[2026:RJ-JP:20321]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 1651/2025

Yogendra Singh Son of Late Shri Bhanwar Singh, Occupation

Advocate, Resident of Plot No. AC-4, Gayatri Sadan, Sawai

Jaisingh Highway, Banipark, Jaipur.

----Plaintiff-Appellant

Versus

1. Baid Finserv Limited, Through Managing

Director/Authorized Officer, office of Baid House, Second

Floor, 1, Taranagar Ajmer Road, Jaipur.

2. Shri Devendra Singh Son of Late Shri Bhanwar Singh,

Resident of Plot No. AC-4, Gayatri Sadan, Sawai Jaisingh

Highway, Banipark, Jaipur.

3. Smt. Renu Rathor Wife of Shri Devendra Singh Adult,

Resident of Plot No. AC-4, Gayatri Sadan, Sawai Jaisingh

Highway, Banipark, Jaipur.

4. Shri Bhawani Singh Son of Late Bhanwar Singh Adult,

Resident of Plot No. AC-4, Gayatri Sadan, Sawai Jaisingh

Highway, Banipark, Jaipur.

5. Smt. Anurag Jhala D/o Late Smt. Prem Kanwar, Wife of

Shri Manvendra Singh, Adult, Resident of D-172, Ram

Marg, Hanuman Nagar, D Block Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.

6. Manisha Jhala D/o Late Smt. Prem Kanwar, Wife of Shri

Shailendra Singh, Adult, Resident of Khandwa Haveli,

Ambabari, Infront of Bhawani Niketan, Jaipur.

7. Smt. Gopal Kanwar Wife of Shri Vaidpal Singh, Adult,

Resident of Flat No. 305, Sector-5, Mansa Devi, Complex,

Panchkula, Chandigarh.

8. Smt. Pritam Kanwar Wife of Shri Sawai Singh Bhati,

Resident of D-172, Kewat Marg, Hanuman Marg, D Block

Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.

----Defendants/Respondents

For Appellant(s) : Mr. M.M. Ranjan, Sr. Adv. assisted by

Mr. Rohan Agrawal, Adv.

Mr. Yashvardhan Tolani, Adv.

Mr. Naman Pareek, Adv.

Mr. Lokesh Tiwari, Adv.

Mr. Aman Pareek, Adv. &

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (2 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

Mr. Yashvardhan Tolani, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Sr. Adv. assisted by

Mrs. Sunita Pareek, Adv.,

Mr. Adhiraj Modi, Adv. &

Mr. Shubham Sharma, Adv.

Mr. Sandeep Bansiwal, Adv.

Mr. O.P. Mishra, Adv.

Mr. Madho Prapan Swami, Adv.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR

Judgment

Date of Arguments Concluded : 20/04 /202 6

Date of Judgment Reserved : 20/04 /202 6

Full/Operative Part Uploaded : Full

Date of Judgment Pronounced : 22/05 /2026

1.The present civil first appeal has been filed against the order

dated 14.08.2025 passed by learned Additional District Judge

No.6, Jaipur Metropolitan-II (hereinafter referred to as learned

'trial Court') in Civil Suit No.55/2025, whereby, the plaint filed by

the appellant for partition, declaration and permanent injunction

has been rejected on an application filed on behalf of the

defendant-respondent No.1 under Order VII Rule 11 read with

Section 151 CPC, on the ground that it was barred by the law as

per provisions of Sections 34, 35, 13(2), 13(4) and 17(1) of the

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to

as the ‘Act of 2002’).

