicial Data Grid

(NJGD), we have noted hereinbelow the three oldest civil and criminal

cases:

TOP 3 PENDING CIVIL CASES

1. West Bengal

(a) Civil Judge Senior Division, Malda – Partition Suit

No.30 of 1952 – registered on 04.04.1952

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(b) Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Medinipur – Other Suit

No.39 of 2017 -registered on 15.09.1953.

2. Uttar Pradesh

Civil Judge, Junior Division, Varanasi – Original Suit

No.319 of 1953 – registered on 02.07.1953

TOP 3 PENDING CTRIMINAL CASES

(1) Maharashtra

(a) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.2319

of 1959 – registered on 11.04.1959

(b) CJJD & JMFC Mehkar – R.C.C. No.61 of 1960 –

registered on 06.10.1959

(c) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.778 of

1961 – registered on 30.08.1961

The Underlying factors behind Judicial Delays

19. The causes of delay are numerous loopholes in the law itself,

redundant and voluminous paper work, absence of the witnesses,

adjournments sought and granted for no justifiable reason as also delay

in service of summons, lack of implementation of the provisions of

Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) and Code

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of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C’), as the case

may be. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. It is not that

there has been any lack of effort to speed up the Justice Delivery

System. However, the attempts made hitherto have yielded limited

results. Time and again various provisions of C.P.C. and Cr.P.C. have

been amended to cater the ever-increasing demands for speedy

disposal of cases and the results are not inspiring. There is an urgent

need to take pro-active steps to not only clear the huge backlog of cases

at all levels but there should be introspection by all the stakeholders to

gear up to meet the aspirations of the litigant public who would only

seek for speedy justice and to curtail the methods adopted to delay the

proceedings which may suit certain section or class of the litigant

public. When millions of consumers of justice file their cases by

knocking at the doors of the courts of first instance, they expect speedy

justice. Thus, an onerous responsibility vests on all stakeholders to

ensure that the people’s faith in this system is not eroded on account

of delayed justice. It is imperative to note that about 6 per cent of the

population in India is affected by litigation, in such a scenario the

courts would play an important role in the life of a nation governed

by Rule of Law. Peace and Tranquility in the society and harmonious

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relationship between the citizens are achieved on account of effective

administration of justice and its delivery system, even the economic

growth of a country is dependent on the robust Justice Delivery

System which we have in our country.

20. When the efficiency has become the hallmark of modern

civilization and in all spheres of life there is an urgent need to hasten

the pace of delivery of justice by reducing the time period occupied by

the trial of suits and criminal proceedings as also the offshoots of such

litigation which results in revisions, appeals etc. arising out of them.

A historical outlook of steps taken to curb the Judicial delay

21. The issue of delay has been bothering all the stakeholders for

ages. Way back in the year 1924, a committee was constituted known

as the Civil Justice Committee to enquire into the issues relating to

changes and improvements necessary to bring in “more speedy,

economical and satisfactory dispatch of the business transacted in the

courts” under the chairmanship of Justice Rankin. Delay in disposal of

cases beyond a period of two and a half years was a crucial concern

and it was emphasized by the said Committee that “where the arrears

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are unmanageable, improvement in the methods can only palliate. It

cannot cure”.

1

The Central Government under the chairmanship of

Justice S.R. Das set up a committee known as High Court Arrears

Committee in the year 1949. In 1979, the Law Commission of India in

its 77

th

Report on ‘delay and arrear in trial courts’ observed that the

delay in civil or criminal matters have decreased the confidence among

the general public about the judicial system. It was emphasized that

civil cases should be treated as lapsed if the matter was not disposed

of within one year from the date of registration, whereas a criminal

matter should be disposed within six months and in case of sessions

trial it should not go beyond one year. It was also suggested to timely

fill up the vacancies, appoint additional and ad-hoc judges and

increase overall judicial strength. Some of the key recommendations

of the Committee were:

“(i) Improvement of judicial system to meet modern

requirement of society.

(ii) Time for scrutiny of the cases should not take more than

one week.

(iii) Summons and notices should be attached with the plaint

at the stage of filing, without stating the filing date.

(iv) Procedural reforms in civil and criminal case

proceedings.”

1

Civil Justice Committee, 1924

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22. The 79

th

reports of the Law Commission of India pertains to

“Delay and Arrears in High Courts and Appellate Court” which

when read along with the 77

th

report as aforementioned, has provided

a step-by-step manual for managerial judging, prescribing upper time

limits for trial procedure to ensure speedy disposal of cases to be

followed by Trial Courts, High Courts, and other appellate courts. Its

recommendations range from ways in which judges should expedite

the service of summons to the drafting of the decree and includes the

suggestions that they should become more active in conciliation

efforts. Other notable recommendations include:

“(i) Appointment of administrative justices who supervise the

work of process servers;

(ii) Fixing of dates should be done by presiding officer and

not readers, cases should deliberately not be fixed when the

prospects of them being taken up for low and a standard of

number of cases pending before courts should be decided and

whenever there are indications that the number of cases will

go beyond the standard, additional courts should be set up.”

