High Court of H.P.IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,

SHIMLA.

FAO No. 251/2015

Decided on: 19.8.2015

______________________________________________________

Yashwant Singh Chauhan. …Appellant.

Versus

Sneh Lata. …Respondent.

______________________________________________________________

Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1 Yes

For the Appellant : Mr. Anuj Gupta, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Nemo.

____________________________________________________________

Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge (oral).

This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree

dated 16.5.2015 rendered by the Additional District Judge-

Shimla in Case No.12-R/3 of 2010.

2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this

appeal are that the marriage between the parties was

solemnized on 5.5.1995 according to Hindu ritual, rites and

custom prevalent in the area. Appellant has filed petition

under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for

dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce. According to the

1

Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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appellant, conduct of the respondent always remained

arrogant, cruel and quarrelsome. Respondent without any

reasonable cause withdrew from the society of the appellant.

She has also filed petition for maintenance. There is no

possibility of conciliation between the parties. Respondent

has subjected him to cruelty.

3. Petition was contested by the respondent. The

averments made in the petition were denied. According to

the respondent, a sum of Rs. 25,000/-, which was given to

her at the time of marriage was also utilized by the appellant.

Appellant has contracted second marriage with another lady,

namely, Smt. Yashodha. She has given birth to two children.

She has filed a petition under section 125 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure against the appellant seeking

maintenance. It was allowed by the Court. The appellant

was Government servant. He was drawing more than Rs.

30,000/- per month. He was having income of Rs. 5 lakhs

from the orchard. Respondent has no alternative except to

take shelter in the house of her father. The son was about 12

years old at the time of filing of petition.

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4. Issues were framed by the learned Additional

District Judge-I, Shimla on 16.3.2012. He dismissed the

petition on 16.5.2015. Hence, the present appeal.

5. Mr. Anuj Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant

has vehemently argued that his client has been subjected to

cruelty by the respondent. Respondent has deserted the

appellant without any reasonable cause.

6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant

and have gone through the judgment carefully.

7. Appellant has appeared as PW-1. According to

him, he was treated by the respondent with cruelty. She

used to abuse him with intention to humiliate him. She used

to leave the house without permission. Respondent has left

his company without any reason and cause.

8. PW-2 Roshan Singh has shown ignorance to the

specific case of respondent that the appellant has contracted

second marriage with Yashoda Devi. PW-4 Gulab Singh has

also shown ignorance regarding second wife of the appellant

having two children. PW -5 Mehar Sain has also shown

ignorance regarding contracting second marriage by the

appellant. However, fact of the matter is that these witnesses

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have not denied the case of respondent that appellant has

contracted second marriage specifically.

9. Respondent Sneh Lata has appeared as RW -1.

According to her, she was living separately from her husband

since 1996. It is the appellant who has left her company

without any reason. The behaviour of appellant towards her

was not good. Appellant has contracted second marriage

with Yashodha Devi. She was constrained to file a petition

under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for

maintenance.

10. RW-2 Duni Chand has proved documents Ex.RW -

2/A to Ex.RW-2/D. RW-3 Kusum Clerk from Sarswati Vidya

Mandir School, Samala, Rohru has proved school record

Ex.RW-2/D. It is evident from the school record that

appellant has contracted second marriage with Yashod ha

Devi. Date of birth of Bharat Bhushan is 5.12.2002 and date

of birth of Jaiwanti is 25.12.2003. Name of the mother of

Bharat Bhushan and Jaiwanti in the school register is

recorded as Yashodha Devi. The averments made by the

appellant in the petition against the respondent were vague

and sketchy. It was upon the appellant to prove cruelty

against the respondent. It is the appellant, who has caused

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mental cruelty towards respondent by contracting second

marriage with Yashodha though first marriage was

subsisting. She was constrained to file petition under section

125 of the Cr.P.C. for maintenance. Appellant cannot be

permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Respondent

was forced to live with her parents. She has to maintain a

boy, who was 12 years old at the time of filing of petition, i.e.

17.8.2010. Thus, appellant has failed to prove that he has

been subjected to cruelty by the respondent or she has

deserted him without any sufficient cause.

11. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR

1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be

there to prove the desertion: (1) the factum of separation, and

(2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end

(animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion

is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and

circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as

under:

“What is desertion? "Rayden on Divorce" which is a standard work on

the subject at p.128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case -law on the

subject in these terms:-

"Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an

intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation

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permanently to an end without reasonable cau se and without the

consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one

spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party".

The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454

at pp. 241. to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), VoL 12, in

the following words:-

"In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and

abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent

and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations

of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of

life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion,

there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not

the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the

law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common

obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be

termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous

cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been

consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is

not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an

allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of

desertion.

The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists

independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist

for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the

presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge,

of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory

grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of

action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is

constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence".

Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which

differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the

other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or

disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not

amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting

spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1)

the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation

permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are

essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of

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consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the

spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention

aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those

elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the

English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be

pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions

must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately

preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period

is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the

commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the

last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not

call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to

be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference

may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be

capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to

be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by

conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to

the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the

essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an

animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of

separation and the animus deserendi co- exist. But it is not necessary

that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation

may have commenced without the ne cessary animus or it may be that

the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for

example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with

the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to

a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the

Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period

during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting

spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law

and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of

resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life,

before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period,

unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes

to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the

latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that

during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserte d

spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume

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married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well

settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the

offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all

reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an

absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence,

unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In

this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the

case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E R 341 at p. 342(A), may be

referred to :-

"These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a

matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution....... "

With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the

evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has

been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer

by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging

marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on

the part of the husband to take her back.

12. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani versus Meena alias

Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40 have held that in its essence desertion

means the intentional permanent forsaking and

abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s

consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total

repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Their Lordships

have further held that the burden of proving desertion - the

‘factum’ as well as the ‘animus deserendi’ is on the petitioner

and he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt to

the satisfaction of the Court, the desertion throughout the

entire period of two years before the petition as well as that

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such desertion was without just cause. Their Lordships have

held as under:

“The question as to what precisely constitutes "desertion" came up for

consideration before this Court in an appeal for Bombay where the Court

had to consider the provisions of S. 3(1) of the Bombay Hindu Divorce

Act, 1947 whose language is in pari materia with that of S. 10(1) of the

Act. In the judgment of this Court in Bipin Chandra v. Prabhavati, 1956

SCR 838; ((S) AIR 1957 SC 176) there is an elaborate consideration of

the several English decisions in which the question of the ingredients of

desertion were considered and the following summary of the law in

Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.) Vol. 12 was cited with approval :

"In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and

abandonment of one spouse by the order without that other's consent,

and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations

of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of

life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion,

there being no general principle applicable to all cases." The position was

thus further explained by this Court. "If a spouse abandons the other

spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,

without intending permanently the cease cohabitation, it will not

amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion so far as the deserting

spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, (1) the

factum of separation, and (2) the intention of bring cohabitation

permanently to an end (animus deserndi). Similarly two elements are

essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of

consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the

spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention

aforesaid.. . . . . Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the

facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from

certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the

same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the

purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of

intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation.

If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is

whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The

offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the

animus deserendi coexist. But it is not necessary that they should

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commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have

commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the

separation and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time." Two

more matters which have a bearing on the points in dispute in this

appeal might also be mentioned. The first relates to the burden of proof

in these cases, and this is a point to which we have already made a

passing reference. It is settled Law that the burden of proving desertion -

the "factum" as well as the "animus deserendi" - is on the petitioner; and

he or she has to establish beyond reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction

of the Court, the desertion throughout the entire period of two years

before the petition as well as that such desertion was without just cause.

In other words, even if the wife, where she is the deserting spouse, does

not prove just cause for her living apart, the petitioner-husband has still

to satisfy the Court that the desertion was without just cause. As

Dunning, L. observed : (Dunn v. Dunn

(1948) 2 All ER 822 at p. 823) :

"The burden he (Counsel for the husband) said was on

her to prove just cause (for living apart). The argument

contains a fallacy which has been put forward from time to time in many

branches of the law. The fallacy lies in a failure to distinguish between a

legal burden of proof laid down by law and a provisional, burden raised

by the state of the evidence . . . . . . . . . . . The legal burden throughout

this case is on the husband, as petitioner, to prove that this wife

deserted him without cause. To discharge that burden, he relies on the

fact that he asked her to join him and she refused. That is a fact from

which the court may infer that she deserted him without cause, but it is

not bound to do so. Once he proves the fact of refusal, she may seek to

rebut the inference of desertion by proving that she had just cause for

her refusal; and, indeed, it is usually wise for her to do so, but there is

no legal burden on her to do so. Even if she does not affirmatively prove

just cause, the Court has still, at the end of the case, to ask itself: Is the

legal burden discharged? Has the husband proved that she deserted him

without cause? Take this case. The wife was very de af, and for that

reason could not explain to the Court her reasons for refusal. The judge

thereupon considered reasons for her refusal which appeared from the

facts in evidence, though she had not herself stated that they operated

on her mind. Counsel for the husband says that the judge ought not to

have done that. If there were a legal burden on the wife he would be

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right, but there was none. The legal burden was on the husband to prove

desertion without cause, and the judge was right to ask himself at the

end of the case: Has that burden been discharged?"

13. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Smt. Rohini Kumari versus Narendra Singh , AIR 1972 SC

459 have explained the expression ‘desertion’ to mean the

desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage

without reasonable cause and without the consent or against

the wish of such party and includes the willful neglect of the

petitioner by the other party to the marriage.