2.The plaintiff-appellant sought the following reliefs in the suit

filed by him:-

"20- ;g fd vuqrks"k fuEu izdkj gS %&

1-fd og fookfnr lEifRr ,lh 4 xk;=h lnu]

lokbZ t;flag gkbZos cuhikdZ t;iqj dk foHkktu

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (3 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

tfj;s ehVl ,.M ckm.M~l ls djkdj viuk

1@3 fgLlk izkIr dj ys o mldk dCtk izkIr

dj ysA

2-fd izfroknh la[;k&1 us lEifRr fLFkr ,-lh 4

xk;=h lnu] lokbZ t;flag gkbZos cuhikdZ

t;iqj dk lkE;qDr ca/kd fd;k gS mldks o

eqdkcys oknh voS/k] 'kwU; ,oa okbZM ?kksf"kr djkj

fn;k tkosA

3-fd izfroknh la[;k&1 dks ctfj;s LFkk;h

fu"ks/kkKk }kjk ikcUn Qjek nsa fd izfroknh

la[;k&1 uksfVl vUrxZr /kkjk&13¼2½ /kkjk&13¼4½

ljQslh ,DV ds rgr uk rks lEifRr dk dCtk

ys] uk lEifRRk dks fuyke djs] uk oknh ds 'kkafr

iwoZd mi;ksx miHkksx esa ck/kk Mkys ,oa

fLFkfr ;Fkkor j[ksA

4-fd vU; dksbZ vuqrks"k tks ekuuh; U;k;ky;

cgd oknh fo:) izfroknh la[;k&1 mfpr

le>rs vrk QjekbZ tkosA"

3.Brief facts of the case as averred in the plaint are that the

Plot No.AC-4, Gayatri Sadan, Sawai Jaisingh Highway, Banipark,

Jaipur was purchased in the name of Smt. Ratan Kanwar wife of

Late Shri Bhanwar Singh on 30.06.1959 out of Hindu Undivided

Family Funds. Therefore, the property in question is Joint Hindu

Undivided Family property. It has also been averred in the plaint

that on 01.10.1979, an oral partition was made which was

reduced into writing on 24.11.1979 and the property was

partitioned amongst Smt. Ratan Kanwar, Yogendra Singh,

Devendra Singh, Bhanwar Singh and Bhawani Singh. It has further

been averred in the plaint that this family settlement was acted

upon and was relied upon by the Rajasthan Land and Building Tax

Department to exempt the plot from Land and Building tax,

acknowledging its partition amongst the five members of HUF, an

order dated 28.07.1984 was passed in this regard. Furthermore,

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (4 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

plaintiff-appellant’s mother Smt. Ratan Kanwar borrowed a loan

from respondent No.1 and thereupon, respondents No.2 and 3

stood as co-borrowers, by creating an equitable mortgage and

deposited the title documents of the property in question, which

are in the name of plaintiff-appellant’s mother Smt. Ratan Kanwar.

Smt. Ratan Kanwar has died on 29.11.2024. When installments of

loan were not paid, notice under Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002

was issued by respondent No.1. At this stage, the plaintiff-

appellant filed the Civil Suit No.55/2025 and made a prayer for

partition of the property in question by way of metes and bounds,

and also to declare the equitable mortgage of property in question

created by plaintiff-appellant’s mother in favour of respondent

No.1-Bank, as null and void qua the share of plaintiff-appellant

and further to restrain the respondent No.1, from taking

possession of the property in question and also, restraining

respondent No.1 from interfering in the peaceful possession of the

suit property.

4.After filing of the suit, the respondent No.1-Baid Finserv Ltd.

(hereinafter referred to as respondent No.1) moved an application

under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC and Sections

34, 35, 13(2), 13(4) and 17(1) of the Act of 2002 mentioning

interalia therein that the suit has been filed by the plaintiff-

appellant in collusion with the respondent Nos.2 to 8 just to defeat

the recovery of Loan given by the respondent No.1. It was also

mentioned in the said application that the deceased-Smt. Ratan

Kanwar and the defendant-respondent Nos.2 and 3 (hereinafter

referred to as the 'borrowers') borrowed a loan of

Rs.1,40,00,000/- on 05.01.2018 from the respondent No.1 by

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (5 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

depositing title deeds of the disputed property and creating an

equitable mortgage in favour of the respondent No.1. The

borrowers failed to repay the loan, therefore, on 26.07.2019, the

loan account was declared as Non-Performing Asset and a notice

under Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002 dated 20.07.2024 for

outstanding loan of Rs.2,89,31,796/- was issued to the borrowers.