23. The 120

th

Law Commission Report on ‘Manpower planning

in judiciary: a blueprint’ recommended that the most effective way to

overcome the heavy pendency of cases clogging on the judicial system

is by reducing judicial delay. It further states that the judiciary is

overburdened by large number of cases filed each year, which clog an

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already stressed system. The report states that in 2002, when the ratio of the

judges to population was 13 judges to 10,00,000 people, the Supreme Court

recommended, in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India (2002) 4

SCC 247, to increase the ratio to at least 50 judges per 10,00,000 people.

24. The Malimath Committee, constituted on Reforms of Criminal

Justice System, suggested multiple recommendations in its report, for

Criminal Justice System, however some of them can be applied even

in the civil litigation:

1. Time limit for filing written statements, amendments of

pleadings, service of summons etc., must be prescribed.

2. So far as possible, parties must endeavor to decide or to settle

the cases outside the court and to carry out the same objective,

Section 89 in CPC, was introduced.

3. To record the evidences by issuing the Commission instead of

by presence before the court of law. For the purpose of the

same under Section 75 of the CPC, commission can be issued

for collecting evidence.

4. Time frame need to be provided for oral argument before the

court of law.

5. Restriction on Right of appeal.

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25. Similarly, the Delhi High Court undertook a pilot project titled

‘‘Zero Pendency Court Project Report’

2

whereunder 22 specific pilot

and reference courts were referred to collect data to examine

meticulously the life cycles of the legal cases. At its core, the project

sought to understand how the cases progressed through the legal

system in the absence of any backlog. The Data collected from the pilot

project led to suggestions of some major recommendations which

included, primarily, the assessment of Judicial strength, which as per

the report, is regarded as a vital attribute to the cause of delay. The

report in this regard suggested to arrive at an optimal judge strength to

handle cases pending in different court and went on to provide the Ideal

number of judges for different court. The report also highlighted that

in criminal cases, prosecution evidence hearings accounts for the

Highest percentage of court hearings however when it comes to

allocation of time, the courts tend to dedicate more minutes to final

arguments and the issuance of final orders. In civil cases,

miscellaneous hearings are common, but final order proceedings

2

The Inspiration for the project was a remark by Justice M.N. Venkatachalaih (former

CJI) in a conversation with Justice Ravindra Bhat, one of the members of the State Court

Management System Committee (SCMS) of the Delhi HC.

26

receive more time nevertheless, judges allocate a greater amount of

time to the final order or judgment hearings.

26. Melvin M Belli, a member of the California Bar, in his article

titled “The Law’s Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in Civil

Litigation”, which was prepared as a project for the Belli society, has

noted “Trial delays or the period of the American Legal System”. The

backlog of the system has become so typical that a plaintiff has to wait

5 years for trial of a simple personal injury claimed. In case, if there

is an appeal, a final disposition of the case may occur 10 years after

plaintiff has been injured and the following factors were outlined as

the major contributors to the delay:

(i) The inefficient management of the court system by the

judiciary.

(ii) A Tremendous increase in litigation.

(iii) The philosophy of procrastination of many judges and

lawyers, and

(iv) The priority of criminal or civil cases on the court

calendar.

To tackle the aforesaid problems, the following remedial measures

were suggested as possible solutions:

1) Appointment of surrogate judges (auditors, referees,

judges pro tempore) to handle certain cases. The idea of using

surrogate judges is to avoid unnecessary adjudication under

formal trials. This is followed in Massachusetts, where court

appointed auditors or referees, who were practicing attorneys,

used to adjudge motor vehicle tort cases. They report their

27

findings of facts and conclusions to the court and the parties may

accept the auditor’s report as final or request a trial. If the case

goes to trial, the auditor’s findings are prima facie evidence and

may be read to the jury.

2) The imposition of interest accruing retroactively from

the time of incident, rather than from time of judgment, to

remove defendant’s incentives to delay.

3) The elevation of civil cases to parity with criminal cases

so that civil cases will not be usurped.

4) A requirement that judges set definite trial dates and

honor them, so that litigation cannot be delayed by one of the

attorneys.

DELAY ON ACCOUNT OF PROCEDURAL LAWS

27. At the outset, it is necessary to point out the reasons for delay

in civil trial namely:

(i) Absence of strict compliance with the

provisions of CPC;

(ii) Misuse of processes of the court;

(iii) Lengthy/prolix evidence and arguments. Non-

utilization of provisions of the CPC namely

Order X (examination of parties at the first

hearing);

(v) Non-Awarding of realistic cost for frivolous and

vexatious litigation;

(vi) Lack of adequate training and appropriate

orientation course to judicial officers and

lawyers;

28

(vii) Lack of prioritization of cases;

(viii) Lack of accountability and transparency.