“Under Section 10 (1) (a) a decree for judicial separation can be granted

on the ground that the other party has deserted the petitioner for a

continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the

presentation of the petition. According to the Explanation the expression

"desertion" with its grammatical variation and cognate expression means

the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without

reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such

party and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party

to the marriage. The argument raised on behalf of the wife is that the

husband had contracted a second marriage on May 17, 1955. The

petition for judicial separation was filed on August 8, 1955 under the Act

which came into force on May 18, 1955. The burden under the section

was on the husband to establish that the wife had deserted him for a

continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the

presentation of the petition. In the presence of the Explanation it could

not be said on the date on which the petition was filed that the wife had

deserted the husband without reasonable cause because the latter had

married Countess Rita and that must be regarded as a reasonable cause

for her staying away from him. Our attention has been invited to the

statement in Rayden on Divorce, 11th Edn. Page 223 with regard to the

elements of desertion According to that statement for the offence of

desertion there must be two elements present on the side of the

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deserting spouse namely, the factum, i.e. physical separation and the

animus deserendi i.e. the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to

an end. The two elements present on the side of the deserted spouse

should be absence of consent and absence of conduct reasonably

causing the deserting spouse to form his or her intention to bring

cohabitation to an end. The requirement that the deserting spouse must

intend to bring cohabitation to an end must be understood to be subject

to the qualification that if without just cause or excuse a man persists in

doing things which he knows his wife probably will not tolerate and

which no ordinary woman would tolerate and then she leaves, he has

deserted her whatever his desire or intention may have been. The

doctrine of "constructive desertion" is discussed at page 229. It is stated

that desertion is not to be tested by merely ascertaining which party left

the matrimonial home first. If one spouse is forced by the conduct of the

other to leave home, it may be that the spouse responsible for the

driving out is guilty of desertion. There is no substantial difference

between the case of a man who intends to cease cohabitation and leaves

the wife and the case of a man who with the same intention compels his

wife by his conduct to leave him.”

14. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi reported in

AIR 1988 SC 121 have explained the term “cruelty” as

under:

“4. Section 13(1)(i-a) uses the words "treated the petitioner with

cruelty". The word "cruelty" has not been defined. Indeed it

could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to human

conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in

respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct

of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental

or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical the court will

have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If

it is mental the problem presents difficulty. First, the enquiry must begin

as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such

treatment in the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable

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apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the

other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into

account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the

complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct

complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then

the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be

enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be

established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.

5. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been

marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and

responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of

varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore,

when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the

partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for standard in

life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in

another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of

life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social

conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values

to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers,

therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go

in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the

parties. It would be better if we keep aside our customs and manners.

It would be also better if we less depend upon precedents. Because as

Lord Denning said in Sheldon v. Sheldon, [1966] 2 All E.R. 257

(259) "the categories of cruelty are not closed." Each case may be

different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not

generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the

kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may

crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity

or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is

the wonderful/realm of cruelty.”

15. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh reported in (2007) 4 SCC

511, have enumerated some instances of human behaviour,

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which may be important in dealing with the cases of mental

cruelty, as under:

“98. On proper analysis and scrutiny of the judgments of this Court

and other Courts, we have come to the definite conclusion that there

cannot be any comprehensive definition of the concept of 'mental

cruelty' within which all kinds of cases of mental cruelty can be covered.

No court in our considered view should even attempt to give a

comprehensive definition of mental cruelty.

99. Human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is

equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity has no bound,

therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition is

almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to

cruelty in other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to

person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational,

family and cultural background, financial position, social status,

customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value

system.

100. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain

static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern

culture through print and electronic media and value system etc. etc.

What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after

a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any strait-jacket

formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in

matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate

the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances

while taking aforementioned factors in consideration.

101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we

deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour

which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty'. The

instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative

and not exhaustive.

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the

parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not

make possible for the parties to live with each other could come

within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.

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(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life

of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such

that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up

with such conduct and continue to live with other party.

(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to

cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner,

indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes

the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep

anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by

the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment

calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the

spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one

spouse actually affecting physical and mental health

of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the

resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave,

substantial and weighty.

(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,

indifference or total departure from the normal standard of

conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving

sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.

(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,

selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness

and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground

for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of

the married life which happens in day to day life would not be

adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few

isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to

cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy

period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent

that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the

wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other

party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

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(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of

sterilization without medical reasons and without the

consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife

undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or

without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act

of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for

considerable period without there being any physical incapacity

or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.

(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after

marriage not to have child from the marriage may

amount to cruelty.

(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous

separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond

is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though

supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in

such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the

contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of

the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental

cruelty.”

16. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Ashok Kumar Jain vs. Sumati Jain, AIR 2013 SC 2916

have held that it is always open to the Court to examine

whether the person seeking divorce “is not in any way taking

advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the

purpose of such relief.” On such examination if it is so found

that the person is taking advantage of his or her wrong or

disability it is open to the Court to refuse to grant relief.

17. In the instant case also appellant has contracted

second marriage though first marriage was subsisting. Thus,

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the relief sought for by the appellant cannot be granted to

him. The appellant has disobeyed the law by contracting

second marriage. It is reiterated that he cannot be permitted

to take advantage of his own wrong and the respondent has

no option but to leave the matrimonial home.

18. In view of the analysis and discussion made

hereinabove, there is no merit in the present appeal and the

same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands

disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

(Justice Rajiv Sharma),

Judge.

19.8.2015

*awasthi*

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