Thereafter, the borrowers submitted the reply against the notice,

which was disposed of by the respondent No.1 on 10.08.2024 and

initiated proceedings against the disputed mortgaged property. As

proceedings under various sections of the Act of 2002 against the

disputed mortgaged property have been initiated, therefore, it was

stated in the said application that as per the provisions of Sections

as 34, 35, 13(2), 13(4) and 17(1) of the Act of 2002, Civil Court

has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence, it was prayed that the

plaint filed by the plaintiff-appellant be rejected for want of

jurisdiction. Further, it has also been mentioned in the application

that as per Section 34 of the Act of 2002, only Debt Recovery

Tribunal/Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal is empowered to decide

any matter relating thereto. Hence, the prayer was made that the

plaint be rejected.

5.The plaintiff-appellant filed the reply to the said application

and submitted that the civil suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant

for getting the property partitioned by way of metes and bounds

and to get his share and also, to declare the mortgage of disputed

property, null and void qua the share of plaintiff-appellant and

further to grant permanent injunction against the respondents i.e.

not to take the possession of the disputed property which is in the

ownership and possession of the plaintiff-appellant. It was also

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (6 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

mentioned in the reply that it is only the Civil Court which has the

jurisdiction to grant the relief of partition and also, to declare the

equitable mortgage created on such property as null and void and

no such relief can be granted by DRT/DRAT. Therefore, the suit

cannot be said to be barred by the provisions of the Act of 2002,

hence, it was prayed that the application under Order VII Rule 11

of CPC moved on behalf of respondent No.1 be dismissed. Learned

trial Court after hearing both the parties, vide impugned order

dated 14.08.2025, while relying upon the judgment passed by the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Heeralal &

Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC 371 allowed the said application

filed by the respondent no.1 and rejected the plaint of the

plaintiff-appellant holding the suit as barred by law. Hence, the

present appeal.

6.Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submits

that the property in question was purchased in the name of Smt.

Ratan Kanwar by using the Hindu Undivided Family funds,

therefore, the plaintiff-appellant and the respondents (except

respondent No.1) have their vested rights in the disputed

property. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that on

01.10.1979, the property was orally partitioned and the said

partition was reduced into writing on 24.11.1979. Thereafter, the

plaintiff-appellant and respondents were put in possession of their

respective shares and are residing in their respective portions with

separate electricity and water connections. Therefore, the

borrowers including the co-borrowers had no right to create

equitable mortgage of the disputed property. Learned Senior

Counsel further argues that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to get

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (7 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

the property partitioned by metes and bounds and the relief with

regard to partition of the property can be granted only by Civil

Court. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant cannot be

said to be barred by law. It has also been argued that the property

was not under the sole ownership of Smt. Ratan Kanwar and

thereby, creating an equitable mortgage of the property is

detrimental to the legal rights of the plaintiff-appellant, therefore,

the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to get the equitable mortgage of

the property be declared as null and void.

7.Learned Senior Counsel contends that as soon as the

plaintiff-appellant came to know about the notice issued under

Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002 by the respondent No.1, the

present suit was filed, therefore, this suit cannot be said to be

barred by the provisions of the Act of 2002. Learned Senior

Counsel further contends that this is declaratory relief which can

be granted by Civil Court only, hence, learned trial Court has erred

in allowing the application filed on behalf of the respondent No.1

under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, thereby, rejecting the plaint of

the plaintiff-appellant. Thus, it has been argued that the reliefs

claimed in the plaint can only be granted by the Civil Court, and

the suit is maintainable, and the impugned order is not in

consonance with the provisions of law and is liable to be set aside.

8.Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondent No.1 submits that admittedly, Smt. Ratan Kanwar

was the owner of the property in question and the registered sale

deed stands in her name till date, and has never been challenged.