28. Apart from the above reasons, the other vital reasons include

the over-tolerant nature of the courts below while extending their olive

branch to grant adjournment at the drop of the hat and thereby bringing

the entire judicial process to a grinding halt. It is crucial to understand

that the wheels of justice must not merely turn, they must turn without

friction, without bringing it to a grinding halt due to unwarranted

delay. It is for such reasons that the system itself is being ridiculed not

only by the litigant public but also by the general public, thereby

showing signs of constant fear of delay in the minds of public which

might occur during the resolution of dispute, dissuading them from

knocking at the doors of justice. All the stakeholders of the system

have to be alive to this alarming situation and should thwart any

attempt to pollute the stream of judicial process and same requires to

be dealt with iron hands and curbed by nipping them at the bud, as

otherwise the confidence of the public in the system would slowly be

eroded. Be it the litigant public or Member of the Bar or anyone

connected in the process of dispensation of justice, should not be

allowed to dilute the judicial processes by delaying the said process by

29

in any manner whatsoever. As held by this Court in T. Arivandandam

vs. T.V. Satyapal & Another AIR (1977) 4 SCC 467 the answer to an

irresponsible suit or litigation would be a vigilant judge. This analogy

requires to be stretched in the instant case and to all the pending

matters by necessarily holding that every stakeholder in the process of

dispensation of justice is required to act swiftly, diligently, without

giving scope for any delay in dispensation of justice. Thus, an onerous

responsibility rests on the shoulders of the presiding officer of every

court, who should be cautious and vigilant against such indolent acts

and persons who attempt to thwart quick dispensation of justice. A

response is expected from all parties involved, with a special emphasis

on the presiding officer. The presiding officer must exercise due

diligence to ensure that proceedings are conducted efficiently and

without unnecessary delays. While it's important to maintain a friendly

and cooperative atmosphere with the members of the Bar, this should

not be misused as a pretext for frequent adjournment requests. A word

of caution to the learned members of the Bar, at this juncture, would

also be necessary because of they being considered as another wheel

of the chariot of dispensation of justice. They should be circumspect

in seeking adjournments, that too in old matters or matters which have

30

been pending for decades and desist from making request or prayer for

grant of adjournments for any reason whatsoever and should not take

the goodness of the presiding officer as his/her weakness.

29. In-fact, the utilization of the provision of CPC to the hilt

would reduce the delays. It is on account of non-application of many

provisions of the CPC by the presiding officers of the courts is one of

the reason or cause for delay in the proceedings or disputes not

reaching to its logical conclusion.

30. The very fact of the pendency of the present suit No. 2 of 1982,

in the instant case, for the past 41 years is reflective of the fact, as to

how some of the civil courts are functioning and also depicting how

stakeholders are contributing to such delays either directly or

indirectly. The procedure that is being adopted by the courts below or

specifically the trial courts is contrary to the express provisions of the

CPC. It can also be noticed that there are party induced delays. It is

laid down under Orders VIII Rule (1) that a defendant shall at or

before the first hearing or within 30 days, or 90 days as the court may

permit, present a written statement of his defence. In most cases, there

would be no difficulty in presenting such a written statement on the

date fixed, and no adjournment should be given for the said purpose

31

except for a good cause shown, and in proper cases, costs should be

awarded to the opposite side, namely realistic costs. However, this is

seldom found. Delay in filing the written statement and seeking

adjournments is also another tactic used by the parties to litigation to

delay the proceedings No doubt in catena of judgments including

Kailash vs. Nanku 2005 (4) SCC 480, Serum Advocates Bar

Association, Tamil Nadu vs Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353.

Bharat Kalra vs. Raj Kishan Chhabra (2022) SCC OnLine SC 613

and Shoraj Singh vs Charan Singh (2018) SCC OnLine All 6613 the

time limit prescribed under the CPC has been held to be directory and

not mandatory which by itself does not mean that adjournments if

sought should be granted for mere asking. Only when such prayer

being honest and prayer sought with a bona-fide intention, which we

will have to be demonstrated in express terms, at least by way of an

affidavit, such prayers should be entertained as otherwise the purpose

of the legislative mandate would get defeated and the purpose of the

amendment brought to CPC by Act 22 of 2002 would also become

otiose. In other words, it is high time that the presiding officers of all

the trial courts across the country strictly enforce the time schedule

prescribed under sub-rule (1) of Rule (1) of Order VIII in its letter and

32

spirit rather than extending the olive branch on account of said

provision being held directory to its illogical end even where

circumstances of a particular case does not warrant time being

enlarged. Although Order XVII of the CPC indicate under the heading

“adjournments”, making it explicitly clear the procedure which

requires to be adopted by the civil courts in the matter of trial, as

evident from plain reading of the said provision would reveal, seems

to have been completely lost sight of by all the stakeholders, which

can be held as one of the root cause for delay in disposal of civil cases.

It would be apt and appropriate to extract Order XVII of the CPC and

it reads:

ORDER XVII

“1. Court may grant time and adjourn hearing" (1) The

court may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the

suit grant time to the parties or to any of them, and may from

time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit for reasons to be

recorded in writing:

Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more

than three time to a party during hearing of the suit.

(2) Costs of adjournment. -In every such case the Court

shall fix a day for the further hearing of the suit, and

[shall make such orders as to costs occasioned by the

adjournment or such higher costs as the court deems fit:

Provided that, -

(a) when the hearing of the suit has commenced, it shall be

continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in

attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds that,

for the exceptional reasons to be recorded by it, the

33

adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day is

necessary.

(b) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party,

except where the circumstances are beyond the control of

that party,

(c) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another

Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment,

(d) where the illness of a pleader or his inability to conduct

the case for any reason, other than his being engaged in

another Court, is put forward as a ground for adjournment,

the Court shall not grant the adjournment unless it is satisfied

that the party applying for adjournment could not have

engaged another pleader in time,

(e) where a witness is present in Court but a party or his

pleader is not present or the party or his pleader, though

present in Court, is not ready to examine or cross-examine

the witness, the Court may, if it thinks fit, record the

statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks fit

dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross-

examination of the witness, as the case may be, by the party

or his pleader not present or not ready as aforesaid.”

The High Court of Karnataka in the matter of M. Mahalingam

vs. Shashikala reported in ILR Karnataka 4055 had an occasion to

deal with this rule and it was observed as under:

“17. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XVII was

introduced by the code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)

Rules, 1976. The object and reason behind the introduction

of this proviso was that, when hearing of evidence has once

begun such hearing shall be continued from day to day. The

said provision is being made more strict so that once such

stage is reached, an adjournment should be granted only for

unavoidable reasons. A few other restrictions were also

being imposed on the grant of adjournments. The intention

in enacting the said proviso is that, when the hearing of the

suit has commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day,

until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined. In

other words, it provided that a suit being tried like a sessions

34

case in a Criminal Court. Therefore, the Rule is, once trial

begins, evidence should be recorded on day-to-day basis.

Even in exceptional cases, if an adjournment becomes

necessary, it has to be adjourned to the following day only.

Clauses-(b) (c) and (d) were introduced restricting the power

of the Court to grant adjournments on the grounds set out

therein. These clauses make it clear that, the fact that a

pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, is not a

ground for adjournment. Even the illness of the pleader and

inability of a pleader to conduct a case is not a ground for

adjournment, unless the Court is satisfied that the party

applying for adjournment could not have engaged another

pleader in time. It also provides for the Court to record the

statement of witnesses who are present in Court, when the

party who summoned him and the party who has to cross-

examine, the said witnesses and their counsel being not

present Therefore, it is clear that the Court can be liberal in

granting adjournments before the commencement of the

Trial. But once the trial commences, there is an obligation

cast on the Court to conduct the said trial day-to-day until all

the witnesses in attendance have been examined.

Unfortunately, this procedure which is in the statute book

since 1976, is followed more in breach. Adjournments are

sought for and granted by the Courts as a matter of course.

The intention of the Parliament in enacting the said provision

was not appreciated. In spite of introduction of the proviso,

there was no marked change in the trial of suits.

Adjournments continued to dominate and obstruct speedy

trial. Therefore, the parliament amended the law once again

and now an attempt is made to control the power of the

courts in granting adjournments.

18. This time sub-rule (1) and (2) of Rule 1 of Order XVII

was amended substantially by the code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1999. The object and reason behind the

amendment Act was that, every effort should be made to

expedite the disposal of civil suits and proceedings so that

justice may not be delayed. The committee on Subordinate

Legislation (11th Lok Sabha) recommended that it should be

made obligatory to record reasons for adjournment of cases

as well as award of actual or higher cost and not merely

notional cost against the parties seeking adjournment in

favour of the opposite party. Further limit up to three

adjournments has also been fixed in a case.

35

19. The amended Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 provides that at any

stage of the suit, if sufficient cause is shown, the Court may

adjourn the hearing of the suit for the reasons to be recorded

in writing. Therefore, an adjournment cannot be granted for

a mere asking. There should be sufficient cause for such an

adjournment. Before granting adjournment, the Court has to

record in writing the reasons, which constituted sufficient

cause for it to adjourn the case. The proviso to sub-rule (1)

of Rule 1 puts an embargo on the Court's power to grant

adjournments, in as much as, it restricts the said power to

grant adjournments to three times to a party during the

hearing of the suit. Therefore, the Court cannot exercise its

power of granting adjournments arbitrarily, whimsically and

it should know its limitations. The amendment to sub-rule

(2) of Rule 1 makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to

make an order as to costs occasioned by the adjournments.

This rule is intended to see that the imposition of costs may

act as a deterrent to the party seeking adjournment when

there being no sufficient cause. By such costs, the cost of

litigation would increase and it may dissuade the party from

seeking adjournment on flimsy grounds.

20. In spite of the legislative mandate reflected in the

aforesaid provision, the Courts and the Lawyers continue to

ignore the said statutory provisions and the requirement of

holding a continuous trial day to day. The Courts, in practice,

have buried the rule fathoms deep and have been granting

adjournments on the flimsiest grounds. In every case these

provisions are honoured more in breach than in compliance

with the spirit of providing justice expeditiously. It is rare

indeed when a court holds a trial continuously in terms of

this rule. If only the provisions of the Code are followed in

letter and spirit, the grievance of delay in disposal of cases

would have been reduced considerably. The rule of law

requires respect for the law by all the citizens of this country.