The so-called partition of the disputed property was effected just

to evade Land and Building tax, which is clear from the perusal of

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (8 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

the order dated 28.07.1984 passed by Land and Building Tax

Department. therefore, Smt. Ratan Kanwar being the registered

owner of the property had a right to take a loan and create an

equitable mortgage of the property in question. Thus, the

impugned order of learned trial Court suffer with no infirmity or

illegality. Hence, the present appeal be dismissed.

9.Heard learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the

parties and perused the entire material available on record.

10.As per the facts of the case in hand, the registered owner of

the property in dispute is Smt. Ratan Kanwar, who purchased the

property by registered sale deed. As per the plaint itself, the

disputed property was orally partitioned on 01.10.1979 which was

reduced into writing on 24.11.1979 and subsequently, the

plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-respondent Nos.2 to 8 got

their specific shares in the property in dispute. However, the

ownership remained in the name of Smt. Ratan Kanwar. Till date,

the sale deed in favour of Smt. Ratan Kanwar has never been

challenged by any of the parties and no relief in this regard has

been claimed in the suit. The registered owner of the property-

Smt. Ratan Kanwar along with her son and daughter-in-law i.e.

respondent Nos.2 and 3 borrowed a loan from the respondent

No.1 by creating an equitable mortgage by depositing title deeds

of the disputed property. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 have never

challenged the ownership of Smt. Ratan Kanwar in the disputed

property rather stand as co-borrowers. The suit was filed when the

borrowers failed to repay the loan and a notice under Section

13(2) of the Act of 2002 was issued to the borrowers. Learned

counsel for respondent No.1 has submitted that the suit is barred

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (9 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

by law as per the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the case of Jagdish Singh (supra), whereas, it has been

contended on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that at the stage of

deciding the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, only

the contents of the plaint are to be considered and the reliefs

claimed in the said suit, can only be granted by the Civil Court.

Therefore, the suit is not barred by law as Debt Recovery Tribunal

has no power to grant reliefs as claimed in the suit. This Court in

the case of Vijay Singh Vs. Buddha reported in 2012 SCC

Online Raj 3869 has laid down the principles to be considered

while deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The

relevant para 10 of the judgment is quoted below:-

"10. Before dealing with the factual scenario, the

spectrum of Order 7 Rule 11 in the legal ambit needs to

be noted. The legal position in regard to Order 7 Rule 11

CPC may be summerised as below:

(i) The relevant facts which need to be looked into for

deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 are

the averments made in the plaint. The trial Court

can exercise the power at any stage of the suit

before registering the plaint or after issuing

summons to the defendant at any time before the

conclusion of the trial. For the purpose of deciding

an application under clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 11

of the Code, the averments in the plaint are

germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the

written statement would be wholly irrelevant at

that stage.

(ii) The basic question to be decided while dealing with

an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the

Code is whether a real cause of action has been set

out in the plaint or something purely illusory has

been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11

of the Code.

(iii) It is well settled that the question of jurisdiction

namely whether a suit is exclusively triable by a

revenue court or a Civil Court can take cognizance of

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (10 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

it has to be decided on the basis of allegations made

in the plaint. It is also further settled that it is the

substance of the plaint and the true nature of the

suit that is to be seen to determine the question of

jurisdiction. If in substance the relief claimed is one

which the revenue court alone is entitled to give, the

jurisdiction of the civil court will be ousted even

though it may require the revenue court to

incidentally determine some ancillary facts. In order

to determine the true nature of the relief claimed in

a suit, the pith and substance and not the form in

which the relief may be couched has to be

considered. Each case has to be examined on its own

particular facts and no universal rule can be

applicable to every case. If the aforesaid principles

are not kept in view it may be open to a party to

evade the liability as to exclusiveness of Jurisdiction.

But care should be taken not to introduce anything in

the plaint which may not be found there or which

may be foreign to its purpose. A plaint should be

construed as it is and not as it ought to be.