The Judges and Lawyers who are the officers of the Court

are No. exception. First, they should respect the rule of law,

i.e., these statutory provisions. Without any exception they

cannot plead any difficulty in implementing these provisions

in letter and spirit. They are duty bound to act according to

these statutory provisions. Without doing what we are

legally expected to do, we are barking up at the wrong tree

and by this process we are deceiving ourselves. Any number

of amendments to the Code or any efforts to reform the law

would have no effect, unless the Courts give effect to the

statutory provisions contained in the Code. If the Courts do

36

not implement the law, one cannot find fault with the

Advocates or the litigants. If these rules are implemented in

letter and spirit, it may lead to some inconvenience and

hardship as, for more than a century, the Judges, the lawyers

and litigants are used to a particular atmosphere in Court. It

is this atmosphere in Courts, which has no legal support and

is the cause for delay in disposal of cases. Therefore, it is

high time in the interest of speedy disposal of cases, these

rules are implemented; once implemented, in course of time,

lawyers and litigants would fall in line.

In order to implement these statutory provisions as

amended, what is required is a change of mind set among the

Judges and they must have the courage to depart from the

practice which is in vogue. They must remind themselves

that till now these provisions are not followed and the

procedure which is adopted in Courts was totally different

from what is provided under the statute and thus has no legal

basis. That is the real cause for delay in disposal of cases.

Therefore, the need of the hour is a change of mental

attitude, firstly, on the part of the judges and secondly, on

the part of lawyers and litigants. A beginning has to be made.

It has to be done by Judges and Judges alone. In spite of the

criticism and the amendment to the law made by the

Parliament, if the Judges are not sensitive and do not give

effect to these provisions which are made with an avowed

object of speedy disposal of cases, the Judges would be

failing in their duty. Therefore, one may not blame the Code

for delay in disposal of cases. The delay is on account of not

following the provisions of the Code and in not knowing the

philosophy behind these statutory provisions. Even now it is

not too late for the Judges and Lawyers to give effect to the

statutory provisions and render speedy justice to the

litigants. Time has come that this malady should be treated

with even handed at all levels.

21. In fact this view finds support from the observations

made by the Law Commission in the Reports on the Code of

Civil Procedure:

“In the 14th Report of the Law Commission of India on

“Reform of Judicial Administration”, the Commission notes

with concern the failure of the Courts to appreciate that

Order 17 Rule 1 contemplates the continued hearing of a

case, once it has started, from day to day until it is finished.

It noted with concern that the judiciary seemed to think that

the interrupted hearings should be a rule and day to day

hearings the exception. Both the lawyers and the subordinate

37

judiciary still persist in floating these provisions by refusing

to have a continuous trial.

27th Law Commission Report reads as under:

“There is a popular belief that the technicalities of legal

procedure can be exploited and a case continued almost

indefinitely if so desired. In a weak case, apart from

numerous applications for adjournment, frivolous

interlocutory applications are made, e.g. applications for

amendment of the pleadings or for amendment of issues,

examination of witnesses on commission summoning

unnecessary witnesses etc., These tactics do not succeed

before an experienced and astute Judge. They succeed only

before Judges who have no adequate experience. And such

tactics succeed not because of the observance, but because

of the non-observance, of the rules of procedure. Delay

under this item is, therefore, not due to any defects in

procedure. Rules of procedure are intended to subserve and

not to delay or defeat justice.”

22. Therefore, while considering the prayer for grant of

adjournment, it is necessary to keep in mind the legislative

intent. After the trial commences, the legislative mandate is,

it shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses

in attendance have been examined. Even to grant an

adjournment beyond the following day exceptional reasons

should exist and it should be recorded in writing before

adjourning the hearing beyond the following day. A reading

of the proviso makes it clear that the limitation of three

adjournments contained in proviso to sub-rule (1) apply

where adjournment is to be granted on account of

circumstances which are beyond the control of that party.

Even in cases which may not strictly fall within the category

of circumstances beyond the control of a party, the Court by

resorting to the provisions of higher cost which can also

include punitive cost grant adjournment beyond three times,

having regard to the injustice that may result on refusal

thereof, with reference to peculiar facts of a case and

compensate the party who is inconvenienced by such

adjournment. The said cost cannot be notional. It should be

realistic. As far as possible actual cost incurred by the other

party shall be awarded where the adjournment is found to be

avoidable but is being granted on account of either

negligence or casual approach of a party or is being sought

to delay the progress of the ease. Therefore, an attempt is

made by the Parliament to enable the Court to have complete

control over the litigant and prevent parties from controlling

38

the course of the litigation. The whole object is to deter the

parties from seeking adjournment for the sake of mere

adjournment. If a party wants to have the luxury of an

adjournment, he should be made to pay for such luxury and

the opposite party who is inconvenienced is to be

compensated. In other words, the cost of litigation should be

made high in so far as a party who is not interested in speedy

trial. A person who wants to obstruct the course of justice,

delay the disposal of cases, abuse the process of court and

wants to harass his opponent by virtue of his money power,

for him the litigation should become costly which is not so

now. Therefore, this provision of imposition of cost to

prevent the litigant from seeking adjournment, thus, delay

the disposal of cases, is to be given full effect. It is a weapon

in the armory of the Judge to control the course of litigation

and expedite trial. In spite of this provision if the Judges do

not understand the significance and importance of these

amendments and allow the parties to control the course of

litigation, it only shows either lack of will on their part to

implement these statutory provisions or their inability to

give effect to these statutory provisions.

23. When the litigants complain of delay in disposal of cases,

they cannot seek adjournments as a matter of right, as it is

against their interest. An adjournment at the instance of one

party, puts the other party to inconvenience, which in turn

gives rise to such complaints. But an adjournment may

become necessary for various reasons. Therefore, in such

circumstances it would be in the interest of justice to grant

adjournment, but at the same time the party inconvenienced

has to be duly compensated. It is in this background the

provision of Rule 1 of order XVII of CPC as amended has to

be understood and given effect to. A party to a litigation

cannot have any grievance for day-to-day trial and on the

contrary he should welcome it. It is only those litigants who

want to abuse the judicial process and wants to use this legal

machinery as a weapon of oppression against his opponents

can have any grievance. It is there, these amended provisions

come in handy to the courts to prevent such abuse of the

judicial process.

39

The Case Flow Management System Rules: An

Overlooked Lifesaver

31. On the recommendation of this Court in ‘Salem Bar

Association vs. Union of India AIR 2003 SC 189=2003 (1) SCC 49 a

committee was appointed to study the application on implementation

of Case Flow Management system in India, and in response, ‘Case

Flow Management Rules for High Courts and Subordinate Courts’

were meticulously crafted. These guidelines mirrored the suggestions

outlined in the ‘National Mission for Delivery of Justice and Legal

Reform,’ which served as a comprehensive blueprint for judicial

reforms through its strategic initiatives from 2009 to 2012.

Furthermore, the introduction of the Justice A.M. Khanwilkar

Committee on Case Management System aimed to align with these

efforts. On the basis of above recommendation most of the states have

adopted the concept of Case Flow Management and have framed their

own Rules for ensuring timely delivery of justice since 2005.

However, some of the States are yet to frame the rules. We request the

Hon’ble Chief Justices of those High Courts where said Rules are yet

to be framed to take immediate steps to formulate such rules.

40

32. Be that as it may, mere framing of the rules would not suffice

the problem on hand, until and unless the spirit underlying in the

making of the such rules is effectively implemented. The mode,

method and manner in which it requires to be implemented is in the

hands of the respective High Courts. In this regard, although many

High Courts have constituted committees (with different

nomenclature) to monitor the same, the effective implementation

seems to have gone into oblivion. Thus, it would be imperative on the

part of the High Courts to ensure the object with which such

committees were constituted would not remain on paper but are

implemented in its letter and spirit by constant monitoring, at least by

securing the reports from trial courts through the District Judges once

in two months and keeping a watch and vigil particularly, over the old

cases. Such Committees should focus their attention through

monitoring efforts so as to keep a check on matters being adjourned

for no justifiable reason. When such exercise is carried out with utmost

dedication, it would necessarily yield positive results. Therefore, both

the existing committees and any yet-to-be-constituted Committees by

the respective High Courts should make all endeavours to achieve

the object of making such rules. The Hon’ble Chief Justices of the

41

High Courts are requested to activate these Committees and ensure the

implementation of the rules. It is in this background, with utmost

concern the observations were made in the Chief Justice’s Conference,

2016 towards strengthening Case Flow Management Rules for the

purposes of not only reducing arrears but also for ensuring speedy trial.

Numbers speak more than words: A closer look to the Statistics

of the National Judicial Data Grid

33. One of the gravest Administrative and structural delay in

litigation in whole, appears to be because of judicial delay. According

to National Judicial Data Grid, the figures available for the

contribution of judicial delay in pendency of cases is alarming. The

State-wise pendency of cases before the respective High Courts and

overall Civil Courts as on 16.10.2023 are as under:

S.

No

Name of the

State & High

Courts

High Courts Civil Courts

Civil Criminal Civil Criminal

1 Andhra

Pradesh

2,12,317 37,615 4,15,774 4,40,468

2 Arunachal

Pradesh

(Gauhati

High Court)

47,941 13,817 2,911 14,378

42

3 Assam

(Gauhati

High Court)

98,763 3,38,828

4 Bihar (Patna

High Court)

1,08,550 87,779 5,07,039 3,022,705

5 Chattisgarh

(Chhatisgarh

High Court)

59,640 32,342 23,419 76,331

6 Goa (Bombay

High Court)

6,01,362 1,14,309 26,040 30,521

7 Gujarat

(Gujarat High

Court)

1,10,403 56,267 4,02,283 12,70,278

8 Haryana

(Punjab &

Haryana High

Court)

2,76,432 1,65,363 4,55,539 11,13,672

9 Himachal

Pradesh

(Himachal

Pradesh High

Court)

81,875 13,618 1,63,805 3,70,345

10 Jharkhand

(Jharkhand

High Court)

37,565 46,895 85,359 4,21,577

11 Karnataka

(Karnataka

High Court)

2,535,097 45,802 9,33,869 10,69,156

12 Kerala

(Kerala High

Court)

1,99,169 55,659 5,56,950 13,70,576

13 Madhya

Pradesh

(Madhya

Pradesh High

Court)

2,74,085 1,75,924 3,68,346 16,37,442

14 Maharashtra

(Bombay

High Court)

15,96,833 34,09,391

15 Manipur

(Manipur

High Court)

4,567 493 5,049 2,670

16 Meghalaya

(Meghalaya

High Court)