(iv) The exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court cannot

be lightly inferred and the jurisdiction of the civil

court cannot be ousted until the exclusion is clearly

established. Under Section 9 of the CPC, a civil court

can entertain a suit of a civil nature except a suit of

which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly

barred. A statute ousting the jurisdiction of the civil

court must be strictly construed.

(v) Apart from averments made in the plaint,

documents filed by the plaintiff alongwith the plaint

can also be looked into. Documents filed by the

defendant, which are undisputed or cannot be

disputed can also be looked into to decide an

application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC."

11.Thus, while deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11

of CPC, Court has to consider not only the averments made in the

plaint but also, to see whether a real cause of action has been set

out in the plaint or something illusory has been stated to get out

of, Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The Court can also take into

consideration the facts which are undisputed.

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (11 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

12.Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant while

placing reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of Central Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Prabha

Jain & Ors. reported in (2025) 4 SCC 38 has contended that in

the case of Prabha Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held

that the judgment passed in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra) is

silent on the issue whether the suit, in which the relief, that can

only be granted by the Civil Court be said to be barred by law

under the provisions of the Act of 2002. Para 29 of the judgment

of Prabha Jain (supra), is reproduced as follows:-

"29. In para 24 of Jagdish Singh case [Jagdish

Singh v. Heeralal, (2014) 1 SCC 479 : (2014) 1

SCC (Civ) 444] , this Court held that DRT has

jurisdiction with respect to “measures” taken by

the secured creditor under Section 13(4) and

that in respect of such matters, the civil court's

jurisdiction is ousted. However, thereafter, there

is no further discussion on the nature of the suit

and without recording any finding that DRT has

the power to decide partition suits, this Court

straightaway affirmed the rejection of the plaint

under Order 7 Rule 11. While doing so, this

Court missed to consider that under Section 17,

DRT has no power to partition properties and

hence, the civil court's jurisdiction to grant a

decree of partition cannot be said to be ousted.

When there is no finding in the judgment that

the DRT has the jurisdiction to grant the relief of

partition, the judgment cannot be said to be a

precedent on that point."

13.Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1 also places

reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Prabha Jain (supra) and submits that the facts of the

case in hand, are distinguishable from the facts of the case of

Prabha Jain (supra). Therefore, the ratio in the case of Prabha

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (12 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

Jain (supra) is not applicable in the case in hand. Learned Senior

Counsel has drawn attention of this Court towards the facts

mentioned in para 5 of the case of Prabha Jain (supra), which

are as follows:-

"5. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit

land was purchased by her late father-in-law

vide sale deed dated 19-6-1967 and after his

death on 15-8-2005, the same was inherited in

equal shares by her late husband Mahendra

Kumar Jain, husband's elder brother Sumer

Chand Jain (Defendant 4) and mother-in-law.

After the death of Mahendra Kumar, his one-

third share was inherited by the plaintiff.

However, Sumer Chand Jain without any

partition amongst the heirs divided the land

into several plots and sold them off illegally to

different persons. One such plot was sold to

Defendant 3 (Parmeshwar Das Prajapati) vide

registered sale deed dated 3-7-2008 who in

turn, mortgaged the same with Central Bank of

India (Defendant 1) for the purpose of

obtaining loan."

14.Learned Senior Counsel submits that in the case of Prabha

Jain (supra), the sale deed was also challenged, whereas, in the

case in hand, the registered sale deed has not been challenged.

15.As per learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1, the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prabha Jain (supra) has clearly

observed that only the Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant the

relief of partition, however, in the present case, as per the

averments made in the plaint, the suit property has already been

partitioned amongst the plaintiff-appellant and the respondents

except respondent No.1 having possession of their specific shares

in the said property, as per the partition taken place in 1979,

which was reduced into writing and was acted upon by the parties.