883 189 3,517 10,880

17 Mizoram

(Gauhati

High Court)

2,980 3,120

43

18 Nagaland

(Gauhati

High Court)

1421 2747

19 Odisha

(Orissa High

Court)

1,08,154 38,078 3,50,358 15,05,895

20 Punjab

(Punjab and

Haryana High

Court)

3,93,004 5,24,061

21 Rajasthan

(Rajasthan

High Court)

4,86,248 1,78,745 5,50,742 18,19,230

22 Sikkim

(Sikkim High

Court)

119 39 522 1,126

23 Tamil Nadu

(Madras High

Court)

4,89,316 58,164 7,48,895 6,56,014

24 Telangana

(Telangana

High Court)

2,20,677 30,974 3,38,275 5,33,262

25 Tripura

(Tripura High

Court)

1,075 138 11,719 32,952

26 Uttarakhand

(Uttarakhand

High Court)

28,117 21,898 37,760 2,80,476

27 Uttar Pradesh

(Allahabad

High Court)

5,62,794 4,94,366 16,38,238 96,34,553

28 West Bengal

(Calcutta

High Court)

1,69,651 27,275 609910 20,09,011

29 National

Capital

Territory of

Delhi (Delhi

High Court)

78,890 32,770 2,40,118 11,44,038

30 Jammu &

Kashmir and

Ladakh (High

Court of

J&K)

36443 8195 78,981 1,95,903

31 Andaman &

Nicobar

Islands

(Calcutta

High Court)

4,757 4,923

44

32 Chandigarh

(High Court

of Punjab &

Haryana)

23419 76331

33 Lakshadweep

(Kerala High

Court)

140 365

34 Dadra and

Nagar Haveli

and Daman

and Diu

(Bombay

High Court)

1412 1572

35 Puducherry

(Madras High

Court)

13,196 19,015

TOTAL 67,31,370 17,36,714 1,06,91,343 3,30,43,812

34. Further, according to National Judicial Data Grid, if we

consider the stage-wise pendency, it is revealed that majority of the

pendency in cases is at the Evidence/ Argument/ Judgement stage

(43,22,478), within which the maximum pendency is caused at the

stage of hearing and evidence. High pendency is also caused during

the Appearance/Service stage (27,03,493), within which the

maximum pendency is appearance and service/summons related. The

reasons behind the maximum pendency as stated by the NJDC has

been ruled to be matters which are stayed (9,69,262) unattended

(8,31,076) and awaiting records (8,219,929).

35. It is important to acknowledge that while striving for the oft-

cited goal of expeditious justice, courts, litigants, staff, and lawyers

45

may encounter some level of inconvenience. However, this

inconvenience should take a backseat in light of the Fundamental

Duties enshrined in the Constitution, specifically Article 51A(j) which

obligates every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of

individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to

higher levels of endeavour and achievement. Article 51A is to be

understood to be in a positive form with a view to strive towards

excellence. The people should not conduct themselves so as to enable

anyone to point fingers at them or blame them. “Excellence” means

honest performance. It is the vision of the founder of constitution

makers that citizens of this great country India that is Bharat, should

discharge duties in an exemplary manner rather than perform half-

heartedly. The duties envisaged under Article 51A are obligatory on

citizens. No doubt the fundamental duties cannot be enforced by Writs

and it is in this background it has to be understood that the duties which

are required to be performed by the citizens in general and particularly

by the stakeholders of judicial dispensation system should ensure that

they do discharge the obligations prescribed under the law in an

exemplified manner and not blame worthy.

46

36. In the hallowed halls of justice, where the rights and liberties

of every citizen are protected, we find ourselves at a critical juncture.

Our Judiciary, the cornerstone of our democratic system, stands as the

beacon of hope for those who seek remedy. Yet, it is a solemn truth that

we must confront with unwavering resolve—the spectre of delay and

pendency has cast a long shadow upon the very dispensation of justice.

In this sacred realm, where the scales of justice are meant to balance

with precision, the backlog of cases and the interminable delays have

reached a disconcerting crescendo. The relentless march of time, while

it may heal wounds for some, it deepens the chasm of despair for

litigants who await the enforcement of their rights. Hence, It is here, in

the chambers of jurisprudence, that we must heed the clarion call of

reform with unwavering urgency.

37. It is undisputedly accepted that the significance of a swift and

efficient judiciary cannot be overstated. It is a cornerstone of

democracy, a bulwark against tyranny, and the guarantor of individual

liberties. The voices of the oppressed, the rights of the marginalized,

the claims of the aggrieved—all are rendered hollow when justice is

deferred. Every pending case represents a soul in limbo, waiting for

closure and vindication. Every delay is an affront to the very ideals that

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underpin our legal system. Sadly, the concept of justice delayed is

justice denied is not a mere truism, but an irrefutable truth.

Thus, we stand at a crossroads, not of our choosing but of our duty

where the urgency of legal reforms in our judiciary cannot be

overstated, for the pendulum of justice must swing unimpeded. The

edifice of our democracy depends on a judiciary that dispenses justice

not as an afterthought but as a paramount mission. We must adapt, we

must reform, and we must ensure that justice is not a mirage but a

tangible reality for all.

38. Therefore, in this pursuit, we call upon all stakeholders—the

legal fraternity, the legislature, the executive, and the citizens

themselves—to join hands in a concerted effort to untangle the web of

delay and pendency. We must streamline procedures, bolster

infrastructure, invest in technology, and empower our judiciary to meet

the demands of our time.

39. The time for procrastination is long past, for justice cannot be a

casualty of bureaucratic inefficiency. We must act now, for the hour is

late, and the call for justice is unwavering. Let us, as guardians of the

law, restore the faith of our citizens in the promise of a just and

48

equitable society. Let us embark on a journey of legal reform with

urgency, for the legacy we leave will shape the destiny of a nation. In

the halls of justice, let not the echoes of delay and pendency drown out

the clarion call of reform. The time is now, and justice waits for no one.

Hence, the following requests to Hon’ble the Chief Justices of the High

Courts are made and directions are issued to the trial courts to ensure

‘speedy justice’ is delivered.

RE: POINT NO.3

For the reasons aforestated, we proceed to pass the following

ORDER

1. Civil Appeal is allowed and the order dated 28.11.2019

passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 by High Court of

Uttarakhand at Nainital is set aside and the order dated 09.05.2012

passed by the Trial Court as affirmed in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012

dated 13.12.2012 stands affirmed.

2. The following directions are issued:

i. All courts at district and taluka levels shall ensure

proper execution of the summons and in a time bound

manner as prescribed under Order V Rule (2) of CPC and

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same shall be monitored by Principal District Judges and

after collating the statistics they shall forward the same to be

placed before the committee constituted by the High Court

for its consideration and monitoring.

ii. All courts at District and Taluka level shall ensure that

written statement is filed within the prescribed limit namely

as prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 and preferably within

30 days and to assign reasons in writing as to why the time

limit is being extended beyond 30 days as indicated under

proviso to sub-Rule (1) of Order VIII of CPC.

iii. All courts at Districts and Talukas shall ensure after the

pleadings are complete, the parties should be called upon to

appear on the day fixed as indicated in Order X and record

the admissions and denials and the court shall direct the

parties to the suit to opt for either mode of the settlement

outside the court as specified in sub-Section (1) of Section

89 and at the option of the parties shall fix the date of

appearance before such forum or authority and in the event

of the parties opting to any one of the modes of settlement

directions be issued to appear on the date, time and venue

fixed and the parties shall so appear before such

authority/forum without any further notice at such

designated place and time and it shall also be made clear in

the reference order that trial is fixed beyond the period of

two months making it clear that in the event of ADR not

being fruitful, the trial would commence on the next day so

fixed and would proceed on day-to-day basis.

iv. In the event of the party’s failure to opt for ADR namely

resolution of dispute as prescribed under Section 89(1) the

court should frame the issues for its determination within

one week preferably, in the open court.

v. Fixing of the date of trial shall be in consultation with

the learned advocates appearing for the parties to enable

them to adjust their calendar. Once the date of trial is fixed,

the trial should proceed accordingly to the extent possible,

on day-to-day basis.

vi. Learned trial judges of District and Taluka Courts shall

as far as possible maintain the diary for ensuring that only

such number of cases as can be handled on any given day for

trial and complete the recording of evidence so as to avoid

overcrowding of the cases and as a sequence of it would

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result in adjournment being sought and thereby preventing

any inconvenience being caused to the stakeholders.

vii. The counsels representing the parties may be

enlightened of the provisions of Order XI and Order XII so

as to narrow down the scope of dispute and it would be also

the onerous responsibility of the Bar Associations and Bar

Councils to have periodical refresher courses and preferably

by virtual mode.

viii. The trial courts shall scrupulously, meticulously and

without fail comply with the provisions of Rule 1 of Order

XVII and once the trial has commenced it shall be proceeded

from day to day as contemplated under the proviso to Rule

(2).

ix. The courts shall give meaningful effect to the

provisions for payment of cost for ensuring that no

adjournment is sought for procrastination of the litigation

and the opposite party is suitably compensated in the event

of such adjournment is being granted.

x. At conclusion of trial the oral arguments shall be heard

immediately and continuously and judgment be pronounced

within the period stipulated under Order XX of CPC.

xi. The statistics relating to the cases pending in each court

beyond 5 years shall be forwarded by every presiding officer

to the Principal District Judge once in a month who

(Principal District Judge/District Judge) shall collate the

same and forward it to the review committee constituted by

the respective High Courts for enabling it to take further

steps.

xii. The Committee so constituted by the Hon’ble Chief

Justice of the respective States shall meet at least once in two

months and direct such corrective measures to be taken by

concerned court as deemed fit and shall also monitor the old

cases (preferably which are pending for more than 05 years)

constantly.

It is also made clear that further directions for implementation of the

above directions would be issued from time to time, if necessary,

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and as may be directed by this Court.

3. The Secretary General is directed to circulate the copy of this

judgment to the Registrar General of all the High Courts for being

placed before the respective Chief Justices for a consideration and

suitable steps being taken as opined herein above.

4. We make no order as to costs.

.……………………….J.

(S. Ravindra Bhat)

…………………..……J.

(Aravind Kumar)

New Delhi,

October 20, 2023