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (13 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

16.In this regard, this Court deems it appropriate to quote para

10 of the suit-

"10-;g fd oknh dh ekrk Lo- Jh jru daoj dk

nsgkolku fnukad 29-11-2024 dks t;iqj 'kgj esa gks

x;k mUgksaus vius fgLls dh ,d olh;r fnukad 22-

10-2024 dks dj nh ftlls mUgksaus viuk fgLlk vius

rhuksa iq=ksa dks caVokjk cjkcj ds fgLls dj fn;s fd

tks fd vHkh rd vfoHkkftr gSA"

17.The facts as mentioned hereinabove in para 10 of the plaint

reveal that while admitting the factum of partition of the suit

property in the year 1979 itself, the plaintiff-appellant wants

partition of the share of Smt. Ratan Kanwar only, whereas, in the

relief No.1 of the plaint, it has been claimed that the plaintiff-

appellant is entitled to get 1/3rd share in the entire disputed

property thus, the averments of the plaint are self-contradictory.

18.Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that as per

the judgment passed in the case of Jagdish (supra), once the

proceedings under the Act of 2002 have been initiated, all

objections should be presented before DRT/DRAT, and the

jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred. The Hon'ble Apex Court in

paras 22 and 23 of Jagdish (supra) has held as follows:-

"22. Statutory interest is being created in

favour of the secured creditor on the secured

assets and when the secured creditor proposes

to proceed against the secured assets, sub-

section (4) of Section 13 envisages various

measures to secure the borrower’s debt. One

of the measures provided by the statute is to

take possession of secured assets of the

borrowers, including the right to transfer by

way of lease, assignment or realizing the

secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any

of the “measures” referred to in sub-section

(4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of

appeal to the DRT under Section 17. The

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (14 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

opening portion of Section 34 clearly states

that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to

entertain any suit or proceeding “in respect of

any matter” which a DRT or an Appellate

Tribunal is empowered by or under the

Securitisation Act to determine. The

expression ‘in respect of any matter’ referred

to in Section 34 would take in the “measures”

provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13

of the Securitisation Act. Consequently if any

aggrieved person has got any grievance

against any “measures” taken by the borrower

under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the

remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or

the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court.

Civil Court in such circumstances has no

jurisdiction to entertain any suit or

proceedings in respect of those matters which

fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the

Securitisation Act because those matters fell

within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Ap-

pellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the

Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they

are inconsistent with the provisions of that

Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well.

23. We are of the view that the civil court

jurisdiction is completely barred, so far as the

“measure” taken by a secured creditor under

sub- section (4) of Section 13 of the

Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved

person has a right of appeal before the DRT or

the Appellate Tribunal. to determine as to

whether there has been any illegality in the

“measures” taken. The bank, in the instant

case, has proceeded only against secured

assets of the borrowers on which no rights of

Respondent Nos.6 to 8 have been crystalised,

before creating security interest in respect of

the secured assets. In such circumstances, we

are of the view that the High Court was in

error in holding that only civil court has

jurisdiction to examine as to whether the

“measures” taken by the secured creditor

under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the

Securitisation Act were legal or not. In such

circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the

[2026:RJ-JP:20321] (15 of 15) [CFA-1651/2025]

judgment of the High Court is set aside. There

shall be no order as to costs."

19.In the case in hand, it is an admitted fact that Smt. Ratan

Kanwar is the registered owner of the property in question. The

validity of sale deed has never been challenged. Being registered

owner, she has taken the loan from the respondent No.1 by

mortgaging the property, along with her son and daughter-in-law,

(respondent Nos.2 and 3) co-borrowers. The facts of the case of

Prabha Jain (supra), relied upon by the appellant are different

from the case in hand. Hence, the appellant is not entitled to get

any benefit on the basis of Prabha Jain's case. The appellant

shall have opportunity to raise all objections available to him

before DRT/DRAT as per the provisions of the Act of 2002, as has

been laid down in Jagdish Singh's case. Thus, this Court finds

that the impugned order dated 14.08.2025 suffers with no

illegality or infirmity.

20.In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeal is

liable to be dismissed.

21.Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed. Any

pending applications also stand disposed of.

(ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J

AARZOO ARORA /----